

E-Dossier Series Nr. 8.

Documentary Evidence

**ON THE HUNGARIAN
MEDIATION EFFORTS BETWEEN
THE U.S. AND THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
(1965–1967)**

VOLUME VI

Post-Mediation Events – Part Three
(January, 1967 – September, 1967)

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COLD WAR HISTORY RESEARCH CENTER
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CONTENTS

About this E-Dossier series.....	1
Contents of the current E-Dossier	2
DOCUMENT 1 Report from Hungarian Embassy, Hanoi, 19 January 1967, On Le Duc Tho's Moscow Consultations, mid-December 1966, 19 January 1967	4
DOCUMENT 2 President Johnson's reception for the Diplomatic Corps in the White House, 27. April, 1967	8
DOCUMENT 3 Proposal to the Political Committee of the CC of the HSWP, 4 May, 1967	12
DOCUMENT 4 Report on the Chinese-Vietnamese Relations 13 September, 1967	21
MAIN ACTORS.....	42
ABOUT THE AUTHORS.....	55

About this E-Dossier series

The E-Dossier series presenting the Hungarian mediation efforts between the U.S and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) started in 2017 with the aim of shedding light on this still little-known piece of diplomatic history. The first volume, with the subtitle The Early stages of the Mediation 1965 was published at the end of 2017, containing eight documents, describing the genesis of the diplomatic efforts.

The second volume was published in two parts at the end of 2018, because the amount of material made it advisable to split it into two: Mediation Efforts Part One and Mediation Efforts Part Two. Part One contains a short report about an ambassadorial meeting and two lengthy documents about the Hungarian efforts, one written to the foreign minister of the Hungarian People's Republic, János Péter by the Hungarian charge d'affairs in Washington, János Radványi, the other being the minutes of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) Politburo meeting covering the issue. Part Two contains 12 documents, covering Hungarian Foreign Ministry documents about communications with the Vietnamese, Polish and U.S. counterparts, as well as reports and minutes covering the issue.

The third volume was published at the end of 2019. It details the post-mediation diplomatic activities of the Hungarians, including some of the exchanges with the Vietnamese, Polish and Soviet partners. The volume contains documents of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and the leading bodies of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, detailing communication between the Hungarian and North Vietnamese, the Polish, and the Soviet leadership, as well as Hungarian communication with US officials. It contains information provided to the Hungarian side by the Soviets about their dealings with the DRV, so the volume provides a valuable insight into Hungarian and Soviet Bloc thinking about the Vietnam War.

The fourth volume was published at the end of 2020. It contains 10 documents originating from the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and the HSWP, covering the second part of the post-mediation efforts (October, 1966 – December, 1966). It contains multiple memoranda from the János Radványi, long time charge d'affairs and short time ambassador of the Hungarian People's Republic, about Hungarian efforts in Washington, information provided by the Soviet Union about Soviet-Vietnamese talks and the Soviet view of the war, the state of Soviet-Polish talks about Vietnam, a memorandum about talks with Polish officials about parallel diplomatic efforts, a memorandum about Le Duc Tho's visit to Budapest, as well as a HSWP document on talks with a Vietnamese delegation in Budapest.

The current volume, building on the sources used in the earlier volumes, provides documents from the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and HSWP archives. It covers the period between January to September 1967, and was completed in 2021. For a more detailed overview see the Contents of the Current E-Dossier.

Contents of the current E-Dossier

The current E-Dossier contains four documents originating from Hungarian Foreign Ministry and HSWP archives. It provides an overview on the Hungarian and Soviet views of the post-mediation stage, providing a glimpse into the thinking of Hungarian officials.

Document 1 is a report of the Hungarian Embassy in Hanoi, and provides an overview of the Soviet-Vietnamese consultation in early 1967. The topics covered include the Vietnamese-Chinese relations, Vietnamese misgivings about the depth and speed of Soviet economic and military support provided to the DRV.

Document 2 is a report by János Radványi about his conversation with U.S. officials including William Bundy, Francis Bator and Walt Rostow at a White House event. The issue of Vietnam is prominent in the memorandum, besides Hungarian-U.S. relations.

Document 3 is a proposal for the Central Committee of the HSWP. It provides details about the Hungarian assistance efforts to the DRV, including providing air defense artillery systems and other military hardware of various types, as well as economic assistance.

Document 4 is a detailed analysis of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry about the Vietnamese-Chinese relations. It provides historical context for the state of relations in 1967, and the state of diplomatic and military relations between the DRV and the PRC.

ABBREVIATIONS

CC	Central Committee
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CP	Communist Party
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
GDR	German Democratic Republic
HSWP	Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
NLF	National Liberation Front
PRC	People's Republic of China
WPV	Workers' Party of Vietnam

DOCUMENT 1

Report from Hungarian Embassy on Le Duc Tho's Moscow Consultations, mid-December 1966, 19 January 1967

Top Secret!

3 copies made

2 for the Center

1 for the Embassy

Hanoi, 19 January 1967

Subject: Comrade Le Duc Tho's
Moscow Consultations

23/top secret/1967

To Comrade Puja

Comrade Le Duc Tho, who headed the WPV delegation at the IX. Congress of the HSWP, following a preliminary consultation held upon his request, on his way home met Comrade Brezhnev in Moscow, and exchanged his views with him on current matters. Soviet Ambassador Comrade Shcherbakov, the Soviet ambassador in place, provided the following information:

The original plan of the Vietnamese comrades was that Comrade Le Duc Tho travelling to Budapest, joins up with Foreign Minister Trinh on his way back from Sofia, to meet Comrade Brezhnev—in Moscow. However, as the delegation coming to us, due to travel difficulties arrived in Moscow with delay, this meeting did not take place, so therefore, immediately after his arrival in Budapest, Comrade Tho contacted Comrade Brezhnev and they agreed to meet in Moscow after the WPV delegation completed its work in Budapest.

In the course of the consultations, which, for the most part, took place as a colloquial exchange, covered the following topics of greater importance:

1. Comrade Tho's briefing on the Vietnamese situation;
2. Important issues of the international communist movement;
3. Problems concerning the military aid to be provided to the DRV.

Concerning issue 1: Comrade Tho presented the same briefing he presented to Comrade Komócsin, which, according to the Soviet comrades' assessment, contained no new information. Only one question was raised, about their view on their understanding of fighting while negotiating and when this becomes feasible. Their response was that it becomes feasible when they will gain appropriate military superiority over the Americans, and when the Americans will prove with actions that they sincerely want peace. For the time being, however, negotiations are out of the question as the Americans are stepping up their aggression; they have even started to bomb downtown Hanoi.

Concerning issue 2: Regarding the consultative meeting of the sister parties, they presented the same position they had presented here. They do not oppose in principle the convening of such a meeting, but it involves the risk of making the split permanent and that would be an irreparable mistake. The CCP would convene a separate meeting which in itself would mean the division of the international communist movement into two camps. Comrade Tho did not declare whether the DRV would take part in such a meeting, or in which one. Comrade Brezhnev tried to convince Comrade Tho that the purpose of such a meeting would not be the expulsion of one sister parties, but on the contrary, to discuss the ways in which the unity could be strengthened, and to form a common position regarding the ways and forms of the manifold assistance to be provided for the Vietnamese people.

With regard to the unity Comrade Tho, again, presented the same position that he had presented to us, that they support it in principle, but due to the regrettably strained relations, they consider it unachievable. The WPV itself makes considerable efforts to restore unity and, in his view, the other sister parties should with great patience also work for this end primarily with the utilization of bilateral negotiations. When the Soviet comrades sharply criticized the CCP's behavior as unity breaking, deviating from Marxism-Leninism and increasingly hostile towards the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, Comrade Tho - either as a result of his

talks with us or on his own accord -n his capacity as a leader of the WPV, now for the first time stated, that he did not agree with a series of the CCP's activities. For example, he considered current form of cultural revolution damaging, he disagreed with the anti-Soviet resolution of the 11th Plenum, as it further strained relations between the Soviet Union and China, he also disagreed with the CCP's charges against the CPSU. Regarding a number of other issues, Comrade Tho was of the opinion that those were the internal problems of the CCP which should be resolved by the CCP itself and that it would be inappropriate for other parties to interfere . Despite the fact that Comrade Tho did not condemn the CCP's conduct unequivocally, what he said was regarded by the Soviet comrades as a positive change, and as another step in the direction of seeing these issues even more clearly in the future. The DRV's exceptional dependency upon China must be taken into account as an important factor behind Comrade Tho's cautious position.

Concerning issue 3: As it is known, during a private talks with us, Comrade Tho forcefully raised that the Soviet Union does not supply the DRV with the most advanced air defense equipment, meaning the anti-aircraft missiles that are more effective than the ones currently supplied. Comrade Tho had told us that he would also raise this matter during his talks with Comrade Brezhnev. He indeed did so, as he had raised it with us. Comrade Brezhnev ensured him, regarding both the missiles and the other advanced equipment, that he would provide the DRV with any kind of equipment , but a basic condition for that is, that the DRV had appropriately trained operating personnel, because without those even the most advanced weapons remain ineffective. A good example for this was, that during the December 13 air raids one hundred missiles were launched for shooting down a single plane, albeit the target kill probability of these weapons was one and a half per plane at the worst. Another condition was that they should follow the guidance and instructions of the Soviet advisers, at least until their own crews gain sufficient experience. Finally, Comrade Tho was given assurances that they would also receive the most advanced equipment in proportion with the number of returning fully trained crews.

Besides the above Comrade Ung Van Khiem took part in separate talks covering matters he was personally interested in, with special focus to the issue of the disabled. Like here, he also visited in the Soviet Union institutions designed to rehabilitate the disabled; factories that employ partially disabled workers etc. After a one week stay in Moscow, he traveled to the GDR, from where he would return to Moscow to continue his negotiations. The

Soviet comrades, too, had a very positive impression of Comrade Khiem who made exceptionally candid political statements, just as he had made to us. They already assured him of their full support to resolve his problems concerning the disabled, and promised him to meet all of his concrete requests – as best as they can. We agreed with Comrade Shcherbakov to give full support to Comrade Khiem to resolve his problems.

Finally, Comrade Shcherbakov informed me that, while I was away, there was a pleasingly eventful time that constitutes the first, initial steps of increased political-diplomatic activity. It seems that they - even if somewhat belatedly - are beginning to take the advice provided to them during their consultations with friendly delegations. In this respect, it was a useful step that they provided entry for U.S. citizens, with Salisbury among them, who was one of the 56 journalists who, responding to the initiative of the U.S. peace movement, had applied for entry, and he was selected because his paper had criticized Johnson for his Vietnam policy several times. Over here, he was - smartly - paired up with Burchett who accompanied him on all his trips and obviously influenced his work in his articles. The statements of Pham Van Dong and the Paris chief negotiator were also positive because these constitute the first steps out of the 4-point inflexibility inasmuch as they started, even if rather vaguely to explain the 4 point. There are signs suggesting that as a result of these early initiatives the Americans are already becoming bewildered, and, if the Vietnamese leaders realize this, they will hopefully not stop at these initial steps but continue even more actively. In this respect, our task is to make every effort to influence the comrades in this direction.

/ Dr. Imre Pehr /
Ambassador

[Source: Report, Hungarian embassy/Hanoi (Imre Pehr) to Hungarian Foreign Ministry, "SUBJECT: Comrade Le Duc Tho's Moscow Consultations," 19 January 1967, MOL, Vietnamese Relations, 1967, Foreign Ministry records, Top Secret, box 93, 250-001223/1967, XIX-J-1-j, MOL, Budapest, obtained and translated by Zoltan Szoke.]

DOCUMENT 2

President Johnson's reception for the Diplomatic Corps in the White House, 27. April, 1967

W/20/1967

Washington, 27. April 1967

Comrade Vencel Házi
Head of Department

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
B u d a p e s t

Dear Comrade Házi!

