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DICHOTOMOUS STRUCTURES: THE METAPHORS KNOWLEDGE IS LIGHT AND IGNORANCE IS DARKNESS IN ENGLISH AND SERBIAN

The aim of this paper is to analyze how image-schematic structures build the foundation of the conceptual metaphors KNOWLEDGE IS LIGHT and IGNORANCE IS DARKNESS in English and Serbian idioms with the components Eng. *light* and *dark*, as well as Serb. *svetlo(st)* and *mrak / tama*. Since the source domains in question, namely LIGHT and DARKNESS, as well as their target domain counterparts, KNOWLEDGE and IGNORANCE, represent bipolar concepts, it can be hypothesized that the image-schematic structures underlying the idioms would reflect these conceptual dichotomies. The results show that there are different ways in which image-schemas may lend structure to the metaphorical interaction between bipolar source and target domains. These conceptual dichotomies can manifest themselves in two ways: on the one hand, as different constellations of schemas along a temporal dimension in a single schematic structure, or, on the other hand, as two mutually incompatible alternative structures differing in one or more specific schemas.

Keywords: conceptual metaphor, image schema, bipolar concepts, light, darkness.

> *"Darkness cannot drive out darkness: only light can do that."*
> (Martin Luther King Jr.)

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1. INTRODUCTION

Vision plays a crucial role in our perception of the environment, and is thus an important factor in how we understand the world around us. If nothing else, vision is the one sense that we are (usually) most willing to put our trust into. Unsurprisingly then, there is a fundamental connection between the concept of seeing and the concept of knowing, giving rise to the conceptual metaphor KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Light, therefore, is just as crucial to the way we "see" (that is, comprehend) the world, as in its absence, in the dark, we lack the indispensable prerequisite for vision, and with it, an indispensable prerequisite for knowledge. And thus, again unsurprisingly, the UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING primary metaphor gives rise to a pair of more complex, mutually exclusive, yet conceptually complementary, metaphors in the form of KNOWLEDGE IS LIGHT and IGNORANCE IS DARKNESS.

Guided by an interest in how this conceptual antithesis between light and darkness manifests itself in idioms built around the metaphors KNOWLEDGE IS LIGHT and IGNORANCE IS DARKNESS, this paper sets out to analyze such idioms in English and Serbian, two languages belonging to different branches of the Indo-European language family, the Germanic and the Slavic. This will be done using a methodological framework mainly constructed using insights from conceptual metaphor theory, and the theory of image schemas. The hypothesis of this paper is that when bipolar concepts (in this case light and darkness) are used as source domains in idioms, they create complex image-schematic structures reflecting this conceptual dichotomy, and that in turn these dichotomous image-schematic structures build the embodied basis for the semantic reinterpretation of such idioms, as they structure the dynamic interaction between the bipolar source domains, and (by means of the invariance principle) between their corresponding target domains (in this case knowledge and ignorance).

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Conceptual metaphor

In cognitive linguistics, studying language translates to studying patterns of thought, that is, conceptualizations. In this regard, there is no clearer indicator of the connectedness between language and patterns of thought than conceptual metaphor (Grady 2007: 188). The beginnings of the overwhelming interest in metaphor as a manifestation of our cognition can be traced back to the seminal work of Lakoff and Johnson, titled *Metaphors We Live By* (1980). In their work they have brought attention to this general cognitive mechanism through which we map our knowledge of more concrete phenomena in the world onto more abstract phenomena. In more technical terms, metaphors are mappings, in that they are sets of correspondences between a source domain and a target domain (Lakoff 1993: 207).

In line with the topic of this paper, consider the following examples by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 48): I *see* what you're saying; It *looks* different from my *point of view*; I *view* it differently; The argument is *clear*. In all of these examples the (more concrete) source domain of seeing is used to access the (more abstract) target domain of understanding. Therefore they can be subsumed under the same metaphor, namely KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING.[1] It is a prime example of what Grady (1997) calls primary metaphor, which are thought to be universal, because everybody has the same physical and neurological prerequisites for their formation. They come into existence, because "[s]ubjective experiences and judgments correlate in our everyday functioning with sensorimotor experiences so regularly that they become neurally linked. Primary metaphor is the activation of those neural connections, allowing sensorimotor inference to structure the conceptualization of subjective experience and judgments" (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 555).

It has to be noted that some scholars argue that primary metaphors, also called correlation-based metaphors, are clearly connected to metonymy[2] (Barcelona 2000; Radden 2002; Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2007). Others, however, do not see such connections between the two, and argue that such metaphors come into existence without the need for metonymy (Grady 1997; Lakoff and Johnson 1999). Kövecses (2013) aligns himself with the idea that such correlation-based metaphors do indeed derive from metonymy, and claims, based on contemporary knowledge about the human conceptual system, that such "correlation-based metaphors emerge from frame-like mental representations through a metonymic stage." He (Kövecses 2013: 86) convincingly explains: "[T]his happens when one of the elements of a frame-like mental structure is generalized (schematized) to a concept that lies outside the initial frame in a different part of the conceptual system. The generalization process leads to sufficient conceptual distance between the initial and the new frame on which metaphors can be based." In the case of the metaphor KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING, knowledge becomes generalized and becomes a concept independent of direct perception, and thus it can serve as a target domain to conceptualize knowing something nonphysical, e.g. ideas, theories, facts, feelings, memories etc. (Kövecses 2013: 82)

The metaphor KNOWLEDGE IS LIGHT is also a correlation-based metaphor, based, in fact, on the metonymic chain LIGHT FOR SEEING FOR KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING (as light is necessary for visual perception and visual perception allows us to understand physical entities), which means that it is also

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[1] This metaphor has been the topic of much research, and as a result different names have been coined for it, such as, among others, SEEING IS BELIEVING (Dundes 1972), KNOWLEDGE/INTELLECTION IS PHYSICAL SIGHT (Sweetser 1990: 33), THINKING IS SEEING (Danesi 1990), THINKING IS PERCEIVING (Lakoff & Johnson 1999) and KNOWING IS SEEING (Kövecses 2010). However, since they all stand for the same phenomena, and since knowing and understanding seem to be most widely mentioned as the source domains in the literature, KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING is the name that will be used for this metaphor throughout the paper.

