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MILITARY CULTURES IN THE LIGHT OF HYBRID WARFARE

Abstract

Hybrid warfare is one of the most intensively researched fields of military science today, and interest in it by other disciplines, such as political and legal science, has also become apparent through studies published so far.

Nonetheless, in the military science approach to hybrid warfare, it can be stated that it has not yet been fully explored and the research methods and specifics of the discipline have not been fully exploited.

Of these shortcomings, the examination of hybrid warfare was conducted with regard to basic research in the reference framework of military cultures partly with the purpose of initiating an academic discussion and partly to fill in a gap.

Keywords: hybrid warfare, military culture, military science

Hybrid warfare is a topical issue in today's military science - and in many cases other disciplines¹ -that has been intensively engaging the scientific community since the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict. At the same time, however, it should be noted that many aspects of hybrid warfare have not as yet been subject to research.²In terms of the field of military science, it is at the forefront of hybrid warfare research in terms of the number of works published but has not yet carried out specialized analysis in its own field that would be necessary to plan practical implementation - a specific action - against hybrid warfare. At the same time, however, it is essential that we first identify theoretically the characteristics of hybrid warfare that determine the range of manoeuvre, given the characteristics of the aggressor.³

The limits of a hybrid warfare party's activity can be examined from several perspectives⁴, but a fundamental analysis from the perspective of military science can

¹ For example, in political science, HOFFMAN, Frank G. (2007): Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington; from the point of view of law, Ádám FARKAS: From the Total State to the Total War to Total Defence. MTA Law Working Papers 2015/34., Budapest

² Such as the international legal judgment of hybrid warfare in the light of human rights, or the economic security aspects of foreign influence in the preparation of the hybrid war, etc.

³ It is readily apparent that a state with a major position, a third country in economic difficulties, or an international civil society organization with a solid financial background have other options for the use of means and methods classified as hybrid warfare.

⁴ E.g. economic, IT, government support, geographical location, etc.

be made by comparing each military culture⁵, and what aspects of this mode of warfare may be in the non-military (civil) sphere.⁶ Due to the above described reasons, in this phase of theoretical research of hybrid warfare it is appropriate to first review what the options of the different military culture⁷ are, taking into account the specificities of this warfare in preparing and carrying it out. However, it is not possible to examine this without defining hybrid warfare within the scope of this writing, as it currently has no generally accepted definition, either internationally or within military science.

About hybrid warfare

While the use of the term 'hybrid warfare' is becoming more commonplace in our daily lives, we cannot, from a scientific point of view, state that there is a commonly accepted definition in the international literature. In several works⁸ we can find definitions that cover the content of this activity, but they are too practical in terms of the exploration of military cultures within the framework of this dissertation. Because of our active publication and development work on and due to our membership in NATO⁹, I find it appropriate to use the definition of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly – most notably the definition of the term in the political and security science sense¹⁰ – that "*hybrid warfare is an asymmetric tactic that uses non-military means (e.g. political and economic intimidation and manipulation) and seeks to detect and exploit weaknesses, backed by the threat generated by conventional and non-conventional military means.*"

At the same time, however, it is important to emphasize that, according to traditional military science, asymmetric tactics are used by the weaker party in terms of military power. All this in the case of hybrid warfare, by its very nature, is reversed and used by the stronger party. The reason for the use of asymmetric tactics in the traditional sense was precisely the scarce resources available, but in the case of hybrid warfare, the aggressor's priority is to cover the activity in a sense that it cannot be linked to it in any way.¹¹ At the same time, however, keeping the conflict below

⁵ The topic of military cultures in writing KOVÁCS, Jenő (1995): Hungarian military strategy (complex research topic). Theoretical research area. II. R., is processed on the basis of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences' National Excellence in Social Science Research Grant Application, Budapest

⁶ Can some of the means and methods of hybrid warfare be used by civilian, extremist, and terrorist organizations against states or alliances, and if so, to what extent does this fall within the field of military science?

