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A Two-Sided Price-Decoupled Pay-As-Bid Auction Approach for the Clearing of Day-Ahead Electricity Markets

Csercsik, Dávid (2020) A Two-Sided Price-Decoupled Pay-As-Bid Auction Approach for the Clearing of Day-Ahead Electricity Markets. In: The 4th International Conference on Power, Energy and Mechanical Engineering (ICPEME 2020), 14-17 Feb 2020, Budapest.

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Abstract

In this paper we propose a possible alternative for conventional pay-as-clear type multiunit auctions commonly used for the clearing of day-ahead power exchanges, and analyse some of its characteristic features in comparison with conventional clearing. In the proposed framework, instead of the concept of the uniform market clearing price, we introduce limit prices separately for supply and demand bids, and in addition to the power balance constraint, we formulate constraints for the income balance of the market. The total traded quantity is used as the objective function of the formulation. The concept is demonstrated on a simple example and is compared to the conventional approach in small-scale market simulations.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Subjects: T Technology / alkalmazott, műszaki tudományok > TK Electrical engineering. Electronics Nuclear engineering / elektrotechnika, elektronika, atomtechnika
Depositing User: Dávid Csercsik
Date Deposited: 14 Sep 2020 12:23
Last Modified: 03 Apr 2023 06:54
URI: http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/113208

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