[2] Conceptual metonymy, like conceptual metaphor, is a cognitive phenomenon through which we conceptualize the world around us – metonymy makes it possible to understand a given entity by means of its direct, contiguous relationship to another entity (Lakoff und Johnson 1980: 37). Some examples would be (ibid.: 38): The Giants need *a stronger arm* in right field (PART FOR WHOLE); He bought *a Ford* (PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT); The *White House* isn't saying anything (THE PLACE FOR THE INSTITUTION).

a metonymical derivation of the metaphor KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING (Pápista 2017: 174). Since in the case of the latter, as was explained, there is sufficient conceptual distance between the source domain seeing and the target domain knowing/understanding in order to justifiably treat it as a metaphor (as opposed to metonymy), consequently the same applies for the relationship between light and knowledge as well (Pápista 2017: 174–175).

2.2. Image schemas

The term image schema was first introduced into cognitive linguistics by Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987) simultaneously, although Johnson (2005: 15) emphasizes that similar concepts had previously been anticipated by the philosophers Immanuel Kant, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, William James, and John Dewey. The main contribution of image schemas is that they manage to answer the fundamental question (prevalent not only in linguistics, but also in philosophy and psychology) of how meaning is possible for human beings, considering that our cognitive operations are, in essence, embodied, that is, they emerge from our sensorimotor interactions with the environment[3] (Johnson 2005: 15). As Johnson originally explained this idea (1987: 29):

> In order for us to have meaningful, connected experiences that we can comprehend and reason about, there must be pattern and order to our actions, perceptions, and conceptions. *A schema is a recurrent pattern, shape, and regularity in, or of, these ongoing ordering activities*. These patterns emerge as meaningful structures for us chiefly at the level of our bodily movements through space, our manipulation of objects, and our perceptual interactions.

We, of course, do not notice that image schemas play such an important role in structuring our experiences, because it happens subconsciously and automatically (Dodge and Lakoff 2005: 62). Gibbs (2005: 115, 119) emphasizes that image schemas should, however, not be mistaken to be nothing more than encoded structures that we passively activate when we unconsciously process language. Rather, they are "simulations of bodily action" (or "as-if body" loops) that we generate on the fly during all sorts of cognitive activity. These experiential gestalts, so he claims, emerge from ongoing brain, body and world interactions, and, consequently, the use of image schematic reasoning in the understanding of language requires "as-if" embodied simulations of events. In line with this thought, Gibbs and Colston (1995: 349) state that image schemas, as dynamic analog representations formed from sensorimotor input, "exist across all perceptual modalities, something that must hold for there to be any sensorimotor coordination in our experience. As such, image schemas are at once visual, auditory, kinesthetic, and tactile."

Although there has up to this point not been any real consensus about the exact (psychological and neurological[4]) nature of image schemas, they have been "proposed as a supporting structure for human thought and language [and have] become a touchstone notion for all cognitive linguists" (Todd 2007: 214), as a great deal of evidence suggests that our ability to make inferences is tied to such patterns (Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1999). There is no definite number of image schematic patterns that we use to experience the world (Johnson 1987: 126), though a small number of them have gotten most of the attention in the literature (Hampe 2005: 2). In the current paper the following image schemas will be used for the analysis (these are the ones that were identified in the analyzed idioms).

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3 To name an example, Turner (1991) explores the idea that certain concepts are inseparably tied to the bilateral symmetry of the human body. Namely, if we were asymmetric organisms floating around in a liquid environment lacking any spatial orientations at all, then concepts such as UP and DOWN, LEFT and RIGHT, FRONT and BACK would make no sense to us.

4 Based on converging evidence from the cognitive neurosciences, scholars, such as Dodge and Lakoff (2005) and Rohrer (2005), argue that basic image schemas have a neural basis and are therefore natural consequences of the way the human brain is structured.

THING: A basic concept in cognitive grammar. It designates "a [bounded] region in some domain" (Langacker 1987: 189), i.e. "at the most schematic level, a noun (...) is characterized as an expression that profiles a thing" (Langacker 2000: 10). This level of abstraction proved necessary in our analysis, as it would have been counterintuitive to claim that we conceptualize light, a basic natural phenomenon necessary for one of, if not the most important of, our senses as an OBJECT or a SUBSTANCE outside of metaphors that specify it as such. This paper therefore argues for the status of THING as a basic image schema, and that the OBJECT and SUBSTANCE schemas are in fact subsidiaries of it (along with their own subsidiary schemas, like SURFACE), as well as the CONTAINER schema. Other subsidiaries of THING mentioned in this paper are CONTACT, a relation where a trajector and a landmark touch (Lakoff 1987), and COVER, a relation where from a certain viewpoint a trajector is obstructing our accessibility of vision to some part or the entirety of a landmark (Lakoff 1987: 429).

CONTAINER/CONTAINMENT: Structures the common experience of containment and boundedness (Johnson 1987: 21). Its structural elements are an interior, a boundary and an exterior (Lakoff 1987: 272), and this more general schema is connected to the more specific subsidiary schemas FULL-EMPTY and INSIDE-OUTSIDE.

SOURCE–PATH–GOAL: This schema structures movement and involves the following elements: a source (a point of departure), a path (a series of connected locations), a goal (a point of coming to rest) and a direction (Lakoff 1987: 275).

BLOCKAGE: Activated when force is blocked or resisted by an obstacle (Johnson 1987: 45, 46).

REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT: Structures the experience of the removal of a barrier or a potential restraint (Johnson 1987: 46–47).

COMPULSION: The force of one entity moves another entity (that seems unable to resist this force) along a path that the latter has not chosen (Johnson 1987: 45).

3. ANALYSIS

The analysis has been conducted on English and Serbian idioms[5] extracted from monolingual and bilingual dictionaries.[6] The criteria for the selection of the idioms were twofold: on the one hand, they had to include any of the components Eng. *light* / Serb. *svetlo(st)* and Eng. *dark*[7] */ mrak* (or its synonym *tama*[8]), and on the other hand, they had to be semantically built around the dichotomous metaphors knowledge is light and ignorance is darkness (all other idioms with the components mentioned above were excluded from the analysis). This was done so that a specific dichotomy of conceptual metaphors could be analyzed as well as to determine how the explicit presence of the source domain concepts of light and darkness on the lexical level affects the idioms' image schematic structures.9 Based on insights gained from previous research on metaphorical idioms including bipolar concepts (*death* in Papišta 2018a; *life* in Papišta 2018b), which concluded that these concepts in many idioms inferentially activate the concepts of the opposite polarity to create meaning, and that image schemas may in fact play a role in this inferential activation, the current paper aims to analyze the complex interaction of image schemas and their transformations underlying such idioms to see how they may give rise to dichotomous interactions between bipolar source domain (light and darkness) and target domain (knowledge and ignorance) concepts.

