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Thoughts about the current issues of sports policing

Abstract

The present study investigated the causes of football hooliganism and the preliminaries, the tragic events and stadium disasters of the last few decades, which called the attention of those involved in securing these events to the fact that the existing practices had to be changed and that the creation of new legal norms was necessary. The paper showcases the significant statements in Taylor's reports, which were adapted in the practice of securing events in Hungary, too. Taylor established that there was not one method for the management of crowd behaviour that could provide complete safety and, instead of focusing on the policing issue, he moved towards an 'integrated', 'holistic' approach. He realised that it was both impractical and impossible to stop football fans solely by criminal law measures and thought that communication with the clubs and fans, as well as with the media should be developed. All his proposals have now been implemented. Those securing sports events have been trying to ensure order as a basic value of society ever since his ideas were published.

Keywords: sports policing, sports event, football hooliganism, Taylor, crowd psychology, admission

Introduction

In an earlier study I have formulated the idea that sports policing is a specific part of sports administration. It can be interpreted in narrow terms and clearly defined as a special field of policing. A range of laws provides for everything related to sports policing, supplemented by regulations issued by the specific associations, which serve as directions concerning both keeping sports policing records and securing sports events (Tóth, 2016, 292.). In the present paper I seek answers to the following questions: What are the reasons for football hooliganism?



What preliminaries, disasters in various stadiums have happened in the last few decades that focused the attention of those involved in securing events on the fact that the existing practices had to be changed and that the creation of new legal instruments was necessary? Since it is a well-known fact that order is of basic value for every society, and those involved in securing sports events need to make all the efforts in order to provide it, even though, unfortunately, perfect safety cannot be guaranteed. Safety must be given as a service, the main purpose of which is to prevent disturbances. In order to get to the roots of football hooliganism, we need to learn about the history of its development and also the analysis of crowd psychology and that of the supporters attending the stadiums is essential. Stadiums also have special acoustics, which enhance the extraordinary atmosphere of matches with the help of various technical devices (loud music and enormous projectors). When a lot of people are crammed together in a confined space, even the smallest wrongdoing may become fatal (Tóth, 2017, 13.). The individual is dissolved in the crowd and is released from social control. The fans feel that they are anonymous. Since they are driven by the same emotions, striking slogans have an intense impact on them and incite powerful emotions in them. Their individuality ceases to exist; in the crowd they become one and are overwhelmed by passion. The theory developed by Gustave Le Bon discusses the phenomenon of crowd psychology. Its main finding is that the individual loses himself in the crowd (Csepeli, 2001, 157.).

The development of football hooliganism

In the first half of the 20th century soccer was considered a gentleman's sport that had regard for fair play. Consequently, its habitual visitors were middle-class people. The roots of violence among spectators go back to folk football in Medieval England. The behaviour known as football hooliganism emerged in the UK in 1960. In other western European countries, such as Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium the phenomenon developed only 10 years later. In those times clothes search, for example, was still carried out only superficially, the police in the stadiums were understaffed, the chief of police responsible for order in the section did not ask for help in time and the fans were not segregated properly. The disturbance after the National Championship 1 (professional league, NB I) soccer match of 10 March 1990 between Váci Izzó and Ferencváros (FTC) is usually mentioned as the event during which the phenomenon of football hooliganism started in Hungary. Earlier, in the 1970s and 1980s there had already been adverse manifestations by fans, mainly at matches of the teams

