Chapters from Polish and Hungarian Intellectual History

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BÉLA MESTER

The writings selected
for this volume were reviewed by

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Chapters from Polish and Hungarian Intellectual History

Lords and Boors Westernisers and 'Narodniks'

Edited by
Béla Mester & Rafał Smoczyński

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Foreword

The Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Philosophy of the Research Centre for the Humanities (used to be the Institute for Philosophical Research of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences before 2012; and the Institute of Philosophy of the Research Centre for the Humanities of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences before 2019) have been collaborating in the field of Polish and Hungarian comparative intellectual history over last ten years. Their first initiative included a short-term project entitled *Affectivity and its Vicissitudes in Contemporary Humanities and Social Sciences,* supported by the Visegrad Fund. Our cooperation became more established within the frames of projects funded by the bilateral programme of the Polish and Hungarian Academies, entitled *The Impact of Noble Legacy in Shaping Citizenship in Central Europe* (2014–2016, project leaders: Gábor Gángó and Rafał Smoczyński); *The Role of Intelligentsia in Shaping Collective Identities of Poles and Hungarians in 19th and 20th Centuries* (2017–2019; project leaders: Béla Mester and Rafał Smoczyński); and our ongoing research entitled *Westernisers and 'Narodniks'. Dichotomous Identity-Generating Narratives in the 19th–20th-century Polish and Hungarian Intellectual History* (planned for 2020–2022, renewed until 2023 due to the pandemic; project leaders: Béla Mester and Rafał Smoczyński). This volume mirrors the present status of our research based on papers presented during the workshops held in Budapest on 21st February 2019, in Warsaw on 26th October 2019, and in Budapest on 30th July 2020; collected and selected for the 10th anniversary of our cooperation. The editors and authors would like to express their gratitude to the Wacław Felczak Foundation, which supported the publication of the present book. The writings selected for this volume were reviewed by László-Attila Hubbes from *Sapientia* Hungarian University of Transylvania in Romania, a well-known scholar in the field of Hungarian and Polish intellectual histories and societies.

Béla Mester and Rafał Smoczyński

Comparative Approaches

GÁBOR GÁNGÓ
Institute of Philosophy, Research Centre for the Humanities

Stanisław Brzozowski and *Die Neue Zeit*[*]

Stanisław Brzozowski's contribution to *Die Neue Zeit (The New Times),* the theoretical journal of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), *Der Geschichtsmaterialismus als Kulturphilosophie: Ein philosophisches Programm (Historical Materialism as Philosophy of Culture: A Philosophical Project),* has been long-known to scholars (Walicki 2011a. 124, 365–366, 405; Politt 1996. 155). The original Polish version, which was published in *Przegląd Społeczny (Social Review)* and in Brzozowski's book *Idee (Ideas),* has been subject to intensive analysis. In this paper, I will argue that although the German version of the article does not considerably enrich Brzozowski's work from a strictly thematic point of view, it cannot be dismissed as a re-issue either. The circumstances of its publication in *Die Neue Zeit* do help us to understand Brzozowski's intellectual and political dilemmas, especially in regards to his personal relationship with German and Polish Social Democracy between the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the outbreak of the "Brzozowski affair" in early 1908, when he abruptly abandoned all efforts to gain an international reputation. Thus, this article challenges the commonly held view on the lamentable ignorance of Brzozowski outside of Polish literature through the contextual reconstruction of the story of his sole appearance in the most important forum of German Social Democracy.[1]

[*] First published In Jens Herlth – Edward M. Świderski (eds.) *Stanisław Brzozowski and the Migration of Ideas. Transnational Perspectives on the Intellectual Field in Twentieth-Century Poland and Beyond.* Bielefeld, transcript Verlag. 2019. 57–76.

[1] Concerning Brzozowski's international reputation, it must be noted that his novel, *Płomienie (Flames),* was published posthumously by Bong Verlag in 1920 in a German translation, *Flammen* (Brzozowski 1920). Richard Bong (1853–1935) was a woodcut printmaker in Berlin who founded his publishing house in 1891 (Kempe s. a.). Besides art books, he also published books by and on Richard Wagner, William Shakespeare, among others. Leon Richter, Brzozowski's translator, also translated Władysław Stanisław Reymont's novel *Wampir (The Vampire),* which came out in 1914. Further research about the reception of *Flammen* in the interwar German and East European Zionist youth move-

I. Die Neue Zeit: A Forum for Marxist Theory and Polish Social Democracy

At the time of Brzozowski's interest in the journal, *Die Neue Zeit* was the main organ for the international Social Democratic movement (Emig–Schwarz–Zimmermann 1981. 85), which remained from its very beginning under the editorial management of Karl Kautsky until 1917, (Graf 1998. 96–102; Schelz-Brandenburg: Introduction to *Die Neue Zeit*). The profile of the journal was revamped several times with its main profile being the broadening of sociology as scientific support for the routine struggle in the labour movement. It encompassed such themes as the women question, colonization, the living conditions of the working class, modernization, discoveries in natural sciences and technology, healthcare, industry and capitalism, Russia, contemporary naturalistic and socially engaged novels, the economy, alcoholism, prostitution, and periodical overviews of the workers' movement in various European countries, including the Polish movement as part of or connected to the Russian, German, and Austrian Social Democracy.

After *Die Neue Zeit* became increasingly involved in the fate of German Social Democracy, it equally grew more open to the application of theoretical issues. When Brzozowski's study was published, the journal was a general philosophical forum of the Left, so they included a number of authors who contributed but did not belong to the core group of contributors to the journal. Despite this, Brzozowski was the only one audacious enough to challenge the orthodox interpretation of historical materialism.

After 1890, *Die Neue Zeit* became an important forum for Polish Social Democracy as Polish authors and subjects concerned with it started to appear regularly; articles from the journal were translated for the Polish socialists as well (for example: *Kwestja* 1905). These articles generally reported on the situation of socialism in Poland for the labour movements in Germany, Russia, and Austria. Such Polish authors from around the turn of the century included Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz, who discussed theoretical issues from a Polish perspective, and Salomea Perlmutter, who wrote articles for the journal and, along with this, a review of her dissertation was published as well (Perlmutter 1903; 1905; Zetterbaum 1903a). Besides her articles, a letter of hers to Kautsky that was

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ments is still missing in Brzozowski scholarship, although significant contributions are available for scholars speaking Hebrew (cf. Nordheimer-Nur 2009. 67–68); concerning Matityahu Mintz's works on the history of *Hashomer Hatzair* in Poland, see Oppenheimer 2004. 11). According to Yosef Gorny's summarizing account, "the Marxism of Hashomer Hatzair was diluted with the national socialist ideals of Brzozowski" (Gorny 2002).

sent along with her *Ein Beitrag zur Agrarfrage (A Contribution to the Agrarian Question)* also remains (IISH Kautsky D XVIII 486).

Kautsky was moderately interested in Polish issues; at least as far as the problem of the Russian-Polish rivalry was concerned. He wrote two articles on Poland in his journal: *Finis Poloniae? (The End of Poland?),* which was published in 1895–1896, while *Das neue Polen (The New Poland)* in 1916–1917 reflected a more optimistic stance towards the reestablishment of the Polish state. The former article argued that St. Petersburg was a more likely revolutionary center than Warsaw so that the international proletariat did not have to stand up for the restitution of Poland. The Russian Revolution of 1905 seemed to fulfil Kautsky's most sanguine hopes[2] and he encouraged the Polish to integrate with democratic Russia (Tych 1992). Kautsky occupied a definitive pro-Russian stance and he regarded the never-ending skirmish between Polish and Russian Social Democrats as a mutually detrimental and regrettable event for the international workers' movement,[3] thus he wanted to keep his journal free from these bitter polemics.[4]

Although it had some discussion of Polish issues, *Die Neue Zeit* was primarily the forum where new trends in Marxism were discussed. From the very beginning, a number of renowned Marxists–many had been long-time activists in the labour movement–contributed to *Die Neue Zeit* with studies on historical materialism, which played a part in the evolution of Marxist thought. Brzozowski's article was consequently one text among many others, and to add more to his obscurity, he was relatively unknown in the socialist movement.

[2] As he wrote in 1905 to an unknown correspondent, "Die russische Revolution macht mich zehn Jahre jünger" (BArch Kautsky NY 4055/11. fol. 60). I would also like to thank Grit Ulrich (Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde) for her help during my research in German State Archives.

[3] "Im übrigen kann ich Ihnen nicht verschweigen, daß, so weit ich in Basel über die rußischen Dinge sprechen konnte, ich überall die größte Erbitterung und Mißachtung gegen die rußischen und polnischen Genoßen wegen ihres ewigen Haders gefunden habe. […] Man hat in der Internationale keinen Respekt mehr vor Euch – dieß »Euch« gilt allen Fraktionen" (Karl Kautsky to Julian Marchlewski, Berlin-Friedenau, 9 December, 1912, BArch Kautsky NY 4055/22Ü, fol. 14).

[4] "Was ich anstrebe, ist von der N. Z. jede Diskussion russischer Streitpunkte fernzuhalten. […] Von diesem Standpunkt aus lehne ich jeden polemischen Artikel über russisch-polnische Streitpunkte ab, stamme er von rechts oder links. Ich mußte auch den Ihren ablehnen" (Karl Kautsky to Julian Marchlewski, Berlin-Friedenau, 13 December, 1912, BArch Kautsky NY 4055/22Ü, fol. 16).

II. Brzozowski's *Der Geschichtsmaterialismus als Kulturphilosophie.* Its Journey to *Die Neue Zeit*

At least from the beginning of 1906, Brzozowski wanted to make himself known to the German-speaking world, so he turned to Salomea Perlmutter who later became his translator as well as his mediator for communicating with Kautsky. (For her biography, see Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 107n1; Leszczawski-Schwerk 2014.) First, he was thinking about a text entitled *Czy wracamy do Kanta? (Back to Kant?),* although there is nothing more that is known about this project (Stanisław Brzozowski to Salomea Perlmutter, Nervi, 7 February, 1906. Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 155). Instead, Perlmutter translated two of his other articles into German and recommended them to *Die Neue Zeit* and to the Austrian Socialist review *Der Kampf (The Struggle)* respectively (Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 159n10, 318, 321n1, 354). *Der Kampf* published his *Polnische Literatur in der Revolution (Polish Literature in the Revolution)* in January 1908 (Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 338n14).

The Polish version of *Historical Materialism as a Philosophy of Culture* was published in February 1907 in *Przegląd Społeczny* and then was translated and sent to *Die Neue Zeit* by early April. In his commentary to Perlmutter, Brzozowski downplayed the significance of his manuscript and braced himself against Kautsky's rejection. He apologetically wrote to Perlmutter telling her to expect rejection, "artykuł nie był ani dobrze napisany, any nowy w treści. Mniejsza o to zresztą: nie zmartwie się nieuchronną odmową Kautskiego. Szkoda tylko mi Waszego czasu." (The article was neither well-written nor new in its content. Whatever, I do not care about Kautsky's inevitable refusal. But it's a pity for your time.) (Stanisław Brzozowski to Salomea Perlmutter, Nervi, 10 April, 1907. Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 319) He again wrote the same sentiments to the Buber family, "Sądzę, że Kautsky nie wydrukuje artykułu, i będzie miał słuszność" (I assume that Kautsky is not going to publish the article, and he will be right in doing so.) (Stanisław Brzozowski to Wula and Rafał Buber, Nervi, around 10 April, 1907. Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 325).

Brzozowski was probably pleasantly surprised when he received the news of the May 1907 publication of his article and he began formulating projects for further contributions to *Die Neue Zeit*. He considered writing on the topics of Machiavelli (Stanisław Brzozowski to Salomea Perlmutter, Nervi, 2–3 June, 1907. Brzozowski Vol. 1. 346), the "social foundations of Nietzscheanism", and "contemporary art."[5] His publication was a rite of passage to the working class, which he labeled as his belonging to a "minderwerthiger klasy" ("infe-

[5] "Czy dla Neue Zeit nie byłoby dobrze napisać: społeczne podstawy nietscheanizmu [!] lub raczej 'nowej sztuki'?", Stanisław Brzozowski to Salomea Perlmutter, Nervi, 7 June, 1907 (Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 354).

rior class") (Stanisław Brzozowski to Salomea Perlmutter, Nervi, 7 June, 1907. Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 353). It reveals a telling analogy of how he viewed the Poles as inferior compared to the Germans, referring to it as the "minderwerthige Nation" in his letter to Wula and Rafał Buber on 4 January 1906 (Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 109).

III. Brzozowski's Polemic with Karl Kautsky's *Ethik und materialistische Auffassung*

In the initial Polish version, *Historical Materialism as Philosophy of Culture* was a creative effort to reinterpret some fundamental theses of historical materialism with a fearless confidence in the intellectual strength of Polish culture vis-à-vis the German Socialist mainstream; for its contemporary readership, the German translation must have given a very different impact. The reference to the orthodox Marxist interpretation of ethical issues in the first sentence of the article gives the impression that Brzozowski was specifically addressing Karl Kautsky. The beginning surprises the reader with its sharply polemical tone that invokes an "unpleasant" and "thoroughly non-philosophical custom" of using the word "Marxism" as a brand that is fit for all subject matter. As well, it mentions an example for an imaginary title of a book very similar to that of Karl Kautsky's entitled, *Ethics and the Materialist Concept of History*. Brzozowski writes,

> In der sozialistischen wissenschaftlichen Literatur findet sich bisweilen die unangenehme und durchaus unphilosophische Gewohnheit, an allerhand Dinge den Marxismus einem Schilde gleich anzuhängen, das sich ab- und ankleben läßt: "Die Kunst vom marxistischen Standpunkt", "Die Ethik vom Gesichtspunkt des historischen Materialismus" usw.
>
> In socialist scientific literature one encounters from time to time the unphilosophical habit of attaching all sorts of things to Marxism as if it were a signpost where one could hang something up or take it down: "Art from a Marxist standpoint", "Ethics from a Historical Materialist Perspective", and the like (Brzozowski 1907. 153–154).

Accordingly, the critique of the usual treatment on question of ethics and aesthetics in Marxist literature seems to be directed at Karl Kautsky's book, which had a Polish translation (Kautsky 1906a).[6]

[6] Holger Politt attributes the translation to Jan Władysław Dawid (Politt 1996. 47n27).

In his book, Kautsky intended to elucidate the difference between Kantian and historical materialist ethics to prove that Kant's position was very far from a Socialist one (Kautsky 1906b. vii, 34), and thus, Kautsky separated ethics from historical materialism.[7] Brzozowski, in contrast to Kautsky, argues that there is an essential relation between the cultural superstructure and its economic base (Brzozowski 1907. 154). Although he did agree with Kautsky that the ethical ideal had always been and would always remain in the hands of the bourgeoisie (Kautsky 1906b. 135–136), he tried to formulate another solution to this problem by provocatively distinguishing the truth of political socialism with that of philosophical Marxism. While political socialism uses Marxism as its instrument in the struggle for changing society's economic basis, philosophical Marxism is concerned with the method of approaching the superstructure in a Hegelian approach:

> Denn der Geschichtsmaterialismus ist nichts anderes als die Methode, alles zu erforschen was das Werk der Menschheit ist, also auch die Mora, das Recht, die Wissenschaft und die Kunst […]. Der Geschichtsmaterialismus ist das Selbstbewußtsein der geschichtlichen Schöpfungskraft, die aus sich Kunst und Literatur, Wissenschaft, Recht, Moral, Religion und Sozialwirtschaft gebärt […]. [D]er Geschichtsmaterialismus zeigt uns die Geschichte der Menschheit und deren Kultur, als ihr eigenes selbst geschaffenes Werk und ihre Verantwortlichkeit.
>
> Historical materialism is nothing else than the method to explore everything that is the work of man, that means morals, right, science, and art […]. Historical materialism is the self-consciousness of the historical creative force issues from art, literature, science, right, morals, religion, and social economy […]. Historical materialism shows us the history of mankind and its culture as a self-created work and responsibility. (Brzozowski 1907. 154–155.)

[7] "Auch die Sozialdemokratie als Organisation des Proletariats in seinem *Klassenkampf* kann das sittliche Ideal, kann die sittliche Empörung gegen Ausbeutung und Klassenherrschaft nicht entbehren. Aber das Ideal hat nichts zu suchen im *wissenschaftlichen* Sozialismus, der wissenschaftlichen Erforschung der Entwicklungs- und Bewegungsgesetze des gesellschaftlichen Organismus zum Zwecke des Erkennens des *notwendigen* Tendenzen und Ziele des proletarischen Klassenkampfes. […] Die Wissenschaft steht über der Ethik, ihre Resultate sind ebensowenig sittlich oder unsittlich, als die Notwendigkeit sittlich oder unsittlich ist." Kautsky 1906b. 141–142.

By establishing an analogy between historical materialism and cultural creation on the one hand and natural sciences and technical praxis and discoveries on the other,[8] Brzozowski modifies Kautsky's approach to the relationship between technical progress and historical materialism.[9] Brzozowski also argues with Kautsky's interpretation of moral ideals, saying that

> Moral, Ästhetik, Kunst, Philosophie, Geschichtsauffassung und Kultur bleiben noch immer unter dem überwiegenden Einfluß der Autoritäten und Ideale, welche der ritterlich-priesterliche Lebens- und Denktypus ausgearbeitet hat. Dieser Typus hatte seine inneren Gegensätze und Zerrissenheiten; der Priester kämpfte hier mit dem Ritter. Und heute noch kämpfen in unseren Köpfen diese Gespenster, die Stelle moderner Kämpfe vertretend. Die Probleme treten eine lange Zeit in historischen, anachronistischen Masken auf, bevor sie in ihrer wahren, nackten Gestalt auftreten.
>
> Morality, aesthetics, art, philosophy, and concepts of history and culture still remain under the predominant influence of authorities and ideals that were produced by the chivalric and priestly way of living and thinking. It has always had its inner contradictions and disunities; the priest always struggled against the knight. Even today these specters still fight in our heads, replacing modern struggles. Problems tend to appear for a long time in historical and anachronistic masks, before appearing in their real, naked shape. (Brzozowski 1907. 159.)

IV. A Further Effort to Strengthen Contacts: Brzozowsi's Letter to Karl Kautsky

Once Brzozowski received his copy of *Die Neue Zeit,* he intended to continue his success; the very next day, on 8 June, 1907, he wrote the following letter to Karl Kautsky:

> Hochgeehrter Genosse!
> Gestern habe ich die N. der Neuen Zeit erhalten, wo mein Artikel, den meine gute Freundin Genossin dr. Salomea Perlmutter so gütig war zu übersetzen und Ihnen über-

[8] "Der Geschichtsmaterialismus ist das im Verhältnis zur kulturellen und historischen Schaffungskraft, was die theoretische Wissenschaft gegenüber der technischen Praxis und der Erfindungskraft" (Brzozowski 1907. 155).

[9] "Kein Zweifel, es besteht eine Wechselwirkung zwischen der Ökonomie und ihrem geistigen Überbau – Moral, Religion, Recht, Kunst usw. –: von dem geistigen Wirken des Erfindens reden wir hier nicht, es gehört zur Technik, in der ja der Geist auch eine Rolle spielt, neben dem Werkzeug; die Technik ist die bewußte Erfindung und Anwendung von Werzeugen durch den denkenden Menschen" (Kautsky 1906b. 128).

senden. Es freut mich sehr, dass meine Arbeit so günstig von Ihnen beurtheilt war, und lasse mir hoffen dass auch andere meine Beiträge werden von Zeit zu Zeit auf Spalten Neuer Zeit Platz für sich finden[.] Wenn ich aber jetzt mir erlaube Ihnen mit meinem in schlecht deutschen geschriebenen Brief Zeit zu verderben, dann thue ich es um Ihre Aufmerksamkeit auf eine Kleinigkeit zu lenken, die vielleicht einer Besprechung und Abfertigung in Neuer Zeit nicht unwerth ist. In dem neuen Buch von Arturo Labriola uber die Pariser Komune, finde ich folgenden "geistreichen" Einfall über Karl Marx. Ich schreibe die Stelle buchstablich ab:

["]Ma il guidizio di Marx è soggetto a revisione. Marx non amò mai i suoi concorrenti socialistici, la qual cosa mentre teneva all'indiscutibile superiorità della sua mente sovrana, rivela in lui una inclinazione poco simpatico dello spirito[.] Successivamente egli si ruppe col Willich, col Weitling, col Proudhon, col Bakunine, col lo St. Mill, col Lassalle cuoi con tutto quanto d'un certo rilievo e d'una certa importanza produsse l'intelligenza socialista[.] *La sua intimità col'Engels resta certamente un enigma psicologico, messo in rilievo dalla circonstanza che i socialisti tedeschi hanno sempre evitato di pubblicare una biografia di Marx."*

1) Da notare: Marx era molto povero ed Engels molto ricco. Inoltre Engels lasciò eredi della sua fortuna proprio le figlie le di Marx. Arturo Labriola. La "commune" di Parigi. s. 71–72.

Genosse Labriola hat überhaupt sein Buch mit forcirter Originalität verdorben. Er will partout Entdeckungen machen obgleich alle allgemeinen Gesichtspunkte seines neuesten wie früheren Buches vom Georg Sorel stammen. Ich glaube aber dass hier hat seine Originalitätssucht jede Grenzen passiert[.] Wenn ich Ihnen geehrter Genosse nicht unerlaubt andringend scheinen werde, so werde ich sie noch mit einer persönlichen Bitte belastigen. Ich arbeite an einem kleinen Werk über die Philosophie von Karl Marx[.] Leider muss ich Gesundheit wegen in schlimmsten Bücherbedingungen arbeiten[.] So, habe ich bisher keine Möglichkeit gefunden mir Aufsatz von Marx über Max Stirner zu verschaffen[.] Die Buchhandlungen antworten mir, dass es nicht kauflich ist. Da es meine Arbeit, die erste in unserer armen theoretischen Literatur dem grossen Gegenstande sein wird, so vollkommen informiert sehen möchte, als es für mich möglich ist, so macht mir der Mangel dieser Marx'schen Arbeit grosse Sorge. Wenn Sie so freundlich gegen einen Unbekannten sein wollten und mir den Aufsatz zu leihen, würde ich Ihnen sehr dankbar sein und den Aufsatz in einer Woche wiederschicken. Natürlich ist es meinerseits fast eine Frechheit Ihre kostbare Zeit so in Anspruch zu nehmen und ich bin nicht so romantisch um zu sagen Marx'ens willen thun Sie das. Vielleicht werden Sie es aber meiner polnischen Leser willen es thun und damit unendlich verpflichten Ihren Sie hoch verehrenden Genossen

Stanislaus Brzozowski

Nervi. pension Bismarck (Leider! sogar in Italien lebt man in seinem Zeichen)"[10]

[10] Stanisław Brzozowski to Karl Kautsky, Nervi, 8 June, 1907 (IISH Kautsky D VI 714). I am thankful to Dr. Till Schelz-Brandenburg for his help in finding the original

Highly esteemed comrade!
Yesterday I received the copy of *Die Neue Zeit* where my article is published that which my good friend comrade Dr. Salomea Perlmutter had the kindness to translate and send to you. I am glad that my work was judged so benevolently by you and I hope that other of my contribution will from time to time appear on the columns of *Die Neue Zeit*. If I now permit myself to spoil your time with my letter written in bad German, than I do it in order to point your attention to a detail which maybe is not unworthy of a review and discussion in *Die Neue Zeit*. In Arturo Labriola's new book about the Paris Commune I found the following "witty" idea about Karl Marx. I copy the passage literally:

> However Marx's judgment is put into question. Marx never loved his socialist rivals, the reason of which is the undisputed superiority of his sovereign and an unpleasant spiritual penchant. Successively he broke with Willich, with Weitling, with Proudhon, with Bakunin, with St. Mill, with Lassalle, and with everything produced by the socialist intelligentsia that was of a certain importance and certain renown. *His intimacy with Engels will surely remain a psychological mystery, still increased in importance by the fact that the German socialists have always avoided publishing a biography of Marx.*

1) Note: Marx was very poor and Engels very rich. Moreover Engels made Marx's daughters heirs of his fortune. Arturo Labriola. The Paris "Commune". Pp. 71–72. Comrade Labriola generally spoilt his book by excessive originality. He wants to make discoveries at any cost although all general ideas of his recent and his earlier book are indebted to Georges Sorel. I believe his obsession for originality has exceeded all limits here. Hoping not to seem impermissibly intrusive, I would like to bother you with a personal demand. I am working on a small piece on Karl Marx's philosophy. For now I have not yet found an opportunity to purchase Marx's article about Max Stirner. The bookshops have been telling me that it cannot be bought. Since I would like to have my first work, the first in our poor theoretical literature devoted to this great topic, as well informed as possible for me, the lack of this work of Marx is a cause of great concern for me. If you could be so friendly to an unknown person and lend me the article, I would be very grateful and send the article back in a week's time. Of course it is impertinence from my part to take up your precious time and I am not so romantic to say that you will do this for the sake of Marx. Perhaps you will do it for the sake of my Polish readers and infinitely indebt your highly admiring you comrade
Stanislaus Brzozowski
Nervi. Pension Bismarck (Unfortunately! Even in Italy one lives in his sign)[11]

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copy and for his critical remarks on the first draft of this paper. The transcription of this letter in the edition of Brzozowski's correspondence is riddled with incorrect readings and thus unsuitable for scholarly use (Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 375–377).

[11] As Brzozowski says himself, the letter is written in clumsy and faulty German language. Our translation tries to render this style without reproducing the errors.

The letter's poor German probably did not create a favourable impression as Brzozowski colloquially addresses Kautsky and Arturo Labriola, a renowned mastermind of socialism, as comrades despite the fact that he had never met either of them. Even Perlmutter, who was herself well-known in the movement, addressed her letters to Kautsky quite formally. It was also a failure because Brzozowski, speaking mainly about himself, used a great number of expressions of submission to Kautsky; his reverence was an odd discrepancy with the oversized intellectual ego of the ambitious Brzozowski. Apparently, Brzozowski believed that Kautsky had a high opinion of his article and he subsequently vowed to send more. He then denounces Labriola for plagiarism and finally, he shares his idea for writing a ground-breaking work on Marx that would be a first "in our poor theoretical literature." He as well assures Kautsky of many more theoretical contributions on Marx and Marxism but also tries to borrow an article by Marx from him. Kautsky left this letter unanswered.

The tone of the letter is quite contrary to his sharply critical tone when Brzozowski wrote about German Social Democracy in February and April 1907. (Stanisław Brzozowski to Wula and Rafał Buber, Nervi, 18 February, 1907 and Nervi, beginning of April, 1907. Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 307–308; 312–316.) It appears that the publication of his article in Germany affected him so strongly that he had a sudden urge to endorse the theoretical side of the German Social Democratic movement. This gesture, however, was most likely insincere since he had already declared himself a non-Marxist (at least from an orthodox perspective) at the beginning of April 1907. Therefore, he must have written the article in question as an outsider, not as an engaged Social Democrat: "Sooner or later what is true must come to light, although I am not a Marxist and I do not possess a redemptive belief in the providence of a silent evolution of economic factors" (Prędzej czy później to, co jest prawdziwe, wydobędzie się, chociaż nie jestem marksistą i zbawiającej wiary w opatrzność milczącej ewolucji czynników ekonomicznych nie posiadam). (Stanisław Brzozowski to Wula and Rafał Buber, Nervi, beginning of April, 1907 Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 314–315.)

In any case, once the article was published, Brzozowski thought that he was welcomed by the Social Democrats, so much so that he was thinking about going to Stuttgart for the 18–23 July Congress of the Socialist International (like his friend Buber; Najdus 1980. 133). Additionally, he considered sending another article to the review *Mouvement Socialiste (Socialist Movement)*. (Stanisław Brzozowski to Wula and Rafał Buber, Nervi, the first ten days of July, 1907. Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 372–373.) His rather poor opinion of the Germans and German Social Democrats had by no means changed after the publication of his article, but it only turned even more bitter when he received no answer from Karl Kautsky. Around mid-November 1907 he wrote about *bestialità tedesca (German bestiality)* and vented his ambitiously destructive plans to criticize the position of the Stuttgart Congress and to prove in gen-

eral that "socjaldemokracja niemiecka niezasłużenie zajmuje przodujące miejsce pośród organizacji socjalistycznych świata". (German Social Democracy is undeservedly occupying the leading position among the socialist organizations in the world.) (Stanisław Brzozowski to Wula and Rafał Buber, Florence, mid-November, 1907. Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 394, 398n21.)

V. Brzozowski's German Publication in the Context of the Polish Social Democratic Movement

Brzozowski's aim for the article's publication was not only to gain German readers but he also wanted to flaunt his success to his fellow Polish Social Democrats (he had a complicated relationship with many of them). Although the article had already been printed in Polish, the fact that it was translated and published in German would raise Brzozowski's standing within Polish Social Democracy. Not only were Brzozowski's relations to Polish Social Democracy complicated,[12] the labour movement itself was in a precarious situation because Poland was partially controlled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Blobaum 1984; Hawranek 1977; Kochański 1971; Kormanowa 1958; Makowski 1991; Najdus 1980; 1983; Orzechowski 1978; Tymieniecka 1918; Żarnowska 1965). The labour movement in the German-occupied territories in Brzozowski's time consisted of the *Polska Partia Socjalistyczna zaboru pruskiego* (PPS zp), which had seceded from the German Socialist Party (SPD) in 1901, and the *Polska Partia Socjaldemokratyczna Galicji* (PPSD), which operated in Austro-Hungarian Galicia.

Brzozowski associated more with the PPSD because Perlmutter and Buber, who were working in Jewish socialist organizations that were associated with the party on varying degrees, were his contacts in the party. Eventually, Brzozowski published some of his own material in the party's journal (Najdus 1983. 510). Brzozowski did have problems though with the two parties who later formed the Polish Communist Workers' Party in 1918. *Socjaldemokracja Królestwa Polskiego i Litwy* (SDKPiL) (Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania) operated in the Russian territories and they had a more orthodox platform, which meant that they were Brzozowski's enemies. Their newspaper, *Czerwony Sztandar (Red Flag),* reported on Brzozowski's alleged espionage scandal in early 1908 partly because of his criticism of Rosa Luxemburg,[13] who was the party's most well-known member, and because of his opinion that Pol-

[12] Stanisław Brzozowski to Rafał Buber, Florence, 7 Mai, 1908 (Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 502–503). Kochański 1971. 274–275; Walicki 2011b. 187–194.

[13] See Stanisław Brzozowski to Wula and Rafał Buber, Nervi, 28 January, 1906 (Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 136).

ish philosophy was greater than Marxism (Walicki 2011b. 51–53). *Polska Partia Socjalistyczna* (PPS) (Polish Socialist Party), on the other hand, valued Poland over Marxism and thus PPS's position was closer to that of Brzozowski; they regarded him more as a rival than an enemy (Sroka 1970. xxxi). During the Russian Revolution of 1905, Brzozowski was a sympathizer of the PPS (Żarnowska 1965. 34), and he took the position of official journalist and theorist for the PPS the following year (Walicki 2011b. 194–195). In the early 1930s *Robotnik* (The Worker), the party's paper, had a more lenient perspective of the Okhrana affair (Niedziałkowski 1933). At any case, the publication in Germany did not improve Brzozowski's positions among Polish Social Democrats.

VI. An Echo of Brzozowski's Article: Max Adler's *Das Formalpsychische im historischen Materialismus*

Kautsky decided to publish Brzozowski between the renowned Marxists, Rudolf Hilferding and Franz Mehring, which may reflect Kautsky's reservations about Brzozowski as the two were perfect foils for Brzozowski's unorthodox views. Brzozowski would never be published again in *Die Neue Zeit* after his letter to Kautsky, but they did publish an article thoroughly refuting his position without mentioning his name. Soon after Brzozowski's article was published, Max Adler issued his *Das Formalpsychische im historischen Materialismus (The Formal Psychical in Historical Materialism),* which gave an overview to the theoretical approaches that were printed in *Die Neue Zeit*.[14] Adler gives some details on the international repercussions of Brzozowski's writing. Unfortunately, scholarship has taken into account nearly exclusively Anatolii Lunacharskii's reflections on Brzozowski.[15]

[14] "Das Grundproblem der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung ist die Frage nach dem Verhältnis des Materiellen zum Ideellen, nach der Art der zwischen beiden bestehenden Beziehung. Es wäre jetzt, da diese Zeitschrift auf ein Vierteljahrhundert unermüdlicher Arbeit an den theoretischen Grundanschauungen des Sozialismus zurückblickt, nicht blos naheliegend, sondern auch sehr lohnend, der Geschichte der Weiterbildung des historischen Materialismus an den Blättern der »Neuen Zeit« nachzugeben. Hat sie doch mit vielen bedeutungsvollen Abhandlungen in diese Weiterentwicklung eingegriffen; ich erinnere nur an die Aufsätze von F. Mehring zu diesem Thema, an die Arbeiten von H. Cunow und Sadi Gunter, vor allem aber an die Artikelserie von K. Kautsky im XV. und von Max Zetterbaum im XXI. Jahrgang dieser Zeitschrift." (Adler 1908 52.) Among others, Adler must have had the articles in mind as follows: Mehring 1894; Mehring 1899a; 1899b; Cunow 1899; Gunter 1898; Kautsky 1895; Kautsky 1896; Kautsky 1899; Zetterbaum 1903b.

[15] Łunaczarski 1969. Vol. 3. 853–864. For the monistic theory of history, see Walicki 2011a. 44. For Brzozowski's acquaintance with Lunacharskii, see Stanisław Brzozowski

From Adler's retrospective account, it seems that Brzozowski's provocative study helped end the debate on historical materialism in *Die Neue Zeit* and it paradoxically contributed to the consolidation of the orthodox interpretation to Marxism. Adler considered the orthodox interpretation of the base and superstructure as a dogma that was not open to revision.[16] Criticizing this position was nothing else than a bourgeois chimaera, "[a]uch seither hat kaum ein Marxist von wissenschaftlicher Bedeutung eine derart skurrile Ansicht vertreten, und alle bürgerliche Polemik gegen dieses Phantom ist pures Mißverständnis" (never before has any Marxist of some scientific reputation held such a bizarre view, and all the bourgeois polemics against this ghost is a pure misunderstanding), (Adler 1908. 53). This statement applied to Brzozowski's argument meant that Brzozowski was "no Marxist of scientific significance" and his critique was a bourgeois polemic directed against phantoms that originated from a misunderstanding. Adler's response to Brzozowski's attack (or one much like it) was that historical materialism is essentially related to real life and it has nothing to do with materialism in natural philosophy (Adler 1908. 54). In connection with this, Adler refuted the Hegelian readings of Marx, (Adler 1908. 55) and then his summarizing statement on the nature of art and ethics seem to reject Brzozowski's viewpoint,

> die bewußt gewordenen Richtmaße unserer geistigen Natur, also die Ideen der Wahrheit, der Sittlichkeit, des Rechtes, der Kunst, sind somit nichts anderes als die Formen der sozial gewordenen Selbsterhaltung, als die Art, in welcher sich die soziale Beschaffenheit des menschlichen Lebens inmitten seines individuellen Entwicklungsprozesses immer wieder herstellt.

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to Salomea Perlmutter, Florence, beginning of December, 1907 (Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 409). For Lunacharskii's critique, see Walicki 1974. 214–219; Mänicke-Gyöngyösi 1982. 222; Politt 1996. 91. In Holger Politt's interpretation, Lunacharskii's main objection was directed towards Brzozowski's all-too Hegelian stance in which the Marxist position was hardly recognizable. According to Politt, Brzozowski failed to understand Lunacharskii's response and mistook it for a sign of approval. See also: Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 401.

[16] "Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung bestimmt das Verhältnis des Ideellen zum Materiellen in der Weise, daß sie bekanntlich das letztere zum bedingenden oder, wie der Ausdruck auch lautet, bestimmenden Element des ersteren macht." This is a thesis that Marx as well as Engels held (i.e., Adler defended Engels against any revisionist attack): "Die Unterstellung, als ob die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung je behauptet hätte, das Materielle, das heißt die ökonomischen Lebensverhältnisse bewirken oder erzeugen erst die geistigen Lebensformen, so daß also diese in Idee, Sitte, Recht, Kunst usw. nur eine Art von Reflex wären, ohne jede eigene, selbständige Wesenheit – erscheint schon durch den Wortsinn der bezüglichen Stellen bei Marx und Engels widerlegt." (Adler 1908. 53.)

> The standard gauges of our spiritual nature, hence the ideas of truth, morality, rights, and art are nothing else than forms of self-preservation having become social, than the way in which the social shape of human life is constantly reproducing itself in the middle of its individual process of development. (Adler 1908. 58.)

It was in this sense that Adler rejected Prometheism as well as determinism, the sphere of economy is nothing else but the fundamental layer of the spiritual and thus the "superstructure" can never be independent of the "base" even less can their relation be reversed (Adler 1908. 60).

VII. Conclusion

Brzozowski's efforts to make a name outside of the Polish-speaking world peaked in the first half of 1907 when his position was close enough to Marxism that he looked for contacts with the Austrian and German Social Democrats. But jealousy limited his ambition, because he wanted to stand on a more equal footing with the Polish Social Democratic leaders who had urged him to seek support and recognition in the German-speaking world. In his haste to be known, Brzozowski unwittingly (or deliberately?) reversed his priorities–being an author in *Die Neue Zeit* did not make a Social Democrat but instead it was being an engaged Social Democrat that made one an author of the journal. Brzozowski's publication in *Die Neue Zeit* was an exception and the reasons for his appearance in the journal remain a mystery.

At first it seemed that he was about to realize his dream: two of his articles were published in Perlmutter's translation, but it did not come to anything and it was very much his loss. The letter he wrote to Kautsky delivered the *coup de grâce* to their possible personal, political, or professional relations. Adler's devastating rectification concerning the "correct" interpretation of historical materialism, Luxemburg's denunciation of Brzozowski at *Der Kampf*, and the accusations of his being a collaborator with the Tsarist Okhrana (Brzozowski 1970. Vol. 1. 487n7; Kochański 1971. 22–23) swept all of his hopes away of gaining a greater intellectual reputation in a national and international context. These accusations finally alienated Brzozowski from the Polish Social Democrats and he also maintained resentment against the German Party (Walicki 2011a. 191–193) most likely because of the negative reception of his article and the rejections of anymore of his work.

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The Idea of Liberty in the Political Philosophy of Aurel Kolnai

The question of liberty permeates the whole work of Aurel Kolnai. In the books and political articles written before World War II, he focused on the threats to the idea posed by the totalitarian regimes established in Soviet Union and Hitler's Third Reich. In the post-war period, the target of his criticism became, in turn, those tendencies of his contemporary democratic ideology which subverted liberty itself in his interpretation. What makes "the forgotten work of Aurel Kolnai" (Honneth 2007) one of the most interesting phenomena of both Hungarian and Polish intellectual history is nothing but the original idea of liberty presupposed by the criticism directed at diverse and mutually opposing ideological standpoints. In his political philosophy, which used to be labelled conservative rather than liberal due to, among others, its unreserved hostility towards American progressivism and the New Deal policy, Kolnai revitalised the fundamental opposition between, Benjamin Constant's *la liberté des anciennes* and *la liberté des modernes* or, to put it in other words, between participatory republican liberty and civil liberty as freedom from arbitrary political coercion. What is perhaps most important from the perspective of Polish intellectual history is the fact that he also problematized the concurring interpretations of liberty anew in terms of, respectively, political privilege and natural human right. Insofar as he argued that not only the hierarchic societies of *anciens regimes,* but contemporary liberal-democratic society also depends on the recognition of privilege not as a threat, but a "rampart of liberty" (Kolnai 1999b. 47), the question arises whether Kolnai's political philosophy is able to shed new light on the well-established interpretation of the Polish nobles' Golden Liberty as a historical relic and political anachronism (Walicki 1999).

I. The Liberal Conservatism of Aurel Kolnai

The reconstruction of Kolnai's philosophy of liberty as well as the reasons why he regarded making this political idea real as threatened not only by its outspoken enemies but also by its professing friends, must start from recalling the intellectual origins of his thought. As a Hungarian philosopher of Jewish descent born in 1900, Kolnai was not just theoretically, but also personally confronted with the proliferation of threats to liberty in the twentieth century. After the liberal-democratic Aster Revolution in Hungary greeted by Kolnai with enthusiasm (Dunlop 2002), the next political challenges he had to face were the Bolshevik Revolution in Budapest in 1919 and the following right-wing Horthy's Regime. Kolnai regarded both the Hungarian People's Republic proclaimed by Bela Kun and Horthy's White Terror as nothing but modern forms of tyranny, the recognition of which motivated him to leave Budapest and to start studying in Vienna (Kolnai 1999b). His personal experience of the Bolshevik political practice he summarized in his Viennese exile in his *Psychoanalysis and Sociology* in 1920, conceived as a psychological study of what he called "anarchist communism" (Kolnai 1920; 1922). In Vienna Kolnai also observed the growing danger of fascism and Nazism to liberal democratic society, against which he fought in the thirties with a series of articles published in collaboration with Dietrich Hildebrand in the Catholic conservative journal *Der Christliche Ständestaat* (Hildebrand 1994). From that time on, Kolnai published a number of important articles, including *What is Politics About?,* in which he criticized the theses of Carl Schmitt's paper *The Concept of the Political* (Kolnai 1933; 2004), as well as his monumental book *The War Against the West*, one of the first critical analyses of the "essence" of Nazism as a political phenomenon (Kolnai 1938; 2015).

The intellectual background of Kolnai's philosophy of liberty consisted of several, seemingly heterogeneous and irreconcilable approaches to this question. In his first book, he adopted elements of psychoanalytic social theory developed by Sigmund Freud, for the purpose of critiquing anarchism and communism, which he considered to be two sides of the same coin. In his psycho-sociological study which he wrote as a direct student of Sandor Ferenczi (Honneth 2014), Kolnai not only preceded the representatives of the Frankfurt School in applying the results of psychoanalysis to sociology and political theory, but worked in a way that was conversed to their methods. As he wrote in the article *The Humanist Significance of Psychoanalysis* published in the special issue of *International Journal of Psychoanalysis,* dedicated to Ferenczi, "one can easily get an idea, that psychoanalysis performs in regard to individual psyche the same work as Marxism in regard to the social structure and that it could be taken therefore as its continuator and co-fighter" (Kolnai 1923). However, Kolnai formulated a list of arguments against the idea of Marxism and psychoanalysis as co-oper-

ative areas of thought in his article. According to him, the sociological as well as political implications of psychoanalysis, free of any metaphysics of history, consisted first of all in everything *but* messianic, revolutionary practice. As he wrote, "the original aim of psychoanalysis is extremely simple; the cure of the patient. […] It aims at securing for the individual a better balance, at bringing about a better adaptation to the environment, at establishing a higher rationality, and producing a more perfect harmony." (Kolnai 1923.)

The conservatism of Kolnai's political philosophy takes its first root from the recognition that as a natural theoretical ally of psychoanalysis in the field of social theory should be regarded not Marxism, but rather Durkheim's sociologism and his theory of social solidarity. To Kolnai, the most important distinction made by Durkheim was between "mechanic solidarity", ruling in societies based on religion and tradition, and "organic solidarity", specific to the complex social organisms and founded on the division of labour. In reference to this distinction according to which mechanic solidarity was its lower, more primitive form associated with a similarity of society's members, Kolnai criticised Communism and its anarchist, revolutionary practice in psychoanalytic terms of "regression". In *Psychoanalysis and Sociology,* he pointed at what he called "primitively anarchical impulse towards freedom", ruled by his interpretation of both Anarchists and Communists, and which is only possible to satisfy by introducing the tyrannical dictatorship of the proletariat (Kolnai 1920; 1922). To the extent that "psychoanalysis teaches us", he wrote, "that mental disorders as disturbances of the adaptation to the extant form of society, are regressions to its lower stages" (Kolnai 1920; 1922), anarchist Communism was nothing but a kind of social psychosis, "a mixture of blood halitus and logarithms" (Kolnai 1920; 1922). While interpreting the Communist ideology as a regressive mythology, he criticised Marxism in his first book already, above all with respect to its attitude towards "the specific human value that goes by the name of »political liberty«" (Kolnai 1920; 1922). He pointed out that Marxism consisted in the rejection of the concept of both political and personal liberty, insofar as Marx considered liberty to be a "relative value" and was unable to recognize "the inward freedom as a correlate of outward freedom" (Kolnai 1920; 1922).

The next component of the theoretical background which influenced Kolnai's philosophy of liberty was Scheler's material ethics of values. After he abandoned the "psychoanalytical movement" under the influence of Scheler's critique of Freud's theory of *libido* (Scheler 2008), he turned towards the phenomenological one (Kolnai 1925) and critically developed his material theory of value hierarchy in the dissertation *Ethical Value and Reality* (Kolnai 1927). As one of the numerous young phenomenologists exposed to Scheler's Christian proselytism, he converted to Roman Catholicism in the same year, which fact determined his subsequent approach to liberal democracy and the idea of liberty itself (Dunlop 2002) significantly. The first expression of Kolnai's both "Catholic" and

"phenomenological conservatism", coined by Pierre Manent, was his book of 1929 called *Sexual Ethics,* written about the meaning and foundations of gender morality (Honneth 2014). As an outspoken expression of this conservatism, comparable to the approach towards the social and political world of Dietrich Hildebrand and Michael Oakeshott as well as Eric Voegelin, Leo Strauss, and the articles of the above-mentioned journal, *Der Christliche Ständestaat.* While legitimizing the rule of Chancellor Dollfuss in Austria merely by virtue of the publication of these, he began to propagate Catholic corporatist ideals as well as to develop the idea of civilizatory significance of the social hierarchy and other social institutions limiting the political power for the first time (Dunlop 2002).

II. Three Riders of the Apocalypse

This complex, by no means obvious and coherent, biographical and intellectual background of Kolnai's approach to the question of liberty – which he recapitulated thoroughly in *Political Memoirs* and which Francis Dunlop critically reconstructed in the study *The Life and Thought of Aurel Kolnai* – became publicly manifest no sooner than in the direct and systematic research carried out after his emigration to the United States and Canada, after 1938. He analysed the meaning of the idea of liberty and the threats to its survival in the post-war world in the series of articles he wrote at the end of the 1940s, published mostly in Catholic journals *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* and *The Thomist*. Even though in his approach to this question Kolnai did not pretend to be impartial and openly claimed his commitment to "Christian conservatism", the motto of his analyses, in a phenomenological sense still, was "the sovereignty of the object" (Kolnai 2008). While declaring himself to be a "confirmed Rightist", who lets "the phenomenon speak" (Kolnai 1999a. 65) he approached the idea of liberty in a common sense rather than in a doctrinaire manner. He unambiguously let his readers know that he preferred "the drab but comparatively solid common-place advocates of the liberal-democratic »middle road« to the flippant aesthetes of Conservatism who despise »trivial« facts and obvious »truisms« for their lack of piquancy" and "twist the truth so as to fit the ideological need of the moment" (Kolnai 1999a. 111).

In the then unpublished article of 1950, he stated his paradoxical programme of conserving liberty and compared its most dangerous foes of his time to the "riders of the Apocalypse" (Kolnai 1999a. 105–118). He listed Progressive Democracy (Kolnai 1999a. 105) among these, along with Communism which represented "the fullness of Inferno, which man in the process of his self-enslavement has vowed to make unto himself for an earthly paradise", and Nazism, which in his opinion bears no relevancy except to Nazi Germany due to its defeat and to lacking "practical support for the time being". As opposed to the

last two riders, which were totalitarian and anti-liberal "noisily" and "defiantly", the democracy encountered by Kolnai in the US, which he calls progressive "for want of a better name" he saw as subversive to the political liberty in a less direct, but perhaps an even more lethal way. As he wrote,

> If […] we consider the "insidious" totalitarianism inherent in the trend towards equality, uniformity and administrative "planning for welfare," we might […] find that Progressive Democracy really out-strips the totalitarianism not only of the Nazis but even of the Communists, assimilating as it does (under the deceptive verbal cloak of liberalism and tolerance) the thinking, moods and wills of everybody to a wholesale standard of the "socialized" mind more organically and perhaps more durably; eliminating all essential opposition to its own pattern by incomparably milder methods but so much the more effectively and irrevocably (Kolnai 1999a. 108).

Kolnai described the "Riders of the Apocalypse" with reference to Plato's *Republic* as "three classic postures, three epiphanies as it were, of *Man at large*" (Kolnai 1999a. 114). Due to the fact that Progressive Democracy, in his interpretation, "sired" both Communism and Nazism, he considered it to be "*the* Rider of the moderne Apocalypse rather than merely one among the others" (Kolnai 1999a. 118). According to Kolnai's reading of Western history, comparable not as much to Hegel or Comte as to that of French traditionalists such as de Maistre or de Bonald, Progressive Democracy, together with other epiphanies of the modern state, was to be regarded as a product of the process initiated by Christianity, which first had to set man free and lifted him "above the flats of his fallen nature" (Kolnai 1999a. 114). As one of the first upshots of the "»trend of progress« as ushered in by the Renaissance »emancipation of man«", the idea of progressive democracy had to consist in "wrenching" the Man himself "free *from* Christianity" at its roots and in constructing "the automatic workings of his fallen nature into a mirage of self-made heaven" (Kolnai 1999a. 114).

While pointing out the historical process of human emancipation from Christianity as a common denominator of all three foes of liberty taken into consideration, Kolnai analysed the mutual relationships between these and attempted their distinctive characterisation in his article. The basic threat common to both Nazism and Communism which represented a radical new departure from Progressive Democracy with its "quasi-religious idea of a limitless self-sovereignty of man", was their programme of making it valid and guaranteed by the total sovereignty of state-power (Kolnai 1999a. 106). A point of structural similarity between the two systems implied by the totalitarian conception of "identity" between the wills of the rulers and the ruled, he noticed a monistic and centralistic conception of social power in the form of a one-party rule, which reduces the law and morality to mere functions of the government's will, and which uses a severe dictatorship with deified leaders as personal figureheads and terror

as a constitutive element of government exercised by the secret police (Kolnai 1999a. 106).

From Nazism and Communism, Kolnai admitted, Progressive Democracy distinguished itself with a kind of continuity with the normal life of society and the pluralistic landscape of interests. The elements of the "rights of man" and "the dignity of the individual", as he noticed, could not be "wholly ousted from Progressive Democracy short of a radical overthrow of the system" (Kolnai 1999, 108). In contrast to the political religions professed by two other riders of the Apocalypse, a "secular religion" by which it was informed, connoted "an element of tolerance, indetermination, and détente" (Kolnai 1999a. 107). Despite of being prone to an idolatry of the progress, the progressive-democratic "man at large" did not make, in his interpretation, "a chiliastic promise to be redeemed after a world-wide dictatorship" (Kolnai 1999a. 107). Insofar as the world of Progressive Democracy was based on the recognition of a "given" human reality underneath the "ideal" subsisting in its own right, the part of this progressive ideology itself was the conservative belief that so long as it would last, it "should never be completely determined by its dominant ideology" (Kolnai 1999a. 107).

While appreciating a kind of conservatism of this rider of the Apocalypse with regards to the liberty issue – the fact, that it "constitutionally precluded […] enforcing an un-»constitutional« mode of life" (Kolnai 1999a. 107) – he also pointed out what Progressive Democracy had in common with the other riders. With Nazism, which also represented the "maimed" form of "normal human society", it shared, as he noticed, the character of "incomplete totalitarianism" (Kolnai 1999a. 108). In order to highlight the totalitarian elements of Progressive Democracy, in his article Kolnai first of all stressed the incompleteness of Nazi total state-power with regards to such remnants of society considered by him being normal as the capitalist economic system, or, "despite the enmity it had sworn to the »Jewish moneylender«", the inherited social structure with its class distinctions (Kolnai 1999, 109). Even though, as Kolnai admitted, Nazi tyranny was "»unlimited« in the sense that it kicked aside constitutional »checks and balances«" and "positively totalitarian in the educational, literary, artistic and similar fields", it did not claim "a total determination of the order of human life and relationships on behalf of one exclusive political will as actualized by the rulers" (Kolnai 1999a. 109).

In some aspects, according to Kolnai, Progressive Democracy might have been described, nevertheless, even "as more »progressive«, »modern« and »totalitarian« than Communism" (Kolnai 1999. 110) or, respectively, Nazism. It shared for instance, not only the idolatry of the Progress, but also the goal, which that democracy was progressing, that is "the self-same basic concept of Social Revolution" (Kolnai 1999. 110) with Communism. Unlike Nazism, whose merit was, in his opinion, its role in arousing "radical revulsion from the sleep-walkers

path of Progress", what Progressive Democracy and Communism had in common, was "the concept of history as a […] process ordained to the goal of a man-made »rational« utopia […], embodied in mankind wholly organized on a unitary plan and wholly master of itself, that is, wholly slave to its centre of will" (Kolnai 1999a. 112). On the other hand, both Progressive Democracy and Nazism aspired, according to him, to a totalitarian determination of man by state-power through numerous channels. For instance, as he wrote,

> Biological and eugenic points of view seem to rank higher, not only in Nazi racialism but also in the Progressive Democratic trend towards a medical and psychiatric dictatorship, than in the Communist state-worship with its monomaniac reference to political power and social (in the sense of extra-political) equality (Kolnai 1999. 110).

III. The Liberty of the Common Man

As one can conclude from the contextual reading of the pertinent articles, the immediate trigger of Kolnai's criticism of Progressive Democracy was his opposition against the equalitarian principles of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's presidency. The principles were expressed among others in the famous presidential *Four Freedoms Speech* of 1941, and in the not less famous speech of vice-president Henry Wallace, *The Century of the Common Man* from 1942 (Kennedy 1999. 469). In order to reveal the totalitarian tendencies of those speeches, which subverted, in his interpretation, the very idea of liberty, the main target of his criticism was the ideology, the "worship" or, as he also called it, the "cult of the Common Man" lying behind them. While being aware of the political or, as we would say today, populist motifs of this ideology (Kazin 1995), that is, of the fact that it aimed at convincing the American electorate, prone to Communist promises, about the possibility of attaining the Communist goals in a peaceful manner, Kolnai drew the attention of his readers to the costs of such rhetorical progressivism. He argued that the most substantial of those costs was sacrificing "man's intrinsic freedom" on the altar of the Common Man and sacrificing liberty for equality, security and welfare (Kolnai 1999a. 103). About the "champions" of the Common Man who presented themselves as working on behalf and in the interest of him, Kolnai wrote that they worked in fact "on the »advancement« of liberal democracy along the path that leads to totalitarian tyranny" (Kolnai 1999a. 85).

In the article *The Meaning of the "Common Man"* of 1949, Kolnai attempted to not only reveal the anti-liberal, moral and political background of democratic-progressive ideology. He also pointed at the subversive Consequences of the equalitarian ideology of democracy itself. The progressive critique of the liberal-democratic system of Western society due to its being insufficiently

democratic rooted, according to Kolnai, in the "great Subversion" that by no means started only when Lenin seized the power (Kolnai 1999a. 92). In Kolnai's interpretation, the main premise of the ideology, professed with no difference by "Communists, philo-communists, Socialists and radicals or progressives of various shades" who aimed at establishing "substantial" or "social" democracy in the place of the liberal one as merely formal, juridical or political, was the aforementioned secularization of Christianity or, as he also put it, its political "adoption" (Kolnai 1999a. 110). The historical and moral background of that ideology was, according to Kolnai, "subversive humanism" along with the set of its ideological sources marked among others by the names of Spinoza, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Marx (Kolnai 1999a.99). After recognizing in *The War Against the West* the subversive potential of psychoanalysis and the role played in the self-destruction of liberal idealism by the psychoanalytical "glorification of urges and instincts, of complexes and natural desires which attributes overwhelming power to sensual lust and unconscious impulse", he eventually listed Sigmund Freud among them too (Kolnai 1938. 15).

Kolnai considered the concept of the Common Man to be the next expression of this subversive humanism. He defined it as a modernized and Westernized edition of the Marxian proletarian and sharply distinguished from what is meant when speaking about a "plain", "average" or "ordinary" man. In contrast to the plain man, who, as he wrote, "evidently fails to cultivate and to assert himself, is not an ideologist of his own grandeur", the authentic Common Man he considered to be "above all a function and an implication of the subversive equalitarian ideology itself" (Kolnai 1999a. 88). As an ideological construct and prefiguring, to some extent, Zinovyev's concept of *homo sovieticus* (Zinovyev 1986), the concept of Common Man in his interpretation referred to a man "artificially hyper-simplified, cleansed from common sense, distinctive loyalties and traditions, chance limitations and possessions", to a man, who "must be »born anew« of the »Cause«, the »ideology«, the »faith« in his own »mission«, »rights« and »future« itself" (Kolnai 1999a. 90). According to a kind of comparative psychology thereof by Kolnai in his article, he might be defined as a "»plain man« gone mad, who, by exaggerating and puffing up his plainness, aspires to embody the fullness of human perfection" (Kolnai 1999a. 88).

According to Kolnai, the equivocation between the ordinary, plain man as such and the Common Man as, after Henry Wallace, a "hero of our century" was rooted in the "equivocation between »commonness« as inherent in Distinction, the »universal Cause«, the *bonum diffusivum sui,* and »commonness« as a negation of distinction and inequality (the »common crow«; a »common trait«)" (Kolnai 1999. 90). While exploiting the fact that this equivocation allowed to refer the concept of commonness to both Christ and Barabbas, the equalitarian ideology of Common Man appealed, in Kolnai's interpretation, in no other way than Nazi ideology of Aryan Germany, to our "loyalty towards our own kind"

(Kolnai 1999a. 83). As based on the assumption that there is a "sort of substantial identity between my person as a Common Man and Humanity as a whole", it considered, thanks to this equivocation, "selfishness" in ourselves "to be not only permissible but actually a duty" (Kolnai 1999a. 84).

From Kolnai's perspective, on the one hand, the threats to liberty on the part of the ideology of Common Man consisted in undermining the American determination to resist the external pressure of the Soviet system of power (Kolnai 1999a. 92). Since he concluded from his own Hungarian experience that the Soviet system was "certainly and irrevocably set on enslaving the remainder of the world and imposing Communism upon it by brute force" (Kolnai 1999a. 92), he considered it to be a direct threat to liberty to succumb to the emotional attraction of the Communist ideology, "exercised upon us […] because of its points of »democratic« affinity with our own" (Kolnai 1999a. 92). Kolnai used this point of view to criticize the "well-meaning Liberals and Conservatives" for their ignorance in regard to the Marxian doctrine, which inspired the action of Communism. Nothing but this ignorance could explain, in his opinion, charging the Communists "with having »betrayed in practice« their own »lofty« aims and ideals" (Kolnai 1999a. 93). As he already recognized in his book of 1920, it was nothing but the Marxian war against the contradictions implicit in the fabric of civilized society itself what culminated "in the blind-alley of the one supreme »contradiction« between the Terror State […] and the Luciferian vision of pure Anarchy" (Kolnai 1999a. 102). It was more than obvious to him thirty years later that "terror is not the means but the meaning of the »direct« and »actual« rule of »The People«" (Kolnai 1999. 101).

On the other hand, in Kolnai's interpretation, the ideology of Common Man threatened liberty by "its inherent tendency towards anti-constitutional, monistic, totalitarian types of power" (Kolnai 1999a. 92). He warned that even in the "happy event" of the downfall of the Soviet power, liberal democracy shall continue to face the real danger of springing "the great Tyranny of the future […] from the soil of American mass equalitarianism" (Kolnai 1999a. 92).

This internal threat, inherent in liberal-democratic ideology itself, was supposed to consist in subverting and "paralysing" in virtue of the idea of Common Man, the constitutional meaning of the rule of the American "people". As Kolnai wrote, summarizing the political results of Roosevelt's New Deal policy,

> we have travelled a long way already from Liberal abstractions and juridical formalism to Socialist "substance" and mass regimentation, from "rights" to "claims" and from "liberty" to "security" from one's right to do what one likes to one's right to get what one likes, from "the pursuit of happiness" to a claim to happiness rationed out by the State, a guarantor of "social justice", from an official indifference to quality to its latent persecution, from the principle of moral "equivalence" of any human "needs" whatsoever to the programme of ensured "need-gratification" (Kolnai 1999a. 92).

Insofar as the authentic Common Man was regarded by Kolnai not so much as a simple product of the conditions of life under industrialism but rather being generated and trained by his heralds and interpreters, worshipping him, in his interpretation, surreptitiously subverted together with the "old concept of political liberty" also the concept of citizens' rights and that of citizen itself. Due to the fact that the Common Man, according to Kolnai, cared "about nothing but his welfare in the strictest sense", as a voter, he experienced in the election of public officers, on the one hand, all transcendent authority as tyranny. On the other hand, as Kolnai noticed, he not only was, but also expected to be "influenced by the crudest *ad hominem* arguments and the basest »psychological« tricks" (Kolnai 1999a. 88). As such, the Common Man might be described from the perspective of political psychology sketched in Kolnai's article, as a "robot sublimized into an angel", "an absolute Citizen in whom all wisdom of the race is incarnate", "a sovereign machine or a governable Superman" (Kolnai 1999a. 91).

IV. Liberty and Nobility

The idea of liberty, defended by Kolnai in his post-war articles from the cult of the Common Man, seems to be an utter anachronism, and not only from the contemporary perspective. He also appeared to be aware that the political world which he attempted to maintain or rather to resuscitate, was already a kind of political Atlantis in his time. As his biographer Francis Dunlop reports, the unpublished notebooks of Kolnai, as well as the letters to his friends, witness his life-long concern with the imaginary future history of a Hungary which had retained its old borders in 1918 and gradually developed into a constitutional monarchy called *Ulászló* (Dunlop 2002. 47). His indulgence in imagining the alternative history of his lost homeland suggests not only Kolnai's awareness of the utopian character of his liberal conservatism, but also some possible points of historical reference of reactive utopia, which he takes into consideration. Insofar as Kolnai probably called his imaginary kingdom after the Polish Jagellonian King Władysław of Warna, who ruled Hungary in the 15th century (Dunlop 2002. 259), it is not out of question that not only his political phantasmagoria, but also the "old concept of political liberty", which he attempted to conserve, referred to some extent to the lost Nobles' Commonwealth of this part of Europe and to its core idea of *aurea libertas*.

While considering Progressive Democracy with its ideology of Common Man to be the threat to the old concept of liberty, Kolnai did not define, admittedly, his liberal-conservative political program in terms of a reactionary utopianism. As he wrote,

> what we have in mind is not, of course, a proposal to substitute for Western Democracy along with its ideological biases, a fancy system of Conservative Constitutionalism, nor a return to this or that specified stage of the past, but a suggestion to displace the spiritual stress from the "common man" aspect of democracy to its aspect of constitutionalism and of moral continuity with the high tradition of Antiquity, Christendom and the half-surviving Liberal cultures of yesterday (Kolnai 1999a. 64).

What allows to search for some point of reference of Kolnai's idea of liberty in the lost tradition of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is, nevertheless, his provocative attempt to define this concept in terms of "nobility" and "privilege", banned from the political discourse at least since both the American and the French Revolution.

In order to reconstruct the old liberal sense of the concept of liberty, Kolnai started from analysing its subversive meaning in the aforementioned *Four Freedoms Speech* of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in his article *Liberty and Privilege*. Especially the last two freedoms listed in there, i.e. (apart from the "freedom of speech" and the "freedom of worship") the "freedom from want" and the "freedom from fear" (Engel 2016), Kolnai has identified as steps towards the "degradation of the Liberal idea of Liberty in the democratic society of Liberal inspiration" (Kolnai 1999a. 35). He regarded it as nothing but a piece of demagogy, since, as he noticed, in this speech "the increasing prevalence of an entirely different set of values (such as security and material need-gratification) will be aptly camouflaged by their rhetorical assimilation to the concept of liberty" (Kolnai 1999a. 36). Insofar as liberty in Roosevelt's understanding, subsuming "welfare" under the category of freedom, no longer meant liberty "from" government, but liberty "through" government, it marked "the dropping of the liberal or semi-liberal in favor of the totalitarian brand of »Democracy«" in Kolnai's interpretation (Kolnai 1999a. 42).

Kolnai's attempt to define liberty – unlike in the case of the modern political philosophy from Hobbes' *Leviathan* to the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* – in terms not so much of the inalienable "right" but rather of "privilege", started from the criticism of the very foundations of liberal political ontology. In the pertinent article, he established an opposition between two types of political philosophy he calls "totalitarian" and "conservative-liberal", and defines those types as based on two different philosophical principles "identity" and "participation", respectively. "The principle of Identity", Kolnai wrote in his essay, "involves what we may call the principle of the negation of – isolation from, and hostility to – whatever is "non-identical" or irreducible to identity" (Kolnai 1999a. 23). Concretely it meant "the exclusion of participation" in whatever presents itself as "transcendent" – in the sense of qualitative otherness and in particular of "superiority" – to the private "self" (Kolnai 1999a. 23). The political expression of "man's craving for identity", understood as carrying within

it "the developing germ of radical enmity to Being", was already the idea of "emancipation" and "equality" itself (Kolnai 1999a. 23).

While proclaiming the equal and joint sovereignty of men, the principle of identity formed the basis of the totalitarian idea of both political and civic liberty to him. To the extent that it abolished any distinction between them, the eventual political fulfillment of the principle turned out to be – as in the "Communist" ideology from Rousseau to Stalin – nothing but the identification of the will of Citizen with the "General Will" or the will of the man with that of the "People" (Kolnai 1999a. 26). As based on the ontology of identity, it was thus already the definition of liberty in terms of human right that constituted a kind of ideological bridge between democracy and Communism from Kolnai's perspective. Insofar as civic liberty defined in this manner involved the identitarian idea of human power unrestrained and omnipotent, the logic of the liberal principle of absolute freedom for the individual, not limited by anything except the equally absolute freedom of others, was considered by him to be "ineluctably suicidal and conducive to the Communist principle of an absolute freedom of the individual in the sense of an actually identical absolute power of »all«" (Kolnai 1999a. 40).