⁷ Material-centric, movement-centric, guerrilla

⁸ HOFFMAN (2007) op. cit.; RESPERGER, István: Crisis Management and Hybrid Warfare. Dialóg Campus Publisher, Budapest, 2018

⁹ Over the past five years, NATO and the Parliamentary Assembly have published a number of reports that have served as a reference for the scientific works I have processed, including the overwhelming majority of the wording of the hybrid warfare that is being described.

¹⁰ NATO Parliamentary Assembly Defence and Security Committee: Hybrid Warfare: NATO's New Strategic Challenge? General Report [166 DSC 15 E bis], 2015, paragraph 12, <https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2015-166-dsc-15-e-bis-hybrid-warfare-calha-report> (downloaded: 06. 05. 2019.)

¹¹ MARTON, Péter: Conditions of the occurrence of hybrid warfare. Nation and Security 2018/3., Budapest, p. 96.

the level of war is of paramount importance, as the aggressive state's requirement of keeping international crisis management operations away from the country of destination is a basic requirement.¹² It should be noted, however, that the causes of traditional asymmetry appear to be that, while the aggressor may be said to be stronger overall, the country under pressure still has fewer resources than the (governmental) forces operating on the domestic base.

The reason for this is that special operations units appearing in the hybrid warfare system are up to a few thousand, while the defence and law enforcement forces of the target country are many times superior, and they obviously have better local knowledge, relations and in some cases popular support than the aggressor.

In our classic military science, war is the continuation of politics by other (violent, military) means in order to force our opponent to carry out our own will.¹³ In the case of hybrid warfare / war, we can adapt the above statement, since the military leadership assigned to achieve the policy objectives also uses non-military means to perform its task, so we can say that *hybrid warfare is the continuation of warfare by other (non-military) means*. As (Ret.) Maj. Gen. Ferenc Réczey, who annotated Clausewitz's cited work, puts it¹⁴ "... war is none other than the continuation of politics with violent means and subordinated to this, depending on the intensity of the political relations, it is sometimes more, sometimes less than «war»." Accordingly, the military forces and non-military assets are used alternately or in parallel.

The wide range of these 'other (non-military) assets', which generally include all the means and methods available to the state, and otherwise the fact that they are constantly used (though not specifically for the purpose of pursuing a coordinated hybrid warfare) means *that, at the moment, every state is engaged in hybrid warfare against almost every other state in the world*. Of course, we must not accept this in a literal sense, but rather as a factor to be taken into account, since the activities of states, such as the continuous intelligence with regard to countries of interest, endeavour to shape economic processes in their favour, or even political and financial support for entities that identify with their values and share their interests, are areas in which they have extensive experience. In the context of a possible hybrid warfare activity, the conduct of these activities is not only conceivable, but is also necessary when concrete implementation takes place.

Overall, the novelty of hybrid warfare is not that it introduces new means or methods, as it is just one form of state warfare, and as with other forms, it relies on the full range of state power tools, since every war has such non-military means application that influenced its course.

The novelty of hybrid warfare lies in the fact that military and non-military assets *are deployed in a coordinated manner and are controlled by designated military command*. Today's military science focuses on the analysis of the operations of the

¹² RESPERGER (2018) op. cit. p. 21.

¹³ CLAUSEWITZ, Carl von: On War. I-II. Vol. Zrínyi Publishing House, Budapest, 2014.

¹⁴ CLAUSEWITZ, Carl von: On War. Volume I. Zrínyi Publishing House, Budapest, page 8.
Translated and annotated by Major General RÉCZEY, Ferenc (Ret.) (1961)

Russian Federation in connection with the events in Ukraine¹⁵, and it should be noted that although its investigation is timely, it does not fully satisfy the research of the theoretical bases stated in this paper. With regard to the ' Russian hybrid warfare', it should also be noted that although many scholars, such as Mark Galeotti , mentioned above, or the national literature, András Rác¹⁶ clearly identify the works of Army General Gerasimov as according to which the Arab Spring was the a result of the intervention in the domestic affairs of the target by Western countries and the logic behind it is that the Russian Federation also has the right to engage in similar activities, with many questioning it and appraising it for providing post factum explanations¹⁷, or even for misunderstanding the concept of the United States as a major threat¹⁸. In addition to these contradictions, however, research into hybrid warfare in the aftermath of the Ukrainian conflict has produced military science findings that can be used to investigate it and the responses given to it¹⁹.