FTC and Újpest. Then the Minister of Children, Youth and Sport Affairs asked a committee to evaluate the state of affairs. The investigation established that football hooliganism is a complex social issue that cannot be remedied merely by policing tools. Using the report, the contemporary government developed an action programme and on its basis the government decree 1071/2003. (VII. 18.) was accepted, which defined the specific tasks to be carried out by the various ministries, including deadlines and persons in charge. In 2006, based on the research done by the National Institute of Criminology it was clear that there was a lack of efficient sanctions; banning fans from matches was not a functioning legal institution. There were no access control systems, and the sports facilities were also in poor technical condition. It was already established at that time that football hooliganism could only be combatted with the cooperation of all the actors of Hungarian soccer and of the police, an important element of which should be a continuous dialogue and consistent compliance with the legislation (Nagy, 2006, 118-134.). In the 1990s a joint research programme was conducted together with CEPOL. In the framework of studying mass events, the lessons learnt about access control systems and forward-thinking proposals were shared among police experts, which also had a great impact on the principles of securing events. Going back to the preliminaries, we can sadly establish that since the Second World War 1500 people have been killed in more than 60 stadium disasters, which turned the stadiums into hell. The case in 1964 is recorded as one of the most devastating events, in which 318 people were killed in Lima, after a match between Peru and Argentina. The police used tear gas against the fans, who tried to escape but the exits of the stadium were locked up. Apart from the 318 fatalities more than 500 people were seriously injured. A rash police attack in Ghana in 2001 ended with the death of 127 people. The people in the panicked crowd fell over each other as they wanted to get out, but most gates were closed at this event, too. 93 people lost their lives under bizarre circumstances in Nepal in 1988, when an enormous hailstorm hit the stadium in the middle of a Nepal – Bangladesh match. The spectators tried to escape, but, for some unknown reason, the police kept and turned the crowd back and the people crushed each other to death. In 1985 a dropped cigarette-end caused a fire, which reduced one of the terraces of the stadium in Bradford, UK to ashes. The police had to drive the spectators to the field but even so, the tragedy was unavoidable, resulting in 56 fatalities. An interesting fact is connected to the above, namely that in the Staff Regulations issued for the Police by the Hungarian Ministry of Interior, it was pointed out already in 1948: *'Smoking is prohibited on the wooden grandstands (terraces) of sports and race grounds. The audience's attention must be drawn to this ban with the help of signs posted in*

prominent places. In Scotland there were two disasters. In one of them, due to heavy rains, the newly constructed wooden grandstand drenched through and collapsed during a match. Several hundreds of fans fell down and 25 did not survive. The decree adopted after this case stipulated that stadiums in the territory of the UK must be built from reinforced concrete. The worst sports disaster in Russia took place in Moscow in 1982. The leadership of the Lenin Stadium decided to open only the western and eastern terraces, these being the only clean ones after a heavy snowfall a few days before. Some people fell over the barriers, taking several others with them. This domino effect caused the death of 66 spectators (Kocsis, 1986, 21-22.).

A few more data on panic resulting in disasters:

25 people were killed and 517 injured in Glasgow, in 1902, where in 1971 there were 66 fatalities and more than 100 injuries. We know about 120 injured during the Firenze – Juventus match in Turin in 1957. Ten people died and more than 100 were injured in Kirikhala, Turkey in 1906. A match in Buenos Aires in 1968 led to 80 fatalities. 33 casualties and 400 injured were reported in Bolton in 1946. October 1956, Naples: 65 people injured. December 1964, Istanbul, Turkey – Bulgaria match: 84 seriously injured, due to panic. 1964, Turkey: 27 fatalities and 600 injured after a clash with the police. 1968, Buenos Aires: 80 dead and 150 people injured at a River Plate – Boca Juniors match. Congo, 1969: 27 dead and 52 injured, due to panic within the audience. April 1977, Hamburg: 1 dead, 25 injured at the Hamburger SV – Bayern München match. June 1977: only three months after the previous case, 70 injured again at the Hamburger SV – Bayern München match. At the Zamalek– Dukla Praha match in 1974 several hundred people were injured and 48 were killed. 1981, Piraeus: 21 dead and 54 injured at the Olympiacos Piraeus – AEK Athens championship game. November 1982, Cali: 24 fatalities and 50 injured at the America – Deportivo championship game. November 1982, Algiers: 8 people died and 600 were injured when a terrace collapsed during the championship match of the local team. May 1985, Beijing: vandalism and clash between the police forces and the fans, several dozens of injured and arrested people after the 2:1 defeat by Hong Kong (Kocsis, 1986, 22.). Wednesday 29 May 1985, Brussels, Heysel Stadium, European Cup Final between Juventus and Liverpool: The two teams were accompanied by several tens of thousands of home supporters, who had arrived in the capital of Belgium by air, ship, train and car, more than 30 of them never to return to their homes, due to a group of drunken and careless British supporters, who attacked the Italians. Escaping from the raving Britons, the panicked crowd was pushed back against a brick wall, which collapsed. Many of the people fell down, after which the remaining part of the wall collapsed onto them. Incidentally, at

