

Rural Security

**Lesson Learnt from Horn of Africa – Ethiopia: Conflicts
Caused by Change in Living Space**



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Cover pictures

Above – A girl moves her family's livestock in Afar region of Ethiopia in April 2014. Source: UNICEF¹

Below – A farmer, tilling using a traditional plow (*Maresha*) based with the draft animal. It is predominantly used by smallholder farmers all-around Ethiopia. 2012. Source: Johannes Engl²

¹ <https://www.flickr.com/photos/unicefethiopia/14935624574/in/photostream/>. Accessed on 3 March 2018.

² <http://photo.johannesengl.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/ethiopia-2014-9.jpg>. Accessed on 3 March 2018.

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Glossary

Amharic	A language widely spoken in Ethiopia and was a national language until 1991, presently the federal working language.
Balabat	A local leaders in pre 1974 Ethiopian revolution, who served as the intermediaries between the local people and the central government with a land holding right right/gult. Balabat had also a fief power to collect tributes from peasant farmers or Gebbars, living in the region or district under his domain.
Bega	A dry season in Ethiopia, as the same time winter in Europe, December, January and February. Frost is common in morning especially in January.
Belg	The spring season for Ethiopia also known as the harvest season, autumn in Europe, September, October and November are
Berha	Desert or hot arid
Dega	Cool zone
Derg	A word derived from the ancient Ethiopian church language, Ge'ez, it means committee and it refers a military junta by the name the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) that ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1987 under the Provisional Military Government and from 1987 to 1991 under the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia after adopting a socialist.
Erbo	One-quarter
Gasha	A unit of area measurement of land that have been used in Ethiopia. One gasha equals to 40 hectares.
Gebbar	Tenant
Gult	Land ownership right acquired from the monarch or from provincial rulers who were empowered to make land grants. Gult owners collected tribute from the peasantry

Kebele	Ethiopia's smallest administrative unit, similar to a ward, a neighborhood or a localized and delimited group of people.
Kiremt or Meher	A rainy season in Ethiopia, summer in Europe June, July and August months with heavy rain fall.
Kolla	Tropical zone or warm semiarid
Rist	Land holding system in Ethiopia, characterized by the principle of acknowledging access to land (use rights and transfer rights without land alienation) by all descendants of people from a common ancestor and in an ambilineal way (the right to inherit land from father's and mother's line of descent).
Tseday	The autumn season with sporadic showers, where May is the hottest. It spring in Europe, March, April and May.
Woina Dega	Cool to sub-humid or tropical
Woreda	Ethiopia's third-level administrative divisions after Regional State and Zone. It is similar to districts, Weredas further subdivided Kebele.
Wurich	Cold to moist

Abbreviation

ADLI	Agricultural Development Led Industrialization
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AQIM	al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defense
EPRDF	Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
OAU	Organization of African Union
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PMAC	Provisional Military Administrative Council
UAR	United Arab Republic
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme

UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan

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1. Introduction

1.1. Background

The study of rural security is important especially in the Horn of Africa where over two-third of the population live in. In the whole African continent, the rural population is currently estimated at 60 percent, compared with 73 percent in 1980, even though there are rapid increase and the fact that it is the fastest urbanizing region globally, Africa is still the least urbanized continent in the world.³

The most urbanized countries on the continent are Gabon, Djibouti, Cabo Verde, Congo Republic, South Africa, Mauritania, Gambia, Botswana, Cameroon, and Cote d'Ivoire. Djibouti is the only Horn of Africa state in from the top ten most urbanized sub-Saharan African state. The majority rural population in Africa live in Burundi, Uganda, Malawi, Niger, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Swaziland, Chad, Kenya, and Lesotho.⁴ Out of the top ten states in Africa, three of them are in the Horn of Africa.

Country	Rural Population (per cent age)			
	1980	2015	2025	2050
Djibouti	28.9	22.7	21.5	17.3
Eritrea	85.6	77.4	72.5	57.9
Ethiopia	89.6	80.5	75.8	62.4
Kenya	84.4	74.4	69.7	56.1
Somalia	73.2	60.4	55.4	42.1
Sudan	80.0	66.2	63.3	50.2
South Sudan	91.5	81.2	78.4	66.1
Uganda	92.5	83.9	80.1	67.9

Table 1.1. Rural Population and Rural Population Growth in the Horn of Africa states⁵

³ United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. “*The Demographic Profile of African Countries*. Addis Ababa. 2016.

⁴ World Bank. “Rural population (per cent of total population)”. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?view=chart>, Accessed on 28 February 2018.

⁵ United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 2016.

Since independence, the Horn of Africa is a region overwhelmed by lingering conflicts, drought, and famine. Especially the rural residents of the region both pastoral and agrarian are the one who suffered most because of both manmade and natural disaster. Because of the falling living space in this region, besides fighting for scarce resources, the increasing younger population begin to migrate and look for new living space.⁶

There is also a high presence of UN and African Union military support operations in the region. AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the UN and the AU Hybrid Peacekeeping Missions in Darfur – UNAMID, Abyei-UNISFA, and South Sudan – UNMISS. United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was also deployed between the border of Ethiopia and Eritrea from 2000 to 2008.

The objective of this study is to conduct a literature review and analysis on the change in the living space or the environmental degradation or climate change that makes the region so vulnerable to conflict. IGAD described the regional ecosystem as the following which is extremely vulnerable and which clearly indicates there is a change in living space which can affect the security.

... Only 5 percent of the original ecosystems/habitats remains intact in the region. This means that 95 percent of the original ecosystems have been either converted to other land use forms or have been degraded severely or moderately by different drivers. The main drivers of environmental and natural resources include climate change, frequent drought, high population growth, overgrazing, forest degradation, soil and land degradation, wildlife poaching and trafficking, desertification, etc. The impact of these drivers is the reduction of the capability of the different ecosystems to provide the necessary goods and services essential for the survival of living things in the region.⁷

In a region where the majority of the population live in rural areas depending directly on land and nature, the study rural security is vital. Unlike in Africa, Europe wherein 2015, almost one quarter 22.8 percent of the EU-28 population was living in a rural area.⁸ Lithuania was the only

⁶ Boldizsár, Gábor. “Complex Challenges, Complex Responses and the State”. *International conference: Knowledge-Based Organization*, 23.1 (2017): 53-60. Page 56. <https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/kbo.2017.23.issue-1/kbo-2017-0008/kbo-2017-0008.xml>. Accessed on 29 February 2018.

⁷ IGAD. “The IGAD Region”. <https://igad.int/about-us/the-igad-region>, Accessed on 10 February 2018.

⁸ Eurostat. Statistics on rural areas in the EU. February 2017. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Statistics_on_rural_areas_in_the_EU, Accessed on 10 February 2018.