Attached to this letter I'm sending my memorandum on the reception on the 26. April, which was given to the diplomatic corps by President Johnson in the White House. I managed to gather some information. Please consider these as an addition to my diplomatic mail, and communicate them to the leadership of the Ministry.

The situation is rather complex, the prospects are fairly pessimistic, the exasperation amongst the clear-sighted individuals is growing, from Lippmann to Bishop Blake. At the same time, Johnson practically wants to test the limits of the patience of the Soviet Union.

I hope my words find you in good health, together with your dear family.

Greetings with lots of love
János Radványi

János Radványi

Top Secret!

M e m o r a n d u m

Subject: President Johnson's reception
for the Diplomatic Corps at the White House

The usual yearly presidential reception took place on the 26th April in the White House. Despite President Johnson, and his delegation only arriving back to Washington from West Germany in the afternoon on the 26th April, he gave the reception at 7:00 p.m.

The president and his wife received the arriving guests, talked to everyone for a shorter or longer period of time, then Vice President Humphrey and his wife, and after, Secretary Rusk – together with his wife – greeted the guests.

Johnson looked fairly fresh, however, Rusk, W. Rostow and the others looked pretty tired. The reception gave me an opportunity to conduct conversations with the Americans, and other diplomats who were present at the reception.

Upon my arrival, President Johnson exchanged a couple of conventional words with me, he did not mention neither international issues, nor political issues related to our two countries, and neither did I mention anything like that.

Deputy Secretary of State William Bundy, the leader of the Far East department of the SD initiated a conversation, and said, that for now the President has no other choice, but to use military tools. For their part, the biggest obstacle is Hanoi not understanding the American side, and being unwilling to engage in negotiations. I noted, that he can use this argument with a journalist, but he should not claim it to me. We both know that this is not the case, he should rather say whether the US government wants to solve the issue of Vietnam solely with weapons, or also by the means of diplomacy?! W. Bundy then answered that Hanoi is not willing to talk to them, and they cannot accept the condition of unilaterally stopping the bombing of the DRV. If they stopped – he said – then the negotiation still would not happen, because Hanoi would demand the withdrawal of their forces from South Vietnam. It would be great, he continued, if a situation would emerge again, where the Hungarian Foreign Minister, János Péter could help, before the situation worsened.

In my answer I noted, that through the years, whenever a peace-initiative moved on to a serious stage, the Americans always answered with bombings, and the escalation of the war. For my part, I could only say that if he had anything official to say on this topic, he naturally knows where, and how he can reach me.

During my conversation with the advisor of the President, Walter Rostow, he said that he is disappointed in the Soviet Union. He anticipated the Soviet Union to make efforts to restore the peace in Vietnam. In contrast, in the past couple of weeks, Jurij Zsukov, the editor in chief of Pravda was here, and he talked to him, and other American leaders, and during those conversations he used roughly the same threatening tone, as Khrushchev did with Kennedy

back then in Vienna. The President also knows about this, but the United States cannot be threatened.

I asked him if he thinks that the United States is going too far with the war in Vietnam. Rostow answered that if needed, they are ready to clash with China as well, if that is the price of fulfilling their obligation in Vietnam.

Here, our conversation broke down, as President Johnson unexpectedly approached Rostow, and asked him if the speech he is due to give to the physicists is ready. The President also gave a speech yesterday at a banquet, and additionally to the original speech, he now also said that he is absolutely for peace, he wants peace in Vietnam, and that he wants to achieve that through negotiations, but for now, he can only negotiate with himself. Reflecting back now, it seems like the President was asking Rostow about this addition.

Rostow, excessively humble in his answer, said that the addition was ready, and he already showed it to Rusk, who agreed with him. The President then turned to me, and asked what is happening in Hungary, and if we expect good results from the new economic reforms.

I answered, that this is a transitional year, and the reforms will only be implemented in 1968. The President wished good luck to the new Hungarian Prime Minister and the government, and went over to another group of people.

After that, I talked with Francis Bator, the President's special advisor on European issues. Bator mentioned the issue of appointing an Ambassador. He said, that however strange it may sound, and whether we believe it or not, the reason it is still dragging on, is because the President has still not been able to decide it yet. President Johnson considers Hungary to be a really important country, and he would like to find someone similar to Ambassador Gronousky, of Polish origin. They know in the White House, that dragging on the appointment of their new Ambassador is not a good thing, but they cannot do anything against it, because the issue is at the sole discretion of their President.

Ambassador Harriman tried to intervene with President Johnson about the issue in the past couple of weeks, but he waved him away as well, saying that he needs time to make the appropriate decision.

According to Bator, the President would likely rather send a politician, and a career-diplomat to Hungary. I answered to Bator that appointing an Ambassador is the job of the President, and I do not have anything special to comment on that. It is however strange, that the President, through Under-secretary Leddy, asked for an answer as soon as possible on elevating our relations to embassy level. This is why it is incomprehensible for me, that if it was that

urgent, then why is the appointment of the Ambassador dragging on this much. This is however – I said – is my own opinion – please, consider it as such.

Harriman introduced me to Ambassador Steve, the Head of the Personnel Department¹ of the SD. In front of me, Harriman asked Steve about the situation concerning the Ambassador to be sent to Budapest. Steve answered, that the list of recommended people has already been sent to the White House. There is a certain difference of opinion between the SD and the White House, as the SD thinks that sending a career-diplomat to Budapest is the most suitable, while the White House is resolved to appoint a politician. Steve stated, that he hopes that the issue will be resolved soon. I noted, that they should not wish to involve me in the argument between the White House, and the State Department.

I also had a short conversation with B.K. Nehru, the Indian Ambassador, who told me, that he will return back to India permanently on the 30th June.

Comrade Csernyakov, the Soviet charge d'affaires² said, that comrade Ambassador Dobrinyin will return to Washington after the 1st May. According to comrade Csernyakov, new disagreements have arisen between the United States and its allies in relation to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and it is strongly questionable that in the current political climate they would quarrel with them because of the Soviet Union.

Comrade Csernyakov described the situation as generally chaotic, and dangerously tense.

Washington, 27th April, 1967

[Source:
translated by Dániel Kocsis]

¹ nem biztos fordítás

² nem biztos fordítás

DOCUMENT 3

Proposal to the Political Committee of the CC of the HSWP, 4 May, 1967

Dear Comrade Biszku!

Attached, I am sending the proposal of the Political Committee regarding the trip of the military delegation.

Comrades Rezső Nyers, Lajos Fehér, Mátyás Tímár, József Bíró, Imre Párdi, János Péter, and Péter Vályi agree with its content.

The remarks of the above-mentioned comrades have been taken into consideration while drafting the proposal.

Comrade Borbándi is also familiar with the material, and agrees on it. I am sending the proposal directly to you due to his illness. Please, endorse it as urgently as possible, so it can be put on the agenda of the 9th May Political Committee session.

Budapest, 4th May 1967

With comradely greetings:

Lajos Czinege

PROPOSAL

to the Political Committee of the CC of the HSWP

We plan to execute our approved trips to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea between the 13th May and 7th June, 1967, after coordinating with the host countries.

The nature of our visit: political demonstration of the brotherly friendship and international solidarity between our parties, governments, armies, and people, as well as orientation, and exchanging information about mutually relevant military, and furthermore, domestic and foreign issues.

To carry these out, it is important, that the delegation receives appropriate principles and authorities for its trip, and the negotiations.

1./ During the meetings, the delegation in both brotherly countries:

- expresses the brotherly greetings of our party, government, army, and the whole population;
- emphasizes the stance of our party and government on the current international issues;
- should give information on our results in socialism building so far, the status of our army, and its role in the Warsaw Pact.

2./ During the negotiations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the issue of further military and civilian assistance, and mutually exchanging information regarding that will undoubtedly be brought up. Namely, we have already received further requests from different bodies of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam about aid transports, other than the coordinated, agreed, and the already ongoing deliveries for the year 1967.

a./ [pótigény³] from the Ministry of Defence of the DRV for 1967, and requests for 1968 without indicating quantities /as per the 1st appendix/;

b./ from the Interior Ministry/Ministry of Social Affairs/ of the DRV for 1967, and the following years.

We investigated the feasibility of the above-mentioned new requests with the concerning partner-bodies. The result of the investigation so far:

Regarding military assistance:

The government preliminarily approved 15 million rubles as the 1967 military aid budget, from which 13,4 million rubles have already been fixed in the Hungarian-Vietnamese interstate agreements. 73% of the military equipment aids have been granted from our stockpiles.

We are only able to grant significantly less part of the further military equipment requested as aid in the appendix, in excess of our own needs.

We took the approved 600 million forints /15 million rubles/ military aid budget for 1967 as the basis of our investigation.

The possibilities of satisfying the needs mentioned in the 1st appendix:

a./ Without replacements, we can deliver requested materials from our stockpiles worth 160 million forints /4 million rubles/ until the end of 1967, as a pre-delivery of the 1968 materials.

b./ With replacements up until 1970, military equipment worth 300 million forints /7,5 million rubles/ can be delivered from the stockpiles of the military. Out of this amount, military

³ nem tudom az angol megfelelőjét

equipment worth roughly 4 million rubles have to be replaced by special imports. /for the replacement of air defence equipment/

c./ By production throughout 1968, materials worth some 120-140 million forints /3-3,5 million rubles/ can be guaranteed.

There are more details about the a/, b/, and c/ points in the 2nd appendix.

Among the needs, there are items, that we cannot provide neither now, nor in the future /e.g. SZON-9/A radars, 23mm anti-aircraft guns, various aggregators, etc./

Other items can also be offered, that were not requested by the Vietnamese comrades, but we can provide from our stockpiles that are in excess of our needs. Like: various infantry weapons – rifles, machine guns – / ammunition for these only from production, /76mm field guns and ammunition, 85mm anti-aircraft guns and ammunition –/without radars, tow trucks, and other instruments/.

In case the Party and the Government later – taking the evolution of the war into consideration – decides, to increase the aids budget of 15 million rubles for 1968, then mostly the quantity of the items under point b./ can be increased, and the category under points a/ and c/ to a smaller extent.

Regarding civilian assistance:

The requests from the Interior Ministry of the DRV can be separated into three basic groups:

a/ the first group is of emergency aid nature, in which they ask for food, medicine, and various textiles;

b/ the other group of needs is to serve those, who have become crippled, unable to work, or those military and civilian personnel, whose working capacity have reduced. It also includes fully equipping 5 home-schools /for 1000 orphans/, and a TB-disabled⁴ sanatorium for 200 people;

c/ in the third group, they require factories, and means of production for the various institutions that employ disabled people.

Based on preliminary calculations, the total value of the aids requested by the Interior Ministry for the years 1967-68 is 120 million forints /3 million rubles/ at minimum.

This is a new area of aid requests, which means a multiple years long continuity, because in addition to the one-time equipment of the above-mentioned institutions, the Vietnamese comrades also require their supplement not only during the war, but after the war as well.

⁴ nem tudtam máshogy lefordítani

Out of the requests worth 120 million forints, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and the Ministry of Health, in case of a fast approval, and the provision of a financial budget, sees the possibility of delivering an emergency aid worth 22 million forints /550 thousand rubles/ this year already. Half of it would be made up by the requested medicines, milk powder, etc., and the other half would provide parts of the home equipment for disabled children.

According to the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the delivery of some items listed under points a/ and b/, like the equipment of the disabled children's homes, the needs of the TB sanatorium, as well as various other tools /sewing machines, knitting machines, etc./ in year 1968 is possible in case of an approval, as part of an aid budget of around 60 million forints /1.5 million rubles/.

The delivery of the items under point c/, the various factories /gloves, glass frames, bicycle parts, wooden furniture/ is not possible according to the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Likewise, the Ministry of Foreign thinks that satisfying their needs of large amount of textiles and blankets is neither possible, with the exception of the blanket needs of the disabled institutions.