Kolnai admitted, indeed, that "the combination of »popular sovereignty« with the »rights of the individual« is not, in principle, a purely arbitrary mixture of two contradictory schemes" (Kolnai 1999a. 38). However, as he noticed, especially in the time of geopolitical conflict between liberal democracy and Communism "the equilibrium between the two 'lines' of man's self-assertion […] is a delicate and precarious one" (Kolnai 1999a. 38). What Kolnai suggested facing that challenge, was aforementioned shifting "the emphasis within »Democracy« from the fabric of ideas and tendencies symbolized by the »Common Man« onto whatever the »Rule of Law« stands for" (Kolnai 1999a. 64). He meant by this, after Durkheim, nothing but a "Balanced Society", based on, as he wrote

> the finiteness of all human power even on the level of human relations; the plurality and the limitation of all social powers and political prerogatives; the ordering of society in deference and in reference to a Power radically beyond and above Man in his social reality, in his political dignity and in all manifestations of his "will" (Kolnai 1999a. 64).

Like Tocqueville before him, Kolnai thus considered the inevitable condition of liberty in democratic society, especially the one challenged by the Communist rhetoric of radical democratization and emancipation, to be nothing but the hampering of the power of "the paramount will of Society" by "all kinds of divisions, reservations, privileges, taboos, conventions, traditions" (Kolnai 1999a. 31). According to him, the abstract idea of freedom as a human right could not be the only source of a social order in which freedom is to thrive. The civic

liberty Kolnai regarded as rather a result than a foundation of civilization. "The freedom and self-government of man", he wrote, "must be grounded in some other principle than the specious »evidence« of […] one's »right« to »do what one likes« subject to the »identical right of others«" (Kolnai 1999. 39).

Unlike Tocqueville, Kolnai did not hesitate to present as the foundational principle of both civil and political liberty in contemporary democratic society the category of "the privilege". He defined this category as an "institutional recognition […] of metaphysical smallness, failure and fallenness of Man: the fact that a few or rather, very many men in different ways transcend the 'common level' of mankind" (Kolnai 1999a. 22). The necessity of a system of privileges as both "traditional embodiment" of this metaphysical fact and the very condition on which liberty is possible Kolnai justified by referring to the abovementioned principle of conservative-liberal political philosophy he called "participation". What he meant by this was not the postulate of civic engagement addressing issues of public concern, but rather the Platonic concept of *methexis,* that is, participation of particulars in some "eternal" forms, first of which is in the "common Good". In reference to some elements of Catholic political theology, Kolnai characterized participation as "another word to express man's affirmation of – or loyalty to – Being, Form, and Limits, implied also by his true relationship with Being Infinite" (Kolnai 1999a. 26). The privilege, according to Kolnai, signified on the level of social reality, that in all Participation as opposed to Identity, "there must be present some element embodying a specific stress on the dissimilarity and distinctness between what participates and what is participated" (Kolnai 1999a. 53).

Defined in legal terms as "exemption from the law" granted to a particular category of people in a particular and limited context, privilege meant for Kolnai a principle of a "personal, semipublic, not or not directly political position of power" (Kolnai 1999a. 52). Understood in this way, the privilege was in his interpretation a "rampart of liberty – not the liberty of »the privileged« only, but of all classes of the people, of the whole multitude" (Kolnai 1999a. 47). As opposed to "the citizen" of modern democracy, equal in his rights to the others, presented by Kolnai as nothing but "an anonymous molecule of society, a drifting spark of the 'universal reason', an infinitesimal entity of the political calculus" (Kolnai 1999a. 47), "the privileged" have to express "the existence of relatively independent persons as quasi finite parts of society, as »principles« of the community, which are quasi commensurable with state-power, even though inferior to it in strength and dignity, and subject to its jurisdiction" (Kolnai 1999 47). Similarly to Tocqueville's (and Bodin's) conception of liberty *le corps intermédiaires,* in Kolnai's interpretation it is the privileges that made civic and political liberty possible. As he wrote, "it is by privilege and countervailing privilege, by the finiteness and limitation of privilege, […] by a hierarchy of multiple hier-

archies, and not by the abolition of hierarchy, […] that liberty […] comes into being" (Kolnai 1999a. 47).

Apart from the "philosophical apology of privilege", tantamount to the attempt at working out its critical concept, Kolnai also did not hesitate to undertake a kind of "critique of nobility" understood as a condition of possibility of liberty in the "balanced society" of today. In his post-war articles, he took up the analyses of the social and political significance of the nobility, delivered by him in the article *An Attempt to Classify the General Social Ideas of Power*, published in Berlin in 1929 (Dunlop 2002. 108). Kolnai's approach to this political concept in this early article was purely analytical and consisted in juxtaposing of the idea of the social power of the Nobility with those of the two other social classes, the Bourgeoisie and the Proletariat (Kolnai 1929). In reference to his recognition from this article that "it is part of the very essence of the Nobility to cultivate certain personal value-qualities" (Dunlop 2002. 108), he also maintained in the post-war time, that "social nobility is not and never was – except in the imagination of imbecile snobs – an equivalent of human and personal, of moral or intellectual nobility; nevertheless, its existence is indispensable for the existence of such nobility" (Kolnai 1999a. 77).

While considering the idea of equality to be the political weapon of subversive humanism, Kolnai stated on the margin of his criticism of the ideology of Common Man, that "the war against nobility […] is in truth an essential and metaphysical rebellion levelled at something that towers infinitely above kings, dukes, barons, squires, factory owners, generals and admirals, fops or usurers" (Kolnai 1999a. 83). According to the "principle of participation" as opposed to the "principle of identity", he defined nobility as a "quasi-natural, quasi-essential superiority that is necessarily not only in society but also of society" (Kolnai 1999a. 81). In reference to Scheler's material ethics of values, Kolnai maintained that "»nobility« means the reception […] by society of a structural principle of order that is not of its own making or positing but originates in supra-social, quasi »entitative« human value" (Kolnai 1999a. 81). As such, it expressed "the submission of Society on the natural plane […] to what is higher and better than its own »thesis«, »volition« or »appointment« may be" (Kolnai 1999a. 81).

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Polish and Hungarian Parallels in Socialist Architecture Theory

I. Ideological Background of Polish and Hungarian Architecture

After the First World War, a new era emerged due to social needs and reconstruction processes, the modern movement. The aim of so-called classical modernism was a functional architectural approach which works with *typification* and standardisation, in order to find the best solution to the needs of the society. After World War II, the aims were similar to the previous post-war period: to build houses for people with quick and cost-efficient methods.

After WWII, a social and economic transformation was dominant in Central-Eastern Europe which had a strong influence on the architecture of the region in the 20th century. All of this occurred at the micro and macro levels, from realistic representations to the design of new cities. The ideological background was to create new common myths with new form language in the visual communication of art and architecture. In Central-eastern Europe in the aim was to renew processes, change the regime, separate and isolate from the West, create a centralised power and society, and to start processes of industrialisation and urbanisation both in terms of society and architecture.

The Visegrád countries, i.e. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland had a common history during the years of Socialism. After WWII, three different periods were distinguished: the years of renovation and reconstruction; the years of dogmatism which means a renewed historical architecture, and the mass housing project, which means the era of prefabricated houseblock systems. In order to analyse the tendencies in the post-war period, we have to focus on the ideological background of applied architectural styles and building methods.

The first period, which contains the reconstruction processes, was already under the influence of ideology, but only on the surface. Bernard Huet (Huet 1998) called this *formalism*, but I argue, that this should more precisely be called *facadism*. The second period was socialist Realism, the new Soviet ideology-influenced architecture; a culmination of the aforementioned facadism. The

third era, i.e. the mass housing project was the architecture of great numbers. The aim was to work out a calculable system for living and spaces.

Czechoslovakia is a little bit different from Poland and Hungary because of the fusion of Czech and Slovak people and territory. In 1948, the newly grounded country was dominated by the Soviet Union and was turned into a Stalinist model in the working method of the state. The political power was handled and controlled by the Communist Party, and a centralised system emerged in each field of politics and culture including art, architecture and urban design. The background was similar during these years in Poland, where the Soviet dominance began in 1949. Soviet influence extended to all spheres of public and private life.

The historical, political and cultural situation was similar in Poland in the era, because after WWII, Poland was under strong Soviet dominance from 1949 on. The processes were similar to that of Czechoslovakia: totalitarianism was the main goal in everyday life here as well. The main task of architects was not only to plan and build houses or streets, but they had to work on the embodiment of the new social order and the consciousness of the people. The preferred style was the renewal of Renaissance, like classic Polish architecture. This was part of the ideology according to which they had to choose the style of the most victorious era of the country for the new basis of the Soviet-dominated architectural form-language. A special development in Poland was that they built the Joseph Stalin Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw (1952–1955), which looks like a typical Soviet-type skyscraper.

The Hungarian state after WWII was also under the dominance of the Soviet Union. After WWII, the construction processes continued in the style and concept of the classical modernism of the interwar period. The form of government was a People's Republic. Cultural life was formed under the motto: "Socialist by content, national by form". In 1956, a revolution against the regime took place, but it was unsuccessful, and the political power remained unchanged until 1989, the year of the change of regime. There were different approaches under Socialism with different architectural and urban aims, the Rákosi system, and then the Kádár system. For about 45 years, the political and cultural life of Hungary was under the influence of the Soviets, thus Soviet principles had to be adopted.

In Hungary, there were two definitive debates, the first was the *Great Architectural Debate* the second was the critique of the construction of the impersonal prefabricated house-block systems: the *Tulip Debate*. The first related to socialist realism, the second to the mass housing project. In the *Great Architectural Debate*, the task was to find the best style for Hungarian socialist realism, which would match the Soviet notion the most. During the debate, in which the decisive word was that of a Hungarian philosopher, George Lukács, the participants agreed that the task is to renew Hungarian classicism.

II. Parallels in Historical Reconstruction

One of the main building processes was the reconstruction of the built heritage of previous historical buildings. Due to using socialist ideology, there was a need for distinguishing memories of the past which were compatible with the new aims. All this was realized in architecture along the idea of socialist realism. This resulted in the category named *reconstruction for the people*. For the region in question, this could be formulated by giving its former representative buildings a public function. Historical reconstructions are indistinguishable from the original state to the eye of the average person. However, an analysis of art history reveals the layer that proves the ontological worthlessness of these reconstructions. The form language thus developed was intended to create a new imperial architecture aimed at glorifying the party. They thus retained the representational purpose of historical-type architecture, but these no longer applied to the bourgeois, aristocratic, or the ruling class. Instead, the party emerges as a customer, which, of course, serves the people, satisfying their needs in terms of both culture and function. By using earlier historical elements which were reapplied to buildings used by the people, they seemed to represent equality. The axis of time culminated then and there, projected by the party-approved historical ages. Conceptually speaking, therefore we can talk about the unification of the ideology of socialism and realism in artistic disciplines, from which socialist realism emerged. The provision of new, public functions to representative historic buildings stolen from previous owners is thus socialist realism manifested in architecture. All of this might even fit the nature of architecture as an original public function, but due to its ideological background, the buildings were ontologically worthless, as they did not refer to their original meaning.

> Socialist Realism was created in order to hide the reality, to construct a beautiful illusion and present it as the truth […] The task of the writer or artist consisted of creating such illusions, in depicting reality, not as it is, but as it will be under socialism; moreover, the future was described as if it already existed. (Petrov 2011. 874.)

In this section, I will present case studies to support the applied usage of historical elements: the Buda Castle in the Hungarian capital, Budapest, and the Wawel in Warsaw.

1. Case study: the Buda Castle

The castle in the Hungarian capital is an important symbol of the country; its construction history can be traced back to the Middle Ages through both historical studies and the study of architectural monuments. The complex of the Buda

Castle, which was rebuilt into a neo-Baroque building in the 19th century and was severely damaged in World War II. Thus, during the period of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Vienna became a worthy pole in the dualistic political system.

The palace complex was badly damaged in World War II, and the third floor and roof also burned down. The representative spaces were located on the first floor, which could have been restored. Historic historical elements reminiscent of the kingdom and aristocracy were removed in the 1950s and 1960s. We are aware that the so-called Habsburg Stairs and Habsburg Hall were demolished on account of their names. Outbuildings such as the barn and stables could also have been saved but were rather demolished due to their confusing connotation to the system.

In the 1960s, the palace was completely renovated. In the Baroque parts, the façade was stripped of its ornaments, and the architecture of the other parts was redesigned to fit it. The roof profiles were simplified, the dome was simplified and elevated, its shape was inspired from earlier Baroque and Classicist examples. It was called a commission dome because no one undertook to use the completed structure. The interiors were designed in an age-appropriate modernist taste. The palace housed institutions that put the former elite building at the service of the public. (Sisa 2002. 104.)

Unfortunately, none of the modest designs of the originally modernist architects won the tender. The finally implemented plan featured oversized, disproportionate measures to the palace, an official structure about which architect János Bonta writes: "you might get used to it in time, but you may not love it" (Bonta 2008. 234).

The Buda Castle District is an important place for today's capital constructions. Reconstruction of parts of buildings and whole buildings have been taking place, such as the stables, that were demolished during World War II and during socialist rebuilding processes. We need to distinguish reconstruction from the rebuilding method. Rebuilding is a typical socialist realist genre, which means a recreation of reality, whereas reconstruction means the correct method of keeping the historical heritage and using satisfying professional procedures.

2. Warsaw Main Square

The old town and the Main Square of Warsaw were demolished by the Nazis in 1944. In the year of Stalin's death, 1953, it was rebuilt by using an 18th-century Canaletto painting. The hidden ideological background was to symbolise the goodwill of the Party. During the rebuilding process, architects neglected the ideologically fulfilled appearance of the 19th-century bourgeoisie. During the renovation, an idea to visually hide the churches of the old town occurred. This

project can be defined as the historical policy of the landscape, because everything old was seen as representing the wrong history of the pre-war period. (Czepczynski 2008. 81–82.)

III. Symbolic Landmarks

Historical events were similar in Poland. Socialist realism also lasted a few years, from 1949 to 1956. During this period, two emblematic congresses were organised where the tasks and the form language of architecture were discussed. The first one was held in 1945; the *National Conference of the Party Architects,* and the second was the *All-Polish Architectural Meeting*. In 1945, the core issue was, just like in the *Great Architectural Debate* in Hungary, to develop and create the new architectural form language to be accepted by the Party. Of course, this was socialist realism, but the aim was not exclusively to copy the original of the Soviet Union, but to create the Polish version thereof by using traditional Polish architectural elements and ornaments. At the second event in 1956, architects started to criticise socialist realism and they turned to the soviet modern building methods, leaving the previous usage of Polish and Soviet-style historical element behind. In this section, I will present two emblematic examples of Stalinist dogmatism: the PKIN in Warsaw and the facadism of building R of the Budapest University of Technology and Economics.

1. The Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw

The Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw is a symbolic building of the Polish capital. Construction took place from 1952 to 1956 and the building, a skyscraper of late socialist realism that we could even call the Polish cousin of the seven sisters in Moscow was completed after Khrushchev's architectural speech (Khrushchev 1963. 153–192). In addition to the fact that the skyscraper shows the style of socialist realism in Moscow, a closer look also reveals elements of Polish historical architecture. The building was a gift from the Soviet Union to the Polish people and was built in the former ghetto area. Due to its gigantic size, the building is considered a symbol of socialist ideology in the Visegrád countries.

2. Building R of the Budapest University of Technology and Economics

The university campus is divided into three parts: the old part with historicist-style buildings, the modern, post-war block and the newest part, which was built in contemporary style. The buildings named R, T, H are located within the mid-

dle block. Their names are thought to be abbreviations of the following Hungarian words: R from the name of the Communist Party leader Mátyás Rákosi, T from "knowledge" (tudás), H from "progress" (haladás). According to another explanation, the names came from the location of the departments and institutes found in the building. Building R is situated on the riverside. It was built in 1951–1955 by Gyula Rimanóczy and János Kleineisel. This building was located parallel to the river Danube and connected to another one by a covered walkway. The two rear blocks, built in late modern style, were not decorated, but the main façade was decorated in the required neo-classical style. We can see brick-covered walls with a tent roof and pronounced Classicist decorations here.

The main goal of building the socialist realist university block was to create a counter pole to the central building, which was built in historical style, which was the style of the bourgeois class in the name of the new socialist system. These two buildings dominate the riverbank between two bridges of the Danube. The front of building R shows the influence of Scandinavian design, in contrast with the interior, where the characteristics of the Stalinist style are dominant. Several films have been recorded there, because this is one of the most authentic socialist realist buildings in the Hungarian capital (Jász 2017. 42).

IV. Industrial Cities as the Representation of the Power

> Soviet buildings and urban forms should be radiant, and hence materialise the radiant future, which the Party was promising its citizens (Cook 1997. 137).

Newly built socialist cities can be separated by represented style. The first is the socialist realism of Nowa Huta in Poland and the first building period of Dunaújváros in Hungary. The second is the socialist modernist centre of Salgótarján in Hungary and the second building period of Dunaújváros. In this section, I shall introduce case studies of these cities. After the war was over, universities soon restarted and new ones were built as well. The period was characterised by the construction of heavy industry universities in both countries in question.

1. Dunaújváros and Salgótarján

Building cities for heavy industry was an important aim of Hungarian ideology. The motto was to make a country out of steel and iron. Great emphasis was placed on heavy industry training centres, including the construction of universities for heavy industry. The ideology also had to be represented in the external appearances of the cities and university buildings thus created by applying the

style propagated by the party both in the internal and external design of the buildings. In accordance with the previously defined distinction, the socialist realist ensembles of Dunaújváros and the socialist modernist ensembles of Salgótarján are good examples.

The village, developed into a Stalinist city, was the largest investment in the first five-year plan between 1950 and 1954. The concept was based on the collaboration of the city and the ironworks, their organic unity: a representative main road was made between the ironworks and the main square of the city. The plans do not differentiate between interior and exterior; all parts of the city are built in the same quality. The cameraman is ex-Bauhaus Tibor Weiner, who worked and gained experience in South America. The design of the city follows that of historic cities, and the architect used modernist structure in the design of the streets and buildings. The buildings were originally flat-roofed, and tympanums were later placed upon them. This also supports the theory of facadism. (Czepczynski 2008. 78.)

Salgótarján was an old mining town. The golden age of the city was brought by the post-WWII socialist system. Ambitious plans were made to plan a city based on heavy industry activity. Star architects of the country were invited to design the central core of the city in the style of Soviet modernism. In the city, the traditions of workers' class prevailed strongly. One of the cleanest appearing city centres of Socialist modernism was formed, where geometric forms no longer dominated, rather than historicization. After changing the regime in 1989, such industrial cities typically found themselves in a difficult situation due to the lack of raw materials previously imported from the Soviet Union. Nowadays, Salgótarján is also struggling with the problem of shrinking cities. City planners are working to rehabilitate industrial areas that have become dysfunctional (Alföldi–Balázs 2019).

2. Nowa Huta

After WWII in Krakow, a process of clearing and rebuilding began. A significant part of the city was saved: the situation in Krakow was incomparably better than in Warsaw, 80% of which was destroyed. Most of the work was limited to repairing damaged buildings. The most serious and large-scale task was the construction of Nowa Huta, a workers' city that was annexed to Krakow after its completion. The decision to start the work was made in March 1949, and construction began the following June.

The idea of build a large ironworks in Poland was born in 1946 in Poland. It was a part of the six-year plan from 1950 to 1955. The main goal was the rapid industrialisation of the whole country; this was the golden age of metallurgy and mechanical engineering industry. For the people, to live and work in Nowa

Huta meant a social uplift, a move from small farms without comfort to the fully equipped apartments with bathrooms and heating in the city.

In 1952, a plan for the central part of the city was completed. The news appeared in the press in March 1953, at the same time as the news of Stalin's death. This provided a good opportunity to name the central square "Nowa Huta" after it. Its current name is Ronald Reagan Central Square. Eight-storey buildings were designed around the square, in which the ground floors and first floors were arranged for commercial and service purposes. In November 1953, the most important streets were named: Lenin Road (now Solidarity Road), Best Workers Road and Six-Year Plan Road (now John Paul II Road), and October Revolution Road (now General Anders Road). (Czepczynski 2008. 80.)

Nowa Huta exemplifies the theory which represents the prototype of socialist industrial cities in Poland, near Krakow. For the construction of the representational projects, high-quality materials and handicraft techniques were used. The realistic decoration on the buildings was also an important task. The buildings were constructed in neo-classical style, with the need of the Soviet type of total work of art (Gesamtkunstwerk). Every element of the city had to be in harmony, e.g. houses, street furniture, parks, interiors, etc. This was the process of Stalinisation, but it is important to notice that an architecture form-language cannot be socialist; it was the ideology that was socialist behind the architecture. The form language was based on the ancient Roman style, which explained the desired equality of society in the architecture (Groys 1992. 52–53). In case of Nowa Huta, imitation of the decorative elements from the Wawel and the classical Roman style were mixed. This combination of the styles resulted in a building method instead of a new style, which was mixing. The hidden meaning behind this renewing of old elements is to merge the ideological content: the typical national forms and the imperial architecture of greatness.

3. Prefabricated House-block Systems

After the Khrushchevian architectural turn (1954), architects could focus on real life problems of everyday people. A new era emerged: the period of prefabricated house block buildings, both in Western and Eastern Europe. There were common technological and ideological aims all over Europe; to build new houses cost-effectively, to create workplaces for the unskilled masses and to standardise the technological solutions.

The task of the development of new neighbourhoods was to increase the housing capacity of cities. The new housing complexes were built in suburban areas in both Western and Eastern Europe. As the idea of panel building technology came from Western Europe to the East and the Soviet Union as well, this re-

quired that socialist propaganda could favourably compare Western and Eastern living conditions. People in socialist countries lived in new panel houses with the same level of comfort as their Western counterparts (Forty 2012. 160–164).

V. Conclusions

After WWII, the Visegrád countries shared a common historical background which affected the whole population centrally: the influence of the Soviet Union to a greater or lesser extent. The Party exercised control over every activity in the country, including architecture. Building processes gained an emblematic representative status: to show the power of the state and the Party.

This essay compared the ideological background of Polish and Hungarian architecture, and the similarities, which are divided into three categories. The first category was the historical reconstruction which was defined as the *reconstruction for the people.* Original functions changed to new ones focusing on the needs of the workers' class. This was supported with the case study of the Buda Castle and the main square in Warsaw. The second category contains the symbolic landmarks of the era of dogmatism of Socialism. The two buildings I compared were the PKIN and building R of the Budapest University of Technology and Economics. The latter is characterised by a central, prominent location, large dimensions, and an authentic application of the Russian socialist realism in the name of *facadism*. The third category is the building of industrial cities. In both countries, a dominance of heavy industry is observable. New cities were built for factory workers, and this required the creation of a new urban structure. This was realized in Dunaújváros and Salgótarján in Hungary; the former belongs to the socialist realist, the latter to the socialist modernist mode of construction. The Polish example is Nowa Huta (New Smeltery), which is the only Polish city where no church was planned.

Overall, there are several theoretical similarities in the socialist architecture of Poland and Hungary. The differences are to be found in all local conditions, to which the latter refers from the motto *socialist in content, national in form*. It is the common task of the two countries to think about the buildings created during socialism and to take care of their future.

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Case Studies from Polish Intellectual History

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The Polish Case

Ultra-orientalism or the Anamorphosis of Introducing Oneself

This article is a *prosodion* for a deep analysis of orientalism and nesting orientalism applied to the Polish case. I explicitly use a term coming from the ancient theatre vocabulary, because I will refer to several scenes, acting as a kind of Levi-Straussian *bricoleur* who needs to invent new tools to describe in a non-descriptive way, represent in a non-representative way and introduce trying to respect someone's *droit au secret* (using Derrida's expression the right of secrecy). These scenes will only create a patchwork for the dramaturgy of auto-presentation that Edward Said claimed for the Orient. In my study, I experimentally displace Poland from the logocentric position occupied by Europe (albeit middle or east Europe) and perform a translation of that Eastern-ness into orientalism. In this "song before the road" (which is the etymological meaning of *prosodion*) the results will only be hypothetical. We will not move further than the first meeting when we get to know each other. Even though the politics of the proper name with all its complexities revealed by post-structuralism, Marxism, post-modernism etc. will not allow a step further and will keep the Polish case in a position characterized by some in-between-ness of Europe and the Orient – a nowhere from which, struggling against domination, it disputes its right to (re)present itself.

I. Act 1: The Oriental Shawl

These reflections begin in a strange theatre, the existence of which I have never been aware of. Several years ago, I was invited to a typical colonial salon located in Warsaw's district of Saska Kępa. That quartier has already marked that meeting with a special flavour, because since the first forms of the settlement were a bridgehead of strangeness in close proximity of the Polish capital. It is located on the eastern side of the Vistula River. Its first settlers were Protestants fleeing religious persecution, mainly Dutch and Flemish. In the 18th century, it became the place of another form of marginalization, when Augustus III turned

it into a frequently visited place of various forms of entertainment, from hunting to skating and various circus performances. When we look at Kostrzewski's painting entitled *Circus in Saska Kępa,* the first impression the silhouettes when we do not see the colours of the faces or recognize the species of the trees yet give the impression of a colonial scene – some gentlemen in cylinders in the wild, as it is neither a garden nor a park. Among "primitive" people like the boy without shoes in the foreground, and further on, perhaps the most colonial character because of his/her dark face (probably only related to some shadow) who climbed on an old tree to have a better view of the show. A circus always belongs to an alien/outer world; a world which some gentlemen in cylinders need to reach by boats. The landscape, especially the two centrally located trees may at first resemble palm trees, although they are probably soaring acacias, with a clump of light green high up, and underneath, there is a typically Polish wooden cottage, which however, in this entourage, resembles a kind of cabana, covered with hay, or possibly, palm leaves. The colonial aspect of this scenery is expressed above all by the presence of the gentlemen who wear cylinders, in the proximity of the cabana with a hole in the roof. The social class critique theme was characteristic of Kostrzewski's illustrative work. But in this particular painting, all these different people are brought together for a performance that takes place on a cheerful stage…

My visit to Saska Kępa took place at the invitation of the Cultural Attaché of the French Republic in Poland. Before dinner, during the small talk we had mainly with the women surrounding Mrs. Consul who had just arrived to take her post in Warsaw, I overheard a conversation about some practical hints about shopping. Hearing that, I was amazed to discover this place, just round the corner, in the city where my family had been living for generations – the Orient. The story of one of these ladies who was joyfully joined by others, (so that only I felt excluded from this unique experience) was about the once famous market, at the *10*th *Anniversary Stadium* – called *Europa Bazaar / Trade Fair (Jarmark Europa)* the largest open-air market in Europe. From my perspective as an inhabitant of the left bank of Warsaw, this place seemed like "no entry zone", so I could hardly imagine these upper-class, elegant ladies buying oriental shawls in the midst of multi-cultural nations from the former republics of the USSR, selling guns and duty free cigarettes hidden behind Chinese plastic products. What was truly surprising was that however hard I would deny the cultural connection of Poland to these exotic materials, to these ladies, the oriental faces, the Persian scarves, the Sarmatian origins of their Polish aristocrat guests and the project of breeding back the Polish Konik, a small Polish horse which owed their agility to a mixture of oriental blood; all these images were convincing enough to state that Asia originated on this side of the Vistula river.

The Europa Fair seemed paradoxically (when taking into consideration its name) or adequately to its stadium like shape, a theatre in which the Orient de-

livered the spectacle expected by European core countries. Poland, as the liminal space between the East and the West was too dull to attract the attention of the western diplomats, seeking exotic impressions. At last, this evening Poland emerged only under the condition of accepting it to have been a part of the Orient, though in the most tedious role.

II. Act 2: Pan Twardowski

From the perspective of the Russophilian French culture, Poland was much too European to attract attention. When considering orientalism, one must balance between identity and otherness. If otherness was created and moulded according to western standards, the Polish case should be taken under consideration as being too close to these standards to stand out and be noticed at all. The second act of this *prosodion* will take place in a real theatre, the Słowacki's Theatre during World War I. The audience that does not understand the language of the lyrics will be represented by Ferenc Molnar, the Hungarian writer and poet, who in his youth was sent to the eastern front as a press correspondent.

> My way to the theatre led between the cannons, entanglements, camp fires. A few days ago, I could hear the choir of steel thundering of the Cracow fortress, and now the theatre, more! – the opera! Even it is a premiere. I am standing among people dressed in tailcoats, myself in war boots, a linen shirt, moved like a fearful peasant. I am filled with jealousy and incomprehensible bitterness: how can they play in the theatre now? But, anyone who would say he saw a more interesting premiere would lie. These people are strange. Someone has just stopped banging on them with cannons, and they are already running to the theatre […]
>
> The lyrics are in Polish. I decided to fall asleep immediately. I will only see the decorations. The curtain rises, in the foreground there are rocks, behind them a Polish plain covered with snow, the same one I saw today at noon. It seems as if the back of the theatre was destroyed and we have a view of the Słomniki. The moon lights up the snowy landscape. But where are the thin crosses protruding from the soft, waving snow? And where is that old, suffocating hussar? […] A man sitting in front of me turns around, gives me the program and asks:
>
> – Are you a war correspondent?
>
> – Yes. – I whisper. […]
>
> This man is a professor at the Jagiellonian University. He teaches history.
>
> – Please write that the Poles are the most ill-fated nation in the world. The whole war is taking place on our land. Of the 4 million, 130 thousand soldiers fighting under German command, 340 thousand are Poles. Four and a half million Poles live here, 400 thousand of whom are in the army. Sir, it is horrible that 12 million Poles live in

Russia, including 8 million conscripts, and they face 740,000 Prussian and Austro-Hungarian Polish soldiers.

– […] Sir – says the professor whispering – please write that Krakow is the heart of Polish culture, here are the universities, and here are the premieres of Polish authors…

– And Warsaw?

– Warsaw is the Polish Paris… Krakow is the Polish Göttingen. Warsaw is life, richness, light, fun, commerce… Krakow is Polish science, literature, music, patriotic politics, painting, history, science. Please write how unfortunate the Polish nation is… Warsaw will have to pay with suffering for its liberation from Russian captivity. It will be demolished…"

[…] Applause and shouts. Success. It hurts no more that they play in the theatre. This is a Polish matter to the bone. They shout and applaud against the Muscovites. To Polishness. Beautiful moment… I would like to open the roof of the theatre, like a box, so that these intense, wild cries of triumph could spread in the dark night, reaching Russia. […]

– Long live Poland! – shouts the professor. (Molnar 2011. 63 [my translation, U.I.].)

3. *Theatrum Mundi* – the "Theatre Metaphor"

The theatrical perspective is one of the classic paradigms of science when it comes to representation. The audience takes the place of a neutral observer hidden in the shadow, whose culture has framed the stage, whose perspective is limited to a narrow angle, for which reality dresses up in a costume.

Edward Said pointed out that "the idea of representation is a theatrical one: the Orient is the stage on which the whole East is confined. On this stage will appear figures whose role it is to represent the larger whole, from which they emanate. The Orient then seems to be not an unlimited extension beyond the familiar European world, but rather a closed field, a theatrical stage affixed to Europe" (Said 2003. 63). In fact, the description of the background of this stage, the prop room of this theatre resembles "a prodigious cultural repertoire" and magazine gathering objects "that evoke a fabulously rich world: the Sphinx, Cleopatra, Eden, Troy, Sodom and Gomorrah, Astarte, Isis and Osiris, Sheba, Babylon, the Genii, the Magi, Nineveh, Prester John, Mahomet, and dozens more". However it is not this crowd of people in disguise that makes the theatrical approach the most adequate. What is more important is the relation between the spectator and the performance, the tension that the theatre and any other representative art (nowadays the happening as well and the performance) have tried out in dozens of ways. The core of this tension consists in the two poles of representation – the one who presents and the one who is presented. These two poles mark the axis of what Said called a "strategic location", and his teacher,

Michel Foucault, metaphorically described as the "king's place" (referring to Velasquez's *La Meninas;* Foucault 1970. 3).

There is a place inside the audience that is called the "director's place". This is the vanishing point where all perspectives lines appear to converge. It is there that the theatrical anamorphosis is arranged in the most perfect way. The rest of the audience must be satisfied with angles of view that differ from the norm set by the creators, curves that are complemented by the work of imagination. The director's place corresponds to the position *en face* when facing the picture – the vanishing point on the image plane. In both cases (the "mise en scène" and the painting), the synergy of two eyes set at the right distance is taken into account. Distance is crucial. It is obvious that optic laws require this distance between the observed object and the optical centre that collects all light rays. The optical centre has to be distant – the longer the distance, the less distorted the object is. Edward Said, instead of talking about distance, spoke about opposition. In his introduction to *Orientalism,* he mentioned "geographical opposition" being an invention of western culture. East and West are constructed, "geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions geographical sectors as »Orient« and »Occident« are man-made. Therefore as much as the West itself, the Orient is an idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for the West. The two geographical entities thus support and to an extent reflect each other." (Said 2003. 5.)

The invented opposition plays the role of distance. There is no fluidity, such as the one experienced by the traveller journeying towards the azimuth. There is an area resembling an orchestra pit – a space under the stage that separates the audience from the actors. A map does not have such a row, unless it corresponds to the part used to be called *hic sunt leones* ("here are the dragons" in English), referring to unknown territories. But if the denoted area is recognized, then instead of a "row", we have a compass rose displaying the orientation of cardinal directions.

III. Act 3: Natasha's Dance

Said declared that he presents only a skeleton of orientalism open to further anatomical details, looking only for a utopian place from where one can look and explore in a "non-repressive and non-manipulatory" way (Said 2003. 52). The question "is there such a position?" remains unanswered.

In the first act of our *prosodion,* this place was occupied by diplomats, i.e. the politician, in the second the journalist and the future great dramatist, Ferenc Molnar. The director's place of the audience will belong to a historian – Orlando Figes, who begins his cultural history of Russia with the performance of Natasha's dance described by Tolstoy in *War and Peace*.

> Natasha threw off the shawl from her shoulders, ran forward to face "Uncle", and setting her arms akimbo, also made a motion with her shoulders and struck an attitude.
>
> Where, how, and when had this young countess, educated by an émigrée French governess, imbibed from the Russian air she breathed that spirit, and obtained that manner which the pas de châle would, one would have supposed, long ago have effaced? But the spirit and the movements were those inimitable and unteachable Russian ones that "Uncle" had expected of her. (Tolstoy after Figes 2018. 2.)

Figes noticed that, contrary to what Tolstoy imagined, "there was not authentic Russian peasant dance" and the majority of "folk songs" – also the one featuring Natasha's dance "had in fact come from the towns" (Figes 2018. 7). While other elements of the peasant culture described by Tolstoy came from "Asiatic steppe" ("Natasha's shawl was almost certainly a Persian one" (ibidem). There is no original. There is no genuine national culture "only mythic images of it, like Natasha's version of the peasant dance" (Figes 2018. 8). Nevertheless Figes does not aim at disenchanting or "deconstructing" these myths, on the contrary, he does not care about origins established by 19th-century folklorists and orientalists, but rather enjoys the show from a multitude of perspectives – the ones of Natasha's brother, their uncle, Anisjya, and "the hunting servants and the other household serfs, who watch[ed], no doubt with curious amusement (and perhaps with other feelings, too), as the beautiful countess perform[ed] their dance" (Figes 2018. 6 modified, U.I.).

"My aim – declared Figes – is to explore Russian culture in the same way Tolstoy presents Natasha's dance: as a series of encounters or creative social acts which were performed and understood in many different ways" (Figes 2018. 6).

What is crucial in this dance is that a certain story is being told by means that escape the traditional trap in which otherness falls when it tries to speak. This is the answer to the question *Can the subaltern speak?* – a question which would be rhetorical if we treat language in the traditional way, as a form of power according to the knowledge-power alliance unveiled by Foucault. Language is born and develops in what Said so aptly called the nexus of many forms of power (the "power political", "power moral", "power cultural", "power intellectual" (Said 2003. 12). The language of dance must be a language game that belongs to a much wider understanding of "language". First of all, it is no longer the master's discourse or the language of the engineer, who has the right tool to analyse its object but the discourse of *bricolage*, where temporariness and combination overrule mastery. The gesture of changing one shawl for another shows how the change of a small element at hand can change the whole universe.

Of course, Figes' perspective is not an issue that is subject to subaltern or post-colonial discourse. If we were to apply this perspective, we would rather have a situation in which a Russian aristocrat tries to understand the idiom of peasant culture, tries to cross that border which her Uncle, and later her brother

crossed in their lives. However, this is not what Figes is talking about, and his perspective does not take into account the domination practices of imperial Russia. Figes' story is about a nation, which, although imperial and imposing its imperialism on others, is crippled in terms of the patterns it can impose, a nation that constantly builds the language of its reign, continuously looking for words that could cover the naked power of violence and domination. The meanderings of this quest oscillate between folk culture and Western influences and seek the spirit of the nation.

The post-colonial thought not only noticed the difficulty in articulating its interests and righteousness to those who are deprived of power, but above all, it rose to the level of ultra-criticality, noting that many gestures, symbolic objects, and elements of language are colonized by adding intentions to them. It is not only a matter of misreading intentions, but rationalizing gestures by reducing them to intentions.

Meanwhile, in her dance and the decision to borrow the oriental shawl, Natasha has no arguments and therefore does not expect understanding. In his description, Tolstoy achieved the intended effect, avoiding reduction to psychology or social background. Natasha's gesture belongs to the sphere of pragma (in the tradition ranging from James to Bourdieu).

> In these circumstances the object acquires a kind of primacy, with a moment of independence from the agendas and intentions of the people surrounding it. It has a particular force as a thing. Because of its complex epistemic situation, because of the ease with which it accommodated alternate interpretations of its meaning, [it] constituted a potent form of immanent critique […] it provides an example of political action that is performative, indeterminate and critical. (Olson 2015.)

This remark by Kevin Olson referring to the tricolour cockade and its role for Haitian insurrectionists functions very well when we substitute the shawl for the cockade. The question remains whether it is possible to write the history of these practices or construe any theories around them. May the *bricoleur* become a historian or theorist? Is it possible to maintain this performative power, this indefiniteness of *object a* before it launches the production of the symbolical? These objects (cockade, oriental shawl), these scenes (theatre, dance) or emblems cluster various forms of critical discourse, from the archaeology of Foucault, through Said's orientalism, up to post-colonial thought and subaltern studies. Their suspicion mainly concerns the knowledge-power alliance. Knowledge, analysis, description, interpretation, and quantification are expressions of control over the object, not necessarily colonial control, but as we know from the various branches of subaltern studies, it may be cultural control over all forms of otherness. Said was aware of the difficulty to distinguish science, domination

and invention, which was only calling into existence the oriental imaginarium. Classification, categorization and labelling are much closer to construction than to discovery (Derrida). But we cannot miss the difference between the description of Egypt (*La déscription de l'Egypte* launched by Napoleon), and the pillaging of Egypt for the benefit of museums and private collections and oriental literature such as Vernet, Nerval or Flaubert.

We clearly notice the disparity between robbery and enchantment by the orient transmitted on paper in European languages. The common denominator is the question of cultural representation that Said summarized with the saying taken from Marx's *18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*: "They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented".

> The exteriority of the representation is always governed by some version of the truism that if the Orient could represent itself, it would; since it cannot, the representation does the job, for the West, and "faute de mieux, for the poor Orient / Sie können sich nicht vertreten, sie müssen verstreten werden", as Marx wrote in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Said 2003. 21).

Of course we know that Marx was referring to French peasantry, not the "Orientals". But the next sentence corroborates Said's claim: "Their representative must at the same time appear as their master". This reference to Marx has offended Marxist thinkers who accused Said of mixing political representation and depiction (Ahmad 1992; Habib 2005). Defending Said, one could say that at the very beginning of representation (political, artistic or scientific) and depiction comes introduction or presentation, which makes such a paraphrase possible: Since he could not introduce himself, one had to introduce him. This reduction of representation to introduction/presentation helps us to get rid of the economical, moral, scientific and cultural realm and focus only in the very first moment of the entanglement of power and naming. The most idiomatic, most personal name like Kuchuk Hanem can take over the imagination of the European subject, but can also be forgotten as one of the many names pronounced during receptions and symbolically, but vainly, fixed with a handshake. When Said claims there is no reality of the Orient, we can paraphrase that as "there is no proper name of the Orient, only a name given to it".

Coming back to Natasha's peasantry dance, juxtaposed with Kuczuk Hanem's Oriental dance, one must take into account the difference between art and cultural description. On the one hand, a piece of art like Natasha's dance may not be a faithful recreation of steps, a faithful performance of a non-existent folkdance choreography, it may be an invention, like an invented but non-existent Orient. On the other hand, possibly, it will be a perfect *guessing* of the essence of things, a perfect eidetic insight. This kind of guessing or prediction reminds me the story of Marquis de Custine, who referred to the criticism he

underwent from offended Russians after he published his famous *Letters from Russia*: "»Trois mois de voyage, il a mal vu«, they said. To what de Custine responded: »Il est vrai j'ai mal vu, mais j'ai bien deviné«". I refer to that story following George F. Kennan, who amplified this inventive character of de Custine's description, which supposedly defectively described 1839's Russia, however perfectly prophetically "guessing" the Russia of Stalin, Brezhnev and Kosygin (Kennan 1972. 124). Herling-Grudziński develops this interpretation (Herling-Grudziński 1972), Kennan keeps the French word used by de Custine: "[de Custine] had deviné the nightmare of Stalin" (Kenan 1972. 118).

This would correspond to Said's intention when he referred to Kuchuk Hanem, who inspired Flaubert and Curtis and became the archetypal "oriental woman": "She never spoke of herself; she never represented her emotions, presence or history. He spoke for and represented her". This role of *porte-parole,* legitimized by wealth, gender, social status and origin ("He was foreign, comparatively wealthy, male, and these were historical facts of domination that allowed him not only to possess Kuchuk Hanem physically but to speak for her and tell his readers in what way she was »typically Oriental«") starts with a name: Kuchuk Hanem (which is not a proper name but probably a nickname meaning "little lady" in Turkish), (Said 6).

The politics of the proper name – using Derrida's title (Derrida 1984) – is applied at this point to the act of presenting/introducing people: since they do not have a name or do not know how to introduce themselves, one has to introduce them. This initial baptism (Kripke) is not only a form of labelling which makes the referent addressable (and therefore *assujetti* in English: *Subject to*, according to Althusser's *Ideological and Ideological State Apparatus*)*;* it is also the specific form of invention capable of guessing the spirit of the referent. Orientalism was such an invention and Russia wanted this invention. The Russian Ballet created by Italian, French or Polish dancers, Oriental shawls, folk culture were all interweaving one kilim into an empire of impressions that dazzled the Western world.

But in this *introductory* theatre we must finally get back to the Polish case. In this context, the best *porte-parole* of the Polish case would be Adam Mickiewicz, not only because he is admittedly *the* "national poet", the emblematic figure of Polishness, but also because he lectured about the Slavonic literature exactly at the time when Victor Hugo pronounced the words quoted by Said "Au siècle de Louis XIV on était helleniste, maintenant one est orientaliste" (Said 51). The whole Paris was leaning towards the Levant. Everyone could be "orientaliste" because that notion was probably one of the widest categories of humanities. The oriental knowledge of that time was shaped in European libraries without the need of travelling (like Friedrich Schlegel *Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* or Goethe's *Westöstlicher Diwan* (Said 2003. 51) and Mickiewicz lecturing at the Collège de France was also part of that work of invention

of the East. His case was however very different, as he was a political refugee, coming from an actually non-existing country. Moreover, his lectures could not be based on books which were inaccessible in France, so his work was even more of a combination of memory and invention, like Natasha's dance.

Many Polish commentators have recognized the post-colonial and critical potentiality of Mickiewicz Parisian lectures (Janion 2006; Kuziak 2013. 126–127), mainly because the poet undertook the question of colonial violence. But at the same time, speaking French, he was also unwillingly practicing the discourse of representation.

> The professor-poet speaks about [the Slavs] as unknown, remote and excluded people – seen in those categories by Europe. He knows that he is lecturing about matters exotic to the West, that he is supposed to present to his audience a different Europe, until now silent, also because of bondage – younger, fairy, barbaric. (Kuziak 2013. 120.)

Mickiewicz was "entangled in the language and Logos of the West" (Kuziak 2013. 124) conscious that "Paris is the centre, […] that through Paris the European nations learn to get to know each other, and sometimes even to get to know themselves" (Mickiewicz 1953. 15). He was aware of the danger that threatens the attempt to filter these idioms through Western ideals of the Enlightenment, which, "shines only with reflected light". Therefore he strongly denounced the 17th-century tendency of Polish educated circles to become 'civilized' "cultivated" "European" "French". These adjectives give a perfect description of what will be currently called "nesting orientalism".[1] Our reading of Mickiewicz's lecture will follow this revolutionizing stance up to what I have called in the title of this essay ultra-orientalism. I mean by this a procedure that may turn out to be the most modern and subversive than all others, but as far as I know has been missed by contemporary Mickiewicz scholars.

When summarizing the whole course on 23rd April 1844, Mickiewicz spoke about the "new spirit of that foreign tribe". Even the word 'tribe' sounds very autochthonous when applied to the Slavs or more exactly to the Poles. The poet defines his work as a translator's task, not only between two languages, but also between two different epistemologies. The first one that surrounds Mickiewicz and provides him this task, is not limited to France; it is the European

[1] "Kraj słowiańskie w XVII wieku zbiżają się do Europy: wielki prąd umysłowy i literacki unosi je ku Zachodowi. […] Ród słowiański wszystkimi porami wchłania w siebie ducha europejskiego. Na tym rozległym obszarze wytwarza się wierzchnia warstwa ludzi, tak zwanych »cywilizowanych« i »ogładzonych«, którzy stają się Europejczykami, Francuzami. Warstwa ta błyszczy francuskim światłem, a raczej fosforescensją, bo nie ma życia własnego w tych zjawiskach pełnych blasku a znikomych" (Mickiewicz 1953. X. 9).

culture that "draws its strength and life from the past" (Mickiewicz 1953. 427). This heritage – by this concept Mickiewicz refers to books and monuments of national cultures acting as materialized past – provides the ground to cultural studies. This ground is solidified by memory. While in contrast, this is exactly what the Slavs are lacking. We should not be misled into thinking that the reason for this sense of lack is the absence of books that Mickiewicz had to deal with. It is much more: some mysterious Slavonic logic that required from Mickiewicz or anyone representing and *introducing* Slavs a new method of translation – "A new way of getting you acquainted with the Slavs" (Mickiewicz 1953. 427). These words may be surprising from the perspective of the audience attending a course on Slavonic literature. And actually they are surprising from any perspective; I will therefore quote this passage at length.

> I know foreign travellers who having been in our region came back astonished, that they did not see or hear anything of what was close to their heart or what they were most curious about. It is vain to look in these countries for the Slavonic books enjoying the greatest readership, even those that have already been translated into foreign languages. Everyone is pretending that they don't know about their existence. The historical names of many famous warriors, the names of famous writers are never pronounced there. As for the political storms that so often roar in the North, and whose last thunder almost rocked Europe, one would vainly try to investigate their causes and consequences on the Slavonic land. You will never hear there the voice of political passions. No one ever talk about international issues. The next day after a revolution it is as quiet as it was the day before. A foreigner interested in seeing the battlefields of Grochów and Ostrołęka would hardly find anyone who would admit that he knows their place. What is even stranger is that even geographical and political partitions seem to be continuously changing in shape and colour and shape but are quite elusive for a foreign researcher. Princedoms, republics, Slavonic kingdoms marked on the map of Europe cannot be recognized on Slavonic soil. No one will dare showing you the border that separates Lithuania from Russia, Poland from Lithuania, and the Czech Republic from Austria. A stranger is always in those countries in the position of a parliamentarian allowed to enter a besieged fortress: he will hear, he will see, and will guess only what is granted in the order given to the guard. Whilst the order is to remain silent? (Mickiewicz 1953. 427–428.)

When we read these mysterious words, it seems that Mickiewicz's treatment is twice as difficult. It is not about bringing western Europeans closer to a foreign culture, but about breaking the seal of silence. This enemy emissary, the parliamentarian, has maps on which there is more information than he is able to get where he is. No one dares show anything, no one admits to know any place. Not having any satisfying interpretation of this order of silence which hangs over the whole Slavonic land, we are forced to improvise and to read Mickiewicz

anachronistically, more as a prophet than as literary theorist. Undoubtedly, we deal here with many elements that turn Mickiewicz into a post-Enlightenment or modern thinker *avant la lettre*. All the elements listed in this passage, such as a critical approach to information, play on the ambiguity of names and geography raised to the rank of elusive topography, which turns a map into an anamorphosis – all these elements correspond much more to a post-colonial language than mid-19th-century orientalism.

Perhaps a clue to understand these lines is given a few pages further, when Mickiewicz says: "here [in the Slavonic culture] every outstanding literary work is both religious and political" (Mickiewicz 1953. 431). This issue will turn out to be crucial for our perspective, since for Mickiewicz, a religious text cannot be materialized and become a part of some heritage. Speaking about the Quran Mickiewicz protests against making it the object of occupation of European humanists" (Mickiewicz 1953. 431). Mickiewicz thus condemns orientalism for operating on materialized past, whereby "materialized" he means a past deprived of life. For Mickiewicz, the genesis of humanities is to deprive life of the object of studies. He writes: "they finally discovered that this life does not exist, and they called Latin the study of humanity *studia humaniora*. For them humanity was present only in classical books". This proto-orientalism or more widely post-Enlightenment unmasks a scientific approach to literature, which, being restrained by Western rationalism, has excluded "all elements of real life" from literary work. That is why western Europe cannot recognize Slavonic literature, since it seeks for it on the shelves, through dusty volumes, while meeting the Slavs is to recognize among them the recipe for creating "the greatest and only true literary works: Homer's poems, the song of the Nibelungs, Quran verses and even Gospel stanzas" (Mickiewicz 1953. 432). There is no doubt that this fragment contains one of the most eccentric thoughts of Mickiewicz: the collection of Arabic, Hebrew and German texts is meant to support the specificity of Slavonic literature. Mickiewicz is trying to defend his clause by pointing to Serbian rhapsodies exemplifying that kind of literature, but it is obvious that this example is not convincing enough. Therefore, the solution to this puzzle must be brought, if not by the object of the study, then by the method – and this is exactly what Mickiewicz aims at, saying: "I have found in this position my plan of action and the means of fulfilling it" (Mickiewicz 1953. 427). Because of this lack of archived heritage, lack of materialized past, the lack of the letter Mickiewicz formulated a new language for this spirit. This practice sounds very modern, because we are dealing with an event triggering a new discourse, the idiom of an "unknown tribe" requiring not systems (Mickiewicz used the archaism "systematic") but the Greek *poiesis* (gathering literature and practice).[2] Is this plan

[2] Attempts to translate this language in different post-Englightenent discourses of difference have been made both by M. Janion (2006) and M. Kuziak (2013), post-colonial

and method noticeable throughout Mickiewicz lectures? The answer requires an extended analysis, which exceeds the frame of our *prosodion*. I would therefore propose to answer elliptically, developing the analogy of representing and introducing/presenting someone. In fact, Mickiewicz began his lectures by saying that it might be difficult for a foreigner to understand that one can speak about nationality under the figure of a person, which is particular for Poles and Czechs (Mickiewicz 1953. 39). Therefore, he understood his role as the *porte-parole* of the unknown voiceless tribe. To keep silence confronted with the parliamentarian, the envoy of the enemy (which etymological root also signals speaking (Fr. *parler*) does not mean having no language or being barbarian (i.e. someone who is babbling). The Polish tribe seems to defend its history, geography and spirit from filling shelves in west-European libraries. Their spirit is non-discursive or belongs to the oral tradition of religious scriptures. It corresponds to the element of identity that cannot become the subject of knowledge and representation, the part that refuses domination. Stanisław Vincenz, writer and philosopher, author of a project he called the "Slav Atlantis" described the myth of a nation as the man's soul – "a condensed reality […] singular, original and representative".[3] It is another voice standing for an approach to nationality as a person, an individual. The tribe "which is the last to take part in European life" has no speak-able legacy of the past; its signifiers are "raids, slaughters, chains, exiles" (Mickiewicz). This painful history "brings the 'Word' between them", says Mickiewicz (1953. 435). It brings their name.

When the lyrics of the theatre play are in a foreign language, and the places of battlefields are not given to the parliamentarian, the nation introduces itself: "Please write that Poles are the most sorrowful nation in the world" – says someone sitting in the audience. Perhaps that cry of despair is the only self-presentation that resists mastery and domination. The war correspondent – Ferenc

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thought but also an attempt to read Mickiewicz as an example of the discourse of the apostle following Badiou in Idziak & Bednarczyk (2019).

[3] "O możliwościach *rozpowszechnienia* kultury i literatury polskiej" (Vincenz 198 – "O micie narodu – świadom niebezpieczeństwa tego zestawienia – Stanisław Vincenz pisał, że jest to "r z e c z y w i s t o ś ć s k o n d e n s o w a n a do czegoś więcej niż typ, to indywidualność wyjątkowa, nadindywidualna, źródłowa i reprezentacyjna. To, co jest duszą człowieka. Z powyższego widać, jak trudno określić, czym się stał dla poezji polskiej, a później dla ludzi w Polsce, ten mit Ojczyzny. Jeśli kiedyś ktoś to światu wytłumaczy, to mimo zabłąkanie i samobójczość polityki, będzie to może wielkie s ł o w o p o w s z e c h n e" (Vincenz 1983. 109). "a unique, super-individual, original and representative individuality. That which is the soul of man. From the above one can see how difficult it is to define what has become for Polish poetry and later for people in Poland, this myth of the Fatherland. If someday somebody will explain it to the world, then despite the wandering and suicidal nature of politics, it will perhaps be a u n i v e r s a l w o r d." (Vincenz 1983. 109.)

Molnar – will act as a representative but not as a master (referring to Marx's *18th Brumaire*). He will *guess* well *(bien deviner)* that behind the orchestra pit, on this stage resembling the landscape of the war field without milestones, names nor distinct borders, the Polish tribe presents itself. Here we are in the theatre of war, which is never circumscribed for the pleasure of a specific audience, (however "central" "core [countries]" or accidental it would be). This stage is observed from a multitude of perspectives, like Natasha's dance. The dances of this opera (which probably was the Polish Faust "Pan Twardowski") are likewise improvised to express the national spirit. "Playing the theatre" in the middle of a war does no longer confuse Molnar, as soon as he recognizes that through applause and shouts, Poland introduces itself with its own idiom. "Long live Poland! – shouts the professor" (Molnar 2011. 63).

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The Church in Poland – National or Universal?
The Drama of a Certain Dilemma

The dilemma outlined in the title seems to indicate a certain antinomy, some "either-or" situation. However, titles have a tendency that they must simplify, and sometimes strip the text of various and multiple meanings. To sound somewhat like a slogan, limiting itself to one, perhaps the most expressive layer of meanings – in this case, to a layer characterized by a certain drama, the drama of fundamental choice.

I. The Truth of False Antinomy

Thus, the title I chose is somewhat of a "lie". And this "lie" consciously, with the full participation of the author thus "pretends" to become entangled in a specific "categorical network" prompted by contexts, by a certain common tone of discourse. He pretends to believe in the antinomy suggested to him on a daily basis – prompted more openly by ideologues and politicians who, by virtue of their own authorization, recognize themselves as emanations of Polish Catholicism and national substance, rather than by prominent people of the Church.

Of course, there is some "truth" in this dilemma, but it is very complicated and needs to be elaborated.

Hence, the truth is concealed in a certain "enchantment" of words and meanings hidden under their surface, which – precisely through kinds of witchcraft incantations, through well-worn ideological spells – are not allowed to be revealed in a way, to appear in a rational light. They are at the same time – this drastic paradox must be uttered – secretive and secret, primarily because they rest on the surface, like the title "purloined letter" in the famous story by Edgar Allan Poe (a letter that cannot be found because it lies in plain view, is widely available); (Poe 1846/1844).[1]

[1] The statement that "this mystery troubled him so much on account of its being so very self-evident" (Poe 1844/1846. 214) is particularly significant.

In the case of the dilemma outlined in the title, however, it is not a criminal riddle, as it happens in Poe, but a mystery related to the misuse of words and their specific history. A history in the face of which one would beg to recall the category of "empty forms" or "empty shells", commonly found in texts and public statements by Slavoj Žižek. He "borrows" the expression from Lacanian psychoanalysis, adding, of course, new understandings and new contexts. Or rather, – because the metaphor of the Slovenian philosopher could suggest a complete emptiness of ideologically abused terms at first glance, and yet this is not the case, therefore, the category named by Aby Warburg called *Nachleben* should be used here, only in such an understanding which would benefit one only from the possible meanings of the Polish translation here: "relics", therefore, or "spores", not "dog tags". By the way, the meaning of "empty forms" or "empty shells" would be revealed, pointing to their peculiar deadness and their susceptibility to being filled with another but completely undefined content.

So, one example which explains the "work" of these *Nachleben* very well is as follows:

> Salvation from the blood sacrifice, then said Aby Warburg in his revealing lecture from the psychiatric hospital in Kreuzlingen, the history of religious development from East to West like the most internal ritual of purification. The Snake participates in this process of religious sublimation, and the manner in which it is related can be considered a fundamental measure of the evolution of religiosity from fetishism. In the Old Testament, like the Babylonian pre-serpent Tiamat, he represents the spirit of evil and temptation. In Greece, he is also a merciless subterranean devourer: Erinia is entwined with serpents, and the gods send the serpent when they want to punish someone. This image of the serpent as a destructive force of the underworld has found its strongest tragic symbol in myth and sculpture The Laocoōn Group. The priest and his two sons, dying in the grip of the constrictor serpent in the grip of the constrictor serpent in revenge, become in this most famous sculpture of antiquity the very embodiment of the greatest human suffering. […] Thus, the death of the father and sons becomes a symbol of the ancient Passion: death at the hands of demons of vengeance, without justice and without hope of salvation. It is a hopeless, tragic pessimism of antiquity. The serpent as a demon in the pessimistic worldview of antiquity contrasts with the serpent-god, in which we can finally welcome the spiritual, human-friendly classical beauty. Asclepius, the ancient healer god, has a serpent as a symbol that wraps around his medical staff. He is endowed with the attributes that characterize the saviour of the world in classical sculpture. […] The serpent wrapped around the stick of Asclepius is himself, that is, the soul of the deceased, which still lives and manifests itself as a serpent. For the snake is not only […] a death bite – inflicted or to come – which it ruthlessly annihilates. *By shedding its skin, the snake shows by its own example how the body, having shed its skin - having shed, so to speak, the body shell – can nevertheless continue to exist.* It can sink into the ground and come out of

> it again. Returning from the ground, where the dead rest, makes it – in combination with the ability to renew the body's shell – the most natural symbol of rebirth from the torment of disease and death. (Warburg 1923/2011. 51.)

In the matter that I am trying to stick to for the time being quite sketchily, it is not about the snake's body, shedding its skin but about the idea of persistence "despite" remaining "with it" – with a certain core or content – despite the appearance of absolute transformation or renewal. And in the rightly suspected fear of which the Gospel of Matthew says the following:

> No man putteth a piece of new cloth vnto an olde garment: for that which is put in to fill it vp, taketh from the garment, & the rent is made worse. Neither doe men put new wine into old bottels: else the bottels breake, and the wine runneth out, and the bottels perish: but they put new wine into new bottels, and both are preserued. (Matthew 9: 16–17.)[2]

Briefly (and at the same time more clearly and concretely) put, when it comes to talking about – an otherwise real and important – tension within the Polish Catholic Church and the game of proper definition, one cannot be seduced by a conceptual "gravity": leading us astray into radical and quite Manichaean dualism, expressed in essentially meaningless (thus empty and dead-breathing) *Nachleben,* through the widespread and shallow abuse of the "eternal" pair of (supposedly) opposite notions of "national – universal".

These old conceptual "bottles" will never be filled with "young wine", and more importantly – and this especially is the problem – the self-definitions of the Polish Church, appearing occasionally and hidden on the surface of words, as well as the self-definitions of the synergistic common "denominational nationalism" (Czarnowski 1937/1956) which can be reduced to the slogan "Pole-Catholic", carry appropriation with the power and properties of the "categorical imperative". For the field of universal discourse is seemingly occupied by them, leaving no room for new conceptual "wineskins" and thus, according to the Gospel message, for "new wine" which – it would seem – does not find new containers for itself.

This is a "threshold" or "starting" lie. And, as I said before, they are visible on the surface.

The deeper lie concerns the very understanding of the ecclesial approach to particularism and universality, to the "national" and "universal" approach of the Church.

[2] See also parallel expressions of Jesus – Mark 2: 21–22 and Luke 5: 36–39. In the latter, this caution is expanded and reinforced. I give biblical quotations in the 1611 version of the King James Bible.

It is easy to notice – by even thousands of examples – that it is a sin of a kind of essentialism, i.e. a conviction, perhaps derived from the Aristotelian-Thomistic system still in force here, that there are some beings, some substantial contents of what is national and what is national, what is universal. And that they are available directly and rationally. They are available to every participant of the collective scene, therefore not requiring any justifications and explanations. What is more, they impose themselves through existence itself, though supposedly "natural" participation in this very "religion of life", in which one has to be born and die, without regard to any "religion of choice".

II. On Guard of the Mythical Substance

Even if this was for historical reasons, it just "happened".
And I mean by such a statement, in order to stop at least for a while at the historicity of concepts, using the *Nachleben* category again, referring to their distorted uses in a certain ecclesial (and not only ecclesial) linguistic practice.

Meanwhile, the obvious is not obvious here and it comes from attachment to the conceptual myths of modernism, developed somewhere at the beginning of the 19th century and trying, in their own way, to effectively keep the substantial understanding of the nation alive. Myths created primarily by Hegelian absolutism, with the conviction of "divinity" – divinity that is, however terrestrial – of a nation shaped into a state, and by romanticism, mainly Germanic and Slavic, from (say) Herder to (say) Mickiewicz. And then, at the end of the century and in the first half of the next, so just when came to the fore for obvious historical reasons, and the idea of a "Pole-Catholic" became overwhelming, subjected to nationalist trivialization in the spirit of degenerate social Darwinism.

The mentality of the Polish Church was formed in this bygone era and consolidated because of the obvious: the pressure of authoritarian regimes on the one hand, and on the other the largely agrarian, almost until the end of the twentieth century. The nature of social life became the main factor of preserving or even freezing attitudes. It is, moreover, the primary source for Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński's and John Paul II's "theology of the nation" justified by quite different historical circumstances.[3]

[3] The historical development of this local variety of the "theology of earthly realities" is shown primarily in the collective work *Polska teologia narodu* (see Bartnik 1986), where the views of the Jesuit preacher Piotr Skarga (1536–1612), the nineteenth-century founders of the Resurrectionist Order, the poet Cyprian Kamil Norwid (1821–1883), cardinal Stefan Wyszyński (1901–1981), and finally John Paul II (1920–2005).

Today, however, there is a kind of mental inertia, a kind of "gravitational force" with this secret and special logic, which was so perfectly read by Edgar Allan Poe:

> The material world […] abounds with very strict analogies to the immaterial; and thus some colour of truth has been given to the rhetorical dogma, that metaphor, or simile, may be made to strengthen an argument, as well as to embellish a description. The principle of the *vis inertiæ,* for example, seems to be identical in physics and metaphysics. *It is not more true in the former, that a large body is with more difficulty set in motion than a smaller one, and that its subsequent* momentum *is commensurate with this difficulty,* than it is, in the latter, that intellects of the vaster capacity, while more forcible, more constant, and more eventful in their movements than those of inferior grade, are yet the less readily moved, and more embarrassed and full of hesitation in the first few steps of their progress. (Poe 1846/1844. 214–215; my italics, Z.M.)

The Polish Church is burdened with the power of this inertia not only by a substantial or essentialist understanding of the nation, but also a similar understanding of the bond between these two realities, which is to be characterized not so much by identity as unthinkable, but – to use the category of Karol Wojtyła and recalled by him in completely different circumstances that is completely adequate now – some essential "same-identity" (Wojtyła 1969. 62 and in other places). It results from a simple and apparently overwhelming dialectic, from a simple and supposedly self-imposed historical drama of the Polish fate:

> Polish experience also shows – writes, for example, Fr. Henryk Zieliński on the portal *Rock – Laboratory of Faith and Culture* belonging to the Episcopal Conference – for a special feedback between the Church and the nation. This is our geopolitical reality that whenever the freedom of the nation was violated, the freedom of the Church in Poland was threatened so many times. (Zieliński 2017.)

He invokes, by the way, to support this justification, the understanding of the nation that appears many times in the texts and statements of John Paul II as one, next to the family, of the two "natural" structures of collective existence (the others are allegedly unnatural, thus deprived of the authentic "essence" or "substance", "emanated"). And it is by no means an isolated voice, but on the contrary – common in the Polish Church, acting with the same force that characterizes all vulgarized *Nachleben*.