EU Member State where a majority, 56.2 per cent, of the population in 2015 was living in a rural area; Luxembourg, Slovenia, Latvia and Hungary⁹ are states with the relatively high number of inhabitants lived in rural areas by any way incomparable to the states in the Horn of Africa.¹⁰

Horn of Africa has suffered the greatest number of armed conflicts compared the rest of the continent and still is among those drowned by intra-state and inter-state conflicts raging the region. Most of the conflicts are associated with ethnic diversities which are also fueled by the change in living space, decline of agricultural or grazing land and water.

Security has been the focus in the region because of past and ongoing conflicts with state authorities and neighboring ethnic communities over water use, grazing access, cattle raiding and environmental degradation in rural areas is still security concerns.

Continues fight for land and water among the agricultural and pastoral communities where common in this region, especially in arid and semi-arid areas. The Darfur conflict is a major example of such fight for a living space.¹¹ Currently, the resource pressure make millions of people in the region are displaced and living in refugee and IDP camps.

The main case study of this monograph, Ethiopia is the most populous, where most of the population lives in rural and often suffer from severe food shortage and poverty is deeply widespread and continues which is the most crucial challenges for the Ethiopian Government.¹²

⁹ Hungary 28 percent of the population is living in rural area.

¹⁰ Eurostat. Statistics on rural areas in the EU. February 2017. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Statistics_on_rural_areas_in_the_EU. Accessed on 10 February 2018.

¹¹ Flint, Julie and Alex De Waal. *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*. London: Zed Books. 2008. Page 63.

¹² Buayalew, Yohannes. An Anthology of Peace and Security Research. The Nexus between Food Insecurity and Conflict: The Case of Jille Timmuga Wereda. 220 Institute for Peace and Security Studies in collaboration with Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia November 2010.

1.2. Research Methodology

The study relies on a comprehensive review of literature and publications on the case of Horn Africa and mostly on Ethiopia. This study utilized library and internet research. And explored to help understand the prevailing situation in of rural societies in the Horn and mainly in Ethiopia.

The study is set out to examine the dynamics of Ethiopian rural society in terms of security and an overview the Horn of Africa. With the objective of this, the study tries to answer the following questions: What is rural area in Ethiopian and Horn of African context? What is rural security? What are the main causes of conflict and security threats in rural part of Ethiopia? What does it mean conflict caused by change in living space in the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia? To answer this questions, the research used qualitative approach that employed a wider review of secondary data on Horn of African and Ethiopia. Lack of field work, primary sources and short time frame of the research are the major limitation of the study.

The monograph is divided into four chapter. Chapter one is the introduction. Chapter two deals with the theoretical background deals with the definitional of conflict, ethnicity as the cause of conflict in Africa, the concept of changed living space and how it can be a cause for conflict, and it attempts to define rural and rural security.

Chapter three look the overview of the Horn of African states, politics, geography and population. It also covers IGADD and IGAD which is the main sub-regional organization established to tackle environmental hazards in the region in the mid-1980s. This chapter also covers the two important rural societies in the Horn of Africa namely pastoralist and agrarian and see how change in living space became the cause of conflict in the region.

Chapter four focuses on Ethiopian history, politics, geography and population. Also it looks in the land tenure system in the three regimes of Ethiopia because land as a major rural phenomenon. Also the chapter looks to the rural security in both pastoral and agrarian societies in the region. Internal displacement, land grabbing, the refugee issue, water security, and famine are also included in this chapter for the reason that this topics a key matters in rural Ethiopia. Chapter five concludes and put some recommendations.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1 Defining Conflict

Conflict is the state of disagreement or hostility between two or more people.¹³ Individuals or groups can have a conflict for different reasons like on sharing power or resource or because of having contradictory perspectives on particular themes. There are different terms for conflict also, contrast, disharmony, discord, struggle, contest, strife, antagonism, controversy, clash, rivalry, contest, contention, brawl, fisticuff, fight, battle, feud, combat and war.¹⁴

There are different types of conflict, from small scale revolts and insurgencies to full scale armed conflicts. Armed conflict is an open, armed clashes between two or more centrally organized parties, with continuity between the clashes, in disputes about power over government and territory.¹⁵ There are different types of armed conflicts. The major distinctions are of armed conflicts are conventional warfare or international conflict and civil war or non-international armed conflict. International armed conflict, which is mostly termed as ‘war’ – an armed conflict between two or more states¹⁶ and it is fought with regular army along a particular front with primarily military and strategic objectives.¹⁷ The fight between Ethiopia and Eritrea and Azerbaijan and Armenia were the only conventionally fought wars in Africa and in Europe respectively since the end of Cold War.

¹³ Nicholson cited in Folarin, S. F. Types and causes of conflict. In Soremekun, K. et al. (Eds.), *Readings in peace and conflict studies*. Ota: Covenant University Press. pp. 15-29, 2013.

¹⁴ Folarin, 2013.

¹⁵ Smith, Dan. Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict In: Austin, A. et al. (eds) *Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004.

¹⁶ Crawford, Emily. *Hot Topics 80: International humanitarian law. Chapter 4: Types of armed conflict*. 2012. <http://legalanswers.sl.nsw.gov.au/hot-topics-80-international-humanitarian-law/types-armed-conflict>. Accessed on 21 February 2018

¹⁷ UNECE. “The Role of Economic Dimension in Conflict Prevention Villars”. A UNECE-OCSE Colloquium with the participation of experts from NATO. Switzerland 19-20 November 2001.

And non-international armed conflict which is traditionally termed, ‘civil war’.¹⁸ A condition of armed conflict between the state and an internally-located insurgent movement that had taken up arms.¹⁹ This also includes revolt against the government and genocide.

However, looking more into non-international armed conflict, there are different terms with distinct meanings. For example, when we use the term ‘civil war’ it means an internal conflict that count more than 1,000 battle deaths in a single year, and the term ‘civil conflict’ it means that count at least twenty-five battle deaths per annum.²⁰ Under these, states can experience different types of internal armed conflicts for different reasons. State control war which is struggles for control of governing apparatus of the state, state formation conflict which means regions of a country fighting for a greater measure of autonomy or outright secession and failed state war where the armed conflict is about local issues and disputes involving violence in the absence of effective government control and failure to provide security for its citizens.²¹

The above conceptual explanations and classifications are state centric. However, contemporary conflicts are not restricted to the state. Ethnic groups, local militia, armed groups, criminal groups become the main actors of armed conflicts. In the Horn of Africa all kinds of armed conflicts has been raging the region. The words of Abdikadir Ahmed Abdi’s statement summarize well as following:

... There have been consistently high levels of violent conflict throughout the region for the best part of the last century and before. Conflict has occurred at every level-within states, between states, among proxies, between armies at the center and in the periphery. This appears to have created habits of war, including reliance on the use of force to achieve political goals, which in turn contribute to the persistence of violent conflict.²²

¹⁸ Crawford, Emily. 2018

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Blattman, Christopher and Edward Miguel. Civil War. *Journal of Economic Literature*. Vol. 48, No. 1. March 2010, pp. 3-5. Page 3.

