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In Defence of the Phenomenological Objection to Mental Fictionalism

Márton, Miklós and Tőzsér, János (2020) In Defence of the Phenomenological Objection to Mental Fictionalism. ORGANON F, 27 (2). pp. 1-18. ISSN 1335-0668 (print); 2585-7150 (online)

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Abstract

In this paper, we defend the main claims of our earlier paper “Mental Fictionalism as an Undermotivated Theory” (in The Monist) from Gábor Bács’s criticism, which appeared in his “Mental fictionalism and epiphenomenal qualia” (in Dialectica). In our earlier paper, we tried to show that mental fictionalism is an undermotivated theory, so there is no good reason to give up the realist approach to the folk psychological discourse. The core of Bács’s criticism consists in that our argumentation rests on an equivocation concerning the folk psychological concepts of conscious experiences. In our present argumentation, at first, we shortly recapitulate our earlier argumentation and Bács’s main objection to it. After that, we argue against the case of equivocation, claiming that it rests on a highly implausible and unsupported verificationist approach. Lastly, in answering another remark of Bács’s, we discuss the possibility of a realist mental fictionalism and conclude that it is an incoherent standpoint.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion / filozófia, pszichológia, vallás > BD Speculative Philosophy / rendszeres filozófia > BD3 Philosophy of mind and spirit / szellem filozófiája > BD352 Phenomenalism / fenomenológia
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion / filozófia, pszichológia, vallás > BF Psychology / lélektan
SWORD Depositor: MTMT SWORD
Depositing User: MTMT SWORD
Date Deposited: 16 Mar 2021 11:00
Last Modified: 16 Mar 2021 11:00
URI: http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/122385

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