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# Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics

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VOLUME IV  
CONFIRMATION—DRAMA

EDINBURGH: T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET  
NEW YORK: CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, 597 FIFTH AVENUE

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of existence between individuals enunciated in the *Origin of Species*, and as it has become increasingly evident that the application of the law of Natural Selection to human society involves a first-hand consideration of all the problems of mind and philosophy, a remarkable feature of the situation has presented itself. This has consisted in the extremely limited number of minds of sufficient scope of view and training to enable them to deal with the new and larger problems that have arisen. The exponents of philosophy, untrained in the methods of science and largely unacquainted with its details, have necessarily continued to be without a fully reasoned perception of the enormous importance of the Darwinian principles of evolution in their own subject. The biologists, on the other hand, continuing to be immersed in the facts of the struggle for existence between animals, have in consequence, on their part, remained largely unacquainted with the principles of social efficiency in the evolution of human society. The dualism which has been opened in the human mind in the evolution of this efficiency has, in the religious and ethical systems of the race, a phenomenology of its own, stupendous in extent, and absolutely characteristic of the social process. But it remains a closed book to the biologist, and the study of it he is often apt to consider as entirely meaningless. The position has, therefore, most unusual features.

Darwin made no systematic study of human society. But, where he approached the subject in the *Origin of Species*, it was to disclose the bewilderment produced on his mind in attempting to apply the principles of the individual struggle for existence to social evolution. He seemed to think that Natural Selection must be suspended in civilization:

'We civilized men,' he said, 'do our utmost to check the process of elimination [of the weak in body and mind]; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute poor laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of every one to the last moment' (*Descent of Man*, ch. v. [p. 168 in 1871 ed.]).

Darwin thus exhibited no perception of the fact that this sense of responsibility to life, which is so characteristic of advanced civilization, is itself part of the phenomenology of a larger principle of Natural Selection. That the deepening of the social consciousness, of which this developing spiritual sense of responsibility to our fellow-creatures is one of the outward marks, is of immense significance as characteristic of the higher organic efficiency of the social type in the struggle for existence was a meaning which seemed to escape him.

Alfred Russel Wallace, in approaching the study of human society in his book *Darwinism* (1889), displayed the same inability to distinguish that it is in relation to the capital problems with which the human mind has struggled in philosophy, ethics, and religion that we have the phenomena of Natural Selection in social evolution. The qualities with which priests and philosophers are concerned, he asserted, were altogether removed from utility in the struggle for existence; and he even mistakenly used the suggestion as an argument in support of religion. Here also the fact in evidence was that the naturalist, with his mind fixed on the details of the individual struggle for existence as it takes place between plants and animals, has been altogether at a disadvantage, both by training and equipment, in attempting to deal with the laws and principles of social efficiency. Huxley reached an almost equally characteristic contradiction in the Romanes lecture delivered at Oxford in 1893, in which he attempted to make a distinction in principle and meaning between the social process and the cosmic process, the lesson of evolution, like the lesson of religion,

being, of course, that they are one and the same. Sir Francis Galton, one of the last and greatest of Darwin's contemporaries, recently also exhibited this characteristic standpoint of all the early Darwinians. He put forward claims for a new science, 'Eugenics,' which he has defined as a science which would deal with all the influences that improve the inborn qualities of the race, and would develop them to the utmost advantage by 'scientific breeding.' The list of qualities which Galton proposed to breed from included health, energy, ability, manliness, and the special aptitudes required by various professions and occupations. Morals he proposed to leave out of the question altogether 'as involving too many hopeless difficulties.' Here once more we see the difficulty with which the naturalist is confronted in attempting to apply to human society the merely stud-book principles of the individual struggle for existence as it is waged among plants and animals. The entire range of the problems of morality and mind are necessarily ignored. The higher qualities of our social evolution, with all the absolutely characteristic phenomena contributing to the highest organic social efficiency, remain outside his vision.

We are as yet only at the beginning of this phase of knowledge. The present remarkable situation, here of necessity only lightly referred to, in which the biologists and the philosophers remain organized in isolated camps, each with the most restricted conception of the nature and importance of the work done by the other and of the bearing on its own conclusions, cannot be expected to continue. One of the most urgent needs of the present time is a class of minds of sufficient scope and training to be able to cover the relations of the conclusions of each of these sets of workers to those of the other and to the larger science of society. See also art. EVOLUTION.