²¹ Project Ploughshares. *Types of Armed Conflict*. <http://ploughshares.ca/armed-conflict/types-of-armed-conflict/>. Accessed on 21 February 2018.

²² Abdi, Abdikadir Ahmed. “The Impact of Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: A case study of Kenya.” A Research Project Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the Degree in Masters of Arts in International Studies, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi. 2015. Page 17.

2.2 Ethnicity as a Cause of Conflict in the Horn of Africa

Conflicts can be caused by struggle for political power, natural resources or for ethnic and religious differences. In the Horn of Africa, though the causes of conflicts are complex here one of the major causes of conflict in the Horn of Africa studied by most scholars, ethnicity which is related with the state formation in the region is discussed.

Ethnic conflicts are conflicts in which the warring parties are defined by a combination of historical, linguistic and cultural features.²³ In most cases it is the marginalization of the poor has become a fertile ground for the elites to promote ethnic conflict which benefit them to sustain their own control over power.²⁴ However, the root cause goes back to state formation in Africa which was artificial where national boundaries were made by the European colonizers where the ethnic groups have no say and mostly dividing ethnic groups in two or more states.

There are more than three hundred seventy linguistic groups or can be ethnic groups in the Horn of Africa. Some scholars argue that because of the states in the region has diverse ethnic in case of Somalia clans and religious having national cohesiveness or common political identity become hard.²⁵ Have their societies are divided along ethnic and religious lines also means 'political loyalties often cut across state boundaries'.²⁶ Secessionist wars in Ethiopia and Sudan and irredentist war between Somalia and Ethiopia where fought for a long years after the independence. Also 'ethnic conflicts arise during the process of state formation, when a fight erupts over which people should belong to which the state'.²⁷

²³ Schlee and Shongolo cited in Feyissa, Tigist Kebede. Conflicts among Pastoralists in the Borana Area of Southern Ethiopia: The case of Borana and Garri. Master's Thesis in Peace and Conflict Transformation Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education University of Tromsø. Autumn, 2014.

²⁴ Department for International Development. *The causes of conflict in Africa: Consultation Document*. London. March 2001.

²⁵ Tekle, Amare. International Relations in the Horn of Africa (1991-96). *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 23, No. 70 (Dec., 1996), pp. 499-509

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Wimmer cited in Jinadu, L. Adele. Explaining and Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Towards a Cultural Theory of Democracy. *African Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (June 2004), pp. 1-26

Country	Total Language in the Country	Extinct	Indigenous	Non-indigenous	Institutional	Developing	vigorous	In trouble	Dying	Deaf Population	Literacy Rate	Principal Language
Djibouti	5	none	2	3	2	2	1	-	-	-	68%	French, Standard Arabic
Eritrea	15	none	9	6	5	4	4	1	1	-	69%	English, Standard Arabic, Tigrigna
Ethiopia	90	2	85	3	43	13	16	11	5	1,000,000	49%	Amharic
Kenya	68	1	60	7	13	33	15	2	4	-	82%	English, Swahili
Somalia	13	none	10	3	3	3	5	1	1	-	38%	Somali, Standard Arabic
South Sudan	72	3	58	11	13	24	15	11	6	-	27%	English
Sudan	77	2	70	5	3	15	11	34	12	48,900	72%	English, Standard Arabic
Uganda	43	None	41	2	5	27	7	2	2	160,000	73%	English

Table 2.1. Languages Spoken in the Horn of African States²⁸

The history goes back to the Berlin conference in 1885, when Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden-Norway, Turkey, and the United States of America met to avoid the tangle between the major colonial powers in Africa, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Portugal and to mark their boundaries in Africa. What happened was peoples who were ethnically and culturally the same end up divided or historical rivals united.²⁹ Though, most people in Africa was living in loose groupings without unmarked territories and no boundaries in post-colonial period.³⁰ They ended up with a fixed artificial boundaries created a catastrophe after independence. The good example for this is the Somali, who are divided in to four different countries, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya and where desire for reunification has resulted in deadly conflict.³¹

After most African state got their independence the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on May 25, 1963 by the political leaders of 31 African

²⁸ Source: <https://www.ethnologue.com>, Accessed on 20 April 2018.

²⁹ Badejo, Diedre L. The African Union. New York, Infobase Publishing. 2008. Page 49.

³⁰ Mazrui, Ali A. 'Conflict in Africa: An Overview', in A. Nhema and P. T. Zeleza (eds.), The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs, Oxford, Athens, OH and Pretoria: James Currey, Ohio State University Press and UNISA Press in association with OSSREA. 2008. Page 37.

³¹ Ibid.

countries.³² Its major aims were seven statist principles that were enshrined in Article 3 of the Charter. These included the sovereign equality of all member states, non-interference in the internal affairs of member states; respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state; the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration; unreserved condemnation in all its forms, of political assassination as well as subversive activities on the part of neighboring states or any other sates; absolute dedication to the total emancipation of all African territories; and affirmation of the policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.³³

Recognizing the faultiness of national boundaries OAU to keep the stability and avoid border disputes among of the new states the assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting in its First Ordinary Session in Cairo, UAR, from 17 to 21 July 1964 pass the following resolution:

Considering that border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissention; Conscious of the existence of extra-African maneuvers aimed at dividing African States; Considering further that the borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality; ...Solemnly declares that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.³⁴

However, the resolution didn't save African nations form conflict because of ethnic groups divided by the colonial border. The table below indications a good example of conflicts caused by divided ethnic groups among Horn of Africa states.

³² Makinda, Samuel M. and F. Wafula Okumu. *The African Union: Challenges of globalization, security, and governance*. New York, Routledge. 2008. Page 11.

³³ OAU. *Organization of African Unity Charter*. Addis Ababa. https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-sl-oau_charter_1963_0.pdf. Accessed on 19 February 2018.

³⁴ OAU Secretariat. *Resolutions Adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government Held in Cairo, UAR, From 17 to 21 July 1964*. Addis Ababa. https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9514-1964_ahg_res_1-24_i_e.pdf.

Name of Ethnic Group	Countires of Habitation	Occurrences of Conflict
Afar	Djibout*, Eritrea. Ethiopia*	Yes
Somali	Somalia*, Djibouti*, Ethiopia*, Kenya*	Yes
Luo	Kenya*, Uganda, Sudan*, Ethiopia, Tanzania	Yes
Luhya	Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania	NO
Beja, Rashaida, Tigre	Eritrea and Sudan*	Yes
Tigrigna, Kunama, Shaho (Irob)	Eritrea* and Ethiopia*	Yes
Oromo	Ethiopia* and Kenya	Yes
Pokot and Teso	Kenya and Uganda	No
Kakwa, Sebei, Lugbwara, Madi, Ancholi, Kaliko, Pojullo	Uganda* and South Sudan*	Yes
Anuak, Nuer, Bertha, Donyiro, Tirma, Shita, Gumuz, Murle, Kichepo, Wetawit	Ethioia* and Sudan*	Yes
Daasanach	Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan	No

*Countries where the conflicts have occurred.