that time sports events in Brussels were secured by experienced, practised organisers. The Belgian minister of the interior had alerted the gendarmerie, the police, the fire brigade and the ambulance before this match. More than 3.000 police officers were securing the stadium and the whole law enforcement machinery of the city was on standby. There were 7 ambulances and a medical liaison car on the premises, as well as 200 English police officers to help their Belgian colleagues. The entrances of the stadium were opened at 5 p.m., three hours before the match, which was planned to begin at 8.15 p.m. The clothes of the spectators were searched in only a superficial way, as the fans were eager to get in fast. The Heysel tragedy was clearly caused by football hooliganism, resulting in the death of 39, mainly Italian supporters. Many people think soccer died that day. That is what The Times also declared the following day, taking a very strong stance against football hooligans. I believe that, after this incident, due to the significant changes, the whole industry of soccer was reborn from its own ashes, to become one of the most profitable businesses in a short period of time. Beginning from the mid-1960s, the majority of the spectators at football matches was gradually made up of those living on casual work and social benefits. The latest research, however, shows that the ratio of those who never go to such matches is the highest among those who completed only 8 years of primary education or even less. My findings have confirmed the same. In the first half of the 1990s in Hungary it was only the police that took an active role in managing this negative phenomenon in sport. A standing committee was set up to review the infrastructural requirements and to update the security plans of the contemporary People's Stadium. It must be highlighted that the Crowd Management Division of the National Police Headquarters has been running a National Football Information Point to manage intelligence related to threats to security since 2003. Going back in the Hungarian history of football atrocities, we should mention events like the one in 1921 at an MTK – Kispest match at the stadium in Üllői road, Budapest, when a referee was beaten with a knuckle duster until he passed out or the match in 1922, which the chief commissioner of the national police ordered to be held with the public excluded. In 1937 at a FTC – Debrecen match 2000 fans were stopped by 14 equestrian and 10 pedestrian police patrol officers. In 1947 a match between the Hungarian and the Austrian elected teams almost ended in a disaster. The fans were celebrating the 50th anniversary of Hungarian football at the sports ground of the FTC in Üllői road. More than 40 thousand people were crammed on the wooden terraces designed for fewer people, whose 8-metre section collapsed, resulting in about 200 fans falling down. At the beginning of the 2000s, acts qualifying as football hooliganism or vandalism and brawls between fans already occurred

in higher numbers. By that time, it had become quite clear that securing public order was necessary not only on the terraces but also before, and, more importantly, after the matches (Kolláth, 2003, 40.). On 30th May 2003, after the match at the stadium of the FTC in Üllői road, Budapest, a riot broke out among the spectators. It is almost unbelievable but there were no fatalities this time, either. The most seriously injured person, a young man suffered vertebral and cranial fractures. (He became disabled for all his life and later was employed by FTC. He was a cashier for 25 years and was even given accommodation in the Club's headquarters in Üllői road.) On the same day there were atrocities in Siófok between the fans of the teams of two towns.

The Taylor Report

Lord Justice Peter Taylor worked together with a committee and carried out a detailed analysis of the Hillsborough disaster in 1989. His recommendations, for example the establishment of all-seating stadiums without perimeters, radically changed the image of modern British (and later European) soccer. In his Report, Taylor examines not only stadiums but also the facilities of many other sports. However, he clearly establishes that the most important task is to ensure the safety of football stadiums, on the one hand because football can be considered the sport of the nation and, on the other hand, because it moves the largest crowds. He considers overcrowding the greatest threat and his investigations showed that disasters also resulted from outdated stadiums, poor facilities, hooliganism, excessive drinking and poor management. In the present paper I wish to present the practical elements of the Taylor Report and its influence on the securing of sports events, taking into consideration the Hungarian practice and comparing the underlying principles. In Hungary there have been no fatalities related to sports events. Before the change of the political system, in a society under strict control, disorderly acts rarely occurred on the terraces and around the sports fields. Even the chants were more mannerly. Since the change in the political system, violent acts among the audience at sports fields have become more frequent. Today the mass media do not keep silent about such events, either, although their reports are often about scoop hunting and written in tabloid style. Unfortunately, violence has become a form of spending one's spare time. A professional committee led by MP Zoltán Páva studied the experience and lessons gained from the already mentioned, 2003 riots in Üllői road. Their findings, often referred to as the Hungarian Taylor Report were issued on 12th July 2003. The committee established that football hooliganism had been han-

