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## Granica i transnacionalizam: graniĭari i prelaznici granica

APSTRAKT: Nauĭni rad ispituje naĭin pojavljivanja granice u mađarskoj knjiŭevnosti. Granice kao taĭke ili linije koje za ljude postaju specijalna taĭka i linija jer se tamo uvek deĭava neĭto i jer tamo, dok ljudi ĭekaju, oni promiĭljaju svoje ŭivote. U doba transnacionalizma – ĭak i ako su u okviru Evropske unije granice postale otvorenije – to je i dalje vaŭno za stanovnike Balkana, pa i za Mađare u Srbiji. Narative i ŭivotne priĭe u vezi sa prelaskom granice postaju vaŭan deo identiteta u kojem „Ja” u kontekstu „Nas” i „Njih” dobija novu dimenziju.

KLJUĭNE REĭI: transnacionalizam, migracija, granice, integracija, mađarska knjiŭevnost

Kao graniĭar sam sluŭio 1991. i 1992. godine u jugoslovenskoj i kasnije u srpskoj vojsci. Ćuvanje srpsko-mađarsko-rumunske krajine bilo je u domenu kikiĭskog bataljona. Ja, kao bataljonski pisar nisam patrolirao na granici, ali sam radio dve nedelje baĭ kod tromeđe na karauli u Rabi kao prevodilac, kod takozvanih elektriĭnih izviĭaĭa. Taĭnije, moj zadatak je bio da osluĭkujem mađarsku vojsku, i otkrijem da li ĕe nas napasti, to jest: ŭpijunirao sam... Naravno, taj posao je bio smeĭan, mađarskoj vojsci uopĭte nije padalo na pamet da uradi tako neĭto. Ali bila je to jedna od najstraĭnijih, a moŭda i najstraĭnija nedelja u mom ŭivotu – bili smo zatvoreni tamo zajedno, nas otprilike dvadesetoro, na niĭijoj zemlji, a u takvim uslovima ljudi neizbeŭno idu jedni drugima na ŭivce. Mnogi su se nedavno vratili sa fronta, ŭtaviĭe veĭ su bili rezervisti, ŭeljni da se ŭto pre vrata kuĭi. Zvaniĭno je i meni ostalo samo par nedelja do kraja, i nisam puno mario ni za ŭta. Tada veĭ, naravno, u naĭoj jedinici nije bilo nijednog slovenskog, hrvatskog, bosanskog, albanskog, makedonskog vojnika, samo Srbi i ja. Taĭnije, bio je jedan polu Srbin, polu Mađar kog sam poznao od ranije, ĭak smo bili u dobrim odnosima, ali nije znao ni reĭ mađarskog.

U to vreme se odvijala Olimpijada u Barseloni, na kojoj su „mali-Jugosloveni” imali pravo nastupa samo u pojedinaĭnoj konkurenciji. A plivaĭica Kristina Egersegi je reĭala mađarske zlatne medalje. Kad je dobila i ĭetvrtu, jedva sam se izvukao da me ovaj kolega ne izmlati, jer je u psovkama i huljenju na etniĭkoj osnovi dosegao takve razmere da viĭe nije mogao nadmaĭiti ni samog sebe, mada bilo mu je pri ruci i napunjeno oruŭje koje vojnici graniĭari uvek nose sa sobom... Tada su nas, na moju sreĭu prekomandovali i pozvali me nazad na bazu. Napomenuo bih da sam se prilikom regrutacije kao dobrovoljac namerno prijavio baĭ u ovaj rod vojske, jer je i moj otac bio graniĭar i priĭe koje sam ĭuo u detinjstvu su bile priliĭno egzotiĭne, a pored toga to mi se ĭinilo i smislenijim: ĭuvati

granicu umesto da trunem u nekoj kasarni. U to vreme, naravno, nisam ni slutio da će tokom ratova sve biti potpuno drugačije.

Onda sam tamo na karauli konačno saznao šta se sve odvija na granici – u svakom smislu. Geografske granice su bile najmanje važne, a mnogo su bile važnije – barem u njihovom odnosu prema meni – one etničke. Gde se nalaze granice između nas, i što je još važnije: zašto? Vojnika, koji je i inače bio na granici ludila, dodatno je nerviralo što sam ja često čituckao u svom slobodnom vremenu – u „biblioteci“, to jest među knjigama koje su se prostirale na ukupno jednoj polici. Pronašao sam knjigu Ive Andrića „Na Drini ćuprija“, o kojoj smo, naravno, učili u srednjoj školi, ali bila je ogromna revelacija pročitati je, naročito u originalu. Dve decenije kasnije, gostujući kod mađarskih prijatelja u Holandiji, nabasao sam na mađarsko izdanje, koje je, povrhu svega, preveo zemljak iz mog sela: kao da sam čitao neku sasvim drugu knjigu: nije stvaralo nikakvu atmosferu. Suština je: činjenica da sam čitao i listao knjige, a ne neki erotski magazin, sama po sebi je prouzrokovala barem isto toliko veliki gnev kod tog vojnika, kao i moja etnička pripadnost. E, da su znali da su troje od mojih osam pradeda i prababa bili Švabe... U svemu ovome je, naravno, najvažnija pouka da postoji jedna zaista stroga, zla, neizdrživa granica: granica jedne zatvorene zajednice, gde je malo ljudi zaključano zajedno, pa uništavaju jedni druge psihički, mentalno i fizički.

Ja sam, u principu, pošao u vojsku pripremljen – čak i u književnom smislu. Kao i mnogim drugim tinejdžerima, roman „Škola na granici“<sup>1</sup> Geze Otlík i meni je bila i ostala upečatljiva čitalačka uspomena. Roman koji je izašao iz štampe 1959. godine jeste jedan od najznačajnijih, a možda i najznačajnije delo mađarske proze 20. veka (hrvatsko izdanje se pojavilo 1967. godine, ali u Jugoslaviji, makar po mom saznanju, nije pridobilo mnogo pažnje). Radnja se odvija u vojnoj školi u Kesegu (Kőszeg), gde se obučavaju kadeti tinejdžeri, i to u 1920-im godinama, kada su nakon Trianona („prisajedinjenja“) premestili ovu školu ratnih kadeta u taj mali grad pored austrijsko-mađarske granice. Strogi i frustrirani oficiri egzerciraju decu gvozdenom disciplinom, a među đacima se formiraju hijerarhijski odnosi i nastaju bande, koje su često i nemilosrdnije i od oficira prilikom međusobnih obračuna. Svako mora da se izbori za svoju poziciju kako bi preživio – izgrađuju se prijateljstva i dečaci čuvaju leđa jedni drugima, ali je sve to veoma krhko. Uvek se nađe i poneki buntovnik koji razbije dominantnu grupu – moglo bi se reći: izdajom, cinkarenjem. Ali možemo reći i ovako: izgovaranjem istine.

Jedno je čitati o ovakvom svetu, a sasvim je druga stvar proživeti sve to, i to sa jedva 19-20 godina. Ispostavilo se da književnost ne pomaže puno u pripremi za vojsku, ali itekako pomaže posle, u razumevanju. Roman je inače od sedamdesetih godina postalo takvo kultno delo, da ga je Peter Esterhazi u celini prepisao rukom, na jednu jedinu poveću kartonsku hartiju, pišući redove jednog preko drugog. „Škola na granici“ je do dana današnjeg očuvao svojstvo kultnog romana. Ako danas mađarski pisac uzme u usta reč „granica“, mora se neminovno obračunati sa nasleđem i simbolikom koji se za tu reč vezuju.

Što se samog romana tiče, možda je najmanje interesantan detalj što se ta vojna škola nalazi na granici Mađarske i Austrije. Zgrada i park su i danas impozantni i odišu duhom Austrougarske monarhije. Ako baš želimo da posmatramo stvari kroz prizmu politike, onda možemo reći da je reč o klišeju u vezi sa mutnim svetom u periodu nakon Trianona, kada jedna ruinirana i osakaćena država mora da formira novu vojsku. I profesori i oficiri traže svoje mesto: posle imperije sada su stisnuti u malu državu. Uz to, u vojsci je ranije uglavnom korišćen nemački jezik, pa i komande veoma sporo postaju mađarske.