Table 2.2. A selected list of Ethnic groups that are spread across different counties³⁵

The absence of nation-state and the forceful amalgamation of different ethnic groups has been a security challenge for African states. Jeffrey Herbst described it as follows:

... The majority of [African] states have difficulty creating viable symbols to attract the loyalties of their citizens. Not surprisingly, therefore, there are today very few attempts in African countries to forge a national consensus on major issues, much less a national identity. For instance, most formulas to decrease inter-ethnic tension concentrate only on ameliorating the negative aspects of ethnic conflict by accommodating it through decentralized government structures and preferential policies.³⁶

It is in the time of Cold War the post-colonial African borders challenged especially in the Horn of Africa and the Pandora box opened and ethnic conflicts exploded throughout Africa. What Jeffrey Herbst argued in 1990 is still true in the Horn of Africa region. The post 2013 conflict in

³⁵ Mengisteab, Kidane. Critical Factors in the Horn of Africa's Raging Conflicts. Uppsala 2011. Discussion Paper 67. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

³⁶ Herbst, Jeffrey. War and the State in Africa. *International Security*. Vol. 14, No. 4 (spring, 1990), pp. 117-139. Page 127 – 128.

South Sudan³⁷ and the post 2015 Oromo uprising in Ethiopia is the indication of still there is ethnic tension.

Also in the Horn of Africa, rooted in the legacy of colonialism border wars were common the Ethiopia–Somalia war of 1977, the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict of 1998, the Djibouti-Eritrea conflicts of 1995 and 2008, and the Sudan-South and Sudan border related wars in 2012 are the major once.

2.3. The Concept of Changed Living Space

The term ‘living space’ came from in its political use also known as *Lebensraum* was first used in its classic sense in the 1890s by the renowned Leipzig University geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), who published its most cogent statement in an essay in 1901. Ratzel defined *Lebensraum* as the geographical surface area required to support a living species at its current population size and mode of existence.³⁸ Ratzel’s functional definition of human *Lebensraum* is essentially farming land.³⁹ A good example in history is Hitler’s ambition of obtaining land:

... Hitler was obsessed with Germany’s need for *lebensraum* (“living space”), because Germany did not have enough land to grow food for its growing population or to provide raw materials to maintain its industrial might. Other Germans shared this basic vision of increasing German economic autarchy to reduce Germany’s vulnerability to interruptions of trade. Germany ultimately decided to implement this policy by going to war.⁴⁰

Land is not merely the topography of the earth surface. According to the definition by Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP):

Land and land resources refer to a delineable area of the earth's terrestrial surface, encompassing all attributes of the biosphere immediately above or below this surface,

³⁷ Rolandsen, Oystein H. Another civil war in South Sudan: the failure of Guerrilla Government? *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 9:1, (2015) 163-174. Page 165.

³⁸ Smith, Woodruff. D. Friedrich Ratzel and the Origins of Lebensraum. *German Studies Review*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (February 1980), pp. 51-68. Page 53.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Brown, Michael E. et al. (ed.) *Theories of War and Peace: An International Security Reader*. Cambridge; the Mit Press. 1998. Preface xxxv.

including those of the near-surface climate, the soil and terrain forms, the surface hydrology (including shallow lakes, rivers, marshes and swamps), the near-surface sedimentary layers and associated groundwater and geohydrological reserve, the plant and animal populations, the human settlement pattern and physical results of past and present human activity (terracing, water storage or drainage structures, roads, buildings, etc.)⁴¹

Thus, resources that are useful for human livelihood can be considered as living space.

What does it mean changed living space? And what cause change in living space are important questions to be answered. Environmental degradation and Climate change are the main forces that are changing the living space.

Environmental degradation for example, deforestation and water pollution, which arise from increased demand for environmental resources or from unequal distribution, reduce cropland, forests, river water, and fish stocks.⁴² On the other hand climate change increases the scarcity of the regular patterns of rainfall and temperature on which farmers rely.⁴³ In general, land resource are under threat because of climate change, desertification, warming, sea level rise, groundwater levels drop and substantially they are reduce the living space.⁴⁴

2.4. Changed Living Space as Cause of Conflict.

The main factors that resulted changed living space are environmental degradation and climate change which affect or increase the probability of conflict respectively.⁴⁵ Thomas Homer-Dixon predicted in 1999 five types of conflicts that resulted from environmental scarcity:

1. Disputes arising directly from local environmental degradation caused, for instance, by factory emissions, logging, or dam construction.
2. Ethnic clashes arising from population migration and deepened social cleavages due to environmental scarcity.
3. Civil strife (including insurgency, banditry, and coups d'état) caused by environmental scarcity that affects economic productivity and, in turn, people's

⁴¹ FAO/UNEP cited in FAO and UNEP. *The Future of Our Land: Facing the Challenge*. Rome, 1999. Page 8.

⁴² Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. *Environment, Scarcity and Violence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Boldizsár, 2018.

⁴⁵ Devitt, Conor and Richard SJ Tol. Civil war, climate change, and development: A scenario study for sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of Peace Research*. 49(1), 2012. 129-145 and Homer-Dixon, 1999.

- livelihoods, the behavior of elite groups, and the ability of states to meet these changing demands.
4. Scarcity-induced interstate war over, for example, water.
 5. North-South conflicts (i.e., conflicts between the developed and developing worlds) over mitigation of, adaptation to, and compensation for global environmental problems like global warming, ozone depletion, threats to biodiversity, and decreases in fish stocks.⁴⁶

Almost two decades after the prediction some of the predations are happening. In Horn of Africa the problem of living space was the central issue. The Darfur crisis, which is known worldwide was caused as caused as a result of groups fighting over grazing land and water. The soft calamity between Egypt and Ethiopia because of Ethiopia's constriction of dam on Nile River is important security concern in the region.

In history land has been a cause of war according to Arthur Westing in both First and Second World Wars, the Algerian War and decolonization, territorial, civil and secession wars are land and resources of land played an important role as cause.⁴⁷

The shrinking of habitable living space is the major security challenge in the Horn of Africa. Abdikadir Ahmed Abdi described the situation as follows:

Another contextual factor that has contributed to the conflicts and instability of the Horn of Africa is the highly increasing rate of environmental degradation the region faces. Much of the region is arid or semi-arid and has over the last five or so decades faced rapid environmental degradation, manifested in frequent droughts and chronic food and water shortages.⁴⁸

Eric van de Giessen in his assessment study on the environmental security of the Horn of Africa he studied the environmental problems, driving forces and the causes for the environmental problem.⁴⁹ The following table is an extraction from his study.

⁴⁶ Homer-Dixon, 1999.

⁴⁷ Libiszewski, Stephan. "What is an Environmental Conflict?" A paper Presented at the first coordination meeting of the "Environment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP) in Berne/Zurich. April 30 – May 1, 1992.