X X X

3./ Based on the above-mentioned things, I suggest, that the delegation led by me gets authorised to do the following:

a./ the delegation ensures the leader Vietnamese comrades during the negotiations, that the Central Committee of the HSWP, and the Hungarian Government will continue to do its utmost to help the efforts of the heroic Vietnamese people against the American aggressors and their minions. Accordingly, they will examine the possibilities of further assistance.

The government sees the possibility of delivering various military equipment in 1967, this year already, with a 4 million rubles budget. These transports have to be considered as a pre-delivery of the 1968 transports, to be signed later as an intergovernmental agreement. During the negotiations, military equipment that were not requested by the Vietnamese, but can be granted from the available stockpiles without replacements, can also be offered.

The delegation should continue its negotiations based on the above-mentioned, to further specify the needs for both 1967 and 1968.

b./ tell the Interior Ministry of the DRV, that it sees the possibility of delivering an emergency aid, with a budget of around 550 thousand rubles, of medicines, food, and tools. The detailed negotiations should be carried out by the respective Ministries of Foreign Trade.

The needs of those who have become crippled, the civilian and military personnel that are unable to work as a consequence of the war, and the continuous service of the institutions

that are to be established for them, are currently being investigated by the competent government bodies, with the goal to fulfill the requests to the most of our capacities. The results of our investigation will be communicated to the Vietnamese comrades at the next intergovernmental negotiations.

c./ to communicate during the negotiations, that other than financial and material assistance, our Government also sees other possibilities to help:

– the training, and further training of the officers, sergeants, and soldiers of the People's Army of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hungary /using and repairing technical tools/; sending Hungarian military brigades to Vietnam to repair and teach the use of the techniques sent by us previously, the quota to be agreed later on;

– sending expert brigades to cooperate in the reconstruction of the damaged roads and rail networks;

– sending Hungarian doctors, and medical cadres to the hospitals and first aid posts we transported.

d./ the invitation of a Vietnamese military delegation to a date that is the most suitable for them;

– to give out around 100-150 awards, primarily to the military personnel who participated directly in the battles /the different grades of the “Haza Szolgálatáért Érdemérem⁵” that was founded by the Cabinet⁶, and can awarded by the Minister of Defence, based on coordination on site/.

4./ I would like to get authorization, to mention to the Vietnamese comrades the necessity, and expediency of a technical body consisting of the representatives of the socialist countries, to coordinate and ensure the aids for Vietnam.

X X X

5./ The delegation for the negotiations to be held in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should be given authorization for the following:

– the invitation of a Korean delegation, led by the Defence Secretary of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with noting, that we consider the previous holiday invitation of the Korean Defence Secretary to be still valid;

– to initiate the mutual exchange of military attaches, noting that we would like the exchange to be realized as soon as possible;

⁵ nem tudom ezt le kell-e fordítani angolra

⁶ nem tudom, hogy ez-e az angol megfelelője

– broadening the relations between the Hungarian and Korean People’s Army on a professional, sport, and cultural level /holiday exchanges of the officers, Hungarian field trips for Korean experts, friendly matches between [honvéd sportolók], informative exchange regarding the life of the People’s Army, etc./;

– to preliminary negotiations, in case of a Korean initiative, about assisting the Korean People’s Army, /aids free of charge only after taking the available stockpiles into account / or about the shipment of military equipment based on trade agreements;

– giving out 50 awards, primarily to the military personnel who are stationed at dangerous areas /the different grades of the “Haza Szolgálatáért Érdemérem” that was founded by the Cabinet, and can awarded by the Minister of Defence, based on coordination on site/.

6./ [Hírközlő szerveink] will deal with our trip based on our custom, and also taking the public press of the host country into consideration.

7./ I suggest, that the O.T., with the involvement of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, investigates in detail the possible means of further assistance, including the means of the replacements necessary for the Ministry of Defence, so we will be ready in time to sign further intergovernmental agreements on assistance, taking the knowledge and experience our delegation will return with, into consideration.

Appendices: 1./ Statement on the requests of the DRV. Sfsz.: 363/61. /2 pages/

2./ Statement on the options of granting the requests of the DRV. Sfsz.: 363/62.
/3 pages/

Budapest, 4th May 1967

/: Czinege Lajos :/

1st appendix

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL!

S T A T E M E N T

on the nomenclature of the main military equipment
requested by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

/[pótingény] for year 1967, claims for year 1968/

ARMAMENTS:

57mm Sz-60 anti-aircraft guns

23mm anti-aircraft machine guns

AK type machine guns

snipers

SZON-9 radars

E-2 [lőelemképző]

SzNAR type artillery reconnaissance radar

SZPO-30 aggregator for the 57mm [lé.á.ütegkomplexum]

ammunition for 37mm, 57mm anti-aircraft guns

Reserve components for previously transported radars and anti-aircraft guns

SIGNALING MATERIALS

various URH radio stations / R-105, R-108, R-109, R-114 /

various RH radio stations / R-104, R-125, R-102 /

various radio relays / R-403, R-401, R-405 /

various RÁF tools / VU-21, VU-31 receivers, UP-3, UP-3M panorama adapters, M-5,

M-6 tape recorders

field easy-wires and field hard-wires

TECHNICAL AND CHEMICAL PROTECTION MATERIALS

various inflatable boats

anti-tank mines

mine searching-mine detonating devices

fog and smoke grenades

VEHICLES

D-344 type jeeps and lorries

tow trucks

tools facilitating electrical and technological tests, or "SZERO" cars

VARIOUS MEDICAL MATERIALS, CLOTHING, FUEL TECHNOLOGICAL DEVICES

medicine, primarily "DELAGIL" and "ATEBEIN" against malaria

clothing materials

fuel storage units / barrels and cans /

fuel pumps and fuel transporting pipelines

fuel lab

2nd appendix

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL!

S T A T E M E N T

on the options of guaranteeing the main military equipment
and materials requests of the DRV

a./ Devices, materials, that can be granted from the stockpiles / storages of the MN without replacements:

- 1000 pieces of 7,62mm sniper rifles with 10 [ja.] ammunitions
- 200000 pieces of 81mm mortar fragmentation grenades / modifying 82mm ones /
- 10 stocks of R-30 radio stations / medium power /
- 10 stocks of R-50 radio stations / high performance /
- 200 stocks of various inflatable boats
- 500 stocks of mine clearance equipment
- 200000 pieces of anti-tank mines
- 15000 pieces of [ködgyertya] and smoke grenades
- 30 pieces of Cs-800 tow trucks
- 100000 pieces of anti-malaria medicine "ATEBRIN"
- 50000 pieces of quinine tablets
- 100000 pieces of individual wound dressing packs
- Various hand-held medical instruments for first-aid worth 2,2 million forints
- Various accessories and spare parts worth 3 million forints.

The total value of the above-mentioned items is some 160 million forints, or 4 million rubles.

b./ Devices, materials, that can be granted from the stockpiles of the NM to be replaced up until 1970:

- 2 complete 37mm anti-aircraft artilleries / 72 cannons / with the necessary instruments, accessories, spare parts, and ammunition, /in return, we ask for the special import of air defence equipment/.
- 20000 pieces of 7,62mm machine guns /in return, we ask for AMD-65 type ones/
- 100 pieces of ZISz-151 jeeps with accessories and spare parts /in return, we ask for CsD-576 jeeps after 1970/.
- 10 stocks of R-104AM/G division type radio station vehicles
- 100 stocks of R-105D regiment radio stations
- 30 stocks of R-109D artillery radio stations
- 50 stocks of R-114D cooperative radio stations
- 10 stocks of R-104AM/G division type radio station vehicles
- 10 stocks of R-125G commander radio station vehicles

20 stocks of R-30 radio stations without vehicles /in return, we ask for type R-125/G/
10 stocks of R-50 radio stations without vehicles /in return, we ask for the stable
versions of the R-102M radio stations
23 stocks of R-118BM/G army-division type radio station vehicles /in return, we ask
for R-102M-I/G radio stations/
4 stocks R-405M/G radio relay vehicles
1000 kilometres of field easy-wirings without building equipment
25 pieces of 3m³ steel containers
400 pieces of manual petrol pumps
10 pieces of fuel pumps /electrical/
Various pieces of clothing worth roughly 12,5 million forints.
The total value of the items we can give that have to be replaced: some 300 million
forints, or 7,5 million rubles.

c./ Military equipment and materials, that can only be granted through industrial production:

6 stocks of E-2 [lőelemképző]
200 stocks of R-108D artillery radio stations
100 stocks of R-105D regiment radio stations
100 stocks of R-109D artillery radio stations
30 million pieces of PPS machine gun ammunition / this adds up to [5 ja-t] after the
machine guns recommended to be handed over. Previously, we planned to hand over,
together with the stockpiles of the NM, 10 millions / [1 ja.] / of them.
50000 pieces of fragmentation grenades for 57mm Sz-60 anti-aircraft guns.

The total value of the above-mentioned items: some 120 million forints, or 3 million rubles.

The total value of the military equipment and materials in the statement: 580 million forints,
or 14,5 million rubles.

[Source:

translated by Dániel Kocsis]

DOCUMENT 4

Report on the Chinese-Vietnamese Relations 13 September, 1967

Kü/3114/2

Hanoi, September 13, 1967

Study on Vietnamese-Chinese Relations

Possibly, there is no other single socialist country where you can feel as strongly and as evidently the consequences of the nearly one-decade-long conflict evoked by the Chinese CP leaders in the international communist and workers' movement, as in Vietnam. The relations between the DRV and the PRC are full of increasing contradictions and changes. From both sides, there are few available data which would allow an accurate assessment. From many points of view, this assessment and this conclusion is supported by the observations and impressions gathered during my 18-month stay here, and by the conversations I had with Vietnamese friends and European diplomats. I do not intend this study to be complete. It has two goals. Firstly, to show the main outlines and tendencies of the economic, political and cultural relations between the two countries, and the contradictions present in these relations; to draw conclusions about the policy and behavior towards the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Secondly, to attempt to give an answer to the problem which rightfully arises in everyone: what is the situation in Vietnam, whose influence is prevailing? / Before finally preparing the material, I consulted with a Soviet partner . /

I.

Regarding Vietnam and China, there are objective factors which can be defined in advance: the geographical situation, the relations developed in the course of history, the intertwining of the liberation and workers' movements of the two countries, and the currently ongoing war.

B U D A P E S T

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The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has a border of some 800 kilometers with the People's Republic of China, from the Gulf of Tonkin to the border with Laos. At the same time,

China is the only socialist country with whom Vietnam has a common border. Two railway lines (Hanoi-Nanning, Wuhan-Hanoi-Lao Day-Kuming) and three first-rate highways (Hai Phong-Canton on the coast of the South China sea; Hanoi-Nanning, Hanoi-Chung King) ensure land transportation between the two countries. Apart from these, the Chinese airline has a regular civilian line from Peking to Hanoi. Transport to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam can happen in two ways: by land, on railway or highway through China; or by sea, to the Hai-Phong and Hon Gai harbors.

Some 600,000 Chinese live in the territory of the Democratic Republic of China. The majority settled in this century. The last large settlement was in the years following World War II. A large part of the Chinese living here assimilated, took Vietnamese citizenship and enjoy the rights due to Vietnamese citizens. A smaller part, especially those who settled recently, remained Chinese citizens. The Chinese can be members of the VDP independently from their citizenship. / However, the Vietnamese living in China cannot be members of the CCP. /

Chinese conquests, Chinese rulers' influence on the Vietnamese dynasties and anti-Chinese struggles played a big role in the past 2,000 years of the history of Vietnam, apart from the 100-year French rule. Eventually, the northern and central part of Vietnam was under Chinese rule for some 900 years. This had a strong influence on independent Vietnam even in recent times.

The natural treasures of Indochina / anthracite, phosphate, zinc, tin, manganese, gold, silver, etc. /; its precious woods / camphor, bamboo, ironwood / and the richness of its arable attracted the neighboring expanding Chinese, just like other foreign conquerors.