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[5] The notion of idiom employed in this paper is based on the work of Burger (2003: 14-32), who defines idioms as linguistic entities employing the following characteristics: polilexicality, fixity and idiomaticity.

[6] The used dictionaries are listed at the end of the paper.

[7] There were no idioms with the component *darkness* in the dictionaries used.

[8] Although Serb. *tama* ('darkness') is a synonym of Serb. *mrak*, the used dictionaries contained only one idiom with this component that was built around the metaphors KNOWLEDGE IS LIGHT and IGNORANCE IS DARKNESS.

[9] It should be noted that the scope of the data analyzed is limited by the fact that it contains only idioms found in the dictionaries consulted.

The approach developed for the purposes of this analysis can be summarized as follows: As a first step, a descriptive analysis has been conducted using the theory of image schemas and conceptual metaphor theory to determine the individual image schemas and their dynamic interactions underlying the main semantic constituents of the idioms. These dynamic interactions were considered to represent the schematic structures of the idioms, and the individual schemas their components. The THING schema has been taken as the basic unit of the schematic structures (unless otherwise specified as any subsidiary schema of THING[10]), representing the discrete entities in a given idiom's scenario, and different schemas have been used to represent processes and relations between those discrete entities. As a second step, it was determined what individual components or constellations of components mapped onto the source domain and the target domain concepts. It was hypothesized that individual components would divide the structures into dichotomous constellations, which would allow for the mappings of both the explicitly expressed and the inferentially activated conceptual entities.

During the analysis it became evident that, while the hypothesis proved to be true for the most part, the analyzed idioms could be categorized into two groups that differed considerably on the conceptual level. The semantic reinterpretation of one group of idioms necessitated the juxtaposition of two alternative versions of schematic structures, a phenomenon which can be explained by what Dancygier and Sweetser (1996, 2005) in their research on conditionals and counterfactuals called alternative (or alternate) mental spaces.[11] They define alternative mental spaces as follows:

> [T]wo spaces are in an alternative relationship if they are incompatible (and thus cannot be combined into a single coherent space) and are both construed in context as subsequent causal and temporal developments from the same base or reference space, *for the same portion of the timeline* [emphasis added by the author]. That is, the two spaces in question are incompatible fillers of the same 'slot' in the range of time values for counterpart spaces of that base. (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 35)

In the analyzed idioms employing such alternative spaces, the schematic structure in an initially activated reality space (also called base space) would evoke an implicit alternate version of the structure differing in a specific parameter, and this implicit space would act as a background frame for the interpretation of the base space. The spaces in question are alternatives, because they would occupy the same "slot" in the timeline of the discourse, and are hence incompatible fillers of the "slot".[12]

Accordingly, the next section will be divided into two parts: first the idioms requiring a single structure will be analyzed, followed by the idioms with alternative structures. In both groups, first we will analyze those idioms that were identified in both languages, then the ones exclusive to the English language, and lastly the ones found only in Serbian.

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[10] Although we hold the view that the CONTAINER schema is a subsidiary schema of THING as well, because only bounded entities can exert the topology of containment, it will nonetheless always be listed without reference to a THING, as its specific properties contribute to the semantic reinterpretation of idioms differently than more generic bounded entities lacking such properties.

[11] Fauconnier, the father of mental space theory, defines mental spaces the following way in The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics (2007: 351): "Mental spaces are very partial assemblies constructed as we think and talk for purposes of local understanding and action. (...) [They] are constructed and modified as thought and discourse unfolds and are connected to each other by various kinds of mappings, in particular identity and analogy mappings. It has been hypothesized that at the neural level, mental spaces are sets of activated neuronal assemblies and that the connections between elements correspond to coactivation-bindings. On this view, mental spaces operate in working memory but are built up partly by activating structures available from long-term memory."

[12] The difference between the alternative spaces activated by the idioms analyzed in this paper and the ones activated by conditionals and counterfactuals as shown in Dancygier and Sweetser (1996, 2005) is that here the reality/base space itself becomes one of the two alternative spaces, while in the case of traditional conditionals and counterfactuals the reality/base space gives rise to two new spaces, which are alternatives of each other.

3.1. Idioms with a single schematic structure

3.1.1. English and Serbian idioms

From the analyzed idioms that employ a single mental space for the semantic reinterpretation, the first one employs an image in which a person casts light onto something (or somebody), illuminating this target, which metaphorically expresses the meaning that someone clarifies something by revealing some detail or information:

(1)   a) Eng. *shed / throw / cast (some / an amount of) light upon / on something* [/ someone][13]
         b) Serb. *baciti / bacati / prosuti svetlo na nešto / nekoga* (= 'to throw / spill light on sth / sb')

Components: THING$_1$, COMPULSION, THING$_2$, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, THING$_3$ (> OBJECT > SURFACE[14]), CON-TACT.

The semantic reinterpretation of the idiom necessitates setting up a temporal structure with an inferred initial constellation and a resultant constellation of schemas. These two constellations are divided by the presence or absence of CONTACT between THING$_2$ (→ the light → the explanation[15]) and the surface of THING$_3$ (the topic of the explanation). We propose the term *divider schema* for components (or sets of components) that organize schematic structures into two semantic wholes. This complex image schematic structure transforms in such a way that THING$_1$ (→ the agent, the explainer) moves THING$_2$ from the SOURCE-location (which coincides with the agent) to the GOAL (which coincides with THING$_3$), at which point the CONTACT schema is established. As this analysis shows, the concept of light (knowledge, information) is structured by a single schema (THING$_2$), and is explicitly expressed through lexical means, while the concept of darkness (ignorance, i.e. the absence of information) is structured not by a single schema, but by a specific constellation of schemas (THING$_2$ being located away from THING$_3$, i.e. the light not yet being cast onto the object of explanation), and is therefore activated only through inference by this initial constellation.[16]

If one acquires new information about something, and by taking into consideration this newly acquired knowledge one changes their behavior or attitude regarding the topic in question, it is possible to say that it happened *in (the) light of something*, as if the new information was a light that illuminated the (previously dark) thing in question, allowing it to be more accurately observed:

(2)   a) Eng. *in (the) light of something*
         b) Serb. *u svetlu nečega* (= 'in the light of something')

Components: CONTAINER, THING.