LITERATURE.—C. Darwin, *Origin of Species, Descent of Man; Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*, ed. F. Darwin<sup>2</sup>, Lond. 1887; A. R. Wallace, *Darwinism*, do. 1889; B. Kidd, *Social Evolution*, Lond. 1894, art. 'Sociology,' in *EB*<sup>11</sup>; T. H. Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*, Lond. 1893. BENJAMIN KIDD.

DASNĀMIS.—See ŚAIVISM.

DĀWŪD B. 'ALĪ B. KHALAF.—Dāwūd b. 'Alī b. Khalaf, called al-Zāhiri (with the *kunya* Abū Sulaimān), a jurist celebrated as the originator of the Zāhiriyya school in Muslim theology, was born in Kūfa, A.H. 200 [=A.D. 815] (or, according to other authorities, A.H. 202 [=A.D. 817]), of a family belonging to Iṣfāhān. Among the many eminent teachers under whom he studied in his youthful travels were two of the leading theologians of Islām, viz. Iṣḥāq b. Rāhawāih (†A.H. 233 [=A.D. 847]) of Nisābūr, with whom he enjoyed personal relations of the most intimate character, and Abū Thaur (Ibrāhīm b. Khalid) of Baghdād (†A.H. 240 [=A.D. 854]). Having completed his career of study, he settled in Baghdād, where he soon established a great reputation, and began to attract pupils in large numbers. His audience, in fact, commonly numbered about 400, and included even scholars of established repute. At this time Baghdād possessed another teacher of renown, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (†A.H. 241 [=A.D. 855]), the Nestor of ultra-conservative orthodoxy, whose name is borne by the Ḥanbalitic party. Dāwūd sought to come into friendly relations with Aḥmad, but all his advances were repelled, as he lay under the suspicion of having affirmed, while at Nisābūr, that the Qur'an was a created work—a doctrine which Aḥmad had attacked with great vigour and at heavy personal cost. It was even said that Dāwūd had been punished for his error by Iṣḥāq b. Rāhawāih. Though Dāwūd met



these allegations with a distinct denial, Ahmad still refused to receive him; nor was the strain relieved by the fact that the system promulgated by Dawūd coincided in many respects with that of Ahmad, and was even fitted to lend it support.

Although Dawūd, in his travels as a student, had applied himself eagerly to the study of the *Hadith*, 'prophetic tradition,' he has no outstanding reputation as an authority on that subject. In point of fact, he is said to have given currency to only one prophetic dictum of note, which came to be associated with his name through the instrumentality of his son, Abū Bakr Muḥammad, a well-known *bel esprit* of his day. The saying is as follows: 'He who loves and pines and hides (his torment), and dies thereof, is to be regarded as a martyr.' As a teacher of jurisprudence, on the other hand, Dawūd's influence was enormous, and here he ranks as the founder of a distinct school. He allied himself with the system of the Imām, al-Shāfi'i, for whom he manifested an extraordinary reverence, and to whose high qualities (*manāqib*) he devoted two of his books. But, while Dawūd found his starting-point in the system of Shāfi'i, he at length developed a new method in the deduction of sacred law—a method which, in its results, diverged from that of his master in the most pronounced way, and at the same time brought its author into collision with the universally received views of Muslim jurisprudence. According to the prevailing doctrine, the bases of juristic deduction were (1) the ordinances attested by the Qur'an; (2) those which had the support of tradition; (3) the *consensus* ('*ijmā'*) of recognized authorities; and (4) the conclusions established by speculative reasoning from analogies (*qiyās*), and by deduction of the *ratio legis* ('*illal al-shar'*) from given ordinances. In cases where positive injunctions derived from the first three sources proved inadequate, the reflective insight (*ra'y*, *opinio prudentium*) involved in the fourth was regarded as valid ground for juristic reasoning. Dawūd, however, denied the legitimacy of this last-mentioned source, *i.e.* the *ra'y*, and all that it implied, as also of all inquiry into the reasons of the Divine laws and the analogical arguments founded thereon. The only sources of juristic deduction which he recognized were the positive, or, as he calls them, the 'evident' (*zāhir*), *i.e.* the Qur'an and Tradition. As for the *consensus*, he restricted it to the demonstrable 'agreement of the companions of the prophet' ('*ijmā' al saḥāba*'), assigning no more precise limits to the scope of this factor. In thus running counter to the procedure of the dominant schools, Dawūd found himself in alliance with the extreme section of the party known as the *ashāb al-hadith* ('traditionalists')—in contrast to the *ashāb al-ra'y* ('speculative jurists'),—and became the founder of the Zāhiriyya school, which is accordingly also called the *mudh-hab Dawūd*. It is true that he brought himself to the point of conceding the admissibility of the 'obvious analogy' (*qiyās jalī*) plainly indicated by positive injunctions, but only as a last resource. As a preliminary of delivering judgment, moreover, he demanded an independent investigation of tradition, and deprecated a mechanical adherence to the established doctrine of a master or a school (*taqlid*). 'The automatic repetition of the teachings of one who is not infallible is pernicious, and shows blindness of judgment.' 'Out upon him who, having a torch (*i.e.* tradition) wherewith he may light his own way, extinguishes his torch, and moves only by another's help.' Men should not blindly follow any human authority, but should examine the sources for themselves.