The effect of Chinese influence on social life was felt in nearly all fields. After the conquest of Vietnam, Chinese religious thought became dominant, Chinese was the written language until the French rule, and the social organization also became equivalent to Chinese feudalism. The fundamental trait of the penetration of Chinese culture is that it was already present at the formation of Vietnamese civilization. Therefore, the first Vietnamese culture was half barbarian and half Chinese.

The 900-year Chinese rule triggered a whole series of freedom movements and rebellions, whose traditions are still alive today in tales, allegorical fairy plays, folk songs,

paintings, and in the pagodas set up in the occasion of victories exerted over the Chinese. But they are confused also in current political articles and declarations. The occupation and the plunder of Tonkin by the over half-a-million-strong horde of Chang Kai-Shek in 1945 has left rememberable, unpleasant traces which are felt still today.

The Chinese economic, political and cultural influence largely decreased after the French colonizers began to penetrate the rear of India in 1774, and after later in 1882 they created French Indochina, which was composed of five colonies or protectorates / Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina, Cambodia and Laos /. French culture penetrated mainly the landowners, those working in the state administration, the personnel serving the French and the strata of the then small Vietnamese intelligentsia, and this is still strongly felt today. Since then, the written Vietnamese language uses the Latin letters. A significant part of the intelligentsia, the older city dwellers and the functionaries understand and speak the French language still today, while only a significantly smaller number of the young speak it.

The relation with China in this century, beginning with the mid-twenties, broadens with a new momentum, whose memories and traditions still strongly act between the two parties. Vietnamese comrades also took part on the foundation and in the later activity of the Chinese Communist Party, among others, for example, the president Ho Chi Minh and Truong Chinh, the president of the National Assembly. The Central Committee of the Indochinese Communist Party, founded in 1930, held its first session in Canton, and later it directed from there the Indochinese movement for a long time, especially at the beginning of the thirties, when the French answered the rebellions broken out in Vietnam with a bloody reprisal. Vietnamese comrades also studied in the military schools organized by the Chinese Communist Party of the time, among them, for example, Giap, the current defense minister. Some of them even took part in the Long March. In this and in later times a close personal relation and comradeship in arms came about between the Vietnamese and the Chinese party leaders.

After the formation of the People's Republic of China the Chinese influence showed again an increasing tendency. The Government of the People's Republic of China was one of the first to recognize the Vietnamese Democratic Republic. In the liberation war against the French the PRC could give the closest support to the Vietnamese people's army though, looking at its size, this support is minimal compared to the Korean.

After the 1954 Geneva Agreements Chinese influences grew stronger. The relations between the two parties' leaderships and the two governments became even closer. In sum, the Vietnamese comrades consulted with the Chinese on every important question of international and internal politics, and they adjusted to this their behavior. Chinese experts appeared in the country, and the first Vietnamese grantees were sent to China. The Vietnamese implemented the land reform and began the socialist reorganization of agriculture with Chinese methods and with the collaboration of Chinese advisers. They committed so severe mistakes in this period that in 1958 they had to relieve from his office the then secretary general of the party, Truong Chinh. / They had shot by the hundred even those small landowners who had taken part in the resistance, and serious difficulties arose in supplying the population. /

The initial successes of the People's Republic of China and of the Chinese Communist Party in international and internal politics, their growing authority among Asian and African countries and parties further strengthened the influence and the stance of the Chinese also in the DRV, the only South-East Asian socialist country. The more the contrast between China and the European socialist countries - and between the Chinese CP and the large majority of the communist and workers' parties - became obvious, the more Chinese pressure increased. This tendency grew ever stronger until the 1963 Liu Shaoqi's visit to the DRV. During this period, the Soviet-friendly and internationalist elements were pushed into the background in the state leadership and in the Central Committee, except those persons who won an international reputation for themselves in the resistance years. The China-friendly elements won space especially in the area of propaganda, internal security, foreign policy and the army. In this time the DRV was strongly isolated internationally, which was also due to the fact that, as a consequence of the growing Chinese influence, the influence of the other countries of the socialist camp grew weaker.

The robust growth of Chinese influence did not trigger clear approval neither in the party, nor in the masses out of the party, especially in the rows of the intelligentsia. During the CC plenum of the fall of 1963, the proposal of Le Duan was meant to bring forward a resolution which would have further increased Chinese influence, and which would have put the policy of the VDP and of the DRV even more on a Chinese line. However, there was not a sufficient political power and majority to do this, on the one hand because they met a growing resistance, on the other the course of events changed. At the extraordinary party conference of the

beginning of 1964, Ho Chi Minh and his circle could step up more decisively against the growing, all-compassing Chinese influence.

After the incident which took place on August 5, 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin, it became obvious to the DRV leadership that the USA, in a way, was extending the war also to the North. This situation brought a significant change in the foreign and domestic policy of the DRV. The gist of the new political line: to win the support of all socialist countries, firstly of the Soviet Union, for the struggle against the USA; to remain neutral in the controversial questions of the international communist and workers' movement; in domestic policy, conversely, to unite all forces, all political currents in the struggle against the Americans, in the interest of helping the South. The resolution of the October 1964 CPSU plenum about comrade Khrushchev's ousting played a large role in this change. Following this, a slow process reverse to the previous years begins: the palpable decrease of Chinese influence and the strengthening of the influence of other socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union.

II.

On the present relations of the DRV and of the PRC

1./ On the economic level:

The economic, and probably also the military help of the People's Republic of China is second in size after the Soviet Union. In 1965-66 Chinese aid had a value of 40-40 million Rubles, on top of this the commodity exchange agreement put through 20 million Rubles. According to the economic treaty for the year 1967, China is already giving 600 million Yuan of aid and of commodity credit to the DRV. However, to our knowledge this is counted on the domestic value of the Yuan, and also according to the best judgements corresponds to 120-180 Rubles. This sum covers the expenses of the support of the some 200,000 Chinese technicians and anti-aircraft personnel.

The details of the 600-million-yuan aid and commodity credit are not known. We only know that China exports to Vietnam 15 million meters of cotton tissue, 300,000 tons of grain / of which 250,000 tons of rice /, 50,000 tons of oil seed and something between 400 and 1,500 trucks. / The ongoing turmoil in China puts into doubt the fulfilment of this quota. / So far, we know nothing on the economic and military agreements regarding the year 1968.

The metalwork *bombina* [I have no idea what this is, M.G.] of Thai Nguyen, the cotton industry works of Hanoi, the biscuit factory, more smaller electric power plants, the new two-track railway from the Chinese border to Thai Nguyen, the new highways for military use in the northern part of the country, etc., were built with Chinese help. Chinese geologists are also taking part in the exploration of the natural treasures of the DRV. A part of them are looking for uranium ore. However, there are no Vietnamese-Chinese joint companies.

The quality and quantity of the Chinese military aid is not known. From the so far available information one may conclude that the Chinese are exporting mainly obsolete weapons, especially modern hand weapons and a few radar devices.

One of the most important fields of economic collaboration and of dependence at the same time is transport. A significant part of the help coming not only from China, but also from other socialist countries, flows on the two Chinese railways. However, these are used for the interests of the DRV only by 30-35%, at most. The monthly permeability capacity of the Vietnamese-Chinese border stations is more than 30,000 tons, but the present utilization is approx. 10 thousand. The fast flowing of transports through China is an increasingly growing problem for the Vietnamese side, because the Chinese reject all efforts directed at coordinating transports. Basically, the Chinese decide what can be transported to Vietnam, and they often put difficulties in their way. It is not possible to measure the quantity of goods and of military implements sent to Vietnam which are presently stored or kept in China. Some important devices and implements arrive only late to their place of destination, or they do not arrive at all. For example, for a long time we did not have reliable information on the fate of the weaponry shipment sent to the Patet-Lao. For a long time, the Vietnamese comrades were passive in this question. With a few exceptions, they did not intervene because of the delays. Quite the reverse, they also stressed the "objective transport difficulties" present in China. This year in April, in Peking, the prime minister Pham van Dong more decisively proposed the coordination of shipments. No significant change happened, the Chinese side continues to decide the urgency and the necessity of the shipments. This triggered dissatisfaction in the circle of Vietnamese leaders.

The bombing of Hai-Phang and the accidental destruction of the harbor will only increase the dependency on the field of transport. After all, this may lead to shipments directed to Vietnam reduced to China.

The effect of Chinese pressure was felt and is felt also in that the Vietnamese leaders, especially at the beginning of the war, required help from the other socialist countries more than was needed. In many cases they required devices which they do not need at all in the present situation. Among the Vietnamese leaders many do not want to admit that objectively the countries of the socialist camp cannot support them – and especially the struggle of the DRAF – as effectively as the USA supports the Saigon government. Probably, Pham van Dong's intervention this year in April, when he declared: "If the USA is capable of spending 7 million dollars daily in the Vietnam war, it is also the duty of socialist countries to do that," was done on suggestion of the Chinese.

The Chinese leadership watches the events taking place in China with profound preoccupation. There is a rightful fear that the turmoil which has been going on in China for more than one year may set back production, and that this may reduce the opportunity of economic support towards Vietnam, as well as hampering the military shipments and of other kinds through China. Moreover, a civil war in China would completely paralyze them.

2./ On the political and diplomatic level:

There are much more facts and information available on political relations. China's political pressure and the contradictions present in the political relations with China can be felt more clearly.

The Tonkin incident, the bombing of the DRV, but first of all comrade Kosygin's visit in Vietnam in February 1965 opened the gates and started a process which may be said to have as a consequence the stoppage and the progressive decrease of Chinese influence. /So far still carefully./ Many political and diplomatic events showed this:

- The deputation of the Hungarian party and government paid a visit in 1965, with the leadership of comrade Fock;
- In January 1966 Selyepin led a Soviet delegation to the DRV; in the fall of 1966 the Czechoslovakian, Bulgarian, Italian, Cuban party and government deputations paid a visit;

- In 1967 a Hungarian military deputation went to Vietnam;
- The Polish party delegation in 1967;
- The travels to the DRV of other union, youth, women's, cultural and peace movement delegations, etc.

On the other hand, since 1963 the DRV did not receive a representative Chinese deputation. In the first half of the past year, the visits first of Liu Shaoqi, then shortly afterwards of Mehmet Sehu, who happened to be in China - to counterbalance the effect of the 23rd congress of the *SzNP* [?] – came up, but the Vietnamese leadership did not accept this.

Despite the fact that since 1963 no showy Chinese deputation went to the DRV, the Vietnamese party and state leadership often turned up in Peking. Up to the present day, the Vietnamese leadership discusses every important domestic and foreign policy issue with the Chinese leadership, and looks with “one eye” at China when taking any action. Every Vietnamese deputation travelling through China conducts talks in Peking there and back. When developing the points of view, the Vietnamese always take into consideration Peking's explicit or implicit opinion. In the Soviet comrades' opinion, in the late times there is a certain change in this respect. The sincerity of the Vietnamese diminished, also towards the Chinese leadership. So far, however, they did not reach the point of sincerely informing also the Soviet leadership on the conception and the intentions of the Chinese leaders regarding the Vietnam war.

The VDP and the state leadership look united on the implementation of the current foreign and domestic policy line, but in my opinion this is only because of the war situation, because of the struggle against the Americans and because of the union of the different inner political forces. In reality, even the highest leadership is divided. It is widely known that two persons in the Political Committee of the party are China-friendly. One is Truong Chinh, the other is Hoang van Hoan. Hoang Quoc Viet, the president of the unions' league, also belongs here. He is not part of the Political Committee, but has numerous leading state and social functions. It is beyond doubt that they also orderly implement the resolutions. Moreover, at last year's Albanian party congress Hoan van Hoan defended the Soviet Union to a certain extent, while Truong Chinh declared to the Italian CP deputation: “They say about me that I am China-friendly, but I read Dante and Shakespeare.” One of Viet's children studies in the Soviet Union

and another in Hungary. However, in the leadership they notoriously represent the Chinese line. According to certain opinions, lately there is a somewhat positive change in Truong Chinh.