Roman je ponajviše *Bildungsroman* (obrazovni roman), ali su granice opstale sve do današnjeg dana. Naročito u slučaju mađarskih pisaca iz Vojvodine. Naravno, bila je ta tema prisutna i u mađarskoj književnosti, osobito do 1989. godine i pada gvozdene zavese kada su mađarski državljani počeli slobodno da putuju, dok su vojvođanski Mađari već od 60-ih godina imali svetski pasoš, da bi od 1991.

1 Ottlík Géza, *Iskola a határon*, Budimpešta, Magvető, 1957.

situacija bila obrnuta (mi smo morali da ĉekamo u redovima za vizu, u to vreme ĉak i za Maĉarsku). Peter Esterhazi i Imre Kertes su objavili dve veće pripovetke na tu temu s naslovom „Jedna priĉa“,<sup>2</sup> u kojoj pišu o strahu koji nastaje kada neko prelazi maĉarsko-austrijsku granicu i oduzmu mu sakriven novac, izvreĉaju ga i ponize bez posebnog razloga... A nismo više u socijalizmu, nego u 1991. godini. Do te godine su već pali jednopartijski reĭzimi u Istoĉnoj Evropi, što je takoreći donelo slobodu. Moglo se birati izmeĉu više partija, ali se na Źelezniĉkom graniĉnom prelazu nije ništa promenilo, jer mentalitet, habitus nije moguće promeniti na izborima koji se odrĭavaju nedeljom: još uvek gospodari carinik koji ĉe onjušiti sakrivene šilinge. Budućeĝ Nobelovca primoravaju da napusti voz kod Heĉešhaloma, zato što ima kod sebe više valuta nego što je dozvoljeno, dok kod Esterhazija naĉu više forinti, ali on moĉe da nastavi svoje putovanje.

Granica od tada više nije tema maĉarske knjiŹevnosti, ali opstaje u delima vojvoĉanskih maĉarskih pisaca. Jer na granici se uvek dešava nešto, ĉak i kada se na kraju ne desi ništa, i kada srpsko-maĉarsku granicu preĉemo lagano i brzo – jer doŹiveti da se ne desi ništa, znaĉi potpuni oseĉaj sreće... Ali sada je tamo Źiĉana ograda, već je i sam prizor zastrašujuć. Graniĉari su moĉda za nijansu ljubazniji, carinici traŹe uglavnom samo cigarete i rakiju, a iz dosade se ĉak i šale sa putnicima. Ali i dalje opstaje ukorenjena misao da je granica – granica.

Jer ma koliko treba ĉekati, ništa ili satima, ionako ĉe svako zastati – voz svakako stoji u mestu sat-dva – i zato makar na desetak minuta svako moĉe da promisli: dokle je stigao, dokle smo stigli. U dnevniĉkim beleškama novosadskog pisca Lasla Vegela ĉesto se pojavljuje taj motiv, i zajedno sa njim sva Źivotna pitanja koja se vezuju uz kolektivni identitet i kolektivno pamćenje: lokalpatriotizam, biti bez domovine, niĉija zemlja, eksteritorijalnost. Poĉev od 1918. Godine, granica je uvek istaknuto mesto, jer promenom imperije Vojvodina je pripala Srbiji, Jugoslaviji. Geza Ĉat, pisac rodnom iz Subotice koji je Źiveo u Budimpešti, je u stanju bunila i paranoje dok se leĉio od narkomanije, beŹao tamo-vamo kroz srpsko-maĉarsku granicu dok ga nisu uhapsili, a na kraju je umro od predoziranja. S obzirom na to da u vojvoĉansko-maĉarskim knjiŹevnim krugovima pored DeŹea Kostolanjija njega slave i veliĉaju ponajviše od svih maĉarskih pisaca, barem što se pokojnih pisaca tiĉe, Ĉatova smrt je postala neka vrsta simbola. Prema jednoj mitologiji su ga zapravo upucali srpski graniĉari.

Posle 1945, pod uticajem jugoslovenske ideologije i zbog toga što sve do poĉetka 1960-ih godina nije bilo jednostavno putovati ĉak ni u Maĉarsku, maĉarski pisci iz Vojvodine su se naljutili ne samo na matičnu ŹrŹavu, nego – podrazumeva se – i na samu granicu. Maĉarske knjige nisu mogle da preĉu granice, a teško su i dela vojvoĉansko-maĉarskih pisaca dospevala do ĉitalaca u Maĉarskoj. Nije to drugaĉije ni danas, situacija je isto tako nepravedna i frustrirajuća, jer poboljšanju ne doprinosi puno ni postojanje interneta. Granica je i danas demarkaciona linija, mada više ne toliko koliko ranije. Ranije je nekolicina vojvoĉanskih Maĉara, naroĉito pisci i intelektualci, Źelela da na neki naĉin postane Jugosloven, oĉekivali su da njihova dela budu prevedena na juŹnoslovenske jezike, ĉak su neki od njih poĉeli da pišu na srpskohrvatskom jeziku, sve dok im Antun Šoljan nije oĉitao bukvicu, rekavši: vi ste Maĉari i nikada nećete postati Jugosloveni. Ova anegdota potiče od Otoa Tolnaija, moĉda i nije sasvim istinita. Ono što je sigurno je da je hrvatski pisac, sa kojim se Tolnai zajedno vozao ĉamcem po Jadranu, Źeleo da kaŹe da je pišĉeva domovina njegov maternji jezik, bez obzira na granice. Ili kao što se Vegel priseĉao: „Matiĉna ŹrŹava je predaleko, a Źivot preblizu“ (Véĝel, 1998: 75). A jedan od konkretnih razloga je svakako bila zatvorena političko-ideološka granica – kao što je izjavio Oto Tolnai: „zbog gvozdene zavese mi smo se potpuno okrenuli jugoslovenskoj knjiŹevnosti i Jugoslaviji“ (Tolnai, 1986: 63).

O tome da je pitanje kulturološke granice još komplikovanije, svedoĉi i to što u krugovima maĉarskih knjiŹevno-umetniĉkih intelektualaca svake godine plane bar jedan skandal u vezi sa ovom temom.

2 Kertész Imre, „Jegyzókönyv“ – Esterházy Péter, „Élet és irodalom“, Budimpešta, Magvetó – Századvég, 1993.

Mada svi znaju da je asimetrija centra i periferije nerešiva, makar zbog institucija – uvek u glavnom gradu ima najviše fakulteta, pozorišta, muzeja, medija, itd. Naspram toga što Mađarskoj i danas postoji puno značajnih književnih časopisa i van glavnog grada i van granica matice, pisci iz provincije i dalje se često žale zbog toga što ako nisi u Budimpešti – ne postojiš, što, na ovaj način iskazano nije istinito. I naspram toga što je veliki deo, možda čak i polovina stanovnika glavnog grada došla iz provincije ili im preci potiču iz provincije, čak i ti uspešni pisci koji su se preselili u Budimpeštu povremeno frustrirano iskažu da Budimpešta nije otvoren grad, da žitelji Budimpešte potcenjuju provincijalce, da starosedeoći isključuju, ograničavaju ljude koji su poreklom iz provincije.

Ako sada ne uzmemo u obzir da jedan deo budimpeštanskih intelektualaca vuče svoje poreklo iz provincije, što bi trebalo da ukazuje na to da kao provincijalci ograničavaju druge provincijalce, tu se suočavamo sa problemom koji se može dobro opisati na teorijskoj razini pomoću teorije polja i kapitala Pjera Burdjea.<sup>3</sup> Ukratko: unutar polja se nalaze granice, koje su u ovom slučaju povezane sa količinom moći, to jest sa institucionalnom pozicijom i priznatošću – a sve to zavisi od toga ko koliko ima kapitala na polaznoj tački i koliki je kasnije stekao: prikupljeni kulturni i naučni kapital, koji se može konvertovati u finansijski kapital. Kada govorimo o prelasku granice unutar polja, o tome kako se nečiji položaj može menjati, tada treba da ukažemo na činjenicu da se dete koje pohađa neku elitnu školu u glavnom gradu i čiji su roditelji intelektualci sasvim drugačije socijalizuje u odnosu na dete koje je živelo van granica države u nekom mađarskom selu u Vojvodini – jer, kako obično kažu: nije mu pao klavir na glavu dok je bio dete, iliti nije imao francusku guvernantu. Kakve će komunikacijske sposobnosti imati neko ne zavisi samo od školovanja i od toga kako su sa njim razgovarali roditelj i vršnjaci – komunikacija, razumevanje, sposobnost argumentacije može i treba da se podučava, ali ako neko ne postane sposoban da sasluša Drugu osobu, a pored toga je ljut, besan, to jest ima „ressentiment“, tamo onda ne pomaže nikakav diplomatski pasoš.