Secular universalism, especially its European project, is also treated in a similarly "essentialist" way – however, on the basis of a negative reflection of the nation, on the basis of a dark and disturbing reflection – it appears as the opposite pole of the national substance and the values assigned to it, as a mecha-

nism of expropriation with identity despite the fact that the Church is one of the significant profits of European financial projects.[4]

Moreover, in this context, there are reminders full of historical allusions:

> No one decent will say that the Church in Poland was unnecessarily involved in creating the foundations of our statehood over a thousand years ago or defended Polish interests against the accusations of the Teutonic Knights at the Council of Constance. Likewise, no one questions the validity of the involvement of the Church in Poland in the defence of our independence and in national uprisings, from the Kościuszko Uprising to the last uprising of Solidarity. Finally, no one resents the political involvement of Father Augustyn Kordecki, defending Jasna Góra against the Swedes, Father Ignacy Skorupka, accompanying young soldiers in defending Warsaw against the Red Army, Polish bishops writing a letter to German bishops, or Fr. Jerzy Popiełuszko, who called for human dignity in enslaved Poland. After all, even the [left-wing] SLD government strove for the Church's support for Poland's integration with the European Union, and did not see anything inappropriate in it. There was also no particular resistance to such involvement on the part of Church representatives. (Zieliński 2017.)

Of course, the thought of the fundamental antinomy between the Church and the nation and pernicious European universalism is not always stated openly and directly:

> The purpose of the nation's existence – for example, Paweł Skibiński writes with pathos and considerable categorically – Is therefore clear. It is to help man to achieve his proper, from the Catholic point of view, goal – achieving his salvation. The national community - like other natural communities, such as the family – thus seem to be a path for man, leading to his salvation. For each person, this path becomes his own community, with its advantages, disadvantages and tasks. John Paul II seemed to treat the nation in exactly the same way. Both titans [this is also about Cardinal Wyszyński – Z.M.] not only of Catholic pastoral care, but also of Catholic social thought, treated the nation as a necessary and natural community. Love for it is a detail – and hence a concrete element – of love of one's neighbour, and not – as many other thinkers have suggested – its unacceptable limitation to members of one's own community. In this sense, it could be assumed that, *in a normal situation, man's path is to seek salvation, e.g. by the best possible service to one's own nation, by cultivating the virtue of*

[4] The examples of the benefits obtained here can be very numerous, so I will only refer – to recall some eloquent facts – to the construction of a great Marian pilgrimage center in Kodeń (in the east of Poland), which is carried out with the participation of the European Regional Development Fund, or to the enormous scale of European expenditure on renovation and reconstruction religious monuments.

> *patriotism, and not by blurring one's identity. True universalism – Catholic universalism – unites nations, allows them to flourish, but does not absorb them and does not eliminate their separateness.* (Skibiński 2006–2007. 282; my italics, Z.M.)

In this way, the nation is transformed into a soteriological instrument, into a necessary "springboard" of salvation. And it is precisely in this plan – the plan of the Catholic saviour of the economy – that it is also understood as a component of universalism, not contradicting it. Such a contradiction, however, falls in this "unnatural" or "essenceless" universalism – we can only guess what – which "blurs" national identity, "absorbs" nations, "eliminates their separateness" and prevents them from flourishing.

At the basis of a similar sacralisation of the nation, – its substance – there are certain threads peculiar to traditional Polish theology, which are connected with a certain distrust in a democratic society as a society of contract:

> The term "nation" denotes a community that finds its homeland in a certain place in the world and that stands out from others by its own culture. Catholic social teaching considers both the family and the nation to be natural communities, and therefore not the fruit of mere contract. Therefore, nothing else can replace them in the history of mankind. For example, one cannot replace a nation with a state, although a nation naturally wishes to exist as a state, as evidenced by the history of individual European nations and Polish history. […] Even more so, you cannot change the nation into a democratic society because it is about two different but complementary orders. A democratic society is closer to the state than to the nation. (John Paul II 2005. 74–75.)

And for such reasons, this dangerous universalism aimed at the democratic desacralisation of "our national substance", its absorption and liquidation, can also be understood in an essentialist way: as alien and unnatural in its very essence. Moreover, in such an approach, one can read the Lacanian *la jouissance* – the jealousy of the alleged bliss or at least the joy of such a dangerous otherness that it draws, constantly waiting for it, from appropriation and, ultimately, the liquidation of national identity. The fear – a collective fear of necessity – of looting threatening us, of tearing out our inherent, inalienable substance, of depriving us of ourselves, becomes an inevitable product here. It thus situates Catholic followers of such a formula for the relationship between what is national and what is universal, in circumstances as if from an old fairy tale or legend: treasure guardians and knights of the Holy Grail. And "Europe" from the black myth, with its secular axiological universe, appears perhaps not so much as a monster, though it happens anyway, but as a sorcerer who casts an evil, tempting spell.

III. Identity under Pressure (of Modernism)

It is in all this, one can guess, about maintaining a kind of monocentrism of the Church, which is still trying to perceive itself as the only "verital society" (a term for Father Maciej Zięba), that is, having the truth *(Veritas)* in an absolute and unique way. Zygmunt Bauman and Stanisław Obirek recall this term – "verital society" – in a collection of letters among themselves, to express another, radically different form of universalism: a state of mind which they describe as "agnosticism", which emerged, as Bauman says, on the "route from a monologue to a dialogue or a polylogue", from the self-righteousness of the owner of a single truth to the restraint of a witness of many truths – something he calls "polytheism" and constituting the antithesis of monotheism and "closed Church", not religion "or even the Church" in general (Bauman–Obirek 2013. 6–7). And although Stanisław Obirek puts the category of "polyphony" over this "polytheism", both of them mean precisely agnostic "abstinence" in the face of all temptations of monotheism or monocentrism, religious and completely secular, as well as throwing off the dictatorship of the only truth, demanding monopoly and saying "a war of the diversity of the principles of life and its authorities", arbitrarily drawing "the line between good and evil, virtue and disability, merit and fault, orthodoxy and heresy, faith and paganism, truth and untruth" (Bauman–Obirek 2013. 9).

It is not without reason that I contrast these two different approaches – the Polish Church and the authors of the aforementioned correspondence. They are, in a way, "at the antipodes" of today's debates on identity, universalism and particularism.

It could hardly be otherwise. The Polish Church remains within the mental limits of nineteenth-century modernism, not only in the matters referred directly to it, but also in the matter of supporting the concept of the identity (and therefore of the nation and universalism) of Thomas' philosophy of being, which is characteristic thereof.

Therefore, instead, as Tadeusz Bartoś wants, to give it the dimensions of a living reflection essential for our time, the time of "late post-modernity", the aim is to treat the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas as coherent and compact, without gaps or "faults", and thus more – free from internal contradictions or aporia. What is more, Thomism understood in this way becomes, as if in a medieval model, the measure of truth (or rather, the truth); its highest, if not only, criterion or guarantor. Meanwhile, "it is only […] in places of discontinuity that essential questions arise", and "the authentic movement of thoughts begins where the obviousness is stopped by asking which cannot be cancelled. When we don't see it, we are left without questions, empty-handed with ready-made answers." Of course, "it is not easy to protect your being against the illusion of ultimate continuity". It is not easy, because this illusion is guided by some primal instinct

of self-preservation, which demands alleviation of fears of chaos and the scattering of meaning, or at least their limitation – by finding the kind of saving ground that this or that system of thought can give. It is not easy to go consistently "against the tide" of such a tame illusion, and, to openly announce – what is even more difficult – the "death of absolute truth", in any way, and not only in its Thomistic understanding (Bartoś 2010). This painful idea, from a certain point of view, could of course mean a disturbance or even the destruction of religious faith; it could mean a radically agnostic project, and maybe even a nihilistic unbelief. But, as one of the most outstanding post-modern philosophers of today, Gianni Vattimo announces, one could succumb to the conviction of "weak metaphysics" *(metafisica debole),* which includes both the process of secularization, the philosophy of "God's death" and the Heideggerian "end of metaphysics". As well as the kenosis of Jesus Christ, process involves his descent to the very bottom of humanity and his submission to the fate of a scapegoat (Vattimo 1996).

Considered in this perspective, the "death of absolute truth" and its "bankruptcy" do not mean rejecting or striking out faith, including the Catholic faith. And, they are rather a vision of its cleansing of ideological illusions and absolutist temptations, as "a chance to revive the authentic sources of religious experience, it is a chance to purify faith – because it teaches humility. Authentic religion needs to refer to something that is beyond man. Man cannot be a judge of divine truth, he cannot be its guarantor or herald. He can only ask questions, seek patiently and without discouragement – by listening." Hence, one should strive to liberate Aquinas's thoughts from the burden of old scientism, to which the Church was subjected – on the basis of a paradoxical reversal, a paradoxical mirror image – at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, when he tried to build on the basis of theology and philosophy of Thomas, transforming it into an unshakable paradigm; an alternative to the certainty of contemporary science, a model of one's own certainty. Today, this formula has fallen into ruins – just like the formula of the Church of that era, the Church understood as a "fortress besieged and militant" – and Thomas's thought can be freely revived (this is one of the basic ideas of Tadeusz Bartoś) as an open reflection, sensitive to the fragility and uncertainty of the human condition, and also surprisingly concurrent with the philosophy and humanistic science of our time (Bartoś 2010). And in this way it is universalistic.

For we are in the depths of a world subjected, as Bauman often says, to constant "fluidity", where all identity recognition, all naming and separation become more and more difficult. After all, as Jean-François Lyotard wrote in *Postmodernism for Children*: "We are in a moment of uncertainty – I think about the colour of time." And in fact "we are not modern", and we are probably not heirs of either nihilism or romantic nostalgia. We only forage, perhaps, "in the pile of waste, in the remnants of various fundamentalisms," and we regard "unaware-

ness, stumbling, limitations, parataxes, nonsense or paradoxes as the basis of belief in the power of the new and in the promises of change" (Lyotard 1998. 12).

In such a situation, the traditional, static and substantial understanding of identity inherited by the Polish Church after nineteenth-century modernism, loses all sense and cognitive value (trying not to lose what radicalization means, both current and potential conflicts, their somewhat ritualistic ideologism). And the same happens, of course, with the substantive and static understanding of the nation and universalism.

Identity today – to put it very briefly – is something extremely "fluid" and is subject to constant transformations and choices. And in fact in the West, and therefore also in Poland, one should rather talk about various layers of temporary and occasional identities, open in many directions at the same time and always temporary, between which one still has to make insufficient choices and between which there is also a constant game of choices made by individuals and collectives. In any case, no old "wineskins" can absorb this "liquid". And they can only become, as it happens, phantasms that are sustained with more and more effort, stripped of essential content.

IV. In Front of the Universalism of the Church

Apart from all this, however, there is a certain growing and more evident, especially during the pontificate of Pope Francis, distance between universalism as understood by the universal Church and universalism as understood by the Polish Church. Anyway, the remarks made here on the subject of the Polish "theology of the nation", the dialectics of the Church and the nation, the tendency to remain in the area – when it comes to the basic and most general ideas and concepts – of modernist essentialism from the nineteenth century indicate the size and nature of this gap. However, the fundamental differences seem to result from different ways of reception, dictated, of course, by the historical situation, indications of the Second Vatican Council and various "theologies of earthly realities" born out of its inspiration.

The distance, gap or the difference between what is universal and what is particular or local is naturally not only the domain and problem of the Catholic Church. It seems, however, that it is precisely in the Catholic Church that such a phenomenon takes on – it must take on (although it often manifests itself subcutaneously or hidden, characteristic of all phenomena of "long duration") – quite dramatic and even radical forms, not always combined with the performance of faith itself. This is naturally due to the tension between the strive for universality that is immanent to the Catholic Church, to interpret itself as the only way of salvation, and the apparent need for "inculturation", that is, concrete rooting, a concrete presence "here and now". And at the same time, as a consequence of

the tension between the authority of Rome and its centralism, and the always particular perspective of the local Churches, a tension that is never finally and truly resolved by even the categorical formula *Roma locuta, causa finita*. In fact, it is merely a mask, more or less occasional, while opposition and distance breed somewhere in the depths of a particular orthodoxy. Orthodoxy, because of schismatic decisions and organized heresies – we are talking about our times – are now rather rare. The mere fusion of these two different aspirations in one visible body must be a paradox, it must give rise to a being, by its very nature, that is somewhat hybrid, or at least paradoxical, and therefore immediately condemned to a constant oscillation of identity, a play of meanings, a journey of "points of gravity". Significant tensions, often taking the form of open or hidden antinomies, are connected here with the problem of self-determination, or, more precisely, the self-definition of the Church. It is therefore, in the most general sense, about three forms or methods of the Church's self-understanding that are present in Catholic ecclesiology, about the relationships between them in the living practice of faith, about their experiential hierarchy. It is about the Church as the mystical body of Christ, about the Church as an institution, and finally about the Church understood as the people of God.

Being formally concurrent and integrated, in different periods of history, however, they reveal themselves in different hierarchical systems, exposing certain or other meanings of the Church at a given historical moment - occasionally stacking up some, degrading the other, and relatively rarely and very fleetingly achieving a kind of synergy. Such a synergistic arrangement of them emerged precisely during the Second Vatican Council and immediately after it, when the understanding of the Church as the people of God was strongly appreciated, which – recovered from oblivion – became a kind of synonym and metaphor for the Council's transformation. And, of course, it meant a departure from the conservative, clerical and "militant" Church that used to expose itself primarily as the mystical body of Christ and a hierarchical, centralist, authoritarian institution.

For various historical reasons – such as the consolidation of "denominational nationalism" and traditional folk religiosity, along with a ritualism and clericalism characteristic thereof, and above all because of the necessity to confront the Communist system, the Polish Church was not too concerned with the formula of the people of God and its promotion by the Second Vatican Council. Consequently, this meant a radical, and by the way unmasked, gap with the tendencies characteristic of the universal Church, thus a kind of incompatibility with its reformist orientation, and then quite commonly understood, in an almost journalistic language, as "incompatibility with the spirit of the Council".

The gradual departure of the universal Church from the reformist atmosphere of the Council and the renewed increase in traditionalist aspirations it had, of course, weakened the sense of the Polish Church's incompatibility with the rules

governing universal Catholicism – even more so as the "rightness" of the path it chose seemed to be revealed, along with new political, social and religious processes.

Here then, firstly, it emerged victoriously from the confrontation with Communism, and finally, after 1989, in the conditions of the new democratic era, it considered itself a triumphant Church having absolute rights not only in the spiritual or moral dimension.

Secondly, the abovementioned gap – which was never really closed and was always visible – was hidden in the depths of the discourse on the pontificate of John Paul II, the "Polish Pope", and in part even in the logic of the pontificate itself, exposing the vitality and dynamism of the religious masses and leaning, especially at a later stage, towards a conservative attitude. The discourse of the same name, in a sublime and "national" spirit, did not show the dramatic complexity, antinomies, aporia or errors of papal teaching cultivated by the Polish Church, about this great pontificate. The cult of the Pope, understood from elsewhere and which was justified for many reasons for it played a role, became more and more phantomatic of an obvious facade or a festive decoration beyond which one could calmly practice unchanging rituals of spiritual and political power and expand the sphere of possession and rule without feeling intellectually and morally bound to any transformation.

On the one hand, the time of friendly stabilization and triumphal ossification came for the hierarchy of the Polish Church, and the presence of the great Pope not only masked this phenomenon, but appeared in ecclesial statements as its legitimation. On the other hand, passivity and complacency worked deeply, triggering a reluctance to face emerging problems and a dramatic inability to solve them.

The hierarchical Church which relied on the presence of the "Polish Pope" in everything, therefore constantly revealed – on the occasion of spectacular and publicized tensions – the inability to resolve various conflicts, not to mention the shaping of some more serious visions, related, for example, to the creation of such models of pastoral ministry and social commitment required by the new democratic times. That is why, on the occasion of these conflicts, attitudes of absolute ineffectiveness of decisions, conformist passivity, silence, and the expectation that the problems of the local, particular Church would be solved directly by the Pope, were still evident. At the same time, the Polish Church kept its stone calm and unshakable certainty. And it did not notice the looming threats in time, especially the secularization taking place in Poland, following the example of the West.

Thirdly, the complacency of the Polish Church – resulting both from the triumph over Communism and from the mass spectacle of faith, from the ritual universality which Fr. Władysław Piwowarski called "festive religiosity" (Piwowarski 1971; Piwowarski 1977), manifested especially during "papal

masses", pilgrimages to Jasna Góra or great celebrations – it built an illusory belief in the superiority of native forms of faith over the irreligiousness of the West, revealed through the desolate temples. Meanwhile, as I once stated in an interview for the liberal Catholic magazine *Tygodnik Powszechny*:

> The problem is similar in both cases – I believe that in Poland, the Christianity of empty churches in the West often enjoys Catholicism in empty and "dumb" ritual forms. Thus, in this void comes the religion of the "invisible" or "private", which allows you to construct for your own use a certain – fluid and not very coherent – set of behaviours, rituals, beliefs and moral norms taken partly from Christianity, partly from the East, parts – anywhere, from the great universal memory archive. So if you do not like something in a given religious doctrine, you simply throw out that element and replace it with whatever you take from another. Western man has not ceased to be religious, he is still *homo religiosus*. But his spirituality ceased to be hierarchical and related to the church institution. And it has become rather communal, "horizontal" and occasional, resembling a patchwork or – as Marilyn Fergusson, one of the New Age champions of the Age of Aquarius wrote – "a carelessly tied fishing net", a specific equivalent of which is this online, virtual, phantomatic, today often the basic sphere of building and searching for a new spirituality… (Mikołejko 2006.)

To put it another way, desacralisation or heading – like the West – towards the "invisible religion", the "religion of choice", takes place here in the shadow of the altar, under the cover of a few, purely nonsensical acts of the ritual "religion of life" dictated only by habit, and often by social conformism.

V. Answers: "Theodemocracy" and the Concept of "Smolensk Religion"

It seems that the answer to the process of secularization is the project of "theodemocracy", promoted in various forms and methods by the Church since the fall of Communism.

I am referring to the concept created at the beginning of the 1990s by Georges Charachidzé and referring to the ideological temptation characteristic of religious institutions in countries which, as it were, function on the fringes of the democratic West – for example Israel, Georgia and Poland. Generally speaking, it is a conviction that democracy is void of overwhelming justification and roots, and therefore must be provided by religion and theology. As a consequence (and in practical terms), this means that the foundational and primary reason of the democratic system is religious faith and morality, and its guardian is a specific religious institution, i.e. in the Polish case the local Catholic Church (Charachidzé 1991. 33–38).

The "theodemocratic" perspective has been accepted– if not in the ideological, then certainly practical dimension – by the majority of the political elite and has been implemented by them, regardless of orientation (from the right to the left), to a greater or lesser extent. And this concerned both the structures of the entire state as well as individual institutions and local government structures. As a result, it has become somehow legitimate to speak of Poland as not so much a "confessional state" (as radical interpretations would like), but a "strongly religious state" and, in general, extremely susceptible to the suggestions and expectations of the Church (not always; an example may be a radically a different attitude to refugees from the populist Law and Justice party, which has been ruling since 2015).

In recent years, this drive has arisen and has taken on a paradoxical form. The Church, entering the extremely strict form of the marriage of the altar with the throne, allowed in silence the Law and Justice party – sometimes surprisingly passively – to turn its teaching, symbolism and rituals into a quasi-political instrumentation, a kind of ideology and substitute symbolism, integrating the previously scattered anti-liberal environment and nationalist resentment. This happened at the same time in the most dynamic, breakthrough moments of the party's "revolutionary" march for power, the demolition of the state and the rise of the disordered, semi-authoritarian regime. It was like the final act of a process which meant that political interests and social sentiment could manifest freely in the language of faith, as long as it favoured the material and non-material aspirations of the Church. As a rule, it is a crippled language, sometimes pathetic and unconsciously parodical, using the remains of catechistic teachings and sermons and recalling – as scenarios of action – some afterimages of devotional iconography. The first performances of – as I once called it – the "Smolensk religion" (see more on this topic Mikołejko, 2017. 125–164) became an evident expression of such behaviour, the centre and the mythical binder of which was the crash of the presidential TU154 aircraft near Smolensk (April 10. 2010). Within such performances, the cross was transformed into a kind of tribal totem, and the behaviour of its hysterical "defenders" were shaped according to "holy pictures" depicting the Three Marys at the Cross or the *Mater Dolorosa*.

Thus, the too strong rooting of the Polish Church in the institutions of the state and law ended with something, as I mentioned, paradoxically opposite: a kind of expropriation, grotesque and pathological taking over of some of its doctrine and practice for the purposes of political strategy and immediate interests, including emotional interests and social interest by certain groups, contesting the democratic order in a populist fashion. The fact that the intensity of the "Smolensk religion" has lost its momentum today and weakened in its spectacular forms does not mean, however, that its powers have expired – it remains only in a kind of "dormancy", it retains its potential, which may revive, probably in changed forms and in other masks, in any situation of crisis and moral panic.

The appearance of the "Smolensk religion" became at the same time a local, but not at all isolated, confirmation of Jean Maisonneuve's statement on the so-called wild sacred in an allegedly desacralized world: "It would be an exaggeration to say that the sacred has disappeared". And also his thesis that sanctity was transferred, often in an unrecognizable way, to spheres other than that of religion. Maisonneuve thus distinguishes four "levels" of this transference. First, it is the level of survival of myths and rituals. "Contemporary man – he says – has a hidden mythology and outdated ritualism, therefore many traditional threads can be found in contemporary literature, art, cinema and the media […]. Similarly, in modern art we find some initiation attempts, the search for the hidden meaning of the world and human existence." Secondly, it is the level of "wild sacred" which "embraces innovative movements with their spontaneity and the creation of new rituals" and "is expressed at the same time by the diversity of groups and sects of occult, theosophical and oriental orientations", combining "syncretism of beliefs with ritualistic", complementing "the shortcomings of traditional religions", and arising out of "longing for spiritual connection, especially among young people". Thirdly, it is "a level of technology that is today a substitute for the sacred for many people, and the source of many myths (in the field of futurology and science-fiction) and spectacular shows". "With the threat of an atomic catastrophe and the latest genetic discoveries, technology, like the ancient mystery, becomes both fascinating and terrifying through the Promethean search. Magic is closer to the goals of science and technology than to religion. They want to tame nature, life and death, as well as fulfil their ancestors' dreams of achieving dizzying speed and conquering the skies. In fact, it is not about establishing a world order, nor about responding to existential anxiety, but more about the ethical problems posed by scientific and technological progress." Fourthly, it is the "ideological and political level", the level of "secular religion", or "doctrines that take the place of faith in the souls of modern people, replacing the ideas of human salvation with an ideal social order in the distant future" (Maisonneuve 1996).

"Smolensk religion" is such a process of production and reproduction of meanings and images, taking place spasmodically and compulsively, but consistently, even relentlessly – with ruthlessness that can only be envied by other formations of Polish public life. Hence, the conspiracy theories and the most bizarre concepts – always in the garb of a sinister, cruel fairy tale – of the "assassination" on the presidential TU154 at first glance seem to have nothing to do with common sense and technical knowledge, with meteorology and political rationale, the drama of an often monstrous coincidence that despises the pronunciation of facts and constantly contest them.

They are not about, as one might expect from painful and gloomy tones, to discover and establish some reliable truth about the catastrophe near Smolensk. The point is simply – perhaps by turning the Smolensk fog into absurd vapours

– to give categorical, unambiguous meaning, durability and uniformity to undifferentiated, purely emotional and often temporary forms of opposition to the democratic order, liberal culture, and the requirements of the free market. Yes, it must be said emphatically: there is method in this madness as well. The method of capitalization or accumulation of anger, *thymōs,* whose gurus and priests become expressive *yuródivyyie* of the present Polish populism, is persistently critical of the alleged "Tsarist System" (Adam Mickiewicz's term) and prophetically revealing its abysmal evil.

This is, of course, a universal phenomenon in the contemporary liberal or, rather, post-liberal world. And the "Smolensk religion" is only a local mutation of that thymotic political economy. In order to understand what Polish is better, it is necessary to refer to more common processes, presented in one of the most penetrating studies of our era – anger and the time of Peter Sloterdijk. It is important, and for this reason, that he speaks of the "post-communist situation" and the "post-communist constellation", not limiting himself solely to the "political culture of the West", but also referring to "filial civilizations in the East and South" (Sloterdijk 2011. 50).

In any case, the philosopher invokes a figure fundamental to the present game of social identities, which emerged after the inevitable and, hopefully, final end of the centuries-old incarnation of "unhappy consciousness" – enslaved people. Thus, modern emancipations wiped out the figure of a slave from the pages of history, but someone else immediately took his place in the journey of history. "Modernity has invented the loser. This figure, which we encounter halfway between yesterday's exploited and today's and tomorrow's superfluous, is an incomprehensible greatness in democratic power games. Not all losers will be reassured by pointing out that their status corresponds to their position in the overall competition. In response, many will note that they never had a chance to participate in a game and thus take a position. For the wrongs suffered, they blame not only the winners, but also the rules of the game." (Sloterdijk 2011. 49–50.)

It is therefore worth noting immediately that in Polish conditions, the subject of constant attacks by "losers" is not only the emerging middle class and its short-term political emanations, but the mechanics and logic of a certain whole, variously known, but always stigmatized as an enemy and dark force, using secret methods: "elite", "pact", "Third Republic" or – with an allusion to the allegedly unworthy compromise of some Solidarity leaders with Communists – the "Republic of the Round Table".

Such terminology does not appear here by accident and it is not only about demonization which stigmatizes the opponent. We are here in a completely new space of holy war, which opened after the previous holy war, with an opponent common to both sides of the conflict that is now emerging – after the victorious deal with Communism, which had, so to speak, "material" or "physical" charac-

ter. “With physical battles fought”, writes Sloterdijk, “the time of metaphorical wars is approaching. These are inevitable, because the total guarantor of the order of the liberal world: the mutual recognition of all by all as equal citizens of the community is in fact too formal and not specific enough to open up an individual’s access to happy consciousness. Also, and even above all, in a world of widespread freedoms, people cannot cease to strive for specific forms of recognition manifested in prestige, prosperity, sexual superiority and intellectual superiority. Since such goods are never abundant, the liberal system accumulates a considerable amount of envy and dissatisfaction in the weaker competitors – not to mention the underprivileged and de facto excluded. The more order there is in the essential features of «society», the more colourfully everyone’s jealousy blooms towards everyone. It involves candidates for better positions in a constant struggle involving all aspects of life.” (Sloterdijk 2011. 49.)

Meanwhile, as Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger once wrote, orthodox faith cannot follow those who “do not want to follow reality, but overtake it with a torch in hand”. So Ratzinger strongly denied a program of Christianity that would “transform the world according to Hope”. This means then that such orthodox Catholic faith would not want to “follow reality”, and it is terrified that “the torch ahead of the facts quickly set fire”, giving rise to various subversive and destructive formations for the Church. Asking about a possible strategy for Christian hope, Ratzinger emphatically rejected the idea of the Kingdom of God inherent in such a political theology: “Building the Kingdom of God is not a political process. If you look at it in this way, you practice both false theology and false politics. False messianisms arise, from their essence and from their messianic claims appearing on a lousy plane, turning into totalitarianisms”. For when “science of the last things” is turned into a political utopia, Christian hope is degraded and diminished. “By directing it to reality, you take away its proper content, transform it into a false substitute.” But this forgery – in his opinion – affects politics as well. And the “mystery of the Kingdom of God” is misused here to justify political irrationality, political absurdity. So, if faith does not want to go astray, if it does not want to go the way of radicals and terrorists – if it wants to be faithful to the way of the Man of Nazareth – it must clearly and strongly separate politics and “science of the last things”. “For where eschatology and politics coincide, morality ceases to exist.” And it is only the effectiveness in achieving goals that decides. And only it becomes “the only standard of action” (Ratzinger 1986).

The constant invocation of the heretical Gnostic dualism in its extreme dimension is also characteristic of the “Smolensk religion”. More so in the simplistic, xenophobic articulations of duality, in the demonization of the political opponent as a metaphysical “enemy”, among shouts that already smell the “smoke of fires” and the “dust of brothers’ blood”, although fortunately they culminate in ritual fights on the occasion of anniversary demonstrations.

Perhaps we should recall what medical textbooks say. They say that compulsion is compulsion in action, a type of anxiety disorder, expressed by performing compulsory actions defined by psychiatrists – not by accident – as rituals. Most of these forced actions, psychiatry continues, are cathartic in nature and concern cleanliness, constant cleaning and checking everything in order to prevent a dangerous situation. This behaviour is usually based on the fear of danger, always in the lurking potency, a fear that is further deepened by the awareness that the ritual activity – despite its irresistible compulsion – is a futile, ineffective, symbolic attempt to reverse the threats (see e.g. Bilikiewicz 2007. 702).

Thus, a specific "vicious circle" is revealed: the more strongly, the more intensively the ritual is reproduced, the more obvious and predatory its ineffectiveness and helplessness become. And it becomes obsession, redundancy and hyperbolism, more and more omnivorous, more and more greedy. And sometimes also explosive, that is, one that finds its limit and culmination in violence – in violence against oneself, in self-destruction, or in violence against another, who becomes a scapegoat for someone's dark, unfulfilled powerlessness. Drastic, insatiable and unsatisfied desire, then, stands at the root of the compulsion and gives it direction and meaning. The desire for the victim, which inevitably gives rise to the need for constant stigmatization, violent and blind stigma, at all costs and without looking at anything, especially rational reasons for choice – after all, it is about emotions, only emotions, simultaneously fuelled and consumed by fear. All the more so, because the scapegoats selected in this blind rush – called *pharmakoi* in ancient Greece, "healers" not for nothing – ultimately heal nothing: they are only temporary addressees of painful and dark thirst and its accidental placebo, while their discoveries and "unmasking" bring relief only for a little while. This is also because the marking of the victim, their alleged "uncleanness", always leaves a spot on the victim himself, even when killing her is merely figurative, symbolic.

As you can see, everything I am talking about oscillates around the notion of fear. And it is fear that seems to be the disturbing nucleus of all ritualistic behaviour. Anyway, all the secular theories of ritual, developed by "late modernity", make it the centre of ritual reality, both individual, personal and collective. Well, not only them. The faith of earlier times, up to the era of modern secularization, carried the categorical conviction that holiness is always revealed through a dense weave of *tremendum* and fascination.

However, we live in an era when this horror and holy fear have lost their importance, and the fascination, often bordering on the spirit of fun and tourism, has come to the fore in individual and common faith practices, as evidenced more and more often – also in Poland – by the behaviour of pilgrims. In order to see it more clearly, one should pay attention to, for example, the history of mystical revelations: in the past centuries, they were most often Christo-centric revelations – such as, for example, experienced by mature female mystics in

their restless, ambiguous meetings with the Bridegroom, but in the 19th and 20th centuries, they were replaced by maternal revelations given to children by Mary. This infantilisation of faith obviously has a dramatic background, but it soothes completely different kinds of fear than it did before. And, as it has just happened in Poland, it creates a devotional basis and form for many of the losers and the angry, their ideological "family".

Such motives were recognized by Stefan Czarnowski, mentioned here, in Polish folk religiosity – which later became, due to almost "mechanical" migration to cities and the apparent urbanization of the country, a nationwide religiosity, retaining its original features in the new conditions of existence – primarily as an expression of collective identity, expressed almost exclusively in collective ritual practice, in collective faith practice. This "denominational nationalism", inheriting the xenophobic features of the yet counter-reformation noble religiosity of the Baroque with its closure and rejection of all alienness, with its scrupulous (one would like to say: neurotic) devotion and excessively developed – in accordance with the rules of Baroque aesthetics, devoid of internal experiences, which is governed, as we know, by the principles of *horror vacui,* "fear of emptiness" – external and formal rituals, beyond the scope and interest of which faith and personal morality remain, it was quite well, for obvious reasons, in the era of Communism.

I would add something else to this image: namely, the thanatic trait of this "festive religiosity", that is, it evoked such an experience that clearly states that a sacred, solemn community is usually established in our country, and then it immediately collapses and goes home on the occasion of mourning, but not as a result of a social contract negotiated on a daily basis. That it is created – according to non-accidental patterns from the Romantic era – over the tombs of our fallen heroes, sons of the motherland who rest in her womb-grave, wrapped in the maternal mantle of Mother Mary, the mantle of "fields painted with various grains, gilded with wheat, silver plated with rye" (Adam Mickiewicz, *Pan Tadeusz, czyli Ostatni zajazd na Litwie,* 1834 – *Master Thaddeus, or the Last Foray in Lithuania: A Nobility's Tale of the Years 1811–1812, in Twelve Books of Verse*). This is how the "white walls of the Polish house" and the Baroque *castrum doloris* or the romantic mourning procession from Norwid's poem *A Funeral Rhapsody in Memory of General Bem* (*Bema pamięci rapsod żałobny…*, 1851) happen, again and again, also in the pulsating rhythm of the "Smolensk religion", a redeeming, liberating bond (with but a devastating holy message).

In the case of the "Smolensk religion", we are also dealing not with an excess of politics in religion, but with an excess of religion in politics – also in the iconic sphere, in the language of political imagery, which uses unscrupulous, for example, the *Mater Dolorosa* icon or the icon of the Three Marys at the tomb (between immediately after the presidential crash of the TU154 in performances outside the presidential palace in Warsaw), also in speeches evoking messianic

and apocalyptic visions and the idea of martyrdom. Not without reason: the rudimentary language of the catechisms of teachings and devotional pictures is for many Poles the only mode of discourse – apart from the language of serials – which can express ideas that are more general than their everyday existence. It is, in a way, a substitute language, which is also used in a way by the Polish formation – to use the term Gilles Kepel (Kepel 2010) – of the "religion of God's revenge", i.e. the militant and fundamentalist milieu of Radio Maryja, remaining in a strong, though complex marriage with the "Smolensk religion" and constituting a very important segment of the "people" professing it (I would like to remind you that Kepel used this term to name such phenomena that "dress" various ideological, cultural and social messages in the remains of the teachings of Islam, Judaism or Christianity; in the case of Radio Maryja, which gathers mainly old, poor and uneducated inhabitants of villages and small towns, it would be a dramatic problem of "irrelevance").

An evident expression of this is the pursuit of hyperbolism in creating sacred places, in the spatial organization of sacred experiences. For the fundamental projects in this area, sin with an excess of mass and all decorum, just as it was in the counter-reformation propaganda of faith in the Baroque era. The hyperbolic nature of the Warsaw Temple of Providence, Christ of Świebodzin, and finally the basilica in Licheń, with its maddening and neo-baroque debauchery of forms, speaks for themselves. It is, by the way, an appeal as if directed to a post-modern man who – as Zygmunt Bauman writes – is characterized by the sensitivity of a tourist. But the condition of a tourist is expressed in a fleeting and external gaze, a gaze that never stops longer and does not go deeper but wanders nervously on the surface, gets impatient, looks for new attractions and illusions. But also the "people of Smolensk" in their religious and political – tremendous and mournful – practice do not want any deepening. And the method of political madness finds its expression without difficulty in the madness of iconographic and spatial forms, as well as in the "politics of the cross" bristling with excesses in front of the presidential palace on Krakowskie Przedmieście Street, which has been transformed from a symbol into a sign of an immediate crusade, into a kind of political projection screen, and in a certain sense cornered by hysterically thrashing figures from the depths of Marian devotion, undermining both the Christocentric nature of the Christian message and – in spectacular acts of nationalist appropriation – eliminating the spiritual significance of this black tree of death, which was once erected on Golgotha for someone who did not want to be not at all a political Messiah, and said that His Kingdom was not "of this world".

In the *Peasant War in Germany*, Friedrich Engels wondered, among other things, why the rebellious peasants, breaking up against their lords, high clergy and patricians, wrote evangelical slogans on their banners. Engels' answer was, to put it simply, the following: because they did not know others by means of

which they could express – in the more commonly understood language – their anger, their disagreement with injustice and exploitation, their socio-economic and moral postulates (Engels 1850/1981).

We have a similar situation today in Poland: in a society where two-thirds of citizens do not read anything at all, to express anger and dissent typical of the "Smolensk religion", the remnants of catechismal teachings must be used as more general categories of expression, adorned with nationalist and xenophobic exclamation marks.

Moreover, we would have to reach for the subcutaneous, never essentially revealed, historical lineage of the most commonly practiced types of revenge in our country. This is due to the masked genesis of modern Polish nation. This modern nation actually begins to be born with the enfranchisement of serfs, with the end of their semi-slavery or even slavery. And it was a long, painful and late process considering other European countries. It is rarely talked about, and this is extremely important, perhaps the most important for our mentality, which "on the surface" is only covered with a "polisher" of intellectual and noble mythology, still the basic matter – despite the pressure and omnipresence of pop culture – of Polish "high culture". Meanwhile, the heritage of "animal Poland" is working deeply. This includes a legacy of passivity, poverty, brutality, limited horizons, humiliation, a slave and hate mentality, tough, cruelty and fear, the legacy of an animal peasant fate, falsified by myths about the noble lineage of our society.

This heritage has never been honestly "worked out" intellectually and morally, has never been honestly recalled, has never become an essential element of national consciousness. And all attempts to recall it end with a sharp social reaction that appears when recalling the peasant robbery in Galicia ("bloody Shrovetide" of 1846), killing the insurgents of 1863 and tearing their corpses apart, the pogrom in Jedwabne (10 July 1940) and – in general – the participation of peasants in the last wave of the Holocaust, in the murder of the survivors of the Nazi extermination of Jews.

All this covers itself with heroic myths, succumbing to the disgusting schizophrenia, the fatal dialectic of hypocrisy, already present in Mickiewicz's mystery drama *Forefathers' Eve* (*Dziady,* part III, 1832): that there is a public "shell" of our life, cold and hard, dry and filthy on the surface, and some hidden "inner fire" of true and worthy existence. A fire supposedly untainted by the moral dirt of enslavement. The fiction of such a split still lives and works in the unconscious, repressed areas of Polish social life. Above all, however, this heritage I am talking about was fulfilled in small meanings, in ugly everyday tricks. But this revenge was terrible, which we do not want to know all the time: "We forgot everything, they fucked my grandfather with a saw" – reminds the Groom in the in the mystical drama by Stanisław Wyspiański *Wedding* (*Wesele,* 1901) and the peasant the bloody Galician slaughter of 1846, and the false, fearful attitude of oblivion characteristic of the nobility and the intelligentsia.

"Forcibly", artificially, the noble-intelligentsia story about the national history of those who did not have such a history, i.e. the peasants, was forced into the story – the struggle of the "Smolensk people" with the "foreign" and "born" liberal power, anointed by Satan's capitals: Moscow, Berlin, Brussels.

This mechanism, it seems to me, reflects the illusory or fictional nature of revenge to a great extent. The point is above all that it "keeps you alive sometimes". What is more, it can give energy, satisfaction, a sense of triumph and even delight. And it shows that revenge is not only about retribution or compensation, but also about other important things. For example, paradoxically, to break away from the culprit and his guilt and use the harm suffered as the "engine" of one's own actions, as a "lever" that serves to rebuild one's own identity, to recreate it (somehow on a new, "higher" level). In a way, it is a way of freeing both the pain of the harm suffered and the destructive, self-destructive urges that always accompany revenge. Then, the harm and the desire for revenge can turn into an impulse for a salutary transformation, for *catharsis*. And this is a religious or sacred dimension, something that uplifts and fills us with power – like a jug of wine given to us by the gods.

In everyday moral practice, in the case of the "Smolensk religion", you are not a disciple of Christ. The pressure of other ethical and moral traditions, including those very archaic, pre-Christian, and the historical experience of the nation is enormous. It is, in a way, our irresistible heritage. It is not only about historical experience in matters of morality and custom: there remains the problem of pain after harm, pain that is often so shocking that it makes us insensitive to any ethical or religious indications. Polishness, which is always allegedly harmed, eternally humiliated – now by Brussels, previously by Moscow and other "strangers", especially by the Jews and the Germans – serves self-justification and, moreover, passivity, taking away the responsibility for one's fate. So what Erich Fromm calls "an escape from freedom", coupled with fear, consent to violence, and the authoritarian desire of a "providential man", a strong "leader of the nation" who is to come to take care of our fate. And he took care of our fate.

This, of course, on the one hand, founds faith in a charismatic leader, and if he does not become charismatic, his artificial breeding begins: the state of permanent crisis, imposed to society and the state by the "Smolensk religion", serves precisely this purpose – giving charisma to a political leader who does not have charisma (in line with Max Weber's discovery that charismatic personalities are not fixed quantities, but acquire appropriate features precisely in crisis conditions). Moreover, this crisis is evoked in apocalyptic terms, in the language of faith and the nation's destruction from all sides, the sign of which – which is why it is necessary to constantly talk about it, constantly exaggerate it – is the alleged "Smolensk attack".

On the other hand, as René Girard says, it is also a "sacrificial crisis" in which the alleged "Smolensk martyrs", through the terrible and messianic beauty of

their tragic death, justify the right to resentment and appropriate revenge, even if the guilt is imaginary, and revenge is to know no bounds. This kind of revenge also turns out to be a condition for building a community, and the victim – death in the Smolensk vapours, the death of the "betrayed at dawn" – turns into a founding act of a new, unpolluted order. "There is a concept of Law and Justice" said Ludwik Dorn, the closest collaborator of the Kaczyński brothers in the past, "immediately after the presidential crash of the TU154, who would monopolize what I call the victim of the Republic of Poland, postponed by 20 years, because such a meaning was given to the tragedy in Smolensk. One can argue what kind of president Lech Kaczyński was, and it will be a justified dispute. […] His death restores substantiality to the state. […] Death must be at the origin of every city-state, including Rome. The sacrifice of blood is necessary because it mythically emphasizes that the state is a deadly matter: it can kill its own and strangers. This »deadly gravity of death« makes the state substantial. This Third Polish Republic, which originated from »some talk at the table«, was missing. The celebration of the anniversary of the Round Table was a fight for the founding myth, but the disaster in Smolensk invalidated these efforts." (See Brzezicki 2010.)

The ritual scenario of revenge and sacrifice is also supplemented here by afterimages from the romantic archive of collective (non-)memory: the many months of ecstatic cultivation in front of the presidential palace of "the fallen near Smolensk" became a regeneration, perhaps even restitution, of the ghostly vision from Juliusz Słowacki's drama *Kordian* (1834), according to which the fictional "coffins of kings" invented by the poet from the basement of the church (and today the cathedral) of St. John in Warsaw went to the palace of power, the Royal Castle, to kill the "Tsar of the North" (Nicholas I), before he unlawfully placed the crown of the Polish monarch on his head.

It is time, however, to point yet out another paradox, perhaps the most dramatic one: that for many Poles, exhausted and rudimentary religious experiences, practices and content become, especially to those less educated, characterized by passivity for various reasons, basically – apart from those drawn from pop culture, mainly from tapeworm series – a tool for both the reception of the world and the expression of meaning: from existential truths to culture and political beliefs. Thus, for example, reminiscences of Catholic dolorism and attempts to impersonate the devotional iconicity assigned to it could be seen in some of the "defenders of the cross" from Krakowskie Przedmieście, and in the killer of her daughter, Katarzyna Waśniewska from Sosnowiec, who was first effectively incarnating the figure of Mater Dolorosa, Mother of Sorrows, despair after the loss of the Child (after discovering the crime, she immediately began to play the role of an erotic series vamp).

More important, however, seems to be another phenomenon, which can be associated with the expansive "fear of emptiness", with the baroque *horror va-*

cui in its own way. His obvious testimony may be all manifestations of religious hypertrophy, a crazy overgrowth of forms noticeable in various public areas: from the gigantic Christ of Świebodzin to the 14-meter monument of John Paul II in the Częstochowa Miniature Park (!), from the Basilica in Licheń to the Sanctuary of Our Lady of Sorrows Świętokrzyska in Kałków-Godów, known as the "Golgotha of the East".

I pay attention to these places not only because of their pseudo-baroque hypertrophy, but above all because of the specific dialectics – and at the same time the best synthesis – of what is religious and what is political, of the history of salvation with the history of the nation understood in the messianic spirit. And due to the inherent machinery of transforming Christian universalism into Polish "denominational nationalism" of the new breed. In the national Catholic industry of suffering, the most spectacular interpretation of this is the architecture and iconosphere of Lichen, where priest Eugeniusz Makulski (later unmasked as a paedophile) and architect Barbara Bielecka transformed a naïve fairy tale about the magnificence of faith into an unbridled synthesis of baroque and socialist realism, and the passion of Christ into a Polish martyrdom story, spread out in a great the space between the "testimony" of national suffering in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, that is, a kitsch copy of Golgotha and the ultimate spiritual triumph, embodied in giant stones and the golden robe of the tallest basilica in Europe. Everything here is supposed to be arch-Polish: so, the angels have hussar wings, the acanthus has been transformed into oak leaves; the leaves of the palm and papyrus have been replaced with fern leaves. And when it comes to pestering someone from the twentieth century "history unchained", it is only about us: in Katyn and Siberia, in the hell of Nazism and Communist shackles.

"Licheń Golgotha", wrote Ziemowit Szczerek, "is for the Polish form what the aesthetics of Día de Muertos is for Mexico or the colorfully painted Mothers of God throughout South America. […] It is a reflection of the people's soul, something that comes out of the guts of the Polish nation. This and – for example – disco polo. A dream we dream about ourselves". But there is also something more: hence from this decay of forms, from spiritual immaturity and aesthetic barbaria – Szczerek argued – but also from the sins of liberals and leftists, from their contempt for the plebeian element and the lack of genuine ideas for a reliable civic republic, today the triumph of power comes Ruling Poland. For "Kaczyński's immaturity coincided at a certain point with the emotional immaturity of this »lichenian«, radio-Marian, częstochowian Poland of popular Catholicism." (Szczerek 2017. 332). And moreover – I will add – with the coarse dialectic of "Kordian and boor", as well as with the brutal, revolutionary liberation, not without acts of violence, not only symbolic, hitherto unspeakable peasant story from the pressure of the "lord's", noble-intellectual tale. One from the defenders of Częstochowa is Andrzej Kmicic, from the novel by Henryk

Sienkiewicz, *Deluge* (*Potop*, 1886), written "to cheer up hearts", and finally the knightly ethos.

There are no innocent words, absolutely innocent cultural texts, free from ideological complications. There are no such ways of speaking – "discourse modes" – behind which there is nothing "there". Which would not be governed, most often in a hidden and subcutaneous way, by some more powerful orders, mechanisms or forces. And which would not serve – as a rule, regardless of the wishes of the speakers – some ideological beast. They would not be subject to its propaganda machine. So, we are – as Michel Foucault would say – in the bondage of a certain discourse, a certain way of speaking and thinking, above all a "discourse" of power, which through its overwhelming network of concepts, serves to discriminate, discriminate, isolate, accuse, condemn and persecute. And because of this, we do not say, but in fact "we are spoken". The discourse therefore completely defines us and assigns us roles: it orders and classifies, rejects and elevates, distinguishes and condemns, prohibits and orders various things.

"People create their own history", Marx wrote in turn, "but they do not create it at will, not under circumstances of their choice, but as they find themselves directly, as they are given and communicated to them. The tradition of all deceased generations weighs down on the minds of the living. And it is precisely when they seem to be preoccupied with overthrowing themselves and around them that […] they anxiously call to help the spirits of the past, borrow from them names, battle slogans and robes, in order to centuries in disguise and in this borrowed language to play a new act of world history." (Marx 1869/1980. 1.)

Thus, a propaganda game is taking place on the ideological stage of our history, in which the spectres of the dead are mixed with the living. In which it constantly reaches back to the past to bring out decorations, costumes and masks. To use tradition, usually very limited to the present needs, mocked and, most importantly, often only imagined, to satisfy the most current, immediate needs of its participants.

Of course, this is not a coincidence, and by real choice, but according to the script given to them. However, this storyboard would not be "available" if it did not satisfy some real hunger. Even though the hunger is unnamed, it is painful and authentic. And in essence, then, a romantic desire to emerge from the lack of meaning experienced one way or another, from the mediocrity of life. Distinguishing itself through the costume of heroism borrowed from the dramatic and bloody history of the twentieth century and the stigma of suffering, "curse", rejection, salutary defeat with the spiritual or even "angelic" assigned to it. It is worth noting that, for example, the obvious, seemingly and universally accepted model of a Home Army (Armia Krajowa) fighter and wartime conspirator is not used here, but the myth of the "cursed" post-war anti-Communist partisans, shrouded in a fog of secrecy, election, absolute surrender of the Earth and Blood, sacrifices of life, and mystical weddings with death.

Itis just that in today's Poland, it is "served" and consumed in a trivial, painfully flat version, and in the formula of often fun or ritual games, with the possibility of cheaply matching – even at the price of a t-shirt with an appropriate print– a stolen and distorted identity. However, there is a more subtle and discreet pattern of fitting into the romantic discourse of patriotism; one that has been inscribed – and is still inscribed – to us imperceptibly into the spirit and blood, just as Mickiewicz wanted in his free, expressive translation of Byron's *Giaur:* "The fight for freedom, when it begins once, / it falls through the father's blood on his son's heritage."

The power of romantic discourse, holy and damned, redemptive and pushing us into the abyss, is still with us. And he holds us ruthlessly in his embrace. And his propaganda heritage lives in us in various ways. And he is fine, and sometimes even better. Sometimes it is romanticism, often truncated, often liberated from meanings that are uncertain for the imagined national tradition.

Here a role is played by scenarios quite common to our behaviour and in the collective subconscious, written there by the romantic culture of death and mourning. The vision of the cultural and social order in Poland is derived, unlike in western democracies, not from the "social contract", but from a vast culture of suffering and mourning – the basic form for us to show national community itself. After all, in cemeteries, mainly in cemeteries, during the times of partitions, occupation and enslavement, we could worship our fallen heroes – sons of the motherland, resting in its womb-grave, therefore, rarely, extremely rarely, Polish society of the 19th and 21st centuries used to gather in crowds on an occasion other than some mourning occasion, the matter of death – recently at the mourning ceremonies of Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, John Paul II, and the victims of the Smolensk crash.

In addition, when the West lived under the pressure of technical progress, rapid industrialization and urbanization, the development of science and comprehensive expansion, the "rebellion of the masses" and modern war doctrines, Poland was, through no fault of its own, in the shackles of an old-fashioned agrarian economy and serfdom system, struggling at the same time with the mechanism of bondage. Let this break be shown by a symbolic date: when the anti-Russian lost January Uprising broke out and serfdom was abolished in the Kingdom of Poland (1863), the first metro line had already been in operation in London, for we were elsewhere – on the complete periphery of the modern world, staring at our own suffering and rural-idyllic way of existence, like an Asian Buddha statue stares into our own navel. After all, Wyspiański wrote ironically in the already mentioned *Wedding* on the threshold of the 20th century: "Let war all over the world / just a Polish village, / any Polish village calm" (act I, scene 1).

The village, of course, was not peaceful, as for example in Władysław Stanisław Reymont's *The Peasants* (*Chłopi,* 1904–1909). It contained, like a

black worm, a long-standing hatred of "masters", an age-old sense of injustice and enslavement, which could only be released, though not completely, in the war with Bolshevism, or in the era of hasty modernization and urbanization of the country after 1945.

In fact, however, the Romantic doctrine of rusticity was preserved and preserved, often in crippled and rudimentary forms, such as the vision of Norwid, who, "frightened" on the pavement of the London metropolis, longed for "the village of white with satin apple blossoms" (*Village – Wieś* – from the volume *Vade-mecum,* 1866). The modern secular city, its greedy and inhuman crowds, its ghostly and brutal nature, and even the wildness of contemporary capitalism terrified not only the romantics. Łódź from Reymont's *Promised Land* (*Ziemia obiecana,* 1899) is an apocalyptic city, a harlot and a beast that destroys characters and crushes the old country order, transforms people into cynical and greedy monsters. Even in *The Doll* (*Lalka*, 1887–1889) by Bolesław Prus, the main character of the novel, Wokulski, who is, as it were, the messiah of the modern, urban world, does not ascend, but – having first descended into the hell of poverty from Warsaw's Powiśle and the hell of shattered feelings – perhaps ends in suicide. His passion turns out to be in vain, and the novel will ultimately not be an apology for the city, but a great story about suffering and defeat, about passing and death.

Communism, of course, perpetuated – "froze", as it were – such a romantic structure of thought and experience. And both the spirituality of John Paul II or Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, the spirituality of the Polish Church in general before 1989, as well as the first outburst of "solidarity" were its great vent, a romantic carnival of freedom.

However, after 1989, instead of the fulfilment of romantic hopes; instead of romantic messianism, a completely different project appeared to us. And another messianism – the liberal one, with its (which is something naively accepted) cult of civilization progress, practicality and openness to the world, with its doctrine of "equating Europe". It left – we know, we know very well – somehow beyond its reach of various losers and rejected ones, sometimes in fact, and sometimes only in its own opinion. It left angry, full of various resentments and ready for rebellion.

The scenarios were ready. They were stuck at hand and in the deposits of the collective subconscious. And they finally took the form of the "Smolensk religion", which could not do without romantic afterimages. It is no coincidence that Jarosław Kaczyński, stigmatizing the opposition and pointing to its "alien", demonic inspiration, quoted Kornel Ujejski's *Chorale. With the smoke of fire…* (*Chorał. Z dymem pożarów…,* 1847), one line of this stanza, in which it is said that "other devils were active there". "There", that is, in the slaughter of the nobility of Galicia by peasants inspired and paid by Austrian officials.

It is a mad desire for faith sealed in "past forms" – "denominational nationalism", focused on the rite of folk religiosity, peasant enslavement and the desire

for revenge, and finally a romantic cult of death and suffering, the desire for faith trying, however, as the poet says, "to return to existence", is still felt in Poland. And the moral panic in the "hour" of the pandemic will probably not soothe it. At the same time, church scandals of paedophilia and mass, radical and in many of its manifestations provocatively blasphemous revolt of women and the young generation directed in October and November 2020 against extreme attempts to limit abortion caused devastating blows, as did the marriage of the altar with the throne and the Church itself. This contestation has its roots not only in feminist culture, but also in the firm rejection by many Catholics – perhaps even the majority – of the authoritarian, fundamentalist, closed attitude of church hierarchies, mentally rooted in the forms of "traditional faith" described in this text and, to some extent, atavist, and morals. Hierarchies, in fact, are helpless in the face of the secularization rapidly taking place in Poland, and trying to counteract it only by strengthening their ties with state and legal institutions.

VI. Knocked-out Projects of Universality

This does not mean, of course, that within the Polish Church no new and interesting projects of universalism would appear at all, attempting in various ways to break the link between native Catholicism and the substantial understanding of the nation, and to present a different – from the dominant and almost treated as a condition of salvation – understanding of universality.

However, they are treated almost as a heresy or a symptom of disciplinary rebellion, rejected or at least marginalized.

Such marginalization – including the implication of injustice – meets, for example, the concept of the "misericordial" Church – the Church of universal mercy and hope for universal salvation – presupposed by Rev. Wacław Hryniewicz.

> I believe – says Hryniewicz, for example – that God is able to effectively heal what seems incurable to us, and that He can find what seems definitively lost. One must think about these moving matters with great confidence in the wisdom, goodness, and teaching of God. I believe that hope does not disappoint and cannot fail. (Hryniewicz 2005, 274.)

However, Father Hryniewicz does not see a similar trust among the followers of traditional dualistic theology, also attributed to the dominant current of the Polish Church teaching, a theology according to which hell can never be empty, because it would offend freedom and make it absurd and abstract. Which, further, sees the creature in a precipitous and drastic eternal split between beings destined for salvation and creatures destined for damnation; between beings worthy of eternal happiness, and beings worthy of an eternal state of sin and

death (or worse, absolute perdition). Which, finally, rebukes and rejects the idea of *apocatastasis*, renewing – as Origen put it – all things in God, and choking with visions of the apocalypse and judgment, with its radical and spectacular, as in the Gdańsk altar of Hans Memmling, division into good and bad, into deserving of fire and deserving of eternal harp lessons?

Thus, thanks to Hryniewicz, we are now at the centre of the dispute within Christianity. It is a dispute, to put it simply, between "misericordial" Christianity, Christianity pointing to the limitlessness of God's mercy, and Christianity, so to speak, "sacrificial", entangled both in the modes of archaic cults with the figures of "goats" burdened with guilt community and offered to the gods as a gift, as well as in Augustinian mills of grace and top-down, double predestination.

Meanwhile, stresses Hryniewicz, "salvation is not an illusion". It is not a naive myth or a cheap therapy. So, there is hell. But it is not – cannot be – an eternal condition and "a sign of God's freedom and love". For God "in his love respects the freedom of creation, but does not leave it to itself" (Hryniewicz 2005. 255). After all, freedom is not an "idol" against which God is helpless. And yes, no one can be saved against their desires, choices and decisions, and God is not here a mechanism of oppression that forces "everything and everyone" – but also, thanks to His love for creation, from stone to angel, He is able to direct it towards itself, transform and heal our freedom. He is able to get it out of the often terrible entanglements, from the dramas of personal and collective history, from the torment of fate.

And for this reason, it is precisely freedom that does not entail, as dualistic theologians would like, the necessity of an eternal hell, while Gehenna, while completely real and obvious, must be merely a transitional and therapeutic state. Thus, "the hope of salvation is an imperative for everyone", "it is a call to reconciliation" (Hryniewicz 2005. 257), because God's love is so powerful that He is able to reconcile everyone with themselves, including even Satan.

Another important project – successfully repressed by disciplinary measures – was a vision, derived from the spirit of Franciscanism and close to the teaching of Pope Bergoglio, the "poor Church" of our time, an open, lively and humble Church, free from nationalist and anti-Semitic phantasms, represented by Father Wojciech Lemański. However, it turned out to be unbearable for the Polish hierarchical Church, because of the evident criticism of it: "Unfortunately, our nest has been tainted for a long time" (Lemański 2013. 18).

It is far from the sacred spirit of national-Catholic substantialism, so unacceptable. Not yet acceptable by the Church that is too particular and that does not seem to see in it the possibility that "the fashion of this world passeth away".[5]

[5] I am referring to the words of Saint Paul in the First Letter to the Corinthians: "But this I say, brethren, the time is short. It remaineth, that both they that haue wiues, be as though they had none: And they that weepe, as though they wept not: and they that

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reioyce, as though they reioyced not: and they that buy, as though they possessed not: And they that vse this world, as not abusing it: for the fashion of this world passeth away" (1 Corinthians 7, 29–31).

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Working Notes on the Historical Evolution of the Late 1700s Polish Elites*

I. Introduction

This paper proposes a preliminary discussion about the possibilities of studying the reproduction processes of Polish elites during the long historical run, spanning from the late 18th century until the early 20th century. The case under consideration is the Polish political, social and cultural elite over one and a half century, that is to say, from 1788 until 1939. Specifically, this exploration should be understood as an example of developing a line of inquiry on the evolution of the peripheral Eastern European elites experiencing a transformation from the state of feudal social arrangements, which relied mainly on agrarian means of production into modern urban-based social arrangements that drew on merit and individual achievement resources. We explain what data are being used to carry out this analysis and what interpretative parameters seem to be most plausible to accomplish this task.

The preliminary calculations of the available data show that the direct reproduction understood in Marxian terms as reproduction of the elite possessing the agrarian means of production was broken in the period of time under analysis. Namely, the 1930s elites in most instances did not represent the biographical successors of the late 1700s elites, mostly high aristocratic families. The preliminary analysis suggests that the Polish elite in the 1930s clearly belonged to new democratic intelligentsia cohorts, without direct familial relations to previous aristocratic elites, or they were descendants of petty noble families which were forced to adapt to new meritocratic conditions over the span of several generations. The analysed transformation, which paved a way for the intelligentsia's hegemony in 20th century Poland, poses, however, several ambiguities, which will be considered along the discussion of the data in this paper.

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The paper consists of five parts: firstly, we offer a deliberation why studying the reproduction of the elites in Poland, especially in the late 19th century and the early 20th century, has to be confronted with the intelligentsia's epistemological bias. Simultaneously we depict the relevance of the Bourdieu's field of power concept for our study. Secondly, we explain the differences of the intelligentsia and noble "social animal species", with a special emphasis put on the different role of material capital, homogamy and kinship networks for these social formations; thirdly, we discuss the data parameters planned to be used in this research. Fourthly, we present the preliminary calculations and finally, we sum up and present the conclusion.

II. The Intelligentsia's Hegemony and its Epistemological Bias

Since the intelligentsia elite had incorporated selected expressive status features of its noble predecessors, and more importantly, insofar as early intelligentsia cohorts often originated from the noble households, there had not been a clear-cut replacement of the analysed elites (Smoczyński–Zarycki 2017). Moreover, the established intelligentsia cohorts (from the late 19th century onwards) had significantly re-calibrated the Polish field of power by raising the stakes of cultural capital, while reducing the significance of other types of capital, especially material capital resources (Zarycki–Smoczyński–Warczok 2017; Zarycki–Warczok 2014). The latter had traditionally been used in collective identity building processes by both the feudal noble elite and even more importantly, by the bourgeoisie (Getka-Kenig 2009). The recalibration of the field of power was an important strategy that strengthened the intelligentsia in its "class struggle", since the bourgeoisie from the late 19th century onwards had begun to challenge their attempts to assume a leadership position in Polish society (Janowski 2008). Eventually, this competition turned out to be successful for the intelligentsia, due to the Second Republic of Poland's policies favouring the intelligentsia, and because of anti-capitalist class bias of the Communist Poland (1945–1989), (Zarycki 2009). The bourgeoisie has never managed to establish itself as a hegemonic class in Poland (Kochanowicz 2006; Eyal–Szelenyi–Townsley 1998). Bearing in mind these peculiarities, we will discuss how the late 1700s elites managed or failed to reproduce their dominant position over the long historical span.

Once we point to the "field of power" concept, we follow a Bourdieusian terminology, emphasizing that public discourses are negotiated in a public sphere where elites fight for the dominance of their interests, values, idiosyncrasies, etc. (Bourdieu–Wacquant 1993; Bourdieu 2012). This struggle creates an overreaching national interpretative framework of social relations, symbolic hierarchies and prestige (Bourdieu 1998). Conventionally, in the bourgeoisie-dominated

Western European countries, the main stakes are typically set by the elites of economic capital, even though the field of power – as Bourdieu argued – should be understood as relational, that is to say, extended between economic and cultural fields. In the semi-peripheral Central and Eastern Europe from the late 19th century onwards, the leading social positions in the field of power had been built mainly with the usage of cultural capital resources (Gella 1976). Clearly, wars, revolutions, and dispossessions of the private property in the early 20th century Eastern Europe should be perceived as decisive factors in belittling the political role of the bourgeoisie in the Polish field of power (Jasiewicz 1995). However, the intelligentsia's victory in replacing feudal elites (aristocracy) and defeating the bourgeoisie was crucially facilitated by the second Republic of Poland's (1918–1939) policies, which promoted the employment of the members of the intelligentsia in the public sector (administration and education sectors, state run enterprises) (Zarycki–Smoczyński–Warczok 2017). This policy perpetuated their social prestige. The prominence of cultural capital in the Polish field of power was also a general result of the growing bureaucracy in rapidly differentiating modern states in Eastern Europe. This process actually started in the former empires of Tzarist Russia, Prussia and Austria that controlled the Polish territories (Chwalba 1999). Moreover, the bureaucratic staff, especially associated with the institutions of culture, had been constantly reinforcing a self-affirming knowledge on the intelligentsia's leading role in modern Polish society. This included written documents, normative statements, school curricula, etc. All these tendencies created a specific doxa, which strengthened the emergence of inherently biased material archives, used as a point of reference for studying the evolution of elites in 20th-century Poland. This also applies to the present study.

Overall, the above mentioned recalibration of the field of power created a myriad of filters pre-determining the perception of the ranks of modern Polish elites. The self-assigned intelligentsia's position of gatekeepers had proven efficient in building symbolic hierarchies of social prestige in Polish society. In other words, the intelligentsia doxa created the very threshold of visibility of elitist status by installing the criteria of desirable ideals required to be followed in order to become a member of the national elite. Obviously, these ideals emulated specific resources cherished by the cultural capital-oriented intelligentsia individuals, e.g. education, individual achievements and altruistic service for the nation's sake. Some of these features overlapped with the formal feudal elites as subscribing to the exclusivist social etiquette and various informal practices perpetuating some symbolic social inequalities (e.g. demonstrating expressive contempt towards different categories of "non-responsible" citizens along with self-presenting a sense of the intelligentsia's moral superiority) (Chałasiński 1946). However, other crucial elements of the intelligentsia's collective identity were distinct, as mentioned earlier, a less decisive tendency to employ material capital resources for their positioning in the Polish field of power (they were

mostly employed in remunerated jobs), (Walicki 2005). Also, the intelligentsia members did not exercise a similar function of extensive kinship relations or matrimonial homogamy for reproducing their elite status. In fact, the very socialization process of the intelligentsia contributed to the emergence of a specific "social animal species". Namely, its members were mostly born into urban-based nuclear family units, in which socialization was carried out, whereas nobles as individuals representing another social animal species were born and raised in rural-based, extended kinship networks (Smoczyński–Zarycki 2017).