⁴⁸ Abdi, Abdikadir Ahmed. "The Impact of Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: A case study of Kenya." A Research Project Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the Degree in Masters of Arts in International Studies, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi. 2015. Page 43.

⁴⁹ Giessen, Eric van de. *Horn of Africa: Environmental Security Assessment*. Institute for Environmental Security. Hague. 2011. www.envirosecurity.org/espa/PDF/ESA_HOA.pdf. Accessed on 12 February 2018.

Causes	Driving Forces	Environmental Problems
Population growth	Increasing demand for wood	Deforestation and forest degradation
Poverty	Expansion of agricultural areas	Land degradation
Dependence on natural resources	Inadequate resource management and protection	desertification
Land tenure insecurity	Illegal resource extraction	Pollution
Land use planning	Overgrazing	Biodiversity loss
Inadequate governance capacity		
Knowledge, attitudes and behavior		
Conflict and insecurity		
Climate change		
Drought		

Table 2.3. Eric van de Giessen’s environmental problems, driving forces and the causes for the environmental problem in the Horn of Africa

Living space become threatened when there is disturbance in the ecosystem. When Judith Rees explains, the extraction of oil become environmental degradation when there is a damage to the environment while producing the oil not the extraction itself.⁵⁰

Judith Rees identified four types of resource scarcity problems. First, physical scarcity which means resources which are limited in existence. Second, geopolitical scarcity mean resources unevenly distributed in the world that some countries have in abundance and others have to depend on them. Third, socio-economic scarcity which means unequal distribution of purchasing power for the natural resources and the fourth one environmental scarcity that is environmental degradation, resources which were abundant naturally but become scarce because of failure of human management.⁵¹

Based on Judith Rees’s types of resource scarcity. Stephan Libiszewski defined environmental conflict as ‘a conflict caused by the environmental scarcity of resources which mean a

⁵⁰ Judith Rees Cited in Libiszewski, Stephan. “What is an Environmental Conflict?” A paper Presented at the first coordination meeting of the “Environment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP) in Berne/Zurich. April 30 – May 1, 1992.

⁵¹ Judith Rees Cited in Libiszewski, Stephan. 1992.

destruction of the space of living with overuse of renewable resources man-made disturbance'.⁵² He argue that conflicts caused by physical, geopolitical or socio-economic resource scarcity are not environmental conflicts of resource distribution.⁵³ Conflicts become environmental conflict when conflict over agricultural land, for example, 'only if the land becomes an object of contention as result of soil erosion, climate change, changes of river flows or any other enviromental degradation'.⁵⁴

Thomas Homer-Dixon describe three type of conflicts resulted from environmental degradation. First simple scarcity conflicts means scarce renewable resources like river water, fisheries and agriculture productive land; second group-identity conflicts means clash between ethnic or cultural groups caused by deprivation and stress as a result of environmentally caused migrations and third relative-deprivation conflicts which means the creation of class cleavage in the society where mostly with weakly legitimated political institutions, as a result of economic impacts of environmental degradation.⁵⁵

Preliminary research indicates that scarcities of critical environmental resources- especially of cropland, freshwater, and forests-contribute to violence in many parts of the world. These environmental scarcities usually do not cause wars among countries, but they can generate severe social stresses within countries, helping to stimulate subnational insurgencies, ethnic clashes, and urban unrest. Such civil violence particularly affects developing societies, because they are, in general, highly dependent on environmental resources and less able to buffer themselves from the social crises that environmental scarcities cause.⁵⁶

Another important point is environmental degradation causes conflict which causes environmental degradation, creating a vicious cycle of environmental decline, tense competition for diminishing resources, increased hostility, inter-communal fighting, and social and political breakdown. In a semi-subsistence economy the easiest form of attack is to destroy the natural

⁵² Libiszewski, Stephan. 1992.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Homer-Dixon Cited in Libiszewski, Stephan. "What is an Environmental Conflict?" A paper Presented at the first coordination meeting of the "Environment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP) in Berne/Zurich. April 30 – May 1, 1992.

⁵⁶ Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. *Environment, Scarcity and Violence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

resources an opponent needs for survival.⁵⁷ W. N. Adger et al in their literature review work on climate change and human security found out that conflicts will lead to climate change induced vulnerabilities.

Armed conflict disrupts markets and destroys infrastructure, limits education and the development of human capital, causes death and injury to workers, and decreases the ability of individuals, communities, and the state to secure credit. Conflict thus creates poverty and constrains livelihoods that, in turn, increases vulnerability to the impacts of climate change. Violent conflict is a major cause of hunger and famines. Armed conflict interrupts the ability of resource-dependent individuals and communities to access natural resources, and in so doing limits their capacity to adapt to climate change. The denial of strategic space as a tactic in armed conflict (through, e.g., deliberate destruction of crops and spreading of landmines in conflict affected regions) can reduce the capacity of individuals and communities to access natural capital and hence cope with climate variability.⁵⁸

It is also important changed in living space is not always a single or sufficient cause of large migrations, poverty, or violence; it always joins with other economic, political, and social factors to produce its effects.⁵⁹

2.5. What is Rural?

It is difficult to put a clear definition of rural however, six characteristics of rural by Puja Mondal⁶⁰ are significant to understand rural more. First, the main occupation of people in rural community is agriculture though a few people are engaged in non-agricultural vocations. Second

⁵⁷ Creative Associates International. ?.

⁵⁸ Adger, W.N., et al. Human security. In Field, C.B. et al (eds.). *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability*. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014: pp. 755-791.

⁵⁹ Homer-Dixon, 1999.

⁶⁰ Mondal, Puja. "Rural-Urban Differences: Demographic and Socio-Cultural Characteristics" <http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/difference/rural-urban-differences-demographic-and-socio-cultural-characteristics/39322>, Accessed on 15 March 2018.

density of population in rural community is low while in urban community is high. Third people in rural areas are close to nature while people in urban areas are surrounded more by man-made environment and are isolated from nature. Forth, rural communities are more homogeneous while urban communities are more heterogeneous. Fifth, while rural communities are stratified more on caste and less on class basis, urban communities are stratified more on economic class basis. Sixth, relations amongst people in rural areas are predominantly personal and relatively durable while in urban areas, relations are more secondary, impersonal, casual and short-lived. Generally, rural can be considered areas outside cities and towns. Also rural is mostly associated with agriculture and forestry; the environment, biodiversity and countryside.⁶¹

In the Horn of African context and for this study the rural refers to two geographical or demographic spaces with rural character: pastoral and agrarian. Pastoralism is a livelihood strategy and a system of mobile livestock production that makes wide-ranging use of grazing lands in arid and semi-arid environment that doesn't uphold sustainable crop cultivation.⁶² Pastoralism can be also considered as a traditional form of natural resource use and management where from pure nomadism, characterized by long-distance migration searching for pasture lands, to seasonal movements over shorter distances.⁶³ The agrarian societies in the region are mostly subsistence farmers; they grow only enough food to feed their families though semi-commercial and commercial farming is slowly emerging.⁶⁴

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation No. 456/2005 define rural as 'any land outside of a municipality holding or a town designated as such by the relevant law'.