Ipak, sve je to anahrono u slučaju pisaca i umetnika, što znači da velik kulturni kapital nije dovoljan, potrebna je i darovitost i puno rada. I kao što sam već nagovestio: komunikacija – što je, naravno, u principu, trivijalna konstatacija. Daću i jedan dobar primer: pisac Adam Bodor, rodom iz Kluž-Napoke, koji je dosta svog slobodnog vremena proveo u planinarenju po planinama Transilvanije, na Karpatima, 1982. godine se preselio u Budimpeštu i njegovi romani i kratke priče postigle su ogroman uspeh. Veliki deo njegovih dela odigrava se na jednom neimenovanom mestu, negde u Karpatima, u Transilvaniji, a njegove protagoniste takođe je teško identifikovati, barem po njihovim imenima: ne zna se da li su Mađari, Rumuni ili eventualno Turci. Ljudi nesigurnog porekla, neodređenog identiteta (mađarska reč za atribut „neodređen“ je reč „határozatlan“, koja u sebi sadrži „granicu“, jer „határ“ znači: granica...), ili možda imaju više porekla, dvostruki identitet, pa su i višejezični – odnosno prelaznici granica, ali ujedno i proskribovani, sumnjivi, ponekad im ni papiri nisu ispravni, jer dolaze „iz ničega“. A uvek je prisutan i graničar, policajac, šumar – čuvar, koji bi čuvao imaginarnu granicu ili možda onu stvarnu.<sup>4</sup>

Radnja romana *Zona Sinistra* se odigrava među Karpatima – a ta regija pak predstavlja sredinu Evrope.<sup>5</sup> A jedan od njegovih romana se odigrava u mestu Verhovina – kuda voz, ako uopšte i prolazi, bez reda vožnje dolazi, jer su ga ukinuli.<sup>6</sup> Njegova zbirka novela koja se pojavila ove godine, veoma simbolično nosi naziv: *Nigde*.<sup>7</sup> (U zagradi: povodom migracione krize koja se odvija poslednjih nekoliko godina i miliona ljudi koji pristižu u Evropu, mnogi uglavnom zaboravljaju da se posle Drugog svetskog

3 Vidi npr. Pjer Burdje, „Gazdasági tőke, kulturális tőke, társadalmi tőke“, in Angelusz Róbert (szerk.), *A társadalmi rétegződés komponensei*, Budimpešta, Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó, 1999, 156-177.

4 Zbirka izabranih pripovetki sa kojim je postao poznatiji i pred širom publikom: *Vissza a fülesbagolyhoz*, Pečuj, Jelenkor, 1992.

5 Vidi npr. Bodor Ádám, *Sinistra körzet. Egy regény fejezetei*, Budimpešta, Magvető, 1992.

6 Bodor Ádám, *Verhovina madarai. Változatok végnapokrai*, Budimpešta, Magvető, 2011.

7 Bodor Ádám, *Sehol*, Budimpešta, Magvető, 2019.

rata odvijala mnogo veća migracija, više desetina miliona ljudi je potražilo utočište samo u Evropi, često bez papira.)

„I ja sam uvek dobar putnik a loš pri stizanju na odredište, kao što Tomas Bernhard tvrdi o sebi. Volim da budem na putu, to jest da budem nigde“ (Kertész, 1993: 33) – napisao je Imre Kertes u svom već citiranom delu, pre skoro tri decenije, a Tomas Bernhard je to rekao o sebi još pre njega. A možemo dodati i da uprkos žičanim ogradama na granicama balkanskih i srednjoevropskih država, onom ko ne dolazi iz Azije i Afrike, nego je Evropljanin, često nije potreban ni pasoš kako bi prešao kroz granicu, dovoljna mu je i lična karta. Za milione ljudi biti na putu više nije jednako sa bivstvovanjem nigde, već sa bivstvovanjem svugde, ili barem na dva mesta, u dva doma, u dve države. Migriranje, bivstvovanje u dve države, ali i odlazak na mesec-dva, to jest gastarbajterstvo, čak i na dnevnom nivou, što u slučaju Mađarske važi za sve susedne države, čak u oba pravca – postala je deo svakodnevice miliona u poslednjih 10-20 godina. Gledajući u procentima, Moldaviju napušta najviše ljudi, ali i Rumuniju, Ukrajinu, i naravno sve balkanske zemlje su tu među najvećim emiterima. Za bivše Jugoslovene je sve to poznato već od 1960. godine, naravno i u knjiŕevnosti, odnosno u štampi je oduvek bila prisutna ova tema, a prisutna je i dan danas.

Ono što danas stručna literatura naziva transnacionalizmom, ipak je nova pojava u više pogleda.<sup>8</sup> Oni koji su u socijalizmu emigrirali iz Jugoslavije iz bilo kojih razloga, ali čak i italijanski, portugalski, grčki, turski i ostali gastarbajteri su planirali da će se vratiti – i već u aktivnim godinama počeli su da grade kuće i gazdinstva u svojoj domovini. U slučaju eks-Jugoslovena to se često osujetilo zbog južno-slovenskih ratova. Druga generacija, čiji su mnogi pripadnici već rođeni u inostranstvu, a naročito treća generacija, koja više ni ne govori jezik svojih predaka, nisu više migranti ali često opstane dvostruka povezanost i u njima nastaje čak i neka vrsta nacionalizma, baš zbog toga što ih neko određeno društvo ne prihvata ili oni sami nisu sposobni ili ne žele da se integrišu.

Za prethodnu šemu se moglo reći da je bila jednostavna: migrant prelazi granicu, ostavlja za sobom teritoriju jedne države i privremeno boravi u drugoj, tamo radi, ali socijalni kapital mu se ne menja puno – vojvođanski Mađar koji radi u Nemačkoj održava veze sa svojim plaćidrugarima koji su tamo i sa onima koji su ostali kod kuće. Ako se provodi, onda ide na takozvane jugo-ŕurke – to se i dan danas dešava, čak i u slučaju Mađara u Budimpešti. Nije u mogućnosti da se asimilira na zapadu, jer s jedne strane ne poznaje jezik, a s druge strane ni većinsko društvo ne želi da ga prihvati. Šalje novac kući, familiji, možda ulaŕe u nešto kod kuće, a pomaŕe i rođacima i poznanicima koji žele da emigriraju. Nije to drugačije ni danas, s tim da se u međuvremenu razvila dobro organizovana, ali često ilegalna transnacionalna industrija, čije se delovanje prostire od legalnog poslovanja kroz negu starijih osoba u sivoj zoni, pa sve do prostitucije. Danas je to mnogo lakše zahvaljujući umreŕenosti društva, mobilnim telefonima i internetu ili zahvaljujući brzom i jednostavnijem saobraćaju, kao što su na primer jeftini letovi. Granica i granična kontrola postala je gubljenje vremena i oteŕava protok predmeta i potrošačkih artikala uz koje se migranti emocionalno vezuju, na primer paprike, ćevapi, rakija, zakuska. Ne vredi što na primer u Londonu skoro svaka nacija ima celu svoju mreŕu radnji – a tamo živi barem sto nacija – ipak je drugačije ono što je *domaće*, poreklom iz *domovine*.