The usage of this syntagm infers an initial constellation in which a THING (→ the topic, situation etc.) is located outside of the CONTAINER (→ the light → the new information), and this is then followed by a constellation in which the THING is located inside of the CONTAINER. It should be noted that no element infers either the THING or the CONTAINER to be a moving entity, which is the reason why no PATH is present in the structure.[17] The darkness is, as before, evoked by the inferred initial constellation.

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[13] According to the English dictionaries consulted, light can only be cast on *something*. However, a quick internet search reveals a relevant number of instances where this is not the case.

[14] The greater-than sign is used to represent a relation of subsidiarity.

[15] Individual mappings will be given in brackets and represented by arrows, depicting a mapping direction from source domain concept to target domain concept.

[16] It would be a faulty analysis to claim that e.g. THING$_3$ represents darkness, as it already represents the topic of the explanation. THING$_3$ can, however, be attributed as being dark as a result of not being illuminated by light (i.e. it is not understood by someone, because no explanation has been given regarding the topic).

[17] Nonetheless, it can be assumed that this idiom stems from other idioms, which express the casting of light onto something, and thus do employ the PATH schema, as is the case in idioms (1) and (6).

Both languages also share idioms which express the meaning that something becomes known or available to the public by being metaphorically transferred from darkness to light:

(3)   a) Eng. *bring to light*
         b) Serb. *izneti na svetlo dana* (= 'to bring sth out to the light of day')

Components (3a): THING$_1$, THING$_2$, COMPULSION, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL.
Components (3b): THING$_1$, THING$_2$, COMPULSION, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, CONTAINER (> INSIDE-OUTSIDE).
The structures of the English and the Serbian idiom differ regarding their components, because (3b) specifies the SOURCE-location of the movement to be inside of a CONTAINER. The structure for the scenario in both cases transforms as follows: THING$_1$ ($\rightarrow$ agent) exerts force and causes THING$_2$ ($\rightarrow$ information) to change its location from a SOURCE-location ($\rightarrow$ darkness $\rightarrow$ state of being hidden from the public) to a GOAL-location ($\rightarrow$ light $\rightarrow$ state of being known to the public). In the English (3a) the structure is divided by the dichotomy between the SOURCE-PATH and the GOAL, while in the Serbian (3b) the INSIDE-OUTSIDE topology of the CONTAINER also contributes to this division.

The main difference between the idioms under (3) and (4) is the lack of an entity exerting a COMPULSION force. Thus, instead of caused motion, the idioms under (4) involve animate (self-) motion. As before, unlike the English (4a) the Serbian (4b-c) also involve a CONTAINER schema. Furthermore, there is a difference between the Serbian idioms (4b) and (4c) as well, in that the verb *izbiti* ('to break out') infers an initial constellation in which the CONTAINER obstructs the movement of the THING. However, the force of the THING is stronger than the CONTAINER, and thus the obstruction is removed.

(4)   a) Eng. *come to light*
         b) Serb. *izaći / izići / na svetlo (dana)* (= 'to get out to the light [of day]')
         c) Serb. *izbiti na svetlo (dana)* (= 'to break out to the light [of day]')

Components (4a): THING, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL.
Components (4b): THING, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, CONTAINER (> INSIDE-OUTSIDE).
Components (4c): THING, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, CONTAINER (> INSIDE-OUTSIDE), BLOCKAGE, REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT.
Idiom (5) is similar to (3) and (4), but has several meanings: 'to be born', 'to come into existence' and 'to become known to the public'. Out of these meanings only the last one is relevant to us (as it is the only one related to the metaphors KNOWLEDGE IS LIGHT and IGNORANCE IS DARKNESS), but it is metaphorically derived from the first meaning. As the image alludes to a newborn leaving the womb (which has the consequence that it metaphorically sees daylight[18]), the schematic structure has to be reconstructed with this original meaning in mind:

(5)   a) Eng. *see the light of day*
         b) Serb. *ugledati svetlost dana* (= 'to see the light of day')

Components: THING, CONTAINER (> INSIDE-OUTSIDE), SOURCE-PATH-GOAL.
THING$_1$ ($\rightarrow$ information) moves from a SOURCE located inside the CONTAINER ($\rightarrow$ darkness $\rightarrow$ state of being unknown to others) to a GOAL located outside of it ($\rightarrow$ light $\rightarrow$ state of being known to others).

3.1.2. English idioms

The following 2 idioms have been identified only in the English sources. The first idiom maps the Sun and the day-night cycle onto someone coming to understand or realize something. Since dawning

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[18] The lexical structure of the idiom is related to the actual scenario by means of an EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy (SEEING THE LIGHT FOR LEAVING THE WOMB). The metonymy evokes the scenario (the schematic structure of which is described above), and this in turn evokes the meaning of the idiom.

is a transition from darkness to light, it serves as a convenient source domain for the transition from ignorance to knowledge:

(6)   Eng. *the light dawned on someone / light dawns on someone*

Components: THING$_1$, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, THING$_2$ (> OBJECT > SURFACE), CONTACT.
Just like in (1), the CONTACT schema is pivotal in expressing the inferred initial and resultant state, thus dividing the structure into two semantically meaningful constellations: THING$_1$ maps onto light ($\rightarrow$ knowledge), while a constellation where THING$_1$ and THING$_2$ ($\rightarrow$ the referent) are located apart from each other (until CONTACT is established) maps onto darkness ($\rightarrow$ ignorance).

Idiom (7) maps a person's (delayed) perception of light onto the meaning that someone understands something that they did not understand previously:

(7)   Eng. *(begin) to see the light*

Components: THING$_1$, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, THING$_2$, CONTACT.
In this case, the purpose of the PATH is to structure THING$_1$'s ($\rightarrow$ the perceiver's) line of vision, which is a movement vector emanating from a SOURCE, which coincides with THING$_1$, and the vector is directed towards a GOAL, which coincides with THING$_2$ ($\rightarrow$ light $\rightarrow$ knowledge, truth). Darkness ($\rightarrow$ ignorance) is, again, evoked by an inferred initial constellation, where the movement vector of the perceiver has yet to reach the GOAL, and therefore has not established CONTACT with THING$_2$.