dled almost exclusively as a policing problem. The Report wanted to find the most important lessons and similarities that could be found with the Taylor Report and to reveal the new, modern security philosophy and the important legal measures needed. It also sought answers to questions such as: What results can be expected from the application of technological solutions? To what extent are the problems football-specific? (Kolláth, 2003, 41.)

Based on the study report on the events related to the demonstrations, street riots and public order measures in Budapest in September-October 2006, we can state that in the mid-2000s soccer matches were frequented by fewer and fewer real fans and consequently the terraces were less occupied by football hooligans, too. Between 2003 and 2006 there were 23 cases when the riot police had to intervene in stadiums. The aforementioned professional committee was already set up in 2003 to investigate football hooliganism. It established that the state of sports security was not satisfactory and that after a scandal the responsible persons or organisations had only been found in exceptional cases. Between 1992 and 2002, vandalism led to riots in 46 cases, resulting in serious damage at the matches or in the surrounding areas, including wrecking the means of transport and shops on the hooligans' way or harassing and hurting passers-by. Of course, at that time large-scale violence and supporting football teams were not necessarily related. The member states of the Council of Europe agreed on the European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in particular at Football Matches on 19 August 1985. The basic principles of this Convention were also incorporated in the Hungarian Act on Sport (2004). That was why the committee proposed that the limits of liability of the organisers of sports events should be clearly defined. It was necessary to make it clear that the police should only take part in securing sports events and in restoring public order for the purpose of performing a public task. It was decided that the police should appoint one or more officers, called constables responsible for order to assist the organisers of high-risk sports events. These officers should supervise on the scene how the event is organised and conducted, whether the security regulations are observed and may initiate, if necessary, the intervention of the police forces. They thought the police had to be authorised by law to declare an event finished, take out and remove ringleaders, or if this is not feasible, to dissolve the crowd, provided that the behaviour of those present endangers the safety of the event and order cannot be restored in any other way. His research led József Végh to the conclusion in 2001 that it was very important that plain-clothes police officers should join fans' groups. He wrote that each officer should meet the same group of fans, since personal acquaintance and relationship, through which the fans will definitely consider

the officers their partners, is more efficient than any squad operation for crowd management. With the help of this constant relationship between a well-prepared police officer with good communication skills and a group of fans, the police command can be informed about the planned events. In Germany, too, it helped a lot with managing football hooliganism that this kind of work became the main sphere of activities of some experts (Végh, 2001, 47.). Today plain-clothes police officers wearing Partner Group waistcoats play an active role in securing sports events in Hungary. At sports activities posing a security risk they also apply dialogue-based crowd management, laying great emphasis on communication and defusing volatile situations. The members of the Partner Group are clearly distinguishable from high-profile police. (The Group had their debut at the Romania – Hungary soccer match, actually posing the greatest challenge to the police.) They work among the fans, wearing plain clothes, without having weapons or coercive equipment. Their task is to mitigate tension, recognise crisis situations and manage them by verbal means. They do everything in order to have a peaceful solution by getting into and keeping in touch with fan clubs. The members of the Partner Group do not take measures. While working, they constantly maintain contact with the chiefs of the operation units. They actively monitor the spectators, notify their colleagues, who are deployed to provide security, about more significant disorders and provide information for the fans about escape routes and the order of transportation. Their aim is establishing a situation that requires the smallest amount of active police intervention. They place emphasis on the prevention rather than the solution of problems and try to keep up the dialogue with the fans. Order No. 8/2010. (OT 5.) of the National Police Headquarters on the qualification and policing of sports events names the earlier mentioned, appointed police officers as spotters within the organisational structure of the Hungarian Police Force. According to this order, spotters, i.e. officers appointed to liaise with sports organisations and to carry out and coordinate security-related policing tasks must be involved in the preparations and execution of securing the safety of sports events. Spotters are professional members of the police staff, deployed at the various sports teams and organisations. They are selected from their own staff by the head of the territorially competent police headquarters. The key selection criteria are situational awareness, good communication skills and love for the given sport. A spotter must know everything about the team. He must know its members the fan groups and it may also be important to have or to establish a relationship of trust with them (Keller, 2016, 16.).