⁶¹ European Union. *Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Statics*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2017

⁶² Aberra, Yohannes and Mahmmud Abdulahi. Introduction: Government Development Strategies in Pastoral Areas of the Horn of Africa. In Aberra, Yohannes and Mahmmud Abdulahi (eds). *The Intricate Road to Development: Government Development Strategies in the Pastoral Areas of the Horn of Africa*. Addis Ababa: Institute of Peace and Security. 2015. Page 1.

⁶³ Giessen, Eric van de. *Horn of Africa: Environmental Security Assessment*. Institute for Environmental Security. Hague. 2011. www.envirosecurity.org/espa/PDF/ESA_HOA.pdf. Accessed on 12 February 2018.

⁶⁴ Giessen, Eric van de. 2018.

2.6. What is Rural Security?

Security is traditionally associated with state, protecting the state from foreign enemy and defending its territorial integrity and sovereignty.⁶⁵ The weakness of this state centric view of security is not focusing on individual.⁶⁶ After the Cold War the first international document articulated human security was the Human Development Report of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994.⁶⁷ The document put seven areas which human security include:

Economic security – an assured basic income for individuals, usually from productive and remunerative work, or, in the last resort, from some publicly financed safety net.

Food security – ensuring that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to basic food.

Health security – guaranteeing a minimum protection from diseases and unhealthy lifestyles.

Environmental security – protecting people from the short and long term ravages of nature, man-made threats in nature, and deterioration of the natural environment.

Personal security – protecting people from physical violence, whether from the state or external states, from violent individuals and sub-state factors, from domestic abuse, and from predatory adults.

Community security – protecting people from the loss of traditional relationships and values, and from sectarian and ethnic violence.

Political security – ensuring that people live in a society that honors their basic human rights and ensuring the freedom of individuals and groups from government attempts to exercise control over ideas and information.⁶⁸

When security is considered in terms of rural area all UNDPs human security areas are included in terms of special rural futures. For example pollution, organized crime, human trafficking are main security concerns of urban. On the other hand rural areas especially in the Horn of Africa context have their own security vulnerabilities like unemployment because of less diversified

⁶⁵ Acharya, Amitav. "Human Security" in Baylis et al. (eds). *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008.

⁶⁶ Menon, Sudha Venu. *Human Security: Concept and Practice*. Munich Personal RePEc Archive. Issue 2478, 2007. pp. 1-24 - <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2478/>. Accessed on 19 March 2018.

⁶⁷ Jolly and Basu cited in Menon, Sudha Venu. 2018.

⁶⁸ Acharya, Amitav. "Human Security" in Baylis et al. (eds). *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008.

economic activities and shortage of land, land alienation, militarization or illicit small arms and light weapons in terms of environmental concerns deforestation, land degradation, water insecurity and loss of biodiversity.

2.7. Summary

Conflict can be also termed as contrast, disharmony, discord, struggle, contest, strife, antagonism, controversy, clash, rivalry, contest, contention, brawl, fisticuff, fight, battle, feud, combat and war. Major types of conflicts in the hon of Africa are can be divided in to two; international which is conflict between two states and civil war is when groups inside a state which can be ethnic groups, local militia or armed groups fight each other or with the government.

The answer for the question, what is the cause of conflict in the Horn of Africa? Discussed in this chapter in two ways. The first one is the separation of ethnic groups in different states by colonial powers make it had to have a state with political cohesiveness or common political identity. The other reason which is the principal theoretical background of this monograph is conflict over changed living space, which means the shrinking of important land resources by climate change and environmental degradation. Thus, scarcity of land and water for agriculture for the peasants and shrinking of grazing land for the pastoralist is a key source of conflict in the region.

In the Horn of African context rural refers to two geographical or demographic spaces with rural character: pastoral and agrarian. Security concerns of rural areas of the Horn of Africa region area are unemployment and shortage of land, land alienation, militarization or illicit small arms and light weapons deforestation, land degradation, water insecurity and loss of biodiversity

3. Horn of Africa

3.1 Introduction

The Horn Africa ⁶⁹ is located in the Northeastern part of the continent consisting of eight countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia⁷⁰, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda. These nine states are also the member of the regional block, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which make the member states to be considered as the regional complex that reflect interlinked regional security complex.⁷¹ Except Uganda, Ethiopia shares a border with all the member states.

The Horn of Africa region is a place of the origin of humanity. Fossil remains of *Chororapithecus Abyssinicus*, lived 12 to 7 million years ago, found in the Afar depression of Ethiopia and the most famous of the discovery in the same area is Lucy '*Dinkenesh*', the most complete skeleton of an early hominid yet found and dating back some 3.2 million years.

⁶⁹ Prominent scholars on the region have four usage of the term 'Horn of Africa.' The first group use the term Horn of Africa only Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti. See Clapham, Christopher. *The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay*. London: Hurst & Company, 2017 and Habte-Selassie, Bereket. *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa*. London: Monthly Review Press, 1980.

The second group include Sudan, see De Waal, Alex. *The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power*. Cambridge: Polity Press. 2015 and Lata, Leenco. *The Horn of Africa as Common Homeland: The State and Self-Determination in the Era of Heightened Globalization*. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2004.

The third group in addition to the above states they add Uganda and Kenya. See Williams, Paul D. *Horn of Africa: Webs of Conflict and Pathways to Peace*. Washington, DC: The Wilson Center, 2011 and Mesfn, Berouk "The Horn of Africa Security Complex" in Roba Sharamo and Berouk Mesfn (eds.), *Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa*. Pretoria: ISS Monograph 178, April 2011, pp.1-29.

The fourth group go further by including Burundi, Rwanda or Tanzania by using the term 'Greater Horn of Africa'. See Mengisteab, Kidane and Redie Bereketeab, (eds.) *Regional Integration, Identity and Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa*. Suffolk: James Currey, 2012 and Fisher, *Jonathan Mapping 'Regional Security' in the Greater Horn of Africa: Between National Interests and Regional Cooperation*. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, April 2014.

For this study the third usage of Horn of Africa is used because it includes IGAD member states.

⁷⁰ Somaliland is non-recognized a *de facto* independent state but internationally recognized as an autonomous region of Somalia.

⁷¹ Klosowicz, R. "The Role of Ethiopia in the regional security complex of the Horn of Africa." *Ethiopian Journal of Social Sciences and Language Studies*, Volume 2, Issue 2, 83-97, 84.

The Aksumite Empire, in present day Ethiopia and Eritrea was the well-known empire in the pre-colonial Africa. In the Middle Ages Ifat Sultanate of present day Djibouti, Adal Sultanate of present day Somalia, the Zagwe dynasty of Ethiopia, the Mehdist in Sudan, the Buganda Kingdom in Uganda and other sultanates and kingdoms existed in the region.