III. The Role of Material Capital and Homogamy for Collective Identities

Historically, the very condition of successful recreation of a noble class in Eastern Europe (mainly representatives of *noblesse d'épée*) was dependent on the possibility of perpetuating the ownership of agrarian means of production, but it holds true also for the urban-based properties owned by representatives of *noblesse de robe* in several Western European countries (Tazbir 2013). Political arrangements which did not harshly tamper with the property rights were less significant in impacting the longevity of the nobility. The noble class either in the pre-modern era or in more invisible way in the modern times had existed under different political regimes, as long as they were able to keep at least some share of their historical properties. Jaap Dronkers and his collaborators, who studied the contemporary nobility in Western Europe extensively demonstrated that along the increasing significance of social and cultural capital in protecting noble identities, the material capital seems to be still an important factor for understanding the social relevance of 20th and 21st century nobility (Dronkers 2003; Korom–Dronkers 2009; Unger–Dronkers 2014). In case of the analysed Polish elite group from the late 18th century to the early 20th century, its members did not need to adapt to an urban-based social environment governed by new social ordering logics (e.g. renumerated employment, nuclear family socialization) only when the material resources were intact over the proceedings of new generations. Consequently, ideologies legitimizing the possession of these resources (e.g. the natural rights of noble class to act as the national elite) or the possibility of reproducing crucial social rituals for preserving group integrity as matrimonial homogamy had remained efficient over passing generations. This was particularly relevant for the aristocratic fraction of the successors of the 1700s elites (they did not make up more than a few hundred families), (Górzyński 2009). Importantly, aristocrats were also less frequently engaged in risky political insurgent activities which could have led to dispossessions and downward mobility, as was often the case with the petty nobility. We have to remember that the Polish nobility during the whole span of the First Republic of

Poland (1569–1795) and during the period of partitions (1795–1918) constituted a fairly heterogeneous group, ranging from rich aristocrats possessing multi-hectare latifundios to the poor, landless nobility (Zajączkowski 1993; Beauvois 2005). This diversity in possession of material wealth and power made the Polish historical nobility, as Andrzej Zajączkowski (1961) argued an example of not single-class group but a multi-class formation. For our line of inquiry, it is important to note that this social diversity inevitably implied a varying degree of political risks which were accepted or not accepted by members of this heterogeneous formation. According to Lech Mażewski (2004), the petty nobility for instance was more often involved in risky insurgency acts against occupying powers (mainly against Tzarist regime since it was Russia which occupied over 80 percent of Polish historical territories). This willingness to accept risks often meant prosecutions and exile, but frequently did not incur the threat of substantial dispossessions, since the poor nobility was often deprived of the significant material resources in the first place (Jedlicki 1968).

The political prosecutions and the general unfavourable climate for the rural-based economy, especially for small-sized land properties, had one crucial effect – the petty nobility started experiencing downward mobility from the mid-19th century onwards – from the ranks of old feudal elites into new class positions (Roszkowski 1991; Rudnicki 1996; Jedlicki 1999). Dispossessed Polish nobles were not only taking on the new social roles as members of the peasantry, the working class and the intelligentsia, but they were also adopting to new social ordering logics (e.g. renumerated jobs, nuclear family units, socialization within dispersed and more identity heterogeneous milieu), which structurally differed from the existential modus operandi of kinship-based nobility. Even though the intelligentsia, as mentioned earlier, was capable of incorporating into its "cultural code of behaviour" several noble expressive rituals. Nonetheless, it lacked the structural elements which have traditionally kept the collective noble identities intact. Firstly, it lacked matrimonial homogamy (Zarycki–Smoczyński 2014). This agency historically implied rational allocation of resources within the noble family units, and secondly, the intelligentsia members lacked socialization within the confines of extended kinship which upheld consistent adaptation of new generations within the noble network. Since these structural elements got gradually decomposed the interruption of the linear reproduction of the old elites had occurred shortly after. The offspring of noble houses began to intermarry with people of non-noble descent, which led to the emergence of the new social animal species – the intelligentsia, but also, a number of former nobility members merged with the peasantry and the working class, where the rapture with the old elites' lifestyle, ideologies, family memories etc. was even more visible. The old material and symbolic barriers guarding the almost "racially" homogenous composition of the old elite family based on maternal and paternal noble pedigree started shrinking particularly from the late 19th century (Sikorska Kulesza 1995;

Sęczys–Górzyński 2000). Conversely, the intelligentsia deprived of a strong social distancing approach represented a much more heterogeneous collective identity; this group included old noble descendants, but also petty bourgeoisie and ethnic minorities (Jedlicki 2008). Paradoxically, the moment of easing barriers of strict homogamy also came to a narrow aristocratic milieu after the Second World War. Once the 1945–1949 confiscations of their rural properties had been implemented by the communist authorities, the social species' structural distinctions of aristocrats began to fall apart as they intermarried with the representatives of other classes, most notably, with the intelligentsia members and former petty nobility (Jakubowska 2012; Epsztein 2010; Smoczyński–Zarycki 2017). Eventually, even though this group has been using certain elements of aristocratic homogamy until today, they are not considered as having a distinct status or class group, but rather as a peculiar subgroup of the intelligentsia.

IV. The Data Parameters

1. Time Span

The Republic of Poland and Lithuania was gradually dismembered in 1772 and 1793, and finally ceased to exist in 1795. It was resurrected around 1920. In September 1939, the area was dismembered between Germany and Russia (Soviet Union) again, which incurred changes so great that we should considered it as its final date. The initial date, 1788 was chosen to catch the whole term of the Great Sejm, which was the last period when the elites of old Polish-Lithuanian Republic could still govern themselves in peaceful circumstances.

2. Geographic Area

The territory of interwar Poland (1922–1938) and the territory of Poland-Lithuania after the First Partition (1772–1793) overlapped only partially. First, there were vast areas in the East, ceded in 1921 to the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Belarus. In the North East, two independent states were formed: Lithuania and Latvia. Conversely, in the South and North-West Poland managed to gain vast areas which were already lost in 1772 to Austria and Prussia (and therefore, in the beginning of the period under analysis did not belong to the Republic).

It would be tempting to reduce the analysed area to some common part, but we must consider that the elites were generally mobile. As we discussed in (Minakowski 2014), in the 19th century, all Polish counts (people entitled to use the title of "count" or equivalent, living worldwide) were connected by closer family ties than peasants living in a single backwoods parish of comparable popula-

tion size. We also discussed (Minakowski–Smoczyński 2019) that 20th century descendants of the 18th century elite are so mixed that differences in their geographical origin are indiscernible. The Polish elites living in areas ceded to the Ukraine and Belarus fled from their homes to Poland due to Bolshevik terror. When independent Lithuanian Republic was proclaimed, the Polonized elites of Lithuania made a coup d'état and torn off the so-called "Middle Lithuania" (the Vilnius area), which was finally merged with Poland in 1922; the remaining state with its capital in Kaunas had Lithuanian-speaking elites of peasant origin.

Ironically, a smaller state of 1920–1938 gained rather than lost as compared to the 1772–1793 state (in terms of descendants of former elites). The areas lost between 1793 and 1918–1922 (to Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and Latvia) had in the 1920s and 1930s their new elites, raised from formerly lower social classes. At the same time, a considerable part of the elites of the Republic II of Poland (1918–1922–1939) had their ancestors in the elites of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria (formed in 1772 in the area annexed by Austria). West Prussia (1772–1793), that is the area taken by Prussia in 1772 was much less inhabited (about 1/5 of population of 1772's Galicia) and even so, not all of it was regained in Versailles Treaty. Its elite were also more prone to be Germanized by the end of 19th century, so its importance for interwar Poland was little.

To compare what is comparable, we should then take the elites of the Second Polish Republic (1922–1939) on one hand, and the combined elites of the 1772–1793 Polish-Lithuanian Republic and the 1772–1795 Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria on the other. We could also try to subtract "Galicians" from the elites of the 2nd Republic of Poland, but this can be difficult to perform due to the great importance of the City of Cracow (during 1815–1846 The *Free* City of Cracow), which acted as a strong link between them (Cracow, the former capital of Poland, belonged to Poland until 1795 but was seized in 1846 by Austria and actually became a part of Austrian Galicia).

3. Eligibility

Who can be considered a member of the elite? This is a tough question if we try to compare societies across the Industrial Revolution. At the end of 18th century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's role in European economics was virtually completely contained in agriculture and forestry (production of grain, timber, potash etc.). Cities were auxiliary and the bourgeoisie was dominated by foreigners and Jews, what kept the cities off general politics. The country elite were generally reduced to land nobility, owners of great estates. Rich people who did not belong to the landed nobility either were not able to pass their social status to their heirs, or, if they managed to do so, were also able to raise themselves to noble status (through nobilitation or marriages).

At the end of the discussed period, we see a completely different picture. Poland in the 1930s was still an agricultural country, but the agricultural business was devastated by the Great War and the Great Depression. Agriculture was no longer a profitable business, so the elites sought means of living by other activities, especially in the public (state-owned) sector: bureaucracy, education and military by capitalizing on their cultural and social capital.

To identify and analyse the elites, we should therefore use a set of diverse criteria with a special focus on factors typical for carriers of cultural and social capital. We can call it "notability", following the general idea of *Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopaedia*.[1] People can be "notable" (that is: deserve own article in encyclopaedias and biographical dictionaries) for various reasons, including their political and economic function in the country's life, so we can also state that in some variant, the elite of a country, at a time, is defined as a set of all "notable" people with their families and friends, living in the country.

4. Continuous (Diachronic) Sources

General notability is reflected in great collections of the biographical data. We can call three main sources which should be discussed first.

The most important source of biographical data on the Polish (including Polish-Lithuanian) elites is *Polski Słownik Biograficzny (Polish Biographical Dictionary)* published since 1935 in Cracow by the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN and PAU). So far, there are about 28,000 articles, written mostly by professional (usually prominent) historians, included in over 50 volumes in alphabetic order covering surnames beginning with A–T. The *Dictionary* can be considered as a gold standard of notability in the Polish elites as considered by professional historians.

The most popular source is of course the aforementioned Wikipedia, especially its Polish edition. Wikipedia can be considered as the reflection of notability in popular culture. The Polish edition of Wikipedia in the middle of 2020 included at least 360,000 biographical articles. Of course, most of them are about people who are contemporary or who cannot be considered 'Polish', but nevertheless, there is enough data which are suitable for our purpose.

Another source is a collection of newspaper obituaries. The collection of over 18,000 obituaries from *Kurjer Warszawski* published in 1821–1861, collected by A. Tyszka has been already discussed in (Minakowski 2017). The project of collecting about 460,000 obituaries from major Polish-language newspapers

[1] "On Wikipedia, notability is a test used by editors to decide whether a given topic warrants its own article", see: URL < https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Notability >; last access on 20th November, 2020.

published before September 1939 is underway. The obituaries are important, because they reflect the perceived prominence of family in the moment of death of a given person.

Combining the three sources and focusing on death dates, we can analyse the composition of the elite in the time discussed year by year, within the three perspectives: current professional historians, current general public and newspaper editors and their audience in past periods.

5. Synchronic Sources (Snapshots)

Subsequently, we will discuss snapshots or "family portraits" of the elite at certain periods. Such sources enable us to produce statistical and demographic data and calculations. For instance, let us consider the complete list of members of parliament elected in 1830. We can agree that maybe the election process was not just and representative; maybe a considerable part of MPs were mean people who deserved to be forgotten by history. Nevertheless, for our sake, it is important that their names are certain, the list is sealed and the calculations based on this list are reliable.

Below, we discuss several lists of important people in specific periods of time which have been already checked and are ready for meticulous analysis.

(1) The political elites of 1788–1794 (930 distinct people)

(1.1) 357 members of the Great Sejm (lower chamber, the House of Representatives)

In 1788 and 1790, general elections to lower chamber of Parliament were conducted. Each time, each constituency designated a few (at least two) envoys (members of Parliament). The votes were personal (voters elected names, not parties). Therefore, the list is a sum of regional elites from across the country, roughly equally represented.

(1.2) 220 senators sitting since 1788 until 1795

Senators formed the political elite of the whole country. They were nominated by the king and despite being officially governors of provinces (palatines or voivodes) and main royal castles (castellans); the composition of Senate reflected the balance of power in the countrywide elite.

(1.3) 474 members and officers of Confederation of Targowica (1792)

and

(1.4) 181 members of Zgromadzenie Przyjaciół Konstytucji (1791)

We can call the two organizations the two main political parties of the country. We know that full lists of members of both organizations and their members can be identified. We can therefore assume that even if some members of the political elite were not present in Parliament 1788–1792, they must have enrolled in one of these parties. Therefore, the number 930 seems to be fairly complete.

(2) The political elites of the early Kingdom of Poland (1545 distinct people)

The Kingdom of Poland, formed in 1815 in the Congress of Vienna (therefore called "the Congress Kingdom") in Central Poland, from the area that was in hands of Austria and Prussia since 1795, later (since 1806–1809) conquered by Napoleon and forming the Duchy of Warsaw, then (since 1813) occupied by Russia. Before 1831 (the fell of November Uprising), the Kingdom of Poland had a Polish administration, its own Parliament and a French civil code. The army was also all-Polish, formed in large extent from Napoleonic officers.

(2.1) 564 officials of the Kingdom of Poland 1819–1830

The list of acting officials of the Kingdom was annually published in the *Nowy kalendarzyk polityczny*. For the years 1819–1830, there are 1503 people indicated. Out of those, 564 have been so far successfully identified.

(2.2) 174 members of 1830–1831 Parliament

In 1830, the Parliament (Sejm Królestwa Polskiego) was elected and the list is known. There are 174 representatives in two groups (*posłowie* and *deputowani*) together with the senate appointed by the King (the Russian Czar).

(2.3) 361 senior officers of the Army of the Kingdom of Poland

The whole list of officers of the Army have been published and we were able to identify the major staff (majors, colonels, generals).

(2.4) 676 senior officers of November Uprising

During the November Uprising (1830–1831), the army of the Kingdom of Poland fought against Russia. The headcount of the army was multiplied compared to the peaceful years before, as was the major staffs. Unfortunately, we cannot identify all of them, because it was wartime and the archives are not complete. Robert Bielecki published the lists of officers in his three-volume *Dictionary of the Offic-*

ers of November Uprising, but he covered only surnames beginning with A–R (the last volume was never written as the author died). We were able to identify 676 major officers (majors, colonels, generals) out of 1163 contained there.

(3) The political elites of the Kingdom of Poland 1855–1863 (4845 distinct people)

One generation after the fall of the November Uprising, after death of Czar Nicholas I (1855) and the Russian defeat in the Crimea War (1856), there were several years when the Kingdom of Poland was relatively liberal and self-governed again. As before, the period ended with an uprising (January Uprising, 1863–1864).

(3.1) 2227 officials of the Kingdom of Poland

Between 1850 and 1866, the acting officials of the administration of the Kingdom of Poland were listed in *Rocznik Urzędowy Królestwa Polskiego*. Out of 5722 people listed there, we were able to identify 2227 people so far.

(3.2) 2765 members of the Agricultural Society

Formally, the Agricultural Society in the Kingdom of Poland (Towarzystwo Rolnicze w Królestwie Polskim) formed in 1857 and dissolved in 1861 was an organization of farmers. But, being the only legal non-governmental organization, it served as an unofficial political party with central administration and local (county) chapters. Most of its members belonged to rich landed nobility and were owners (or managers) of great estates. The complete list of members (with their postal address) was published in 1861 and we are able to identify 2765 of them.

The list of the members of the Agricultural Society is actually the last known "family picture" of the old noble elites of Poland (many families lost their estates subsequently or were forced to emigrate after the January Uprising).

(4) The "Positivist generation" (born 1831–1860)

(4.1) The "Positivist generation" in *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*

For the period between late 1860s and the World War, we could not find any good group suitable for analysis. Instead, we analyzed all people described in the *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, born between 1831 and 1860. On average, they died around 1910, long before the edition of the *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* were started (1935). There are, so far, 3434 people matching this criterion.

(5) The political elite of the 2nd Polish Republic (6511 distinct people)

As a result of the fall of the January Uprising, the Kingdom of Poland was incorporated into the Russian Empire and lost its autonomy. It is hard to find any representative lists of the Polish elites of the next generation. Only two generations later, as the result of the end of World War in 1918, the Polish state resurrected and by 1922 received its final shape. We should therefore skip this period (which can be supplemented by the continuous sources mentioned earlier) and explore the elite of the 2nd Polish Republic (1918–1939).

(5.1) 2050 Members of Parliament 1919–1939

The two-chamber Polish Parliament (Sejm and Senate) was first called in 1918, and the last election was performed in 1938. 2050 people had acted as members of the Parliament over this time. The parliamentary system was representative and open for both sexes and all social classes. We know much about the politicians and we can trace how many of them had ancestors in upper classes.

(5.2) 4862 articles in Łoza's *Who is who*

In 1938, shortly before the fall of Poland, Stanisław Łoza published his *Who is who*-like biographical dictionary of contemporary people (title: *Czy wiesz, kto to jest?*). There are 4862 people recorded therein, usually with birth dates and places of birth and –importantly – with their parents' and spouses' names. We could therefore identify the people and we are able to identify the whole class of social celebrities.

V. Hypothesis (Educated Guess)

According to our hypothesis, supported by many years of research in the field, the main trend in the move of social elites was the following.

"The haves" had much to lose. The owners of great estates, who formed the pre-partition elite clung to their estates and tried to continue their country life. The economic trends were ruthless, however: farming in Poland was still less and less profitable.

The industry and financial operations could bring great profits but were very dangerous. Therefore, they were dominated by immigrants from Western Europe and Jews expelled by Russians from the Eastern parts of the former Polish-Lithuanian state who had nothing to lose or received support outside of Polish society.

There was, however, an important group of "noble have-nots", that is people from poor nobility who had no land estate (nothing to lose) but had enough cul-

tural capital that enabled entrance to bureaucracy and creative jobs. This group had similar surnames and – to the naked eye – were indiscernible from the old elites, so one could easily replace them in the eyes of lower social classes.

We can try to check whether and to what extent our hypothesis is backed by the numbers.

VI. Results

"The old elite" has been defined as a sum of the (1.1), (1.2), (1.3) and (1.4) above (both houses of the Great Sejm and members of Targowica Confederation and Zgromadzenie Przyjaciół Konstytucji – which altogether came to 930 distinct men. The group has been extended by adding their brothers and sisters, which makes 3185 people.

"The descendants of the old elite" are children, grandchildren, great grandchildren etc. of the aforementioned 3185 people. All of them (to the 21st century) currently make 78,301 men and women.

Next, we checked how many people of the abovementioned groups belong to "the descendants of the old elite", defined above. Here are the results:

	Group	*number*	*old elite*	*%*
	The Kingdom of Poland, 1815–1831			
(2.1)	Officials of the Kingdom of Poland 1819–1830 – Identified	564	44	8%
(2.1)	Officials of the Kingdom of Poland 1819–1830 – all	1503	44	3%
(2.2)	Members of 1830–1831 Parliament	174	77	44%
(2.3)	Senior officers of the Army of the Kingdom of Poland	361	53	15%
(2.4)	Senior officers of November Uprising	676	94	14%
	The Kingdom of Poland, 1850–1866			
(3.1)	Officials of the Kingdom of Poland 1850–1866 – Identified	2227	144	6%
(3.1)	Officials of the Kingdom of Poland 1850–1866 – all	5722	144	3%
(3.2)	Members of the Agricultural Society – identified	2765	717	26%
(3.2)	Members of the Agricultural Society – all	4054	717	18%
	Positivist Generation			
(4.1)	People of Polish Biogr. Dict. born 1831–1860	3434	349	10%
	Republic of Poland, 1918–1939			
(5.1)	Parliament 1919–1939	2050	143	7%
(5.2)	Łoza's *Who is who* 1938	4862	338	7%

The descendants of the old elite were never fully homogenous. Therefore, after many generations, the share of this group should be still larger within society (for instance, it is enough to have only one of 32 great-great-great-great-grandfathers in the old elite to be counted as a descendant). But the observed share was still shrinking. In the 1930s, only one of fourteen celebrities or politicians had at least one ancestor in the pre-partition political elite.

This does not mean that the group listed as the officials of the Kingdom of Poland, that is an early intelligentsia or bureaucracy, had ever been able to create any hereditary elite. It is too early to claim anything like this. What is even more important, a preliminary insight within the genealogies of an early intelligentsia suggests that the dynamic of the group was different: some of them were absorbed by families of the old elite and the other were not able to pass the status to their grandchildren. But this issue still awaits thorough analysis.

VII. Conclusion

These preliminary remarks shed some light on the processes of how a new social species is born. Using an example from the transformation of 1700s aristocratic elites over the long historical span, we have suggested that it is done mainly through either relaxing reproduction barriers of a given social formation or protecting them.

From this point of view, an aristocratic milieu for most of the 19th century did not seek to establish kin relationship with the intelligentsia or petty nobility (Schirmer 2012), mainly because the latter did not possess the required resources which would have facilitated the adaptation of aristocrats to population niches governed by new social logics where the allocation of resources was not consistent with the aristocratic milieu. Barriers had been thus intact, as easing them would have led to the deterioration of chances to manage a successful reproduction of its population niche. The evolutionary stimuli had been evoked as always by the rapid changes affecting a general population context, that is to say, by the social revolutions and modernization of the means of production that accelerated in the early 20th century. It was especially the growing inefficiency of agriculture-oriented economy that delivered a blow to the infrastructure of aristocratic social formation.

Until the early 20th century, the aristocracy had not been challenged by the need of adaptation to new social niches, and these families did not need to rearrange their structural social logic (e.g., homogamy, kinship network agency). In other words, the speciation of social collective identities always requires a certain isolation of group A (e.g. wealthy aristocrats) from group B (e.g. the intelligentsia or petty nobility), which differentiates their population niches (selection of partners, logic of adaptations, lifestyle preferences) to such an extent

that matrimonial exchanges between group A and B are impossible. This is the moment where the reproduction barrier is cemented and speciation takes place.

The fusions of species or reverse speciation are always caused by the changes of habitat (e.g. economic change, the advent of social species better adapted to the habitat, which are in the position of imposing new dominant social logics). Within the new social context, the intelligentsia acted as a species with better adaptation capabilities. Its market flexibility, capability of running "low transaction costs of everyday life" (less demanding nuclear family, little housing, and service needs) made this group more versatile in the modern market economy society. It still kept several expressive social rituals inherited from its noble predecessor (an aspiration to political leadership and self-perceived moral superiority), however, overall, its shift from the "heavy" material capital to "light" cultural capital came out as more efficient in struggling for the social hegemony and its further chances of swift social adaptability. It does not come as a surprise that the aristocracy eventually had to assume the position of the intelligentsia's sub-group. It was probably the only chance to retain at least some of its several expressive, symbolic identity elements.

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Cultural Evolution Perspectives on Elites – Illustrated with Modern Polish Examples*

I. Introduction

The main purpose of this paper is to discuss whether and how the evolution of elites can be analysed in a framework of cultural evolution – the modern evolutionary approach, in which cultural and social change is studied using theoretical and empirical methods borrowed from evolutionary biology. The phenomenon of an elite existence is undoubtedly very important from the perspective of human evolution, as well as from a shorter-term (historical) and regional viewpoint. Cultural evolutionary researchers prefer the former scale of analysis, because it helps to build a grand unified theory of evolution. However, to understand the historical social change and modern processes, it is necessary to develop a theory of phenomena happening on a shorter timescale, or fitting to the so-called "middle-range theory" (Merton 1968). From this point of view, I would like to focus on elites understood as a mesosociological concept – a topic which is still undertheorized in cultural evolution.

In this paper, I focus on examples from the modern history of Polish elites. The motivation for this is the observation that there are many similarities between evolutionary explanations and the style of thinking of the researchers of how the Polish (or even Central European) elites took shape. The best example could be how Eyal–Szelényi–Townsley (1998) adapted Bourdieu's theory of elites to an analysis of Hungarian transformation from Communism to capitalism. The original theory, according to them, is a theory of reproduction rather than social change and should be modified to catch the dynamics of Central European social trajectory. Also, the popularity of Bourdieu's perspective (see Zarycki 2007) might not be accidental – this theory contains some elements not far away from commonly understood "Darwinism" (Bennett 2005) (through the metaphors of struggle, survival, and accumulation). The Polish (or wider: Central European) case is also interesting for another reason: this part of Europe has experienced a relatively high level of political instability and drastic systemic

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changes, which influences the rate of social evolution. This factor makes Central Europe a valuable case for comparisons with other (more peaceful or even more unstable) regions.

The structure of the article is as follows: firstly, I present the general sketch of cultural evolutionary approaches, focusing on these currents, which should be, in my opinion, exceptionally useful in studies of the elites. Secondly, I illustrate the opportunities and limitations of the cultural evolution approach to the elites with some examples taken from modern Polish history. It is also an occasion to point out the theoretical gaps in cultural evolution which should be developed to study this issue better, as well as the chance for an alternative interpretation of known patterns in the history of Polish elites.

II. Cultural Evolution – the Modern Approach

Cultural evolution theory is based on the adaptation of models and empirical tools from the biological sciences to cultural (or even social) research. Considering that this is not the first nor the only attempt to present cultural and social phenomena in an evolutionary perspective, it is worth emphasizing that this paper refers to the approach inaugurated (among others) by the works of Luigi Cavalli-Sforza and Marcus Feldman on gene-culture coevolution, and Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd on dual inheritance theory. This perspective is distinguished from previous theories in several ways. First of all, it directly refers to the mechanisms of Darwinian evolution and biological sciences. Secondly, representatives of modern cultural evolution refer to similar ontological assumptions: for them, culture is socially transmitted information, passed from person to person. An oft-emphasized rule of this approach is *population thinking* – that is, in terms of population of cultural traits. Third, social and cultural phenomena are treated from the perspective of hypotheses and questions about universal properties of humans and societies (e.g. the cumulative nature of human culture, the ability to cooperate with non-kin, cognitive biases) – see Driscoll 2018. It does not mean that this trend is homogeneous – for example, one of the divisions noted is based on the difference in research goals: is it the role of culture in human adaptation to the environment, or is it the shape that culture takes (Scott-Phillips et al. 2018)? Fourthly, an important role in this trend is played by mathematical models and statistical hypothesis testing and the use of computer simulations (and indirectly, by referring to the theory of complex systems).

One may ask: what phenomena are of interest to cultural evolution? Different representatives of the schools define the sufficient criteria of the evolutionary process in various ways. According to the broadest of them, the basic thing is "population thinking" – i.e. in terms of populations of relatively independent units, different from each other, where the frequency of unit types varies over

time (Claidière–Scott-Phillips–Sperber 2014). According to the most restrictive criterion, the evolutionary approach assumes the most faithful replication of entities selected for their properties (e.g. memes). On the other hand, Mesoudi (2011) believes that Darwinian evolution can be talked about under three conditions: individuals differ from each other, they compete with each other because of their characteristics, and new individuals more or less faithfully inherit traits from the old ones. Because I am interested in a specific problem – the evolution of elites – I will mention only the approaches I see as potentially relevant for this issue.

The "populational" approach – stopping at the point of "population thinking" – is sometimes referred to as "cultural epidemiology" (which started from Sperber's "epidemiology of representations" – Sperber) or "cultural attraction theory" (Scott-Phillips et al. 2018). It assumes that culture can be treated as a chain of cultural representations (mental – such as beliefs, knowledge, intentions, and public – such as speech, artefacts, behaviour) that are transmitted from person to person, modified during transmission, but (under some conditions) preserving some degree of similarity. The main challenge of this theory is to explain the similarity (or the stability of cultural representations), despite the fact that cultural transmission is very often inaccurate, or even intentionally changed. The main answer of "cultural epidemiology" is the assumption of the existence of "transmission biases" – that is, as a result of non-random transformations, a stable distribution of types of cultural representations emerges after many acts of transmission. The stable and frequent version of cultural representation is called the "cultural attractor". Biases during transmission are called "forces of attraction", and the causes of these biases are "factors of attraction" (Scott-Phillips et al. 2018). The factors of attraction can be psychological (cognitive) and/or ecological (e.g. climatic or technological conditions of transmission) – however, one may notice that this branch of cultural evolution is mostly concerned with the former.

The more restricted approach, which could be called "selectionist", is also more popular. It focuses on the issue of how a given cultural trait helps to win the competition between others and helps to be better adapted to the environment. In this approach, cultural traits are treated as ready variants from which some are selected for survival and some are selected for extinction (not gradually transformed or adapted, as in the cultural epidemiology perspective). However, there are opinions that the distinction between cultural attraction and selection is not correct, because selection itself can be treated as a form of attraction (Claidière–Scott-Phillips–Sperber 2014), or that there is a continuum of processes, where cultural attraction and strict selection are two extremes (Acerbi–Mesoudi 2015). On the other hand, "selectionist" works are not so much concerned with cognitive factors of selective pressure.

Research in cultural evolution focuses on abstract and universal explanations. At the same time, population thinking shifts the theoretical emphasis of bottom-

up processes – i.e. how phenomena at the level of individuals result in phenomena at the level of the whole system. Therefore, one may wonder to what extent this approach is conducive to wider use in the area in macrosociological study. An example of such a wicket linking cultural evolution to large-scale social phenomena is the problem of "ultrasociality" – that is, explaining the extensive cooperation between people despite their very distant relationships (Campbell 1983): why people cooperate with each other despite the lack of direct individual benefit from such cooperation. According to some "cultural evolutionists", the key to explaining this phenomenon is the mechanism of multilevel cultural selection, which occurs when there is benefit obtained from better functioning of the cooperating group. In this model, the increase in altruism results from the excess of the intergroup selection effect over intragroup selection (Boyd–Richerson 1985). Selection between individuals depends primarily on the variation of these individuals, and therefore the evolution of cooperation can be explained primarily by high intergroup variation and small intra-group variation in terms of propensity to altruism (Bowles 2006; Turchin 2010). It is pointed out that the phenomenon of intergroup selection may be much more important in the case of cultural evolution than genetic evolution – especially concerning the "conformist message" (i.e. the one in which people are inclined to acquire the most popular cultural trait) – even when the population is high, and the level of "extinction" of less well-adapted groups is low (Boyd–Richerson 1985). However, the concept of multilevel selection is controversial among supporters of the Darwinian theory of evolution, where it is most often assumed that a selection mechanism acting on individuals (not groups of individuals) is sufficient to explain evolutionary processes.

Even wider possibilities of linking the theory of cultural evolution with macrosociology are provided by the use of models and tools derived from population ecology. The models of Peter Turchin (2003) can be an example of this approach, and particularly, his development of structural-demographic theory, which aims to explain the phenomena of political instability. This theory, originally formulated by Jack Goldstone (1991) completely outside the context of cultural evolution, is the result of comparative studies of revolutions and rebellions (both in time and in geographic space). Turchin extended it (2003) with models derived from population ecology, which makes it possible to describe it using a mathematical and testable model, which can (at least potentially) give predictive possibilities (Turchin–Korotayev 2020). It assumes a dynamic relationship between four components: a state, a population, an elite and general socio-political instability. It is worth noting that the relationship between the structural-demographic theory and cultural evolution is ambiguous. Peter Richerson, in his review of Turchin's book *Age of Discord* (Richerson 2017), describes it as anchored in the perspective of dynamic complex systems. However, it is not directly derived from the theory of Darwinian evolution (although

there is also concepts closely linking cultural evolution with treating culture as a complex system – Buskell–Enquist–Jansson 2019). What builds the distance between models that come simply from "population thinking" and more ecological models describing "system dynamics", is that the latter refers to ready-evolved components (institutions, social groups), (see Turchin 2014). There is also the omitted problem of choosing to couple cultural transmission an information flow, with the flow, processing, and consumption of resources. This coupling is often relevant for the class of issues falling between strictly cultural and ecological-populational levels. One of the potential possibilities of combining both perspectives is the evolutionary analysis of the individual components of the system. In this text, I would like to focus on one of them – on the elite. This component is extremely important in cultural evolution, considering whether the interactions of elites are characterized by cooperation or by conflict, either the ability of the elites to cooperate or their high level of conflict. The elites also determine the magnitude of the economic burden on the population and are more influential in the expansion of new cultural patterns than the rest of society. The issue of elites also has a certain potential to be one of the bridges between research in the study of cultural evolution and some branches of traditional sociology. In this paper, I focus on the short-term and local perspective (from an evolutionary point of view) – of the elites in states shaped after World War I, especially in the Polish (or Central European) context, though I hope some questions raised here could be elevated to relevance also when thinking on a wider scale.

III. The Cultural Evolution of Elites

According to "populational thinking," we should think about elites as a population. Each elite is a population, and together they constitute a population of elites. Among the elites, we could distinguish factions of elites – which are populations too. As members of elites could be categorized into various types and the prevalence of factions changes with time (and depends on the prevalence of factions in previous periods), we could use the widest approach to cultural evolution – the epidemiological approach.

1. The Epidemiology of Elites

Various cultural traits (and even material objects) can be inserted under the "cultural representation" heading, however, the examples provided by representatives of the "theory of cultural attraction" are usually limited to fairly simple traits (e.g. portrait painting style, attitude to genetically modified food, knowledge about the building of canoes) – which seems to be a broader prob-

lem of the whole branch of cultural evolution (Buskell–Enquist–Jansson 2019). What perhaps would be more interesting in the context of the elites is to convey more complex traits related to the perception of one's place in social hierarchy, the manner of fulfilling roles related to it and a whole package of preferences and routines that distinguish members of the elite from ordinary people. Such a complex trait can be identified with the Bourdieu *habitus* – that is, the entirety of skills, habits, and dispositions for social action (Bourdieu–Nice 1977). Taking into account the acquisition of *habitus* through imitation (and therefore social learning), it would be possible to talk about the "epidemiology of habitus" passed from person to person and at the same time adapted during the life of individuals to the specific requirements of the environment (i.e. under the influence of the "forces of attraction"). The problem with describing the elites in such categories is maybe not so much in theory as in empirical practice – how to operationalize the *habitus*? It is worth noting that some attempts to link Bourdieu's *habitus* with cultural evolution and its operationalization are already being made (Turchin et al. 2018).

One possible way to use such a perspective is to track the diffusion chain of a given cultural trait (or set of traits). It requires adequate data – e.g. prosopographical, network, genealogical. Especially, it could be interesting to see which traits are inherited within-family or within other groups where elite members are socialized (e.g. schools or specific organizations). For example, the remnants of Polish aristocracy are socialized in family networks. As Smoczyński and Zarycki (2017) show, there is a dependence between the local density of family networks and the preservation of noble traditions. It corresponds with Morin's conditions of stable traditions (repetition, redundancy of transmission, and proliferation) which can substitute inefficiency and inaccuracy of cultural transmission (Morin 2016). It has empirical consequences – as it is less important to track every transmission, but rather to localize and survey the places where preservation of traditions is high and can proliferate them further.

Another way is to focus on cultural attractors – i.e. stable types of cultural representation which emerge as a result of transmission biases. Some illustration of such attractors could be the idea of a division between lords *(panowie)* and boors *(chamy)* which was originated among Polish gentry and was adapted to modern status wars (especially between the intelligentsia and elite aspirants, who are not enough equipped with cultural capital), (Zarycki–Smoczyński–Warczok 2017). This is an old representation (from the times of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth), and despite the transformations, it is still actively used. More generally, all modern Polish intelligentsia's characteristics borrowed from 18th- and 19th-century gentry (Gella 1971) can be analysed as a long chain of transmissions of specific cultural traits with "forces of attraction" making the former aristocratic features more stable than the features of newcomers, who joined the intelligentsia stratum later and without gentry origin.

2. Elite Selection

The extent to which the evolution of the elite can be discussed in a narrower (selective) perspective is questionable. However, it seems that some processes could be interpreted in a selective way: during elite conflicts, some of their members – or groups of members – are sometimes eliminated in an almost physical way. Genocides and purges but extinct aristocratic lineages without descendants could also be mentioned. In less drastic forms, the selection can have a form of destruction of the capitals responsible for the high status of their possessors. A good example could be the emergence of newly-independent states in Central Europe after World War I: new state borders cut the existing social and economic ties, which weakened the groups maintaining the status of which these bonds were crucial for. In the case of Poland, this meant a significant weakening of the landed gentry and bourgeoisie, having estates on the Eastern frontiers, not incorporated into the new, independent state (Zarycki–Smoczyński–Warczok 2017), and strengthened others, especially elites based on cultural capital – i.e. the intelligentsia. The difference between selection and a more "epidemiological" approach results from the question of how adaptive the elites (of factions of elites) are – to what degree they are able to keep their high-status thanks to their elastic behaviour and in what degree their situation is externally determined and their possibility to adaptation is limited. It is worth highlighting how this distinction (selection versus attraction), which is treated by some cultural evolutionary theoreticians as an important theoretical or empirical challenge (Claidière–Scott-Phillips–Sperber 2014; Acerbi–Mesoudi 2015), has a counterpart in the question posed by researchers of elite transformation after the fall of the Iron Curtain, to what degree the elites are able to adapt their portfolios of capitals to the new requirements of the post-transformation situation (Eyal–Szelényi–Townsley 1998).

Changes in the number of political units in Central Europe due to military actions and threats (or lack thereof), and the losses and regains of autonomy by political units, indicates that the role of selective pressure of inter-elite conflicts could be exceptionally important in the context of the region (and in Poland). The dynamics of the number of (at least formally) independent political units is a property that clearly distinguishes it from Western Europe. In Central Europe, the number of states not only fluctuated more (especially during the periods of World Wars) but also showed a trend to proliferate – in contrast to the neighbouring German and Italian states, whose number dropped drastically in the second half of the 19th century as a result of unification processes. Assuming that an independent state is an expression of the autonomy of the elite (it gives the possibility of exercising power and limits dependence on others, which can be called a "field of power" under Bourdieu (Bourdieu–Wacquant 1993), it could be said that the general tendency among Central European countries is to increase the number of fields of power.

As I mentioned in the previous section, strong intergroup selection can influence the degree of cooperation inside the group, which is described in the model of multilevel selection. How it works in the Central European context is an empirical issue. The very apparent trend is the emergence of new political units – and it was accompanied by a tendency towards their increasing ethnic homogeneity. This process began during World War I and was also visible after the collapse of the Iron Curtain (the collapse of the USSR, the division of Czechoslovakia, the reunification of West Germany and the GDR, and the collapse of Yugoslavia). A transitional, contradictory process took place in the World War II period (and just after dividing the countries up into Western and Communist blocs), but also here it we can notice that despite the absorption of many countries by the USSR, the number of (at least formally) independent political units did not change much, and the borders of existing countries often became ethnic borders (due to the extermination of minorities, border shifts or the resettlement of people) – see Kosinski (1969).

The tendency to extract ethnically homogeneous countries can be interpreted as an effect of increased intergroup selection for the skill of restoring the autonomy of the field of power and then maintaining it, which is facilitated by minimizing internal cultural variation – i.e. minimizing ethnic variation in the state. This pattern fits the multilevel selection explanation. On the other side – while this process may seem obvious, it is worth noting that multilevel selection also explains the formation of complex political organisms (e.g. empires) (Turchin–Nefedov 2009). The increase in intergroup conflicts may lead to the formation of coalitions by groups, instead of division into smaller, but more homogeneous groups. However, the counterparts of such "coalitions" in Central Europe (various federal concepts such as that of *Intermarium*, popular among some of the Polish elites) were rather unsuccessful. Also, counterintuitively: if the explanation of emergence of national states as the function of external, interstate conflicts is true, then this weakens the explanations of Central European nationalisms based mostly on internal processes (urbanization, an active strategy of intellectuals and intelligentsia, new communication tools and accessibility, or simply ideological preferences).

Another interesting consequence of inter-state conflicts is their potential selective pressure on factions of elites. Some studies indicate that, at least concerning Poland and Hungary, there is a strong trend towards the formation of elite based on cultural capital (Eyal–Szelényi–Townsley 1998; Zarycki–Warczok 2014) and relatively subordinated role of economic elites. It is worth noting that the suggested explanation in the literature for this phenomenon refers directly to the mechanisms of evolution: loss of economic resources as a result of inter-elite conflicts (national uprisings, wars, and the resulting border changes and expropriations), more effective "reproduction" of intelligentsia through the school system and family networks in comparison to inheritance titles (as in the

case of the aristocracy), which could be unrecognized by occupying administration (in 19th century many Polish families lost their official noble status as a result of Russian law), or the inheritance of economic capital (which could be expropriated or bought out by stronger economic powers). Therefore, a mechanism of "survival" of the part of the elite that has the greatest ability to "reproduce" is proposed, which sounds like Darwinian selective evolution at a very general level.

The Darwinian interpretation of cultural capital-dominated elites allows the consideration of under what conditions this kind of capital could lose its reproductive advantage. If this is mainly the result of systemic changes (wars, expropriations), then a longer period of stability could reshuffle the elite hierarchy, according to new possibilities of capital reproduction. Basing on the Western pattern of strong domination of economic capital, one might predict the increasing advantage of business elites in Central Europe, though analogous predictions from the times of Communism-to-capitalism transformation were not fulfilled in the case of Poland and Hungary (Eyal–Szelényi–Townsley 1998). On the other hand, evolutionary success is strictly linked to reproductive success. It is worth noting that among the increasing number of educated people in Poland during period 1918–1939 and after 1989, the most significant part of them were employed in state sectors (Podolska-Meducka 2018). During the period of 1945–1989, the Communist authoritarian regime inevitably strengthened its political capital. Moreover, most Central European states had some period of an authoritarian regime before 1939, and Poland was no exception. It could be argued that in Central Europe, between political crises (resulting from external interstate competition), the role of political elites increases and access to political capital gives an apparent advantage in elite reproduction. This advantage is lost during systemic change but the pattern of conversion of cultural capital into a political one could be recurrent during the longer periods of peace. Whether this is so or it is only accidental is an open question.

Finally, it could be added that the model of multilevel selection can be used not only to explain higher levels of cooperation linked to inter-elite conflicts but also lower levels – selection within the elites. It could be assumed that higher intra-elite competition (and stronger selection for elite factions) should lead to minimizing the variability of factions. How this process could materialize is an empirical question, but a potential symptom could be ideological polarization, the tightening of criteria of recruitment of new elite members, or the intensity of stratum solidarity. In the discussion of the state of Polish intelligentsia in the 1960s, Gella (1971) noticed that before World War II, the group was divided into intellectuals, professional intelligentsia, and technical intelligentsia with white-collar workers. Despite this variety, the stratum professed ideological egalitarianism. After World War II, the intelligentsia became disintegrated and one of the signs of this process was a strong division into two separate groups: old intel-

ligentsia and working intelligentsia. From a multilevel selection perspective, the pre-war egalitarianism of that stratum can be explained as a sign of strong intra-elite fights between intellectual elites and the rest of the high-status possessors. The post-war emergence of old intelligentsia would be a sign of strong intra-intelligentsia competition as well as a sign of weaker competition between cultural and other types of elites.

3. Ecological Approach

By the term "ecological approach", I understand a focus on dynamics of a population of elites – i.e. its growth, its decline, and its divisions. One of the basic mechanisms is the emergence of intra-elite conflicts as a result of an excessive population of elites (so-called "overproduction of elites"). In Turchin's interpretation of the structural-demographic theory (Turchin 2016), this process results from the Malthusian dynamics, which consists of the increasing level of consumption of the elites (the effect of the elite getting accustomed to increasing consumption and the increase in the minimum level of consumption needed to maintain the elite status), the rise of the number of elite aspirants to elite positions due to social mobility, and the existence of an upper limit to the economic value created by commoners that can be captured by the elite, as well as a limited number of elite positions (e.g. positions in political institutions). As a result, a member of the elite has fewer resources and positions, with higher and higher aspirations – which leads to very a intense competition within the elite and ultimately to political instability.

In the history of the last hundred years of Poland, there have been moments of an apparently very strong intra-elite conflict – such as the moment of the creation of the Second Polish Republic (which can be symbolized by the murder of President Narutowicz), protests in March of 1968 (which can be associated with the "overproduction" of university graduates – Warczok 2019; Zarycki 2020), as well as the present political conflict in Poland (since 2005). An important research task would be to check to what extent the overproduction of elites in Poland and the related periods of political instability fit into the structural-demographic theory. The original model was applied to agrarian societies, and it has since been adapted to modern societies – especially the US and Western Europe. As I indicated above, in the case of Central Europe, the dynamics of intra-elite conflicts overlap with inter-elite conflicts (between states, political blocs, political and economic powers) – to some extent at least exogenic in nature, which may disrupt domestic cycles of the overproduction of the elite. For example, the fall of Communist regimes was mostly peaceful (Round Tables in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany versus Romania), which is sometimes explained by the democratic tradition or prudence of leaders (of opposition and

communist side). But maybe it is only the result of the temporarily relatively low intensity of inter-elite infighting during this period and shifting the same process in time to when the elites were more overproduced would give a more violent outcome. However, whether this is the case, whether the cycles of elite overproduction are immune to such shocks, or whether there is some transnational synchronization of such cycles is an empirical matter that requires further research.

Another aspect is the access of elites to various kinds of resources, which is important for the epidemiological question as well. Apart from the habitus, in the context of the elites, it is also difficult to avoid the issue of transferring specific resources between their members (inheriting titles, property, positions). The transmission of fortune is different from the transmission of cultural representation – the problem of presenting this phenomenon can be associated with a more general tendency in cultural evolution to focus only on the flow of information, while it is often related to the flow of resources, and significant interactions take place between them (e.g. it is difficult to acquire the ability to manage land property without access to land property, and inheriting land property may force the learning of many practices related to its operation). In the presentations of the epidemiological approach, access to resources is treated as an "ecological factor of attraction" (Scott-Phillips et al. 2018) – how should it be interpreted, however, when it is not a "global variable", related to all participants in the transmission chains but it is transferred together with a given cultural representation?

IV. Conclusions

I have reviewed some potential theoretical and empirical areas, which could be used to build the middle-range evolutionary theory of the elites. I have illustrated these with examples from the modern history of Poland because I assumed it can be a valuable source of empirical material, which could be used for further theoretical extensions and to verify hypotheses.

The main advantage of the evolutionary approach, I have noted, is that it opens up to more structural explanations of historical events (related to general models of the dynamics of social systems) – in terms of elite overproduction cycles and intra-elite conflicts, adapting to the intensity of inter-state conflicts (the role of multilevel selection), or within the frame of cultural epidemiology and its conditions of stability of tradition and cultural attractors. I avoided references to formal models here but it should be noted that quantitative methods are a distinguishing feature of modern cultural evolution. They have limitations, but they allow for verifying hypotheses more systematically and comparing processes taking place in various regions and processes. It is a very general remark,

but to be able to judge the important mechanisms determining the shape and elites of Central Europe, the case of Central Europe should be compared with other regions.

However, the basic problem with using the perspective of cultural evolution to analyse elites in a specific region and historical period is that this theory is not sufficiently developed, and many issues are not represented even in the form of preliminary or partial empirical research. Among the examples that were highlighted in the above arguments is a very cognitive-centred perspective of cultural epidemiology, which makes it difficult to apply it in the real, historical context of the evolution of regional elites. Among the missing empirical analysis, I have noted the lack of application of structural-demographic theory to peripheral regions with interfering influences of neighbouring centres (e.g. Central Europe). Moreover, the usefulness of the theory of cultural evolution to describe the evolution of the elite largely depends on the possibility of its operationalization, and this is one of the more difficult stages of research, especially in the face of the relative inaccessibility of historical quantitative data going beyond the period of mass communication and institutionalized statistical documentation.

Collecting quantitative historical data and regional empirical exploratory studies are relevant to overcoming this problem. For epidemiological issues, prosopographical and genealogical data should be the most attractive. For selectionist approach, the proxy variables for inter- and intra-elite competition are needed. For the specific issue of the evolution of elites in Central Europe, it would be recommended to check whether the semi-peripheral location of the region (and external shocks influencing inter- and intra-elite competition) makes the rhythm of overproduction of elite different than in the case of Western countries (Western Europe and the US). Nevertheless, I hope that this article shows that even without the comfort of easy translation of the cultural evolution perspective into a specific research scheme, evolutionary thinking can enrich more traditional meso- and macro-sociological approaches.

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Trends and Portraits from the Hungarian History of Philosophy

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Who Were the First Modern Professional Philosophers in Hungary?

The Authors of the Journal *Magyar Philosophiai Szemle* (1882–1891)*

I. Introduction

It is generally accepted by the scarce scholarly literature on the emergence of modern philosophy in Hungary that the new era was ushered by a series of novel institutions, including the establishment of the "first professional journal dedicated to philosophy in Hungary" (Perecz 2007. 1160), namely the *Magyar Philosophiai Szemle (Hungarian Philosophical Review)* which appeared in print between 1882 and 1891.[1] The aim of the present paper is to undertake a modern, comprehensive

* The author of the present writing is grateful to László Gergely Szücs and Barnabás Szekér for their comments.

[1] The history of the journal was briefly investigated by Perecz 1998. 26–28, as a preparation of his more substantial study of the journal *Athenaeum*, which succeeded the *Szemle* in 1892 and flourished until the Second World War (it ceased in 1947). Besides the general exposition by Laczkó 1996, there only exist some contemporaneous recollections about the beginning of the journal, respectively the society behind it (Böhm 1884; Kozáry 1890), which serve as the main historical sources of the former research articles. In the course of modern research on compiling the bibliography of Hungarian philosophy, a comprehensive bibliography of the journal was also published (Szanka 2000), though regrettably without any biographical information concerning the journal authors. It is not our aim here to revisit the historiography of the journal; yet the role of the informal *Philosophiai Társaskör (Philosophical Society)* in Budapest in the late 1870s must be emphasized, which, contrary to the received view (cf., e.g., Ladányiné Boldog 1980. 889) explicitly aimed at establishing a philosophical periodical (see: Varga 2020. 82–83, n. 69). – An eponymous journal (in a slightly modernized linguistic form), the *Magyar Filozófiai Szemle (Hungarian Philosophical Review),* was established in 1957, to be published by the newly founded Research Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (see Horváth 2000. 8–9). It still serves as the main, if not the only scholarly venue of professional philosophy in Hungary (since the 1980s, it has been published by the Standing Committee of Philosophy at the Academy, rather than the Institute of Philosophy, which, until the science policy reform of 2019, belonged to the network of research institutes operating under the auspices of the directorate of the Academy, while the standing committees are more closely tied to the Academy in her capacity as the so-called non-departmental public body of Hungarian scholars).

and interdisciplinary study of the Hungarian philosophers who published in this journal. I hope that reconstructing the professional backgrounds and interconnections of these authors will not only help understand this hitherto less-studied key episode of the emergence of modern philosophy in Hungary but could also serve as a paradigmatic case study of the historical and institutional embeddedness, the multifaceted philosophical commitments of doing philosophy in the late nineteenth century that might interest the historians of nineteenth-twentieth century European philosophers as well. All the more so, since the late nineteenth-century Hungarian philosophy arguable lacks historical figures of undisputed international relevance (even though the self-avowed topos of Hungarian philosophy's belatedness or, even sheer non-existence is, I believe, grossly overexaggerating);[2] hence the historiographical situation of the late nineteenth-century Hungarian philosophy could serve as a spur to introducing more sophisticated historiographical methodology in writing the history of nineteenth-twentieth century European (so-called 'Continental') philosophy in general, respectively exploring the philosophical implications of such non-trivial understanding of the history of philosophy.[3]

II. Biographical Reconstructions

1. Preliminary Methodological Remarks

The opening pages of the issue of the *Magyar Philosophiai Szemle* carried a list of its "present contributors," alongside with naming its "editor-in-chief" (Károly Böhm) and "co-editor" (Ferenc Baráth). However, it comes as no surprise that not all of the initially named editorial staff contributed articles to the journal, respectively the authors of the journal were by no means confined to those included on this initial list, not to mention that the list of contributors has changed by time and the list itself appears to have been omitted in the later issues. Thus, the following reconstruction is based on the list of the actual authors of papers published in the journal.[4]

[2] This historiographical topos, which still preoccupies the historians of Hungarian philosophy, was sampled for international audience by Steindler 1988 (for a modern overview of the nineteenth-century history-writing of philosophy in Hungary, from the point of view of its broader political context, see Mester 2018).

[3] The broader historiographical and metaphilosophical program underpinning the history-writing of nineteenth-twentieth century philosophy in Hungary is also pursued in Varga 2017. Concerning the present author's views on the macrostructure of post-Hegelian German philosophy, see Varga 2016a.

[4] The classification of the various genres of publications within the journal are based on the journal's own section headings, but the present survey excludes eulogies, anonymous pieces, mere translations, and the section called "[Secondary] School".

The individual entries are reconstructed on the basis of biographical lexica: For the sake of brevity, biographical information obtained from the most established Hungarian biographical lexica (SZM, GP, MÉL, ÚMÉL) is not referenced individually; other biographical sources are explicitly mentioned.[5] These biographical skeletons are augmented, if possible, by information regarding the precise semesters and faculties of university studies in Hungary and abroad (so-called peregrination), obtained from the original course catalogues of the University of Budapest, respectively the sources compiled by excellent recent peregrination research in Hungary (Szögi 2001; Szögi–Kiss 2003; Bozzay–Ladányi 2007; Sárközi 2013; Szögi–Varga 2018).[6] The exact circumstances of appointments at the University of Budapest and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences are similarly established, if possible, on the basis of specialized sources (Szentpétery 1933; Markó et al. 2003). It is indicative of the lack of a comprehensive biographical survey of the actors of modern Hungarian philosophy that, in several cases, these biographical sources proved insufficient and we had to take recourse to original eulogies, death notices, and other historical primary sources which are indicated alongside the corresponding entries. In order to convey an impression of the places of the individual figures within the broader canon of Hungarian culture, sciences, and society; the occupation classifications given by the *Új Magyar Életrajzi Lexikon* (ÚMÉL), the most modern comprehensive Hungarian biographical dictionary, were quoted in case of all historical figures included in that lexicon.

The system of education and science underwent considerable changes in Hungary during the period examined by the present paper, which, in some cases, renders it challenging to compare and classify the individual biographical trajectories involved. Thus, in order to establish a common ground, I have grouped all forms of pre-tertiary education under the common heading of 'secondary school' (i.e. education above fourth grade). With regard to education levels above secondary school, I have distinguished between universities (practically the University in [Buda]pest, later in Kolozsvár [today: Cluj in Romania]) and non-university forms of education (e.g., the Academy established in Pozsony [today: Bratislava in Slovakia] after the transfer of the university of [Buda]pest, or other forms of confessional tertiary education). In case of the former, consequent distinction was made, if possible, between occupational levels (unsalaried lecturer [*Privatdozent*],[7] extraordinary and ordinary professor), which resemble

[5] Concerning the theoretical framework of biography, see, e.g., Klein 2009.

[6] Unresolved geographic locations from historical primary sources – especially settlements which lie outside of the modern borders of Hungary – are identified using Lelkes 2011.

[7] It is worth mentioning that the university lecturers called *Privatdozent* were not entirely devoid of remuneration from registration fees, but lacked regular salary (not to

the well-known career system of the Humboldtian model of universities; while, in the latter case, no such attempt was made to regularize the ambiguous occupational positions.

2. Reconstructed Biograms

(1) **Antal, Géza** (Tata, 1866 – Pápa, 1934): "Calvinist bishop, ecclesiastical writer" (ÚMÉL vol. 1, 155).[8] Studied theology in Pápa (Hungary) and abroad in Utrecht (at the Faculty of Theology between 1885–1887), Berlin (at the Faculty of Humanities between May 1887 and Nov 1888),[9] and Vienna where he earned a doctoral degree in philosophy in 1892 (examined by the Vienna professors of philosophy Robert Zimmermann [1828–1898] and Theodor Vogt [1835–1906]).[10] Became a secondary school teacher in Pápa (1889), and then professor of dogmatics (1889) and philosophy (1917–1924) at the Calvinist Hight School in Pápa. Pursued an ecclesiastical and political career (*inter alia*, member of the parliament between 1910 and 1918, bishop since 1924), exiled in the Netherlands between 1919 and 1924.

(2) **Babics (Babits), Kálmán** (Győr, 1840 – Budapest, 1886): "philosophical and pedagogical writer" (ÚMÉL vol. 1, 233). No identifiable university studies; a secondary school teacher in Budapest (1869).

(3) **Balásy, Dénes** (Székelybetlenfalva [today part of Székelyudvarhely / Odorheiu Secuiesc in Romania], 1854 – Székelybetlenfalva, 1939):[11] Studied at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Kolozsvár (1874; today Cluj in Romania). After a career in journalism in Kolozsvár (1882–1883) became a secondary school teacher in Budapest (1885; later head of the school).

(4) **Baráth, Ferenc** (Kunszentmiklós, 1844 – Budapest, 1904): "literature historian, writer" (ÚMÉL vol. 1, p. 413). Studied at the Protestant Theological

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mention job safety), which greatly contributed towards academic rivalry and innovation pressure that characterized the Humboldtian universities (see also note 74 below).

[8] Concerning his identification, see Pongrácz 1928, 176.

[9] Other – possibly irregular – university studies he carried out in Germany (e.g., Tübingen, Heidelberg) mentioned by the general biographical lexica were not confirmable using Szögi 2001 and are thus omitted.

[10] His doctoral dissertation (dedicated to a common question of traditional philosophical logic), entitled "*Die Modalität der Urteile* [*The Modality of Judgements*]", remained unpublished (cf. his doctoral files, Archival Signature: PH RA 736 Antal; Catalogue of the Archives of the University of Vienna, https://scopeq.cc.univie.ac.at/Query/detail.aspx?ID=208413, last downloaded: Sept 4, 2020).

[11] Missing from all biographical lexica except GP (vol. 1, cc. 1208-1209); see also: https://siculia.gitbook.io/szekelyfold-hires-emberei/balasy_denes (last downloaded: Oct 29, 2020)

College in Debrecen (1861–1863), the Protestant Theological Academy in Budapest (1863–1865), the Faculty of Theology at the University of Jena, Germany in SS 1866 (cf. Szögi 2001, 349), and at the Faculty of Theology of the Edinburgh University between 1867 and 1869 (cf. Sárközi 2013, 122). Secondary school teacher in Cegléd (1866) and Budapest (1869). Retired in 1900. Founding co-editor of the journal until October 1884 (cf. vol. 3, no. 6., p. 476).

(5) Belják, Bernát Pál (Teplicska [also known as: Vágtapolca, today: Teplička nad Váhom in Slovakia], 1856 – Eperjes [today: Prešov in Slovakia], 1904):[12] Franciscan priest, secondary school teacher; besides ecclesiastical training, university studies (religion, German and Hungarian philology) at the University of Budapest (doctoral degree in 1903); pursued a teaching career in Bártfa (today Bardejov in Slovakia) and Eperjes.

(6) Bihari (Bihary), Péter (Zsadány, 1840 – Budapest, 1888): "Calvinist educator; philosophical, art historian, and pedagogical writer" (ÚMÉL vol. 1, 734). After studies at the Protestant Theological College of Debrecen, he studied abroad at the Sorbonne University in Paris (at the Faculty of Humanities around 1865) and the University of Utrecht (Faculty of Humanities) between 1866 and 1868;[13] earned a doctoral degree in the humanities at the University of Budapest in 1875. Besides his secondary school teacher career (in Szatmárnémeti [1868; today: Satu Mare in Romania] and Budapest [1873]), he was an unsalaried lecturer *(Privatdozent)* in "experimental psychology" (Szentpétery 1933, 681) at the University of Budapest (1882); since 1885 teacher of philosophy at the Reformed Theological Academy in Budapest. His further career was precluded by the onset of a mental illness in 1888.

(7) Bodnár, Zsigmond (Nagykároly [today: Carei in Romania], 1839 – Csillaghegy [today: Budapest], 1907): "historian of literature, philosopher" (ÚMÉL vol. 1, 783). Catholic priest (1861) until joining the Unitarian Church in 1874, ecclesiastical (*inter alia*, at the journal *Religio*) and secondary school career (Nagyszombat [1865; today: Trnava in Slovakia], Szeged [1871], Budapest [1872–1905]). He earned a degree in Hungarian and Latin philology at the University of Budapest (1870; beginning of studies not identifiable), where he became an unsalaried lecturer *(Privatdozent)* in "Hungarian philology and literature" (Szentpétery 1933, 681) in 1875.

(8) Bokor, József (Kadarkút, 1843 – Budapest, 1917): "philosophical and pedagogical writer" (ÚMÉL vol. 1, 821). Having studied at the Reformed

[12] See esp. GP, vol. 2, col. 950.

[13] Further – possibly irregular – reported university studies abroad (e.g., in Wien in 1866) were not confirmable on the basis of the corresponding peregrination lexica and are thus omitted.

Theological Academy in Budapest (1868), he was appointed (extraordinary) professor at the Reformed Theological Academy in Sárospatak (exegesis in 1868, philosophy between 1877 and 1885). Besides a secondary school teaching position in Budapest (1885–1896), he earned a doctoral degree (1884), had an unsalaried lecturer position (*Privatdozent*, 1887), and later (1912) and became honorary extraordinary professor of the "history of pedagogy" (Szentpétery 1933. 681) at the University of Budapest. Co-editor of the journal starting with vol. 4 (1885), no. 1 (sole editor since vol. 6, no. 1).

(9) Böhm, Károly (Besztercebánya [today: Banská Bystrica in Slovakia], 1846 – Kolozsvár [today: Cluj in Romania], 1911): "philosopher" (ÚMÉL vol. 1, 902). Studied at the Faculty of Theology of the University of Göttingen in Germany in WS 1868/69 (cf. Szögi 2001. 242) and the Faculty of Theology of the University of Tübingen between SS 1869 and WS 1869/70 (cf. Szögi 2001. 485). Secondary school teacher in Pozsony (1870; today Bratislava in Slovakia) and Budapest (1873; director: 1883). Ordinary professor of philosophy at the University of Kolozsvár (1896; today Cluj in Romania). Founding co-editor of the journal until vol. 3, np. 6 (Nov 1884). Corresponding (1896) and honorary (1908), a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (cf. Markó et al. 2003. vol. 1. 178).

(10) Brassay [Brassai], Sámuel (Torockó [today: Rimetea in Romania], 1797 – Kolozsvár [today: Cluj in Romania], 1897): a "polymath" (ÚMÉL Vol. 1. 920). He studied at the Unitarian High School in Kolozsvár (1813–1818; today Cluj in Romania). After working as a private tutor and journal editor, became a professor at the Unitarian High School in Kolozsvár (1837), with an excursus in [Buda]pest (1850–1859); ordinary professor at the University of Kolozsvár (1872). Retired in 1884. Corresponding (1837), ordinary (1865), and honorary (1887) member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (cf. Markó et al. 2003. Vol. 1. 182).

(11) Buday, József (Szeged, 1854 – Budapest, 1906):[14] Studied at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest since WS 1873/74.[15] Secondary school teacher in Újvidék (1877; today Нови Сад in Serbia) and Budapest (1883). Habilitation (1890) at the University of Budapest in "the history of modern philosophy" (Szentpétery 1933, 681). Retired in Oct 1905. Co-

[14] See also his death notice in *A Budapesti Második Kerületi Állami Főreáliskolának ötvenegyedik évi értesítője az intézet fennállásának 52. évében az 1906–1907. iskolai évről* ([Budapest]: Budapest Székesfőváros Házinyomdája, 1907). 11–12.

[15] See *A Budapesti Királyi Magyar Tudomány-Egyetem Almanachja MDCCCLXXIII–LXXIV-ről* (Budapest: Magyar Királyi Egyetemi Könyvnyomda, 1874). 45; name disambiguation on the basis of SZM.

editor of the journal between vol. 4, no. 1 (Jan 1885) and vol. 5, no. 6 (Nov – Dec 1886).

(12) Domanovszki [Domanovszky], Endre (Tótkomlós, 1817 – Budapest, 1895): "philosopher" (ÚMÉL vol. 2, p. 210). Studied theology at the Academy in Pozsony (1839; today: Bratislava in Slovakia), law at the Legal Academy in Pápa (1842), and at the Faculty of Theology of the University of Halle in Germany since WS 1843/44[16] (cf. Szögi 2001, 261). After working as a private instructor (1846–1849), became a secondary school teacher in Szarvas (1850) and Sopron (1853), then an ordinary professor of philosophy at the Legal Academy in Nagyszeben (1876; today: Sibiu in Romania). Retired in 1887. Corresponding (1871) member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (cf. Markó et al. 2003. Vol. 1. 272).

(13) Felméri [Felméry], Lajos (Székelyudvarhely [today Odorheiu Secuiesc in Romania], 1840 – Kolozsvár [today: Cluj in Romania], 1894): "educator" (ÚMÉL vol. 2, 607). Studied at the Reformed Theological Academy of Sárospatak (1862), the Protestant Theological Academy in [Buda]pest (1863), the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest since WS 1863/64,[17] the Faculty of Theology of the University of Jena in Germany in SS 1867, the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Heidelberg in Germany since SS 1868 (cf. Szögi 2001),[18] and at the Faculty of Theology of the Edinburgh University between 1866 and 1867 (cf. Sárközi 2013. 121). Became an extraordinary (1868) and ordinary (1869) professor of philosophy Reformed Theological Academy of Sárospatak, ordinary professor of pedagogy of Kolozsvár (1872; honorary doctoral degree in 1880; today: Cluj in Romania).

(14) Heller, Ágost ([Buda]pest, 1843 – Budapest, 1902): "natural scientific writer, historian of science" (ÚMÉL vol. 3. 216). Studied at the Technical High School of Budapest (1862–1866)[19] and at the Faculty of Natural Science at the University of Heidelberg since WS 1869/70 (cf. Szögi 2001. 308). Assistant at the Budapest University of Technology (1867–1869); secondary school teacher in Budapest (1870–1898), unsalaried lecturer *(Privatdozent)* at the Budapest University of Technology (1872–1875). Corresponding

[16] His further university studies in Germany could not be confirmed.

[17] See *A Magyar Királyi Tudomány-Egyetem személyzete MDCCCLXIII–IV* (Buda, Magyar Királyi Egyetemi Nyomda. 1864). 15.

[18] His (possibly irregular) university studies in Tübingen (reported in SZM, ÚMÉL) could not be confirmed on the basis of Szögi 2001.

[19] The ÚMÉL's report his studies at the University of Budapest (vol. 3. 216; missing from SZM and MÉL), allegedly concluding in a teaching license examination in 1868, could not be confirmed on the basis of the corresponding university catalogues. It is highly possible that the license examination was taken without him being a registered university student.

(1887) and ordinary (1893) member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (cf. Markó et al. 2003. vol. 1. 501).