Migracija kao sredstvo mobilnosti – i ovde ne treba podrazumevati samo mobilnost u geografskom smislu, nego u društveno-privrednom smislu takođe, što može rezultirati blagostanjem, to jest

8 U vezi stručne literature o transnacionalizmu vidi: Váradi Monika Mária, „Elméleti kaleidoszkóp – a migrációs tapasztalatok értelmezési lehetőségei“, in: szerk. Váradi Monika Mária, *Migráció alulnézetből*, Budimpešta: Argumentum – MTA KRTK RKI, 2018, 13-42. U ovoj knjizi možemo čitati studije o transnacionalnoj migraciji Roma na severu Mađarske i o njihovim iskustvima o mobilitetu; o nastanku socijalnih mreŕa; o kućnoj nezi starih osoba, o sluŕkinjama novog doba; o položaju ŕena iz malih sela na globalnom tržištu rada; o deci koja se iseljavaju i o onima koji ostaju kod kuće, a možemo upoznati i razne porodične priče. Na prostorima nekadašnje Jugoslavije istraŕivanje migracije, odnosno istraŕivanje posledica prelaska granice je počelo već ŕezdesetih godina prošlog veka na univerzitetima u Zagrebu i Beogradu, a kasnije se razvilo u istraŕivačkim centrima.

promenom kvaliteta Źivota – svima u srednjeistočnoj Evropi i na Balkanu je doŹivljaj od Źivotnog zna-čaja: pa tako i onima koji su ostali kući, jer čekaju povratak oca ili majke iz emigracije (a raspadanje porodica i razvodi se dešavaju upravo zbog rastavljenog Źivota), čekaju povratak deteta, unuka, brata, sestre, prijatelja, poznanika. Sklapaju nove Źivotne strategije, bilo da je reč o edukaciji dece ili o penzionom osiguranju, ali se menja habitus i u vezi učenja stranih jezika i upoznavanja drugih kultura. A usput, misao da je *naša kultura* bolja, jedina prava i prednjači ispred svih, postaje element identiteta. U doba transnacionalizma rastu upravo nacionalizmi i ksenofobija i u krugovima onih koji ostaju, a i kod onih koji odlaze u inostranstvo.

Samo je prividni paradoks to što globalna transnacionalna mreŹa u isti mah povećava broj veza – emigrantima se u većini slućajeva povećava socijalni kapital, jer često menjaju radna mesta, odlaze i u druge gradove, Źive u mnogo većim stambenim zajednicama, pa čak i na radničkim prenoćistima – a u isti mah uvećava i dezintegrisanost. Oni koji su ostali kod kuće, Źale se na usamljenost, a emigranti kaŹu – barem po iskustvima mog londonskog istraŹivanja – da to što Źive u gradu od deset miliona stanovnika nema znaćaja, većinsko društvo ih ne prihvata. Čak ni one koji poseduju – barem po mađarskim standardima – najviši stepen poznavanja engleskog jezika i rade na svom drugom doktoratu, jer, kako je jedan od njih rekao: teŹe je ući u elitne univerzitetske krugove i postati deo engleskog aristokratskog društva, nego što je afrićkom izbeglici kroz Źičanu ogradu proći. I oni u Engleskoj ne vaŹe više za Mađare, nego se prema njima ophode kao prema Istočnoevropljanima, a Mađari to, što ih svrstavaju u istu grupu sa Poljacima, Rumunima ili Ukrajincima, doŹivljavaju kao uvredu. To što je neki Mađar u dobrim odnosima sa kolegom iz Azije ili popije pivo sa Afganistancem, ne znači da postoji mogućnost za razvoj prisnijeg prijateljstva ili ljubavne veze. Dakle, sve što osoba koja sebe naziva belim Mađarem dobija i doŹivljava od strane većinskog društva (koje se uvek pojavljuje u oblićju nadređenog), uzvraća onima koji nisu beli, koje on gleda prezrivo i koje ni on ne bi nikad prihvatio. Jedan vojvođanski Mađar koji je postao Austrijski drŹavljanin i već dvadeset godina Źivi u Beću mi je vickastim tonom isprićao tokom intervju-a, oćekujući da ja razumem, kako ga je kolega iz Pakistana sa kojim je radio na gradilištu pitao odakle je, na šta je on besno odgovorio da je on kod kuće, on ne potiće niotkuda, jer je Vojvodina bila deo Austrougarske, ćiji je jedan od glavnih gradova bio Beć. On je, dakle, kod kuće. Onda je nastavio da se Źali na starosedeoce u Austriji.

Jedan drugi sagovornik koji je takođe vojvođanski Mađar i ima oko 30 godina, od pre 2 godine radi u Budimpešti, ali je često boravio i u Americi, kaŹe da su Budimpeštanci zapravo nepodnošljivi i da bi radije otišao na zapad. A pošto je Źiveo i studirao u Novom Sadu, ima nostalgiju za domovinom i nedostaje mu taj mentalitet koji je doŹiveo i posvojio u Vojvodini, na Balkanu. Ponosno je rekao da su na jednom razgovoru za posao protumaćili kao prednost činjenicu da je on Mađar, ali ipak, drugaćiji Mađar, jer ume da lupi šakom o sto. Njemu nedostaje Balkan, taćnije oni kulturni obrasci i mesta koja u doba transnacionalizma mogu da izgrade i saćuvaju samo veće zajednice, kao što su na primer njujorški Jevreji.

Ali nipošto ne bi trebalo da pomislimo da je njima bilo lako. Da nema nićeg novog pod suncem što se prelaska granice tiće, lepo potkrepljuje knjiga Martina Polaka „Amerićki car“,<sup>9</sup> koja se bavi velikom galicijskom emigracijom koja se odvijala između 1880. i 1990. godine. Iako nemamo na raspolaganju sigurne podatke, znamo da se radilo o više miliona ljudi, od kojih su moguće čak pedeset odsto bili Jevreji. Naspram široko rasprostranjenosti ubedenosti jevrejski emigranti su takođe bili siromašni, često i nepismeni, baš kao i slovaćki, rusinski i poljski seljaci. Ali među posrednicima, onima koji su podstrekivali ljude da emigriraju, bilo je dosta Jevreja – jer su se i inaće bavili trgovinom i uslugama – i bilo je

9 Martin Polak, *Az amerikai császár*, Budimpešta, L'Harmattan, 2019 (*Kaiser von Amerika. Die grosse Flucht aus Galizien*, Wien, Paul Zsolnay Verlag, 2010)

dosta prevara i izrabljivanja onih koji su se odlučili da emigriraju: mala imovina koju su ostavljali za sobom je otkupljena ispod tržišne cene. Zbog toga je porastao i antisemitizam. Ipak, u to vreme svako je mogao slobodno da se iseli iz Austrougarske monarhije – kojoj je pripadala i Galicija – ukoliko bi osoba nabavila pasoš i ukoliko bi osobu pustili i kroz prusku granicu. S tim da su graničari lovili regrute, oni nisu mogli da migriraju. Sve u svemu, suština je da je nastala ogromna privredna grana, počev od hamburških i bremenskih brodarskih društava, preko stanodavaca, službenika, milicajaca, graničara, do seoskih organizatora. I svako je iskorišćavao emigrante, do poslednjeg guldena, jer su tada i tamo koristili tu novčanu jedinicu.

Šta se promenilo do dana današnjeg? Postoji internet i avion, ali sistem umreženosti i iskorišćavanja migranata je opstao – a sve se dešava mnogo brže. Kao što i Polak piše: oni koji su se bavili krijumčarenjem ljudi, prosledili su siromašne devojke u industriju prostitucije sve do Amerike, ali i u ostale delove sveta, od Istambula do Mumbaija. U Mađarskoj i dan danas postoji slična praksa kada govorimo o prostituciji – opet su siromašne devojke u ulozi žrtve, dok krijumčari, organizatori, lokalni moćnici, vlast koja žmuri – beneficiraju.

Doba lutanja nije počelo sada, a granica je i danas samo još jedna prepreka, jedna od mnogih. Ipak, pomalo ironično bih mogao reći da dok su o emigraciji iz Galicije svojevremeno pisale samo novine, ili kasnije o vojvođansko-mađarskoj emigraciji pisci i reporteri, danas imamo obimnu i veoma ažurnu stručnu literaturu iz oblasti sociologije, a isto to možemo reći i za filmsku umetnost, pozorište i dokumentarne filmove o ovoj temi.