The European powers become more interested in the region to occupy after the opening of Suez Canal in 1869. The French colonized a small portion at the land at the cost of the Red Sea which they named French Somaliland that latter become Djibouti in 1894. The British took over northern Somalia which they named British Somaliland in 1887 which is the present day the autonomous region of Somaliland and in further south Imperial British East Africa Company in 1888 which latter become Kenya and since 1894 Uganda became a British protectorate and Anglo-Egyptian colony of Sudan established in 1899. Italy took possession of Eritrea in 1890 as well as the southern Somalia, Italian Somaliland in 1889. Ethiopia, however, did not fall under the colonial yoke, because they able to defeat the Italian Empire in 1896 except brief occupation of Ethiopia (1936 – 1941).

Djibouti get its independence in 1977 after a popular referendum. Eritrea got its independence after Italy defeated at Second World War and expelled by the British in 1941 but remained under the British military administration until it was federated with Ethiopia following United Nations Assembly Resolution 390 in December 1950. However the Eritreans fought for their independence after the Ethiopian Empire dissolve the federation and made Eritrea one of the fourteen provinces in 1962. After a long civil war the Eritreans got independent from Ethiopia *de facto* in 1991 and *de jure* in 1993 after a popular referendum. On 26 June 1960 British Somaliland became independent and on the 1st July 1960 Italian Somalia became independent and joined Somaliland to form the Somali Republic (Somalia).⁷² Uganda got its independence in 1962 and Kenya in 1963. Sudan got its independence in 1956 however the Southerners fought for independence since 1972 until 2005 and South Sudan got its independence from Sudan in 2011.

⁷² Lewis, Ioan. *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society*. New York: Colombia University Press, 2008. Page 124.

At the time of the Cold War because of the strategic location of the region both USSR and United States were involved in the region. For example in the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977 – 78 both USSR and United States were supporting the Ethiopians and the Somalis respectively.⁷³ And most recently the region become one of the focus of global war on terror.



Map 3.1. Political Map of Horn of Africa⁷⁴

Today the region consists of two of the nine newest states in the world, Eritrea and South Sudan.⁷⁵ And Somaliland is striving to be one since 1991 by establishing the most stable state and

⁷³ Tareke, Gebru. *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2009. Page 182.

⁷⁴ Source: Sitesatlas. World Sites Atlas. <https://www.sitesatlas.com/>, Accessed on 2 February 2018.

conducting peaceful government transition in the region, by challenging the image of war and disaster that has been associated with the region.⁷⁶

Djibouti, a home of the Afar and Issa (a Somali clan) and the smallest state in the region both geographically and in population wise, host four military bases because of its most strategic location of sea routes. The French, Japanese, United States' larger permanent military and recently the first oversea military base of China.

After Eritrea became independent in 1993 it has been ruled by a single man, who led the long civil war of independence, without a constitution or effective parliament. In 1998 it went into full scale war with Ethiopia which both remained in a state of war since. Because of its conscript system and human right violations many Eritreans are choosing to leave the country and Eritreans become the second largest nationality after Syrians to seek refuge in Europe.⁷⁷

Known for its savannah safari, Kenya is the economic hub of the region. Kenya also known for its democratic transitions until the 2007 which led to the death for more than one thousand Kenyans because of post-election ethnic violence. On security wise Kenya has been a target of terrorism since 1998, the bombing of United States embassy in Nairobi. In recent past the Somali radical group al-Shabaab hit Kenya several times; two of the most viscous were the September 2013 attack of the Westgate mall in Nairobi, triggering a four-day siege with the government forces which 68 killed and 175 wounded. Another one in April 2015, al-Shabaab gunmen attacked Garissa University College, targeting non-Muslim students, killed 147 people and wounded dozens.

Somalia was troubled by violence since 1991. Absence of functional and strong government left the county to radicalism, piracy, drought and plundering of its natural resources. Illegal fishing and logging of wood and charcoal and dumping of toxic waste become a severe problems.

⁷⁵ Taylor, Adam. The 9 newest countries in the world. September 16, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/16/the-9-newest-countries-in-the-world/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8359404d3f26. Accessed on 22 March 2018.

⁷⁶ Bradbury, Mark. *Becoming Somaliland*. Oxford: James Carry. 2008. Page 1.

⁷⁷ UN News Center. "Thousands of civilians fleeing 'rule of fear' in Eritrea, say UN experts, warning of gross rights abuses". 24 June 2015. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51239#.Whte3UqnFPZ>, Accessed on 27 November 2017.

Transitional Federal Government of Somalia was established with the support of IGAD in 2004 and later the Federal Government of Somalia was established in 2012. However, the radical group al-Shabaab is still controls some parts of the country and making terrorist attacks one of the deadliest ever single attack was in October 2018, a truck bomb killed over 320 people and wounded 300 more at a busy intersection in the capital, Mogadishu.⁷⁸ On the other hand, Somaliland, the *de facto* independent state, was able to go out of the crisis after the civil war, establishing the government of Republic of Somaliland in 18 May 1991. Somaliland was able to conduct free and fair elections and it is one of the only two countries with Kenya which is Partly Free according to Freedom House report among the Horn of African states.⁷⁹ Only Djibouti, Ethiopia and Turkey has a consulate in Somaliland.

The 54th state of Africa and 193rd member of the United Nations, South Sudan gained its independence in 2011 after a long civil war. Geographically South Sudan is borders with mostly troubled neighbors, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, DR Congo and CAR. Though it has abundant natural resources it turned to a civil war in 2013, turning more than 2 million of its citizen to refugees.⁸⁰ On February 2017 United Nations declared famine in South Sudan.⁸¹

Sudan, led by a single man since 1989, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, who faces international arrest warrant by International Criminal Court in The Hague. He is the first sitting President to be wanted by the ICC, and the first person to be charged by the ICC for the crime of genocide.⁸² He was charged and arrest warrant was issued on him two times in March 2009 and in July 2010 for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur. Sudan's economy is mainly based on oil and also the economic embargo of US was lifted in October 2017.

⁷⁸ Williams, Jennifer and Kainaz Amaria. Al-Qaeda-linked militants kill more than 320 in Somalia truck bomb attack. October 17, 2017. <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/10/17/16485944/somalia-truck-bombings-mogadishu-terror-attack-shabaab>, Accessed on 24 March 2018.

⁷⁹ Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2017. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017>, Accessed on 23 March 2018.

⁸⁰ UNHCR. South Sudan Refugee Crisis. <https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/south-sudan/>, Accessed on March 24, 2018.

⁸¹ UN News. Famine declared in region of South Sudan – UN. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/02/551812-famine-declared-region-south-sudan-un>, Accessed on March 24, 2018.

⁸² ICC. Darfur, Sudan. <https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur>, Accessed on March 24, 2018.