In his Report, mentioned earlier, Taylor also defines the role and line of responsibility of the police and of the organisers, including the bearing of the

costs. Firstly, he discusses whether the terraces should be monitored by the police or the club via its stewards. He refers to the Green Guide (issued in 1986), according to which it is basically the responsibility of the home club, i.e. the one that invites the audience to its premises to secure safety at the event. More exactly, both in normal and in emergency situations, safety of the public inside the ground is the responsibility of its management. He lists the five basic duties of the stewards, such as:

- controlling or directing the spectators when entering or leaving the stadium to make sure that there is an even flow of people and that they are safely dispersed on the terraces;
- patrolling the premises and managing emergencies (e.g. fires) that occur;
- supervising important points such as entrances and especially exits and gates that are open during the event;
- helping the police staff with crowd management when needed;
- carrying out specific duties in cases of emergency.

Taylor refers to the public inquiry made by Justice Popplewell in 1985 and the interim report based on it and another report produced for the Minister of Housing and Local Government in 1969, according to which crowd control responsibilities should be split between the police and the club operating the ground. However, it says that the police should be responsible for the movement of spectators through the entrances and from the entrances into the ground, and the club is responsible for the control of spectators inside the club's premises. Justice Popplewell says that in practice the physical safety of the premises is the responsibility of the club, whereas the police usually take care of managing the crowd during the game. For example, if the ground has to be evacuated, the police should organise and supervise the procedure. In his Final Report, Popplewell explains that this practice has developed as the police officers have regularly attended football grounds in large numbers and thus the clubs have assumed that the control of what happens inside the ground has passed to the police from them. He, however, emphasizes that it is mainly the responsibility and duty of the club or of the occupier of the ground as the organiser of a private event to ensure reasonable safety for those who are invited and the task of the police is merely to assist in the enforcement of law and order. Yet, the club may need to *'employ the police to act as their agents in certain circumstances'* and may actually be authorised to do so, which involves paying them to attend and prevent the sections from overcrowding. At the same time Popplewell acknowledges that this is a grey area of responsibility, which needs to be reviewed.

Taylor goes on to define several elements within the monitoring of the terraces, such as the phase when the spectators enter, when they are placed, when they move within the ground and when they leave it, i.e. exit from it. He also confirms that the club has the legal duty to take reasonable care for the safety of those invited to the ground but specifies two practical reasons why the clubs are tempted to make the police be in charge (Final Report, 1990, 35.). One is that the clubs carry out their duties through stewards, who are often supporters themselves, often inexperienced and physically not fit enough to deal with unruly customers, are underpaid and not always committed to the task. The police, however (and this is the second reason), have the duty to maintain law and order in public areas outside the stadium. They are trained and, thanks to their uniform, have the respect of the majority of spectators, who fear the law, thus they have far more authority than the stewards do. Therefore, and also because they have the control room, the CCTV, a communications system to co-ordinate deployed officers around the ground and reserves at their disposal, whenever there is misbehaviour or disorder, the police will inevitably be called to take control. Taylor quotes a submission from the Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland (ACPO), which says that *'dual responsibility for safety is a recipe for confusion'*. Since the police will always seize the initiative in a crisis, will never accept direction from stewards and stewarding will never be able to cope without some law enforcement backup, the police should have prime responsibility for controlling the crowd. Taylor also notes that clubs are tempted to leave it all to the police if they are not required to make realistic payment for police services. He describes the contemporary practice, according to which recovering costs of policing inside the grounds varied greatly from place to place. It either involved the actual cost of the officers attending the stadium or depended on the risk category or the size of the crowd involved, or, in certain cases was entirely arbitrary. Taylor suggests that it would be more economical to recruit fully trained (with the help of the police), efficient, fit and active stewards or hire security firms to man gates, direct spectators to the correct areas and to their seats, keep gangways clear, monitor the density of packing in pens or enclosures. This way they could reduce the number of police deployed, whose authority would mainly be needed at high-risk matches. He also proposes that the clubs and the local police force should have a written statement of intent, setting out their respective functions for crowd control (Final Report, 1990, 37.). Taylor thinks that the definition of the tasks of police commanders is also of major importance, since the ultimate control of any match lies with them. They must decide on the number and positions of the officers deployed, whether or not to postpone kick-off, stop the