Of Dawūd's writings, a list of which is given in the *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, nothing is now extant, but

it would be possible to reconstruct his doctrines from quotations in later literature. Biographical writers are at one in extolling the piety and sincerity of his character, and his abstemious mode of life. His fame spread far beyond the confines of his domicile, and from the furthest limits of the Muhammadan world those who were perplexed with theological problems came to him for light. He died in Baghdād in A.H. 270 [= A.D. 883]. Vast as his influence was, however, his system, which, owing to its limited scope, did not adequately meet the requirements of juristic practice, failed to gain a firm footing in public life. Numerous Muslim scholars associated themselves with it, but their adherence was largely personal and theoretical, and, except in a single instance, the system never attained an authoritative position in the official administration of justice. Its solitary success in this respect was achieved in the empire of the Almohads in Spain and North-West Africa, the founders of which, repudiating all adherence (*taqlid*) to particular schools, held that the appeal to the traditional sources was the only permissible procedure. The history of Muslim learning down to the 9th cent. A.H. contains the names of famous adherents of the Zāhiristic principle in many different countries. The most important, and, in a literary sense, the most eminent, of these was the valiant Andalusian, Ibn Ḥazm, 'Alī b. Ahmad, who expounded the Zāhiristic method in his works, and applied it not only to the jurisprudence of Islam, but to its dogmatic theology as well.

LITERATURE.—*Taj al-din al-Subki, Tabaqāt al-Shāfi'iyya* (Cairo, 1324), ii. 42–48 (biography of Dawūd); I. Goldziher, *Die Zāhiriten, ihr Lehrsystem u. ihre Geschichte*, Leipzig, 1884; for the Almohadic movement, the same author's Introduction to *Le Livre de Mohammed ibn Tounert, Mahdi des Almohades*, Algiers, 1903, pp. 39–54. I. GOLDZIEHER.

DAY OF ATONEMENT.—See FESTIVALS (Hebrew).

DEACON, DEACONESS.—See MINISTRY.

DEAD.—See ANCESTOR-WORSHIP, DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD, STATE OF THE DEAD.

DEÆ MATRES.—The *Deæ Matres* are divinities of uncertain character and function, whose worship is found chiefly in the Celtic and German provinces of the Roman Empire (cf. art. CELTS, vol. iii. pp. 280, 286, and *passim*). How far they are to be identified or associated with so-called 'Mother-goddesses' among other peoples is a matter of dispute and will be discussed later. But there is evidence on Celtic and Germanic territory, and to some extent outside these limits, of a fairly definite cult of goddesses called usually *Matres* or *Matronæ*, and depicted in accordance with well-established conventions. Knowledge of them is derived entirely from inscriptions and monuments, of which a large number (over four hundred inscriptions) have been preserved; apparent survivals of their worship have been detected in the beliefs and traditions of the Celts and Germans of later ages; but no certain reference to them has been found in ancient literature. There is no reason for applying to them, as is sometimes done, a passage cited from Varro in the *de Civ. Dei* of St. Augustine (vii. 3, 'Unde dicit etiam ipse Varro, quod diis quibusdam patribus et deabus matribus, sicut hominibus, ignobilitas accidisset'). Varro's reference is probably general, and certainly the context in St. Augustine does not suggest an application to the particular divinities in question.

The inscriptions discovered up to the year 1887 were published and classified by Ihm in his very important monograph on the *Matronenkultus* (cited here by this short title; for exact references, see the Literature at end of article). Additional material