EPISTEMIC SELF-ESTEEM OF PHILOSOPHERS IN THE FACE OF PHILOSOPHICAL DISAGREEMENT

Bernáth, László and Tőzsér, János (2020) EPISTEMIC SELF-ESTEEM OF PHILOSOPHERS IN THE FACE OF PHILOSOPHICAL DISAGREEMENT. HUMAN AFFAIRS, 30 (3). pp. 328-342. ISSN 1337-401X

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Abstract

Our paper consists of four parts. In the first part, we describe the challenge of the pervasive and permanent philosophical disagreement over philosophers’ epistemic self-esteem. In the second part, we investigate the attitude of philosophers who have high epistemic self-esteem even in the face of philosophical disagreement and who believe they have well-grounded philosophical knowledge. In the third section, we focus on the attitude of philosophers who maintain a moderate level of epistemic self-esteem because they do not attribute substantive philosophical knowledge to themselves but still believe that they have epistemic right to defend substantive philosophical beliefs. In the fourth section, we analyse the attitude of philosophers who have a low level of epistemic self-esteem in relation to substantive philosophical beliefs and make no attempt to defend those beliefs. We argue that when faced with philosophical disagreement philosophers either have to deny that the dissenting philosophers are their epistemic peers or have to admit that doing philosophy is less meaningful than it seemed before. In this second case, philosophical activity and performance should not contribute to the philosophers’ overall epistemic self-esteem to any significant extent.

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