Sa mađarskog prevela  
Kristina Orovec

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## Border and Trans-Nationalism: Border Officers and Passengers

**ABSTRACT:** The paper examines the ways in which borders appear in Hungarian literature. Borders, like dots and lines, represent specific dots and lines for people because they were always the places where something was going on, and where people reflected on their lives while waiting. At the age of trans-nationalism – even though the borders within the European Union became more open – borders are still of importance for people in the Balkans, including the Hungarians in Vojvodina. Narratives and life stories related to border crossings become an important part of the identity within which “Me” in the context of “Us” and “Them” gains a new dimension.

**KEY WORDS:** trans-nationalism, migration, borders, integration, Hungarian literature

## A határ és a transznacionalizmus: határőrök és határátlépők

**REZÜMÉ:** A tanulmány azt vizsgálja, hogy a magyar irodalomban hogyan jelenik meg a határ, mint egy olyan pont vagy vonal, amely az emberek számára kitüntetett ponttá válik, mert ott mindig történik valami, és a várakozás során átgondolják életüket. A transznacionalizmus korában – ha az Európai Unión belül nyitottabbá is váltak a határok – ez továbbra is lényeges maradt a Balkán, illetve a Szerbiában élő magyarok számára. A határátlépéssel kapcsolatos narratívák, élettörténetek az identitás egyik lényeges építőkockájává válnak, amelyben az Én a Mi és Ők kontextusában új dimenziót kapnak.

**KULCSSZAVAK:** transznacionalizmus, migráció, határok, integráció, magyar irodalom

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# Analysing EU's External Cultural Relations: Case Study on the Role of National Cultural Institutes in Croatia\*

**ABSTRACT:** For some time now, the academic and policy literature has been preoccupied with the definitions, terms and scope of the multi-layered phenomenon of cultural diplomacy. A massive aspect of cultural diplomacy is traditionally related to the establishment of national cultural institutes abroad. In the EU, the culture has been recognized as integral part of EU's external relations. The main objective of this paper is to analyse the existing EU's mechanisms for external cultural relations and, in this regard, observe the role of national cultural institutes in the youngest Member State – Croatia. Considering the institutes' long tradition of exporting culture, the questions were designed to find out whether their goals nowadays are nation-centred, or aimed at fostering the European integration processes and international cultural relations. For this purpose, a semi-structured interviews with cultural professionals in the selected national cultural institutes in Zagreb were conducted. Additional information is provided based on the content analysis of institutes' official web sites and EUNIC as the main cooperation platform for European external cultural relations. This paper has not been inspired by finding the gap in the literature – on the contrary – the proliferation of literature has encouraged me to do a research in the field which branches out in new directions.

**KEY WORDS:** EU's cultural diplomacy; EUNIC; external cultural relations; international cultural cooperation.

## INTRODUCTION

The extension of diplomacy beyond government diplomats resulted in creation of “new” forms of public diplomacy and its subsets. Although the concept of cultural diplomacy in the EU's institutional context is constrained to the actions of governmental agents (diplomats), the proliferation of a variety of non-state actors has extended diplomacy into private, non-governmental, track two, independent activities etc. (Helly, 2014: 5). This is also reflected in Milton C. Cummings' (2005: 147) broadly accep-

\* This paper is based on my thesis titled “EU's external cultural relations and the role of national cultural institutes” (Postgraduate Study of Diplomacy and International Relations, University of Zagreb, April 2019).

ted definition of *cultural diplomacy* as “the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other aspects of culture, with the intention of fostering mutual understanding” in which he does not place focus on state and its interest.

The term *EU’s external cultural relations*, is primarily employed by the EU’s institutions – notably the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission (EC) – and it refers to the EU’s cultural relations with third countries.<sup>1</sup> In short, European external cultural relations mean providing support to cultural exchanges but also including the cultural dimension in other aspects of external and development policy. According to Lisac (2014), EU’s external cultural relations could be considered as part of cultural policy or foreign policy; however, no particular department is responsible for external cultural relations. Different programmes and instruments, which fall under the responsibility of different entities, are supporting the EU’s external cultural relations. Thus, the support comes from the areas such as development, education, neighbourhood policy, etc. The activities of many Directorates-General (DGs) in the EU include cultural dimension, but it is not their responsibility to develop external cultural relations. In this sense, Lisac (2014) argues that this kind of a structure is due to the fact that the national competence in the cultural field still prevails and that the EU gained this competence much later than it was the case with other fields.

According to Isar (2015: 494 - 495) ‘culture in EU external relations’ is a far broader notion used by EU institutions in lieu of ‘cultural diplomacy’ practiced by nation-states. Thus, the EU’s external cultural relations would include both cultural cooperation and cultural relations. The actors who are engaged in the international cultural relations but are state sponsored are national cultural institutes. Considering that an important aspect of cultural diplomacy in Europe was related to the establishment of national cultural institutes abroad during the 20th century, the question arises whether their goals nowadays are nation-centred, or aimed at fostering the European integration processes and international cultural relations.

#### CULTURE AS A TOOL OF EU’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Culture is only a non-exclusive competence of EU and Member States hold the main competences concerning cultural policies. The EU’s legitimacy to act on the cultural field was for the first time enabled by the Treaty of Maastricht (formally, the Treaty on European Union or TEU) which was signed in 1992. After a longer period of time, the European primary law included a paragraph on cultural policy. The Treaty (European Union, 1992) then stated:

*The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore. [5]*

The question of maximizing the impact of culture in foreign policy has become a central theme of many recent discussions among the EU’s commissioners. The strategic use of soft power in EU’s external relations is taken more seriously into account over the last few years and the ‘culture in EU’s external relations’ became a new buzzword (Isar, 2015: 495). As repeatedly stated in different EU documents, the culture has been recognized as integral part of EU’s external relations. But – what does it really mean?

A turning point in which the culture became an integral part of the EU’s international relations was in 2007, when the European Commission put forward a “Communication on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world”. However, culture, i.e. national cultural policies, is under the *principle of subsidiarity*, and as such, is not within the exclusive competence of the EU. According to the Agenda, which was later

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<sup>1</sup> See glossary of the European Commission’s *Preparatory Action ‘Culture in EU External Relations’. Engaging the World: towards global cultural citizenship* (2014). Besides, a term ‘third countries’ “refers to all non-Member State countries, and as such, they can be European or non-European countries”. See also Lisac (2014: 11).

that year endorsed by the European Council, the EU must seek to become “an example of a ‘soft power’”. The Commission (2007: 8) defined three sets of objectives in the Agenda to be the guide for future action:

*1. promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue; 2. promotion of culture as a catalyst for creativity in the framework of the Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs; 3. promotion of culture as a vital element in the Union’s international relations.*

These three objectives are the cornerstone for the emerging European cultural policy. In order to attain the 3<sup>rd</sup> objective, the Commission (2007: 10) proposed to follow a ‘twin-track’ approach which consists of

*systematic integration of the cultural dimension and different components of culture in all external and development policies, projects and programmes [...] and support for specific cultural actions and events.*

This twin-track approach would provide a way to include cultural dimension into other areas of international relations, without disregarding its economic aspect. The next important step happened on 12 May 2011 when the European Parliament adopted the *Resolution on the cultural dimensions of the EU’s external actions*. By the Resolution, European Parliament

*emphasizes the importance of cultural diplomacy and cultural cooperation in advancing and communicating throughout the world the EU’s and the Member States’ interests and the values that make up European culture”, and “stresses the need for the EU to act as a (world) player with a global perspective and global responsibility. [22]*

Nonetheless, the Parliament

*is concerned at the fragmentation of external EU cultural policy and projects, which is hampering the strategic and efficient use of cultural resources and the development of a visible common EU strategy on the cultural aspects of the EU’s external relations. [9]*

This concern resulted in an allocated budget of €500,000 for a *Preparatory action on culture in external relations*, a document prepared by the European Commission and carried out by the *Goethe-Institut* in 2014. The report (European Commission, 2014: 132) which covered 54 countries (the 28 EU Member States, the 16 Neighbouring countries of the EU and the 10 Strategic Partnership countries) “has confirmed that cultural stakeholders in the third countries surveyed are strongly interested in broadening and deepening cultural relations with their European counterparts”. The document focused on the role of the EU in ‘global cultural citizenship’ and outlined the enhanced role of private sector actors. Helly (2017) also argues that the conclusions of the Preparatory action show “an appetite among countries and civil societies outside of the EU for more cultural relations with Europeans”, but also “fatigue (...) with EU bureaucracy.”