(15) Horváth Cyrill (Kecskemét, 1804 – Budapest, 1884):[20] "philosopher, Piarist monk" (ÚMÉL vol. 3. 361). Piarist monk (1820, solemn profession: 1826; ordained as a priest: 1828). Studied philosophy in Vác (1823–1825) and theology in Nyitra (1826; today Nitra in Slovakia). Besides his ecclesiastical career, he worked as a secondary school teacher in Vác (1828), Szeged (1830; director since 1847), [Buda]pest (1849–1858; also as a director), and Szeged (1859). Supplementary (1860) and ordinary (1863) professor of philosophy at the University of Budapest. Corresponding (1834), ordinary (1836), and honorary (1865) member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (cf. Markó et al. 2003, vol. 1. 535).

(16) Jeszenszky, Dezső (Újvidék [today: Нови Сад in Serbia], 1846 – Zombor [today: Сомбор in Serbia], 1899).[21] Studied theology at the Academy of Pozsony (today: Bratislava in Slovakia) and the Faculty of Theology of the University of Halle in Germany since WS 1868/69 (cf. Szögi 2001. 269).[22] After a brief ecclesiastical career in Torzsa (today: Савино Село in Serbia), secondary school teacher in Zombor (1874; supplementary teacher since 1872).

(17) Kapossy, Luczián (Ignácz) (Lovasberény, 1849 – Pápa, 1927):[23] Benedictine monk (1867; solemn profession: 1873; left the order in 1881), Catholic priest (1874). Studied theology in Pannonhalma (teaching license examination at the University of Budapest in 1875 and the University of Kolozsvár [Cluj] in 1888; earned a doctoral degree in the humanities at the University of Budapest in 1878). Secondary school teacher in Sopron (1874), Esztergom (1876), Győr (1879), Pápa (1881; director since 1902). Habilitation the University of Budapest in 1878.[24] Retired in 1917.

[20] See esp. Léh 1998. 158. Not to be mistaken with Horváth, Cyrill (1865–1941) who was also a priest (in fact, a Cistercian monk until 1896), a humanities scholar (literary historian, rather than philosopher), and elected as a corresponding and ordinary member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. If that were not enough, Cyrill Horváth jr. also published philosophical papers in his juvenilia, without any name disambiguation hint. In fact, even lexical sources as respectable as Markó et al. 2003 (cf. vol. 1. 535–536) swapped some of the data of their academic inaugural lectures!

[21] Missing from the biographical lexica (except for a laconic entry, without the exact birth year, lest any bibliographical data, in GP vol. 15, col. 746), see his eulogy: Szól 1900.

[22] Mistakenly reported as Jena in his eulogy (Szól 1900, 4)

[23] See also: MKL (vol. 6. 153–154) and his eulogy: Győry 1928.

[24] Dating of MKL accepted against SZM.

(18) Kiss, Áron (Porcsalma, 1845 – Budapest, 1908):[25] "educator" (ÚMÉL vol. 3. 939). Studied at the Reformed Theological Academy of Sárospatak (doctoral degree in education at the University of Kolozsvár [today Cluj in Romania] in 1872). He pursued a career as teacher at the Teacher-Training Colleges in Sárospatak (1866), as director in Nagykőrős (1870), as teacher (1875) and director (1899)[26] in Budapest. Retired in 1907.

(19) Kiss, Mihály (Garamszőlős [today: Rybník in Slovakia], 1856 – Aranyosmarót [today: Zlaté Moravce in Slovakia], 1935):[27] Studied at the Faculty of Law of the University of Budapest since WS 1874/75.[28] Administrative career in Bars county (today in Slovakia).

(20) Kun, Pál ([Buda]pest, 1842 – Sárospatak, 1891):[29] Studied at the Reformed Theological Academy in Budapest between 1860 and 1864 and, simultaneously and probably irregularly, at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest. Secondary school teacher in Sárospatak (1867), supplementary (1888) and ordinary (1889) professor at the Reformed Theological Academy in Sárospatak.

(21) Kun (Kuhn), Sámuel (Pápa, 1849 – Budapest, 1910?): Lacking any formal higher education, he worked as a typesetter while publishing philosophical and sociological papers.

(22) Kuncz, Ignácz (Réde, 1841 – Kolozsvár [today: Cluj in Romania], 1903): "lawyer" (ÚMÉL vol. 3. 1251). Studied at the Faculty of Law of the University of Budapest since WS 1860/61[30] (earned a doctoral degree in 1866). After a brief administrative career, became lecturer at the Legal Academy in Pécs (1866), professor at the Royal Legal Academies in Győr (1873) and Pozsony (1874; today: Bratislava in Slovakia), unsalaried lecturer *(Privatdozent)* at the Faculty of Law of University of Budapest (1868), ordinary professor at the University of Kolozsvár (1893–1901; today Cluj in Romania). Corresponding (1896) member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (cf. Markó et al. 2003. vol. 2. 759).

(23) Lechner, Károly ([Buda]pest, 1850 – Budapest, 1922) "psychiatrist and neurologist" (ÚMÉL vol. 4, p. 148). Studied at the Faculty of Medicine of

[25] Common surname and given name combination; identified on the basis of the bibliography in SZM.

[26] Accepted the dating in GP (and MÉL) against SZM.

[27] Common surname and given name combination; identified on the basis of the bibliography in SZM.

[28] See *A Budapesti Királyi Magyar Tudomány-Egyetem Almanachja MDCCCLXXV–LXXVI-ról* (Budapest: Magyar Kir. Egyetemi Könyvnyomda, 1876), 60.

[29] See also his eulogy: Radácsi 1891.

[30] See *Hivatalos kimutatása a tanitói és hivatal-személyzetnek valamint a tanulóknak a pesti magyar királyi tudomány egyetemnél az 1860/1-ik tanévben* (Buda: Magyar Királyi Egyetemi Nyomda, 1861), 19.

the University of Budapest since WS 1868/69[31] (medical certificate examinations in 1873 and 1874) and the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Vienna in Austria in SS 1881 (cf. Patyi et al. 2015. 274).[32] Pursued a medical university career in Budapest (1874; lecturer: 1876) and was appointed as ordinary professor at the newly-founded University of Kolozsvár in 1889 (today: Cluj in Romania; the university resettled to Budapest in 1919); retired in 1921. Corresponding (1921) member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (cf. Markó et al. 2003. vol. 2. 784).

(24) Lechner, László (Buda[pest], 1841 – Budapest, 1913):[33] Studied at the Faculty of Law of the University of Budapest since WS 1859/60[34] and the Faculty of Humanities of the same university since WS 1864/65[35] (teaching license examinations in 1866 and 1870; doctoral degree in philosophy in 1867). After a brief administrative career, became a secondary school teacher in Szatmárnémeti (1867; today Satu Mare in Romania) and Budapest (1870–1897); he fell seriously ill in 1900.

(25) Maczky [Maczki / Macski], Valér (Eger, 1847 – Eger, 1921):[36] "educator, Cistercian monk" (ÚMÉL vol. 4. 365). Studied theology in Zirc and studied at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest in 1869 – 1870 (doctoral degree in philosophy in 1876). Cistercian monk (1864; ordained as a priest in 1870). After a short ecclesiastical career became a secondary school teacher in Pécs (1871), Eger (1877), Pécs (1889), Eger

[31] See *A Magyar Királyi Tudomány Egyetem személyzete. MDCCCLXI-II.* (Buda: Magyar Kir. Egyetemi Nyomda, 1870), 25.

[32] His universities studies abroad (mentioned without details in ÚMÉL) were not identifiable.

[33] See also his eulogy (which disambiguates him vis-à-vis other persons with the same name): Vajda 1914. – His university studies in Vienna could not be confirmed on the basis of Szögi–Kiss 2003; Patyi et al. 2015.

[34] See *Hivatalos kimutatása a tanitói és hivatal-személyzetnek valamint a tanulóknak a pesti magyar királyi tudomány egyetemnél az 1860/1-ik tanévben* (Buda: Magyar Királyi Egyetemi Nyomda, 1861), 20.

[35] See *A Magyar Királyi Tudomány-Egyetem személyzete. MDCCCLXIV-V.* (Buda: Magyar Királyi Egyetemi Nyomda, 1864), 20.

[36] See also: MKL. Interestingly, Maczki was remembered not only in the interwar period (see, e.g., the report on the "Macki Memorial" in *Egri Népújság* vol. 39, no. 270 [Nov 26, 1922], p. 2); but, despite his manifest clerical background, in the (late) socialist era as well (see the archival document, which also provides biographical data on Maczki's retiring: *Javaslat a kiemelkedő elhunyt megyei személyiségek születési évfordulójának, nevezetes munkásmozgalmi eseményeknek az 1987. évi megünneplésére*. MSZMP Heves Megyei Végrehajtó Bizottságának ülése (Feb 10, 1987), Box 52, Archival Unit 786, p. 46, p. 6; URL= https://library.hungaricana.hu/hu/view/HEVESMSZMP__22_3_52/?pg=169&layout=s ; last downloaded on Oct 20, 2020). The "Maczki Valér" street, inaugurated in 1942, seems to have existed continually in downtown Eger.

(1890–1906); professor at the Episcopal Legal High School in Pécs (1875–1877) and the Archiepiscopal Legal High School in Eger (1877).

(26) Málnay (Mannheimer), Mihály ([Buda]pest, 1860 – Budapest, 1945):[37] "educator" (ÚMÉL vol. IV. 450). Studied at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest since WS 1878/79[38] (doctoral degree: 1883) and the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Leipzig in Germany in SS 1885 (cf. Szögi 2001. 399).[39] Teacher at the Jewish Teacher-training College in Budapest (1886) and secondary school teacher in Budapest (1893); retired in 1920.

(27) M[éray]-Horváth, K[ároly] ([Buda]pest, 1859 – Budapest, 1938): "sociologist, writer, journalist" (ÚMÉL vol. 4, p. 663). Described by his contemporaries as one of the last "polymaths" (Sós 1938. 159), studied at the Technical High School in Munich in Germany between WS 1875/76 and WS 1877/78 (cf. Szögi 2001. 580), the Academy of Fine Arts (Akademie der bildenden Künste) in Munich in Germany in 1880 (Szögi 2001, 661) and the École de Beaux-Arts in Paris in France in 1880 (cf. Szögi–Varga 2018, 68); worked as a newspaper editor (*Arad és Vidéke,* 1887–1993), invented a novel typesetter machine (1893). He was a politician, an author, and a public intellectual without any official academic position.

(28) Nemes, Imre (Nagymoha [today: Grânari in Romania], 1845 – Budapest, 1938):[40] Studied at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest since WS 1867/68[41] until 1870 (teaching license examination: 1870; doctoral degree: 1874); as well as at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Berlin in Germany in SS 1871 and the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Jena in Germany (inscribed in WS 1871/72; cf. Szögi 2001). Pursued a career as a secondary school teacher in Budapest (1872), Pozsony (1873; today: Bratislava in Slovakia), and Nagyvárad (1874; today: Oradea in Romania), as a director in the newly-founded Fogaras (1898–1901),[42] a

[37] See also: MZSL.

[38] See *A Budapesti Királyi Magyar Tudomány-Egyetem Almanachja MDCCCLXXX-LXXXI-ről* (Budapest: Magyar Kir. Egyetemi Könyvnyomda, 1881), 78.

[39] His studies in Jena (attested in SZM, MZSL, MÉL, ÚMÉL) could not be confirmed on the basis of Szögi 2001.

[40] See also, e.g.: *A Nagyváradi M. Kir. Állami Főreáliskola értesítője az 1878–79. tanévről* (Nagyvárad: Hollósy Jenő, 1879), p. 30.

[41] Cf. *A Magyar Királyi Tudomány-Egyetem személyzete. MDCCCLXVIII–IX.* (Buda: Magyar Királyi Egyetemi Nyomda, 1869), 26.

[42] See *Hivatalos Közlöny* vol. 6, no. 18. (Sept 15, 1898), 423–424; *Budapesti Hírlap* vol. 19, no. 188 (July 9, 1899), 7.

as a teacher in Szeged (1902; retired in 1905).[43] Worked as an unsalaried lecturer (*Privatdozent*) or, possibly, only had habilitation in "philosophy" at the University of Budapest in the academic year 1874–1875[44] and held a similar position at the Legal Academy in Nagyvárad.

(29) Nyíri Elek (c. 1857, Szarvas [?] – Szarvas, 1889):[45] Quixotic journal publisher (*Népszerü Bölcsész* [*Popular Humanities Scholar*]), a radical socialist and antisemitic writer, an unlicensed practitioner of homeopathy. His studies were unfinished at the Faculty of Law of the University of Budapest which he began in WS 1877/78[46] and the Faculty of Medicine in WS 1880/81.[47] Reportedly died due to a suicidal hunger strike.

(30) Ormay (Ormai), Lajos (Kispalugya [today: Palúdzka in Slovakia], 1861 – Budapest, 1889):[48] Studied at the Faculty of Engineering of the Technical High School of Munich in Germany between WS 1878/79 and SS 1878/79 and at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest since WS 1879/80.[49] Worked as a secondary school teacher in Budapest since 1883. Died due to a "psychologically puzzling" (Hittrich 1923. 218) suicide after establishing a small endowment for mathematically gifted pupils.

(31) Öreg, János (Pátka, 1838 – Debrecen, 1911): "Reformed pastor, educator" (ÚMÉL vol. IV, p. 1208). Studied at the Protestant Theological Academy in Budapest (1856–1859) and the Faculty of Theology of the University of Utrecht (1861–1863); teaching certification examination (1870) and doctoral degree in pedagogy and philosophy (1879) at the University of Budapest. Secondary school teaching (e.g., Szentes, 1863; Nagykőrös,

[43] See *A Szegedi Magyar Kir. Állami Főgymnásium ötödik értesítője az 1902–1903-ik tanévről* (Szeged: Várnay L., 1903), 21; *Budapesti Hírlap* vol. 25, no. 202 (July 24, 1905), 3.

[44] See *Beszédek, melyek a Budpaesti Kir. Magy. Tudomány-Egyetemen MDCCCLXXXVI–LXXXVI. tanévi rectora és tanácsának beiktatásakor október 1. tartattak. III. Tanév-megnyitó beszéd* (Budapest: M. Kir. Egyetemi Könyvnyomda, 1876), 7; though, missing from Szentpétery 1933, cf. esp. 684.

[45] Missing from the standard biographical lexica, except for a short entry in SZM. See, e.g., *Békésmegyei Közlöny* vol. 25, no. 33 (Apr 24, 1898), [unnumbered] p. 4; *Budapesti Hírlap* vol. 19, no. 88 (Mar 29, 1899), 5–6; *Békés. Társadalmi és közgazdászati hetilap* vol. 31, no. 14 (Apr 2, 1899), [unnumbered] 3–4.

[46] See *A Budapesti Királyi Magyar Tudomány-Egyetem Almanachja MDCCCLXX-VIII–LXXIX-ről* (Budapest: Magyar Kir. Egyetemi Könyvnyomda, 1879), 77.

[47] See *A Budapesti Királyi Magyar Tudomány-Egyetem Almanachja MDCCCLXXX–LXXXI-ről* (Budapest: Magyar Kir. Egyetemi Könyvnyomda, 1881), 82.

[48] See also his eulogies in *Protestáns Egyházi és Iskolai Lap* vol. 32, no. 19 (May 12, 1889), col. 605 and *Magyar Philosophiai Szemle* vol. 8, no. 3–4 (1889), 316–317; as well as Hittrich 1923. 218.

[49] See *A Budapesti Királyi Magyar Tudomány-Egyetem Almanachja MDCCCLXXIX–LXXX-ról* (Budapest: Magyar Kir. Egyetemi Könyvnyomda, 1880), 81.

1874–1880; Debrecen, 1884) and an ecclesiastical career; a professor of philosophy at the Protestant Theological Academy in Debrecen (1891–1898).

(32) Palágyi (Silberstein, Menachem Salamon;[50] Palagyi, Melchior), Menyhért (Paks, 1859 – Darmstadt, 1924):[51] "philosopher, literary historian" (ÚMÉL vol. V, p. 40). Born in a Jewish family belonging to the Neolog faction; studied at the Technical University of Budapest (1877–1881), earned a doctoral degree at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest in 1886. Became a secondary school teacher in Budapest since 1887 (regularly since 1889).[52] He worked as an unsalaried lecturer *(Privatdozent)* of philosophy at University of Kolozsvár (1905; today Cluj in Romania); emigrated to Germany in 1909.

(33) Parádi (Pomp), Kálmán ([Buda]pest, 1841 – Kolozsvár [today Cluj in Romania], 1902):[53] "zoologist, educator" (ÚMÉL vol. V, p. 133). Piarist monk (1858; solemn profession: 1869) and Catholic priest (1871), until his conversion to Calvinism in 1871. He studied theology in Nyitra (today Nitra in Slovakia) in 1863, then studied at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest (degree obtained in 1870; beginning of studies not identifiable) and the Anatomical Institute (1870), resp. the University of Kolozsvár (1873–1875; today Cluj in Romania). Secondary school teacher in Temesvár (1862; today Timișoara in Romania), Tata (1863), [Moson-] Magyaróvár (1865), Szeged (1867–1870), Kolozsvár (1872).

(34) Patrubány, Lukács (Erzsébetváros [Budapest], 1821 – Budapest, 1926): "linguist, Armenian scholar" (ÚMÉL vol. V, 176). Studied at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest since WS 1878/79[54] (doctoral degree in 1884). Became a secondary school teacher in Budapest

[50] Concerning his request to change his family name, approved in 1895, see, e.g., *Pesti Napló* vol. 46, no. 224 (Aug 17, 1895), 4.

[51] Despite the *epitheton ornans* of being 'forgotten' or 'ignored' (see already, e.g., Gibson 1928. 15), Palágyi belongs to those tiny fractions of Hungarian philosophers who have attracted considerable biographical attention, see also esp.: Serdült Benke 2007; Bogdanov 2017 (see the present author's contribution concerning the relationship between Palágyi and Husserlian phenomenology: Varga 2019) – For my present purposes, it is worth noting that Palágyi did not officially register himself for university courses during his famous peregrination in Germany between 1900–1903 (at least, his data was not identifiable in Szögi 2001).

[52] Contrary to some biographical accounts, Palágyi had already been a secondary school teacher before his study period in Germany, see, e.g. *Budapest székesfőváros törvényhatósági bizottsága 1900-ban tartott közgyűléseinek jegyzőkönyvei* (Budapest: Székesfővárosi Házinyomda, 1901), 388.

[53] See also: Léh 1998. 289.

[54] See *A Budapesti Királyi Magyar Tudomány-Egyetem Almanachja MDCCCLXXIX–LXXX-ról* (Budapest: Magyar Kir. Egyetemi Könyvnyomda, 1880), 82.

(1882–1909); and an unsalaried lecturer (*Privatdozent*) at the Faculty of Humanities of the University Budapest in "Armenian language and literature" (Szentpétery 1933. 685) in 1900.

(35) Pauer, Imre (Vác, 1845 – Vác, 1930): "philosopher; Premonstratensian priest" (ÚMÉL vol. V, p. 182). Studied at the Faculty of Theology at the University of [Buda]Pest since WS 1861/62,[55] respectively at the Faculty of Humanities since WS 1865/66.[56] Worked as a secondary schoolteacher in Szombathely (1862–1875; director since 1868). Appointed professor of philosophy at the Academy of Pozsony (today: Bratislava in Slovakia) in 1875. Extraordinary (1886) and ordinary (1889) professor of "philosophy [*bölcsészettan*]" (Szentpétery 1933, 668) at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest (retired in 1916). Corresponding (1874), ordinary (1889), and honorary (1914) member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (cf. Markó et al. 2003, vol. 2. 981).

(36) Pekár, Károly (Arad [today Arad in Romania], 1869 – Fiume [today Rijeka in Croatia], 1911): "aesthete, psychologist" (ÚMÉL vol. V, 234). Studied at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest since WS 1887/88[57] (doctoral degree in 1891) and at the Faculty of Humanities of the Sorbonne University (1891) and of the University of Dijon in 1892; became a secondary school teacher in Lőcse (1893; today Levoča in Slovakia) and Budapest (1904). His ailing health prevented him from commencing his activity as an unsalaried lecturer (*Privatdozent*) of psychology at the Budapest University of Technology in 1911.

(37) Pikler, Gyula (Temesvár [today Timișoara in Romania], 1864 – Ecséd, 1937): "legal scholar, sociologist, psychologist" (ÚMÉL vol. V, 349). Studied at the Faculty of Law of the University of Budapest (doctoral degree in 1884), became an assistant librarian (1884–1893), an unsalaried lecturer (1886), a titular extraordinary (1891) and ordinary (1896–1912; 1914–1919; was re-installed and retired in 1925) a professor of philosophy of law, resp. international public and private law at the University of Budapest.

[55] See *A Magyar Királyi Tudomány Egyetem személyzete. MDCCCLXI–II.* (Buda: Magyar Királyi Egyetemi Nyomda, 1862), 17.

[56] See *A Magyar Királyi Tudomány-Egyetem személyzete. MDCCCLXV–VI.* (Buda: Magyar Királyi Egyetemi Nyomda, 1866), 24. – It is worth mentioning, in order to understand the significance of Pauer's studies better, that the religious orders, including specifically the Premonstratensians, did not send their members to state universities until the 1850s, but rather, the older members trained the future teachers who were, then examined by the county educational inspectors before embarking on their actual teaching (see Lakatos 1909. 6–7).

[57] See *A Budapesti Királyi Magyar Tudomány-Egyetem Almanachja MDCCCLXXXIX–XC. évről* (Budapest, Magyar Királyi Egyetemi Könyvnyomda, 1890), 102.

(38) Rácz, Lajos (Mád, 1864 – Sárospatak, 1934): "educator, philosophical author, Reformed pastor" (ÚMÉL vol. V, 522). Studied at the Reformed Theological Academy of Sárospatak (1882–1886), Faculty of Humanities of the University of Leipzig in Germany between WS 1887/1888 and SS 1888, and the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest since WS 1888/1889[58] (doctoral degree in 1892). Extraordinary (1889) and ordinary (1894) professor of modern languages and philosophy at the Reformed Theological Academy (secondary school director between 1902 and 1907); retired in 1929.

(39) Rakodczay, Pál ([Buda]pest, 1856 – Szentendre, 1921): "actor, theatre director, theatre historian" (ÚMÉL vol. V, p. 595). Lacking any formal higher education, he worked as a bookseller, schoolteacher (since 1877), and a freelancer actor (since 1897), theatre director (1891–1900) etc., while publishing papers on the theatre and the arts.

(40) Ráth, Arnold (Dobsina [today: Dobšiná in Slovakia], 1849 – Budapest, 1921).[59] Studied at the Protestant Theological Academy of Eperjes (today Prešov in Slovakia) between 1867 and 1870, and the Budapest Technical University and the University of Budapest since 1873. Became a secondary school teacher in Nagykálló (1875) and Budapest (1876–1920).

(41) Sárffy, Aladár (Takácsi, 1858 – Balassagyarmat, 1900):[60] Studied at the University of Kolozsvár (today: Cluj in Romania) between 1879 and 1884 (doctoral degree in 1884); pursued a career as a secondary school teacher in Podolin (1884; today Podolínec in Slovakia), Lőcse (1887; today Levoča in Slovakia), and was appointed as the director in of the newly established secondary school in Balassagyarmat in August 1900.

(42) Schmitt, Jenő Henrik (Eugen Heinrich Schmitt) (Znaim in Moravia [today: Znojmo in the Czech Republic], 1851 – Berlin-Schmargendorf in Germany, 1916): "philosopher" (ÚMÉL vol. V, p. 1027). His mother, a military widow, moved back to her native Zombor (today Сомбор in Serbia) when Jenő was four years old; he was precluded from a military career due to health reasons. He first started to study and publish in philosophy on his own (his prize essay [Schmitt 1888] won laudable mention by the Berliner Philosophische Gesellschaft [Philosophical Society of Berlin]).[61] Studied at the

[58] See *A Budapesti Királyi Magyar Tudomány-Egyetem Almanachja MDCCCLXXXVIII–LXXXIX. évről* (Budapest: Magyar Királyi Egyetemi Könyvnyomda, 1889), 103.

[59] See also his eulogy: Hittrich 1923. 219.

[60] See also his eulogy: Szabó 1901.

[61] Contrary to many simplifying biographical accounts, it is worth emphasizing that, according to contemporaneous newspaper reports (see, e.g., *Pesti Napló. Esti kiadás* vol. 38, no. 183 [July 5, 1887], unnumbered p. 2), Schmitt was not awarded the prize itself. This is also acknowledged by the preface to Schmitt book written by none other than

Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest in 1887–1888[62] (earned a doctoral degree in 1888). After working in an administrative job in Budapest (1890–1896), which he quit due to political reasons; he became a private scholar and public intellectual living in Budapest and Berlin.

(43) Sebesztha, Károly (Pilis, 1849 – Temesvár [today Timișoara in Romania], 1911):[63] Studied at the Faculty of Law of the University of [Buda]pest since SS 1869,[64] pursued a career as an educational administrator in Znióváralja (1872; today Kláštor pod Znievom in Slovakia), in Pest county (1880), Zólyom (1882; today Zvolen in Slovakia), and in Temes county (1893–1908; today split between Romania and Serbia).

(44) Simon, József Sándor (Fancsika [today: Фанчикове in Ukraina], 1853 – Budapest, 1915):[65] Studied at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest since WS 1877/78[66] (doctoral degree in 1879), pursued a career as a secondary school teacher in Besztercebánya (1878; today Banská Bystrica in Slovakia), Zombor (1879; today Сомбор in Serbia), Szolnok (1890), Losonc (1893; today Lučenec in Slovakia), later in Budapest (retired in 1912).

(45) Sprinczer, János (Pozsony [today: Bratislava in Slovakia], 1849 – ?): After studies at the Faculty of Law at the University of [Buda]pest starting in SS 1867,[67] he served as a chief administrative officer; in 1887 was elected as member of Parliament (House of Representatives) on a liberal ticket.[68]

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the Protestant theologian and philosopher, Adolf Lasson (1862–1832), who chaired the society: "One of the submitted works has been mentioned by the committee with special distinction. Even though this work, too, failed to do justice in the same way to all requirements set out by the society in the program of the prize competition; it exhibited considerable merits and contributed to the solution of these problems in a not negligible way." (Schmitt 1888, iii; my translation.)

[62] See *A Budapesti Kir. Magyar Tudomány-Egyetem Almanachja MDCCCLXXXVII–LXXXVIII. évről* (Budapest: Magyar Királyi Egyetemi Könyvnyomda, 1888), 124.

[63] See also his eulogy in *Magyarország* vol. 18, no. 111 (May 12, 1911), p. 11 (reference found in *Gulyás Pál Cédulatár* [URL= http://gulyaspal.mtak.hu/pic.php?mode=1&id=9833 ; last downloaded on Oct 12, 2020]).

[64] See *A Magyar Királyi Tudomány-Egyetem személyzete MDCCCLXVIII–IX* (Buda: Magyar Királyi Egyetemi Nyomda, 1869), 29.

[65] See also: *Révai Nagy Lexikona. Az ismeretek enciklopédiája. XVI. kötet. Racine – Sodoma* (Budapest: Révai Testvérek Irodalmi Intézet, 1924), p. 814; *Gulyás Pál Cédulatár* (URL= http://gulyaspal.mtak.hu/pic.php?mode=1&id=10458 ; last downloaded on Oct 12, 2020).

[66] See *A Budapest Királyi Magyar Tudomány-Egyetem almanachja MDCCCLXXVII–LXXVIII-ról* (Budapest: Magyar Kir. Egyetemi Könyvnyomda, 1878), 85.

[67] See *A Magyar Királyi Tudomány-Egyetem személyzete MDCCCLXVI–VII* (Buda: Magyar Királyi Egyetemi Nyomda, 1867), 28.

[68] See Sturm 1888. 238.

(46) Szentmiklossi A. or Szentmiklossy Á. – unidentifiable (possibly two distinct authors**).**

(47) Szlamka (Szitnyai), Elek (Berencsfalu [today: Prenčov in Slovakia], 1854 – Budapest, 1923):[69] "educator, philosopher" (ÚMÉL vol. VI, p. 465). Studied at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest since 1875,[70] a secondary school teacher in Selmecbánya (1880; today Banská Štiavnica in Slovakia), where he himself went to school in his youth,[71] Nagybánya (1887; today Baia Mare in Romania), and Budapest (1896–1920). He later become the secretary of the Magyar Philosophiai Társaság (Hungarian Philosophical Society), and respectively the editor of its journal, *A Magyar Philosophiai Társaság Közleményei (Communications of the Hungarian Philosophical Society)* between 1905 and 1910.

III. Analyses: What the Biograms of the First Modern Philosophers Could Teach Us?

1. Historiographical Preliminaries

The philosophers who populated the pages of the first Hungarian philosophical journal, the *Magyar Philosophiai Szemle,* are dispersed on a broad spectrum with regard to the position they occupy in cultural memory. Some of them, e.g., Károly Böhm, Sámuel Brassai, and Gyula Pikler, indisputably belong to the pantheon of Hungarian philosophy (respectively of Hungarian culture in general),[72] while others are undoubtedly more peripheral (this situation was also manifest in the amount of efforts required to compile their biograms), and some of the authors – Dénes Balásy, Dezső Jeszenszky, Elek Nyíri – were simply missing from the main, if not virtually every biographical lexica; not to mention the fact that two authors regrettable remained unidentifiable. This observation could already constitute a lesson for the historiography of Hungarian philosophy (and Continental philosophy in general), insofar as it could serve as an antidote

[69] Even though his request for a change of his family name was already approved in 1883 (see *Budapesti Közlöny* vol. 17. no. 254. [Nov 6, 1883], 2), Szlamka / Szitnyai apparently published in the *Szemle* using his original family name, which has so far prevented his identification with the later stages of his career (even by Szanka 2000).

[70] See *A Budapesti Királyi Magyar Tudomány-Egyetem Almanachja MDCCCLXXLV–LXXXVI-ról* (Budapest: Magyar Királyi Egyetemi Könyvnyomda, 1876), 80.

[71] Place and year of birth assumed on the basis of *A selmeci királyi kath[olikus]gymnasium tanulóinak érdemsorozata 1867/8 tanév vévégel* ([s.l.], [s.d]), unnumbered sheet 2.

[72] It might be mentioned as a quick informal measure of their privileged status in cultural memory that their lexicon entries in ÚMÉL are at least one-page long (which is apparently above average, not to mention those authors who were omitted from ÚMÉL).

to the so-called "monumental" way of writing the history of philosophy that focuses predominantly on "great books" written by "great thinkers". What the study of the flesh-and-blood persons who filled the pages of actual philosophical journals could probably teach us, first, is that "great thinkers", i.e., historical figures occupying central positions in the cultural memory (respectively in the standard narrative of the history of the corresponding scientific discipline), amount only to a tiny fraction of the actual historical fabric that constitutes the scientific discipline in question.[73]

This discrepancy also manifests itself in a concrete way when we take a look at the occupation classifications provided by the most recent comprehensive Hungarian biographical lexicon, the *Új Magyar Életrajzi Lexikon* (ÚMÉL). Out of the 46 identifiable figures, 17 are not included in the lexicon, and only 12 of the remaining lexicon entries are classified as "philosophers." Even though publishing one or more scholarly paper in a dedicated philosophical journal admittedly does not make a full-time professional philosopher (i.e. somebody whose main vocation is philosophy), it could equally be the case that Hungarian cultural memory is too restrictive in applying the label 'philosopher.' Having authored at least one full paper in the *Magyar Philosophiai Szemle* does pass an unambiguous threshold of actively participating in the professional-scholarly philosophical life in a certain period, which must suffice for being included in the category of philosophers, understood as a broad spectrum, ranging from full-time dedicated philosophers (the paradigmatic example of which is the professor of philosophy at the Humboldtian university)[74] to those striving towards becoming dedicated philosophers (paradigmatically, the unsalaried lecturers [*Privatdozenten*] at the Humboldtian university), to those who made a successful scholarly career in a neighbouring disciple (e.g., theology, humanities, or social sciences), which implied a professional excursion to philosophy, and respectively to those who failed to fulfil their philosophical career ambitions. It is only by virtue of studying these 'surplus philosophers' that the richness and complexity of the Hungarian tradition of modern philosophy could be captured and this objective is what the present analysis intends to contribute to.

[73] Concerning the theory of the history of philosophy, see, esp., Geldsetzer 1968; Rorty 1984; Normore 2016. The present author's views are outlined in Varga 2020.

[74] For the philosophical background of the Humboldtian concept of university, the distinctive features of which – e.g. the career option of being a *Privatdozent* (unsalaried lecturer) who created an academic competition for the established professors – were introduced in the Habsburg Monarchy in 1849, see, e.g., Fehér M. 2008.

2. Age and Occupation

The bulk of the authors of the journal were relatively young, three of them even less than twenty years old when the first volume of the *Magyar Philosophiai Szemle* was published. Amongst those who already had come to their age by then, 13 authors were between 20 and 29 years old, 16 authors between 30 and 39 years old (this constitutes the largest age cohort), and 9 between 40 and 49. Only four authors were elderly: two of them between 60 and 69, respectively one septuagenarian and one octogenarian. This age distribution also corresponds to the most distinctive formal career milestone available to 19–20th-century Hungarian scientists, namely membership at the Magyar Tudományos Akadémia (Hungarian Academy of Sciences). When the first issue of the *Magyar Philosophiai Szemle* left the press, almost all of its elder prospective authors were members of the Academy, and there was also one younger member (the ill-fated Imre Pauer, who had been corresponding member since 1874 and was awarded an ordinary membership during the publication period of the journal in 1889, just three years before his reputation was staked by a not entirely baseless plagiarism scandal). Ágost Heller earned his corresponding membership during the time that the journal was published, and three other members of the younger age cohorts were awarded the prestigious membership after 1891. By the time the journal became discontinued, its former authors naturally grew older, and the largest age cohort shifted to the philosophers in their 40s (although all of the three major age cohorts were affected by interim deaths). In order to quantify their impact on the subsequent periods of Hungarian philosophy, it is worth mentioning that 5 authors died while the journal was still being published, 6 until 1901 – when the Hungarian Philosophical Society (Magyar Filozófiai Társaság), the most distinctive milestone in the institutionalization of Hungarian philosophy (see Perecz 2007), was established –, 14 authors (the largest cohort) in the period between 1901 and 1914, only 3 between 1914 and 1920, 9 between 1920 and 1933, and, finally, 8 authors between 1933 and 1947 (i.e. none of them lived until the radical post-WWII transformation of Hungarian philosophical life). In sum, the bulk of the authors of the *Magyar Philosophiai Szemle* were young or, more precisely, (early) mid-career and they remained active until the inter-war period of Hungarian cultural and scientific life.

In contrast to the homogeneity of their age distribution, the occupations of the journal authors paint a more heterogeneous picture. Three of those deemed philosophers by the *Új Magyar Életrajzi Lexikon* (ÚMÉL), respectively three of those not deemed so are also classified as being clerics (churchmen), i.e. Catholic priests or Protestant pastors.[75] If we look at the reconstructed biograms

[75] In order to obtain a strong notion of having an ecclesiastical background, the mere institutional tie to an ecclesiastical educational institute – e.g., Mihály Málnay's teach-

themselves, there are not less than 10 persons (more than 20 percent!) who were clerics at least during some period of their adult life. Furthermore, 21 authors could be classified as having an ecclesiastical background, i.e. had unambiguous institutional ties to one of the Catholic or Protestant churches (it must be emphasized that this concept is understood in the sense delineated by social sciences, rather than in terms of personal religiosity). The other main group is that of the secondary school teachers which comprises 32 out of the identified authors (almost 70 percent!). Already on the level of crude data, these numbers hint at the significant role of both the confessional factor and the impact of the well-organized system of secondary education at the career options of (would-be) professional philosophers. In Section III.5, I will attempt to analyse these factors by virtue of more sophisticated methods.

3. The Role of the University of Budapest

From the point of view of the history of philosophy (and intellectual biography in general), there is a datum that is probably more relevant than the sheer biographical data of age, namely the years in which our heroes first crossed the gates of a university. Owing to the detailed biographical reconstructions carried out in Section II above, it is possible to draw an almost complete picture of this key biographical circumstance, which, in turn, could be compared to the historical developments at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest (where, as we will see in more detail, the majority of the journal authors had studied), resulting in a philosophically even more relevant analysis.

During the period in question, there was only a very limited number of active professors and unsalaried lecturers *(Privatdozenten)* of philosophy at the University of Budapest.[76] Cyrill Horváth became a supplementary professor due to the sudden coup mounted by the university to take advantage of the privilege of Hungarian instruction language granted by the October Diploma of 1860 (see Szentpétery 1933. 436 ff.) and in June 1863, his professorial position was finalized by virtue of the formal tender announced by the university (cf. 450 ff.).

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ing position at the Jewish Teacher-training College in Budapest – is not classified as an explicit ecclesiastical background. Thus, not all ecclesiastical ties are captured by this notion (lest the actor's personal religiousness).

[76] Cf. Szentpétery 1933; Gergely 1976. – It is worth noting that Imre Szentpétery's book, though published almost a century ago and thus marked by an earlier approach towards writing intellectual and institutional history, still constitutes a privileged source, insofar as the pertaining archival material was affected by the fire in the Magyar Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archives) during the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.

Despite being praised by the Faculty as "a national authority and, furthermore, the most eminent one in Hungary" (ibid.), it is worth noting that Horváth's prior career did not predestine him to this position, not to mention the fact that Horváth's fellow Piarist József Purgstaller (Palotai, 1806–1867), who authored a six-volume overview of philosophy between 1843 and 1847 (while Horváth, in stark contrast, failed to publish a single book during his distinguished career, lest an original philosophical treatise), could have been a more natural choice for the chair of philosophy at the University of Budapest. Purgstaller was indeed appointed in the wake of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, but in 1849, the Habsburg-imposed Council of Governor-General divested him of the professorial chair (see Szentpétery 1933. 374 ff., 393). He continued his ecclesiastical and secondary school teaching career until he was sent to a psychiatric clinic in 1866. Horváth's stellar career backfired in an equally spectacular way when, shortly after his death, Horváth was vehemently accused of lacking philosophical output, as hopes for an alleged systematic *opus magnum,* "lying in the cupboard of his desk, complete and even including an index of subjects",[77] bitterly evaporated (cf. Mester 2011). Given this highly charged historiographical situation, the plain and sober method of biographical reconstruction which is employed in the present article could be hoped to convey a more concrete and anchored picture of Horváth's influence. Amongst the 14 authors whose exact year of entrance at the university could be ascertained,[78] eleven started their university studies under the aegis of Horváth.

The first cracks on the 'System of Horváth' appeared at the "turn of the 1870s-1880s" (Gergely 1976. 10), as Bernhard (Bernát) Alexander (1850–1927), the uncontested doyen of late pre-war Hungarian philosophy, as well as his student companion József Bánóczi (Weisz, 1849–1926) returned from their peregrinations[79] and obtained unsalaried lecturer *(Privatdozent)* positions in 1878 in "the history of philosophy and the theory of knowledge," respectively in "the history and propedeutics of philosophy" (Szentpétery 1933. 680). In 1880, they were joined by Frigyes Medveczky (his name on foreign titles was Bärenbach; 1856–1914) who received an appointment in "anthropology and the theory of

[77] *Vasárnapi Ujság* vol 31, no. 45 (Nov 9, 1884), 721.

[78] The lack of identifiable entrance year is probably equally due to the peculiarities of pre-modern (ecclesiastical) secondary school teaching career (see note 56 above), as well as the contingent circumstances of the availability of historical sources. With regard to the method employed above, I think that the year of entrance is more relevant than the year of finishing university studies, as the study period used to be both more intensive and intellectually formative at the beginning, not to mention that the later part used to be more irregular.

[79] Concerning Alexander, see, e.g., Gábor 1986; Turbucz 2018. – A section of his peregrination was reconstructed by the present author: Varga 2018a., together with the publication of the corresponding entries in his student diary: Szekér et al. 2018.

knowledge" (684). However, due to the organization of the curriculum at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest, it was impossible for the students to avoid Horváth, who held the lectures in the larger classes required for the teaching license examinations (which he also superseded). In any case, eight of the aforementioned 14 authors entered the university when philosophy was monopolized by Horváth (further two arrived in 1878 and one in 1879). It is, thus, not an overstatement to claim that – at least with regard to those coming from the University of Budapest (and whose year of entrance could be ascertained) – the *Magyar Philosophiai Szemle* was deeply entrenched in the hands of philosophers schooled by Horváth (if not his explicit students, e.g. Nemes). This is all the more interesting, since Horváth – as a delayed countereffect of his rise and posthumous fall from fame – is nowadays uniformly considered as lacking any serious philosophical role in the history of Hungarian philosophy. Quite the contrary, Horváth emerges as the central figure behind the first professional philosophical journal in Hungary.

Horváth's chair was inherited by Pauer in 1886 (ordinary professor since 1889), but the age of plurality already arrived in professional philosophy at the University of Budapest in 1882 when a second chair of (theoretical) philosophy was established upon the request of the Faculty formulated in November 1881 (see Szentpétery 1933. 532). This chair was bestowed upon Medveczky, who became ordinary professor in 1886. Alexander had to wait until 1895 in order to become extraordinary professor (in hindsight, Alexander ascribed this delay to rising anti-Semitism in Hungary: Alexander 1919. 28). Only three of the journal's authors entered the university in that pluralistic age.

4. Peregrinations

The most promising aspect of the uniform biographical reconstruction of a given set of historical figures lies, arguably, in the possibility of mapping their institutional embeddedness and interconnections in a way that goes beyond the confines of the usual assumptions of history-writing with regard to the corresponding period. In order to exploit this potential, we are, first, going to study the authors' studies at universities abroad, their so-called peregrinations, which is customarily considered the most compelling form of interconnections between historical actors and institutions (even though, as we will see, in the actual case it is not yet able to live up to its general promises).

On the basis of the biographical reconstructions provided in Section II.2 above, it is possible to reconstruct the detailed network of peregrinations by the authors of the journal *(Figure 1),* including the possibly exact date of their studies, and respectively the exact faculties involved (not just the universities as such). In contrast to Horváth himself, who, as seen in Section III.3 above, could



Figure 1: Peregrinations by the journal authors, including date and faculty information

be regarded as a "founding father" of the young or, more precisely, mid-career philosophers gathered under the umbrella of the *Magyar Philosophiai Szemle,* a significant portion of the authors in question attended a foreign university for one or more semesters. Given the long-established tradition of peregrination in the circles of Hungarian intellectual elites (cf. the introductions in Szögi 2001 and the subsequent volumes of the series), it would be misleading to interpret this contrast as a sign of modernization (notwithstanding the institutional efforts by the Hungarian secretary of education to foster peregrinations among prospective teachers),[80] but rather a phenomenon that is rooted in confessional differences. In particular, it is not by chance that the Piarist priest Horváth did

[80] See, e.g., *Beszédek, melyek a Magy. Kir. Tudomány-Egyetemen MDCCCLXXII–LXXIII. tanévi rectora és tanácsának beiktatásakor október I. tartattak. V. Tanév-megnyitó beszéd […]* (Buda: Magy. Kir. Egyetemi Könyvnyomda, 1872), 38–39. Even though not all of them were funded by this program, the prospective authors undertaking peregrination were all secondary school teachers, except for three of them.

not attend foreign universities, since the infrastructure of the Catholic church in Hungary was still strong enough and not dependent on foreign institutional support (unlike in the post-WWII age), not to mention the institutional separation of the Hungarian religious orders resulting from the *Sonderweg* of their historical development vis-à-vis their counterparts outside of the Habsburg Monarchy since the decrees of Emperor Joseph II.[81]

Extensive as it was, the peregrination network of the journal authors still counts as dispersed, consisting of several smaller unconnected components, i.e. any given foreign university was visited by not more than 2-3 philosophers. Due to the lack of studies concentrating around certain poles, no clear pattern emerges, although the network is unsurprisingly dominated by German-speaking institutes of tertiary education. In this regard, it is conspicuous that the students mostly avoided the University of Berlin, which quickly emerged as the centrepiece of the interconnected system of German universities, attracting professorial talents from every corner of the Empire, culminating in philosophical excellence on the basis of the glorious tradition of idealist philosophy in Berlin (see Gerhardt et al. 1999). Instead, the students concentrated on so-called research universities, e.g., the Universities of Heidelberg, Jena, and Tübingen, which, rich in tradition as they were, did not always coincide with the locus of the *in statu nascendi* modern German philosophy. Another notable emission was the University of Vienna, the Faculty of Humanities of which was visited only by one prospective author of the journal. While the former focus might be rooted in the traditional preferences of the peregrination movement, it is plausible to relate the omission of Vienna to general political aversion, and respectively cultural concurrency against the capital of the Habsburg Empire. Notwithstanding its motives, the lack of any significant attention paid to Viennese philosophy is deeply regrettable, since none other than Franz Brentano, who is customarily credited as the 'grandfather of phenomenology' (cf., e.g., Baumgartner 2003), i.e. as being the main representative of the arguably most innovative strain of philosophical thought in late nineteenth century, had taught there between 1874 and 1894. Yet, even the single visitor in Vienna, Géza Antal apparently avoided Brentano and, instead, opted for the colourless Herbartian philosopher, Robert Zimmermann.[82]

At the same time, the lessons of the above study of the peregrination network are far from being entirely negative. Even though there is no manifest larger pattern

[81] See Borián et al. 2007. Concerning the career path of secondary school teachers in Catholic religious orders, see also note 56 above.

[82] It must be added in Antal's defense that Brentano had lost his professorship in 1880 and was demoted to the rank of unsalaried lecturer *(Privatdozent),* see Winter 1979; Baumgartner and Burkard 1990; Varga 2014 (not to mention that, contrary to the received biographical view, Husserl himself was not exempt from Herbartian influences mediated through none other than Zimmermann, see Péter András Varga 2015; 2018b).

underlying individual peregrinations, the dispersed university studies abroad hint at significant, though a diffuse and subliminal system of interactions taking place between nineteenth-century Hungarian and contemporaneous German philosophy, which deserves a detailed philosophical interpretation. There are, however, two methodological prerequisites for such a philosophical interpretation (the full implementation of which obviously exceeds the confines of the present investigation): First, one has to identify the precise lists of the courses attended or, at least, the philosophical teachers who held these classes. This kind of information is, unfortunately, not provided by the otherwise excellent collections recently published on the topics of Hungarian peregrination (see Section II.1 above), and is neither found in the general biographical stories told and re-told about the particular philosophers (these accounts, as seen above, are more often than not are lacking and inadequate when it comes to concrete historical data), but, in most cases, are only available in foreign university archives. Second, what is more important philosophically, one has to interpret these raw archival records against the backdrop of contemporaneous German academic philosophy *(Universitätsphilosophie),* i.e., the special variant of philosophy, hitherto forgotten, the representatives of which populated the philosophical chairs of Germany in the long period spanning between the death of Hegel – respectively the demise of German Idealism in general – and the rise of modern Continental philosophy at the turn of the last century. It is this area, where the study of admittedly obscure Hungarian philosophers meets the historiography of European (German and Austrian) philosophy and, thus, could acquire a broader historiographical significance.[83]

5. Institutional Networks

On the other hand, the map of institutional interconnections within Hungary, i.e. the map of the sources of knowledge and the impact points of knowledge transmission *(Figure 2),* is surprisingly rich and insightful. For the sake of the present analysis, all forms of tertiary educational institutions (including not only the Universities of [Buda]pest and Kolozsvár [today: Cluj in Romania], but also the nascent Technical University of Budapest, as well as the various academies) have been considered in a uniform way both with regard to studying (indicated by dotted lines) and teaching (indicated by solid lines, disregarding the differences in appointment forms). Furthermore, one special kind of institutional membership, namely the membership of the aforementioned Hungarian Academy of Sciences

[83] For case studies in this research program undertaken by the present author, see Varga 2016b; Varga 2017; Varga 2018a. – Concerning the historiographical concept of German post-Hegelian academic philosophy *(Universitätsphilosophie),* see esp. Köhnke 1986; Beiser 2014 (cf. Varga 2016a).

is also included. In order to improve the legibility and emphasis of the institutional structure, names of historical persons themselves are omitted from the figure. Institutions are symbolized by rounded rectangles. In case of historical persons, a triangle indicates the occupation class of secondary school teachers; the reversed ('V-shaped') triangle indicates the ecclesiastical background (their intersections are symbolized by diamonds), while a simple circle is employed in the default case. The size of nodes is proportional to their so-called in-degree (i.e., the number of incoming links). In case of links, dotted lines symbolize the simple studying, while solid lines indicate the presence of teaching. Institutional memberships are symbolized with dot-dash lines. Finally, a dark gray node outline indicates that the corresponding author could be regarded as a canonized philosopher, insofar as the corresponding lexicon entry in the *Új Magyar Életrajzi Lexikon* (ÚMÉL) includes the occupation classification "philosopher."

The first striking feature is the relative density of connections, by virtue of which the whole map consists in one large, connected component, with the exception of a single minor component. While the network would technically remain connected even without the presence of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences; from a topological point of view, this venerable institution is what connects the upper and lower parts of the network. In a historically plausible way, the former consists of various regional academies (i.e., institutes of tertiary education not regarded as university), which mostly had only two faculties: the



Figure 2: Institutional adjacency network within Hungary

Faculty of Law and a Faculty of General Humanities or of Theology. It is, thus, also plausible from a historical point of view that these tertiary educational institutions are grouped together with the Faculties of Law at the Universities of Budapest and Kolozsvár, respectively the Faculty of Theology of the University of Budapest. The two medical faculties involved are understandably located on the fringe. It is worth noting that, taken together, the institutions which lie outside the confines of the typical career path of a modern philosopher account for a significant and coherent portion of the institutional network in which the authors of the journal were embedded.

The lower part of the main component is, unsurprisingly, centred around the Faculty of Humanities, which was analysed in Section III.3 above. There are, however, some surprises lurking in this area or, more precisely, hidden features that not only make sense philosophically but also provide relevant insights or, at least, corroborate such conjectures concerning the historical period in question. First, the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Kolozsvár (founded in 1872),[84] which was often regarded as an antipode of the older institute of Budapest, is still conspicuously close to the latter, which might be understood in the sense of indicating that academic rivalry was still embedded in an overarching shared scholarly framework. Second, what is more important for the purposes of the present investigation, a series of confessional institutes are located in the relative proximity of the central Faculty Humanities of the University of Budapest. I am inclined to take this topological feature as a further corroboration of the insight, already formulated in Section III.1, according to which historical figures with an unambiguously confessional background – not to mention clerics themselves – constitute a significant portion of the first modern philosophers in a way that might have been underrepresented by the historiography of Hungarian philosophy so far.

These insights could be further articulated by taking into account the occupational classes as indicated in *Figure 2*. To begin with, the canonized philosophers (i.e. historical figures classified as philosophers by the *Új Magyar Életrajzi*

[84] The idea of a scholarly rivalry between the two faculties of humanities was widely shared by the contemporaries as well. For instance, Lajos Felméri, then professor of philosophy in pedagogy in Kolozsvár, wrote in an occasional writing addressed to none other than Imre Pauer, his counterpart in Budapest: "We, the teachers in Kolozsvár are getting quite accustomed to the benevolence shown by our colleagues in Budapest towards us. They are almost indulging us: as the saying goes, they apply ointment to us with logs of wood [*the original proverb does not exist in contemporary Hungarian either; P.A.V.*]. Every now and then, someone grown into an official big boy [in Budapest] turns on to one of our fellow colleagues [in Kolozsvár], whispering into his ears: 'I love you so much that I could almost eat you up [*untranslatable word-play in Hungarian; P.A.V.*].'" (*Budapesti Szemle*, vol. 67, no. 175 [1891], 143.) – On the early history of the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Kolozsvár, see T. Szabó – Zabán (eds.) 2012.

Lexikon [ÚMÉL], indicated on the figure by dark grey node outline) are almost exclusively concentrated around the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest, where they studied, and respectively where they taught. What is perhaps more surprising is that the bulk of them came from the intersection of the authors with an ecclesiastical background and secondary school teaching (the remaining intersectional figures are also located in the lower, more prominent half of the figure). Put differently, the official narrative of the nineteenth-century history of philosophy in Hungary, at least with regard to the authors of the *Magyar Philosophiai Szemle,* is confined to secondary school teachers with ecclesiastical backgrounds, while neglecting those who were either secondary school teachers or had an ecclesiastical background (i.e., the disjunctive union or, alternatively, the symmetric difference of the two groups), even though the bulk of them are similarly centred around the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest (or the lower topological part of the main component of the institutional adjacency network). It is probably also not by historiographical chance that figures associated with the ecclesiastical institutes or the university outside the capital are ignored by this kind of canonization, even though some of them – including the co-editor Baráth – belonged to the aforementioned intersectional group. This, again, calls for a more inclusive historiography of Hungarian philosophy that is also attentive towards the hitherto marginalized sub-traditions outside of the mainstream.

6. Geographic Distribution

Finally, let us take a look at the geographical distribution of the authors of the *Magyar Philosophiai Szemle*. Based on the reconstructed biographies, *Figure 3* shows separate maps for the places of birth, respectively places of death of the authors, as well as the group of canonized philosophers (i.e. classified as a philosopher by *Új Magyar Életrajzi Lexikon*, ÚMÉL), clerics, authors with an ecclesiastical background, and secondary school teachers. Given that the place of death could be very misleading from the point of view of biographical significance (for instance, the old Imre Pauer retired to his native city Vác, masking both a geographically and professionally varied career which led him to a secondary-school teacher and director position in Szombathely to the professorial position, first, at the Academy in Pozsony [today: Bratislava in Slovakia] and, finally, at the university in the capital of Hungary), the figure also maps the places of professional occupations – including tertiary studies, but excluding already dead, retired or otherwise incapacitated persons – in the years when the journal was started (1882) and abandoned (1891). For the sake of simplicity, Budapest, which was unified only in 1873, is treated as a single geographic entity.



Figure 3: Geographical distributions of the places of birth, occupations, and death by the various classes of the authors

The unmistakeable and general geographical trend points towards concentration, especially during the course of the professional careers, in Budapest. It is particularly conspicious in case of the canonized philosophers who were all born outside of the capital but, with a single exception, have migrated to Budapest by the time the journal was last published. The reverse side of the same coin is, however, that there seems to exist an exclusive focus on the capital by the mainstream historiography of philosophy (or, at least, a tendency towards it) which would certainly fail to do justice to the geographical diversity of late nineteenth-century Hungarian philosophy, as the authors of the journals were far from being confined to only Budapest (despite the journal's beginning from informal meetings in Budapest, respectively Böhm's exclusive role in the contemporenous accounts of the event).[85] Even during the decade of the journal's existence, not all of its authors have moved to the capital. By virtue of the classification of the biographies, it is also possible to ascertain the sources of this geographical plurality.

In this regard, it is, to begin with, the group of secondary school teachers that is worth our attention. The geographic trajectories of their biographies were regularized by the cities in which secondary schools were located, resulting in a less dispersed geographical distribution than that of their places of birth. At the same time, this geographical dynamic was far from being limited to Budapest, but rather remained distributed around the regional centres during the whole life of the journal. While some of the individual geographical trajectories culminated in a position in the capital, other graduates of the University of Budapest were confined to the countryside through their entire careers (often including hops to distant cities). It is easy to imagine that some of the scholarly gifted teachers were hurt in their feelings by being prevented from moving to Budapest. For instance, Imre Nemes, who successfully habilitated at the university, yet was confined to regional centres during his entire active career. At least, he was able to move to Budapest after his retirement, where he was a keen participant of the meetings of the Szent Tamás Társaság ([Hungarian] Thomas Aquinas Society), respectively member of the counter-cultural Catholic Academy, the Szent István Akadémia (Saint Stephan Academy).[86] In any case, the scholarly reconstruction of their philosophical output must, in a similar fashion, avoids the geographical containment to Budapest, but rather look for obscure printed sources published far from the capital, e.g., the school yearbooks from which several eulogies were cited the course of the biographical reconstructions in Section II.2 above.

The second group comprises clerics – authors with ecclesiastical backgrounds – whose professional careers remained, in a significant portion of the cases, geographically tied to regional centers (e.g., Pápa, Sárospatak, or Eperjes

[85] See note 1 above.

[86] See, e.g., *Magyar Lapok* vol. 7, no. 114 (May 24, 1938), 7.

[today Prešov in Slovakia]), some of which retained a higher significance within the administrative structure of the corresponding confession than in the general structure in the secular Hungarian state (a contemporary example of this difference is Vác, which is still an episcopal seat, despite its relatively low population count). Again, I think this trend should remind us that recovering the special confessional traditions of Hungarian philosophy, which, as seen in the previous sections (e.g., Section III.5) constitute substantial threads within the story of Hungarian philosophy, hinges to a considerable extent on looking beyond the geographical centre of Hungary.

IV. Concluding Remarks

In case of the short-lived first Hungarian philosophical journal *Magyar Philosophiai Szemle,* often credited with "a drop in the [scholarly] standard" (Laczkó 1996. 65) by the end of its publication period (particularly with regard to the proliferation of less-reflected classical positivism), the 'Who?' might be more important than the 'What?'. More precisely, the authors of the journal constitute a group of philosophers the choice of whom is not governed by a prevalent philosophical canon, but rather an external historical fact, namely their participation in this pioneering venue of Hungarian professional philosophy. This surplus was already manifest in the amount of scholarly efforts required to compile their biographies (Section II.2), which in several cases had to rely on obscure contemporaneous sources (cf. Section III.1). In order to uncover the facets of this source-based grouping of late nineteenth-century Hungarian philosophers, I have investigated their age and occupation (Section III.2), including, specifically, the age distribution of their study at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Budapest, which constitutes their most frequently visited university (Section III.3), as well as their studies at universities abroad, their so-called peregrinations (Section III.4), their embeddedness in the Hungarian institutional network (Section III.5), and, finally, the geographical distribution of their places of birth, death, and respectively their places of occupation at the beginning and end of the journal's publication period (Section III.6).

Studying this group is all the more important as, even though there obviously were individual professional philosophers before them (e.g., the professors of philosophy at the University of [Buda]pest, earlier in Pozsony [Bratislava]; see Szentpétery 1933. 668–669), they could be regarded as the first Hungarian professional philosophers in the collective sense, in case the establishment of the public sphere *(Öffentlichkeit)* of Hungarian philosophy – in the form of a professional scholarly journal – could be regarded as the prerequisite to the latter. The fact that the author list of the journal constitutes an access to this first modern Hungarian philosophers that is not governed by the presuppositions of

a historiographical canon – but rather the historical sources themselves – could be hoped to contribute to a more inclusive historiography of modern Hungarian philosophy, in a way that is more attentive of the hitherto marginalized sub-traditions (e.g., the sub-traditions of various confessional philosophies or the school-philosophies) outside of the historiographical mainstream. At the same time, the discrepancies manifested in this genre of philosophical history-writing, respectively the methodological tools involved might be of interest for the historiography of general European philosophy, especially of nineteenth-century German academic philosophy (*Universitätsphilosophie*) and the pre-history of phenomenology as well.

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MÉL Kenyeres Ágnes *et al.* (eds.) *Magyar életrajzi lexikon.* 4 vols. Budapest, Akadémiai, 1967–1994.

MKL Diós István – Viczián János (eds.) *Magyar katolikus lexikon*. 17 vols. Budapest: Szent István Társulat, 1997–2014.

SZM Szinnyei, József *Magyar írók élete és munkái.* 14 vols. Budapest, Hornyánszky, 1894–1914.

ÚMÉL Markó László et al. (eds.) *Új magyar életrajzi lexikon.* 6 vols. Budapest, Magyar Könyvklub – Helikon, 2001–2007.

ZSL Újvári Péter (ed.) *[Magyar] zsidó lexikon.* Budapest, Zsidó Lexikon, 1929.

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Why is not Bernhard Alexander One of the Best-known Hungarian Philosophers?

Possible Answers

I. Raising the Question and the Framework of Interpretation

Bernhard Alexander was one of the most influential figures of philosophy in Hungary until 1919. His influence, that is his educational, editorial, translating and academic work was not only a novelty but also essential (Perecz 2001. 123). Apart from becoming part of the canon in the history of philosophy, he is not looked upon as one of the best-known philosophers of the nation. The reason for this, in my view, lies not solely in the fact of how "deeply" or "lightly" he discussed Schopenhauer, Descartes, Diderot, Spinoza or any other philosopher in his works. In fact, his being neglected cannot be accounted for by his works in the canon but rather *external reasons*. This study aims at reviewing and presenting these reasons and by doing so, giving an answer to the question posed in the title.

Just like today, it was also true for the intellectual life of 19–20th-century Hungary that for several decades there was an openly anti-philosophical atmosphere, when intellectuals had no better chance of becoming well-known than either becoming a writer or building a career abroad. Obviously, there were other alternatives too; for example, getting expelled from the country (especially if being committed politically to a dictatorship) was as good as a guarantee of success after a while. Also, there were some other paths, such as taking up politics and, what is more, there were also a few people who just happened to be at the right place at the right time.

Bernhard Alexander chose the first alternative; he tried to assert himself as a philosophical writer. In one of his first studies called *Faust and the Tragedy of Man* (Alexander 1871. 19–29). He already discussed the philosophical relationships of the two popular literary works using the language of journalism. Furthermore, he identified himself as a philosophical writer some decades later as well, which was marked by his admission to the Kisfaludy Society. Why is the appraisal of his achievements in philosophy missing, then? The scholarly discussion of philosophical questions and the use of literary language do not exclude each other. Without an extensive knowledge of Bernhard Alexander's philosophical life work, the question above cannot be answered at present, and

all efforts to do so can only produce attempts at answering it until a bibliography of all his works has been compiled. At the moment, the only fact that we can state is that the acknowledgements of his philosophical achievements in his life were restricted to his appearances at the meetings of the Kisfaludy Society and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and his reading evenings at the Hungarian Philosophical Society, and most of them were restricted to the applauses received at these occasions. Further incidental acknowledgements came from some newspaper articles written about some of his works, mostly not even by philosophers. There were some rare exceptions though. One of these was *How is Philosophy and Criticism Done at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences*? by József Sándor Simon (Simon 1897. 5–11), and we can also mention most of young Oszkár Jászi's concept of art, as well as György Bartók's critique of Alexander's thoughts on war. After 1927, up until the years preceding the fall of communism, the appreciation of Alexander as a philosopher was connected to Gyula Kornis, Károly Sebestyén, Samu Szemere and Sándor Imre, their academic positions and the depths of their interpretations.

Concerning the main question, the most important thing is to learn how the given Hungarian thinker acted in a particular life situation or what he thought of the historical event he was living through. Studying these could be the key to understanding his fame or the lack thereof. One illustration of this is the following: the date of Bernhard Alexander's acceptance as a full member of the academy is known but its background, that is, his role in the war that led to his gaining this membership has just got into the focus of certain studies. Also, there are ongoing efforts today to prove that his Spinoza orientation and the approach of his late Shakespeare and Madách interpretations can be almost exclusively related to his persecution and the ruining of his reputation in 1919, and that is why so little is known about them.

Where can Bernhard Alexander's recognition as a philosopher be ranked among the Hungarian thinkers of the 19th and 20th centuries? Some simply view him as *a philosopher without any independent philosophical works,* and this way they do not bother much about obtaining his books and studies. Regarding publications about him, there are a lot fewer of these than, for example, about György Lukács, and even the *Biographical Encyclopaedia of Hungary* devotes only one column to his name (Kenyeres 1967. 20–21), about as much as to Sándor Fürst, a supposed martyr of the labour movement. These facts raise questions about how Alexander pursued his profession to become so marginalized in the course of time, and how we should regard him and whether his oblivion is justified. Judgement about a person who is a philosopher, an aesthete, a teacher, an organizer of institutions, a translator, a journalist, an editor, a theatre critic, a litterateur, a psychologist, an editor, an encyclopaedia writer, and even an orator at the same time is determined by two main factors: the knowledge of his works and his sources. Actually, the

relevant question really is whether we truly know his life, his works and their origins or we are just still scratching the surface.

The most suitable term for a scholar who, according to his contemporaries, was knowledgeable about all cultural issues is *polymath,* regardless how old-fashioned this term is.[1] It is this huge complex of activities that a narrow group must be isolated from, the ones related to philosophy, which, in my view, can only be made in the knowledge of his other life situations and activities influencing his philosophical work.

Answering my question may seem an easy task at first sight by looking at his writings of 30 years in his book titled *Studies: Philosophy* (Alexander 1924), published in 1924. Based on these writings, Alexander truly stands without any philosophical works in his own right. How could he be well-known, let alone popular, then? We can only reply to this after an examination of his biography, since the above book of studies hardly contains even the essence of Alexander's philosophy, thus providing only partial answers at the most.

II. 1908–1910

The first period in Alexander's life concerning which the question raised can actually be adequately answered falls between the years of 1908 and 1910. After writing his monograph entitled *Art: The Value of Art: On Artistic Education* (Alexander 1908), which has seen several editions in Hungary, he cared to have a French translation of it but did not care to have one in German. He did not care about the possibility of the latter one despite of the fact that he had had quite a wide group of readers in Germany due to his newspaper articles and essays. He did not think of translating his previous books at all. Thus, among his philosophical writings that were of a reasonable length, his doctoral thesis was basically the only one that was available in a foreign language.

In 1909, he put more effort and philosophical work into the comments and notes for the second, revised edition of Madách's *The Tragedy of Man* (Madách 1909) than into his own writings. The only exceptions in this period may have been his aesthetic writings named *Vonalról (About the Line)* and *A tapintat (Tact)* (Alexander 1908; Alexander 1909). The 66 pages of the accompanying studies of Alexander's critical edition, boasting five editions, clearly show the gigantic scale of the undertaking, by which his aim was to prove the poet's qual-

[1] According to a letter of his dated 1920, as many as 1565 "assignments" were published since his years at university. MNL OL, K 636 1923-5-77815 (134099/1920), *Dr. Bernhard Alexander's letter to István Haller.*

ity as a philosophical writer.[2] He considered this undertaking as one of his most important, a "fifty-year-long philosophical project".

