“What is it like to be a jellyfish?” – Husserl on the origins of consciousness in the animal world

Marosán, Bence (2021) “What is it like to be a jellyfish?” – Husserl on the origins of consciousness in the animal world. In: SPEAKING BODIES, Embodied Cognition at the Crossroads of Philosophy, Linguistics, Psychology and Artificial Intelligence, 2021. május 13-15., Kolozsvár, Románia. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

In this paper I would like to present some elements of a project, whose main aim is to shed light on the origins of consciousness in the natural world from a phenomenological point of view. In this endeavour partly Husserl’s approach of first person lived experiences and partly the mind-body conception of Embodied Cognition play a crucial role. In the first part of my presentation I would like to talk about Husserl’s theory of the lowest level of conscious experience and its embodied character. In the second part, I intend to speak about the problem of realization; namely about the question that how conscious experience is realized through certain physical processes in the world. In this second part I would like to offer a so-to-say “heterodox” version of Embodied Cognition, which is compatible with a sort of functionalism on the one hand, and with standard Embodied Cognition on the other.

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