In June 2016, the Joint Communication towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations was presented by the European Commission, building on three important pillars:

*1. supporting culture as an engine for sustainable social and economic development; 2. promoting culture and intercultural dialogue for peaceful inter-community relations; 3. reinforcing cooperation on cultural heritage* (European Commission, 2016).

Furthermore, it introduced new elements of coordination such as cultural focal points and 139 delegations and offices operating around the world. To help implement the EU strategy for international cultural relations, an EU Cultural Diplomacy Platform<sup>2</sup> was set up in February 2016 focusing on ten strategic partners of the EU.

<sup>2</sup> Cultural Diplomacy Platform: <http://www.cultureinexternalrelations.eu/>

Eleven years after “Communication on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world” (European Commission, 2007), a “New European Agenda for Culture” (European Commission, 2018) has been adopted on 22 May 2018. The New Agenda has three objectives with three dimensions (social, economic and external), which are now described as “strategic”:

- *Social dimension – harnessing the power of culture and cultural diversity for social cohesion and well-being*
- *Economic dimension – supporting culture-based creativity in education and innovation, and for jobs and growth*
- *External dimension – strengthening international cultural relations*

In addition, two important areas of policy actions at EU level are included and envisaged to serve all three objectives: *cultural heritage* and *digital*.

These objectives are not new (in fact, they are the same as in 2007 European Agenda for Culture), but they are more thoroughly described since they specify concrete actions such as the launch of the project on “Cultural and creative spaces and cities”, implementation of Preparatory Action “Music Moves Europe”, etc. As expected, the most attention was given to the economic and social dimension, with focus on three specific “eco-systems”: education and training, cities and regions, and cultural and creative industries. In supporting the New agenda, a direct role is assigned to “Creative Europe”, a programme which supports the European cultural and creative sectors from 2014 to 2020 (European Commission, 2017).

#### Models of the EU’s external cultural relations

The Commission’s Preparatory Action “Culture in EU External Relations. Engaging the World: towards global cultural citizenship”, specifies two models, based on governments’ implementations of strategies and actions for culture in external relations. About two-thirds of the EU Member States have a decentralized model (so called *arm’s length* model) while one-third of them employ a centralized model. To illustrate with an example, France, Germany and the United Kingdom are undoubtedly the most successful countries in Europe and worldwide when it comes to cultural diplomacy.<sup>3</sup> The fact that France is having centralized model and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) acts as a supervisor of all cultural activities conducted by French agencies or cultural institutes and offices such as *Alliance française*, *Institut français* etc., also means that the *Institut français* in Paris is not responsible for the numerous *Instituts français* abroad – they are directly under the supervision of the MFA. On the other hand, both Germany and the UK have decentralized model in which the implementation of cultural and educational policies is performed independently by e.g. *Goethe-Institut* or the British Council. Despite their autonomy, they naturally operate within the general scope of priorities defined by their governments. In addition, the principal actors engaged in cultural relations in most EU Member States are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) and the Ministry of Culture (MoC) which act abroad through their embassies or / and cultural institutes and centres (European Commission, 2014: 30-31).

The same model of management (centralized – decentralized) is outlined in the KEA’s Study on European cultural institutes abroad. According to this Study (Smits et al., 2016: 30), more than half of the cultural institutes (16 out of 29 institutes from 22 EU Member States) fall within the government’s scope (e.g. Austrian *Kulturforen*, the Czech Centres, the *Institut français* and the Polish Institute). On the other hand, one third (10 out of 29 cultural institutes) are independent in their performances. The examples of such institutes are the British Council, the Danish Cultural Institute, the *Goethe-Institut* and the Hellenic Foundation for Culture. Nonetheless, the Study also notes that the both centralized

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<sup>3</sup> According to the report *The Soft Power 30* on global ranking based on a country’s soft power in 2017 (available online at <https://soft-power30.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/The-Soft-Power-30-Report-2017-Web-1.pdf>), France has secured the top spot for the year 2017, while the UK has maintained its second position two years running. In comparison to 2016, the US fell to third place, Germany slid down one place to fourth, and Canada finished at fifth.

and decentralized models are very flexible when it comes to the operational (in)dependence. For example, Austrian *Kulturforen* enjoys a certain freedom in adapting its activities, whereas certain independent legal entities (NGOs or Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs)) have inflexible, centralized models which define their actions and priorities. A very important factor in the successful managing of external cultural relations, especially when it comes to the cultural institutes, is their financial dimension. All the large as well as some medium-sized cultural institutes largely rely on private funding. Both the British Council and the *Goethe-Institut* perform independently; however, the British Council receives only 19% of its budget from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whereas the *Goethe-Institut* enjoys larger freedom and receives 72% of its budget from German MFA. Also, an independent NGO such as Dutch Culture receives 97.5% of its budget from the state (European Commission, 2014: 31).

Of course, each of governance models is faced with strengths and weaknesses. While the good thing is that the debates about culture and cultural policies have finally shifted to the implementation strategies, yet such diversity of models cannot easily satisfy current objectives of the European external cultural relations. What is certainly missing is more communication and focus on action-oriented strategic thinking between the European expert communities. It is becoming more obvious that new forms of European cultural representation in the world (aided by new technologies) are sought in order to overcome these challenges and match the diversity of European external cultural action.

#### CASE STUDY ON CULTURAL INSTITUTES IN ZAGREB, CROATIA<sup>4</sup>

This section highlights some of the main findings from the conducted semi-structured interviews with cultural professionals in the selected cultural institutes in Zagreb, Croatia. Additional information is provided based on the content analysis of institutes' official web sites and desk research of relevant literature on the subject, particularly KEA's Study on European cultural institutes abroad (Smits et al., 2016).

##### The core activities of the selected national cultural institutes

According to the main findings presented in the KEA's Study on European cultural institutes abroad (Smits et al., 2016), the promotion of national culture and language is the core activity of most cultural institutes, regardless of their size. Of course, this role should be understood more broadly.

The director of the Goethe-Institut in Zagreb highlighted that the interest of the Institute is not to present "the culture of Germany" but "culture from Germany" and "artists from Germany". According to him, national branding is a task of foreign offices, not cultural institutes. In the interview, he brought attention to the Institute's commitment to create spaces for cultural dialogue and the exchange of ideas between the nation states. He, as cultural expert (and not diplomat as he says) is concerned about the European cultural development and interested in creating regional projects.

The representative from the Embassy of Sweden in Zagreb explained how cultural diplomacy fits into their overall public diplomacy:

*Our public diplomacy aims to communicate 'the Swedish brand', meaning Sweden's values and culture. In Croatia, the Swedish embassy therefore focuses its diplomatic work on innovation, sustainability and human rights. Everything we do in terms of promotion should relate to one of these*

<sup>4</sup> Three directors, one cultural attaché and one project manager who participated in this research were coming from the following cultural institutes: Balassi Intézet (interview held on 15 February 2018); Goethe-Institut (interview held on 2 March 2018); Instituto Camões (interview held on 3 April 2018); Institut français (interview held on 8 March 2018); Österreichische Kulturforen (email correspondence from 28 February 2018). Apart from these, two diplomatic representatives, one from the Embassy of Belgium (interview held on 19 March 2018) and one from the Embassy of Sweden (email correspondence from 13-14 March 2018) gave their thoughts on this topic. Considering the fact that some countries of the EU did not establish their own cultural institute in Zagreb, I tried to obtain at least some information from the relevant embassies (cultural attachés if possible) regarding EU's external cultural relations.