Going back to 1909, as the "ambassador proper" of the Kisfaludy Society, some philosophical works written in foreign languages could have come in handy for him, but he did not find the time for them. To tell the whole truth, he did not have time for translations because of all the work piled up around his *Filozófiai Írók Tára (Collection of Philosophical Authors).* Lest we forget, his books on Berkeley, Plato, Nietzsche and Morus were published sequentially between 1909 and 1910.[3]

When he delivered his speech *Vallomás (Confession)* (Alexander 1924. 5–12) in 1910, Bernhard Alexander was the best-known philosopher in Hungary. However, besides his illustrious oration, he hardly engaged in his field of study. He considered the book *Emlékkönyv (Memory Book)* (Dénes 1910), which was addressed to him, the spreading of prints of his speech among his friends, and the homage paid to him by some provincial cultural associations sufficient to ensure that he would be remembered in the future.[4] He rather spent his free time editing the book series called *Népszerű Főiskola Könyvtára (Popular College Library)* (Földes 1907. 16–17). His philosophical activity was most significant in the related Popular College Courses in this period. With his very well-attended lecture courses, he was able to earn the equivalent of his three months' salary as a lecturer.[5] He did not only make notes for his lectures, but also thoroughly elaborated them, yet in consequence of the bankruptcy of the editorial undertaking, the submitted manuscripts could never be published; to our current knowledge they were lost. These works are *Bevezetés a filozófiába: A filozófia alapproblémái (An Introduction to Philosophy: The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy)* of 1909*; Nagy gondolkodók a XIX. században: Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Comte, Spencer* (*Great Thinkers of the 19*th *Century: Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Comte, Spencer*) of 1910*; A XIX. század filozófusai (The Philosophers of the 19*th *Century)* (Pozsony) and *Korunk művészi mozgalmairól (On the Artistic Movements*

[2] By admitting to Madách's philosophical assimilation, Alexander explicitly argues with the views of János Erdélyi, Menyhért Palágyi and Mór Kármán.

[3] The bibliographical data of these works were published by Laczkó 2004. 121. The story of the sequel was most fully and firstly summarized by Béla Mester (Mester 2006. III–XX).

[4] In 1912, Count Dénes Andrássy, Viktor Rákosi and Bernhard Alexander were admitted as honorary members of the Kazinczy Circle. OSZK Manuscripts Archive, documents about Bernhard Alexander's life 1912–1917. *Kazinczy-Kör levele Alexander Bernáthoz (Letter of the Kazinczy Circle to Bernhard Alexander).* Also in: *Budapesti Hirlap* 30 April 1912. 17.

[5] To view his salary, see MNL OL, K 636 1923-5-77815 (129752/1922), *Account book (debts) statement.*

of our Time) (Nagybecskerek) of 1911, *A művészetről és a művészi alkotó erőről (On Art and Aristic Creative Power)* (Miskolc) of 1912.

By 1910, Alexander had been at the philosophical world congresses held in Geneva and in Heidelberg, where he not only gave lectures but also wrote reports on the events. What is more, he was the main orator at one of the ceremonial dinners in Heidelberg and was elected a member of the organizing committee for the next congress. At the Bologna congress, he was supposed to take the chairman of honor's seat for one day, which he refused. But why did he do so? Based on our current knowledge, it was due to two important and well-paid duties of his: the editiorial work on the *Révai Nagy Lexikona (Révai's Great Encyclopaedia)* and his contract with *Vasárnapi Újság (Sunday Newspaper)*. Because of these obligations, which engaged his creative powers for years, he could not even make it to the congress. There was also a personal factor, and it was the fact that he had become a board member of the Israelite community in Pest, which came with further obligations in the following years.

III. 1914–1918

In relation to the centenary of the First World War, this period in Bernhard Alexander's life gained special attention, so I will now restrict myself to mentioning the most important facts only. Concerning the appreciation of his philosophical life work, he dealt with philosophy most intensely and most extensively in the times of war. These were the times when he stood at the peak of his popularity as well.

He himself identified his philosophical work between November 1914 and the summer of 1917 as "wartime philosophy", and being aware of himself as the most significant representative of the field, he accepted the leadership of the Hungarian Philosophical Society in 1915. In the same year, his achievements were also acknowledged by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, which elected him a full member. Most of his best-known philosophical works of this period, even if they were only lectures, have survived: *A háború mint nemzetnevelő (War as the Nation's Educator), Filozófia és háború (Philosophy and War), Magyar filozófia (Hungarian Philosophy), Cselekvő gondolat (The Proactive Thought), Leibniz-beszéd (Speech on Leibnitz),* etc. Unfortunately, there are some exceptions here too: his transcribed lectures *Az örök béke problémája (The Problem of Eternal Peace), Az örök béke ideálja (The Ideal of Eternal Peace), A háború filozófiájáról (On the Philosophy of War)* from 1915, *Nagy ellentmondások (Great Contradictions), A béke gondolatáról (On the Notion of Peace)* from 1916, and *Tények és értékek (Facts and Values)* of 1918, etc. have been lost.

His break-up with wartime philosophy was marked by his study *Az intuícióról (On Intuition)* (Alexander 1924. 168–190), but it happened too late. He did not

realize that his readings that had attracted enthusiasm until 1916 had raised antipathy by the end of 1917. The scholar basically did not bother about such "earthly matters", so the community of leftist philosophers slowly turned totally against him, while the so-called conservative faction became more and more envious of his success. Publishing his best-known wartime speeches (Alexander 1918/2014) in the second month after the end of the war did not make a good impression, either. In the following year, at the end of 1919, he himself traced the main reason for his unpopularity back to this act.

IV. 1919–1923

We have come to the most important period regarding the main question. What happened to Alexander during these years has been described in some of my earlier writings (Turbucz 2017, 2019). While he was preoccupied with the medical treatment of his wife in Switzerland, he became absolutely discredited in his home country. He got expelled from all academic circles, deprived of his professorship; what is more, his family was forced to leave the country. If these months in his philosophic career should be named, perhaps the term *the period of breaking up with the canon* would be the most suitable. This is because what we see is that for several months from the autumn of 1919 on, the scholar who had left the country was trying to prove unsuccessfully that he had never had any relations with leftist circles. Also, with all his efforts thrown into the scale, he was trying to prove that he was the member of the conservative academic group that had turned against him for some reason. With the exclusions in December 1919, the final break-up took place.

For a very long time Alexander could not forgive that he, who had earlier been accused of pursuing a "tricolor philosophy", was now handled as communist-hearted. He could not leave his wife behind to return home, so he helplessly watched the discrediting campaign led against him. From 1920 on, he reacted to his exclusion from Hungarian philosophic life[6] with neglect and turned his back on the situation, so, at least in Hungary, discourse about his philosophy became more and more polarized. Agitations by newspapers against him and his family hit the target in no time. His popularity collapsed, and university and academic circles were no longer interested in his philosophical views.

Looking at the above events in terms of his academic organizational activities and philosophical works, the sponsorship of his journal *Athenaeum* was temporarily discontinued, the sponsorship (and the very publishing) of *Filozófiai Írók Tára (Collection of Philosophical Authors)* ended. Besides, Alexander did

[6] In order to avoid procedures by the certifying committee, Alexander had to disclaim his chairmanship at the Hungarian Philosophical Society.

not finish writing his lecture *Böhm Károly emlékezete (The Memory of Károly Böhm),* which he had been asked to do by the Academy in May 1919 according to his writing *Föllebezés (Appeal)*.[7] Instead, he turned his interest towards the study of the philosopher Benedictus Spinoza for years, for which – by his own account – he read a libraryful of literature (Szemere 1970. 46–47).

His manuscripts titled *Föllebbezés-memorandum (Appeal Memorandum)* and *A magyar bolsevizmusról (On Hungarian Bolshevism)* (Alexander 1919/2019. 21–53), written in the winter of 1919–1920 were not philosophical works, still they were life-changing works regarding his thinking and world view and were written to vindicate himself from the charges of being "unpatriotic". Unfortunately, neither of them reached any philosophers or other readers in Hungary. The publication of the memorandum was inhibited by the Academy and his paper *A magyar bolsevizmusról (On Hungarian Bolshevism)* could only be published in the Hungarian Americans' newspaper called *Szabadság (Liberty).* In Hungary, this paper was very hard to obtain. Consequently, for a long time his contemporaries regarded him as a communist or, at best, an errant scholar. One of the latter was his future chronicler Gyula Kornis.

Although the University of Geneva qualified Alexander as a private lecturer, and later he held two six-lecture courses in German in Badenweiler, where he was even said to be the most popular lecturer for months, he did not have the chance to publish the texts of these lectures (Szemere 1970. 46). His words were lost among the mountain ranges of the Alps, while his researches were appreciated in Western European philosophical cultures alone. Although his German-language monograph on *Spinoza* (Alexander 1923) was a great success and was also published in an abridged version in Hungarian, it was only met with a positive response mainly by the denominational and not by the professional intelligentsia.

In 1921, his big rival Ottokár Prohászka attempted to write a critique of Alexander's philosophical views (Prohászka 1921. 1–7; *Nemzeti Ujság* 5 May 1921. 7), while others did not even care to mention his thoughts in these years. The Kisfaludy Society, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Hungarian Philosophical Society would not even hear of his works. In eliminating his memory, The Kisfaludy Society went the furthest by avoiding mentioning his name in any parts of their book on the 100-year history of their society published in 1936 (Kéky 1936).

In the autumn of 1922, the finished parts of his work on the philosophy of art *Művészet és alkotó erő a művészetben (Art and Creative Power in Art)* was lost.[8]

[7] ELTE EL, 1/c. 5284/1919-20. *Dr. Alexander Bernát Föllebbezés című elaboratuma (Dr. Alexander Bernát's draft titled Appeal)* – attachment No.15 1–2.

[8] ELTE EKK, G 821 *Alexander Bernát levele ismeretlen címzetthez (Bernhard Alexander's letter to an unknown).* In this letter, which may have been addressed to either

Nonetheless, Alexander did not lose heart. After moving back home to Hungary, in an attempt to prove his militant anti-communist views, he published his booklet titled *Madách Imre* in 1923 (Alexander 1923). Although this published work constitutes the peak of his aesthetic thinking unlike his book *Shakespeare* in 1920 (Alexander 1920), it only found reception by a narrow circle of his disciples. Thus, his attempt to be readmitted to the literary community based on this work remained an illusion.

After one year of his partial rehabilitation at the university and getting his full pension back, the philosopher attempted to regain the trust of the leadership of both the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Hungarian Philosophical Society by having his *Tanulmányok (Studies)* published in 1924. To do so, he deliberately chose to collect his best-known speeches and studies that could be regarded as "patriotic" for the new leaders and not his studies or articles on psychology, literary theory or theatre criticism. So, it was definitely not about publishing his lifework. He invested his incomes from his books and the editorial work of *Irodalmi lexicon (Literary Encyclopaedia)* published in 1926 in relaunching the book series *Filozófiai Írók Tára (Collection of Philosophical Authors),* which had been suspended years before.[9] During this period, he could maintain his standard of living by writing articles about politics and public issues.

The ornate *Alexander-album,* which was published for his 75th birthday and was ignored by the philosophers' community, celebrated him rather as an aesthete. To our knowledge, Bernhard Alexander himself did not force his former disciples to write in the volume, either. Alexander's further philosophical intentions were terminated by his death in 1927. His manuscripts were put into iron chests in his flat on Francis Joseph Embankment by the Danube.

With his *Tanulmányok (Studies)*, *Alexander-album* and *Filozófiai Írók Tára (Collection of Philosophical Authors),* he practically marked the canon himself for his followers, the canon which everyone from Szemere to Sebestyén, from Kornis to Imre referred to in the upcoming decades. So, from 1924, his self-image, which is still known today, was propagated in the first place by Alexander himself. Perhaps the only person who surpassed this image of the philosopher consciously created by Alexander himself was Samu Szemere, who in the 1930s went to extremes trying to interpret Alexander's philosophy in a sort of "national scope showing continuity", and indicating himself as the master's most loyal disciple. His aim was to clear his own name politically. It is little known

Marcell Benedek or Viktor Ranschburg, the philosopher discussed his detailed plan of a book. Cf. Szemere 1970. 48.

[9] According to the newspaper *Corvina,* the series were restarted in 1925. *Corvina* 2 May 1925. 88. See also: Perecz 2019. 5.

that he himself was also considered to belong in the same political space as Géza Révész, Sándor Varjas and Oszkár Jászi.

The three periods discussed above can be summed up as *historical reasons*. These were the events that played one of the important parts in Alexander's not being one of the best-known philosophers.

V. 1927–1930 and 1945

Besides the historical reasons, Alexander's students also have a role regarding the main question. The period of the first receptions, that is *the period of dilemmas,* matches the previous one organically with the tiny difference that the dozens of eulogies published apropos of his funeral depicted his full life, albeit in a polarized manner, focusing only on one specific part of his life work each (e.g. his work in journalism, theatre criticism). In 1930 Gyula Kornis put him, together with József Bánóczi, Frigyes Medveczky and many others, back into the contemporary philosophical history discourse, so the polarization was suspended for a while. Unfortunately, as shown in the Kisfaludy example, the break in the canon could not be completely stopped. Although Károly Sebestyén and Samu Szemere did everything they could to keep the philosopher's memory alive, this could lead to only partial results, convincing the Jewish denominational intelligentsia. Many of his contemporaries and ex-colleagues did not even mention Alexander in their works "as a matter of principle". The philosopher was slowly forgotten and "between the two wars he gradually became an obsolete figure of the early 20th century" (Perecz 2019. 7).

In the meantime, his literary manuscripts left behind were not given to the state for management, his work was rarely discussed and any references to his person were limited to personal remembrance and texts published by Samu Szemere after some time. Finally, the same life period or work got a totally different interpretation, the main emphases were shifted and the lack of consensus became complete e.g. regarding the position of his aesthetic and art philosophy works in his lifework. In 1945, his writings kept safe in iron chests in Budapest were destroyed, and thus any chance of getting to know his full lifework was destroyed as well.

VI. From 1969 until the Millennium

The impact history and renown of the philosopher were seemingly dead over the first two decades of the evolving state communism. From the 1960s, Samu Szemere and István Hermann thought the time had come for the *re-discovery* of the philosopher, and for placing and integrating him into the Marxist philosophical

canon. One of them, Hermann created the image of the aesthete who could be placed in the Marxist-Leninist typology. He saw Alexander as someone who had praised progressive art initiatives. In contrast to Hermann, Szemere undertook to tell a life story, largely filled with gaps, that was apolitical and rather adjusted to the expectations of the era. Besides, he mainly confined himself to describing Alexander's role only as a philosopher, a writer of the history of philosophy and an editor. The patriotic adjectives attached to Alexander's name in the 1920s and 1930s became scarce, while the fanatic anti-communist narrative completely disappeared. In adjustment to the new interpretations, in his publication *A művészet: Válogatott tanulmányok (Art: Selected Studies)* (Alexander 1969), which was edited by Szemere, no political (or interpretable as such) parapraxis, indication or hint could be found (Szemere 1969. 7–40; Hermann 1969. 411–426). The mutilation is most obvious in the text titled *Madách Imre,* from which all the sentences suggesting revisionist thinking and an anti-communist world view were edited out. His *quid pro quo* act though aimed at keeping Alexander's spiritual legacy alive and served the saving of his works from being crushed, is questionable. Obviously, the rediscovery served both the former disciple's personal appreciation and partial preservation of his work for posterity. Besides, it did not result in finding any of Alexander's lost works.

Hermann and Szemere consistently avoided the delicate points in Alexander's career. It was apparently not among their intentions to include the answers the philosopher had given to the most important events of his. But they did not intend to start any research either; on the contrary, they made Alexander's philosophy look like an entity built around questions of aesthetics to which "one or two newly found works" could not meaningfully contribute to. They identified his work in the history of philosophy exclusively with his volumes in the series of *Filozófiai Írók Tára (Collection of Philosophical Authors)*. Thus, asking delicate questions was off the agenda for decades. Consequently, during the decades of communism, the impact history of Alexander can be considered pretty fortunate.

> Communism, as we know, is an ideocratic system, in which the legitimacy of political power is provided by the Soviet-Marxist ideology, enjoying a monopoly. And this Soviet-Marxist legitimacy ideology, in turn, marginalizes and persecutes all its potential alternatives and/or rivals. In this sense, as a rule, every non-labor movement/bourgeois notion, every anti-Marxist/non-Marxist-Leninist philosophy is under ideological prohibition. It is in this context that we can say the figure of Alexander is in a more favorable situation. (Perecz 2019. 7.)

Although just like Szemere, Pál Sándor also emphasized that Alexander did not have any political role in 1919 (Sándor 1973. 428), since communist views were alien to him. Nonetheless, his article *Kunst und Weltanschaung* appeared in a

book of selected publications edited for the sixtieth anniversary of the proclamation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic (Alexander 1919/1979). The fact that the compromising parts of the above writing had been rejected later by the philosopher himself became obliviated. So his preservation for posterity was successful, and from that time on, the memory of Bernhard Alexander was discussed in radio programs and newspaper articles year by year.

Unfortunately, a further, more complex exploration of Alexander came only belatedly, not long before the fall of communism. The quite scarce, encyclopaedia-like information available on him at the time was reviewed by Éva Gábor, whose short monograph titled *Alexander Bernát* is one of the last products of the Hungarian historiography of philosophy that was still grounded in Marxist theory. Concerning the use of references, her work – even compared to the standards of her own age – is hugely selective, her approach is biased, and her statements are hardly verifiable. Despite all this, her work cannot be regarded as a mixture of the family tradition, the Szemere-Hermann interpretations and her individual reading experience. Its publication made further receptions possible; also, for at least two decades it set the most important points of reference and determined the direction of discussions.[10] The path marked by her was followed by further historians of philosophy, but it was not her fault that many of them got stuck in repetition.

After 1989, hardly anyone wrote down Alexander's name. The decade following the fall of communism in Hungary belonged to the previously "ignored" philosophers. "Alexander's Renaissance", which came probably a little late, at the time of the millennium, can be attributed to László Perecz. His work has inspired several scholars to deal with the philosopher's works – at least tangentially – this time free of any ideological pressure.

VII. Conclusion

A long time has passed. Alexander's contemporaries have all passed away, and what is left for posterity are memoirs and books. Leafing through these, one can immediately see that the reason for Alexander's popularity is to be found in the impact exerted by him, and not only in the field of philosophy but also in the other areas of his activities. The exploration of this is unfortunately neglected in most of the treatises written about him. There is a lot more to tell about Alexander, not to mention that the thusly acquired knowledge would further deepen the understanding of the significance of his attitude as a philosopher.

[10] Besides, she also donated many Alexander manuscripts to the Manuscripts Archive of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Overall, we may conclude that the lack of Bernhard Alexander's popularity is not self-evident. It was a joint result of past historical reasons, his image among the disciples and the colleagues as well as the belated interpretations. Nevertheless, all is not lost. According to Mihály Szegedy-Maszák, scholarship remains viable as long as it revises its beliefs from time to time, and for the sake of development it may even have to recant some of its previous observations (Szegedy-Maszák 2003. 9). The systematic processing of the available information thus far and the raising of the new research results into the canon in our time together will allow the broadening of the impact historical horizon, which narrowed down decades ago. All this imples that Bernhard Alexander may still become one of the best-known Hungarian philosophers.

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The Philosopher as a(n anti-)Hero

The Literary Representations of Georg Lukács

I. Introduction

The œuvre of Georg Lukács has been influenced many thinkers like Ernst Bloch, Walter Benjamin, or Theodor W. Adorno, although it is not only his writings that had a strong impact. Lukács's personality, his attitude and his way of thinking also became an inspiration for many artists. One of the well-known international examples is the famous opus by Thomas Mann, *Der Zauberberg* (*The Magic Mountain* in English, published first in 1924), where Lukács's characteristics can be recognized in Naptha's figure.[1] Hungarian literature reflected on Lukács in many different ways as well: in some of these literary works he is the protagonist; in other works he plays only a small but significant part. Although for a wider national or rather international interest, these writings are almost unknown because of their language (they are written in Hungarian, and most of them have not been translated) and they were also left out of the literary canon. A slow process of (re)discovery has begun, where the writings of some authors have been republished and they are becoming a centre of discussion.[2] Why these literary works are worth discussing, it is not always for their aesthetic value, but

[1] The reminiscences are often inconsistent. In the taped interview with István Eörsi Lukács remembers so, that there is no doubt at all that he was the model for Naphta (Lukács 1983. 94). In Katia Mann's memoir, Mann recognized afterwards that he had partly modelled Lukács in Naptha (Mann 1976. 74–75).

[2] Anna Lesznai (1885–1966) is an example of this. Her novel *Kezdetben volt a kert* (in English *In the Beginning was the Garden*, first published in 1966) was republished in 2015 (Lesznai 2015). Before this rediscovery, there are infinitesimal amounts of academic literature which focus on Lesznai, expect Erzsébet Vezér's biography about Lesznai (Vezér 1979) and the journal *Enigma*. The *Enigma* devoted two issues to Lesznai in 2007 (*Enigma* no. 51 and 52) and was edited by Petra Török, who wrote not just a doctoral thesis about Lesznai in 2012, but also published a selection of Lesznai's diary in 2010. Another doctoral thesis must be mentioned here by Fiona Stewart, who wrote about Lesznai and Hungarian modernism at the turn of the century (Stewart 2011). Furthermore, in 2015, Sándor Radnóti wrote a criticism about the republished novel of Lesznai (Radnóti 2015).

their interpretation and reflections. As László Perecz stated, these novels primarily mirror Lukács's disposition, his attitude and most importantly his position in the Hungarian history and culture (Perecz 1991), instead of his ideas.

Lukács's *Theory of the Novel* published in 1916 gave a review of sociological criticism in the form of literary criticism. The unity of 'inside' and 'outside', "a sign of the essential difference between the self and the world, the incongruence of soul and deed" (Lukács 1971. 11) has vanished together with the integrated civilisations. The disintegration of this unity has left its mark on the arts, too. Literary forms, especially novels, are the sign of the shattered totality.

> This exaggeration of the substantiality of art is bound to weigh too heavily upon its forms: they have to produce out of themselves all that was once simply accepted as given; in other words, before their own a priori effectiveness can begin to manifest itself, they must create by their own power alone the preconditions for such effectiveness – an object and its environment. A totality that can be simply accepted is no longer given to the forms of art: therefore they must either narrow down and volatilise whatever has to be given form to the point where they can encompass it, or else they must show polemically the impossibility of achieving their necessary object and the inner nullity of their own means. And in this case they carry the fragmentary nature of the world's structure into the world of forms. (Lukács 1971. 15–16.)

So, in Lukács's interpretation, novels are a kind of contemporary documentation *(Zeitdokument),* because they express the intellectual, sociological and historical changes of their era. The novels, where Lukács appears as a literary character, reflect often on the changing historical and sociological situation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, on the Great War, on the Revolution in 1918, on the Hungarian Soviet Republic and on the first year of emigration after the fall of the Republic. They not only portray history, but also the *Zeitgeist*, therefore these literary works could bring new addition to different fields, such as the history of philosophy and the history of ideas, and they could also illuminate the figure of Georg Lukács better.

Thus, the main aim of this paper is to give an overview about specific literary works which characterize Georg Lukács and to reflect on a troubled period in which the idea of a profane redemption dominated. So, the era, which this paper focuses on is the first two decades of the 20th century (1900–1920), because these years brought important and sudden changes: the ideas which had the greatest influence at the turn of the century shaped the history of the 20th century. This was the period in which Lukács tried to find his way in the maze of his ethical dilemmas and made a lifelong theoretical and practical decision to be a member of the Hungarian Communist Party and to be a theorist of Marxism. The problems of these two decades are also significant in the literary works regarding how Lukács's contemporaries tried to interpret and understand the

sudden changes. These works mediate their authors' moral standpoint as well and based on their beliefs, Lukács's figure becomes either a hero or an anti-hero.

Therefore, this paper will not list all of the writings in which Lukács is a literary character, I only discusses some chosen works where Lukács's ideas and his position in the era in question (1900–1920) are principal. Moreover, my research focuses only on the Hungarian prose and belles-lettres because my aim is to bring these works back into a wider discussion. Because of this, the non-Hungarian-speaking writings are not a part of my focus.[3] The primary questions of this paper are, how Lukács's character is portrayed, how his ideas are represented and what role he plays in the literary works, and in conclusion, what moral position the author would like to express with Lukács's character. In other words, the goal of the paper is to outline Lukács's personality, attitude and his development of thinking based on different literary writings.

The selected literary works discussed in this paper include a feuilleton, two novels and a drama.[4] The author, the title in Hungarian and English and the year of the first publication are given in sequence: Béla Balázs: *Barátság* (*Friendship,* 1911); Emma Ritoók: *A szellem kalandorai* (*Spiritual Adventurers,* 1922); Anna Lesznai: *Kezdetben volt a kert* (*In the Beginning Was the Garden,* 1966); István Eörsi: *Az interjú* (*The Interview,* 1983).

The reason why I have selected these literary works is that these four writings represent an era in Lukács's life and thinking. Another important rea-

[3] A brief part of this research has been already published as an educational writing for the 49th anniversary of Georg Lukács's death (see Szabados 2020a) and it has been presented at a conference organized by Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences (IFiS PAN) in Warsaw, on 26th October, 2019. The title of the conference was *The evolution of social elites in Central and Eastern Europe and beyond*. For further research, the author of this paper relies on the study by László Perecz (see Perecz 1991), where Perecz systematically interprets the various Lukács portraits in the belles-lettres.

[4] The study of László Perecz already listed the most significant novels and dramas which portray Lukács (see Perecz 1991); therefore, this paper would like to give another aspect of some selected works. The literary writings (including the literature written in a diary form), where Lukács is characterized, but will not be mentioned in this paper are the following (the author, the title in Hungarian and in English and the year of the first publication are given in sequence): Marcell Benedek: *Vulkán* (*Volcano,* 1918); Cécile Tormay: *Bujdosó könyv* (*An Outlaw's Diary,* 1920); Frigyes Karinthy: *Balázs Béla* (1920); Elek Benedek: *Édes anyaföldem!* (*My Sweet Motherland!* 1920); Ferenc Herczeg: *Északi fény* (*Northern Light,* 1929); Dezső Szabó: *Megered az eső* (*It Is Starting to Rain,* 1931); Lajos Kassák: *Egy ember élete* (*A Man's Life,* 1934–1936); György Faludy: *Levél Lukács Györgyhöz* (*Letter to György Lukács,* 1948–1949); Ervin Sinkó: *Optimisták* (*Optimists,* 1953–1955); József Lengyel: *Prenn Ferenc hányatott élete* (*The Troubled Life of Ferenc Prenn,* 1959); Marcell Benedek: *Naplómat olvasom* (*Reading My Diary, 1965*); Béla Balázs: *Napló I–II.* (*Diary I–II.,* 1982); András Nagy: *Kedves Lukács* (*Dear Lukács,* 1984).

son is how all of the authors were Lukács's contemporaries and they knew him from closer. This means that the claim expressed in the beginning of this paper, namely that literary works is a form of contemporary documentation (*Zeitdokument* or *Zeitroman*) is the most significant in the writings of Lukács's *comrades-in-arms*.[5] The authors redefine and interpret Lukács's character and attitude, and in these interpretations, they express their own standpoints to Lukács and his ideas.

II. The Idol

1. Béla Balázs: Barátság (Friendship, November 1911)

The earliest and almost unknown short story in which Lukács's character can be recognized has been published anonymously in the journal *Világ* in November 1911. The journal *Világ* was launched on the 30th of March 1910, and its aim was to create a radical daily paper where political issues could be discussed. In 1911, the journal had a call for feuilletons, the prize of which was five hundred *Korona*s. Some of the competition essays have been published and the readers could decide who could win the prize eventually (see *Világ* [1912] 3/27. 9). On the short list was a feuilleton with the title *Barátság (Friendship),* whose motto was "It happened" (Balázs 1911) and its author was probably Béla Balázs.[6] According to the letters between Lukács and Balázs, moreover Balázs's diary, Balázs played a significant part in the suicide of Irma Seidler. In May 1911, Irma Seidler committed suicide (see the letter of Leó Popper on 24 May 1911 in Lukács 1981. 381) and in Balázs's diary and in his letters we can find some reference that Balázs feels himself guilty about Lukács (see Balázs 1982a. 518) and fears that Lukács could have known "his affair with Irma" (ibid.). In August 1911, Lukács wrote his most personal essay with the title *Von der Armut am Geiste* (see Lukács 1977. 537–551)[7] to face with his own sense of responsibility for Irma Seidler's death. When Balázs read this essay, he wrote a long letter to Lukács in which he tries to give a criticism about Lukács's writings (see the letter of Balázs on 16 August 1916 in Lukács 1981. 408–413) and claims

[5] Júlia Lenkei calls the friendship between Georg Lukács and Béla Balázs "comrades-in-arms" (in Hungarian "fegyverbarátság", see Lenkei's *Preface* in Balázs 1982b). This paper takes over this terminology in order to express the close intellectual and ethical interest between Lukács and his contemporaries.

[6] Balázs's feuilleton did not win; it only got 12 votes (see *Világ* [1912] 3/29. 7).

[7] The essay *Von der Armut am Geiste* was translated by Béla Balázs and was published first in Hungarian in the journal *Szellem* in 1911, No. 2. 202–214. The original German essay was published next year, in 1912 in the journal *Neue Blätter*, No. 5–6. 67–92.

that Lukács's essay had a strong impact on him because of "personal reasons" (Ibid.)[8].

However, Lukács's dialogue *Von der Armut am Geiste* and the collection of his early essays, *The Soul and Form* are more complex and not only for biographical reasons. In the *Soul and Form,* Lukács wrote an essay about Kierkegaard and Regine Olsen, where Lukács:

> […] meditates on the way that literary form takes up the sacrifice and loss of love. Kierkegaard's guilt and suffering raise the question of whether literary form can offer redemption of some kind, and Lukács clearly opposes the idea that life can find a full or ultimate redemption in form. Kierkegaard is always attempting to give form to existence, but he fails, and the singularity of his existence proves to resist all efforts to become generalized, or, indeed, communicated, through form. […] What Kierkegaard offers is less an innovation of form or genre than the introduction of the *gesture*. The gesture expresses life, even absolutely, but it can only do this by withdrawing from life, by being merely a gesture. That Kierkegaard sacrifices his fiancée, Regine Olsen, is interpreted by Lukács as a necessary sacrifice, one that underwrites his entire aesthetic practice, a withdrawal that conditions form-making itself. (Butler 2010. 9.)

In the spirit of the collection of the *Soul and Form*, the essay *Von der Armut am Geiste* written in 1911, already searches for an answer or possibility of redemption, which has to be over the forms (Lukács 1977. 539). Lukács describes two ways of redemption where one is the destruction of the forms with goodness. The forms belong to an ethical sphere, where the obligations *(Sollen)* are primarily and as Lukács wrote, vital life is above the forms, while ordinary life is bound to the strictness and obligations of the forms (ibid. 540). Only essential goodness could break the forms and bring an immanent and transcendent redemption (Ibid.). Essential goodness is a divine ability and those who have the ability of goodness do not consider the consequences of an act. These are the characters of Dostoevsky, Prince Myshkin, Alyosha Karamazov or Abraham, the king of faith from Kirkegaard's *Fear and Trembling,* who do not theorize the Other. Goodness is not an ethical category: "[the goodness is] miracle, mercy and redemption" (ibid. 541). Lukács describes those who have the ability of goodness, that they are fanatic, obsessed; they are ready to act at all cost (ibid. 543). However, this obsession is the true sign of goodness because goodness could accept sin in order to bring redemption to the immanent and the transcendent (ibid. 544). This obsession is what breaks the strict ethical forms, the cruel theorising. Lukács here gives an interpretation of redemption and refers to a detour: the character of the dialogue considers himself as one who took a

[8] Lukács did not consider Balázs's suggestions (see the letter of Balázs on 16 August 1916 in Lukács 1981. 408–413).

detour in order to remain sinless (ibid. 544), but also has redemption. However, redemption is not possible without sin (ibid.). As Lukács wrote, the sin was that he could not break the forms of (his own) ethic – Lukács's gesture became meaningless here.[9] At the end of the essay, Lukács still searches for a solution of redemption, however he does not have the ability of goodness, though he could work for it. Lukács describes the pureness of the soul, which is the other way for redemption. The Biblical story of Martha and Mary shows that those who do not have goodness and could not turn towards redemption, have to work for it (ibid. 542). Creation is the only way, whereby the creator lives only for the work – this creation can form such homogeneity and understanding in the ordinary and chaotic world as goodness can with its simple act (Ibid. 550).

While Lukács faced his own ethical dilemmas in his essays, Balázs, who also fought with his own guilt, wrote a widely different feuilleton for the journal *Világ* (see Balázs 1911).[10] In this short story, the protagonist visits his friend to accompany him to a wedding only to find him in agony. The narrative is very simple: the friend, named Ervin, has proposed to his love, Klára, but the woman rejected it and now the protagonist wants to take revenge for the sake of his friend. The protagonist shatters when he sees Ervin weeping like a "sick child" (ibid.) and decides to travel to Italy with him. However, he first heads to the wedding where he finds Klára, who is seemingly enjoying the party. This encourages the idea in the protagonist that Klára humiliated his friend in his "nature" (ibid.). Namely, he believes that Klára did not find Ervin to be man enough and therefore he seduces the woman to take revenge on behalf of Ervin. The tragedy of the story, i.e. that Ervin finds them together and the act of the protagonist turned from rightful revenge into a sin. He realizes that he betrayed not only his friend, but he also sinned against Klára. The feuilleton ends with the realization that everything happened for Ervin (ibid). However, even though Ervin is in the centre of the story, he remains silent. The protagonist narrates the story in the first person, and the only dialogue is when he has a conversation with Klára. Ervin stays in the distance where the main characters, the protagonist and Klára, speak about him and act for him, but could not get in contact with him. This distance is also symbolic, Ervin is described as a man of the *soul (Geist)* who only lives within his ideas:

[9] According to a letter from Marianne Weber, Lukács wrote his essay *Von der Armut am Geiste* about himself and his guilt (see the letter of Marianne Weber on 31 July 1912 in Lukács 1981. 491–492). Lukács's essay had a significant impact on the Webers and Marianne Weber also mentioned it in her memoir (see Weber 1948. 380).

[10] Balázs mentions in his letters to Lukács that he sent some of his writings to the journal *Világ* (see the letters of Béla Balázs on 6 July 1911 and on 16 August 1911 in Lukács 1981. 385 and 412).

> Klára folded her hands: – No, no, no! I did want it! My God, how I wanted to love Ervin! He could have been the redemption of my life. Because everything, which is good in me pulled me to his sphere. I could feel myself human only there. I could only appreciate myself since he has loved me. He raised me out of the rabble, I lived thanks to him. I wanted to belong to him. Because I respect and admire him so infinitely. I almost loved him. He could have been the only solution to my life. But all is in vain! *He always remains a spirit to me; he always will be just a soul to me.* I tried, struggled for years in vain. His body seemed to be a pure idol made of porcelain, which I can only worship. If he touched me, my blood and nerves were horrified. All was in vain! And I – I got tired. I got tired in this never-ending heavy intellectual fight […]. (Balázs 1911; my italics.)[11]

Béla Balázs portrays Lukács as a someone who will make his mark in the world because he is another kind, another "caste" (ibid.). Ervin's character is already a great scholar, a glorious thinker (ibid.) and despite of this cult of brilliance, he is described as a "weak child" (ibid.). However, this intellectual greatness is not enough for the beloved woman because Ervin/Lukács is unapproachable: he is seen as an idol that lives only for his ideas. The true tragedy is not the treachery of the protagonist but the impotence of Ervin/Lukács, who realises the impossibility between ideas and life. This early feuilleton of Balázs's has many biographical references, but the reason why it is cited here is because of how Balázs described Lukács as someone who forms his life as he forms his philosophy.[12] This thought can also be discovered in a novel written by Emma Ritoók which was first published at the turn of 1921–1922.

[11] "Klára összekulcsolta a kezét: – Nem, nem, nem! Én akartam! Istenem, hogy akartam szeretni Ervint! Az életem megváltása lett volna. Hiszen minden, ami jó volt bennem, az ő szférájába húzott. Csak ott éreztem magam embernek. Csak azóta becsülöm magma, mióta ő szeret. Kiemelt a csőcselékből, belőle éltem. Hozzája akartam tartozni. Hiszen olyan végtelenül tisztelem és csodálom. Hiszen majdnem szerettem. Egyetlen megoldása lett volna életemnek. És hiába! Mindig csak szellem, mindig csak lélek maradt ő nekem. Hiába erőlködtem két évig. A teste ugy[sic!] hatott rám, mint valami finom, porcelán bálvány, melyet imádni kell. Ha hozzám ért, megborzadt az idegzetem és a vérem. Hiába volt minden! És én – én elfáradtam. Elfáradtam ebben a szakadatlan nehéz szellemi tornában […]." (Balázs 1911.) Translated from the original by B.Sz.

[12] There is no proof, if Lukács had ever read Balázs's feuilleton. However, Balázs described a moment in his diary when he had a conversation with Lukács about Irma and how he (Balázs) sinned against Lukács (see Balázs 1982a. 617–618).

III. The Path Finder

1. Emma Ritoók: A szellem kalandorai (Spiritual Adventurers, 1921)

One of the first novels which outlines the fundamental ideas of her generation is the novel by Emma Ritoók called *A szellem kalandorai (Spiritual Adventurers)* and it was published first at the turn of 1921–1922.[13] Emma Ritoók got in contact with Lukács before the Great War and after 1915, she became a regular member of the Sunday's meeting at Béla Balázs's. The gatherings were later known as the *Vasárnapi Kör (Sunday Circle),* the intellectual leader of which was Georg Lukács.[14] The idea and mentality of the Circle also had a significant impact on Emma Ritoók's novel, it was made by inlaid technique (see Perecz 1991. 40), where the characters combine the typical features of a real person (see ibid.). However, Ritoók portrays Lukács as one of the supporting characters but his characteristics can be recognized in the protagonist too. The protagonist, named Ervin Donáth mostly embodies Béla Zalai and Ernst Bloch, but Georg Lukács could also have been a model for the character.

In the novel, Emma Ritoók portrays a new generation full of ideas through the struggles of the two main characters, Ervin Donáth and Héva Bartoldy, who are destined for great acts and with the assertion of their ideas, this generation is capable of changing the society radical. Still, the mentality of the novel remains negative and disillusioned due to the fact that Emma Ritoók uses her personal and historical experiences as the basis for writing the novel. The author became disappointed in the great ideas of her generation as she witnessed the Aster Revolution and underwent the 133 days of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. It is visible as Ritoók became estranged from her former comrade-in-arms and this estrangement also appears in the novel:

> Those who came along with Donáth stopped at an advertisement board of a daily paper; the bloody and horrible sacrifices of the last fights could have been foreseen in the sentences of the report. Then they went along uninterested. One part of the youth lived

[13] The first novel where Lukács is characterized is the novel by Marcell Benedek called *Vulkán (Volcano)* and was published first in 1918. However, the story of Benedek's novel focuses only on the period between 1904 and 1914, therefore Lukács's turn to Marxism is not a part of it. Benedek took part in the society named *Thália,* but in 1905, the relation between Lukács and Benedek became loose because of a political disagreement and as their activity in the *Thália* ended, their contact ended too (see Bendl 1994. 51–57). Benedek portrays Lukács in his novel as a revolutionary, however he changes when he gets married to an actress. After the marriage, the former revolutionary is already a traditionalist who acknowledges the priority of the nobles (see also Perecz 1991. 39–40).

[14] Lukács mentions the gatherings of the Sunday Circle in an interview with István Eörsi (see Lukács 1983. 49–51).

> outside history, the other part arranged history with words inside, and the city was in a great distance, which was between those who sacrifice their own life and those who sacrifice their words. In this distance the city let people in who are in fever with a red idea, and – the city has been sleeping. (Ritoók 1993. 485.)[15]

Ritoók describes the characters in the novel as they play with the idea of redemption: they are adventurers who sacrifice others for their philosophy. The spiritual adventurers believe deeply that if their philosophy will be recognized and acknowledged, that will bring the triumph of the idea and enlightenment (ibid. 483). One of the adventurers is Jenő Illés, whose character was based on Georg Lukács. He comes from a converted Jewish family of a provincial town. Illés only lives for work and seeks his way in an academic career in Germany; therefore, at the beginning he is sceptical about Socialism. Illés believes that Socialism cannot be the right goal of the future, it is just a tool of a possible revolution (ibid. 212), and he also keeps himself away from the war. However, at one point he converts himself and he is the first who joins the Bolshevism influenced by the Russian Revolution. The atmosphere of the Sunday Circle is evoked, as the characters discuss their ideas. At these meetings, Illés explains the demands of the revolution, however, it is not a bourgeois revolution (ibid. 481), it is a world revolution, which comes with destruction and raising. The ethic of this revolution converts the ethic of everyday life with the help of philosophy and mysticism to interpret the necessity of killing and sacrifice (ibid. 482). The ideas expressed here strongly relate to Georg Lukács's article *Tactics and Ethics* written in 1919. In this famous article, Georg Lukács expresses that a thoughtful progress, explained in his writing *Bolshevism as a Moral Problem* (December 1918), is not possible since the solidarity with an existing order only holds up the world-historical consciousness.

> That means concretely that every gesture of solidarity with the existing order is fraught with such danger. Deriving though they may well do from true inner conviction, our insistent protests that such and such a gesture of solidarity indicates only a momentary, immediate community of interests, nothing more than a provisional alliance for the attainment of a concrete goal, nevertheless do not obviate the danger that the feeling of solidarity will take root in that form of consciousness which necessarily obscures the world-historical consciousness, the awakening of humanity to

[15] "A Donáthtal tartók megállottak egy napilap hirdetési táblája mellett; az utolsó ütközetek véres és borzalmas áldozatait sejteni lehetett a jelentés sorai között. Aztán közönyösen mentek tovább. Az egyik fiatalság odakint élte a történelmet, a másik idebent szavakkal készítette elő, s az élet- és szóáldozók nagy távolsága közt a város és az eljövendők minden sejtelme nélkül engedte vonulni csendes falai közt a gondolat vörös lázának embereit, és – aludt." (Ritoók 1993. 485.) Translated from the original by B.Sz.

> self-consciousness. The class struggle of the proletariat is not merely a class struggle (if it were, it would indeed be governed simply by Realpolitik), but a means whereby humanity liberates itself, a means to the true beginning of human history. Every compromise made obscures precisely this aspect of the struggle and is therefore – despite all its possible, short-term (but extremely problematical) advantages – fatal to the achievement of this true ultimate objective. (Lukács 1972; Lukács 1987. 127–128.)

Therefore, the tactics here is the realization of a different social order with short- and long-term efforts "which differs from that of every previous society in that it no longer knows either oppressors or oppressed" (ibid. and Lukács 1987. 126). The ethics of these efforts has to be qualitatively different because their aim is a historical demand, which is the stimulation of the necessary historical-philosophical consciousness in the individual (ibid. and Lukács 1987. 129). János Kis compares Lukács's ethical certitude to the *negative responsibility doctrine* (see Kis 2004. 646), where the individual is responsible for not just his own actions, but for the actions of others as well, which he could have prevented. However, instead, he chose not to take any action (ibid.). As Lukács wrote:

> [The] ethics relate to the individual and the necessary consequence of this relationship is that the individual's conscience and sense of responsibility are confronted with the postulate that he must act as if on his action or inaction depended the changing of the world's destiny (Lukács 1972; 1987. 129).

According to Lukács, there is no ethical neutrality, to take action is always the obligation of the individual, and as the result of the action he must take individual responsibility for all sacrifices (ibid.). Only this ethical commitment justifies the tactical actions.[16] The significance of Lukács's ethical turn is the conscious acceptance of sin in order to bring redemption. Emma Ritoók's novel enlightens Lukács's ethical dilemma in Illés's character: Illés also expresses his mystical belief in the revolution, where the acceptance of sin is the only way for possible redemption (see Ritoók 1993. 482–483). Illés and the members of this circle are characterized as they want to free themselves of real responsibility with the help of their philosophical ideas. Their appearance also changes as they accept the idea of sin, which leads them to redemption.[17]

> Illés spoke further in a calm, low, but steady voice with the belief of those who are self-willed and fanatic, [he spoke] with the fatalist belief of youth of high-reaching

[16] Ottó Hévizi describes the ethical complexity of Lukács's turn, where Lukács's ethics is interpreted based on Kierkegaard's, Kant's, and Hegel's dilemmas (see Hévizi 2011).

[17] Ritoók calls it "sin of redemption" (in Hungarian "megváltó bűn" see Ritoók 1993. 482).

> souls and the only in the predominance living and breathing; alongside Donáth, he had in himself the most intense feeling of the conviction that his predominance will be the victory of the idea at the same time. […] The precise and specified sentences of Illés fell to the audience; his eyes started to light up, a kind of murderous cold fanatism moved to his facial features, and slowly everyone started to mimic this in various tones, as if they were all siblings. (See Ritoók 1993. 483.)[18]

Although Illés is a strong supporting character, the protagonist is Ervin Donáth, whose life story is the plot of the novel and Georg Lukács can be identified within some of his characteristic. As it was already stated, Béla Zalai and Ernst Bloch were the models for Ervin's character, but some similarities with Lukács can also be recognized.

From his childhood on, Ervin felt that he was determined to create great things, like he had a mission: he seeked power and fame (see Perecz 1991. 40).[19] Ervin Donáth wanted to live his philosophy as his life, therefore he created new philosophical systems, but these seemed to be failures. In Budapest, he could not find the ground for his philosophy, so he moved to Germany trying to make a career and to habilitate there, only to face rejection. Donáth had no systematic works, only his mystic philosophy of redemption. Returning to his homeland, he begins to find his community in politics. He lectured regularly, where he spread his beliefs, and he continued to work on his philosophy of redemption. Donáth waited for a world-historical moment, when he could take action. This moment was the Russian Revolution and Ervin considered Bolshevism as the new church. Therefore, he took on a leading role in the Hungarian movement and became a people's commissar. However, the movement proved to be a failure and it collapsed: after the downfall, Donáth tried to flee abroad, because in spite of his philosophical belief, he did not want to take responsibility for his action. At the end of the novel, his friend, Gyula Wéber, who truly believed in Ervin's philosophy, shoots him (see Ritoók 1993. 508). Some moments of Lukács's life are easy to recognize on Ervin's path: Lukács also struggled between an academic and a political career and tried to habilitate in Germany (see Szabados 2020b),

[18] "Illés nyugodt, halk, de biztos hangon beszélt tovább, a makacsok és fanatikusok, az ambíció marta lelkek és csak az érvényesülésben élő és lélegző fiatalság fatalisztikus hitével; ő benne volt meg Donáthon kívül a legerősebben a meggyőződés, hogy a saját érvényesülése egyszersmind az eszme győzelme is. […] Az Illés pontos, körülhatárolt mondatai tovább hullottak a hallgatók közé; most már az ő szeme is égni kezdett, valami gyilkosan hideg fanatizmus ült ki a vonásaira, és lassankint mindnek az arca ezt a kifejezést vette fel más-más árnyalattal, mintha mind testvérek volnának." (See Ritoók 1993. 483.) Translated from the original by B.Sz.

[19] As Agata Schwartz points out, a familiarity with contemporary ideas can be recognized in the novel and in Ervin's character, "such as Freud's theories: the shaping of Ervin's character reveals a narcissistic disorder" (see Schwartz 2002. 299).

and returning to Hungary, he gave lectures in the Szellemi Tudományok Szabad Iskolája (Free School of the Humanities).[20] At the turn of 1918–1919, Lukács also chose to take part in the movement and became a people's commissar in the Hungarian Soviet Republic. However, the novel differs from reality and ends with Ervin's death – Ritoók became disappointed in their generation, and the novel had strong anti-Semitism. I must mention that Ritoók already began to work on his novel in 1916 (see Balázs 1982a. 144) and the members of the Sunday Circle read her work in progress entitled *A lélek kalandorai (Adventurer of the Soul)* back then. Béla Balázs noted down his impressions about Ritoók's novel in his diary on 26th January 1916:

> Emma Ritoók's novel: The Adventurer of the Soul. It is a bad novel. It has no vision, it is deaf, transparent, has no atmosphere. It is not the experience of an *artist*. But it is a great human experience. Nevertheless, it made a great impression on me. How great is the generation, whose storm she got caught in. But she got only the flu from it, poor creature. […] It frightened me in the novel, that somebody who took part in it, *could have been disappointed* in our generation. (Balázs 1982a. 144.)[21]

So, in 1916 there was already an ideological difference between the members of the *Sunday Circle*, however most of the members of the Circle shared Lukács's philosophical attitude (for example Béla Balázs, Károly Mannheim or Béla Fogarasi). As the novel was first published in 1921 and republished in 1922 after the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, the idea of "White Terror" (1919–1921) already deeply affected the author and the novel itself. Lukács pointed out in a later interview that Ritoók falsely describes the Sunday Circle as a Bolshevik society; she only joined the discourse of the "counter-revolution".

> Of course, our radicalism should not be over-estimated: it was not radical in the modern, let alone a Bolshevik sense. I myself had to overcome a number of crises before the member of the Sunday Club could turn into a communist. It is absolutely untrue that the Sunday Club was a Bolshevik society, as was later claimed by the counter-

[20] The novel evokes these lectures, see for example Ritoók 1993. 441–446. Lukács also mentions in his late interview with István Eörsi, that they "were vigorously opposed to their freethinking positivism, but this alliance led to the Free School of the Humanities, which began its activities in 1917. Talks were given by Lajos Fülep, Béla Balázs, Emma Ritoók and also Mannheim. I gave lectures as well." (See Lukács 1983. 50.)

[21] "Ritoók Emma regénye: A lélek kalandorai. Rossz regény. Nincs víziója, süket, átlátszó, atmoszférátlan. Nem művész élménye. De nagy emberi élmény. Mégis nagyon megfogott. Milyen nagy generáció az, melynek vihara őt is elkapta! De ő csak influenzát kapott tőle szegény. […] Ijesztett a regényben, hogy valaki, aki részese volt, csalódhatott a generációnkban." (Balázs 1982a. 144.) Translated from the original by B.Sz.

> revolution, by Emma Ritoók, for example. It is typical of the wide range of opinions within the Sunday Club that I was the only one to begin defending a Hegelian-Marxist position. Apart from myself only Frederik Antal had any Marxist leanings. Lajos Fülep took up a position based on the humanities, while Emma Ritoók was basically conservative. Anna Lesznai cannot really be classified in this way. It is not possible to turn the Sunday Club retrospectively into a Bolshevik or even a pre-Bolshevik grouping. (Lukács 1983. 50–51.)

So, Emma Ritoók portrayed her generation in a deeply critical or rather, as Agata Schwartz assumes, a *caricatured way* (see Schwartz 2002. 209), and this intention of the author has been expressed to the greatest extent in Ervin's character, who is the parody of a genius. However, not all members of the Sunday Circle became disillusioned in their generation. Another member, Anna Lesznai, worked on her novel for almost thirty years and she was influenced also by the atmosphere of the Circle's ideas.

2. Anna Lesznai: Kezdetben volt a kert (In the Beginning was the Garden, 1966)

Anna Lesznai was a multi-faceted artist; she was a designer, a graphic artist, a painter, a poet and a writer, besides that she was a regular member of the Sunday Circle. Lesznai worked on her two-volume novel called *Kezdetben volt a kert (In the Beginning was the Garden)* for almost thirty years and published it first in German in 1965 and in Hungarian in the following year. Despite of Ritoók's disillusionment, Lesznai shared the ideological attitude of the Sunday Circle and got involved in the Hungarian Soviet Republic. After its collapse, she emigrated to Vienna, where the members of the Circle reunited and Lesznai continued to visit these gatherings.[22]

Her novel *In the Beginning was the Garden* is a monumental literary work, where parallel timelines appear next to each other in order to portray different social classes. The opus documents the changes in society of the late 19th century and early 20th century trustworthily, besides, it portrays the historical events from the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 to the first years of her emigration to Vienna. The novel is also a biographical piece, since the protagonist named Lizó Berkovics, represents the author herself, who tries to find her path as an

[22] In the emigration the members of the Circle faced their responsibility in the Hungarian Soviet Republic individually and processed it differently in their works (cf. Karádi 1987. 601–611).

artist and as a woman, while she discovers her talent in poetry and experiments with her writing skills. The novel is significant from the point of view of explicit biographical facts, although the aesthetic quality thereof must be mentioned as well: a recurring motif in the novel is the garden of the Berkovics family. The description and portrayal of the garden create an original literary atmosphere. Georg Lukács also appreciated Lesznai's novel and admitted its great aesthetic quality: according to him, the first volume was a masterpiece, while the second one is a good novel (Radnóti 2015).

In the second volume of the novel, Lizó Berkovics would like to leave her garden behind and concentrate on finding her poetic voice, while she became a member of the Sunday Circle, which is also evoked in the novel. Lesznai portrays the members, the atmosphere and mentality of these Sunday's gatherings specifically. In one of the central characters of these gatherings Georg Lukács can be recognized and some strong biographical parallels are visible between Lukács and the supporting character, László Aranyossy.

The first moment when the character of László, who embodies Lukács, appears is at the end of the first volume, where the protagonist, Lizó is at a dinner party with her husband, where the wealthy host introduces his son to her:

> This is my son, László – said Aranyossy and pointed to the scrawny and dull-looking young man sitting next to Lizó. – He came home yesterday from Heidelberg, where he wraps his head around knowledge. (Lesznai 2019. Vol. 1. 675.)[23]

The second volume of the novel portrays not just the biographical facts about Lukács but outlines his development of thinking as well. It gives an accurate picture about his characteristics. According to this, László Aranyossy is very sensitive to ethical dilemmas, who feel responsibility for social injustice, and he sentences his life to the solution of theoretical and practical problems. Lesznai mirrors Lukács's attitude in the novel perfectly:

> László was in silence for a while, but now, maybe to calm György down, he began to speak. […] – Thinking is nowadays the most exciting mission, like never before. We constantly have to make concrete decisions which come with great responsibility, particularly if man obtains power. It is always an inspiring, but often inconvenient mission; it is an inspiring torture, because this exists as well. – He spoke

[23] "Ez itt a László fiam – mondotta Aranyossy a Lizó mellett ülő sovány, seszínű fiatalemberre mutatva. – Tegnap ért haza Heidelbergből, ahol nagykanállal tömik bele a tudományt." (Lesznai 2019. Vol. 1. 675.) Translated by B.Sz. It must be mentioned, that Lukács lived in Heidelberg between 1912 and 1917 with some short interruptions. During these times Lukács got in contact with Max Weber and became a regular member in Weber's private gatherings.

> slowly. As he spoke, the horn-rimmed spectacles tipped on his nose, and he tried to adjust the clumsily, so he leaned his head forward like a wise owl. (Lesznai 2019. Vol. 2. 499.)[24]

Most of the members from the Circle, like their real alter ego, took part in the Hungarian Soviet Republic and had a position, a function. So did Lukács's alter ego, whose ethical dilemma and turn to Marxism are also portrayed in the novel, as well as how he seeked a path for an immanent and transcendent redemption. As László Perecz points out, it seems like Lukács's alter ego has two options in the novel: one option is metaphysical, which effects his praxis directly. This means that László Aranyossy finds the possibility of how to live his theory in practice. The other motif is practical and social: László always had a privileged position and now he must atone for it (Perecz 1991. 47). After the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, the members of the Sunday Circle have to flee abroad, facing their responsibility and the loss of their ideas, illusions. However, Lukács's alter ego, László Aranyossy, decides not to flee, because he must live his theories, even if this means he will be executed. The protagonist, Lizó Berkovics, is already in emigration when she remembers back on the last day of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. In the novel, László's death is described as it was inevitable, because this was the way for him to fulfil his destiny (Lesznai 2019. Vol. 2. 600). Lizó recalls the last occasion with László in the shadow of this sense of fate:

> It cannot be forgotten. It cannot be forgotten either when she said goodbye to László in a cobwebbed, dusty attic, where he hid from the whites […] I am ashamed to flee from Pest, complained [Lizó] to László, I will never walk along the path; I will never do the hundredth step! – Do not blame yourself, Lizó. Ninety-nine steps are a lot, they reach their limit; the hundredth step normally leads to death. – But you will not stop at the ninety-ninth step; she said to László, you will not hide abroad like us, your Sunday-friends. (Lesznai 2019. Vol. 2. 568.)[25]

[24] "László egy ideje hallgatott, de most, talán hogy Györgyöt lecsendesítse, beszélni kezdett. […] – A gondolkodás ma izgalmasabb feladat, mint valaha. Folyton konkrét döntéseket kell hoznunk, ami súlyos felelősséggel jár, főleg, ha némi hatalom is adatott az ember kezébe. Mindig lelkesítő, de gyakran kínos feladat ez, lelkesítő kín, mert az is van. – Lassan beszélt. Közben hosszú, görbe orrán megbillent a szarukeretű pápaszem, és ügyetlenül próbálta helyreigazítani, ferdére hajtva a fejét, mint egy bölcs bagoly." (Lesznai 2019. Vol. 2. 499.) Translated by B.Sz.

[25] "Nem lehet felejteni. Azt se, mikor egy pókhálós, poros padláson búcsút vett Lászlótól, aki ott rejtőzött a fehérek elől […] Szégyellek elmenekülni Pestről, panaszolta Lászlónak, sose járom végig az utat, a századik lépést sose teszem meg! – Ne vádolja magát, Lizó. Kilencvenkilenc lépés nagyon sok, elér az élet határáig; a századik rendesen már a halálba visz. – De maga nem áll meg a kilencvenkilencediknél, felelte Lászlónak,

IV. The Forgotten Master

1. István Eörsi: Az interjú (The Interview, 1983)

The most personally toned literary writing about Lukács was written by his former disciple, István Eörsi. Lukács's biographical sketch – the so called *Gelebtes Denken: Notes Towards An Autobiography* – and the interview called *Records of a Life* are strongly connected to István Eörsi, as well as to Erzsébet Vezér, because it was their great effort to make it possible to capture the last works of the highly indisposed Lukács. Both the editing of Lukács's biographical sketch and the interview are truly remarkable, because the anguished Lukács himself was writing his own biography during the last months of his life, in which he made a wide overview of the narrative of his thinking, his main focus and tendencies from the aspect of an 86-year long period. The old Lukács was not able to give up creation even at his deathbed, but he was physically unable to write, that is why Eörsi and Vezér were recording his biography based on his previously written sketch. This is how *Records of a Life* (Eörsi 1983. 6–8) was made. In his writing, *The Right to the Last Word,* Eörsi revokes Lukács's anecdote where Lukács noted the following on the apropos of his request to be a member of the party again in 1957: "[…] »I have stuck in their throats«, was Lukács's description of such situations: »They can't swallow me and they can't spit me out.« […]" (Eörsi 1983. 10). After a decade following Lukács's death, Eörsi was still not able to leave behind his old master's ethical dilemmas and decisions, Lukács also stuck in his throat, therefore he is interviewed his old Master again in his drama *Az interjú (The Interview)*. Eörsi's drama, or rather an absurd documentary play, evokes Lukács to get final answers, asking him harshly even impeaching him, but the play still portrays the disciple's respect towards his former master and teacher. Eörsi struggles as he tries to question his master and maybe even get some answers but he fails constantly. Not just because of Lukács's illness or the lack of his ability to speak, but also because of the inconsistent elements of his biography, which cannot be formulated and interpreted as one single unit.

Eörsi's drama only deepens the inconsistency between the master and the student more using literary elements such as absurdity and dark humour, and at the end of the drama, it seems like the depth of this abyss is insuperable. An almost religious respect towards the old master can be recognized in Eörsi's play, however there is also a parallel denial and refusal, which constantly tries to ask the eternal question from the old master, but it remains unanswered. It is the unquestionable worthiness of Eörsi that he makes Lukács's œuvre vivid. He reflects on this and brings in a specific literary and linguistic play as Lukács's

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maga nem bujdosik külföldre, mint mi, a vasárnapi barátai." (Lesznai 2019. Vol. 2. 568.) Translated by B.Sz.

biographical elements are combined with Lukács's attitude, character and the main questions and dilemmas of his philosophy. Therefore, the sometimes incomprehensible and uninterpretable character of Lukács becomes more reachable and more human. Next to the philosophical dilemmas, the other important aspect of the drama is the physical decay of the old Lukács, which is parallel with a mental disorder.

> […] I cannot stand much further, I have to imagine him here — I visualize him as he is still standing there in front of the window (he looks towards Lukács, who is standing in the light now), he stares motionless. […] One time in the April of 1971, he stood precisely like this in front of the window when I stepped in [the room]. I was shocked because I had never seen him standing just passively. This time he did nothing, moreover he did not even do the nothing. It seemed that he only stared out the window, actually he did not look out, and however he stood there, I could not dare to claim that he "stood", because this word, as a verb, expresses activity […]. (Eörsi 1989. 10.)[26]

Eörsi's personal drama expresses how the body fails the mind and how the philosopher fades away, only to leave behind the inconsistency and discrepancy of his œuvre, which is still interpreted in many different ways and which leaves Lukács's figure as a(n anti-)hero not just in the literary works, but also in the history of philosophy and the discourse of cultural policy.

V. Conclusion

It is well-known that Lukács tried to write literary works at an early age. Lukács also mentioned these literary beginnings in his biographical sketch:

> Two important concretizations of my entrance into the world of literature. a) with Benedek, even before the Thalia, Banóczi (characterization; later development), in the background (L. Popper). Discovery that I had no authentic gift as a writer. Not long after leaving school-destroyed *all* my manuscripts. (Lukács 1983. 148.)

[26] "[…] Nem bírom ki sokáig, ide kell képzelnem őt — elképzelem, hogy ott áll ma is az ablaknál (Lukács felé néz, akire most fény vetődik), kibámul mozdulatlanul. […] Egyszer 1971 áprilisában pontosan így állt az ablaknál, amikor beléptem. Megdöbbentem, mert még sosem láttam tétlenül ácsorogni. Ezúttal semmit sem csinált, sőt még a semmit sem csinálta. Látszólag kinézett az ablakon, valójában nem nézett ki, és noha álló testhelyzetben tartózkodott ott, nem merném állítani, hogy »állt«, mert ez a szó is, ige lévén, cselekvést fejez ki. […]" (Eörsi 1989. 10.) Translated by B.Sz.

The strong self-criticism of Lukács led him to a different self-realization, however it is worth mentioning that he had intentions for literature. In the summer of 1900, the young Lukács worked on a the sketch of a novel for almost a year and a half and a year later in 1901, he finished his opus *Úri morál (Gentlemen's Morality)* and another one under the title *Éjféli nap (Midnight Sun)* (see Bendl 1994. 37). However, these unsuccessful attempts "led spontaneously to a criterion: where does real literature start?" (see Lukács 1983. 148).

The aim of this paper was not to answer Lukács's question, but to focus on specific literary works which represent the idea expressed in Lukács's *Theory of the Novel*, namely, that the novels "carry the fragmentary nature of the world's structure into the world of forms" (Lukács 1971. 15–16), therefore according the hypothesis of this paper, they could be viewed as contemporary documents (*Zeitdokument* or *Zeitroman*). The four selected literary works represented an era from Lukács's life and philosophy, although their significance is not limited to their reflections on Lukács. This paper focused only one aspect of the selected works; however, I must mention that they were not fully interpreted here, and other important aspects could have been brought to the discourse. One of these aspects may be the interpretation of the historical events of the Aster Revolution and the Hungarian Soviet Republic, which were discussed only from their ideological and philosophical perspectives. Another point of view is the position of the female writers in Hungary at the turn of the century, and how the female protagonists are portrayed in the novels.[27] This also includes how female roles changed in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and after its collapse, and what kind of possibilities women, especially female writers had at the time. The interpretation expressed in Eörsi's drama of the old Lukács could have also been discussed further, as it reflects on how the leading cultural policy tried to reconsider Lukács's œuvre after his death. Moreover, this research can be extended by other literary works in which Lukács's character is represented – how the authors of these works, who either were not *comrades-in-arms* of Lukács's or not even contemporaries of him, portrayed Lukács's attitude and ideas. The motif of the Revolution and the Hungarian Soviet Republic are also recurrent in these literary works and the rediscovering of these works could bring new aspects not just to literary studies, but both the history of philosophy and the history of ideas.[28]

[27] A significant book of Agata Schwartz focuses on this problem (see Schwartz 2007).

[28] The book of Amália Kerekes already outlines the focal points and reflects on the remembrance of the Revolution of 1918–1919 in literature and in films (see Kerekes 2018. 88–94).

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Eutopias and Dystopias from Hungary

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The Intellectual as a Brahmin

Béla Hamvas and the Temptation of Neo-traditionalism: The Utopia of the Golden Age*

I. The International Context: The fin de siècle and the Modernity-crisis: the Discrediting of the 19th-century Model of Technological-capitalist Civilisation

Neo-traditionalism emerged from the peculiar fin de siècle atmosphere. Modern, industrialized technological-capitalist civilisation, from the last decades of the 19th century onward, arrived at the threshold of a modernity crisis which has to be distinguished from the crisis of modernisation (Nipperdey 1986). The modernity crisis is the discrediting of the actually existing model of modern civilisation, while the crisis of modernisation is a necessary concomitant of the process of modernisation in which old, pre-modern social and cultural structures are replaced by new ones. When these two types of crises coincide, it leads to an extremely grave situation: Germany, after the loss of WWI, had to face this problem (Mosse 1964).