3.1.3. Serbian idioms
    The following 6 idioms were identified only in the Serbian sources. Idiom (8) is based on the cognitive model[19] according to which knowledge is located in people's heads, and expresses that someone suddenly understands or remembers something:

(8)   Serb. *sinula nekome svetlost u mozgu / u glavi*[20] (= 'light dawned in sb's brain / head')

Components: THING, CONTAINER (> FULL-EMPTY).
The structure is divided by the FULL-EMPTY schema, a subsidiary of CONTAINER. During the inferred initial constellation the CONTAINER ($\rightarrow$ the head, brain) is empty. In the resultant constellation the CONTAINER is full, with the THING ($\rightarrow$ light $\rightarrow$ knowledge) being inside of it.[21] As in previous cases, a single schema maps onto light (and light maps onto knowledge), while a specific constellation (the initial one, i.e. a head devoid of light) maps onto darkness.

Idiom (9) is also built around the idea of knowledge being located in the head, expressing an act of teaching:

(9)   Serb. *uliti nekome svetlo u glavu* (= 'to pour light into sb's head')

Components: THING$_1$, THING$_2$ (> SUBSTANCE), CONTAINER (> INSIDE-OUTSIDE), SOURCE-PATH-GOAL.
The inferred initial constellation and the resultant constellation are divided by the boundary of the CONTAINER (giving rise to the subsidiary topological elements INSIDE-OUTSIDE). The transformation happens based on the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema, in that THING$_1$ ($\rightarrow$ an agent) moves THING$_2$ ($\rightarrow$ light $\rightarrow$ knowl-

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[19] "A cognitive model is a coherent, in large part non-linguistic, knowledge structure" (Evans 2007: 23).

[20] A variant of this idiom without the component Eng. *light* / Serb. *svetlo(st)* can be found in both languages: Eng. *dawn on someone* and Serb. *sinulo je nekome* (= 'it dawned on someone').

[21] Note that there is no PATH involved. The reason for this is that the THING does not move from outside of the CONTAINER to the inside, but rather originates inside of it. It could be argued, that in this sense the general EXISTENCE schema proposed by Clausner and Croft (1999: 15), as well as an opposite NONEXISTENCE schema, also take part in the conceptualization.

edge) from a SOURCE-location outside of the CONTAINER through the boundary to a GOAL located on the inside. The initial constellation (the light not being in the head) maps onto darkness, and the fact that an agent is responsible for the light entering the head evokes the notion of teaching.

The same schematic structure as in (9) underlies idiom (10) as well, with the exception that THING$_2$ is not specified to be a SUBSTANCE. Another difference relates to the mappings, as the CONTAINER does not map onto the human head, but onto any phenomenon in the outside world (which serves as the object of explanation), thus expressing the meaning 'to explain something, to make something clear':

(10)   Serb. *uneti svetlo u nešto* (= 'to bring light into sth')

In the Serbian idioms employing a single schematic structure, darkness can also be expressed explicitly on the lexical level instead of light (which is a difference with regards to the English idioms employing a single schematic structure). In idioms (11) and (12), the transition from an initial state of ignorance to a resultant state of knowledge is mapped onto a transition from the inability to the ability of visual perception, whereby ignorance is conceptualized as darkness covering the perceiver's eyes, thus obstructing her / his line of vision:

(11)   Serb. *nestaje / pada nekome mrak s očiju*[22] (= 'the darkness disappears / falls from sb's eyes')
(12)   Serb. *skinuti mrak s očiju* (= 'to remove the darkness from the eyes')

Components (11): THING$_1$, THING$_2$ (> OBJECT > SURFACE), COVERING, CONTACT, BLOCKAGE, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT.
Components (12): THING$_1$, THING$_2$ (> OBJECT > SURFACE), COVERING, CONTACT, BLOCKAGE, THING$_3$, COMPULSION, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT.
In the case of both idioms, the schematic structure is divided up into two semantically meaningful parts by the BLOCKAGE and REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT force-schemas (the former being simultaneously active and deactivated along with the COVERING and CONTACT schemas). During the initial constellation, THING$_1$ ($\rightarrow$ darkness $\rightarrow$ ignorance) is in direct contact[23] with THING$_2$ ($\rightarrow$ eyes $\rightarrow$ mind, reasoning), thereby covering its surface completely, and as a result inducing a BLOCKAGE force with regards to the force vector (the line of vision) emanating from THING$_2$. This initial constellation transforms into the resultant constellation by means of the simultaneous activation of the REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT and SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schemas, moving THING$_1$ away from THING$_2$, breaking up their contact and re-enabling the force vector of THING$_2$. In (12), unlike in (11), the COMPULSION force exerted by THING$_3$ ($\rightarrow$ the agent) causes the motion of THING$_1$. In these idioms, darkness ($\rightarrow$ ignorance) is the concept that is expressed on the lexical level, and it is also the concept mapping onto only one schema in the structure, while light ($\rightarrow$ knowledge) is the inferentially activated concept that is evoked by a specific constellation of schemas (in line with the KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING primary metaphor), namely the resultant constellation, in which darkness is located away from the eyes, as this enables the observer to perceive the light (and, as a result, to perceive other things in the environment as well).

Finally, idiom (13) is used to express that someone disappeared (or died) under mysterious circumstances. This meaning is metaphorically described as a person being devoured by darkness:

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[22] It should be emphasized that there is a similar and more frequent idiom in Serbian: Serb. *mrak je pao / došao nekome na oči* (= 'darkness fell / came onto someone's eyes'). However, this idiom expresses that someone lost control over her / his actions due to a heightened emotional state, like anger and rage, and therefore it does not directly fall into the domain of the metaphor KNOWLEDGE IS LIGHT. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the relation between THING$_1$ ($\rightarrow$ darkness) and THING$_2$ ($\rightarrow$ eyes) is the only relevant schematic difference when compared to (11) and (12), that is, in this case THING$_2$ coincides with the GOAL portion of the movement, and not the SOURCE.