Concerning the events in Ukraine, István Simicskó²⁰ explains that while Western military science identifies them as ' Russian hybrid warfare' and, for its articles and lectures²¹ , attributes its development to Army General Valery Gerasimov, a military

¹⁵ The 2014 events in Ukraine and " Gerasimov placed first scientific presentation of see parallels between doctrine ' . GALEOTTI, Mark (2014): The ' Gerasimov Doctrine 'and Russian Non-Linear War. <https://inmoscowshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/> (downloaded: 08/05/2018.)

¹⁶ RÁCZ, András (2014): The Hybrid War of Russia in Ukraine. Foreign Trade and Foreign Affairs Institute for Studies 2014/1, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Institute, Budapest. https://www.academia.edu/8833545/Oroszorsz%C3%A1g_hibrid_h%C3%A1bor%C3%A1ja_Ukrajn%C3%A1ban_Russias_Hybrid_War_in_Ukraine_ (downloaded: 08. 05. 2019.)

¹⁷ MCDERMOTT, Roger N. (2016): Does Russia Have a Gerasimov 's Doctrine? In : US ArmyWar College: Parameters (Spring 2016) <https://inmoscowshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/> pp 97-105 (downloaded: 08. 05. 2019.)

¹⁸ BARTLES, Charles K. (2016): Getting Gerasimov Right. https://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art009.pdf , In: <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2016/> , pp. 30-38.. (downloaded: 08. 05. 2019.)

¹⁹ It should be noted, however, that in addition to disguising the hybrid warfare on the part of the aggressor, we must also consider the response, which is of paramount importance in the phase of hybrid warfare when the aggrieved party is already identified. is looking for supporters in the international community and can't afford to take the biggest possible loss. This is especially true when law enforcement and possibly defence organizations have to be deployed against foreign fighters or even their own rioting populations.

²⁰ SIMICSKÓ, István: History and current issues of hybrid warfare. Military Science 2017/3-4., Budapest, pp. 6-7.

²¹ GERASIMOV, Valery (2013): Tsennost nauki v previdenii./The value of science lies in foresight. Vojennij Promislennij Kurjer No. 8. (476), <https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632> (downloaded: 08. 05. 2019.)

Army General Gerasimov's further writings on the subjectt: Пути активации инновационной деятельности в оборонной промышленности и Вооруженных Силах Российской Федерации./Main trends in the activation of innovations in the activities of the defence industry and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Vestnik – Journal of the Russian Military Academy, No.1. (42) 2013. <http://www.avnrf.ru/index.php/zhurnal-qvoennyj-vestnikq/arkhivnomerov/534-vestnik-avn-1-2013> (downloaded: 08. 05. 2019.); Будущее закладывается сегодня./The future is

dictionary in the author's possession, the activity is identifiable as 'strategic deterrence': "...*strategic deterrence is a coordinated system of military and non-military means (political, diplomatic, legal, economic, ideological, scientific-technical) aimed at deterring a military action against Russia that would inflict strategic damage.*"

With regard to the definition of 'hybrid warfare' by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and 'strategic deterrence' in the Russian military terminology dictionary, there is indeed agreement on the use of non-military assets, the exemplary listing of which does not correspond precisely, but in practice both refer to the use of a wide range of means available to the State. The essential difference is that while the definition of hybrid warfare does not include its aims, it can be stated that in the case of strategic deterrence it was given a precise description "... *to deter a military action against Russia, which would cause strategic damage*" In connection with the Ukrainian conflict in relation to this goal of Russian foreign, security and defence policy²² it acquires meaning along the sense that NATO's priority, but any other international organization-wide expansion effort (i.e. military action) – especially in the directly adjacent states – particularly serious violation of national interests, if they are military. On this basis, it can be seen, if not clearly demonstrated, that Ukraine's previous accession aspirations and the situation following the events on Majdan Square violated the interests of the Russian Federation in addressing them by introducing a strategic deterrence - practically applying the Gerasimov conflict model - was necessary on the basis of the Russian strategic documents in force.