At the turn of 19th and 20th centuries, a growing malaise took place among intellectuals discontented with the asphyxiating atmosphere of bourgeois society: the steel-cage of modernity, using Weber's famous term, became a tight living place for them. The rationality inherited from the Enlightenment seemed to be a one-dimensional approach to the physical and social realities for them. There were different faces of the revolt against the soulless modern secularized world imbued with an insatiable strive to get control over external and internal nature. Cultural criticism fed on different intellectual-cultural sources, from sentimentalism to the critique of modern technology. The naïve pseudo-religious belief in the unlimited progress of human society resulting in a never-ending amelioration of human conditions from material living standards to psychic and moral betterment had been questioned. The popularity of the term of decadence at the turn of the century was a symptomatic sign of this pessimistic mood.

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Paul Verlaine, one of the decadent poets who founded the short-lived movement *Decadisme* (Calinescu 1987. 171) around 1886, confessed his attraction to this word in an eloquent manner:

> I like the word 'decadent,' all shimmering with purple and gold […] it throws out the brilliance of flames and the gleam of precious stones. It is made up of carnal spirit and unhappy flesh and of all the violent splendors of the Lower Empire; it conjures up the paint of the courtesans, the sports of the circus, the breath of the tamers of animals, the bounding of wild beasts, the collapse among the flames of races exhausted by the power of feeling, to the invading sound of enemy trumpets. The decadence is Sardanapalus lighting the fire in the midst of his women, it is Seneca declaiming poetry as he opens his veins, it is Petronius masking his agony with flowers. (Gilman 1975. 5–6.)

This period, as Jason Ā. Josephson-Storm, the American scientist of religion explained it in his book, produced a tide of occultism in the modern world, from North America to Europe. Josephson-Storm reinterpreted the Weberian thesis of disenchantment (Entzauberung); this theory, according to him, became a central myth of modernity, which cannot be justified if we investigate historical sources in an unbiased way (Josephson-Storm 2017). However, sensitivity to neo-traditionalism at the turn of the century was a part of the revolt against modernity. Oswald Spengler, in the second volume of his *The Decline of the West* (1922) contemptuously wrote about it as a prelude of second religiousness which, according to him, is a typical symptom of dissolution in every civilisation approaching its end:

> Correspondingly, we have in the European-American world of to-day the occultist and theosophist fraud, the American Christian Science, the untrue Buddhism of drawing-rooms, the religious arts and-crafts business (brisker in Germany than even in England) that caters for groups and cults of Gothic or Late Classical or Taoist sentiment. Everywhere it is just a toying with myths that no one really believes, a tasting of cults that it is hoped might fill the inner void. The real belief is always the belief in atoms and numbers, but it requires this highbrow hocus-pocus to make it bearable in the long run. Materialism is shallow and honest, mock-religion shallow and dishonest. (Spengler 1928. 310.)

What Spengler described in his peculiar contemptuous-sarcastic style is characterised by the sociologist Bryan Wilson, as the *cultic milieu.* This term refers to the alternative beliefs and ways of life, alternative therapies which are opposed to the dominant ideas and practises of the dominant secular culture of modern societies (Sedgwick 2004. 48). This cultic milieu exists in a network of different groups and secret societies; these usually are not rigorously closed entities, and individuals unsatisfied with the rational-secular dominant culture have a pos-

sibility for a passage from one to another, or they can belong to more than one alternative community simultaneously. The existence of cultic milieu confirms the thesis of the sociology of religion emerged in the last decades in that referring to empirical investigations, religious-spiritual practices did not disappear from the modern world, as it was said earlier in the theory of secularisation. There are always new, alternative forms of spirituality existing in the niches of modern society. Peter Berger, one of the most renowned sociologists of religion of our day, goes even further: the basic feature of modernity, according to him, is not secularisation but the pluralisation of religious-spiritual ideas (Berger 2014. 19–21).

The revolt against modernity was not just a theoretical attitude, but it was linked with reform movements aiming at formulating new, alternative life-models. The most known experiment was the community of Ascona founded by a group of Central-European intellectuals socialized in the strange world of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; among the representatives of the first generation of this counter-cultural community were the psychoanalyst Otto Gross from Graz in Austria, the poet and artist Arthur (Gusto) Gräser from Kronstadt (Brasov), in Transylvania, and the dancer, choreographer and dance-movement theoretician Rudolph Laban from Pressburg (Pozsony, Bratislava); (Green 1986, Landmann 1973). These reformers of the way of life co-founded a community on the Mountain of Truth next to Ascona at the Swiss-Italian border at a symbolic moment in 1900. Their main intention was to break with the patriarchal monogamous family model and the "macho" civilization based on the domination and exploitation of women and nature. They preached the divinity of women and emphasized the importance of eroticism as a main driving force of life. The psychoanalyst Otto Grass, the protagonist of neo-paganism, revived the ancient cult of the goddess Astarte.

Ascona was not a unique phenomenon; the Cosmic Circle (Kosmiker Kreis) was founded in Munich in 1893. Its co-founders were the philosopher Ludwig Klages, the visionary and mystic Alfred Schuler and the poet and translator Karl Wolfskehl. The focal point of their ideas was a resolute anti-modernism. They, similarly to the group of Ascona, refused the old exploitative-dominative, modern mechanized civilization and, drawing on the philosophy of Nietzsche, preached neo-pagan evangelism. A common base of this syncretistic mixture was a strong refusal of the progressivist historical philosophy of the 19th century; it was an angry revolt against modernity.

The George Circle in Munich formed around the famous poet Stefan George around the turn of the century was an important centre of modernity-critique. It was an elite group with a definite elite-consciousness. Some members of the circle attended the meetings of the above-mentioned Cosmic Circle. They were aristocrats, businessmen and intellectuals: the Stauffenberg brothers, Robert Boehringer, Ernst Kantorowicz, Ludwig Klages etc. (Josephson-Storm 2017.

290). They belonged to the heterogeneous conservative revolution rejecting modern society, including Enlightenment, progressivism, egalitarian society and political democracy; some of its representatives flirted with neo-paganism (Mohler 1989. Woods 1996).

The Grand War between 1914 and 1918 proved to be a watershed between the long 19th century and a new uncertain world, burdened with the feelings of fear and worries concerning the future. It was not a new phenomenon; its novelty was its extension. The disillusionment and the sense of rupture after the war, from the attitude of a small segment of cultural elites, became a mass mood permeating modern, shock-stricken societies. However, it was rooted in the malaise and resentment of the turn of the century questioning the values and lifestyles of the optimist 19th century. Walter Benjamin, the German philosopher whose life ended in a tragic way as a refugee of the Third Reich and who committed suicide, gave a concise description of the loss of the plausibility for the paradigm of progress in his fragment No. 9 of historical philosophy. He called the attention to the transformation of positive connotations associated with the term of progress into negative ones. Progress, in the imagination of the inter-war generations became a devastating natural force from a process of value-accumulation:

> A Klee painting named "Angelus Novus" shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress. (Benjamin 1969. 257–258.)

The reality of the disenchanted modern world, the feeling of emptiness, and the sense of a meaningless existence without transcendental values generated a strong need for seeking a new compass to everyday life. The undoing of modernity, the re-enchantment of the world seemed to be a leeway from the bitter reality of the cold, soulless, rational world. Heaven, as opposed to the future-oriented mainstream 19th century way of thinking, seemed to be not before the human race but behind it. This impression became the basic tenet of the fin de siècle neo-traditionalism.

II. Two Representatives of Neo-traditionalism Respected by Béla Hamvas: René Guénon and Julius Evola

René Guénon (1886–1951) was one of the grounding fathers of this movement. His thought, career and role model proved exemplary to his followers. Guénon's carrier began inside academic borders; he was a promising indologist who submitted his doctoral thesis at Sorbonne; the main objection of his thesis opponent was that the candidate used the analysed texts very selectively in an unscientific and biased manner and transgressed the borders of science, so as to find evidence for the existence of a lost ancient mythical wisdom. One of the main characteristics of his thought was syncretism; he amalgamated the religious and philosophical doctrines of Hinduism with Christianity. He became a prophet of neo-traditionalism; he was inspired by Sufi mysticism, converted to Islam and settled in Cairo (Sedgwick 2004. 22–34, 39–50, 73–80).

Neo-traditionalism has two possible implications concerning its attitude to social-political action. One of them is passive-contemplative behaviour: René Guénon chose this way. He seceded from modern world and tried to become a Brahmin realizing a model of perfect personality. This attitude attracted followers; a Brahmin needs disciples. The result was a little group around the deeply revered Master, who gave a living example of a model of perfectness. Guénon linked the idea of world-transformative ancient knowledge to the customary topos of the cultural criticism of the enlightened creative elites:

> […] it may be said that the modern world would immediately cease to exist if men understood what it really is, since its existence, like that of ignorance and everything that implies limitation, is purely negative: it exists only through negation of the traditional and supra-human truth. Thus, through knowledge, the change could be brought about without the intervention of a catastrophe, a thing that seems scarcely possible in any other way; is it then not right to say that such knowledge can have truly incalculable practical consequences? At the same time, it is unfortunately very difficult to conceive of all men attaining to such knowledge, from which most of them are further removed than ever before; but as a matter of fact, it is quite unnecessary for them to do so, and it would be enough if there were a numerically small but powerfully established elite to guide the masses, who would obey its suggestions without even suspecting its existence, or having any idea of its mode of action […]. (Guenon 2001. 108–109.)

The other possibility for neo-traditionalism was political activity; most famously represented by Julius Evola (1898–1974). This way of activity, among the post-war conditions, almost inevitably meant a flirtation with the emerging far-right totalitarian movements, different kinds of fascism. The attack of Enlightenment, rationality and modern egalitarian society supplied a common denomination or meeting point for movements rejecting modernity. But there was an important

difference: fascism was, and definitely tried to be, a mass movement, while neo-traditionalism had a deep contempt for mass society; it was definitely an elitist way of thought. So, the mixing of two movements resulted in some kind of elitist-intellectual fascism, a paradoxical phenomenon in itself. At the same time, it was the way Julius Evola represented it; he became a prominent figure of intellectual, neo-traditionalist fascism. In his book entitled *Revolt Against the Modern World: Politics, Religion, and Social Order in the Kali Yuga* (*Rivolta contro il mondo modern;* 1934), he gave a sharp criticism of modernity. He did not remain within the terrain of theory: he chose and found contacts with Italian fascism and German Nazism as well.

However, Italian fascism and German Nazism, beside their essential differences shared the idea of *actio directa:* they were excessively engaged in political activism associated with the idea of the restoration of traditions. But this was a false promise: these mass movements, because of their inherent paradoxes, were not able to restore the old traditional pre-modern world. The great Hungarian political thinker, István Bibó (1911–1979), pointed to these paradoxes in a concise and illuminating manner in his work written during the years of WWII:

> The upholders of the European tradition simply regard it as a version of value-destroying revolution and emphasize its common features with communism. In contrast, the followers of European progressivism deem it "mercenary pseudo-revolution" backed up by darkest anti-progressive, feudal and reactionary elements. […] Certainly fascism refers to traditional emotions, but it simultaneously brushes off the European tradition. It calls for the support of reactionary forces, but at the same time, it shatters their social prestige. It mobilizes democratic mass emotion but drives it into an impasse. It conjures up revolution but resolves nothing. Naturally, it is difficult to pinpoint the central concept of fascism because all its thoughts are negative. (Bibó 2015. 107.)

The strange amalgam of pseudo-traditionalism and modernism in Nazism and different versions of fascism, after having caught political power, resulted in a peculiar phenomenon: *reactionary modernism* described by Jeffrey Herf in his classical book (Herf 1996). This meant a rapid and robust technological modernization, associated with intention of the revitalisation of pre-modern society. It refused egalitarian, modern society with its social and political consequences. Instead of class society, it preferred some kind of cast-society and instead of representative democracy, it preferred the inauguration of a sacral leadership.

Evola blamed Christianity for its egalitarian quality; it was for him a Semitic religion having contributed to the collapse of the heroic-pagan world. One of the main vices of Christianity, according to Evola, was the separation of temporal and spiritual power, which expelled transcendence from politics. He rejected the modern world as radically as Guénon did, but his revolt did not remain on

the level passive meditation and contemplation. He was also deeply involved in irrationalism; he wrote books on magic and occultism but, and in this respect he was very modern, he explicitly preferred action, first of all political action:

> Some people "react", others "protest". How could it be otherwise considering the hopeless features of contemporary society, morality, politics, and culture? And yet these are only "reactions" and not *actions,* or positive movements that originate from the inner dimension and testify to the possession of a foundation, a principle, or a center. […] Experience has shown that nothing that truly matters can be achieved in this way. What is really needed is not to toss back and forth in a bed of agony, but to awaken and get up. […] The only thing that matters today is the activity of those who can "ride the wave" and remain firm in their principles, unmoved by any concessions and indifferent to the fevers, the convulsions, the superstitions, and the prostitutions that characterize modern generations. (Evola 1995. XXIX–XXX.)

This attitude, among the post-war Italian conditions, brought Evola to the Mussolini led Italian fascism but, after a short time, he thought that Italian fascism was too soft in its relation to modernity and approached to Nazism. However, he attached to intellectual neo-traditionalist fascism to the end of his life and became an icon of Italian neo-fascism of the 60s and 70s (Cassina Wolff 2016. 479). In his late apologetic book, he defended Nazism using the term as an ideal-type and, absurdly, in his apologetics suggested that its horror history was the consequence of contingent events; it came from the poor quality of its historical protagonists and not of its spiritual core (Evola 2014. 14–15, 63–64).

III. The Founder of Hungarian Neo-traditionalism: Béla Hamvas

The position of Béla Hamvas (1897–1968) in Hungarian intellectual life is very ambivalent. In academic life, his evaluation is far from flattering: in spite of his deep erudition, he is a suspicious figure who did not observe the rules of scientific activity. He is said to have violated the basic rules: he refused the idea of objectivity and impersonal approach. Human knowledge, as is the deepest conviction of Hamvas, is a personal matter of the truth-seeking individual: it is not an impersonal enterprise aiming at charting and controlling external reality. Truth-seeking is the way to get personal salvation for man, and not a professionalized–institutionalised activity of experts who methodologically restrict themselves to a small segment of reality. Hamvas did not want to become a professional philosopher; he consciously kept himself outside academia and remained an outsider: he did not want to earn a scientific qualification and, in the inter-war years, he was a librarian in the Public Library of Budapest. The transmission of human knowledge for him, similarly to the conviction of neo-traditionalist fig-

ures such as René Guénon and Julius Evola, takes places in small circles based on personal master–disciple-relationships.

What is important is not the dimension of the future but that of the past. The truth is not waiting for us in the future; it is behind us in the past, in the books of different religious traditions. Hamvas, similarly to other neo-traditionalists, is definitely a syncretic thinker: he tries to synthesise Eastern thought from Buddhism, Taoism and Muslim Sufism with the ancient Greek hermetic philosophy and Christian mysticism. The Golden age is behind us: the main task of the sage, seeking personal salvation, is to collect and transmit the ancient truth that has been divided up in the sacred books of different religions. The task, in other words, is the *re-sacralisation* of the modern soulless, de-spiritualised world. So, Hamvas and his neo-traditionalism can be classified as a thread in the multi-colored, eclectic thought of inter-war cultural criticism. Salvation is self-salvation: Christian mysticism plays a great role in his thought, but he cannot be labelled a Christian in *stricto sensu*: Christianity, in his syncretistic thought, is important but only one component of many ancient religious traditions. If we try to categorise Hamvas, it would be most appropriate to accept the opinion one of his interpreters, who called him the last and maybe the greatest representative of the sacral metaphysics of European thought (Török 1988. 553).

The thought of Hamvas has been deeply embedded in the wider context of his life. World War I, similarly to the other representatives of his generation, was a shock for him; it was a watershed separating the past from the future. He spent two years at the Russian and Italian fronts in 1916–1917 (Darabos 2002a. 41–94). The storm of blood and steel, borrowing Ernst Jünger's phrase, swept away the atmosphere of this pre-war bourgeois life. The happy peace times, as this period remained in Hungarian historic recollection, had disappeared forever and the burnt out front-generations lost their intellectual and moral orientation points. The philosophical program of Nietzsche for the trans-evaluation of old values became, for these generations, a life program. Many ways seemed to be open for them from neo-conservatism and different kinds of totalitarian movements to political passivity with an inward-looking way of life: neo-traditionalism was only one option. The common denomination of the different branches of interwar cultural criticism was the idea of an alternative modernity (Rohkrämer 1999). The life-problem of Hamvas in the post-war world was the following: How is it possible to survive in this "very wrong reality?" (Darabos 2002a. 183.) Neither the present, nor the future offers an asylum from this very wrong reality: only the past is able to give a shelter for the man of modern civilisation who lost his way.

Self-salvation as the main aim of seeking ancient knowledge for Hamvas was a lasting life-strategy, which he tried to realise in different historical circumstances. In the inter-war decades, he remained outside the academic-scientific life voluntarily, but he was present in Hungarian cultural life: he published

many articles, essays and book reviews in different Hungarian journals. This was a very important kind of intellectual presence, because Hungarian cultural life was journal-centred; Hamvas was far from being an unknown author in the circles of intelligentsia. He took part in debates, discussions and literary-intellectual circles. After WWII, in the years of the *Gleichschaltung* of economy and culture accomplished by communist totalitarianism, he was expelled from the state-run cultural life: his voluntary and partial outsider position became enforced and total: he was compelled to a really marginal existence. He had to secure his subsistence by physical work: he tilled soil for a short time, and later worked as a storekeeper of power plants in the Hungarian countryside (Darabos 2002c 124–175). But in this miserable situation, he remained a Brahmin continuing the work of self-perfection: he wrote his books in a graphomaniac manner and translated ancient philosophical and religious texts from Sanskrit, Greek and Latin.

The life-program of self-perfection was the source of his insatiable desire for knowing philosophies and religious traditions: he read almost everything in a possessed manner, in most cases in their original languages. His intellectual horizon covered not only the pre-modern thought of the Eastern and Western civilisations but modern 20th century philosophy as well, albeit in a selective manner. His intellectual tool box contained Chinese and Indian philosophies and religious doctrines, the contemporary existential philosophies and life philosophies, first of all of Jaspers, Heidegger and Nietzsche. From these sources, he synthesized a special, esoteric and syncretic worldview concentrating on the notions of *crisis, tradition* and *realization* (Thiel 2002).

Crisis for him, similarly to other representatives of the interwar thinkers, was a personal experience: this was a common catchword during these decades. Crisis, in the interpretation of Hamvas was not an exclusively modern phenomenon: the history of mankind is the history of crisis rooted in the process of de-spiritualisation, the distancing from life-giving forces of the cosmos: what is new is crisis-consciousness and not crisis itself. At the same time, crisis-consciousness signals a new phase of crisis; it really is a new constellation in the history of human existence: it was the essential recognition of the philosophies of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche (Hamvas 1983. 69–76).

In the process of human history, the ancient theocentric world view had been replaced by an anthropocentric one. True knowledge, as one of his books title says, *Scientia Sacra*, i.e. sacred knowledge has to be mined out from the different ancient pre-modern philosophies and religions, and it is opposed by Hamvas to the modern profane, compartmentalised, soulless knowledge practised by narrow-minded experts: it serves the petty, pedestrian aims of modern mass society, which, according to Hamvas, similarly to other neo-traditionalists, mentioned as a *chandala*-society, i.e. mob society, the society of outcasts. This term indicates that Hamvas's political ideal was the sacred kingship and a caste

society. (Hamvas 1988a. 46–49) At the same time, contrary to other neo-traditionalists, e.g. Julius Evola, Hamvas evaluated it as an un-realisable model for modern societies.

It was not too surprising, in the atmosphere of interwar cultural criticism, that Hamvas soon discovered Nietzsche, an obligatory orientation point for this tradition, and associated his philosophy with the ideas of the Stefan George Circle, René Guénon and Julius Evola. These influences had been moulded into form by the help of German existential philosophies; he had especially been impressed by the thought of Karl Jaspers, whose philosophy he meticulously investigated in a long and thorough paper putting it into the framework of European philosophical thought (Hamvas 1988b 27–84).

Authentic existence was a term borrowed from the philosophy of Jaspers. Hamvas posed himself the question by which he designated his life task: "How is it possible to realize authentic existence?" He gave different answers for it in the ensuing periods of his life. First, borrowing the conception of Nietzsche, his solution was the "beautiful neo-pagan-Greek attitude" and, in his second, Bhramanic period, he based his ideas on the doctrines of the holy books of ancient religions. The conception of the beautiful neo-pagan-Greek attitude appeared in an essay series published in 1934 entitled *Maszk és koszorú (Mask and Wreath),* the leitmotif of which is the idea of age shift (Hamvas 2011. 27–81).

This essay series was written by Hamvas as a discussion-material for Károly Kerényi, the renowned Hungarian classical scholar with international reputation in the topics of Greek mythology. He and Hamvas, together with other Hungarian intellectuals, established a society named *Sziget-kör* (Island circle) in 1935, which dealt with these topics in a different way than it was done by the academic circles of classical philology (Darabos 2002b. 38–46, 195–204). Their approach was determined by their intention to use classical philology for the interpretation and illumination of modern world situations burdened by crisis. This conception had been rooted in the philosophical interpretation of Greek antiquity by Nietzsche, focused on Dionysus instead of Apollo. The Sziget-kör was not a long-lived society: the internal debates disintegrated it. However, for Hamvas, it was a failed enterprise which would have been an esoteric group of the elected persons possessing the ancient primordial knowledge amalgamated with Nietzschean life-philosophy and cultural criticism. The *Maszk és koszorú,* in his intention, was both the interpretation of the crisis unfolding after the Grand War and a program for the planned society.

We are at the border of two eras, Hamvas argues, and the essence of this transition is the fall of the Promethean age and of the emergence of the Dionysian era. The watershed of two historical epochs was the war which, Hamvas argues very similarly to Ernst Jünger (Jünger 1960), put an end to the world of the false safety of the pre-war egalitarian bourgeois society and opened the way for the recognition of primordial truths. The Promethean man is moved by compulsive

dynamism and his ideology is progress; while his Dionysian antagonist exists without this strive for incessant activity; he only exists in harmony with the animating forces of the cosmos. The Promethean man is an individual, Dionysian man, similarly to Ernest Jünger's *Typ* (Jünger 1960. 129) is beyond the subject–object division that so characteristic to the vanishing Promethean epoch. Hamvas borrows the intellectual strategy of the inter-war German cultural criticism, unfolding his theory by the help of antithetical notion pairs: Promethean man – Dionysian man, banal existence – heroic existence, crowd – elite, human – posthuman, historicity – eternality etc. The bourgeois society based on contractual relations in the Dionysian epoch falls apart; the age of pseudo-equality comes to an end, bourgeois class society is replaced by a caste system originated in a "natural" ontological hierarchy. Spirit, that is Culture, survives in the little circles of the creative spiritual elite. The world is going through a process of re-sacralisation and life regains its metaphysical depth (Hamvas 2011. 61). At the same time, in a paradox way, this new age is double-faced: the Dionysian existence is a privilege of small groups for the elected; the majority of this post-historic caste society, including both the caste of the bourgeois lost its political influence and that of workers, continues its inferior ways of life: money-seeking, tilling and pursuing shallow entertainments of mass society. The situation of the oncoming age described by Hamvas is very similar of Oswald Spengler's vision on the post-historic age of Caesarism, albeit Hamvas himself does not mention the author of *The Decline of the West*.

IV. Conclusion: The Refusal of the Totalitarian Implications of Neo-traditionalism by Béla Hamvas

However, Hamvas did not choose the way of political activity inspired by the neo-traditionalist worldview: in spite of his definite respect of the thought of Julius Evola, Hamvas definitely refused the possible totalitarian implications of neo-traditionalism and was able to resist the temptation of totalitarian ideologies; his option was the Brahmin with his disciples, the role model represented by René Guénon. The contemplative attitude was closer to his personal character than political activism was. He explained, during the tide of different fascisms, in 1939, that there was no political solution for the overall crisis of the modern world. After the collapse of democratic regimes, Hamvas wrote, two possible political solutions had offered themselves. One of them was archaic kingship, the only authentic form of government of a rightly constructed, un-egalitarian society: unfortunately, it is unacceptable for modern egalitarian mass society. The other realized option was dictatorship; the main problem with it was, according to Hamvas, that it paved the way for a new kind of modern servitude (Hamvas 1988c).

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Pessimist Hungarian Utopias in the Interwar Period and after the Second World War

I. Introduction

The genre of utopia has never had a serious role in the history of the Hungarian culture; however, there is an important exception, a series of the *pessimist utopias* written mainly in the interwar period. They are not simply *dystopias,* because their fictive inhuman world offers a real alternative to the existing hopeless human culture, which is often the real dystopia in novels' worlds. These works of pessimist utopias have not found their place in the Hungarian cultural canon; they are marginal works of the Hungarian classics, or main works of marginal figures of Hungarian literature. At the end of my writing, I will touch on the problem of the canonisation of these works and its consequence for future research of the Hungarian history of ideas. In what follows, I will discuss five novels and several short stories of three authors briefly, focused on the topics of the production of ideologies, the role of culture and the crisis of the sexual, individual and cultural identities in their fictive worlds. These questions are in close connection with the role models of the intelligentsia, expressed clearly or in a hidden form in the world of the fictional literature discussed. In the first section I discuss Mihály Babits's *Aviator Elza*. I will also analyse Frigyes Karinthy's novels entitled *Rope-dancing* and *Voyage to Faremido*. A distinguished part of my writing will be focused on Sándor Szathmári's works. I will discuss the last part of his trilogy entitled *Vainly – Past, Present, Future,* and his *Kazohinia* in the fourth and fifth sections, and I will touch on problem of his role in the canon of Hungarian literature separately in the last section.

II. The Symbol of a Female Aviator in a Godless World – Mihály Babits's Last Novel

Although Mihály Babits's *Aviator Elza* was written at the turn of the nineteen twenties and thirties, it clearly mirrors the elementary social experiences of the First World War; they are the parallel appearance of the achievements of modern technology and the re-barbarisation of society. It is the epoch of when millions

of young European men had to eat canned food for the first time in their lives and learnt to shave without the assistance of a barber; since they were required to wear gas masks. (Bertrand Russell's logical paradox *on the regiment's barber* clearly refers to the change of military shaving practices. His example is hardly comprehensible to today's audience for cultural reasons; it needs separate notes for the students.) The symbol of the link of technology and re-barbarisation can be the joint usage of *clubs with nails, flamethrowers and poison gases* in the long trench warfare (*clubs with nails and flamethrowers* were the specialities of the Austro-Hungarian Army, especially on the Italian frontiers). The first versions of Babits's novel were published in two series in a well-known daily newspaper entitled *Pesti Napló,* between 15 March 1931 and 10 January 1932. In the time of its formulation, the cultural and personal memories of the Great War and the similarly violent remembrance of the post-war years were life-like experiences for the majority of his target audience. In this first version, Babits's narratives still appeared as two separate novels. The first one is set in the Hungarian hinterland of an imagined future war; the second one entitled *The Creation of the World* is actually a science fiction about a man-made world, constructed by a scientific experiment. The idea to join these narratives appears in the first edition of the novel, as a separate volume. It can be seen as the *ultima manus* of the author, and from the moment of this writing act, we should regard it as *one, single* novel with its final title, *Aviator Elza, or the Perfect Society* (Babits 1933).[1] The heroine of the novel named in the title, *Aviator Elsa* refers to the cultural remembrance of the Swedish *Elsa Andersson* (1897–1922), one of the first female aviators and stunt parachutists who died tragically in a fly-past show which counted as a recent event at the time the novel was written, and her memorial obelisk was erected at the place of her death in 1926, just five years before the first publication of Babits's novel. For Babits's target audience, her figure was a well-known and vivid symbol a *female Icarus*. However, Elsa Andersson had not any connection with military ideas, her tragic figure, transplanted into an imaginary Hungarian war environment of the future was optimal to create a symbol of a (female) human life offered on the altar of the war. *Elza Kamuthy,* Babits's fictive character is a member of the Hungarian middle class, a sportswoman and hobby-aviator, who is a student at the Faculty of Humanities of the local university. Her every characteristic and activity *prima facie* refers to the survived norms of the civilisation of peace; the narrative of the novel shows

[1] In this paper, all mentioned Hungarian fictions will be referred to by their first editions. There is no room here to discuss the difficult history of the afterlife of these works, consequently, there are no mentions of the different modern editions, except for those that have inevitable text-variants. If there are relevant translations in foreign languages, they will be mentioned after the data of the first Hungarian edition.

us that how the war machinery can gradually use all of them for its own aims, all the way to the elimination of cultural and moral values and personality.

At the beginning of the narrative of the novel, we are in the *forty-first year of the perpetual fight,* in the city of Szeged. (Babits just talks about 'Sz.', a big Hungarian city on the bank of the Tisza River with a university; and we can go to "Új/New-Sz." through the bridge of the Tisza River. There is no clear reason to hide the name of the city. It was probably the requirement of censorship. The University of Szeged, identical with the university evacuated from Kolozsvár, was an honoured model-institution of the science-policy of the Horthy regime, but in Babits's novel it appears as an image of the decline of the humanities and the academic sphere altogether in the circumstances of the war.) All the promises of modernity were fulfilled in this fictive world, but in a perverted form. More and more social homogeneity means that everyone is a part of the war machinery. Equal rights of women mean obligatory military service for girls. This last step of the development of the total war machinery is the main element of the narrative of the novel. Elza's peaceful middle-class hobby as an amateur aviator became the basis of her military drilling job at the *air force,* according to the logic of war society. Babits formulates a note on the Jewish origin of the Kamuthy, primary *Kamutzer* family; but this line of the narrative remains just a glance, without antecedents and continuations. These rare and sudden notes on the rare rests of the socio-cultural status of the figures of his novel refer to the real time conditions of the epoch of writing of the novel. The writer's hidden statement could be the following: "Take several social types from Hungary, from the 1930s, and let us see the destiny of their daughters and sons in the *41*st *year of the perpetual fight*. Of course, we will see the same perdition of different socio-cultural types; just their lost illusions remain relatively different."

As the time of Elza's military service approaches, the reader gets more and more familiar with the different strata of war ideology. The socio-cultural position of Elza's family offers a good opportunity to describe a complete picture. We listen to mass propaganda through the street megaphones and public radio programs in the so-called 'air-caves' (refuges in the times of a gas attack); in scenes at the university we can observe the special message for the (female) students as the 'guardians of the rest of culture'; and in the conversations of Mrs Kamuthy and a high ranking medical officer, a friend of the family, we can see the core of war ideology that is the *fight for the fight itself.* A significant point of this secret core of war ideology is that the systems of *nationalism and internationalism* play the roles of each other. One of the main characteristic elements of the description of the world scene is a foggy image of the enemies and allies. From a special hinterland-perspective of the novel, both the allies and the enemies appear just on the horizon. In the novel's world it is well-known that Hungary is a part of a large military alliance, and it is mentioned that "the Hungarian soldiers were divided and mixed with other nations on the long frontiers",

but we actually are not informed about who our allies are. They physically only appear once, when they offer technical help with an equipment of the "death ray" for a collective penalty of decimation ordered by a Hungarian officer, but they have no faces, characteristics, or a concrete nationality. The fictive Hungarian war rhetoric of the novel appears in the framework of this abstract alliance, which is a clear limit of possibility of any autonomous strategic decision on the frontiers, on the level of the nation state. Internationalism appears as the ideology of the main war-enemy that is actually unknown to the war-society of the novel's fiction. On the level of the simplified slogans of the war propaganda, Hungarians fights "for their homeland and nation" against the "poison of the internationalist ideologies" and against "Eastern barbarism"; but the army of the "internationalist barbaric" enemy practically functions as a national army. These foggy images of the allies and enemies can hardly be identified with concrete nations and states; but the initial words of the novel's narrator about the beginnings of the "perfect war society" offer an orientation to the audience. By this historical retrospection, the roots of the total military organisation of society appeared "as early as the first half of the 20th century in the forms of 'fascio'-s and Soviets" (Babits's novel was formulated before Hitler came into power in Germany). Babits here clearly refers to the social and political phenomena of his age, namely Mussolini's Italy and the Bolshevik Soviet-Russia; but these elements of the past are known only to a number of clear-minded figures of the fictive society of the novel. (It is an interesting episode of the afterlife of the novel that in the editions of Babits's novel published in the Communist era, these notes about the parallelism of Soviets and 'fascio'-s; and the slogan of "the fight against Eastern barbarism" were censored, differently in the versions published in Hungary and by the editing house of the Hungarian minority in Romania. For these Hungarian philological details, see Mester 2019a. 67–68. n. 2.)

The deepest consequence of war society for the individual is the crisis of sexuality. Amongst men on the frontiers and amongst women in the hinterland, homosexual and lesbian sexuality became normal, but it is far from the freedom of sexual identity and more similar to the sexuality of prisons. The biggest problem is social alienation of men and women. Many men who were socialised in the war could only imagine having sex with a woman non-consensually in a Sadist way, only, or to be asexual, except that they had to be married in order to have children, but this became more and more uncomfortable both parties. The sexual misery of the fictive war-society is clearly described by the tristful love story of the heroine of the novel. Elza's main motive in her relation with Dezső is just that she does not want to join the army as a virgin. Her romance was regarded negatively and ironically in her socio-cultural environment; in the opinions of her (female) fellow students, she should have chosen a lesbian partner from the university, instead of an uneducated (male) soldier. In the novel's world, every healthy man is a soldier and deprived of the normal university

curricula. At the same time, the social practice of voluntary mutilation and the mutilation of new-borns to industrial measures is a part of everyday life for the middle class. Consequently, in the eye of young women, a young man can either be healthy *and* uneducated, *or* mutilated *and* educated. It is true for young men only in the generation of Elza's father that the planned mutilation was not such a widespread practice. (For this problem, see my lecture: Mester 2019b.) In Hungarian literary studies, Babits's prudery is commonplace. In this locus of his novel, this critical topic appears embedded in the statement that he attributes more significance to the question of virginity than it really had in the everyday life of the Hungarian middle class during the interwar period. A close reading of the few pages of this love story in the novel can persuade the interpreter that lost virginity is just a marginal element of the story; its core is the socio-cultural alienation of young men and women, with serious consequences in sexual behaviour which can be summarised as having an asexual attitude.

In the novel's world, any form of culture may only have a marginal role. Universities have been feminised and have become passive conservators of books, which have haphazardly remained in local university libraries. Writing and printing new books, or having a discussion with the scholars of other inland or foreign universities is not possible. This image of the academic sphere as a feminine realm is based on the personal experiences of the writer. The first Hungarian woman who earned a PhD degree at a Hungarian university, Valéria Dienes (born Geiger) was Babits's close relative, and her details were used in Babits's earlier autobiographic novel entitled *Halálfiai (Death's Sons)* for a description of the figures of the first female students in the novel's world. Another collective experience of all European countries was the multitudinous appearance of female students in the last years of the war, especially in the medical faculties. (The post-war political regimes usually tried to restrict this early feminisation of intellectual careers; for the majority's opinion this was not a beginning of a new era, just an anomaly of the war years.) The uselessness of the remaining elements of the culture of peace saved by the universities is the clearest in Elza's university studies. Her major was history of religion in a world where the priests are just tolerated figures, without any influence on the government and society. (The Christian chronology based on the 'years of A.D.' is only used in and by the Church, and it is regarded an old-fashioned curiosity. According to the official chronology and everyday language, we are in the "41st year of the perpetual fight", in the novel's fictional world. While the traditional churches clearly lost their influence on society, informal prophets and their believers are persecuted and they are not the subjects of academic research and studies.) As a foreign language, she chose Russian, but her studies based on ancient books, without any assistance to learn pronunciation, did not help when she became a war prisoner "amongst the Antipodes", as Babits calls the culturally unknown enemy who is not further from us than a few hours long flight.

As a novel within the novel, Babits puts a science fiction story into his work about an artificial, manmade globe as an experimental research of human history. The idea of this artificial world first appears as a fiction read by a figure of the novel, the above-mentioned medical officer, a friend of the Kamuthy family, and later Elza's commander; she was his personal aviator-pilot. Later, this world of the fiction within the fiction became gradually more and more realistic; and, at the end of the story, Professor-General Doctor Schulberg meets the "small Earth" of his favourite book in reality. At this point, Babits flashes a vision of the infinite series of the manmade worlds; on one Earth, a scientist creates an artificial Earth that has its scientist who creates a second-level artificial Earth, and so on. In this model of the universe, our Earth is just a chain in the series of artificial Earths. For Babits, the core of this system is the introduction of the idea of a *Godless world*. In his epilogue, he calls upon us to resist war ideologies based on a non-defined Christian humanism that is a general characteristic of his late works. The pessimist version of the human history described in his epilogue is that God will leave the created world when humanity has left God.

III. The Body–Mind Problem and the Human–Machine Relationship in Frigyes Karinthy's Post-War Novels

Despite the fact that he novels of our next author, Frigyes Karinthy were written earlier, during and after the First World War, the social experience of the war appears in a more indirect, abstract form in his works. His *Rope-dancing*, written during the post-war years, is a novel about the disintegration of social and individual identity (Karinthy 1923a). His hero, an unknown aviator with his only passenger, his dead lover vested as a mummy, runs an intellectual and political amuck in Budapest, changing his names, identities and roles from that of a spiritualist of middle class saloons to the leadership of the new-model political mass-movements of this epoch. We can see the symbol of hopeless love and aviation in a different version than it was shown in Babits's novel (actually, Babits's novel was written and edited later than Karinthy's one). This initial picture of a man who has alienated himself from the social world and who is connected emotionally exclusively to his dead lover, is based on Karinthy's tragic personal experiences; his pregnant wife died in the 'Spanish flu' epidemic of the post-war years. The core of the story in the milieu of social chaos of the post-war years, described in non-realistic dream pictures of horror, is a physical and spiritual *hunt for the soul* or *the identity* of the anonymous hero who has no established knowledge about who he really is. He could only achieve his real existential presence in his own life at the end of his life described in the novel – his amuck-running is actually a personal mirror of the chaotic history of post-war Hungary. The moment when he wakes up from the dream of chaos is the same as when

his body, to paraphrase Michel Foucault, *escapes from the prison of the soul,* which is also the moment of his execution. In his case, the soul is the *killer* of the body, which is the only possible basis of human identity. Actually, the concept or imagination of a separate, immortal and pre-existent soul was unveiled here as a mere linguistic construction in the service of war ideology. (A characteristic feature of Karinthy's writings in the last years of the Great War was to show the slogans of war ideology in an un-masked form. This deconstruction of the concept of the soul is both the top and core of the critique of war ideology in Karinthy's œuvre.)

The body–mind problem has a similarly important role in his other novels and short stories, I suppose, because of the influence of several physicalist theories of Hungarian philosophical life in this time, on the one hand a more radical amongst them was the behaviourist theory of Jenő Posch (1859–1923) and a Hungarian spiritualist movement in the early 1920s, on the other. (For a short analysis of Posch's ideas about the body–mind problem from the special point of view of the human–animal relationship, see Mester 2015. 156–158; for an interpretation of the body–mind problem and human–technology relationship, see Mester 2021.) His opinion about the roles of the soul and the body in human identity is clearly mirrored in his short story entitled *Legend on the Soul of One Thousand Faces,* written during the war years (Karinthy 1917). Its main character invents the method of perpetual life by the continuous changing of bodies, but he realises that one cannot make love *with a borrowed body,* because his identity is not hidden purely in his soul. From this point on, the existence of the soul or the false ideas about the existence and role of the soul became a central element in Frigyes Karinthy's thought; it was going to be the core of any cultural criticism, as it appeared in his novel written in the war years, entitled *Voyage to Faremido;* but its central topic guides to the next problem of the present section, namely the human–machine relationship.

Karinthy's second novel discussed herein is a work of the genre of actualisations of Swift's Gulliver, put into a wartime environment. The narrator of the story escapes the war situation by plane and leaves the living area of humanity during an air fight, and he wakes up in a miraculous world of singing machines called *Faremido* (Karinthy 1916; 1965). We can see in here the third version of the symbol of the aviator; from the viewpoint of the intelligent machines, the aircraft–human-complex appears as a *reasonless animal* within the *rational machine*. Let us say that we do not see 'the ghost in the machine', just 'the worm in the mechanism'. The cultural criticism described from the point of view of the perfect machines is based on two oppositions of the real world and *Faremido;* the first one is the contrast between eternal inorganic and the temporal organic life, the second one is the antagonism of the perfect language of the music used by the machines and natural human languages. By the description of *Midore,* Gulliver's mentor in *Faremido,* all forms of organic life is in decay in the body

of a *solasi,* for example the globe, but a form of these *dosire* seems to be a rational being. According to the research of scholar *solasi*s, it is just a joke of nature, because in the head of the rational *dosire*s, the organs of *instinct* and *reason* are compressed inside a narrow hole in the scull, and the rational *dosire*s are determined to kill themselves and/or each other, in any way. This tension of *instinct* and *reason* is the root of any form of culture and concept of the soul, but they are just imaginations before the programmed death of the organism. The musical language of the machines refers to an existing plan of the perfect, rational and economic language of music, developed in the 19th century, called *solresol*. Karinthy extended the real potential as a neutral mediator between languages to a critical relation with reality with a moral consequence; by the perfect musical language of the novel, only things of *real reference* can be explained. By the experiences of Gulliver, a lot of words and expressions of the natural human languages cannot be translated into the perfect language of Faremido. They can be interpreted just as the obstacles of communication, different examples of the *channel noise*. As Gulliver could listen to a record of the scientific observation of the *dosire*s, the expression of *historical materialism* was a real, understandable element of the communication only for him; for the scholar *solasi*s it was just a meaningless *channel noise* of the communication.

A counterpart of his *Faremido* in Karinthy's œuvre can be his short story entitled *New Iliad* (Karinthy 1933; 1980b). It is the single writing of the author, published in the late period of his career that regards the rule of technology to be negative but formulates the possibility of the cultural survival of humankind in and after the rule of machines. We are in New York in the future, when the machines have created their autonomous, self-creating and self-developing world that is inimical to the rarely survived groups of humankind. For the re-barbarised human society, the ruins of the Manhattan skyscrapers are natural mountains, canyons and caves, and machines appear as the monsters of nature, only the *time traveller narrators* can realise that several machine-monsters have well-known *ancestors* as a car, a vacuum cleaner, or a printer. The neo-primitive human society is fighting against the machines as monsters of nature. An important feature of Karinthy's cultural criticism is that the machine-monster killed by the hero of the new epoch, had *printer ancestors* according to the observation of the time travellers. Consequently, the prerequisite of the *creation of a new cultural memory* is that the symbolic tools of the ancient ones, the printers, must be destroyed. This hunt for the monster-machines can be the basis of the next possible level of civilisation, the emergence of a new Homer, the creator of cultural memory as a core of collective identity. However, this naive humanist heroism is unique in Karinthy's œuvre and in the whole of the Hungarian pessimist utopias as well, but we can see the failed illusion about the value of the culture of his epoch at the bottom of his enforced optimism.

IV. Elements of the Hungarian War Philosophy as the Roots of Generalised War Ideology in the Fictions of Mihály Babits and Frigyes Karinthy

Mihály Babits and Frigyes Karinthy in their fictions did not just use the primitive slogans of the propaganda of the last war; his description is seriously based on the Hungarian version of the "war philosophy" that was a wide-spread phenomenon of European intellectual life in the war years. However, Babits's novel was written later, his fiction used the concrete details of this literature, because of its realistic Hungarian environment, while Karinthy tended to generalise the main statements of the same ideology and made them run into absurd consequences that were hidden inside them. By the hypothesis of the present paper, the description of the war ideology of a fictional future Hungary as a coherent worldview of a totalitarian society is significantly based on the writings of the doyen of Hungarian philosophical life in the first two decades of the 20th century, Bernát Alexander, focused on the central term of the *philosophy of war*. Alexander's role in military propaganda is not a well-known part of his œuvre. In this topic, the first pieces of research were made by Gábor Gángó, in the context of the Hungarian events of Leibniz-year in 1916 (Gángó 2011); other authors of this volume, Péter András Varga and Bettina Szabados have recent achievements in the field of researching Alexander's international context (Szekér–Szabados–Varga 2018; Varga 2018). Péter Turbucz's philological and historical research is focused on the war- and post-war periods of Alexander's life and œuvre; the preprint version of his first book inspired me to research of the present topic (see Turbucz 2021; and cf. Turbucz's writing in the present volume).

In the following, I will analyse the structure of Alexander's *war philosophy,* its place in his œuvre and in the cultural memory of the historiography of Hungarian philosophy. For us today, the elements probably used by Babits and Karinthy have special importance. For the evaluation of the publications and lectures of Bernát Alexander in the genre of "war philosophy", we should consider the following circumstances. "War philosophy" is not a Hungarian speciality, it emerged in all of the European countries at war, with highly similar inner tensions in their content; it is the opposition of the reality of extended military coalitions and the national rhetoric of public communication. The solution is the emphasis of national culture as the main defender of the whole of European culture against the barbarism of the national culture of military enemies. Within the public communication of European intellectuals for the war, in the German scene, the role of the philosophers was more significant than in France or in Great Britain. The Hungarian version of "war philosophy" is clearly linked to the German one, not only because of the military alliance but for structural reasons as well. In the Hungarian case, in the evaluation of Alexander's war writings, we should consider that Alexander's œuvre is highly fragmented; he wrote

very few longer works or syntheses of his opinions. In this œuvre, the volumes of collected essays edited by him represent a kind of synthesis; consequently, the fact that he published a collection of his war essays after two years after the end of the war has special importance, without any revision of the text, entitled *After the War* (Alexander 1918/2014). It means that he regarded this text corpus as valid and valuable for the after-war period as well, and he did not think that it was a moral or intellectual mistake. The cultural memory of Hungarian philosophy has forgotten these writings for two reasons. At first, the memory of the Second World War and the Communist dictatorship covered the memory of the Great War; secondly, for the first serious researchers of Alexander's œuvre, these writings were morally and intellectually uncomfortable.

The first writing from this text corpus is entitled *The War as an Educator of the Nation* (*A háború, mint nemzetnevelő,* first published in 1914). It is a typical writing of the war literature of its time; the moral and physical challenges of the war offer a possibility to the following step of the development of nations, based on a moral revival. This is more than simple war propaganda; it is the close connection of this writing with other articles and lectures published in the peace period, about national philosophy, and the role of philosophy in the national culture, which was a central question of his thought. Another characteristic writing is entitled *On the Philosophy of War* (*A háború filozófiájáról,* first published in 1915). It is a key to his war-literature; he tries to apply the categories of the neo-Kantian *theory of values* for the war experience, and to find the moral *values* behind the *facts* of the war. It is important and interesting that the logical structure of this writing is parallel with a lecture of professional philosophy held in the same period, on the 22nd May 1918, entitled *Facts and Values* (by the evidence of the report on the annual meeting of the Hungarian Philosophical Society, see *A Magyar Filozófiai Társaság Közgyűlése* 1918). This parallelism demonstrates that the "war lectures" for an extended target audience and the writings for the scholar periodicals did not represent for him an essential but only stylistic difference. In the end, I should mention his paper entitled *The Acting Thought* (*A cselekvő gondolat,* first published in 1915). It can be regarded as the last conclusion of his "war philosophy". In his previous writings he demonstrated the existence of the philosophical values of the war and the significance of the war in national development. In this third step, he details the role of philosophy in the collective acting of the nation in the form of a fight in this epoch. It is clear that for Alexander, "war philosophy" is just a formulation of the conclusions of his philosophy developed during the peaceful years. For Babits and Karinthy, this continuity was disbelief and dangerous in the shadow of the new war.

V. From Pessimism to a Trans-humanist Vision – the Novels and Short Stories of Sándor Szathmári

Central elements of the above-discussed writings of Frigyes Karinthy, namely the problem and the nature of the perfect language and the tension between rationality and the biological-emotive instincts of the same human being are the fundaments of the thought of the best follower of Karinthy, Sándor Szathmári, in a more systematised and developed version. The first sentence of the foreword to Szathmári's novel entitled *Vainly – Future* is that "the words are not to explain our ideas and to understand each other", and he repeats this in the epilogue entitled *A few useless words again* (see in Szathmári 1991). It is the first significant writing in his œuvre, and in here the critique of culture based on the critique of natural language is restricted to ideological languages, yet, extended to the ideologies of the aesthetical rebels at least. Szathmári's trilogy can be regarded as the adventures of a time traveller in the past, present and the future, always under the same talking name (Kálmán Hajós, 'Colman Sailor'), and connecting with the same typical characters, after the model of the *Tragedy of Man* by Imre Madách, and Frigyes Karinthy's above-mentioned time traveller stories. Szathmári's trilogy was written at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s, (at the same time when Babits's last novel I analysed above), but its last parts were published only as late as in 1991.

In the novel's fiction we are in 2082. Communist revolutions during and after the Second World War, (which were forecast in Szathmári's novel, similarly to Babits's work), established a new order of international relations in Central Europe; all the countries of this region have a Communist political system combined with mutual hate, based on extreme nationalism. However, there were rebels in the 1980s, and they achieved several so-called "people's rights" at the time of the novel's story, these rights were gradually eliminated; government is close to the total control of society. It is a definite *dictatorship of the proletariat,* in other words, the *nomenclature* called *vanguard proletariat ('élproletár')* over the empirical working class called *machinists ('gépész'),* and the intellectual middle class of *headworkers ('fejmunkás')*. It is funny to meet Szathmári's fictive Hungarian Communist terminology in our time, imagined in the interwar period; it is a mixture of the remembrance of the political language of the Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919, several modified elements of the Marxist terminology and the uncontrolled fantasy of the author. (One of the keywords, 'headworker / fejmunkás' is a characteristic expression of 1919; another central concept, the exclusive usage of the word 'proletariat' for the nomenclature of the Communist Party is Szathmári's invention.) The novel is a headworker's story in its essence; the caste of headworkers is the producer of the ruling Marxist ideology in "ceremony-masters" in the "neo-socialist" reformers within the party, and in the activists of the underground *Anthropist* resistance as well. Szathmári

offers caricatures of the ideological jargon of these groups; the best is the picture of the circle of the sectarian ideologists of the *Anthropism* with the continuous citations of the fictive author called Hartleben, based "on the German original version".

The essence of the critique of the ideological language is mirrored in the second part of Szathmári's work, in a new autonomous society, liberated from the rule of Soviet-Hungary. In the fiction of the novel's world, the rulers save a safety valve of societal tensions; it is to offer the possibility to the machinists and headworkers for making their self-governed communities separated from the official Soviet-Hungary under very hard financial requirements. The second part of the novel describes one of these societal islands; the readers can hope that a utopia will be offered within the dystopia of the fictional world of Szathmári. In the society of equal citizens, there is no place for *vertical* metaphors and traditional authorities; consequently, the vocabulary and metaphors of the language of power must be changed as well. In a homogeneous society of equal producers, no one can be on the top, or on the bottom of a scale of social status, and with the decline of the rule of the proletariat (i.e. nomenclature), its name evaporated as well. In the new reform-society, the head of the community must be called a *machinist* as all the other citizens and producers, and his status as a leader must be expressed by a *horizontal* metaphor; he is the *Centre Machinist ('Centrumgépész')*. In the novel's narrative of course, our hero, Kálmán Hajós achieved the rank of *Centre Machinist,* but he remained an intellectual in his attitude, i.e. a 'headworker'. He believes that the teaching of the official *Catechism* of the new reform society, formulated by him, can be a hidden capsule of authority-free thinking for future generations. But, as he made it clear in his foreword, "the words are not to explain our ideas and to understand each other"; the antiauthoritarian sentences of the *Catechism* are used by the security service of reform society against the authority of a prophetic, religious critic of the rulers. The conclusion is clear for the future of Hungary, and for the whole of humanity; *vainly,* i.e. it is in vain to hope that the injustice and pain of existing societies can stop as a result of applying rationality because of human nature and the nature of human language.

Szathmári's more consequent and much more known masterpiece is his *Kazohinia*, written in the middle of the 1930s, just after his abovementioned trilogy. The history of the publication of the novel is highly adventurous, mirrors the different periods of the modern history of Hungary. The first edition was published in a mutilated version, because of the censorship in the shadow of Hungary's participation in the Second World War (Szathmári 1941). The second edition can be regarded as the first complete, unmutilated version with the author's theoretical essay on the experiences of the Great World Crisis (1929–1933), and the Second World War entitled *The Song of a Poor Comedian (A szegény csepűrágó dala),* written after the war as an epilogue (Szathmári 1946). This essay is absent

from the later editions, it is available solely in a posthumous collection of the author's shorter writings (Szathmári 1989). The attitude of this epilogue follows the central idea of a short story of Karinthy entitled *Hippodrome (Cirkusz);* the message of the writer must be packed in an amusing form but there is no guarantee that the audience will understand. (Szathmári regarded this writing of his elected master as his own *ars poetica.* He translated it into Esperanto with his personal confession about the importance of this writing for him; see Karinthy 1968.) The genre of the novel is an actualised Gulliver story dedicated to Frigyes Karinthy, who read the manuscript before his death and declared that he could give up the authorship of each of his own works written in this topic for this book. The narrator of the story finds himself on the island of the *hin*s called *Kazohinia* after an ocean storm. His first experience is the regular, artificial and perfect language of the local people. It is a human one, but in its structure and semantics it is similar to the musical language of *Faremido*. In the perfect world of the *hin*s, there are no words for the phenomena of culture, religion and the majority of the elements of psychic life, because these have no reference in the real world. The core of this cleaned out vocabulary is the lack of any concept or term for the soul. Our hero cannot fit into this perfect but soulless society and asks to move to the territory of the *behin*s, which is a settlement of hopeless psychotic patients. In the world of the *behin*s, he first meets a form of the *hin* language that is corrupted in its phonology, grammar and semantics. These deformed linguistic phenomena refer to the imagined things without real reference, expressed by irregular linguistic elements. A large intellectual underworld is manifested as a caricature of human culture; taboos about food and women, religious and political beliefs and dogmas, sacral and political symbols emerge with their well-developed fictional terminology. Within this perverted world of culture, the terminology of art has a direct connection with the trends of art at the time of the first publication of the novel; the slogans of "white seat in a white room" and "the seat for the seat itself" can be familiar to anyone. (A similar aesthetical discussion was described in the second part of his previous novel, but it had a more direct reference to the real scene of fine arts in the novel's epoch.) The core of this crazy vocabulary is the *bruhu,* a *behin* term for the soul as the first cause of everything, and the *böto* as the final end of human life with the connotation of *happiness* and *salvation*. To find the missing soul is not good news for our hero, because it is connected to the periodical wars of the *behin*s; it is necessary because of the ill structure of the *behin* mind, and it is described similarly to the picture of *dosire* in *Faremido*. The war of the *behin*s, called *buku* in their language, mirrors both religious and national fanaticism. War is not just an unpleasant episode of the *behin* history and culture, but its core and final end. *Behin*s must exterminate each other if they do not give up their culture based on the imagination of their *bruhu* (soul); consequently, the soulless world of the *hin*s is the sole guarantee of avoiding the mutual extermination of humanity. The

end of the narrative is the *termination* of the *behin* settlement by the medical service of the *hin*s, before they could exterminate each other in their final *buku*. The term used here for human beings, *termination (megszüntetés),* was just a cynical euphemism for the executions in Szathmári's previous novel in the terminology of the *Red Guards (Vörösőrség)* of the fictive Soviet-Hungary. In the final chapter of his *Kazohinia,* it became a *hin* term of a kind of the institutionalised euthanasia; and this modification of the field of meaning clearly expresses how the author's thinking became more pessimistic.

In spite of this highly pessimistic end of his best known novel, the most *pessimistic* future of humanity linked with an *optimistic* vision of the future of the universe is mirrored in his late short novel entitled *The World of Machines* (Szathmári 1964; 1988; 1989). It is a coming of the heavenly utopia of Karinthy's *Faremido* to Earth. The rationality of the machines is the single requirement of the development and survival of the universe, but it causes the extermination of the hopeless humanity based on the classic utilitarian principle of offering painless and pleasant existence for the greatest number. Today we can read it as a great transhumanist vision, based on the experiences of both World Wars.

VI. Dystopias and Pessimist Utopias of Babits, Karinthy and Szathmári in the Hungarian Cultural Canon and in the International Context

I mentioned above the problematic status of the novels discussed in the Hungarian cultural canon, and their connection to each other. Our first author, Mihály Babits has an indisputable place in the cultural canon, but it is based mainly on his poetry. His novel entitled *Aviator Elza* was not available after the war for decades, and its new editions in the 1980s was censored. According to its interpretations, it was never in the core of his œuvre. In the case of Karinthy, his novels and short stories discussed here are in the shadow of his satiric writings, and of his longer works written during his last years. However, both Babits and Karinthy were the representatives of the same generation of the same important literary periodical entitled *Nyugat (West);* they are usually associated with different topics and literary ideals. Our third hero, Sándor Szathmári was never part of professional literary life, but the fans of his cult-novel entitled *Kazohinia* formed an underground group of interpretation over the last eighty years, and it had sympathies of several representatives of elite culture. It was an ambivalent phenomenon that in the golden age of Hungarian science fiction literature, in the seventies and the early eighties, Karinthy and Szathmári were found as "noble ancestors" of science fiction in the process of the establishment of Hungarian science fiction literature. It was useful for the revival of Szathmári in his last years, who could not publish in Hungarian during the main part of his lifetime but moved him and the other "proto-science-fiction" authors far from the core

of the national literary canon. (For the necrology of Szathmári written by the central figure of the Hungarian science fiction scene, see Kuczka 1975. Kuczka uses the official form of the name of the author, 'Szathmáry'; whose penname was always spelt 'Szathmári'.)

The personal connection of Karinthy and Szathmári is clear; Szathmári saw Karinthy as his master, and Karinthy estimated Szathmári's talent; but it is less known that several elements of the later works of Szathmári clearly refer to the topics of *Aviator Elza,* and one of the last works read by Babits was Szathmári's *Kazohinia,* which put him on the short list of candidates for the Baumgarten Prize, the greatest one in Hungary at the time. (In his last years, Babits was muted by throat cancer and he communicated with his family and his friends in writing. His 'conversation notebooks' were published; for the locus where he mentions Szathmári's novel, see Babits 1980. 390. The next Baumgarten Prize after his reading of Szathmári's book was not decided by him due to his death.)

Besides these personal connections, all three authors are linked with their common theoretical interest about the structure, societal role and semantics of human language. We have seen above that in the cases of Karinthy and Szathmári, this interest has a special role in their novels. (In the case of Babits, there was no room to elaborate on this question in detail here, but the critique of language is a relevant point of view in the interpretation of his novel as well, at least in the topic of the description of the language panels of war propaganda and ideology.) This interest is manifested in their activity in the movements of international languages. Babits was an activist of the Ido language, Karinthy was the president of the Hungarian Esperanto Society for his last years, and their several works were published both in Esperanto (Babits 1929; Karinthy 1934) and in Ido (Babits's several poems in periodicals and Karinthy 1923b). In the preface of the Esperanto edition of his *Faremido,* he drew a parallelism between the musical language of his novel and Esperanto, and he regarded it significant that his novel about the perfect language was published in an international language, although he did not mention the previous Ido version. (Ido appeared as a radical reform of Esperanto, supported mainly by French ex-Esperantists. In Hungary, it was popular in the 1920s; the core of its activists was recruited from French-oriented intellectuals.) We must mention that the time of connection of international language with Babits and Karinthy was a Golden Age of the Hungarian Esperanto culture. Aesthetical and language-norms of the so-called *Budapeŝta Skolo* were inevitable for a long epoch; the opinions of the leader of the edition house and the periodical entitled *Literatura Mondo,* Kálmán Kalocsay was close to Babits's *Nyugat* in his ideas about aesthetics and the principles of translation. Kalocsay actually regarded *Nyugat* as a model for his *Literatura Mondo*.

Szathmári, as a member of the next generation was socialised in this flowering period of Esperanto literature of the interwar period. Later when he learnt the language at a level needed for writing fictional literature, he gradually formed

two, partly separated audiences of his works, a Hungarian and an Esperanto one; and almost the all of his writings were published in two languages, Hungarian and Esperanto after his *Kazohinia*. They are not simple translations, but equal, parallel authorised versions that are significantly different in several loci. First of all, he had to modify the terminology of his masterpiece, in the Esperanto version, omitting several Hungarian letters not known in Esperanto orthography, in the description of the terminology of the *behin* settlement. A friend of the novel's hero, *Zemöki* will be *Zemoki,* and the name of the narrator's wife, *Zajkübü* will simply changed to *Zajkubu,* but this was not enough in a few of special cases. The term of *bivak* ('barbarian, blaspheme man') often used cannot be simple *bivako,* with a normal ending of nouns, because it has another meaning in Esperanto (cf. English 'bivouac'). Consequently, it would be modified to *bivag.* The most symbolic modification is the new term for *böto*. Its simple transcription was *boto,* which is a normal Esperanto word with another meaning (cf. English 'boot'); consequently, Szathmári created the word *boeto,* which can be a linguistic joke with *beato / beata* ('blessed' in a religious meaning, generally used only in its adjective form as *beata*). At the end of the modification of the *behin* terminology, in the Esperanto version it is clearer that *hin*s use the normal (Esperanto) language; and the *behin* vocabulary is not just a collection of meaningless words, but a perverted form of the perfect language of the *hin*s. (The priority of Hungarian or Esperanto versions was a central question of the Szathmári-philology. Vilmos Benczik demonstrated the priority of the Hungarian version persuasively; see Benczik 1988; 1989. The role of Kálmán Kalocsay in the creation of the Esperanto version remained open, yet.) In his *The World of Machines* and in other short stories of the last period of his career, differences of the versions are not based on terminology only. For example, *The World of Machines* is significantly longer and more consequent in its Esperanto version; the extermination of humanity and the emergence of a new world of new-type rational beings is described in detail, as a positive future of the universe, but as a judgement for humanity. In the Hungarian version, Szathmári stops before the last steps of the story, and remind the reader that it was just a bad dream, and we can still save the future of humanity. It is the topic of the Szathmári-philology of the future to find the reason of these significant differences between the Hungarian and Esperanto versions; maybe they are simply based on the censorship of the Communist era.

Szathmári's double audience is clearly mirrored in the best Esperanto interpretations. (In the Hungarian context, he is counted just a Hungarian writer.) It is enough to refer to the most important two writings. Kálmán Kalocsay, in his preface of the first Esperanto edition of Szathmári's Kazohinia entitled *Under Pretext of a Foreword (Pretekste de Antaŭparolo),* put the work in an interesting interpretative context within the frame of a fictive conversation of *Konter, Preter, Malger* and *Super*, (symbolic names derived from normal Esperanto

prefixes). By the fictional interpreters, Szathmári must be either materialist or idealist, existentialist (we are in Paris in 1958), or 'homarano'. The first three are well-known trends of Western thought, but the word 'homarano' can be familiar in the Esperanto literature, only; it is the central term of Zamenhof's humanist vision. After he offered this context of European philosophy and Esperanto literature, Kalocsay links the novel to Hungarian culture at the end of his essay: "we should recognise what was expressed by the Hungarian poet in the following way: »We are sleeping with a tiger«". Kalocsay in here quotes Sándor Weöres's one-line poems (No. 30: "Tigrissel alszunk"), which was probably known and used by Szathmári as well, (for Kalocsay's preface, see Szathmári 1958). Another example is when the inevitable authority of the Esperanto language and literature, the Scottish poet William Auld, who was familiar with Hungarian literature, in his *Introduction (Enkonduko)* for Szathmári's collected short stories, reminds the Esperanto audience that, despite the fact that Szathmári is an Esperanto classic, the roots of his thinking are found in Hungarian culture, as he is a follower of the tradition of Imre Madách and Frigyes Karinthy (see Szathmári 1964; for Auld's relationship with the Hungarian literature see Auld 1974).

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Direct Producers, Radical Needs and the Intellectuals – the Critique of "Existing Socialism" and the Utopia of an Alternative Socialism

Two Famous Books from the Late Sixties

I. Introduction

The books I am going to write about in this paper, became classic works of Hungarian dissident thought in late Hungarian bureaucratic socialism. The first one was a common product of three philosophers: György Márkus and his younger disciples, György Bence and János Kis. Its title: *How Is Critical Economics Possible? / Hogyan lehetséges kritikai gazdaságtan?* (Bence–Kis–Márkus 1992). It was written in 1970–1972 and mentioned later in the circle of Hungarian intellectuals as the *Überhaupt-book.* However, it drew the attention and the wrath of the guards of ideological purity and, as a consequence, resulted in reprisals. It was, of course, not possible to have it published it by an official state-run publishing house – and all publishing houses were state-run at the time in Hungary. It became a *corpus delicti* for the Party organs that had decided, after the death of Lukács in 1971, to eliminate the Budapest philosophical school of Lukács disciples, which was, besides the Praxis Circle of Zagreb, one of the centres of innovative-critical Marxism in Eastern Europe.

However, the *Überhaupt-book* and *The Intellectuals on the road to class power / Az értelmiség útja az osztályhatalomhoz* written by György Konrád and Iván Szelényi were both post-1968 works: their approaches had been determined by the defeat of the Western youth movement and the shocking experience of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the armies of the Warsaw Pact in August1968. Concerning the brief summary of content of the *Überhaupt-book,* it is right to say that, according to its analysis, the structure of modern capitalism could not be described rightly by the intellectual toolbox of Marx's *Capital,* because the prediction of Marx concerning the falling rate of profit and the impoverishment of the working class had evidently proved wrong (Bence–Kis–Márkus 1992. 223). At the end of the voluminous book, the three authors outline a perspective of some kind of market socialism based on the self-managing bodies of the direct producers, i.e. the workers. The conclusion is a definite critique of the bureaucratic Eastern European socialism; it is associated with the hope of a new

social-political-economic setting. It would be some kind of a third road to the Eastern bureaucratic socialism and Western neo-capitalism. The profit-principle and the humanization as a basic idea of the Marxian emancipative historical philosophy must be reconciled: if it is not possible, we have to give up the idea of the economically viable and human faced Marxian socialism – it is the basic conviction of the authors (Bence–Kis–Márkus 1992. 296).