[23] The preposition *s(a)* ('from') implies that the trajector (THING$_1$) and the landmark (THING$_2$) are not separated by a gap, hence the CONTACT schema has to be activated.

(13)   Serb. *pojeo / progutao nekoga mrak*; *pojela / progutala nekoga tama* (= 'the darkness ate / swallowed sb')

Components: THING, CONTAINER (> INSIDE-OUTSIDE), SOURCE-PATH-GOAL[24].
In the initial constellation, the THING (→ the referent) is outside of the CONTAINER (→ darkness → unknown, mysterious circumstances). During the image schema transformation, the CONTAINER, being animate and acting in the role of an agent, envelops the THING, resulting in a constellation in which the THING is located inside the CONTAINER. The INSIDE-OUTSIDE topology of the CONTAINER schema is what divides this schematic structure, the INSIDE mapping onto darkness, the OUTSIDE onto light. The notion of knowledge (regarding the whereabouts of the referent) is evoked by the inferred initial constellation of the structure (the referent being outside of the darkness), the notion of ignorance by the resultant constellation (the referent being inside the darkness).[25]

3.2. Idioms with alternative schematic structures

3.2.1. English and Serbian idioms
An image shared by both languages involves a person performing some (more or less) goal-oriented action[26] in the dark, which is used for expressing the meaning that somebody is aimlessly seeking an answer or solution to a problem, or doing something without the necessary knowledge for it to succeed:

(14)   a) Eng. *leap / shot / (take) a stab / grasp / grope in the dark*
        b) Serb. *lutati / tumarati / tapkati / pipati po / u mraku* (= 'to wander / roam / patter / grope in the dark')

Reality space
Components: THING, SOURCE-PATH (x2), CONTAINER, BLOCKAGE.
There are two instances of the SOURCE-PATH schema, as it has to structure, on the one hand, the visual movement vector (line of vision) emanating from the THING (→ an agent, the referent) and, on the other hand, the force vector of the goal-oriented action that is causally dependent on the visual movement vector (the agent has to see the target for the action to successfully reach the target). During the semantic reinterpretation of the idiom, first a reality space has to be activated. In the reality space, the THING is located inside of a CONTAINER (→ darkness → a state of lacking knowledge), and this CONTAINER exerts a BLOCKAGE force against the THING's visual movement vector (therefore no GOAL is reached). At this point of the reinterpretation process, it is possible for the main metaphorical mappings to occur: the THING maps onto the referent, the CONTAINER maps onto the darkness, which in turn maps onto the lack of knowledge, and the constellation where the THING's visual and force vectors are blocked inside the

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[24] It is unclear, based on the idiom itself, how the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema interacts with the other elements of the structure, i.e. whether the THING moves towards the CONTAINER, or vice versa. Alternatively, a third option could be plausible, in which case the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema does not even get activated, and the envelopment of the THING happens through an expansion of the CONTAINER. Such variables could, depending on the situation, either be contingent on specific contexts, or subject to idiosyncratic construals.

[25] The boundary of the CONTAINER schema blocks out the visual movement vectors of any potential perceiver, thus negating the primary metaphor KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING.

[26] The verbs in these idioms have in common that they are (to varying degrees) goal-oriented, and successfully performing them is therefore contingent on an agent's visual perception (the Serbian verbs *lutati* [Eng. 'to wander'], *tumarati* [Eng. 'to roam'] and *tapkati* [Eng. 'to patter'] in this context imply the failure of an otherwise goal-oriented movement, which would be successful in a well-lit environment). A lack of light necessary for the successful realization of a physical activity that requires visual perception is thus mapped onto a lack of knowledge necessary for the success of a cognitive action (or a physical action that hinges on decision making or the prediction of the action's result).

CONTAINER maps onto the referent's undertaken action and / or thinking processes. However, these mappings by themselves cannot account for the entirety of the meaning reinterpretation. The idioms, namely, express a referent's failure (to find a solution to a problem or to successfully complete an action) due to a lack of knowledge. The semantic reinterpretation has to account for the inferred potentiality that the referent's intentions would have been successfully realized, if only the referent had fulfilled the necessary requirements (i.e. if the referent had had the required knowledge). These inferred meanings do not have any structure to map onto in the reality space alone. For these reasons, an additional, implicit space has to be built[27] to simulate a scenario for the inferred potentiality (in the form of an inferred counterfactual). In other words, since we know that, for example, a shot can only be considered successful in a scenario in which it actually hits the intended target, and since we know that to hit a target one needs to visually locate it first (for which light is needed), the very presence of darkness in the idiom serves as an implicit negation of such a scenario (as it impedes the visual capacity of the shooter). As a result, this negated (successful) scenario has to be set up in a separate mental space, so it can serve as the necessary background information for the reinterpretation of the actual idiom (containing the concept of darkness).

Alternate space
Components: THING, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL (x2)
In this space the CONTAINER ($\rightarrow$ darkness $\rightarrow$ lack of knowledge) is missing, therefore there is no BLOCKAGE obstructing the agent's visual movement vector, which, being a counterfactual version of the reality space's scenario, evokes the concept of light. This movement vector, then, reaches the GOAL portion of the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema (enabling the primary metaphor KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING), and, consequently, the movement vector of the agent's goal-oriented action also reaches the GOAL. The two alternative mental spaces are incompatible with each other in the sense that they would have to occupy the same "slot" in the discourse-timeline.

A person's lack of knowledge about something, which may be a result of others keeping secrets from her / him, can also be expressed with an image in which this person is located in darkness. Depending on the verb, the schematic structure differs in its components:

(15)   a) Eng. *to be in the dark about someone or something*
       b) Eng. *to stay in the dark about someone or something*
       c) Eng. *to be kept in the dark about someone or something*
       d) Serb. *držati / ostaviti nekoga u mraku* (= 'to keep / leave sb in the dark')

Reality space
Components (15a): THING$_1$, CONTAINER (> INSIDE).
Components (15b): THING$_1$, CONTAINER (> INSIDE).
Components (15c-d): THING$_1$, CONTAINER (> INSIDE).
In the reality space of all three variants THING$_1$ ($\rightarrow$ referent) is located inside a CONTAINER ($\rightarrow$ darkness $\rightarrow$ state of ignorance). The basic dichotomous topology of the CONTAINER (being divided into a space on the inside and a space on the outside by a boundary) paired with a concept with negative polarity (darkness $\rightarrow$ ignorance) entails a possible alternate scenario in all three variants. Furthermore, in variant (15b) the verb Eng. *stay* also presupposes the notion of movement as background information, and lastly, in variant (15c-d) the verbs Eng. *keep*, Serb. *držati* ('to keep') and Serb. *ostaviti* ('to leave') necessitate a background frame as well, as their semantic reinterpretation in the context of the idiom