However, in the party and state leadership the group of Ho Chi Minh, Pham van Dong, Le Duan and Giap has the largest influence. Presently, this four-person team is decisive in the development and in the implementation of Vietnamese foreign and domestic policy. Ho Chi Minh also secures the success of this line with his immense personal authority. According to the Vietnamese, in the Far East he is the only one who dares to judge Mao Zedong. This group is internationalist. It believes in the unity of the communist movement and in intensive relations with the Soviet Union and with the other socialist countries. However, it realistically judges China's overwhelming closeness and dominant position in the Vietnam war.

In this closed world it is very difficult to precisely measure power relations and belonging. However, it seems certain that in the party's Political Committee there is a stable, reliable majority against the Chinese line, but not in the Central Committee. There are enough waverers, and there are very few, like for example the minister of the interior Ing van Khiam, who openly and clearly stand beside the Soviet Union. At the same time, the number of those who are unsatisfied is increasing, and their opinion is that the tie with China does not bring any good.

The articles, reports and other writings on the life of the People's Republic of China decreased, but they still appear in larger quantity than those on any other socialist country, also including the Soviet Union. The Chinese living in Vietnam have a small Chinese-language daily newspaper, which appears in 30,000 copies. The newspaper is practically under the direction of the Chinese embassy, and apart from popularizing the PRC, it systematically attacks the Soviet Union. The Vietnamese do not hinder this propaganda. A positive change can be felt also in the line of the Vietnamese press, but they still stick to any opportunity to popularize of China. The Vietnamese press systematically accompanies Chinese nuclear experiments, as well as the political and diplomatic declarations of the Chinese government on the matter of the support to the DRV and of the war, with inordinate glorification. The Vietnamese press deceives public opinion reporting the clamorous, "fighting" and demagogic statements of Chinese leaders and the support to the Vietnamese people. The Vietnamese people comes to know of the events unfolding in China and of the maneuvers against Vietnam by the Chinese only through whispering propaganda.

Contradictions and similarities in ideological and political issues.

The first and the main contradiction between the Vietnamese and the Chinese appears in the assessment of the Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries. The Chinese claim that in the Soviet Union the restoration of capitalism and the liquidation of socialism is going on, that the Soviet party and state leadership is in the hands of modern revisionists who went into cahoots with the Americans and who give the Vietnamese people up. This year in April Zhou Enlai repeated this nonsense in front of Pham van Dong, but the Vietnamese prime minister did not accept it. The Vietnamese stance is that the socialist revolution won first in the Soviet Union, that they are building communism and that the Soviet Union is the supporter no. 1 of the struggle of the Vietnamese people. They express this also by mentioning the Soviet Union always in the first place in this respect. Though the Vietnamese leaders speak unfavorably of Khrushchev, they always speak positively of the present Soviet leadership and blame the Chinese for not admitting the changes which took place in the Soviet Union. This year, also in the DRV they are celebrating to a large extent the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution. In this respect they established a very authoritative party and state committee, whose leader is Le Duan, the first secretary of the party. It is also beyond doubt that from time to time there are disturbing moments in the popularization of the achievements and of the support of the Soviet Union, and there are often discussions with the Vietnamese on the realization of certain program points. Apart from the already mentioned division, the cause of this is that the Vietnamese are afraid that a wider propagation of the friendship with the Soviet Union could irritate the Chinese.

In principle, the Vietnamese leadership agrees that in the socialist camp and within the international communist and workers' movement there is a need for unity. Unity of action must be built in the interest of a more effective support to the struggle of the Vietnamese people. In private conversations, the highest leaders declare that they are also laboring on this. However, officially and in public they dare to speak about this only very generally and cautiously. They refer to the fact that they have already raised this issue in many ways to the Chinese leadership, but the Chinese do not even want to hear about this. There is no doubt that the Vietnamese stance is developing also in this respect. They warmly welcomed the Bucharest declaration of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, as well as the declaration of Karlovy Vary. In principle, they do not even oppose the call for an international conference of the communist and workers'

movement. However, in their opinion, presently such a conference would only deepen the contrasts and would make the split definite. In their opinion, the Chinese would not participate, and they would probably call for another conference. In our judgement, the Chinese leadership hesitates in this issue and is not confident enough. Apparently, the continuous, stiff rejection of the Chinese has also effect on them.

Regarding the issue of the Vietnam war, the Chinese conception prevails in its main lines. In 1965 the Chinese reassured the Vietnamese saying that China needs 5-6 more years to prepare and to start the war with the USA. The main idea of the long 5-10-15-year war can largely be traced back to this. Together with the Chinese leadership, the Vietnamese also hope that the long war will break the Americans' fighting capacity, and that it will lead to the failure of their war policy. Supposedly, in 1965 the Chinese signed a secret pact of common defense with the Vietnamese, which implied sending 300,000 Chinese soldiers to Vietnam. According to this agreement, the Chinese will begin military action if the American troops and their henchmen reach the Red River valley. It is all the more clear, also among the Vietnamese leaders, that the commitment of the Chinese must not be taken seriously. They could not count on Chinese intervention even if Vietnam lost the war. The events unfolding in China make it impossible for the Chinese to mix up in a military conflict. There is no political unity and no stable leadership behind the atom and hydrogen bomb experiments. There is no possibility to concentrate domestic material, political and ethical factors. For a long time there not even to fear that the Americans will try to invade the DRV. The presence of 200,000 Chinese soldiers causes an incredible amount of problems. Apart from their supply needs, they make evacuation difficult, because these Chinese troops are located to the north of the Red River, in the main evacuation territory.

The Chinese leadership consistently pushes the Vietnamese into the direction of a military solution. In this respect, Chinese and American intentions meet, while the Vietnamese so far cannot escape this tight situation. On the one hand, the Americans are stepping up the escalation. On the other hand, the Chinese categorically step up against any other solution. In this, the fact that the Americans could not achieve decisive military successes in the South also plays a large role in this. Conversely, the DRV government cannot start talks without the South, because the DNFF would feel betrayed.

However, there are contradictions also in the issue of the war, first of all regarding the peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese situation. The Chinese react aggressively even to the slightest proposal hinting at this direction. For example, the Chinese openly labelled the declaration of the foreign minister Trinh to the Australian journalist Burchett this year in January / which was about this: if the Americans definitely stop the bombing against the DRV and other military actions, a possibility opens up to start discussions on talks / as defeatist and betraying. The Vietnamese leadership – though not openly – rejected Chinese slander. The view according to which the Vietnamese problems must be solved without the intervention of the Chinese, on one's own, is gaining strength among Vietnamese leaders.

The DRV leadership so far has decidedly resisted Chinese efforts to extend the war to the whole Indochina. Their unchanging goal is to limit the war to South Vietnam. To our knowledge, the Chinese leadership on high level already proposed the extension of the war in two ways, but the DRV leadership ruled that out in both cases.

The Chinese and the Vietnamese approach in the issue on the people's war is also not identical. The Chinese theory ossified, and is mainly based on backward military technique, on the peasant masses and guerrilla tactics. The Vietnamese, based on their own experience, conceive the people's war in more modern fashion. There is no doubt that in the South guerrilla formations still constitute the main force in number, and that they popularize the forms of guerrilla warfare. However, in the last dry season one of the main efforts of the DNFF was to take regular forces away from American blows and to secure their intactness. In the North there is all the less talking about defending the DRV's airspace with rifles. The newspapers are all the more popularizing the air force, the rocket personnel and the anti-aircraft artillery. As a result, in the past two years – though not impeccably – they learnt to handle the modern anti-aircraft cannons, radars, rockets, and to drive fighter planes with a modern air blast. One effort on the Front in the South which is worth attention is that, regarding the land weapons, they could decrease the huge standard difference between American weapons and their own. Obviously, there is nothing of the sort regarding air and sea forces.

The Chinese advisors' influence in the organization of anti-aircraft forces brought bitter experience to the Vietnamese. Namely, the Chinese anti-aircraft system is based on a lower-level technology, while the DRV got and gets much more modern appliances from the Soviet Union and from other socialist countries. This contradiction caused and still today

continues to cause serious damage. However, you can feel the intervention of that Soviet military delegation which was in Vietnam the last year, and which decisively stepped up to liquidate this contradiction.

One can also experience a slow progress in the common application and combination of the military, political and diplomatic struggle. This also contradicts the rigid Chinese schemes. Beginning in the fall of the last year, there were a few declarations / the declaration of the DRV's Paris representative and of the foreign minister; the invitation to Hanoi of numerous Western personalities and publicists – including Americans /, which caused embarrassment in American political circles. Generally, however, we still cannot estimate that this triple activity is flowing satisfactorily. In this, their own rigidity is a large obstacle, because they regard as anti-Vietnamese any suggestion which does not suit their 4- or 5-point stance.

So far, the Vietnamese consider the sending of volunteers a political demonstration. The main causes of this may be:

- First of all, the rigid stance of the Chinese leadership, according to which Vietnam does not need foreign volunteers. Its own force is enough, and shall the need arise, Chinese troops are ready to intervene.
- The presence of volunteers coming from European socialist countries would bring with itself China demanding to let in an even higher number of Chinese volunteers. This would further increase Chinese influence. The joint presence of volunteers from China and from other countries also brings in itself numerous provocation opportunities.
- Finally, apart from other practical difficulties / climate, supplying problems, etc./ the possibility that this may broaden the number of those intervening beside the Americans, and the war itself, also forces the Vietnamese leadership to reflect.

The *davalválódás* [?] of Mao Zedong's personality in Vietnam is a new reality worthy of attention. The swings of the Cultural Revolution going on in China, the turmoil, the setbacks suffered in the field of foreign policy progressively undermine Mao Zedong's personal authority also in Vietnam. This year in May, the article in *Hep Tap* / the theoretical journal of the party/ in occasion of comrade Ho Chi Minh's birthday, in which they voiced a sharp stance against the personality cult without mentioning any name, was an outstanding event of this process. However, everybody knows that this

was against Mao Zedong. In wider publications and in official telegrams they still wrote of Mao as the great leader of the CCP and of the Chinese people. However, in the September 2 celebrative general assembly Pham van Dong spoke already about the Chinese people and about China as struggling Vietnam's great hinterland, without mentioning Mao's name.

In sum, the Vietnamese comrades took an identical stance with the Chinese leadership on the judgement of Yugoslavia and of the Yugoslav Communist Federation. They do not consider Yugoslavia a socialist country. The papers are silent on the positive Yugoslav steps, while they sharply attack Yugoslavia when its stance differs from that of the socialist countries. The Vietnamese leave without attention the fact that Yugoslavia has a considerable influence on the countries of the third world.

They also show rigid behavior in the case of India. Even though the Vietnamese never had disagreements with the Indians, the deterioration of the Chinese-Indian relation also shadows the relations between the DRV and India. The fact that the International Controlling Committee sides with the Canadian [sic] in almost every substantial issue also belongs to the truth.

The diplomatic relation of the DRV with the PRC is very strong and vital, possibly the most active. The PRC has its largest diplomatic representation in Hanoi. In figures, 30 diplomats work at the embassy and in the trade branch office. The previous Peking's ambassador in the DRV / he recently passed away / was a member of the VDP CC, the present one is a substitute. The Hanoi ambassador of the PRC and his first secretary have been away for a long time, probably because their local more moderate activity did not correspond to the extremist Chinese methods. What is certain is that after they went away Chinese provocations against local Soviet diplomats and the anti-Soviet propaganda of the Chinese embassy further intensified.

For a while, the official organs of the DRV wanted to hinder provocations reducing diplomatic events and, when it was possible, they avoided those meetings where the whole diplomatic corps is together. For example, they do not invite the diplomatic corps to the exhibitions and film screenings organized on the occasion of the national holidays. They also reduced the speeches to be delivered at the receptions to short, 2-3-minute toasts and greetings.

On the day of the Chinese people's army the military attaché's speech lasted some 15 minutes, and among those present the Chinese spread various propaganda materials.