The *Überhaupt-book* is a synthesis, representing a demand for Marxist renaissance (on the idea of the renaissance of Marxian thought see: Kovács 2005; Lehmann 1992; Vajda–Dérer 1989), a theoretical elaboration of the views of the Western New Left (Teodori 1969), and an account of the philosophical and sociological debates in Hungary took place in the Sixties. Publication was not permitted; the book became a stumbling-stone in the philosophers' trial of 1973; it was not a formal legal trial but different kinds of reprisals from party disciple processes to dismissals concentrating on afflicting philosophers (Kovács 2005; Lehmann 1992; Vajda–Dérer 1989) took place. The book launches with a comparison of the Sixties in Eastern and Western Europe: the left wing, the authors argue, in the East and the West interprets socialism in different ways. This paper focuses on two topics of this weighty work: the question of radical needs and the problem of the viability of the free society of direct producers. But, before the analysis, it is worth lingering shortly on two journal articles which preceded the ideas of the *Überhaupt-book*.

II. The Antecedents of the *Überhaupt-book*

These articles of 1968 and 1969 were the writings of György Bence and János Kis, the members of Lukács Kindergarten, the younger generation of the Lukács Philosophical School: they were disciples of György Márkus, who belonged to the elder generation. Bence in his article entitled *Marcuse és az újbaloldali diákmozgalom (Marcuse and the student movement of the New Left)* (Bence 1968) examined the relationship of Marcuse and the New Left student movement. He began his train of thought by analysing the crisis of universities as one of the causes of the Western crisis. The students revolted against the bureaucratization of universities and the mega-university as a new form of education serving the needs of neo-capitalism. Bence, following the argumentation of the Western New Left thinkers, called attention to the transformation of universities into specialist factories that supply the working force demand of new great capitalist firms. Bence emphasized the different perspectives of Western and Eastern criticism concerning bureaucratic state-socialism: the New Left criticised from the left Eastern European conditions. He analysed the career of Marcuse up to the sixties, when a pessimistic approach began to dominate his thought. He criticized the idea of repressive tolerance: it was, in his opinion, a one-dimensional

depiction of modern industrial capitalistic society which made the thinking of Marcuse one-dimensional as well; he could not grasp the complexity of neo-capitalism. According to Bence, it made him unable to recognise the radical needs created by neo-capitalism which emerged in the life-praxis of the new working class, and they represented a real possibility of stepping out of the cyclical reproduction of capitalistic economic social and mental structures. These topics of Bence's article prefigured the train of thought of the *Überhaupt-book,* because the ideas of radical needs and the new working class became central problems there. Bence, as a conclusion, pointed out that the New Left had to transcend beyond the perspective of Marcuse.

János Kis, in his article *Rejtett forradalom. Franciaország május előtt és után.* (*Concealed Revolution. France before and after May)* (Kis 1969) supplied another background to the problems treated in the Bence article. He inspected the theoretical antecedents of the French student movement in light of the events of May 1968. His analysis was grounded on two works: *The New Working Class* by Serge Mallet (1963; 1975) and the book by André Gorz entitled *Strategy for Labour: a Radical Proposal* (1964; 1967). Kis focused specifically on the New Left concepts of these works, from neo-capitalism and the possible subject of revolution, to the ideas of the new working class and radical needs. At the centre of his argumentation was the concept of the autonomous existence of the new working class's abilities that gave rise to the radical needs deriving from its creativity rooted in its high skills, which, paradoxically, was necessary for running the neo-capitalist economy. This topic led Kis to the problem of participation. Since the radical needs of the new working class cannot be satisfied within the system of capitalism, they can constitute a potential explosive device for disintegrating it. Having reconstructed the train of thought of Gorz's book, Kis pointed out that the idea of power-seizing had lost its traditional meaning: it had to be reconceptualised. It could no longer be a quasi-soteriological endpoint of class struggle, as it was imagined by classical Marxism: it had to be realized in everyday-life. From this train of thought, he moved to the tactics of revolutionary reforms in the book of Gorz. Kis saw this idea important because it went beyond the old revolution/evolution dichotomy and merged it with the everyday life praxis of society. Gorz gave an important role to workplaces. In the sphere of production, by way of workplace democracy, it would be possible to reshape the system of neo-capitalism. This non-spectacular evolutionary process would step outside the factories and cause a qualitative transformation of the life-world of neo-capitalism. This would mean the realisation of socialism without spectacular and violent political revolution based on a militant elite party. This argumentation reappeared in the *Überhaupt* book, but the authors treated Gorz's expectations about the theory of the new working class critically.

III. The *Überhaupt-book*

The question of radical needs in the *Überhaupt-book* was connected to the theory of the new working class. The authors attached distinguished relevance to the latter because it grounded radical needs in production instead of consumption. They called attention to the excesses of the theory: these would result in a science-fiction-genre socialism and technical Utopianism. The high level of technical expertise possessed by the relatively small segment of white collar workers and the high degree of creativity and autonomy associated with it, would not represent a real danger for the system of neo-capitalism without radical needs. But the theory, according to the authors, grounded in a sufficient manner, implies that the empirical likelihood of the assumption that radical needs are incompatible with neo-capitalism may be able to dismantle this economic-social system (Bence–Kis–Márkus 1992. 292).

In the last chapter of the book, there was a change of perspective. The former chapters dealt with the dilemmas of the Western society of neo-capitalism. The main problem for the authors was the relevance of Marxian theory in the West in light of the concept of radical needs; the concluding chapter focused on Eastern European bureaucratic-state socialism. The dilemma of the East was very different that of the West. Was the choice really between a rational, dynamic society based on commodity relations and a society that aimed to humanize social relations? Was it possible to reconcile the profit-principle and economic efficiency with the emancipative narrative of Marxian historic theory? If not, the authors drew the conclusion that Marxian socialism would not be a real option for this region. The stakes were high, the authors argued, because the organic relation of optimalisation and humanization was a basic tenet of Marx's thought (Bence–Kis–Márkus 1992. 296).

This conclusion inevitably led to the critique of the 'existing socialism' of Eastern Europe and exposed the authors to the investigation of state and party organs: they raised the suspicion of heretics. The example of Eastern Europe, the authors emphasized, showed how socialism without market mechanisms became socialism without freedom: it did not meet the original Marxian intentions. However, the theory of entrepreneurial-market socialism, which undeniably was inspired by Yugoslavian self-managing socialism criticised by the authors, was not without problems. The concept, remaining within the borders of Marxian thought, led to the problem of alienation. The alienation-debate unfolding in Hungarian sociology and philosophy journals in the sixties was a catch phrase for philosophers who wished for the Renaissance of Marxism, and it was an intellectual battleground in their conflict with the conservative Marxists and the party bureaucrats (Kovács 2005; Lehmann 1992). However, for the authors of the *Überhaupt-book,* the problem of alienation emerged with the topic of imagined market-socialism. Having accepted that economically sufficient socialism

would not be possible without the profit-principle, they had to pose the question: which kind of institutional mechanism would be able to restrict or confine alienation to a bearable limit? Which institution would be a suitable regulator to perform this task? If the state was to be this regulator, this situation would be the same as in the case of neo-capitalism, where the state intervenes with economy. But, assuming this solution, this prospective socialist state would be different from its Western counterpart only in name: if it gave a terrain to capitalist production based on the profit-principle, in its essential features, it would be a capitalist state. The thesis that in this imagined market socialism the direct producers would play the role of the private capitalist owners would not solve the problem of alienation, because this market-socialism would need production-controlling and organizer managers, as it happened in the case of neo-capitalism. So, the authors, similarly to the Western New-Left thinkers, arrived at the problem of technocracy; (about the topic of technocracy see Roszak 1969). The self-managing communities of direct producers exerting social control over the state would have to employ independent experts for this control function. But this would be a necessary and not a satisfactory pre-condition: the ultimate warranty against alienation and a new kind of power concentration would be supplied only by new type of communities consisted of individuals who are free from possessing the attitudes of their bourgeois precursors. (Bence–Kis–Márkus 1992. 365). It is easy to notice that this idea was borrowed from the intellectual toolbox of the New Left: it was the concept of the revolution of the way of life propagated, beside others, by Theodore Roszak (Kovács 2005; Roszak 1969). In conclusion, we can say that the *Überhaupt-book* was a seminal work, which documented the authors' distancing from Marxian thought. They parted with Marxism for good over the next few years.

IV. The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power

'Libelli habent fata sua' – says the Latin proverb, and in the case of the famous book by Iván Szelényi and György Konrád, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power,* we can add the following: "Auctores habent fata sua", because the fate of the book and its authors intertwined in an inseparable way. The authors crossed the line between legality and illegality with this book according to the Hungarian socialist authorities in the early seventies, and became suspicious persons who deserved special attention in the form of constant police surveillance. The political police confiscated their manuscript. These events can be read in the foreword to the English translation (Konrád–Szelényi 1979. XVII–XVIII). The authors were offered a chance for emigration, which was a new development in the procedures of Hungarian authorities launched against intellectuals who violated the political taboos of the Kádár regime. There were practically three

strictly guarded taboos which were in effect up to 1989: the revolution of 1956; calling attention to the fact that Hungary was under the occupation of the Red Army, which, according to the official formulation, was stationed in Hungary temporarily, and lastly the ideological slogan that Hungary was a country where the dominant class was that of workers, who held and exercised political power in alliance with the class of peasants and the stratum of intellectuals devoted to the case to socialism. Szelényi and Konrád violated the third taboo, because the central thought of their book was that the real situation was just the opposite: in Eastern European socialism, the dominant class, albeit in a latent way, was a colourful, amorphous social group of intellectuals dooming the workers to the position of an oppressed, exploited class in the system of rational redistribution. The personal and intellectual careers of the authors ramified: Konrád refused to leave Hungary; he became one of the most renowned dissident Hungarian intellectuals; he did not leave the country because he was convinced that a writer had to live in the Hungarian linguistic community to keep a vivid language. Iván Szelényi accepted the offer and left the country and entered the exclusive club of the renowned emigrant Hungarian sociologists including Karl Polányi and Karl Mannheim. Szelényi, by the way, was inspired by both of them: the thought of redistribution as a historically existing variant of a way in which economy was embedded into the social and political institutions determined by custom and tradition was borrowed from Polányi, while the notion of 'free-floating' or 'unattached' *(freischwebende)* intelligentsia coined by Karl Mannheim influenced Szelényi and Konrád when they formulated the antithetic, generic/genetic definition-pair of intelligentsia.

The main cause of the success of the English translation, followed by further foreign language versions, was that its conception about the interpretation of Eastern European socialism as an intellectual class power seemed to fit into the tradition of the New Class theories put into the focus of critical sociology by Alvin W. Gouldner, who published an essay in the winter issue of *Telos* in 1975–1976 entitled *Prologue to a Theory of Revolutionary Intellectuals;* its expanded version in a book form bore the title *The Future of the Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class, which* came to light in 1979 (Gouldner 1975; 1979). The original Hungarian version of the Konrád–Szelényi book was completed in 1973–1974, while its English translation was published in the same year in 1979, as Gouldner's book. So, there was receptiveness for the theory of Hungarian thinkers, having been enhanced by the inevitable political dimension in the world of two super powers; the book came from behind the iron curtain and gave an interpretation of the political system of an exotic, closed portion of Europe. However, later Szelényi himself revised the train of thought of *The intellectuals on the road to class power*: the theory of the system of rational redistribution was interpreted as a contribution to the third wave of New Class Theories. Otherwise, Szelényi emphasized, this theory of the Leftist critical sociology had

a respectable tradition; the notion of a new class had been coined by the forefather of anarchism, Bakunin, in opposition to the theory of Marx. Bakunin labelled his opponent the Bismarck of socialism. He warned about the danger of a scientist, technocratic vision of forthcoming socialism already in 1870. This conception, according to Bakunin, would involve some kind of intellectual despotism. Szelényi cites the Russian anarchist:

> It will be the reign of scientific intelligence, the most aristocratic, despotic, arrogant and contemptuous of all regimes. There will be a new class, a new hierarchy of real and pretended scientists and scholars, and the world will be divided into a minority ruling in the name of knowledge and the immense ignorant majority. (Szelényi–Martin 1988. 647.)

The intellectuals on the road to class power is, undeniably, an embarrassing work; it is not an easy task to define its genre. It is a long essay without the obligatory requisites of academic scholarship: there are no references, footnotes, etc. and the book is imbued with subjectivity: irony and self-irony. At the same time, it presents long and highly sophisticated trains of thought from the fields of historical sociology, comparative social and political history of Eastern Europe, the history of intellectuals and, last but not least, it gives an excellent and deeply ironic phenomenology of the ethos and everyday life of Hungarian intellectuals in the early seventies. In the Preface of their sociological essay, Konrád and Szelényi referred to the concept of the free association of direct producers, that played a key-role in the *Überhaupt-book* and connected it to the idea of an alternative socialism:

> There is much to be learned from critiques of state-socialist societies, yet their negative lessons should not lead us to reject the idea of socialism. Our next task is to work on the theory of an alternative socialism. Though the present study refrains from making explicit the ideological implications of our analysis, we hope that it too will ultimately contribute to the theory of a new, self-managing socialism – a "free association of direct producers", rather than the class rule of intellectuals organized around the redistributive planning process. (Konrád–Szelényi 1979. XV–XVI.)

Konrád and Szelényi positioned themselves as thinkers who, albeit themselves are not Marxists, appreciate the critical potential of Marxism; their method is a value-free Weberian approach based on the concept of ideal-types associated with the theory of rational redistributive systems. At the same time, they gave a perspective embedded in the traditions of Marxian critical thought. Konrád and Szelényi questioned one of the main dogmas of official Marxism in their book. It was the intelligentsia according to their theory, which monopolized political power in Eastern European Socialism; the working class was subordinated to the intellectuals possessing key positions in the interwoven state and party bu-

reaucracy. This position, according to the theory, was an apex of the historical trajectory of the intellectual social group as a historical phenomenon: in the age of capitalism, it had appeared as a social stratum but in the era of Socialism it organized itself as the ruling class. Konrád and Szelényi, using the notions of Weberian and Marxian theories, described 'existing socialism' as an independent Eastern European civilizational model rooted in the traditions of the region:

> In our judgement the rational-redistributive system represents an autonomous form of economic organization closely bound up with the social and historical traditions of Eastern Europe and incorporating its own sovereign model of civilization and its own system of cultural goals. Thus it calls for analysis on its own terms, and is not to be explained according to bourgeois-liberal value systems as the combination of a totalitarian political system with a wastefully dysfunctional economy, no more than an accidental and temporary deviation from the legitimate and generally valid Western model of development. (Konrád–Szelényi 1979. 11.)

Society, in this portion of Europe, the authors argued, had traditionally been colonized by the state. This kind of socialism, according to the theory, was economically based on the system of rational redistribution, which was a modern version of the traditional redistribution of ancient Eastern despotic states: the authors borrowed the theory of the *Asian mode of production* coined by the contemporary Hungarian sinologist, Ferenc Tőkei, who elaborated a new version of Marxian historical philosophy. He modified the historical philosophical scheme of Marxism by making reference to Marx's texts themselves. The classical concept supposed five ensuing economic-social-political models: (1) *primitive communism;* (2) *the slavery-based system;* (3) *the feudal serf-system;* (4) *the capitalist system* and (5) *the technologically and economically highly developed communism*. The Asian mode of production, according to Tőkei, was neither a slavery system, nor a feudal serf-system but a new kind of historical model based on the strong control of the state (Tőkei 1989. 7–33).

The conceptual framework of the book is based on different sources. However, there are three pillars of the train of thought. The first is the Weberian theory of bureaucracy and legitimacy and Weber's sociological method of a value-free approach, the second is the class-theory of Marx and the third is the historic anthropology of Karl Polányi.

The theory of Polányi is rooted in in the leftist critical sociology, augmented by a very strong historic dimension; Polányi synthesizes sociology with economic history and economic psychology. His starting point is a thesis of the denial of the a-historic ubiquity of economic man striving for individual economic gains in the market. This situation, Polányi argues, is a new historical phenomenon which emerged in modernity with an economy that is dis-embedded in society. In the greatest part of human history, economic activity was embedded

in social institutions and the motivation for economic action of the individuals was not the gains expressed in money, but the preservation of their social status. Polányi, in his typology, gives two modes of social embeddedness of economy in archaic societies: (1) *reciprocity;* (2) *redistribution*. The social context of the first is a symmetrical pattern of social organisation, that of the second is an asymmetrical pattern, centralisation which, at a given point of the history of societies, assumes the form of a state (Polányi 2001. 45–58).

The theory of another emigrant Hungarian sociologist, Karl Mannheim on the free-floating' or 'un-attached' *(freischwebende)* intelligentsia was an important point of reference for Konrád and Szelényi. Their book gives an historic panorama of the Central-eastern European region from the epoch of the enlightened monarchy in the 18th century, up to the 'existing socialism' of the second half of the 20th century. In the focus of this historical narrative stands, certainly, Hungary. The leading part of this historical play is the intelligentsia that, as the process of modernization was going further, having acquired key positions in economic and state-bureaucracies. It is the core thesis of the book; while intelligentsia in Western Europe remained really a social stratum serving the needs of the capitalist class, in this region it organized itself into a class that had a common class culture. The train of thought was defying but vulnerable: later Szelényi, in his Western emigration, refined his concept (Szelényi 1987).

'An intellectual is never totally innocent' – György Bence gave the ironic summary of the Konrád-Szelényi book. As one of the three authors of the *Überhaupt-book* who belonged to the group of the dissident thinkers during the 1970s and 1980s, he wrote this in his review of *The Intellectuals on the road to class power* in 1989 on the occasion of the publication of the book in Hungary in the last year of bureaucratic socialism (Bence 2007. 59–61). Guilty, of course here is not used in a legal sense, as the violation of the order of law. Bence here referred to the way of Hungarian political transformation of 1989–1990 in which, at least in the couple first years, the intellectuals dominated the political scene. The thus called round table discussions that put an end to the system of rational redistribution and established a market economy with a multi-party system, were bargains of different kinds of intellectuals from the former party bureaucrats, reform communists and economic technocrats to the former marginal intellectuals who, previously, were under the surveillance of the secret police. Bence, besides his acute-minded and ironically formulated critical remarks which are familiar to those who knew him personally, saw the main merit of the reviewed book in the precise depiction of the ethos of intellectuals; first of all their deep and ingrained attraction to power.

In fact, Konrád and Szelényi, pointed out also with deep irony and self-irony that the system of rational redistribution had created an interest-community and corrupted the wide circles of intelligentsia by allotting them, using the cynical politics of carrot and stick, well calculated favours and advantages. At the

same time, it would be a mistake to see behind the behaviour of Central-Eastern European intelligentsia exclusively cynical pragmatism and egoist privilege-seeking. Konrád and Szelényi mentioned the case of the famous Russian intellectual, Lomonosov, and wrote, of course not without irony, about profound moral conformism as a source of motivation for the intellectuals. In the system of rational distribution, Konrád and Szelényi argued, the subgroups of colourful and fragmented intelligentsia that lacked an overall class-consciousness hailed socialism, which seemed to satisfy both their personal economic needs and their sense of mission from the engineers and economists to artists:

> A scientifically ordered society held great attractions for the Eastern European intelligentsia […] That was why socialist theory was able to rely from the first on the loyalty of the technical intelligentsia […] A poet, who once paid for the publication of his verses out of the proceeds of a clerical job, could now live in a one-time chocolate manufacturer's villa, and see his poems published in editions of tens of thousands and recited on revolutionary holidays in hundreds of factory and villages houses of cultures […] The humanist intellectuals felt themselves just as much called to disseminate the cultural values of socialism as the economists and technicians did to redistribute the national income […] The intellectuals hailed their new situation as the realization of their own transcendence. […] And even where their actual work did not change, it still acquired a transcendent meaning: It was ennobled, elevated from a many-making profession into a calling. (Konrád–Szelényi 1979. 204–205.)

Konrád and Szelényi undoubtedly do their best when they describe the atmosphere of the world of the Hungarian marginal intellectuals from within, including prospective dissident intellectuals recruited mainly from the ranks of the philosophical Budapest school. The book gives a critical review of the main ideas of the disciples of György Lukács. The basic tone thereof is an explicit respect: the Budapest school appears as a centre of creative critical Marxism in Central-Eastern Europe. At the same time, Konrád and Szelényi supply a polemic summary of their ideas, giving an excellent sketch of the Hungarian intellectual subculture of the late sixties and early seventies. The strive for revitalization of Marxian critical thought; the renaissance of Marxism, in the interpretation of Konrád and Szelényi, is a conception which concludes in some kind of transcendental anthropology (Konrád–Szelényi 1979. 240–244). The Budapest School emphasizes humanization against optimization: their main category is a goal-orientated human totality whose main apostles must be the marginal-critical intelligentsia. Otherwise, Konrád and Szelényi criticize the notion of radical needs, which is an Archimedean point of the New Left thinkers, an imagined potential breaking point from neo-capitalism. The main problem with this category, according to Konrád and Szelényi, is that it legitimizes the aversion to the scene of politics converting political radicalism into socio-psychological radicalism:

> […] these critics […] now proceed on the assumption that in our time the values of socialism are to be sought not in whole societies but only in individuals who have made the true ideals of socialism their own, or in elite, avant-garde communities of such people. If a genuinely creative socialism is to be developed, they believe, it can only be done by concentrating on this new type of individual personality, its structure of needs and interpersonal and community relationships. Social and political radicalism has here given way to a sociopsychological radicalism dedicated to the analysis of radical needs. (Konrád–Szelényi 1979. 242.)

The most important aspect of the Konrád–Szelényi book is that its narrative focuses on continuity in Eastern-European history, from the perspective of sociology: it tries to set up a historical-sociological model, the system of rational redistribution, which is far from being flawless. György Bence, in his above-mentioned book review, points out that the term of rational redistribution is very similar to the concept of totalitarianism and its flaws are similar, too: it outlines an abstract model whose explanatory power is weak when we try to apply it to concrete Eastern-European countries with concrete histories (Bence 2007. 65). However, at the end of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power,* the authors, remaining faithful to the idea of an alternative socialism introduced in the beginning of the book, risk reference to the possibility of a third road-type development which may transform the system of rational redistribution: the intellectuals, in the last phase of this arrangement, would give a helping hand to the working classes to articulate their own class interests. This may conclude in a new kind of socialism different from the Eastern European repressive model:

> Thus if individual intellectuals openly enunciated the legitimating principle of the redistributive intelligentsia's class power, their own logic would drive them (or others) on to enunciate the alternative legitimating principle of the owners of labour-power and to a more mature and rational form of redistribution which would make possible the establishment of organs of worker self-management at every level. It would imply, in other words, the organization of the working class as a counter-force within the rational-redistributive model of economic integration, which of course immediately raises the question: Would it still be rational redistribution then? (Konrád–Szelényi 1979. 249.)

V. Conclusion

The *Überhaupt-book* and *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* were both great achievements of Hungarian intellectual life of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Their authors were prominent representatives of critical thought embedded in a widely defined Marxist tradition. Their ideas connected to the

New Left with many threads, albeit it was a critical relation. The fate of these works was different: the *Überhaupt-book* was not able to make the international career it deserved due to its originality and innovative power. It remained in the form of a Hungarian language manuscript and did not enter the circulation of international academic life. *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* ran a different trajectory. When Szelényi accepted the offer of emigration from the Hungarian authorities he and the book received the attention of international academic life. "Libelli habent sua fata" indeed.

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"The time is out of joint…" – The Idea of an Alternate History in the *Uchronia* of István Bibó

I. Personal, Cultural-Intellectual and Political Contexts

István Bibó (1911–1979), after his release from prison by an amnesty in 1963, worked as a librarian at the Statistical Office in 1968. He was living in an inner emigration which lasted until his death. There was no real chance for him to go back to public life: he was pushed outside of the officially controlled intellectual cultural life to a marginalized position. There was no way for him to publish his writings in the state-run publishing houses in Hungary. (On Bibó's œuvre and life: Berki 1992; Kovács 2012.)

The Hungarian Populist Movement, which Bibó had joined in his youth before WWII, played an important cultural, and to a much lesser degree, political role before the war. (On the movement, see: Borbándi 1976; Kovács 2019; Némedi 1985.) After 1945, the protagonists of the movement established the Hungarian Peasant Party, which, during the short interlude of the restricted multi-party democracy between 1945–1948, was a party of the communist-led governing coalition. However, as a consequence of the manipulated and distorted political life, the Peasant Party sank to the inglorious role of communist fellow-traveller. During the short period of the 1956 revolution, the Party revived under the name "Petőfi party"; it delegated Bibó to the revolutionary government. However, after the revolution was put down, during the years of Kadarite-consolidation, the protagonists of Hungarian populism made their personal compromises with the political reality of "existing socialism". Bibó refused this and saw himself as a self-appointed ideologue of the demised Hungarian Popular Movement (Kovács 2004. 434–444). His main task remained, as it became clear from his late works, some kind of a conciliation of the antagonistic narratives of Westernizers and left-wing Populists; in other words, an accommodation of the models of Western liberal democracy and the socialism of left-wing populism that aimed at the emancipation of lower social classes.

The historical philosophy of Bibó is explained in his long, concluding late essay of 1971–1972 entitled *The Meaning of European Social Development* (Bibó 2015. 372–441). Bibó, using the synoptic method borrowed from the neo-Kantian legal philosophy of Barna Horváth, his former master at the univer-

sity of Szeged in the 1920s, sets up simultaneously different referential frameworks. Giving an overall picture of social and, first of all, political development of European civilisation, he puts together different approaches: we can see a strange kind of great narrative which depicts European history as an evolution of freedom and political liberty, but this approach is associated with a very sharp rejection of the metaphysical deterministic histories of philosophy:

> Schemes of world history – that is a series of class struggles, acts of divine economy, or a process of accumulating material goods – cannot be proved or disproved as such; examples of each and their exact opposite – that, for instance, history is a series of class compromises – can be brought up endlessly. […] Far from being necessary development is the collective of some cultures and not others and may even fail. We are not in the comfortable position of either being able to establish, as a kind of natural law, the rule of right and wrong development of society or being discharged by any such natural law from the responsibility of leading the great activity of organizing human polity in the wrong direction, a dead end, or most recently, the total annihilation of mankind. (Bibó 2015. 372, 383.)

Bibó firmly insists on the history-making capacity of human agency; in his conception, a definitely Christian personalism is mixed with liberal and social approaches; the ideal of a bottom-up built egalitarian society, the small circles of liberty appear together with an elite theory inherited from interwar cultural criticism. There is no need for the synthesis of different ideas and the elimination of theoretical contradictions, because they reflect the living contradictions of reality – this is a basic conviction of Bibó's. His last fragments written on his deathbed clearly illuminate his intellectual perspective: "There is no need for a synthesis of ideas; ideological loyalty leads to distortion of thought".

II. The Starting Point: the Idea of Determining Historical Knots of History

Uchronia is a short manuscript of 1968 which remained unpublished in Bibó's life. It is not an easy task to define its genre – its underpinning idea is the conception of an alternate history, the favourite motif of science fiction. However, one should read together with the above-mentioned late concluding essay, *The Meaning of European Social Development.* So, we can notice that this enigmatic text of an alternate history is a pendant of another work. *Uchrónia* is a visual-fictive presentation of the historical philosophy of *The Meaning of European Social Development*. The text bears the following long, baroque-style title: *"If the Conciliar Movement had succeeded in the 15th century…" Uchrónia: A dialogue of ecclesiastic, cultural and political history between Titulary canon István Bibó*

of Vác and his father-in-law, cardinal archbishop László Ravasz of Budapest, with particular attention to the Lutheran and Calvinist congregations. At the beginning of his train of thought, Bibó summarizes the content of the text. It is worth citing the whole passage, because it gives a skeleton of his uchronic, alternate history:

> Toynbee says somewhere that if the Conciliar Movement had succeeded, which it had been on the verge of, in the 15th century, the entire history of Christianity and Europe would have been different; the Reformation, at least in its schismatic form, would certainly not have taken place. It was this comment that inspired the following outline of a dialogical uchronia (i.e. a depiction of non-existent sequences of events on the model of utopias) about what would have happened if the Conciliar Movement had won. The point is that a Catholic-Protestant-Erasmian compromise saves the unity of the Church, and that its Conciliar-Presbyterian democratization serves as a model for secular constitutional movements, which, in an alliance with the Church, beats back attempts at royal absolutism, the interlude of enlightened absolutism being omitted everywhere, and modern freedoms grow organically out of mediaeval liberties, as they did in England. Thus the Church remains the framework of European intellectual life, enlightenment, modern science, humanitarianism, democracy, liberalism, and socialism, everything, taking place within it, and, as the tertiaries of fraternities spread widely, all accomplished intellectuals hold at least titulary offices in the Church. (Bibó 2012a. 1.)

III. The Genre: What is Uchronia?

The term 'uchronia' is a neologism coined by Charles Renouvier, a 19th century French philosopher who is almost forgotten now, but who was in his days an influential public intellectual working in different branches of philosophy from gnoseology and moral philosophy to historical and political philosophy. (On Renouvier: Carver 2017. 81–90; Viney 1997; Terzi 2019.) He was a liberal thinker who wanted to reformulate Kantian philosophy; he labelled his system 'neo-criticism'. He refused both positivism and the Hegelian historical metaphysics and, denying the idea of deterministic historical laws, emphasized human agency as the main history-making factor. Bibó read his lengthy book, more than four hundred pages, on an imagined, alternate history of Europe, because he explicitly refers to it as the author of a new genre complementing the traditional utopia. The book of Renouvier was published in 1876, and similarly to Bibó's short essay-sketch, bears a long, complicated title: *Uchrónie, (L'Utopie dans l'histoire), esquisse historique apocryphe du développement de la civilisation européenne tel qu'il n'a pas été, tel qu'il aurait pu être* (*Uchronia [Utopia in History], an Apocryphal Sketch of the Development of European Civilization Not as It Was But as It Might Have Been*).

The clue of Renouvier's book is the last half-sentence of the long title: "not as it was but as it might have been". This leads us to the basic ideas of his historical theory: contingency and liberty. History, according to him, is contingent and the outcome of historical situations depends on human decisions and human actions. There are no historical laws which predetermine an inevitable progress in the meaning of a continuous amelioration of human civilisations. There are crucial points of history, historical knots *(les noeuds histoire);* in these constellations, the outcome of events and the direction of historical processes are in the hands of people possessing key positions (Renouvier 1901. 411). In case of bad decisions of the key-actors, the later events will depart from the best possible consequences and history will be derailed or miscarried. Renouvier, whose ideal is a synthesis of liberty and solidarity, and that of the basic values of liberalism and socialism, was a sharply anti-clerical thinker. (On Renouvier's conception of Christianity see: Matton 2017.) His basic idea was that the classical values of antique republicanism and civil virtues were repressed by the Christian Church; the main consequence of which was a deceleration of history. Modernity came to the stage of history centuries later than it could have been happened otherwise, in a luckier sequence of historical events. Consequently, in his uchronic, alternate history, the detour of the obscurantist Church dominating the Middle Ages fails to come about, and modernity grows from antiquity in a direct way. Christianity, in the alternate history of Renouvier's *Uchronia*, is not able to conquer the Western world and remains an Eastern superstitious religion. The historical evaluation of Christianity is the point when Bibó criticizes the conception of Renouvier:

> It goes without saying that this whole idea has no foundation: antique slave-owning "democracy" could never have developed into modern democracy based on the equal dignity of all without Christian interludes; nor could the playfully curious probing into nature of antiquity turn into modern exact science without monastic discipline and ascetics, and nor could modern active and optimistic human love have developed out of the resigned and fundamentally pessimistic humanism of antiquity without Christian inspiration (Bibó 2012a. 1).

The historical process, as Bibó conceives it, can be described with the metaphor of rail transport. The tracks offer a fixed route for the train, but this kind of determination is suspended when the train arrives to a junction where different routes are offered, and which route is selected from the emerging options depends on the decision of the driver. However, this metaphor should be supplemented with an important presupposition; namely that there are no obligatory railroad-schedules, i.e. there are no historical iron-laws predetermining the outcomes of events. It is a conception we can label as restricted determinism. Between two junctions, the route cannot be altered, but this is the consequence

of previous human decisions and human actions emerging from them. So, Bibó shares the opinion of Renouvier concerning the theory of historical knots and the rejection of predetermined progress of amelioration of human history and attributes a great role to human freedom. But the question is,whose freedom? As my metaphor suggests, it is first of all the freedom of the train drivers and not the passengers; this conception involves an elite theory. In fact, elite theory is a basic element of the thought of Bibó inherited from inter-war cultural criticism. However, an inevitable question arises, namely, how can elite-theory be accommodated with the idea of small circles of liberty, the picture of a society built from bottom to up? This latter motif is in a central position of the above-mentioned concluding essay, *The Meaning of European Social Development*. Bibó, presumably in the spirit of his synoptic method, would say that the two approaches are not contradictory; they are in a complementary relation with each other.

IV. The Reconciliation of Irreconcilable Identity-generating Narratives: Bibó, the Westernizer 'Narodnik'

One of the last writings of Bibó, a short sketch, has a telling title: *The Purportedly Irreconcilable Differences between Capitalist Liberalism and Socialism or Communism* (Bibó 2012b). This intention of the reconciliation of the different grand ideological-political narratives of European tradition inspired the alternate history of his *Uchronia.* Following this logic, in this alternate history, Bibó depicts an alternative modernity in which Universal Christian Church remains a common denominator, a meta-institution governed by tolerant, enlightened Christian elites without religious dogmatism: Bibó, in his alternate modernity, reconciles antagonistic modern political ideologies: conservatism, liberalism and socialism. This conviction is behind an ironic passage of *Uchronia;* in this alternate history, Karl Marx, an intellectual who stayed within the Church writes his famous pamphlet, *The Communist Manifesto,* in Latin of course, in the library of the Vatican, which appears as a papal encyclical under the Latin title *Spectrum pervadit Europam*. Behind this ironical episode we find Bibó's serious and deep conviction that these ideologies, according to him, had been growing out of Christianity and, after all, it is possible to find passable roads among them. It is worth mentioning that Bibó's conception concerning the historical role of Christianity of European civilisation is similar to the historical narrative of the Polish historian, Oscar Halecki, who explained his ideas in *The Millennium of Europe* (Halecki 1963). Both thinkers evaluate the separation of religion and science from politics and morality as negative features of the modern world, and both oppose the spiritual power of the Christian Church over the imperial tradition, the temporal power. Halecki was a Catholic historian, while Bibó be-

longed to the Hungarian Reformed Church and his ancestors on his father's side, were Calvinist noble intellectuals. However, interestingly and surprisingly, he had a deep respect for the institution of papacy, which, according to him, in the Middle Ages was not able to resist the temptation of temporal power and played away the chance to become a spiritual-regulative centre; if Church would have been able to resist this temptation it could have kept its regulative position in modernity. This would have allowed the mitigation or prevention of the *cul de sac* situations of modernity, from the Jacobin dictatorship to the bloody events of the 20th century. In early modernity, according to Bibó, due to the wrong decisions of the contemporary elites, a situation emerged in which, in the words of Hamlet, "time was out of joint". His uchronic history, all in all, is a fictive correction of this contingent derailment. This uchronic history needs a new type of modern man: the actually existing *homo oeconomicus* of real modernity must be replaced by the fictive type of *homo christianus moralis* of an alternate history.

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Summaries

STANISŁAW BRZOZOWSKI AND *DIE NEUE ZEIT*

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This article challenges the commonly held view on the lamentable ignorance of the Polish novelist, essayist, and political thinker Stanisław Brzozowski (1878–1911) outside of Polish literature through his sole appearance in the most important forum of German Social Democracy, the review *Die Neue Zeit*. My paper reconstructs the story of the submission of Brzozowski's study *Der Geschichtsmaterialismus als Kulturphilosophie: Ein philosophisches Programm (Historical Materialism as Philosophy of Culture: A Philosophical Project)* to the review in 1907, including a new transcription of Brzozowski's accompanying letter to chief redactor Karl Kautsky.

The circumstances of its publication in *Die Neue Zeit* do help us to understand Brzozowski's intellectual and political dilemmas, especially in regards to his personal relationship with German and Polish Social Democracy between the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the outbreak of the "Brzozowski affair" in early 1908. After accusing him of collaboration with the Tsarist secret police, Brzozowski abruptly abandoned all efforts to gain an international reputation.

The historical reconstruction is complemented by a contextual analysis showing that the re-issue of Brzozowski's path-breaking interpretation of Marxism as a philosophy of culture was a polemic message to orthodox Social Democracy in Germany as well as in the Polish movement, and, consequently, was received by both parties accordingly. The present study contrasts *Geschichtsmaterialismus als Kulturphilosophie* to other theoretical papers of the review and argues that Max Adler's comprehensive article, *Das Formalpsychische im historischen Materialismus (The Formal Psychical in Historical Materialism)* in 1908 delivered a devastating critique on Brzozowski's theory. From Adler's retrospective account, it seems that Brzozowski's provocative study helped end the debate on historical materialism in *Die Neue Zeit* and it paradoxically contributed to the consolidation of the orthodox interpretation to Marxism.

THE IDEA OF LIBERTY IN THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF AUREL KOLNAI

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The moral and political philosophy of Aurel Kolnai, considered to be one of the most prominent Hungarian intellectuals of Jewish descent, remained almost forgotten for a long time. Even though the impact of his work, which contains the elements of psychoanalysis, phenomenology, neo-Thomism and analytical philosophy, was far weaker than that of Karl Mannheim, György Lukács, or Michael Polanyi and Karl Polanyi, today we can observe an increasing interest in his complex thought. Apart from his psychoanalytical interpretation of Anarcho-Communism and his phenomenology of aversive emotions like disgust, hatred or pride, the main subject of the contemporary discussions of his work are Kolnai's analyses of the "essence" of Nazi totalitarianism, delivered by in his monumental enquiry *The War Against the West* in 1938. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the background and key elements of Kolnai's post-war conservative-liberal political philosophy, with special regards to his interpretation of the idea of liberty. Insofar as in the period in question, the target of his criticism became, apart from the Soviet system of "real socialism", American progressivism understood as the democratic ideology which subverted liberty itself, this paper presents the main directions, premises and presuppositions of his interpretation. According to the main thesis of this paper, what makes Kolnai's idea of liberty perhaps the most interesting phenomenon from the perspective of Polish intellectual history is the fact that he problematized the concurring interpretations of liberty anew in terms of, respectively, political privilege and natural human right. Insofar as he argued that not only the hierarchic societies of *anciens regimes*, but contemporary liberal-democratic society also depends on the recognition of the privilege not as a threat but a "rampart of liberty", my paper poses the question: is Kolnai's political philosophy able to shed new light on the well-established interpretation of the Polish nobles' Golden Liberty seen as a historical relic and political anachronism?

THE POLISH CASE ULTRA-ORIENTALISM OR THE ANAMORPHOSIS OF INTRODUCING ONESELF

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The present article is an introduction to a possible analysis of the Polish case in the perspective of contemporary political theories inspired by orientalism, postcolonial studies and subaltern studies. However, speaking about introduction is not an expression of modest aims here. Given the elusive character of any foreignness subject to representation, an introduction must deal with all the traps and missteps of identitarian, and therefore oppressive knowledge. Instead of "leading inside" the subject, which is the ancient understanding of *introduction,* we will stick to its late meaning, i.e. presenting one person to another. This introduction/presentation will take place in a theatre through several scenes, derived from different sources (reportage, history of culture, literary studies). It will use some theatre tricks to escape the dictatorship of the audience: improvisation, lyrics in a foreign language and invisibility. The theatre will save the uniqueness of the performance, its epiphenomenality that escapes conceptualization. It will resemble a panopticon with many perspectives that dictate the place from where the anamorphis takes shape. Artistic performance offers tools to a kind of Levi-Straussian *bricoleur,* who opposes the discourse of the master. These tools help to tell the story of the "unknown tribes" that appear as the last nation "to take part in European life", in European culture and languages, *logoi*. These are Adam Mickiewicz's words taken from his lectures about Slavonic literature pronounced in the midst of the fascination with the Orient (Flaubert, de Nerval, Delacroix). The East is not oriental enough, not exotic enough, it escapes the construction of its imagined identity. But at the same time, Polishness or the Polish idiom seems to offer a language that is neither the language of the tribunal (Lyotard), nor the language of invention and construal (Said), but an idiomatic form of auto-presentation aware of its difference. This introduction is only an opening for future reading of Polish authors (Mickiewicz, Vincenz) through the prism of postfoundational critical thought but also a reading of Polish culture through the prism of post-structuralism showing how the language of "Polishness" seemingly matches the logic of the non-essentialist structure and early modern reflection on national culture.

POLISH AND HUNGARIAN PARALLELS IN SOCIALIST ARCHITECTURE THEORY

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> I don't have to explain that architecture is an ideological and, as such, a political issue […] [cosmopolitan, functionalist] modernist architecture is perhaps the only hostile cultural trend that can still openly appear in Hungary today […] there are open representatives around whom the architectural reaction condenses (József Révai, 1951; quoted in Beke 2002. 255).

Following World War Two, the main goals of architecture were the reconstruction of destroyed cities and building houses for the people by using the building method of classical modernism in Central-eastern Europe. After this, a new era emerged; socialist realism with the motto: *Socialist by content, national by form*. Then, the form language of architecture changed completely to a modernist one but with the same ideological content due to the Khrushchevian architectural turn of 1954. There are parallels between the architectural embodiment of this ideology in Poland and Hungary.

Socialist realism lasted for only a short period, from 1949 to 1956, in Polish architecture. The two periods could be described with two congresses, whose aim was to clarify the prevailing architectural style which was supported by the Soviet regime: Renaissance-based socialist realism. In Hungary, the end of WWII was a sharp line historically speaking in politics and society instead of the approach of architecture. After the renovation in 1951, a disputed situation, the *Great Architectural Debate* began. Architects had to care about humankind and glorify social equality due to the use of the style of the country's golden age: classicism.

In my essay I first compare the ideological background of Polish and Hungarian architecture. Secondly, I analyse their parallels at the following level of examples: (1) historical reconstruction, (2) symbolic landmarks and (3) industrial cities.

DIRECT PRODUCERS, RADICAL NEEDS AND THE INTELLECTUALS – THE CRITIQUE OF 'EXISTING SOCIALISM' AND THE UTOPIA OF AN ALTERNATIVE SOCIALISM TWO FAMOUS BOOKS FROM THE LATE SIXTIES

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The book entitled *How Is Critical Economics Possible?* was written in 1970–1972 and mentioned later, in the circles of Hungarian intellectuals, as the *Überhaupt-book*. The structure of modern capitalism, according to the analysis made therein, could not be described rightly by the intellectual toolbox of Marx's *Capital,* because the prediction of Marx concerning the falling rate of profit and the impoverishment of the working class had evidently proved wrong. At the end of the lengthy work, the three authors outline a perspective of a kind of market socialism based on the self-managing bodies of the direct producers, i.e. the workers. The conclusion is a definite critique of the bureaucratic Eastern European socialism associated with the hope of a new social-political-economic setting. It would be a kind of a third road in addition to Eastern bureaucratic socialism and Western neo-capitalism.

The famous book by György Konrád and Iván Szelényi entitled *The intellectuals on the road to class power* was connected to the Hungarian innovative Marxism of the 1960s with many threads. However, its authors did not belong to the Budapest philosophical school György Lukács recruited from his disciples, but they had undeniably been inspired by the ideas of the 'renaissance of Marxist philosophy'. It was a belated work finalised in 1974, after the failure of the Hungarian reform period had begun in 1968. It could not be published; it became a samizdat book whose authors were kept under police surveillance and, at last, Iván Szelényi had to emigrate abroad.

The authors questioned one of the main dogmas of the official Marxism: according to their theory, it was the intellectual class which monopolized political power in Eastern European Socialism, and the working class was subordinated to the intellectuals who possessed key positions in the interwoven state and party bureaucracy. Konrád and Szelényi described 'existing socialism' as an independent Eastern European civilizational model, rooted in the traditions of the region; here society had traditionally been colonized by the state. This kind of socialism, according to the theory, was economically based on the system of rational redistribution, which was a modern version of the traditional redistribution of ancient Eastern despotic states. At the end of the book, the authors outlined the abovementioned third road theory: the intellectuals marginalised in the system of 'existing socialism' would give a helping hand to the working class to articulate their own class interests and give rise to a new kind of socialism different from the Eastern European bureaucratic-repressive one.

THE INTELLECTUAL AS A BRAHMIN BÉLA HAMVAS AND THE TEMPTATION OF NEO-TRADITIONALISM: THE UTOPIA OF THE GOLDEN AGE

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The Golden Age is not ahead of us but behind us: in a nutshell, this is the core of neo-traditionalism. This movement was a reaction of the modernity crisis, whose first symptoms emerged in the last decades of the 19th century: but the real watershed between the eras of safety and uncertainty was World War I. It was the pseudo-religious belief in the unlimited progress meliorating every spheres of human life from material conditions to morality that had last its plausibility. The double face of modernity was revealed: it became clear that it was an ambivalent historical process. It created, on the one hand, the autonomous individual and, on the other hand, left him/her lonely, using the famous phrase of Max Weber, in the iron cage of the modern world. The crisis, on a personal level, assumed the form of an identity crisis. The individual of the explosively growing metropolises felt to be last in the soulless world of cold rationality and was craving for a sure haven. Neo-traditionalism offered this haven, contrary to the mainstream progress-optimism, not in the future but in the primordial truths of ancient times. It was the utopia of the Past. The protagonists of the movement were disappointed intellectuals. Neo-traditionalism tried to res-sacralise the desacralised modern world. The aim of truth-seeking was, for its representatives, to find a way of self-redemption. It was a syncretic way of thought: Christian mysticism, Muslim-Sufism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Kabala, Gnosticism were all amalgamated into a strange mixture. The main representatives this paper deals with, including René Guénon, Julius Evola and Béla Hamvas, possessed a great erudition, but they were outside the academic circles: they refused the distance-keeping, objective method of modern science: their investigation aimed at salvation by the help of ancient, sacral religious doctrines and they refused to become experts of compartmentalised modern science.

Traditionalism, similarly to other historical phenomena, needs contextualisation. The social-cultural contexts of Guénon, Evola and Hamvas were evidently different: pre-war France, post-war Italy and Hungary represented different situations. The Grand War, as we pointed to it above, was really a border of two epochs. The disillusionment after the war became a mass phenomenon. The temptation of emerging totalitarianism, in this new constellation, was strong for neo-traditionalism: how to respond it depended on personal choices. Julius Evola hailed it and created a strange intellectual-elitist fascism, while the Hungarian Béla Hamvas definitely refused this temptation.

"THE TIME IS OUT OF JOINT…" – THE IDEA OF AN ALTERNATE HISTORY IN THE UCHRONIA OF ISTVÁN BIBÓ

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The term of uchronia is a neologism coined by Charles Renouvier, a 19th century French philosopher. The *Uchronia* of István Bibó is a manuscript of 1968 remained unpublished in the author's life. The short sketch has baroque-style title: '*If The Conciliar Movement had succeeded in the 15th century…' Uchronia: a Dialogue of ecclesiastic, cultural and political history between Titulary canon István Bibó of Vác and his father-in-law, cardinal archbishop László Ravasz of Budapest, with particular attention to the Lutheran and Calvinist congregations.* It is not an easy task to define its genre – its basic idea is the conception of alternate history, the favourite motif of science fiction. Alternate history focuses on the dichotóm ideas of historical philosophy: human freedom versus historical necessity. History, according to the uchronic narrative, is contingent and the outcome of historical situations depends on human decisions and human actions. There are no historical laws predetermining inevitable progress in the sense of the continuous amelioration of human civilisations. There are crucial points of history, historical knots in which the outcome of events and the direction of historical process are in the hands of people possessing of key positions. In case of bad decisions of key-actors the later events will depart from the best possible consequences and history will be derailed or miscarried. Bibó depicts an alternative modernity in which Catholic Christian Church remains a common denominator, a meta-institution governing by tolerant, enlightened Christian elites without religious dogmatism; it, in this alternate modernity, reconciles the antagonistic modern political ideologies: conservatism liberalism and socialism. 1968, undoubtedly, was a turning-point in the history of modernity; this statement is true for Europe but in different senses in the case of Western and Eastern Europe. The student revolted on the Western side of the iron-curtain against consumer society, demanded the realization of participative democracy and the demolition of neo-capitalism; while in the countries of "existing socialism" the vision of human-faced socialism emerged: it was the refusal of one-party dictatorship and command-economy. István Bibó, who was living in an inner emigration, wrote an enigmatic essay entitled *Uchrónia* outlining the idea of an alternative history, Behind this conception, as it was mentioned above, was a special philosophy of history based on the idea of moderate determinism, giving a great role to the political-intellectual elites in history-making. The history of modernity, according to Bibó, had been derailed due to the Jacobin dictatorship serving as a terrible model for the dictatorships of the 20th century: it is the central motif of the essay. My paper intends to reconstruct the train of thought of the *Uchrónia* in the context of the Bibó's œuvre.

PESSIMIST HUNGARIAN UTOPIAS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD AND AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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The present paper offers a reconstruction of a trend in Hungarian literature I call *pessimist utopias*. They are not simply *dystopias;* however, several works and narratives can be regarded as the representatives of the latter genre at first glance. The main characteristic of a *pessimist utopia* is that the kind of fictional worlds that usually appear as *dystopias,* are actually real solutions to the fundamental crisis of humanity in these works, according to the authors' goals. In the works discussed, the most characteristic examples of this phenomenon are the fictions of an over-rationalised society or the rule of machines over humans. I first discuss the fictions influenced by the shocking emotional and intellectual experiences of the First World War, which was called the Great War at the time. The first fiction analysed here is Mihály Babits's last novel entitled *Aviator Elza, or the Perfect Society*. The interpretation of the novel focuses on three main points. The first one is a sensitive description of a perverted relationship to one's own body in the practice of mutilation of newborn babies to avoid military service, and the asexuality of youth, caused by the cultural alienation of young men at the frontiers and young women in the hinterland. The second one is the description of the language and functioning of war ideology; the third one is the perspective of a series of artificial words as they appear in a science fiction within a novel, with a conclusion of a possibility of a Godless world on a manmade Earth. The central topic of the next section is the body–mind problem and the human–machine relationship in several novels and short stories written by Frigyes Karinthy. The common core of the fictions discussed, *Rope-dancing, Legend on the Soul of One Thousand Faces,* and *Voyage to Faremido,* is the *hunt for identity* through a critique of the traditional concept of the soul in the focus. A separate section discusses the impact of real 'war philosophy' in Hungary at the time of the Great War in the description of war ideologies in Babits's and Karinthy's fictions. The third author discussed is a representative of the following generation, Sándor Szathmári. I discuss his early novel entitled *Vainly – future*, his well-known masterpiece entitled *Kazohinia* and his short novel entitled *The World of the Machines*. In the interpretation of my paper, Szathmári appears as a highly consequent disciple of Karinthy's, who follows his master's ideas to the extremes. In the last section, I discuss the relationship between the three authors and the idea of an international language and Hungarian science fiction literature which emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.

THE CHURCH IN POLAND – NATIONAL OR UNIVERSAL? THE DRAMA OF A CERTAIN DILEMMA

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The Polish Church again faced an important choice: whether to stick to the atavistic principles of national and cultural inclusivism, or on a more open, universal path, appropriate for, among others, Pope Francis. This dilemma has become dramatic in the context of globalization and secularization experienced rapidly in Poland. However, all indications are that the Catholic hierarchy and the overwhelming part of the clergy are resolving this dilemma in their usual way. This means that – as the article analyses in many respects – such idiomatic and uncritically accepted solutions as the alliance of the altar with the throne, "denominational nationalism" (identifying Catholicism with Polishness), folk and formalistic rituals and counter-reformation remain in force. Baroque religious aesthetics, finally the messianism inherited from nineteenth-century romanticism, saturated, on the one hand, with *thanatism* and *dolorism,* and on the other – oscillating towards a feeling of a kind of "election" or distinction. What is of particular importance here is, above all, the desire to rely on state and legal institutions in the conditions of weakening the practice of faith and the destruction of "traditional religious values", and in order to maintain a dominant position. For this reason, the formula of "theodemocracy" was adopted in the Polish Church, i.e. the concept that democracy is not a fully autonomous order and must be rooted in the order of faith and justified by that order. For this reason, and at the cost of meeting the material and non-material expectations of the Church, it gave unequivocal support to the ruling populist and authoritarian political formation in Poland. Therefore, the Church granted this formation a kind of religious "concession", silently authorizing it for the significant – thoroughly described in the text – appropriation of certain ritual forms and religious symbols. It is about the so-called Smolensk religion, the foundation of which was the martyrdom myth related to the crash of the presidential TU154 aircraft in April 2010. This myth has turned out to be the keystone of the so far dispersed anti-liberal resentment circles in Poland, feeding on an autarkic approach to national identity and prone to fearful authoritarianism. Thus, it played a serious role in the destructive control of the structures of the state and the law, with the evident approval of the dominant forces in the Church. Currently, much of the "Smolensk myth" has weakened, nevertheless, the support of the hierarchical Church for populism in power is still maintained, which results in the strengthening and proliferation of solutions increasingly maintained in the spirit of Catholic fundamentalism and authoritarianism. Such a confession restricts women's rights, including the right to abortion and protection against domestic

violence, as well as sexual minorities, and also leads to restrictions in the field of education and culture, and attempts to transform society in the name of national essentialism. As a consequence, on the one hand, the Church suffers a spectacular defeat on this path: in a strongly secularized community, its faith, political commitment, the sometimes drastic categorical nature of the teachings, and the actual morality expressed, among others, are radically contested, *inter alia* by younger generations in provocative materialism and in concealing the paedophilia of the clergy. On the other hand, the categorical rejection of open, liberal and Universalist concepts of faith and morality and the marginalization of the Catholic intellectuals who support them do not give the Church the opportunity to find a common language with the ever-broader and more challenging circles of anti-clerical rebellion.

WORKING NOTES ON THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE LATE 1700s POLISH ELITES

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This paper develops a line of inquiry on the evolution of the late 1700s Polish elites experiencing a transformation from the state of feudal social arrangements, which relied mainly on agrarian means of production into modern, urban-based social arrangements that drew on merit and individual achievement resources. The preliminary calculations of the available data show that the direct reproduction understood in Marxian terms as reproduction of the elite possessing the agrarian means of production was broken in the period of time (late 18th century – early 20th century) under analysis. Namely, the 1930s elites in most instances did not represent the biographical successors of the late 1700s elites, mostly high aristocratic families. The preliminary analysis suggests that the Polish elite of the 1930s clearly belonged to new democratic intelligentsia cohorts without direct familial relations to previous aristocratic elites, or they were descendants of petty noble families which were forced to adapt to new meritocratic conditions over the span of several generations. Until the early 20th century, aristocracy had not been challenged by the need of adaptation to new social niches, and these families did not need to rearrange their structural social logic (e.g. homogamy, kinship network agency). The 20th century caused changes of habitat, including economic change, the advent of new social groups better adapted to habitat who were in a position of imposing new dominant social logics. Within the new social context, the intelligentsia acted as a social group with better adaptation capabilities. Its market flexibility, capability of running "low transaction costs of everyday life" (less demanding nuclear family, little housing, and service needs) made this group more versatile in the modern market economy society.

CULTURAL EVOLUTION PERSPECTIVES ON ELITES – ILLUSTRATED WITH MODERN POLISH EXAMPLES

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The issue of the evolution and dynamics of elites is extremely important in cultural and social evolution. Over the last 50 years, there was significant progress in natural science-based studies of cultural and social change (which were conducted under the "cultural evolution" heading) and we can expect that with time, the elites will become an important research topic of this branch of science. However, at present, this issue is still undertheorized by the representatives of the modern evolutionary perspective. My paper presents this approach and discusses whether and how the evolution of elites can be analysed in a framework of cultural evolution. I focus on the shorter-term and regional scale of the evolution of the elite, and I ask how to link this issue with three branches of modern Darwinian-based social science: the cultural attraction theory (also called "cultural epidemiology"), the selectionist approach, and the populational-ecological perspective. In the article I review some potential theoretical and empirical areas, illustrating them with examples from the modern history of Polish elites. The case of Poland (or even wider: of Central Europe) seems to be particularly interesting because of the high level of political instability in this part of Europe over the last hundred years. The losses and regains of autonomy by political units may allow us to have an opportunity to study the feedbacks between inter-group and intra-group competition in modern societies. This fact is even reflected in the previous sociological studies of Central European elites, which oft-emphasize the dynamic character of social change in the region and propose explanations which can be interpreted as variants of evolutionary reasoning. However, at the current level of development of the studies of cultural evolution, there are still substantial theoretical barriers to proposing concrete (in terms of hypotheses, research tools, and data) empirical applications of an evolutionary perspective. What I see as potentially the most relevant way to overcome this problem is to collect quantitative historical data (prosopographical, genealogical, proxy variables for inter- and intra-elite competition). In the case of Poland (and Central Europe), it would be worth checking how the empirical dynamics of inter- and intra-elite competition looks and whether it is different from Western Europe and the United States.

THE PHILOSOPHER AS A(N ANTI-)HERO THE LITERARY REPRESENTATIONS OF GEORG LUKÁCS

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Literary works generally portray historical and social changes of their times besides of their aesthetical values. These writings also interpret the ideas which influenced the most. This makes them a form of contemporary documentation (*Zeitdokument* or *Zeitroman*), which helps to understand a specific era. In the 20th century, Georg Lukács, the Marxist theorist and philosopher, was a significant thinker, whose attitude, character, and ideas influenced many other philosophers and artists. The aim of this paper is to outline Lukács's development of thinking from the point of view of his contemporaries. To this end, I discuss four literary writings in this paper: these four works represent an era from Lukács's life and thinking. The almost unknown feuilleton of Béla Balázs published in 1911 idealizes the young Lukács and portrays him as a quixotic thinker, who belongs to another sphere, another "caste". In the turn of 1921–1922, the novel of Emma Ritoók entitled *Spiritual Adventurers* was published, which represented the generation of pathfinders negatively and disillusioned, as they tried to calculate the redemption of the individuals with some mystical philosophical ideas. Anna Lesznai's novel, *In the Beginning was the Garden*, is a significant opus with two volumes which outlines the troubled times of Hungarian history and recreates the historical events from the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 to the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic and the first years of emigration. The two novels portray Lukács as a pathfinder who stands at a crossroads between theory and political praxis. Ritoók's novel judges this struggle and interprets it in a caricatured way, while Anna Lesznai represents Lukács's dilemma and decision as a sacrifice. The fourth work is *The Interview* by István Eörsi, which was published first in 1983 and is a very personal writing. Eörsi's writing is a drama or rather an "absurd documentary play", where Eörsi evokes his old Master, who is not the great thinker and philosopher, who he once was. The mind struggles as it still tries to create and work, but the body fails and Lukács got lost in the maze of his own thinking. The student wants to face his old Master, trying to get answers to his own dilemmas about Lukács, but his physical inability makes it almost impossible to communicate with him. All these four works represent Lukács in different phases and they take a very specific glance at a significant œuvre. However, these works deserve the consideration not just from the point of view of Lukács's significance, but because of their literary value. The literary works mentioned here are on the periphery of the literary canon and the rediscovering of these writings could bring new aspects not just for literary studies, but for the history of philosophy and ideas as well.

WHY IS NOT BERNHARD ALEXANDER ONE OF THE BEST-KNOWN HUNGARIAN PHILOSOPHERS? POSSIBLE ANSWERS

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In this study, I investigate the hypothesis why Bernhard Alexander (1850–1927) is not one of the best-known Hungarian philosophers, while he undoubtedly has the greatest history of influence on Hungarian philosophical life in the 19–20th centuries.

In 1878, Alexander was admitted as a docent into the faculty of philosophy at the University of Budapest, where he became a full professor in 1895. From 1892, he also lectured on dramaturgy and aesthetics at the National Theatre Academy, and on the latter subject and the history of civilization at Francis Joseph Polytechnic. He was a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Kisfaludy Society, a major force in Hungarian literature. Alexander, together with his friend Professor József Bánóczi, later edited a seminal series of books on philosophers, the *Filozófiai Írók Tára (Collection of Philosophical Authors),* for which he did translations and annotations of René Descartes, David Hume, Benedictus Spinoza, Denis Diderot and Immanuel Kant. During his life, Bernhard Alexander wrote books about Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann, as well as Denis Diderot and Benedict Spinoza. He was not only an editor, translator, and philosopher, but also a writer. He wrote several books on Shakespeare and published many important studies on Imre Madách's *The Tragedy of Man*. Before World War I, he was a star of world philosophical congresses; between 1914 and 1918, he was a supporter and disseminator of German and Hungarian war ideas. However, Alexander became pariah in the nationalistic, anti-Semitic environment of post-1919 Hungary and Miklós Horthy's government, and spent four years abroad.

In my opinion, the reason of omission is primarily not due to the interpretations based on Alexander's works, and I aim to demonstrate this through highlights of his life, and in a series of some of his decisions. I limit my research to the following years: 1908–1910, 1914–1918, and events from 1919 to 1924. Continuing the study, I also examine the interpretations of his disciples until the millennium by his followers and students (Gyula Kornis, Samu Szemere, Károly Sebestyén, István Hermann, Éva Gábor, and László Perecz). In this context, I show how the image of him changed between the two world wars and in the decades of socialism; what led to his marginalization and what tasks awaited Alexander researchers in the second millennium.

WHO WERE THE FIRST MODERN PROFESSIONAL PHILOSOPHERS IN HUNGARY? THE AUTHORS OF THE JOURNAL *MAGYAR PHILOSOPHIAI SZEMLE* (1882–1891)

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Even though there obviously were individual professional philosophers in Hungary prior to 1882 (to begin with, the occupants of the chairs of philosophy at the University of Pozsony [today Bratislava in Slovakia], later of (Buda)pest, also the University of Kolozsvár [today Cluj in Romania] since 1872, respectively at the various educational institutes on tertiary and sub-tertiary levels), there were no professional philosophers in the collective sense, at least when one subscribes to the plausible view that the establishment of the corresponding professional form of the public sphere *(Öffentlichkeit)* constitutes a prerequisite of the latter. The aim of the present paper is to study the members of one, or arguably the first of such venues of professional philosophical life in Hungary, namely the authors of the *Magyar Philosophiai Szemle (Hungarian Philosophical Review),* the first philosophical journal in Hungary that appeared in print between 1882 and 1891 (this journal is not to be confused with its namesake, the modern-day *Magyar Filozófiai Szemle,* which was first published in 1957 and still serves as the focal point of Hungarian professional philosophy). In a certain sense, the present investigation is underpinned by the conviction that, at least in case of the *Magyar Philosophiai Szemle* (the late volumes of which were often criticized for the declining editorial standards and the proliferation of the philosophy *du jour*, i.e., French positivism), the 'Who?' might be more important than the 'What?'. More precisely, the authors of the journal constitute a group of philosophers the choice of whom is not governed by a prevalent philosophical canon, but rather an external historical fact, namely their participation in this pioneering venue of Hungarian professional philosophy. Thereby, it becomes possible for the historian of philosophy to question the underlying assumptions of the received view concerning the emergence of modern philosophy. It is this larger objective to which the present study intends to contribute.

In order to exploit this potential, the first challenge was to identify the authors and reconstruct their short biographies based not only on the established Hungarian biographical lexica (e.g., the works of József Szinnyei and Pál Gulyás, as well as the *Magyar életrajzi lexikon* [*Hungarian Biographical Dictionary*] and its recent counterpart, the *Új magyar életrajzi lexicon* [*New Hungarian Biographical Dictionary*] and, furthermore, the corresponding Jewish and Catholic biographical dictionaries), but also on less-accessible sources including original

course catalogues, eulogies, death notices etc. The authors of the journal range from thinkers who indisputably belong to the pantheon of Hungarian philosophy, respectively of culture in general (e.g., Károly Böhm, Sámuel Brassai), to lesser-known or even peripheral ones (not to mention the fact that two authors regrettably remained unidentifiable). This observation could already constitute a lesson for the historiography of Hungarian philosophy (and Continental philosophy in general), insofar as it could serve as an antidote to the so-called 'monumental' way of writing the history of philosophy that focuses predominantly on 'great books' written by 'great thinkers.' What the study of flesh-and-blood people who filled the pages of actual philosophical journals could probably teach us first is that 'great thinkers', i.e., historical figures occupying a central position in cultural memory (respectively in the standard narrative of the history of the corresponding scientific discipline), amount only to a tiny fraction of the actual historical fabric that constitutes the scientific discipline in question.

On the basis of the biographical reconstruction of this group of the first modern Hungarian philosophers, I have investigated their age and occupation (including, specifically, the age distribution of their study at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of [Buda]pest, which constitutes the university most frequently visited by them), as well as their study at universities abroad, their so-called peregrinations, their embeddedness in the Hungarian institutional network and finally, the geographical distribution of their places of birth, death and their respective places of occupation at the beginning and end of the journal's publication period.

I hope that the detailed investigations carried out in the present article could contribute towards a way of writing the history of philosophy that is more attentive towards the hitherto marginalized sub-traditions (e.g., the sub-traditions of various confessional philosophies or the school-philosophies) outside of the historiographical mainstream. At the same time, the discrepancies manifested in this genre of philosophical history-writing, respectively the methodological tools involved might be of interest for the historiography of general European philosophy, especially of nineteenth-century German academic philosophy *(Universitätsphilosophie)* and the pre-history of phenomenology as well.

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