match, evacuate the ground or any area of it. Whereas experienced commanders have the necessary skills and special knowledge of the problems at their particular ground, new commanders must be trained for such functions at specific courses where they could also pool experience and find solutions to common problems (Final Report, 1990, 38.). Going back to Hungary, it is an interesting fact that according to the 1948 regulation issued by the Ministry of Interior nobody was allowed to be in the field during the game, apart from the 22 players, the referee and the linesmen. Only the representatives of the football associations, one doctor, one trainer per team and the reserves (at international matches) were allowed to sit on the inner side of the barrier that separated the field from the spectators. It was the duty of the referee to punish the breach of discipline and to remove unruly players from the field. The referee was obliged to carry out all the orders of the police officer-on-duty appointed to the match concerning the maintenance of order, precisely, without any comments, otherwise the officer-on-duty was authorised to stop the match immediately. Taylor, too, thought that policing activities should be carried out in a reliable way, based on collected intelligence and appropriate risk analysis, applying the most optimal number of staff. He suggested that the police and the clubs should split the costs of securing safety. Higher levels of order meant saving significant sums of money in terms of the number of police staff. While in the mid-1980s there were 74 supporters per one police officer, from 2003 the ratio was halved with 161 supporters per one police officer. According to Hungarian police statistics, today at a high-risk soccer match with 5.000 spectators there are usually 171 police officers and a 100-strong private security team. Taylor viewed securing safety as a complex system with prevention being primary. He reviewed the whole philosophy of security from selling tickets to the visiting team returning home. His report established that the police had prime responsibility for the Hillsborough tragedy. In accordance with Taylor's suggestions and the regulations defined by the Council of Europe, UEFA supported the transformation of stadiums into all-seated grounds for its system of competitions.

This was one of the 76 recommendations Taylor formulated for the sake of more secure sports events. The most important ones of these concerned the following:

- Advisory Design Council
- National Inspectorate and Review Body
- Maximum Capacities for Terraces
- Filling and Monitoring Terraces
- Gangways
- Fences and Gates

Crush Barriers
Duties of Each Football Club
Police Planning
Communications
Offences and Penalties
Green Guide (Ibid. Final Report, 1990, 76-82).

In his Report, Taylor devotes a separate chapter to police planning and control and the provision of an appropriate and efficient police control room. While he acknowledges the activities of the police in maintaining order at sports events and especially in and outside football stadiums and praises the police staff for their invaluable work, being subjected to abuse and having no thanks for the service they provide every week, he underlines the responsibility of some senior officers in what happened at Hillsborough. He admits that it is human fact for the officers to react to the stress and provocation they have to endure and that in the confusion of a crowded scene requiring firm police action it is difficult to select the innocents and free them from the measures taken. Therefore, it is very important to have high-standard police discipline and self-control and friendly relations with supporters. Also, firm control should be balanced with good humour and patience. The police officers should be trained to recognise crowd density and signs of distress and should take immediate measures if necessary. A chief officer from each police force should be nominated to liaise with the management of each football club concerned. Planning should involve providing sufficient reserves to enable rapid deployment of officers to be made at any point inside or outside the ground. Arrest procedures should be optimised so that an arresting officer will not be away from his post for long. The option to postpone kick-off should be in the discretion of the officer in command at the ground. In the Police Control Room, which should be inside the ground, the results of all closed circuit television monitoring outside and inside the ground and the record of numbers admitted to any area of the ground should be available and the officers in the control room should interpret these data. These rooms should be well placed, with a good view of the whole pitch and the spectator areas, of sufficient size and well equipped with radios, telephones, and CCTV screens. There should be room for the Commander, his deputy and enough officers to operate the equipment, as well as others who may need to visit the room from time to time (other senior officers, club management or a member of the emergency services) (Final Report, 1990, 42.). Command points also help police work significantly in Hungary today. Several stadiums have modern command points, the one in Groupama Arena being the most up-to-date,