*areas in some way, e.g. gender equality, climate change and start-ups. Combinations of these areas are of course possible and even better (for example sustainable transport). An event relating to one of these themes can look different in many ways. E.g. we could promote gender equality through an arts exhibition which celebrates this or show Swedish films based around Swedish culture (which we do during our annual Swedish film week). Sometimes our cultural diplomacy does not necessarily relate to one of the themes mentioned above but instead promotes Swedish art and artists.*

Having this in mind, the actions of cultural institutes are passing beyond the simple presentation of national cultures, as they nurture bilateral relations and encourage cooperation with civil societies, cultural sector and artists in the host countries. When speaking about different kinds of cooperation, the question arises whether cultural relations should be discerned as possible efficient means to gain partners in political and /or economic sense.

“The Belgian days” are a perfect example of a hybrid between cultural and economic diplomacy, says Deputy Head of Mission at the Embassy of Belgium. The idea of this event is to gather all important trade representatives in the region, promote gastronomic tourism, and organise diverse cultural activities. In April 2018, Rijeka and Opatija were the hosts cities of this two-day event, packed with concerts and exhibitions, which at the same time promote business between the two countries. The KEA’s Study highlights the role of “two-way dialogue” fostering international cultural cooperation and exchanges and collaborations of diverse artists. In this sense, cultural institutes are giving the opportunity to enrich the cultural sector but also serve as important points for opening new markets for culture and creative industries (CCIs) in Europe (Smits et al., 2016: 29).

Giving languages courses and issuing language certificates seems to be the most prominent and profitable activity of the cultural institutes. For example, from the activities such as teaching English, organizing exams and other language-related activities, the British Council earns approximately 550 million euros a year, which represents about 46 % of the British Council’s budget. In comparison, *Instituts franais* generate 73 million euros from language courses, certifications and local cultural sponsorship (Smits et al., 2016: 47).

The director of the Instituto Camŕoes works with students as a lecturer of the Portuguese language and literature at the Faculties of humanities and social sciences both in Zagreb in Zadar. This double role is appointed to her by the Foreign office in Portugal. Being located at the heart of the Faculties of humanities and social sciences in Zagreb, it is not difficult to reveal the main objective of the Institute. The Instituto Camŕoes in Zagreb is a central Balkan point where the official language certificates are being issued.<sup>5</sup>

#### Promotion of European values<sup>6</sup>

All cultural institutes (no matter the model applied) are aligned to national policies. However, the European dimension is strongly present and thus cannot be neglected by the Member States. Several cultural institutes do mention a sustained effort to promote EU values in their mission statements.

The *Ŗsterreichische Kulturforen* of Austria speaks about “contributing proactively to promoting the process of European integration”; the mission of the *Institut franais* is to “affirm the European dimension of cultural action outside of France” (Smits et al., 2016: 53). However, the majority of cultural

5 Instituto Camŕoes in Belgrade and Ljubljana offer language courses but do not have the permission to issue certificates.

6 According to the Article 3(5) and 21 of the Treaty of the European Union (available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M%2FTXT>): “(the Union) shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.”

institutes do not mention the promotion of the EU and its values in their statements or statutes. Thus, the level of promotion of the EU can be measured by observing and analysing their actions. In this regard, the research in the Study on European cultural institutes shows different levels of structure and activities of European cultural institutes (Cis): “1) the way CIs have added the promotion of the EU and its values to their mission statements or statutes; 2) the type of networks and offices that they have set up at European level; 3) how CIs collaborate in third countries; and 4) their level of participation in EU-funded projects and programmes” (Smits et al., 2016: 73).

All the interviewees in cultural institutes mentioned that they are preparing diverse activities to support the European Year of Cultural heritage 2018 and Rijeka 2020, European Capital of Culture. For most of them, Rijeka 2020 is an absolute priority in organising institute’s activities. Of course, larger institutes are more likely to promote European values and are generally more aware of the possibilities of the EU-funded projects and European programmes in third countries in which they participate.

For Goethe-Institut, the crisis in Europe presents a major challenge but also an opportunity for the Institutes to act as cultural mediators. The focus is therefore put on the networking. Within the framework of the project “Freiraum” (2017 – 2019), 38 Goethe-Instituts throughout Europe are trying to give an answer to the question: What does freedom in Europe mean today? On the occasion of the Warsaw meeting held on 4 and 5 December 2017, it was decided which two Goethe-Institutes in Europe will collaborate within the project, together with the partners. The freedom of the city of Rijeka will be questioned through the #Freiraum Rijeka (European Capital of Culture 2020) which is “facing the challenge of re-defining its industrial heritage, its local perspectives and re-design of a future city” (Goethe-Institut, 2017-2018).

One of the main mission of the Institut franais is to act for cultural diversity on a European scale through European and multilateral partnerships. In 2016, the Institute has modernized its visual identity and the logo is accompanied with the slogan “*Vivre les cultures*” (Embracing cultures). According to their web site, the Institute affirms the European dimension of French cultural action abroad through continuous participation in European projects.<sup>7</sup>

Both representatives from the French and German Institute in the interview highlighted the role of Franco-German Cultural Fund in supporting European projects. The Fund was created on 22 January 2003, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Elys e Treaty, sealing the friendship between France and Germany. It enables both countries to encourage and support co-operative initiatives conducted jointly by the French and German diplomatic networks in a third country. This program illustrates the will of France and Germany to strengthen their cooperation in the cultural field, but also and above all to affirm their commitment to European integration.

In 2016, the Institut franais and the Goethe-Institut together with three more partners launched the Cultural Diplomacy Platform, aimed at developing and strengthening the European Union’s external cultural relations.

In addition, this European dimension can be witnessed through the membership of the European Network of National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) and its clusters. When it comes to the link between EUNIC and cultural institutes in Zagreb, all interviewees mentioned collaboration among members in the framework of EUNIC Croatia<sup>8</sup> in the implementation of projects related to relevant “European” topics. Director of the Austrian Cultural Forum pointed out the role of EUNIC clusters:

7 CinEd, European Film Education for Youth (2015), C4C, Crossroads for Culture (2014-2017), One land, many faces (2014- 2015), Eclectis (May 2013 – December 2014).

8 Composed by Austrian Cultural Forum, French Institute, Goethe Institute, Hungarian Balassi Institute, Italian Cultural Institute, Institut Cervantes, Institut Camoes, and British Council.

*Within the frame of EUNIC Croatia working together with the other members on in the implementation of projects with Europe-relevant European topics (for example such as Dialogue of culture and religions, Cultural Heritage, Migration, Rijeka 2020, etc.) In this framework, we are also involved in common EU-funded projects via general EUNIC Cluster Fund Calls.*

#### Geographical outreach

The geographical outreach is of particular importance for cultural institutes. However, the Study on European cultural institutes (Smits et al., 2016) shows that only large institutes have a wide network of offices established around the world. To be more precise, 13 out of 29 have less than 40 offices abroad. In total, European cultural institutes abroad constitute a network of 1 253 offices in 184 territories, with 156 offices outside the European Union. It turns out that the highest number of open offices have the oldest and largest cultural institutes in Europe – the *Alliance française* (819 offices in 137 countries), the *Società Dante Alighieri* (423 offices in 60 countries), the *Institut français* (145 offices across 37 countries), the *Istituto Italiano di Cultura* (45 offices in 83 countries) and the British Council (191 offices in 110 countries).

In Croatia and Serbia, the Hungarian Institute has opened its doors practically at the same time, with only a few months of difference. In total, Hungary’s culture is represented by 23 Hungarian cultural institutes in 21 countries. Outside Europe, the Institutes are based in New York, New Delhi and Cairo. The Balassi Intĕzet in Vienna, Berlin, Paris, Rome, Moscow and Belgrade functions also as a Collegium Hungaricum, an international research and science centre.