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[27] Although the idioms do not contain explicit linguistic cues for this purpose (i.e. space builders), an inferred counterfactual does. The underlying counterfactual entailment would be: *if* the action would not be undertaken in the dark (or schematically, *if* the visual movement vector would not have been blocked), it would have succeeded. As the analysis shows, such a counterfactual entailment of the idiom's meaning would in fact have a space builder in it, namely an *if*-construction. Such counterfactual entailments are characteristic for all following idioms as well.

requires the juxtaposition with an alternate scenario in which the referent is not kept or left in the dark, but instead brought into the light.

Alternate space
Components (16a): THING₁, CONTAINER (> OUTSIDE).
Components (16b): THING₁, CONTAINER (> INSIDE-OUTSIDE), SOURCE-PATH-GOAL.
Components (16c-d): THING₁, THING₂, COMPULSION, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, CONTAINER (> INSIDE-OUTSIDE).
The implicit alternate scenario for variant (15a) evoked by the reality space simply has THING₁ located outside of the CONTAINER. In the alternate scenario for variant (15b) THING₁ successfully moves from the inside of the CONTAINER to the outside. In the alternate scenario for (15c-d), however, THING₂ (→ the second referent[s], the one[s] keeping secrets) induces this movement of THING₁ (by providing information → COMPULSION). In all three cases, the outside of the CONTAINER maps onto LIGHT, and the constellation of THING₁ being outside of the CONTAINER maps onto KNOWLEDGE.

3.2.2. English idioms
The act of keeping something secret can be expressed metaphorically through the act of keeping something dark, as in idiom (16):

(16)   Eng. *keep something dark*

Reality space
Components: THING₁, SOURCE-PATH, THING₂, BLOCKAGE.
The attribute *dark*, in this case, describes a state of secrecy. According to the event structure metaphor (Lakoff 1993: 220–222), states are locations, that is, bounded regions in space, and changes are movements into or out of such bounded regions. This then means that in the schematic structure of this idiom THING₁ (→ the topic, situation, phenomenon etc. being referred to) has a movement tendency starting from a SOURCE-location (→ a state of being dark → a state of being secret). In the reality space, this movement of THING₁ is obstructed by the force of THING₂ (→ the person[s] keeping it secret), and this maps onto the act of keeping THING₁ the way it is (the verb Eng. *keep* itself expresses that something is stopped from moving or changing).

Alternate space
Components: THING₁, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL.
The movement of THING₁ is fully realized and it reaches the GOAL (→ the inferred opposite of dark, a state of being illuminated → a state of being known to others), thus achieving the opposite state, one of being illuminated and visible (meaning that the visual movement vector of an inferred potential observer would reach it). This scenario acts as a background frame for the reality space, structuring the movement tendency of THING₁. Without such a background frame, understanding the verb Eng. *keep* itself would not be possible, as it implicates the negation of a change that would otherwise successfully occur, hence the reinterpretation of the idiom would not be possible either.
If a person is extremely modest and therefore conceals her / his talents and ideas, this can be expressed with the image of a person (being a source of light) hiding her / his light under a bushel. In other words, the person contributes to being perceived by others as being dark (lacking talent or ideas):

(17)   Eng. *hide one's light under a bushel*

Reality space
Components: THING, SOURCE-PATH, CONTAINER, BLOCKAGE.
In the reality space, the THING (→ light → talents and ideas) has a movement vector which is obstructed by the CONTAINER (→ bushel). It is this entire constellation which maps onto the concept of modesty.

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The potentiality that the referent's talents might be perceived by others if she / he would not be modest has to be accounted for by an inferentially built alternate space (in fact, the very meaning of the attribute *modest* only makes sense when inferentially juxtaposed with the alternative).

Alternate space

Components: THING, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL.

In the implicit alternate space, the THING's movement vector is not obstructed (i.e. the light shines forth) and reaches the GOAL ($\rightarrow$ the field of vision of the inferred perceiver[s]). This structure evokes an inferred meaning of boastfulness, which serves as the opposite and background frame for modesty.

3.2.3. Serbian idioms

To express that something is unknown to us, in Serbian it is possible to use idiom (18), which metaphorically presents the unknown phenomenon, topic, situation etc. as being covered by darkness, and therefore being impossible to be visually perceived (and thus understood):

(18)   Serb. *pokriven / zastrt mrakom* (= 'covered with darkness')

Reality space

Components: THING$_1$, COVER, THING$_2$ (> OBJECT > SURFACE), SOURCE-PATH, BLOCKAGE.

In the reality space, THING$_1$ ($\rightarrow$ darkness) covers THING$_2$ ($\rightarrow$ topic). Because of this, an inferred perceiver's visual movement vector directed at THING$_2$ is obstructed. Just as in the previous cases, an inferred alternate scenario has to be evoked for the complete semantic reinterpretation. However, this idiom is peculiar in the sense that this is mainly necessitated by the structure of the source domain, i.e. the darkness obstructing our vision (which entails that, if not for the darkness, we could have seen the thing in question). The semantic content of the target domain (something being unknown to us) does not by itself necessitate such an alternate scenario.[28] This is a good example for how the structure of the source domain can influence our interpretation of the target domain.

Alternate space

Components: THING$_1$, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL.

In this implicit alternate scenario, the visual force vector emanating from the inferred perceiver does not get obstructed and successfully reaches the GOAL (coinciding with THING$_2$), which, in opposition with the reality space's concept of darkness, evokes the concept of light.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The current paper set out to analyze idioms built around the dichotomous metaphors KNOWLEDGE IS LIGHT and IGNORANCE IS DARKNESS in English and Serbian, focusing on the image schemas involved in the meaning construction of the idioms. For this purpose, an approach has been developed in which the main semantic constituents of the idioms are assigned to appropriate schemas, with THING being the basic unit for bounded entities (and having a set of subsidiary schemas for entities that exhibit specific characteristics). The assigned schemas are treated as components of a more complex schematic structure, and the transformations of these schematic structures together with the given conceptual material are understood to be giving rise to the meanings of the idioms. This allows for a precise analysis of the mappings between the image schemas underlying the idioms and the conceptual material explicitly expressed or inferred by their lexical structures. Using this approach, we have analyzed the various forms

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[28] Although it could be argued that not knowing something, being a notion with a negative polarity, presupposes the activation of an equivalent notion with a positive polarity (i.e. knowing something).

of interaction between the bipolar source concepts of light and darkness, and their corresponding bipolar target domain concepts of knowledge and ignorance.