A new element in the work of the Chinese embassy is the increasing activity which it conducts among the Chinese minority. They bring the Chinese native speakers to the embassy from Hanoi and from the countryside on buses, especially on Saturdays and Sundays. They organize cocktails, they show movies and they hold propaganda sessions for them. They provide them with brochures and flyers on every occasion, so that they can spread them among those living in Vietnam. The goal of this activity is clear. On the one hand, to keep the Chinese minority under political influence. On the other hand, to widen the social base of the Chinese policy towards Vietnam, and to counterbalance the impact of socialist countries. Allegedly, the majority of the flyers provided by the embassy to be spread are handed over to the Vietnamese police, because a significant part of the local Chinese minority already sympathizes rather with the Vietnamese.

During the spring the Chinese embassy began to develop a disturbing activity which lasts still today, and which is directed at stoking contrasts in the leadership. For example, they spread flyers which contained rumors of defense minister Giap wanting to take power away from Ho Chi Minh. / By the way, also the Vietnamese-language Canton radio broadcast this news /. The attack of the Chinese is directed especially at the defense minister, whom they regard as the main revisionist, though they also accuse of this a significant part of the northern leadership. In Hanoi they even spread flyers claiming that the DRV is betraying the DNFF. This provocation activity is also going on in the South.

3. Cultural relations.

The opposition to the Chinese Cultural Revolution can almost unequivocally be qualified as positive. The general opinion is that what is happening in China is not revolution and is not culture.

The Vietnamese-Chinese cultural work plan is not known. One can draw conclusions on cultural relations only based on observation. According to the signs, the relations show a decreasing tendency, because the Chinese "Cultural Revolution" raised uncertainty and

resistance first of all in this field. Last year 4,000 Vietnamese grantees came home from China, after schools and universities were closed. The Vietnamese government forbade the students studying in China to take part in the Cultural Revolution. In the past year only one Chinese group toured the DRV, the Chinese circus. However, it is also true that 60-70% of the foreign movies shown in Vietnam are Chinese, especially the minor war-related plays. In the scenes you can strongly feel the Chinese revolutionary and content influence, the extremely schematic portrayal of heroes and of negative figures.

The DRV's government takes extraordinary pains to keep and to uplift the level of primary and higher education, also despite the severe war situation. In two years, they carried out the evacuation of all educational institutions, and they did not interrupt teaching. Periodic courses work in the cities. Grantees and skilled workers are sent in great number to European socialist countries to train. This effort of the Vietnamese government must be valued positively, because it objectively brings with itself a tendency to independence. Regarding the future, they want to get close to the cultural and technical levels of the European socialist countries. Vietnamese elementary schools have three levels and last 10 years. The completion of the 3rd level corresponds to high-school graduation. Here pupils can choose between two foreign languages: Russian and Chinese. According to our knowledge, most students choose the Russian language. We cannot know for sure the reason behind this. Perhaps the difficulty of Chinese characters, perhaps a silent resistance, but most likely an orientation towards the modern world causes this. The fact that in technical high-schools students prefer to study the English language also proves this, since the English technical literature is the richest.

While in China in the second semester of the last year they threw out and annihilated European and Chinese classics from museums and cultural institutions, in the DRV not only they preserved their national and European cultural traditions, but they also revived them. They also celebrated the anniversaries of Cervantes, Thomas Mann and Rosztevelli [unreadable]. In dramatic and puppet theaters they played again Tao San, the classical Vietnamese drama. In concerts they performed Verdi, Liszt, etc. there is also jazz and Schrammelmusik. The museum of fine arts which was opened last year cut out all works and relics which remind about the common Chinese-Vietnamese civilization. Last year in May in the city theater of Hanoi they organized an exhibition about the history of theater. From this, it turned out that before the war they played in the greatest number Russian classics and Soviet pieces, but besides they also showed Brecht, Molière, Shakespeare. The number of performed Chinese pieces was

significantly smaller. The head and the directors of the theater perfectly know world dramatic literature, from the Greeks to Arthur Miller.

The representatives and the workers of Vietnamese cultural and artistic life condemn all that happens in China in the sign of the Cultural Revolution in an equally firm manner. Because of this, Chinese leaders already expressed their dissatisfaction more than once, and labelled as anti-Mao Vietnamese behavior. The Vietnamese declared that in Vietnam there is not going to be a cultural revolution, and they only replied to Zhou Enlai's proposal that after the war they will newly strengthen the struggle against revisionism.

4./ There are substantial differences in the mentality and in the national character of the Vietnamese and of the Chinese. The Chinese are the most organized among Asian peoples: in China there is an extraordinarily deep ground for dogmatic thought, mendacity and personality cult. Their inner world is completely closed. Perhaps, they never show their real feelings. They are incredibly teachable and diligent, but they are liable to extremist methods and mercilessness. Not by chance they call them the Germans of Asia.

In the Vietnamese, one can feel the southern-ness and the French moral impact. They are much less closed and mendacious, merrier and more easygoing, they have a developed sense for humor. Approximately, also their thinking is not as dogmatic as that of the Chinese. In Vietnam you could not have accepted watchword like this like in China: "in the interest of the revolution all is permitted, and the revolution sanctifies everything." The personality cult also does not have as much ground. There is no artificiality and no perversity in the general respect and love which circle Ho Chi Minh.

The Vietnamese are provided with a special adapting ability, they are teachable and yielding, modest and friendly. Almost all those who visit Vietnam say that here, despite the war, they do not feel the anxiety and the fear they feel in China. Their nationalism is not rooted in great power efforts, since they never ruled over other peoples. By contrast, self-defense, resilience and the unification of the nation gives Vietnamese nationalism its mental and sentimental base. Their patriotism and their national pride, which are also of an incomparably high degree, are based on the successes achieved in the liberation and resistance struggle, which really deserve recognition. Their brave, strenuous struggle against the Americans only increases their patriotism and national pride.

III.

Conclusions.

The causes of the positive developments coming off in the DRV can be explained by the following:

- The People's Republic of China suffered a series of foreign policy failures in the international arena. The Chinese stance and influence in Africa and in Asia weakened in the last years. The tragedy of the Indonesian Communist Party, the victory of Ghanaian reaction, the provocative behavior of Chinese leaders in the Indian-Pakistani conflict, the ousting of the Korean Workers' Party and of the Japanese CP from the Chinese CP made reflect the Vietnamese leadership, and inclined it to prudence.

- The furious, irreconcilable anti-Soviet behavior of the Chinese leadership – which reached a point where what matters are not theories, but any dark methods of great power chauvinism – weighs upon Vietnam. All this astonishes the Vietnamese leadership. Even though they are afraid of opening condemning this, they are ashamed, and they express this with regret. Even a part of the real, out-and-out friends of China are disconcerted. They do not understand what the Chinese leaders want.

The “Cultural Revolution” which is going on in China, the power struggle and the mob attacks against the party committees and the old tried fighters also undermine friendly relations to China, and shake confidence. All this caused astonishment and fear especially in the ranks of the Vietnamese intelligentsia, but also among state organs and among the functionaries of political organizations.

Not long ago, Le Duan estimated that the Chinese-Vietnamese relation is in a crisis situation. Officially, however, the Vietnamese leadership did not take a stance regarding the Chinese events, it considers them a Chinese internal matter.

The ever increasing economic and military support of the socialist camp, its commitment on political and diplomatic lines, and the inconstant effort to create unity of action in the interest of supporting the struggle of the Vietnamese people caused a thorough inner ferment in all strata

of society. It is already not possible to ignore this help, and slowly everyone will have clear that the Soviet Union and European socialist countries help the Vietnamese people incomparably more actively than China.

The policy of the Central Committee of our party and of our government in the Vietnamese issue is proving correct in all respects. The sincere and efficient internationalist help, the profound understanding towards the difficult and complicated situation of the Vietnamese is a great help in the development of Vietnamese foreign and domestic policy. First of all, it is of great help to the ever-strengthening relation with the European socialist countries. Even though this development is not obvious in all respects, and even though there are disturbing moments, setbacks and breaks, and on part of Vietnamese leaders there is not always complete sincerity, this tendency is overall positive. The honest exchange of ideas consistently conducted on high level and within different social organizations - which were coupled with high helpfulness, patience and understanding - were a great contribution to this.

Patience and understanding must continue to be the two most important traits of the local political and diplomatic behavior. This, however, cannot mean passivity and opportunism. Forcing great spectacular results does not usually lead to one's goals. Only a slow, tenacious, grounded work can. So far, we must beware of often putting the Vietnamese leadership in front of dilemmas. Preferably, we must avoid raising delicate questions regarding China with them, and we must demand a clear stance from them.

This requirement must predominate also when choosing the diplomatic cadres working in Vietnam. Political preparation and knowledge of the international class struggle are of primary importance. Diplomatic routine can mean an advantage only if related to the above. It is useful if the cadres working here have experience in party or mass organizations work.

A complicated, open question which occupies many is: what will happen after the war? Will the present unity unravel? Will the struggle among different wings sharpen? Will there be opportunity to influence the course of development into the correct direction? After all, which wing is springing up? This is a different question. What is sure is that we cannot measure support to the struggle of the Vietnamese people from this point of view, because its impact is of historical importance. A people never forgets who stood by its side and who stayed indifferent in a difficult situation.

On the other hand, reconstruction in Vietnam will be a task of such an immense magnitude, that no single socialist country can undertake it by itself. From this succeeds that reconstruction and the building of socialism also after the war presuppose the national unity of the Vietnamese people and the help of the countries of the socialist camp. Therefore, influencing opportunity objectively remains.

We must bring to book that Vietnam will remain for a long time a fighting territory in the struggle for the correct line in the international communist and workers' movement. It will stop to be that only if China comes back to the right path and contrasts cease or diminish to a minimal level.

We judge that in the present situation the conditions for more active actions to enlarge our influence are increasingly ripening. Opportunities for this must be worked out on the economic, political and cultural level.

[handwritten signature]

/: Ferenc Hidvégi :/

December 7, 28.

F[oreign]M[atters]/3114/3

To comrade JÁNOS BERECZ

Party Committee of the Foreign Ministry

Dear comrade Berecz!

I am sending attached – to be returned – comrade Hidvégi's letter. In the letter he suggests the decoration of comrade Pehr and mentions that, because of the circumstances, the Soviets consider work in their Hanoi embassy service in the field. Perhaps it would be useful if the Party Committee of the Foreign Ministry launched the decoration of comrade Pehr and a special praise for the Hanoi collective.

Comradely greetings:

/ Ferenc Lázár /

M – K S – 288f – 32.cs. /1967/.16.8.o.