equipped with 200 high-definition cameras and 3 mobile cameras to assist the police. We should also mention the development of the new Puskás Ferenc Stadium under construction, where the designs for the security system were made following the German pattern. In this facility, too, there will be an independent command point with a detention room and interview rooms. In fact, there will be a miniature police station having the latest technological equipment (Tóth, 2018, 632.). Taylor also thought it was important to enumerate the measures to be taken in order to avoid congestion and panic. In his Report, he calls the attention to the risk of congestion outside turnstiles and consequent injuries or disorder, especially if there is only a limited number of turnstiles and because a large proportion of the crowd usually arrives late, during the last 20 minutes before kick-off. This leads to the building up of queues, followed by anxiety among those waiting, who fear they will not get in for the kick-off. Crowd noise from the ground, when the teams are out, increases impatience. There is also a real danger of pressure towards the turnstiles causing injuries and panic resulting in disorder. Taylor points out that since the national membership scheme has been introduced, all spectators passing through the turnstiles must produce their membership cards for checking, for which some additional time should be allocated. The Statement of Requirements (SOR) for the national membership scheme also provides that the six basic checks should add no more than 1 second to each entry. Whether this can be achieved even in unfavourable conditions depends on the procedures at the turnstiles and on the technology applied.

The process at the turnstile may be delayed if, for example, the card has expired. In this case the card has to be retained and the turnstile operator is required to make out and give the holder a receipt for it (containing either the membership number or some other method to identify the retained card later) and explain the procedure for redeeming the card later.

Other cases in which the process is delayed are:

- if the turnstile alarm alerts the operator to a banned, lost or stolen card or pass-back, in which case the suspect is to be apprehended by the police;
- if there is no card or the card is presented at the wrong turnstile – in this case the spectator is turned back from the entry point.

Discussing technology, Taylor underlines that the required computerised system will be the first of its kind (let us not forget that the Report was presented in 1990). It will need to cope with the massive numbers of people, in a short period of time and in all types of weather conditions, therefore he suggests that great caution and a very extensive testing procedure should be applied. He refers to

the Football Identity Card Scheme in the Netherlands, which involved only five clubs with a bad history of hooliganism and applied only to the away matches of those clubs. The scheme failed; ticket sales were not controlled effectively, and away supporters were admitted without tickets. Also, the clubs were hostile to the scheme and those opposing the experiment joined their forces. Taylor, however, thinks that this failure should not deter those backing the implementation of a totally different scheme proposed in the 1989 Football Spectators Act. Using the lesson learnt from the Dutch example, the British scheme should be built on smart cards that can store a lot of relevant information and that show (when the holder passes it over a reader) whether the card is valid, doubtful or invalid. Taylor says he was impressed by the demonstration of the smart card but expresses his doubts whether the system is going to work with multiple turnstiles, among adverse weather conditions, with a large national referral database to be searched and with people trying to circumvent or wreck the system. He also quotes the concerns of the ACPO as regards the efficiency and reliability of the technology. The technophobia of those expressing disbelief about computer systems (*'All our experience to date has been that computer salesmen have offered much and delivered little.'*) today may even seem amusing but at the time with even thoroughly tested computers frequently going down at airports, causing delays at check-in, computer errors in banks, etc. those fears were realistic and the police were right when they felt that they had to *'be involved in the specification for any technology and would need to be satisfied that it works before support could be given to this scheme.'* They were justly afraid of the consequences of repeated failure, hostile queues and endless delays. Taylor also emphasizes that the scheme could cause very dangerous build-ups, but the solution in the London Underground, where they had to provide manned entrance channels alongside the computerised ones, would not work in football grounds, because the main point of the system is to exclude hooligans by computer checking (Final Report, 1990, 67.). By now the system of membership cards have become reality. It goes without saying that the organisers of high-risk sports events may apply an access control system when selling club cards, season passes or entrance tickets and may check the identity of the spectator against the data of this system on entry. Club cards and football cards have been introduced in Hungary, too. Club cards are linked to associations. Football cards are a special type of club cards, issued by the Hungarian Football Federation for those who are not linked to any clubs and mainly attend the matches of national teams. Taylor emphasized the importance of club or membership cards already in 1989. He states that it must have the member's photograph, name, full membership number, the expiry date, the name of the club he belongs to and the membership