In this sense, while Moscow is defensive in the ideology of its alleged activities in Ukraine, it is nevertheless an intervention in the internal affairs of another state that illustrates one of the main features of Russian movement-centric military culture, the priority of attack over defence.

War Cultures²³ in the light of hybrid warfare

The observation and writing of the differences in the means and methods employed in waging war in relation to individual peoples and ethnic groups dates back to the Renaissance and early Modern Age, whose emergence is considered to be the "first sprout" of military culture.²⁴ In the words of Jenő Kovács, a prominent Hungarian researcher of the topic, military culture: "...*is the sum of military, intellectual and material values affecting warfare, which represents the basic direction of dismantling enemy forces and preserving their own troops. Military culture can be called the orientation (stream) of military science, the character of the army, but also differently.*"²⁵ In his research, Jenő Kovács came to the conclusion that

based on the present. *Vojennij Promislennij Kurjer* No .10. (478), 2013. <https://vpk-news.ru/articles/14865> (downloaded: 08. 05. 2019.)

²² Presidential Decree No 683 of 31 December 2015 on the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation

²³ KOVÁCS, Jenő (1995): Hungary's military strategy (complex research topic). Theoretical research area. II. R., based on the National Grant for Social Sciences Research Grant, Budapest

²⁴ FORGÁCS, Balázs (2017): *Military Theory – The History of Hungarian Military Thinking and Military Cultures*. Based on Dialóg Campus Publishing House, Budapest, page 24.

²⁵ KOVÁCS (1995) op. cit. p. 17.

depending on their culture and socialization, individual leaders, peoples, countries organize and lead their forces. show differences in their application and capabilities. The nature and structure of the armed forces, the country's defence system, the structure of state and military leadership, the nature of military service, military complement and military training, mobilization and supply, standards of conduct against the enemy, and conscious and emotional motives associated with the army are determined by the beliefs, prejudices, insights, beliefs, customs and beliefs of the community and the leader, which are thus embodied in military culture. At the same time, according to Jenő Kovács, these differences of forces can be grouped into three subdivisions, thus defining the framework of three basic military cultures: movement-centric, material-centric, guerrilla, between which the dividing line is deeper and embodied in national strategies (security, military).²⁶

Motion-centric war culture

Considering the military culture of our country in the 20th century, it can be stated that until the 1990s, following the Russian-Soviet military theory, it was one of the movement-centric military cultures whose method was the complete destruction of the enemy through vigorously attack and seizing its territories by deploying the army service branch, given the geographic features of our country. Defence played the role of auxiliary tactic in military thinking, aimed at re-establishing the conditions in the event of an attack. This idea can also be found in the German idea of the “Blitzkrieg” or lightning war, where defence is unnecessarily bad, and in the Russian-Soviet theories²⁷, which regarded defence as a combat mode forced upon us by the enemy. According to Jenő Kovács, these military schools are variants of each other, which considered offensive as the main mode of waging war²⁸ and it was particularly typical of states with a land army. It should be noted in particular that each *expressed a close idea of politics and military* because of the similarities in their objectives. In my opinion, in their case, Clausewitz's mentality takes the form that this military culture *regarded the armed forces as the primary means of achieving political ends*.

Today, of the great powers we can classify Russia as one of the movement centric military cultures which - as has been seen - regards NATO's expansion efforts as a threat, inter alia, and it follows from its doctrines described above that it interferes *offensively* in the events in Ukraine to prevent detriment to its interests. Hypothetically it could be shown that if it had not done so, it could have created a situation in which its neighbour is a NATO member, and consequently, following from its own strategy, would have damaged its national interests, it would have been forced to assume a defensive stance which were undesirable and even avoidable based on its own military

²⁶ It should be noted, however, that the boundaries of the military cultures being described are now blurred by scientific research, and that, depending on the change in the purpose of politics, the military is forced to use the methods of other military cultures, cf. FORGÁCS Balázs (2009): *Today's War Cultures (Theory and Evolution of Warfare in the Modern Age)*. PhD Dissertation, Miklós Zrínyi National Defence University, Kossuth Lajos Faculty of Military Doctoral School, Budapest, Chapter 5.