MAIN ACTORS

APRÓ, Antal (1913-1994) raised in an orphanage, he became a painter. He joined the trade union in 1929, and in 1930 he joined a union dominated by communists, and became a member of the illegal communist party in 1931. He participated in organizing strikes and other illegal activities at the time. Due to his activities, he was imprisoned seven times by the authorities before and during the Second World War. After the war he was entrusted with organizing and leading the trade union department of the communist party, became a member of the provisional national legislature. From 1946 he became a member of the Central Leadership of the Hungarian Workers' Party, and held various positions mostly in connection with organizational work at the trade unions. In 1953 he became the minister for the building material industry but in the Nagy government he lost some of his important roles temporarily. He became a figure for the rehabilitation of victims of show trials, during the Nagy government. As the 1956 revolution broke out, he became a member of the newly established Military Committee, which was formally tasked with defeating the revolution and became a member of the Soviet supported Kádár government. From 1957 until 1971 he was a deputy in the Council of Ministers. From 1961 he led the government commission on foreign affairs, and was the permanent delegate to the Comecon. He became president of the Hungarian parliament in 1971, and he held this position until 1984. He went into retirement at the end of 1984.⁷

BÍRÓ, József (1921-) technician, welder, economist. He became head of the London Trade Office (1957-1960), and deputy minister (1962-1963). From 1963 until 1979 he was minister for foreign trade.⁸

BISZKU, Béla (1921-2016) Born into a peasant family, his family moved to Budapest in 1929. There he finished his schools and learnt to become a tool mechanic, and worked as such until 1942. He joined a union of steel workers, and actively participated in the resistance by supplying weapons. In 1945 he became a member of the communist party, and worked in party organs in Budapest. In 1951 he was demoted from his position, due to family issues. He remained active in the party organization and in 1956 he joined Kádár and started to the

⁷ Apró Antal, Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága
<https://www.neb.hu>

⁸ Bíró József; Ki kiesoda? in: Bencsik Péter (ed.): Az államszocializmus kora Magyarországon és Kelet-Közép-Európában
<http://allamszocializmus.lapunk.hu/?modul=oldal&tartalom=718655>

reorganize the party apparatus in Budapest. He became a central figure in the new regime, and was named interior minister (1957-1961) and played a central role in the retaliation. He became a Member of Parliament, and remained a member until 1985. In 1961 he was made vice president of the Ministerial Committee (1961-1962), and in 1962 he was named a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee (1962-1978). He had an important role in party organizational work. Because of the economic reform plans, he distanced himself from Kádár and became opposed to him. He was relieved from his duties as secretary of the Central Committee in 1978 and was sent into retirement, in 1980 he was removed from the Politburo, and in 1985 from the Central Committee proper. Until 1989 he held a position in the Central Council of the Hungarian Trade Unions. He was tried for his activities in 1956 and its aftermath in 2014-2015, receiving a short prison sentence.⁹

CZINEGE, Lajos (1924-1998) was born into a peasant family. After finishing six classes of primary school, he became a blacksmith's apprentice, later worked as a blacksmith and as a seasonal farm worker. In 1944 he became a member of the 25. SS (Hungarian) Division Hunyadi. In 1945 he joined the Hungarian Communist Party, and he was a founding member of the city chapters of the youth organization of the communist party. He worked as an independent political worker in 1947, and later became a leading member in a city party chapter, later promoted to a deputy county leadership position. Because of an incident in 1950, he was demoted, and worked at a farm equipment repair station. He was promoted to deputy director a short time later at the same station. In 1951 he joined the armed forces, and became a member of the Main Directorate for Political Affairs with the rank of a captain. He later became a political officer at the Artillery Command of the Hungarian Peoples' Army, in 1952 he was promoted to Lt. Colonel. From 1954 on he worked at the central party organ responsible for the armed forces as a deputy leader, in 1955 he became the leader of it. In 1956 he was a member of the Military Committee of the Central Leadership of the Hungarian Workers' Party. After the Soviet intervention of 4. November, he joined the government of János Kádár and was appointed as the responsible leader for the reorganization of the internal armed forces. In 1957 he was entrusted with the organization of the Workers' Militia. Between 1958 and 1967 he was a member of the parliament, and the president of the parliamentary committee of the armed forces from 1960 on. In May 1960 he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General and was named as defense minister. In 1961 he became a member of the Political Committee. In April

⁹ Biszku Béla Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága
<https://www.neb.hu/asset/phpc7CWuX.pdf>

1962 he was promoted to general. In 1963 he enrolled in the Voroshilov Military Academy as a corresponding student. He regularly took part on the defense ministerial meetings of the Warsaw Pact. His membership in the Political Committee ended in 1970 after a reform of the membership. In November 1978 he was promoted to the rank General of the Army. In 1984 he became deputy president in the Council of Ministers (he was defense minister for 24 years). In 1987 he retired. In 1988 he lost his seat in the Central Committee. In 1989, due to a scandal he gave up his rank of General of the Army.¹⁰

DOBI, István (1898-1968) was born into a poor peasant family. After finishing six primary school classes, he became a soldier in 1916 and fought in World War I. In 1919 as a red soldier, he was captured by the Romanians. He returned from captivity in 1920, where he was immediately recruited into the national army, leaving armed service at the end 1920. As a veteran, he received a small parcel of land, and besides its cultivation he worked as an unskilled worker by the Hungarian State Railway Company, later held various unskilled jobs. He joined a landholder association in 1920, and in 1930 he founded a local chapter of the Social Democratic Party in Szőny. In 1936 he switched over to the Independent Smallholder Party, where he rose in the ranks quickly. Thanks to his party affiliation he took higher paid jobs. In 1939 he ran as a candidate for parliament, but was defeated. He was an active organizer, and he saw as his mission to protect the Hungarian peasantry. He came into contact with the illegal communist organization in 1942, and he shared their views sometimes during his work. In 1944 he was mobilized for military service and was captured. He returned in 1945. He became a member of the Communist Party, but he kept his membership of the Independent Smallholders Party, where he became a leader of the left wing. He held high posts at the Independent Smallholders Party. He became a member of the transitory legislature, and was named minister. After the forced departure of Ferenc Nagy, the leader of the Independent Smallholders Party, he was chosen to be the new party leader. During his leadership, he was instrumental in upending the party structures in cooperation with the communists. He also helped the build-up of the communist system. He was Prime Minister between December 1948 and August 1952, but held no real power. In 1952 he became the leader of the collective state leadership (he was the leader of this organ until 1967, and stayed a member until his death). During the uprising of 1956 he stayed in his office, and helped the Kádár government. In 1959 he joined the HSWP, and he was chosen to be a member of the Central Committee of the HSWP. He was a proponent

¹⁰ Czinege Lajos, Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága, <https://www.neb.hu/asset/phpCkpYug.pdf>

of collectivization, but his views were increasingly disregarded. He held various positions in Hungarian agricultural organizations.¹¹

ERDÉLYI, Károly (1928-1971) He earned a teacher's degree in the Soviet Union. He worked in the Foreign Ministry from 1953, he was a consular of embassy, in Moscow. He arrived back home on the 28. October, and after 4. November he worked at the government secretariat, later he was the referent of Kádár in the party apparatus (1958-1962). He was deputy foreign minister (1962-1970), leader of the Foreign Policy Department of the HSWP (1970-1971), member of the Central Committee of the HSWP (1966-1971). According to some, he committed suicide, other believe, he was murdered.¹²

FOCK, Jenő (1916-2001) He learned as a technician and before the war worked as one. In 1931 he joined the youth organization of the trade union, and in 1932 he participated in activities of the illegal Hungarian Association of the Communist Youth Workers. He also joined the Social Democratic Party in 1933. He was drafted in 1939 and was arrested for his activities in 1940 and spent three years in military prisons. He escaped in 1944 and waited for the arrival of Soviet troops. He joined the Communist Party in 1945, became a member of the provisional legislative body. He worked on the workers' issues of the heavy industries. He was named in 1951 as deputy minister for defense industry, a few months later as deputy for machine industry. In 1954 he became the leader of the Hungarian trade office in Berlin, in 1955 he became the one of the secretaries of Central Council of the Hungarian Trade Unions, and in 1956 he was elected as a substitute member of Central Leadership of the Hungarian Workers' Party. After the defeat of rebellion in 1956, he became a member of the Kádár leadership circle. In 1957 he became the member of Politburo, in 1958 he became a Member of Parliament. He was in charge of economic issues. In 1961 he became a deputy in the Presidential Council. He took part in the planning of economic reforms, which would have given a bigger role for market economic methods. As these plans became shelved, he was sent into retirement in 1975, but remained a member of the Politburo until 1980 and a member of the Central Committee until 1989.¹³

¹¹ Dobi István, Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága,
<https://www.neb.hu/asset/phpnFm602.pdf>

¹² Erdélyi Károly; Ki kicsoda? in: Bencsik Péter (ed.): Az államszocializmus kora Magyarországon és Kelet-Közép-Európában
<http://allamszocializmus.lapunk.hu/?modul=oldal&tartalom=718660>

¹³ Fock Jenő, Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága
<https://www.neb.hu/asset/php4wGGVm.pdf>

HÁZI, Vencel (1925-2007) he studied at the University of Technology in Budapest, was a member of youth organizations. In 1948 he was enrolled in a military course as education officer, and later was sent to a one year military school in Leningrad. In 1949 he became an officer of Hungarian military intelligence service MNVK 2 (Magyar Néphadsereg Vezérkar 2. Csoportfőnökség – Hungarian People’s Army General Staff 2nd Directorate), and later was sent to the Hungarian embassy in London (1951-1953). After his return he worked at MNVK 2. In 1957 he was employed by the Foreign Ministry, and was sent to Stockholm (1957-1958). He became the ambassador to Iraq in 1958. From 1961 he was ambassador to Greece. In 1965 he returned to Hungary, where he worked in the Foreign Ministry (1964-1968). He was deputy foreign minister between 1968 and 1970. In 1970 he became ambassador to Great Britain (1970-1976). After his return he became deputy foreign minister again (1976-1983), after that, he became Hungary’s ambassador to Washington (1983-1989). He retired in 1989.¹⁴

ILKU, Pál (1912-1973) was born to a peasant family in Czechoslovakia. Having earned a degree as a teacher in 1932, he came into contact with the mass organizations with communist background. He became a devoted member, publishing articles and taking an active role in organizations. He joined the Czechoslovak Communist Party in 1937, becoming a youth organizer. After the territory was re-annexed to Hungary, he was arrested, released and placed under police supervision. In 1944 he joined the armed resistance. After the war he relocated to Hungary, where he became a member of the Hungarian Communist Party. He organized and lead a party school, held a party position in the city of Pécs and was elected to be a member of the provisional legislature, and he was a member of the legislature until his death (with the exception of one legislative period). He was named to be the deputy head of agitation and propaganda department. He was also named given the rank of colonel (later lieutenant general) of the Political Main Directorate of the Defense Ministry. He was sent to a military academy in the Soviet Union, from where he was called back in 1956 to lead and reorganize the armed forces. In 1958 he was named as deputy culture minister responsible for lower and middle education, becoming minister in 1961 until his death. He was also named a member of the Central Committee in 1958, and was named reserve member of the Politburo until 1970.¹⁵

¹⁴ Baráth Magdolna, Gecsényi Lajos (ed.): Főkonzulok, követek és nagykövetek, 1945-1990, MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont Történettudományi Intézet, 2016, p. 186.

¹⁵ Ilku Pál, Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága
<https://www.neb.hu/asset/phplZBtIN.pdf>

KÁDÁR, János (1912-1989) born out of wedlock in Fiume, he was the son of a soldier and a maid. He took the family name of his mother, only took the name Kádár in 1945. He learned to be a typewriter mechanic, but couldn't find a permanent workplace. He joined the youth group of the illegally functioning communist party in 1931, was arrested multiple times before the war. In 1937 he joined the Social Democratic Party, and worked in the party apparatus. In 1940 he joined the illegal communist movement, and later became a Central Committee member. He disbanded and reorganized the communist party as the Peace Party, for which he was reprimanded after the war. He had important party functions from 1945, becoming deputy secretary general in 1946 (he held the position until 1951). He was named interior minister in 1948, and played a role in the organization of show trials. He was arrested in 1951 with other officials, but was rehabilitated in 1954. In 1956 he was chosen by the Soviets to head the new government. He was named a member of the Central Committee and Politburo, and first secretary (with also being the prime minister between 1957 and 1958, and also between 1958 and 1961) and held various other positions as well. He consolidated the communist system in Hungary. Kádár also took an interest in the improvement of living standards and initiated reforms in 1968, but had to backtrack. In foreign policy, from the 1970s he acted increasingly independently, but with Soviet interests in mind. Due to economic problems in Hungary, he relied on Western partners to keep living standards at a relatively high level through loans. In 1985 he was named general secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. In the 1980s the economic crisis deepened, and he denied the seriousness of the problems. In 1988 he was sidelined with some of his closest associates due to the popular pressure. Combined with his declining health, he was removed from all his positions and died shortly thereafter.¹⁶