The most interested in having its presence in the Balkans seems to be the *Österreichische Kulturforen*:

*Western Balkans region is extremely important for Austria – both economically and culturally. As part of its focus on the Western Balkans, the Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs has paid particular attention to this region with annual cultural favoured-country priorities”, says the Director of the Institute in her recent interview (In Focus Austria, 2017). 2017 was the Croatia-Austria Year of Culture, in which both countries were represented under the motto “Experiencing culture together”.*

#### Thematic priorities

The thematic priorities of the cultural institutes are in line with those of the European Union: migration and refugees, preventing radicalisation of young people, promotion of fundamental values (e.g. freedom of speech, gender equality etc.), cultural diversity, interreligious dialogue, social cohesion/inclusion, conflict/crisis resolution, support for the capacity development of CCS. The *new* focus on cultural diplomacy can be seen in engaging cultural institutes in intercultural dialogue with civil society in third countries. Migration is currently the most pressing topic on the agenda of national cultural institutes in Zagreb. Nearly all of the interviewees confirmed their participation in the event “Borders: Separation, Transition and Sharing” organised by the EUNIC Croatia.<sup>9</sup>

#### CULTURAL NETWORKS: IS THERE A BIGGER ROLE FOR EUNIC?

In the last thirty years, cultural networks continuously support cultural sector in international cultural cooperation. The network of the European National Institutes for Culture, EUNIC, has a spe-

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<sup>9</sup> Organised in partnership with the Institute for Migration and Ethnic studies, Rijeka 2020, the City of Rijeka, University of Rijeka, Kino Tuškanac in Zagreb, Art kin in Rijeka and Živi Atelje DK, with support from the European Commission and EUNIC global fund. From 5 to 15 June 2017, three round tables accompanied by three exhibitions, and a film programme were held in Zagreb and Rijeka.



cific role considering the fact that this joined-up platform establishes itself as a principal actor in increasing collaboration at European level and in promoting European values. Established in 2006, the network's purpose is

*to create effective partnerships and networks between the participating organisations, to improve and promote cultural diversity and understanding between European societies, and to strengthen international dialogue and co-operation with countries outside Europe* (EUNIC, 2016).

This way of cooperation is seen as giving a stronger voice to smaller EU Member States without significant international presence (ibid). However, EUNIC's scope of work as defined in its Statute is not limited only to third countries – the picture often perceived in public. The network's first strategic objective is "to enhance EUNIC's capacity to participate in the design and implementation of cultural diplomacy and cultural relations projects both inside and outside the EU" (EUNIC, 2015).

The vision in the EUNIC Strategic Framework adopted on 11 December 2015 stated that "by 2025 EUNIC will be the delivery, research and training partner of choice for cultural diplomacy and cultural relations at European and international level" (EUNIC, 2015). There is no doubt that EUNIC has a global reach. With 36 cultural institutes and ministries from 28 countries, over 100 clusters and 2000 branches, EUNIC's members operate in more than 150 countries. Clusters are important collaboration platforms, as they represent joint local offices of EUNIC members who operate together. Established clusters have at least 3 local offices of EUNIC members which have an impact nationwide or city-wide.

The organization, however, is faced with several problems. The research conducted by the CCR – Centre for Cultural Relations (2015) has shown that the collaboration between EUNIC members is very weak, the level of their activity varies, and a different priority of larger and smaller members has been identified – larger ones tend to see the added value in EUNIC's contribution to the EU policy framework, while the smaller ones see it in sharing best practice. In addition, KEA's Study on European cultural institutes abroad marks EUNIC's lack of proper governance structure and a financial and technical capacity to support EU institutions (Smits et al., 2016: 55). At the same time, Preparatory Action for Culture in the EU's External Relations (European Commission, 2014) underlines that "the prevailing pattern (...) is to aggregate national level activities rather than seek a common approach". Lisack (2014: 50) agrees by arguing that there is no consensus on the role of cultural institutions and EUNIC as "coordinators of European players in external cultural relations". The question of collaboration was dealt with in the above mentioned CCR's research and the factors which would incite cooperation identified by members are: opportunities to learn through collaboration; scope to increase project impact; and opportunities for cost savings or staff efficiencies (CCR – Centre for Cultural Relations, 2015: 9). The time will tell whether the objectives set by EUNIC are achievable and realistic.

## CONCLUSION

Drawn on different perspectives ranging from policy papers, academic literature and empirical research, this paper offers an analysis of the concept and models of the EU's external cultural relations with focus on the today's role of national cultural institutes. The same way as the idea of culture is embedded in several kinds of narratives which link the events in international relations, the EU's "strategic understanding of soft power" (Isar, 2015) stands between the terms of cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, international cultural relations and cultural cooperation. The paradigm shift in which the culture is put in the heart of EU's external relations is obvious not only in terms of different narratives or terminology whereas cultural diplomacy has been used instead of cooperation or relations, but in the fact that bilateral turned to multilateral and national became European.

National cultural institutes, being under the supervision of respective foreign affairs ministries or independent, are still aligned to national policies. Traditionally, some countries, like Germany, are more tied to their national language, values etc. To evaluate the priority given to European interests and the importance of fostering the integration processes of the EU in the work of national cultural institutes is hard task to do, mostly because there is an obvious diversity of the employees working at the institutes. They are ranging from cultural attachés, cultural experts, language professors and / or cultural activists engaged in civil society, all of whom have different perspectives on how cultural institutes (and their job) should look / looks like. Finally, the impression is that the work of national cultural institutes is not yet adapted to the concept of cultural diplomacy, which is now more broadly understood and moved away from the formal spaces (Nisbett, 2017). It seems that the cultural institutes are taken for granted when it comes to their role in being agents for EU's cultural external relations. No matter the mission statements of the cultural institutes, the work they perform follows the traditional pattern of maintaining cultural (bilateral) relations, combined with traces of newly formed collaborations and partnerships, which often involve civil society. The latter actions are usually encouraged either by the Directors of the institutes enjoying the autonomy or they are motivated by the budget received from the central European network for cultural institutes, EUNIC, or in some cases, both. Even though EUNIC is the main cooperation platform for European external cultural relations, in its current state, the network is not capable of acting as the coordinator of European players nor can it successfully contribute to the EU policy framework. The main reason for this obstacle is that EUNIC lacks proper governance structure, which has also resulted in rather weak collaboration between its members.

At the same time when we witness the proliferation of diverse non-state actors such as civil society and NGOs, who are engaged in external cultural relations, we witness the proliferation of the literature dealing with the actions undertaken by the EU. On one side, we are experiencing a hyperproduction of strategies and agendas coming from the "official" EU, while on the other side, there are researchers and expert communities who raise their voices against the instrumentalisation of culture. In addition, the engagement of multiple actors in the EU's cultural relations resulted in the creation of networks and platforms, which facilitate cultural exchanges. This phenomenon shows that the place of Europe on the international scene is changing, but also that cultural, and any kind of external relations is not a unique phenomenon but rather a set of planned actions which take place in a much broader context. In order to tackle the challenges brought by the new actors on the international scene, institutional framework of the EU has no other option but to provide a strong communication infrastructure for the European cultural cooperation.

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## Analiza vanjskih kulturnih odnosa EU: studija sluaja o ulozi nacionalnih instituta za kulturu u Hrvatskoj

**SAŹETAK:** Akademska literatura je u posljednje vrijeme zaokupljena definicijama, pojmovima i opsegom višeslojnog fenomena kulturne diplomacije. Velik aspekt kulturne diplomacije tradicionalno je povezan s osnivanjem nacionalnih kulturnih instituta, dok je kultura u Europskoj uniji (EU) prepoznata kao sastavni dio vanjskih odnosa EU-a. Glavni cilj ovog rada je analizirati postojeće mehanizme EU-a za vanjske kulturne odnose i u tom pogledu promotriti ulogu nacionalnih kulturnih instituta u njejoj najmlađoj državi lanici – Hrvatskoj. Uzimajući u obzir dugu tradiciju „izvoza“ kulture instituta, namjera je utvrditi jesu li njihovi ciljevi danas nacionalno orijentirani ili pak usmjereni na poticanje procesa europske integracije i međunarodnih kulturnih odnosa. U tu svrhu, provedeni su polustrukturirani intervjui s kulturnim stručnjacima u odabranim nacionalnim kulturnim institutima u Zagrebu. Dodatno je provedena analiza službenih web stranica instituta i EUNIC-a kao glavne platforme za europske vanjske kulturne odnose. Ovaj rad je nadahnut sve većim akademskim zanimanjem za područjem koje se grana u novim smjerovima.

**KLJUČNE RIJEČI:** kulturna diplomacija EU, EUNIC, vanjski kulturni odnosi, međunarodna kulturna suradnja

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