²⁷ The main difference between the German and Russian-Soviet military theory is that the Lightning War conceptualized the simultaneous, rapid, and according to the Russians, the long-lasting strikes to destroy the enemy and seize his territories.

²⁸ Author's note: So far as Clausewitz's duality of war is concerned, the aim is not to exhaust but to destroy the enemy.

culture, so it ought to have striven after creating conditions for an offensive, but it does not have the conditions for an open war with NATO in the foreseeable future, so it would be in a paradox that it cannot resolve. It follows from the above - since Russia did not undertake a traditional war with Ukraine -, it had to assert its interests with the means of hybrid warfare.

In connection with the events in Ukraine it can be said that are reflected inside the Soviet-Russian movement centric features of military culture, which due to the hybrid nature of warfare is not present in the majority of military assets for the purposes of²⁹:

- the exploration and exploitation of the weak points of the enemy: the presence of a majority ethnic Russian a referendum on secession of areas
- demoralization of the enemy through fast -paced attacks achieving success after success, unleashing protests in support of extremist and criminal groups, annexation of areas reducing the combat strength, fighting spirit and morale of the Ukrainian armed forces and law enforcement agencies
- penetration into the depths of the enemy, retaining territories, forcing their will on the enemy, seizing initiative: it was characteristic of military force mainly in the areas already annexed to it, but the entire territory of the Ukrainian state was seized by means of secret services,
- acquiring a "time advantage": postponing intervention and deployment of observers in international fora by continually denying involvement, engaging in various "ceasefire" talks, which, however, lead to a consolidation of the aggressor's position.

Material-centric military culture

Analysing the beginning of the review of this military culture for the first time from the point of view of our country, it can be said that the approach of our accession to NATO arose the need to change our movement- centred approach in order to promote proper integration. Prior to the change of regime, the military (offensive) main directions lost their legitimacy, and given that we had no enemy image, we resolved to develop circular defence, and then to contribute to and rely on collective defence within the Alliance system.

In my opinion, although the transition to this approach and the long-term introduction of material-centric warfare culture within the *Alliance system* – with strong support and joint operations only with our partners – are feasible, we are capable of undertaking tasks commensurate with our role until we have a collective defence mechanism in place – we are currently neither capable of preparing for the fatigue of a material-centric war culture³⁰ nor of creating the conditions for a movement-centric war culture. In my opinion, in such a situation, the warfare culture of the guerrilla warfare to be described below should be prepared for warfare with the

²⁹ It should be noted, however, that movement-centric military culture is not fundamentally characterized by the use of non-military means, since its purpose is to destroy the enemy by seizing the territories which it seeks to achieve by the rapid and destructive application of military force.

³⁰ With regard to the Clausewitz duality of war, the aim is not to destroy the enemy, but to exhaust it and break its will in this way.

support of the population until the Alliance's defence mechanism comes into effect, and so should national defence plans be prepared accordingly.

In international terms, countries representing material-centric warfare - typically the Anglo-Saxon naval powers, e.g. the United States of America - achieves its military objectives by striking high-value destructive assets, for which it is essential to build the appropriate military infrastructure. In their case, the basic mode of warfare is defence, which aims not to create the conditions for an attack against a movement-centric military culture, but to defeat an attack based on (military) dominance. Non-military assets can play an important role in this war culture in the conventional sense of (open) warfare, as the exhausting nature of warfare provides ample time for economic pressure, appropriately designed propaganda and influence, and systematic and devastating diversified activities. to continue. Quoting Clausewitz and putting the ideas of material- centric war culture on the footing of theory of warfare: „.... *defence has a negative purpose: retention, and attack has a positive one: conquest, since the latter multiplies its combat equipment, but the former does not, therefore we must say that the form of defence of the military leadership is, in itself, stronger than the offensive form.*”³¹ All these ideas also mean, and this military culture states, that there is a greater chance of destroying the enemy while defending, though , in addition, the survivability of own forces is enhanced although limited, they can gain an advantage over an attacking party.