KÁLLAI, Gyula (1910-1996) originally trained as a journalist, he was a member of the Hungarian Communist Party from 1931. He worked for the daily Népszava, and later for other dailies. After the war he held various state and party positions, becoming a member of the Central Leadership of the Hungarian Workers' Party (1945-1951), and was named foreign minister in 1949 until his arrest on false charges in 1951. He was rehabilitated in 1954. He held cultural leadership positions, and only shortly before the revolution of 1956 was he named a member of the Central Leadership. After the revolution he became a member of the Central Committee and Politburo, minister of culture (1957-1958), state minister (1958-1960) deputy

¹⁶ Kádár János, Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága
<https://www.neb.hu/asset/phpuoKyAw.pdf>

prime minister (1960-1965), prime minister (1965-1967), speaker of the Hungarian parliament (1967-1971) and a member of the Presidential Council (1967-1989).¹⁷

KOMÓCSIN, Zoltán (1932-1974) He had humble family origins, learned to become a trader. He joined the youth organization of the Social Democratic Party in 1938, he joined the trade union in 1939. After Soviet troops occupied Hungary, he joined the communist youth organization, a short time later also the party. He held various party position, until 1950, when he was elected as a member of parliament (1950-1974). He was sent to study to the Soviet Union, and after he came back, held high state and party positions. He was a member of the Provisional Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and helped to reorganize the party. He led the youth organization (1957-1961), was named editor in chief of the Hungarian daily Népszabadság (1961-1965). He was named regular member of the Politburo (1962-1974) and became the secretary of the foreign relations of the Central Committee (1965-1974). He was opposed to the economic reform plans in 1968, and started to form opposition against Kádár inside the HSWP. He fell ill in 1973 and died a short time later.¹⁸

MARTIN Ferenc (1912-2001): he was born into a worker family. After finishing six primary school classes, he started working as an iron-founder apprentice, but after finishing the apprentice, he couldn't find work. After a short period he found work as an unskilled worker. Only in 1936 was he able to find work as an iron-founder. He joined a trade union and took part in strikes for higher wages. During his mandatory military service he served as a driver and took part in the operation of the occupation of Slovakian territory. In 1941 he served on the Eastern Front, but was wounded and dismissed from military service. In 1943 he joined the Social Democratic Party. In 1945 he joined the Hungarian communist party, he became party secretary at the plant he worked at. In 1947 he became a worker at the Heavy Industry Centre, from 1949 he worked in the Ministry of Heavy Industry as a department leader. He became a secretary of the National Committee of Trade Unions in 1951. From 1953 he was the leader of the Trade Union for Metallurgy Workers. In 1956 he was dismissed from his positions, the Kádár government call him back, and served again as the trade union leader for metallurgy workers. In 1959 he was chosen to be a reserve member of the Central Committee, from 1960

¹⁷ Kállai Gyula; Ki kicsoda? in: Bencsik Péter (ed.): Az államszocializmus kora Magyarországon és Kelet-Közép-Európában

<http://allamszocializmus.lapunk.hu/?modul=oldal&tartalom=718668>

¹⁸ Komócsin Zoltán Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága
<https://www.neb.hu/asset/phpR7ev2n.pdf>

he was a regular member until 1966. In 1960 he joined the Foreign Ministry, from 1960 until 1963 he was ambassador to China, from November 1963 until February 1968 he was ambassador to Poland, from December 1969 until October 1974 he was ambassador to Romania. Between 1953 and 1963 he was a two term member of parliament.¹⁹

NEMES, Dezső (1908-1985): historian. He was a leader of a main department in the Ministry for Peoples' Education (1950-1953), he was the director of the Szikra Press (1953-1956), later he became the leader of the Party Academy (1956). He didn't have any role in the uprising of 1956. He was chief editor of the daily Népszabadság (1957-1961 and 1977-1980), was a member of the Central Committee of the HSWP (1957-1985), was secretary for foreign affairs (1961-1965), and a member of the Political Committee (1959-1980). He was the main director of the Institute for Party History (1965-1966), director (1980-1983), rector of the Political College (1966-1977). He was a member of the pro-Kádár faction in the 70s, and he was also a member of the faction.²⁰

NYERS, Rezső (1923-2018) after finishing four primary school classes, he worked as a delivery boy for four years, and in 1938 he became an apprentice at a printing-house. He became a member of the youth organization of the Social Democratic Party in 1939, became a member of the Party in 1940, and joined the trade union in 1942. After finishing his apprenticeship, he worked in various printing-houses. In 1944 he was called up for military service, and after the German occupation he deserted his unit and went into hiding until the arrival of Soviet troops. In 1945 he served for a short time as a policeman, and after that he became active in the Social Democratic Party. In 1946 he joined the printing-house of the daily Népszava, in 1947 he became a county official of the Party. He took part in the process of fusion with the Communist Party. In 1948 he became a member of parliament and he remained a member until 1998 with the exception of one term between 1953 and 1958. In 1948 he became an accessory member of the Central Leadership of the Hungarian Workers' Party (the communist party). He went to a party school and worked as a political worker in the field of agriculture. He enrolled as a student at the Karl Marx Economics University in Budapest, and finished his studies in 1956. From 1952 he worked in the Ministry of Domestic Commerce, becoming a deputy minister in the

¹⁹ Martin Ferenc, Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága
<https://www.neb.hu/asset/php8goser.pdf>

²⁰ Nemes Dezső; Ki kicsoda? in: Bencsik Péter (ed.): Az államszocializmus kora Magyarországon és Kelet-Közép-Európában
<http://allamszocializmus.lapunk.hu/?modul=oldal&tartalom=718655>

Ministry of Domestic and International Trade in 1954. He was named Minister of Agriculture in 1956. He held this position shortly after the uprising of 1956 and was one of the first members of the newly constituted HSWP. He joined the Kádár government, and acted as a government commissioner for the supply of the public. He was chosen to be a member of the Central Committee, and he remained a member up until 1989. He was named minister of finance in 1960. He was named as a reserve member of the Political Committee of the HSWP and leader of the Secretariat of the Central Committee in 1962. He was responsible for economic issues, as well as some political organizations of a few counties. In 1966 he became a regular member of the Political Committee. He was one of the architects of the so called new economic mechanism, which intended to mix elements of the planned economic system with elements of capitalism. Because of international events the program was abandoned. He was relieved as leader of the Secretariat of the Central Committee in 1974, and he was left out of the Political Committee in 1975. From 1974 he was the director of the Department of Economics at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, from 1981 until 1988 he was a scientific adviser for the institute. Due to the economic problems of the 1980s he returned to public life, and helped some economic reforms. In 1989 he was chosen as the party secretary of the HSWP and after the election defeat he didn't nominate himself again. He withdrew from public life in 1998.²¹

PEHR, Imre (1914-1977) He trained to be a doctor in Italy (1932-1938). After earning his university leaving certificate, he was drafted into the Hungarian army, served as a driver in Budapest (1940-1942), and was later transferred into the forced labor service (1942-1944). He was captured by the Soviets and was a prisoner of war until 1947. After the war, from 1948 to 1965, he became a civilian worker, later an officer of the Hungarian military intelligence service MNVK 2 (Magyar Néphadsereg Vezérkar 2. Csoportfőnökség – Hungarian People's Army General Staff 2nd Directorate). He later became a diplomat, serving in Switzerland and Italy, becoming ambassador in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (1965-1970) also accredited to Laos. After 1970 he worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²²

PÉTER, János (1910-1999) A Calvinistic minister, he started working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1945. He became a bishop of the Calvinistic Church (1949-1956). After the revolution of 1956 he held positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was a member of

²¹ Nyers Rezső, Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága, <https://www.neb.hu/hu/nyers-rezso>

²² Baráth Magdolna, Gecsényi Lajos (ed.): Főkonzulok, követek és nagykövetek, 1945-1990, MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont Történettudományi Intézet, 2016, p. 238

the Council of Ministers. He became deputy foreign minister (1958-1961), and joined the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party in 1961, becoming a member of Central Committee in 1968 and remained a member until 1980. He became foreign minister in 1961 and held the position until 1973. From 1973 he was deputy speaker for the Hungarian parliament.²³

PUJA, Frigyes (1921-2008) he finished 5 classes of high school, and learned to become a printer apprentice, and worked as such between 1942 and 1945. He worked as a party worker, later as a political worker. After he finished the Party College, he was invited to work for the Foreign Ministry. He became ambassador to Sweden (1953-1955), later to Austria (1955-1959). He was deputy foreign minister between 1959 and 1963, and he was the leader of the Foreign Relations Department of the Central Committee of the HSWP between 1963 and 1968. He was promoted to first deputy of the foreign minister in 1968, and state secretary in 1973, becoming foreign minister in the same year. In 1983 he was named as ambassador to Finland. He held this position until his retirement in 1986.²⁴

RADVÁNYI, János (1922-2016) after finishing secondary education, he became a trainee for skilled work (1940-1944). During the Second World War he was drafted into the forced labor service. After the war he studied, and joined the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1947. He worked as a junior diplomat in Turkey, Paris and Switzerland between 1948 and 1953. He was fired from the Ministry in 1954, but returned in 1957. He became charge d'affaires, consul-general and ambassador in Syria. He returned to the Ministry in 1958, until he was named charge d'affaires for the US in 1962. He defected to the US in 1967 for which he was sentenced to death in absentia. In 1971 he earned a doctoral degree at the Mississippi State University and taught history of diplomacy. He was founding member of the Center for International and Security Studies.²⁵

SZILÁGYI, Béla (1908-1995) he finished the Textile Industrial College in Brno. Between 1934 and 1945 he worked in the textile industry at different plants. Between 1945 and 1946 he was the secretary of the Hungarian communist in the county Vas, and was a member of the transitory

²³ Péter János; *Ki kicsoda?* in: Bencsik Péter (ed.): *Az államszocializmus kora Magyarországon és Kelet-Közép-Európában*

<http://allamszocializmus.lapunk.hu/?modul=oldal&tartalom=1203950>

²⁴ Baráth Magdolna, Gecsényi Lajos (ed.): *Főkonzulok, követek és nagykövetek, 1945-1990*, MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont Történettudományi Intézet, 2016, pp. 242-243

²⁵ Baráth Magdolna, Gecsényi Lajos (ed.): *Főkonzulok, követek és nagykövetek, 1945-1990*, MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont Történettudományi Intézet, 2016, p. 243

legislature in 1945. He was acting director of Hungarian coal mines (1946-1948), and later the director of the Textile Industrial Directorate. Between 1949 and 1950 he was the director of the Institute of Industrial Quality Inspectorate. His diplomatic career began with a posting to India (1950-1952), and later became a head of department at the Ministry for International Commerce (1952-1958). He became a member of the Central Committee of the HSWP (1958-1965). He was the ambassador to London (1959-1963). He worked at the Foreign Ministry between 1963 and 1970. His last post as ambassador was to Greece, from 1970 to 1975. He retired in 1975.²⁶

SZTANKÓ, Pál (1928-1989): he started his career as an unskilled worker at a bank. He was later employed by a chicken processing plant (1942-1948). He was an educator in a technical school (1948-1949). From there he went to the Foreign Ministry's Academy, and he became an employee of the Foreign Ministry in 1951. He became a diplomat at the embassy in Bratislava (1952-1953), and after a short stint at the ministry, he became the consul in Bratislava (1957-1960). After his return he was a deputy head of department at the ministry (1960-1966). In 1966 he became consul-general in Bratislava. He became temporary head of the embassy in Albania (1973-1978). After that he worked at the Foreign Ministry, until 1985, when he became consul-general at the Hungarian consulate in Leningrad. He retired in 1988.²⁷

²⁶ Baráth Magdolna, Gecsényi Lajos (ed.): Főkonzulok, követek és nagykövetek, 1945-1990, MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont Történettudományi Intézet, 2016, pp. 270-271

²⁷ Baráth Magdolna, Gecsényi Lajos (ed.): Főkonzulok, követek és nagykövetek, 1945-1990, MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont Történettudományi Intézet, 2016, p. 275

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<http://allamszocializmus.lapunk.hu/?modul=oldal&tartalom=1203950>

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