The analysis has concluded that the presence of bipolar concepts in idioms leads to dichotomous constellations in the image-schematic structures. This conceptual dichotomy can, on the one hand, manifest as different constellations of schemas along a temporal dimension in a single schematic structure, that is, as initial and resultant constellations which take up subsequent slots in the discourse-timeline. Such initial and resultant constellations of schemas are divided either by the presence or absence of a specific schema, in some cases by the simultaneous activation and deactivation of several schemas, or by the dichotomous topology of particular schemas. For such components or sets of components that organize schematic structures into two semantic wholes, the term *divider schema* has been proposed. On the other hand, such a conceptual dichotomy can also manifest as two mutually incompatible alternative structures taking up the same slot in the discourse-timeline and differing in one or more specific schemas. These alternative schematic structures are organized into two alternative mental spaces, the reality space (the initial schematic structure) being the trigger for setting up a second, implicit space (the alternate schematic structure). Although no explicit linguistic cues, i.e. space builders, could be identified in the idioms utilizing such alternative structures, the counterfactual entailments of the reality spaces' structures do in fact suggest implicit *if*-constructions, which can be viewed as implicit space builders responsible for setting up the second schematic structure. These implicitly set up schematic structures serve as background information for the semantic reinterpretation of the reality spaces' schematic structures, that is, both structures (both scenarios) have to be set up and juxtaposed to evoke the idioms' intended meanings.

The mappings from schematic structure to conceptual material can also take several forms. In some cases components of the structure directly map onto single concepts (e.g. when the CONTAINER schema maps onto a person's head), giving rise to image-schema metaphors. In other cases, a component of the structure (e.g. THING or CONTAINER) serves as a source domain for a target domain concept (e.g. light or darkness), which in turn serves as a source domain for yet another target domain concept (e.g. knowledge or ignorance). However, mappings do not have to occur between a single schema and a concept. It is also possible for a specific constellation of two or more schemas to evoke certain concepts (e.g. a CONTAINER without a THING inside of it → a head without light in it → [a head filled with] darkness → ignorance). The analysis also shows that concepts appearing in the lexical structure of the idioms always correspond to a single schema in the schematic structure, while inferred concepts that are not present in the lexical structure of an idiom either correspond to single schemas or to specific constellations of multiple schemas.

With regards to whether they primarily utilize a single schematic structure or two alternative structures, a difference can be observed between the analyzed English and Serbian idioms (taking into consideration variants of the same idioms as well, as long as the differences contributed to a change in the components of the schematic structure). The Serbian idioms primarily utilize a single schematic structure, in which the initial and the resultant constellations of schemas represent two dichotomous semantic wholes. This is evident in the fact that 12 Serbian idioms use such a single schematic structure, while only 3 use alternative schematic structures. The English idioms, on the other hand, use both variants to an almost equal extent: 7 idioms use single structures and 6 use alternative structures (although it could be said that single structures predominate in the case of the English idioms as well, especially if we do not take into consideration variants of the same idioms). The analysis also showed that in both languages a single schematic structure was more likely to be evoked by idioms containing the positive polarity component (Eng. *light*: 7 idioms vs. *dark*: 0 idioms; Serb. *svetlo*[*st*]: 9 idioms vs. *mrak*: 3 idioms), while alternate structures were more likely to be evoked by idioms containing the negative polarity component (Eng. *dark*: 5 idioms vs. *light*: 1 idiom; Serb. *mrak*: 3 idioms vs. *svetlo*[*st*]: 0 idioms). Whether these are indicative of any actual general tendencies in the idioms of these languages has to be determined by further studies of this nature.

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DICHOTOME STRUKTUREN: DIE METAPHERN *WISSEN IST LICHT* UND *UNWISSENHEIT IST DUNKELHEIT* IM ENGLISCHEN UND SERBISCHEN

Zusammenfassung

Bildschemata bilden die Grundlage für abstraktes Denken, da sie es uns ermöglichen, die Strukturen und die Logik unserer konkreten sensorisch-motorischen Erfahrungen zum Verständnis abstrakterer Domänen zu nutzen. Als solche sind sie ein wesentlicher Bestandteil der konzeptuellen Metapherntheorie und repräsentieren die Basis für die Interpretation zahlreicher metaphorischer Ausdrücke. Das Ziel dieses Beitrags ist die Analyse dessen, wie

bildschematische Strukturen die Grundlage der konzeptuellen Metaphern WISSEN IST LICHT und UNWISSENHEIT IST DUNKELHEIT in englischen und serbischen Phraseologismen mit den Komponenten Eng. *light* und *dark*, bzw. Serb. *svetlo(st)* und *mrak / tama* bilden. Da die besagten Ausgangsdomänen, nämlich LICHT und DUNKELHEIT, sowie ihre entsprechenden Zieldomänen, WISSEN und UNWISSENHEIT, bipolare Konzepte darstellen, kann man annehmen, dass die den Phraseologismen zugrunde liegenden bildschematischen Strukturen diese konzeptuellen Dichotomien widerspiegeln. Die Ergebnisse der Analyse zeigen, dass Bildschemata der metaphorischen Interaktion zwischen bipolaren Ausgangs- und Zieldomänen auf unterschiedliche Arten Struktur verleihen können. Diese konzeptuellen Dichotomien können sich einerseits als unterschiedliche Konstellationen von Schemata entlang einer zeitlichen Dimension in einer einzigen bildschematischen Struktur manifestieren oder andererseits als zwei miteinander unvereinbare alternative Strukturen, die sich in einem oder mehreren spezifischen Schemata unterscheiden.

Schlüsselwörter: konzeptuelle Metapher, Bildschema, bipolare Konzepte, Licht, Dunkelheit

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