The material-centric military culture thus considers defence to be the fundamental mode of combat activities and retention of the areas to be the key security requirement and uses offensive as a means to impede enemy movement, in order to take strategic facilities. Its purpose is therefore to thwart the enemy's successes.

The nature of military culture requires that, even in peacetime, not only its military strength, but also its other non-military resources, be carefully and systematically prepared for warfare, the success of which depends on the careful distribution of resources. As seen above, the plan is the “soul” of a material-centric military culture, which includes possible activity variants as well as the distribution of resources with clockwork precision This kind of rigidity poses a major threat to the unexpected success of a movement-centric offensive or the unpredictability of a war against guerrilla warfare, as we have seen in the Vietnam War or in Afghanistan. These weaknesses of material-centric warfare culture today are trying to eliminate this weakness by combining, where appropriate, the rules with decentralized leadership, delegating decision-making authority to lower levels, combined with the benefits of motion-centric warfare.

The following description by Jenő Kovács in relation to the Gulf War well illustrates the thoughtfulness and coherence of material-centric war culture: “The US military command desisted from taking possession of territories offered by military conditions. It did not penetrate Iraq, nor did it break down the forces of aggression. Conversely, citing the residual threat that this caused, they could deploy their military forces in the area and thus exercise military control over the countries of the oil-rich areas. Presumably, this common idea of political and military purpose will shape the American military strategy in the future. The main features of this strategy are military

³¹ CLAUSEWITZ (2014) op. cit. Book Six, Chapter One, Item 2.

dominance, limited attack, influence/coercion/local war in the scale and circumstances. "In my opinion, all of these key features of the American strategy are capable of providing a rapid transition to non-military assets. switching to warfare, since limited (and possibly disguised) attacks, the politically determined end of the Gulf War (economic) target and close military base, local conflict and military supremacy can all be considered as part of hybrid warfare.

Summarizing material- centric military culture from the perspective of hybrid warfare it can be stated that the parallel use of non-military means has followed it throughout history. The novelty can only be experienced in leadership, since, contrary to what has been seen before, when non-military assets are deployed as politically determined, in the case of hybrid warfare, coordination of these assets can take place within the designated military staff.

The military culture of guerrilla warfare

By its very nature, guerrilla warfare does not have the general characteristics of movement-centric and material-centric military culture. In terms of methods, intensity, and its set of equipment, it is most similar to hybrid warfare, although asymmetry is here expressed in the traditional sense, as it is pursued by irregular groups with scantier or fewer resources than the enemy, usually existing or oppressive foreign powers. What distinguishes guerrilla warfare from hybrid warfare is that it is neither necessary nor desirable to cover the acts that have been carried out here, since the support of the population and, in some cases, the winning over of the international community can only be achieved by openly committing their actions, and they have to prove towards both the population and the international community that this group would be able to govern the country.

As regards irregular guerrilla warfare troops, it should be noted that, unlike terrorist organizations, they fall within the scope of the Hague³² and Geneva³³ Conventions, and are therefore actors of war recognized by international law. Of course, this also implies that the activity should not, for these reasons, include acts contrary to the rules of general international law, which must remain within the limits of generally acceptable violence. For this reason, the guerrilla warfare, when appropriately grouped in its resources, is continually employing non-military means (e.g. propaganda, aiding the general public, influencing the Internet, strike, demonstration, etc.) whose objectives are supported, and in this sense armed struggle and violence only plays a complementary role. Generally speaking, during the use of guerrilla warfare, armed struggle may be intermittent, or may be interrupted for longer periods.

From a military point of view, the prerequisite for continuing the guerrilla warfare is the establishment of a secure military base either domestically or abroad³⁴, which contributes to the training and relaxation of forces and provides an appropriate assembly area for the operations.

³² The Hague Convention (1899) II. Chapter IV of the Hague Convention (1907) chapter

³³ Geneva Convention (1949) II. protocol

³⁴ KOVÁCS (1995) op. cit. p 40.