number in a machine readable form to allow rapid matching of the card against the national referral file (Final Report, 1990, 63.). According to the Sport Act, in Hungary the legal basis for data processing is provided by the consent of the holder of the membership card. The processed data are the name and the place and date of birth. The management of the home address is only necessary if the spectator is refused by the organiser. The identity of the spectator can be checked before the purchase of the ticket and on entry. It is an interesting fact that the legislation does not differentiate between ordinary and VIP tickets, which may lead to a number of problems. Disorderly fans at sports events can be subject to criminal prosecution or infringement proceedings. Exclusion from the stadium because of offences related to attending sports events may be applied as a secondary or an independent measure. The spectators' visits to sports events were regulated in detail already in the ancient times. The tool of exclusion from the grounds was also applied by the Romans but the range of those concerned was defined in a broader sense than today, since people were banned from watching the games not only for law enforcement reasons but also on grounds of public morality. Today tickets must not be sold to people in the sports policing records who are therefore excluded, prohibited or banished from the events, and thus they must not be admitted to them. A club card is a certificate endorsed with a photograph, suitable for the identification of a spectator, also entitling him to benefits. Personal identities may also be checked by way of biometric means. Personal data may only be used in the case of criminal procedures or infringement proceedings initiated in relation to a sports event or in the case of an exclusion from sports events. Taylor also underlines the importance of exclusion. He states that it could be enforced by two additional measures, namely attendance centre order (the offender must attend at an appointed centre on the occasions of designated football matches) and those refusing it would be liable to further penalties, including imprisonment. The rationale behind it is that merely banning someone from the matches does not ban their presence near the ground. Taylor refers to a similar provision in Part II of the 1989 Football Spectators Act relating to foreign matches and section 17 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982, which empowers courts to make attendance centre orders for young people under 21, with a minimum length of 12 hours and a maximum of 24 and 36 hours for persons under 17 and between 17 and 20 respectively (Final Report, 1990, 55.). We can undoubtedly state that Hungary is a sporting nation. We organise a large number of national and international sports competitions. In 2017 the police were involved in securing the safety of about 1800 sports events. The organisation of conducting sports events is a very complex task, especially in the case of larger or international ones. The number of such events is growing every

year, while securing safety has become one of the most important aspects of their management. Security measures at the same time must be implemented in such a way that the public and the supporters should not be discouraged from attending these sports events, since football, for example, provides a sports experience and excitement for the supporters. Fans usually identify themselves with the positive social, sports and historical content represented by their team, which is clearly manifested in the fans' chants, too. Many supporters are given the opportunity to assume a role that they cannot typically have in everyday life. At a match a fan may become a leader; he can undergo the experience of having power and feel dominant. Many supporters view the world as a system of complex relations but during a match they can create a world reflecting more transparent relationships. Whether their team win or lose, they can easily have a sense of achievement. They often try to create chaos so that it will be followed by a kind of new order, where they can behave according to different rules (Végh, 2001, 40.). In 2011 a representative public-opinion poll was conducted in Hungary, focussing on the factors that prevent people from visiting matches. One of the most frequent answers was that people did not consider stadiums safe enough. In the questionnaire-based research I conducted in 2018 I sought answers to exactly the same questions. I presented the findings in a monograph in my publication of 2019 (Tóth, 2019, 63-67.).

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URL3: *Leomló lelátók, megvadult tömeg - Amikor a stadionok pokollá változtak [Sinking stands, crowds going berserk – When stadiums turn to hell]*.

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