The strategic objective of guerrilla operations is to exert pressure on the opposing power, its hinterland³⁵, or its forces, which contributes to their disintegration, exhaustion³⁶ and the establishment³⁷ of an appropriate bargaining position³⁸. For all these reasons, the main feature of combat-level guerrilla activity is the application of surprise and rapid course, which, when consistently observed, causes a series of actions to confuse the opposing party. Over time, decentralized deployment of the initial smaller subunits in guerrilla warfare has been replaced by increasingly organized strike measurement, centralized command and control. Given that guerrilla activity is aimed at achieving a political goal, it is not surprising that guerrilla troops generally turn out to be committing violent (military) acts when transformed into parties. Facilitating the transformation into a party can also be a goal for the opposing party, especially if it fails to win over the population and can only put an end to the guerrilla troops by cutting off recruits and support.

Regardless of the events in the conflict in Ukraine, troops deployed in the eastern regions were apparently engaged in guerrilla warfare³⁹, but these units were part of a regular force, and their command was centralized, which is unthinkable for real guerrilla troops. The party would have already been transformed into a party that would have given up fighting.

Based on the above, the use of guerrilla warfare by troops⁴⁰ can therefore be classified as guerrilla military culture, but it should be noted that they differ in their operational environment, opposing party, current level of organization, etc. On the other hand, it is precisely because of these essential factors that we cannot speak of a guerrilla military culture. Guerrilla warfare in each country depends more on opportunities than on historical cultural roots.

Summary, conclusions

In the hybrid warfare model, the aggressor's activity can be described as one that includes the offensive-centric approach of motion-centric military culture, the activities based on asymmetric resource allocation of material-centred military culture, furthermore the exhaustion activity of some guerrilla (or at least designated as guerrilla) troops, as well as further typical means of the various military cultures. All of these may emerge in such a way that one particular military culture may employ methods taken over from the other two military cultures, as seen by the aggressor in Ukraine, whose *primary military culture* is alien to the use of non-military assets

³⁵ Such were the consequences of the guerrilla warfare used during the Vietnam War.

³⁶ Such as the tactics of Mao Zedong.

³⁷ 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC left-wing guerrilla organization.

³⁸ With regard to the Clausewitz duality of war, the aim of the guerrilla warfare is to render the enemy fatigued and thus break his will, and the destruction plays a secondary role.

³⁹ The conditions for this were given: the supportive action of the population, the political aim (secession) against the "oppressive" (Ukrainian majority) power, the existence of a foreign military base.

⁴⁰ Some of which are irregular as troops recognised by the Geneva and the Hague Convention and as such fall within the scope of martial law.

(resource dominance - material-centric) method of obtaining local support from the populace (guerrilla).

Based on the above, the examination of military cultures for hybrid warfare, in my opinion, supports the conclusion that some movement-centric, material-centric and guerrilla warfare entities (countries, irregular troops) still carry the main features of military cultures today, but consider their application as a tool.⁴¹ On the basis of all these, it can be said that military cultures nowadays, mainly by the great powers, show increased *flexibility* compared to pre-modern times.

With regard to the smaller countries, especially the states of the post-Soviet region, it can be stated that although they possess the most characteristic features of a military culture, they are not able to fully implement it in practice. In the case of our country, the requirement to move from a movement-centric to a material-centric military culture before NATO accession was dissonant, as the high- resource-intensive exhaustion activity associated with it would be limited due to its inability to perform independently. For these reasons, I consider it necessary to further explore military cultures with particular regard to the political environment, economic opportunities, and parallel examination of alliance affiliation.

With respect to military cultures, it may be necessary to consider assigning a *primary military culture* to each country to determine their degree of *flexibility in the* light of these considerations.

With regard to hybrid warfare, it has been stated that its novelty lies not in the use of military and non-military means, but in the manner in which they are used. During these warfare, alternating use of military and non-military assets under military command and control ensures effective pursuit of political objectives, while making it difficult for the affected country to win over the international community and public opinion. Military power itself is mostly designed to support non-military assets through the ever-sustained threat.

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⁴¹ FORGÁCS, Balázs (2017): War Theory – The History of Hungarian Military Thinking and War Cultures. Dialóg Campus Publisher, Budapest, pp. 79-87.

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