Uganda, comparatively stable country in the region, ruled by longest serving president in the Horn of Africa, Yoweri Museveni, since 1986. The civil war with Lord's Resistance Army was horrified the north part of Uganda from 1986 to 2005. The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for its top leaders Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti in 2005.⁸³ However, the group, mostly child soldiers went to Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic. The Ugandan army, backed by US Special Forces and African Union (AU) troops, have been searching for him in Central Africa Republic since 2012, where they stop its operation against LRA in 2017 claiming it is no more threat in Uganda though the top leader Joseph Kony is not captured.

	Djibouti	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Somalia	South Sudan	Sudan	Uganda
Failed State Index (2018) ⁸⁴ Rank out of 178 countries	42	19	15	17	2	1	7	24
Human Development Index (2014) ⁸⁵ Rank out of 188 Countries	171	181	174	147	-	179	165	165
Ibrahim Governance Index (Africa 2017) ⁸⁶ Rank out of 54 States	38	52	36	13	54	53	50	19
Corruption Perceptions Index (2017) ⁸⁷ Rank out of 180 States	122	165	107	143	180	179	175	151
World Bank - Worldwide Governance Indicators (2016) ⁸⁸ (per cent Ranked from 0 (Lowest) to 100 (Highest))								
Voice & Accountability ⁸⁹	12.81	0.99	8.87	41.87	2.96	5.42	3.45	27.09
Political Stability & Absence of Violence/Terrorism	23.81	17.14	7.62	9.52	2.86	1.90	2.38	21.43
Government Effectiveness	16.83	3.37	28.38	41.35	0.48	0.00	7.21	32.21
Regulatory Quality ⁹⁰	25.48	1.44	11.54	41.83	0.96	2.88	4.81	46.15
Rule of Law	17.31	5.77	37.02	32.69	0.00	2.88	9.13	45.67
Control of Corruption	30.29	11.54	39.90	16.83	0.48	1.92	1.44	12.98

⁸³ ICC. Uganda. <https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda>, Accessed on March 24, 2018.

⁸⁴ Fund for Peace. Fragile States Index 2018. <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/>, Accessed on 20 March 2018.

⁸⁵ UNDP. Human Development Reports. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/2016-report>, Accessed on 20 March 2018.

⁸⁶ Mo Ibrahim Foundation. Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). <http://iiag.online/>, Accessed on 20 March 2018.

⁸⁷ Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index 2017. 21 February 2018. https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017, Accessed on 20 March 2018.

⁸⁸ The World Bank Group. Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx?fileName=wgidataset.xlsx>, Accessed on 20 March 2018.

⁸⁹ Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

⁹⁰ Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

Table 3.1. Different Indexes of the states of Horn of Africa.

3.2 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is one of Africa's sub-regional organizations, founded in 1996 to replace the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), which was founded in 1986 by the then drought afflicted eastern African countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda for main strategy of controlling drought. The establishment of the regional organization was first associated with frequent environmental disasters and famines in the region where 70 per cent of the area the region consists of arid and semi-arid lowlands which receive an average of less than 600 mm of rainfall per year.⁹¹ In addition to that, millions hectares farmlands and grazing has been unproductive by severe environmental conditions.⁹² The aims of IGADD were:

Coordinate and supplement the efforts of Member states to combat the effects of drought and other related disasters, assist their developmental efforts and help them to deal with problems of medium and long-term recovery and rehabilitation;

Appraise the international community of the very severe problems caused by drought and other related disasters;

Appeal for and mobilize all resources necessary to implement emergency, medium and long-term programmes, set up by the Member states and for financing operations within the framework of sub-regional cooperation;

Identify projects of regional interest submitted by Member states and assist in securing resources for project preparation and implementation;

Assist Member states in setting up guidelines and action programmes for combating drought and desertification and following up the implementation of drought-related activities of sub-regional interest;

⁹¹ IGAD. 'The IGAD Region'. <https://igad.int/about-us/the-igad-region>. Accessed 14 March 2018.

⁹² The Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 21, No. 59 (Mar., 1994), pp. 93-95

Assist Member states and existing bodies in the sub-region in securing funds for their individual programmes.⁹³

Plan of Action adopted by the Heads of State and Government in January 1986 were:

(1) Emergency measures provide immediate relief to the victims of drought and other natural disasters. IGADD helps affected countries assess the magnitude of the problems; appeals for assistance; and coordinates relief measures at the sub-regional level, including mobilization and distribution of food aid, animal feed and emergency water supplies; provision of health care, and the rehabilitation of agricultural production.

(2) Short and medium-term efforts directed toward the recovery from droughts and its effects, and toward establishing a new base for development in IGADD countries, especially action to improve food security; increase crop production; rehabilitate range lands; develop fisheries, water resources and energy systems; control desertification; and develop infrastructures and training.

(3) Long-term programmes for regional development aim at re-establishing a productive and sustainable ecological balance in the sub-region. Through the integrated development of agriculture and rural economies, the aim is to achieve sustained increases in food and agricultural production; the optimal use of soil, water and other natural resources; and the development of physical infrastructure and human resources.

IGADD's major fields of activity were emergency action; food security; water resources; desertification control; communications and transport; crops; livestock; fisheries; energy resources; manpower development, training and research.⁹⁴

Though IGADD's plans were timely and well-intentioned, the governments of the region were highly unstable and five years after its creation, three of six IGADD's founding heads of states, Ethiopian, Somalian, Sudanese had been ousted. Latter, IGAD was designed to expand IGADD's mandate to achieve security, development and integration.⁹⁵ In 1993 Eritrea and in 2011 South Sudan become member states of IGAD. Today it has four divisions namely agriculture and environment, peace and security, economic cooperation and health and social development. The

⁹³ Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). 1986. [https://www3.nd.edu/~ggoertz/rei/reidevon.dtBase2/Files.noindex/webarchive/f/Inter-Governmental percent 20Authority percent 20on percent 20Drought percent 20and percent 20Development percent 20\(IGADD\) percent 20-- percent 20International percent 20Organizations percent 20Online.webarchive](https://www3.nd.edu/~ggoertz/rei/reidevon.dtBase2/Files.noindex/webarchive/f/Inter-Governmental%20Authority%20on%20Drought%20and%20Development%20(IGADD)%20--%20International%20Organizations%20Online.webarchive), Accessed on 20 March 2018.

⁹⁴ Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). 1986.

⁹⁵ Healy, Sally. IGAD and Regional Security in the Horn. In Hentz, James J. *Routledge Handbook of African Security*. New York, Routledge, 2014. Page 219-220.

most significant achievement has been the development of an early warning mechanism, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), which is monitoring three areas of pastoral border conflict.⁹⁶

3.2 Geography and Population

3.2.1 Geography

The Horn of Africa is the easternmost part of the continent stretches over an area of 5.2 million km² and has about 6,960 km of coastline with the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Toudjoura and the Red Sea and on the other side it has a total of 6,910 Km of international borders with Egypt, Libya, Chad, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Tanzania.⁹⁷

Country	Total Number of population in 2016	Number of Rural population in per cent 2016	Land size
Djibouti	942,333	23	23,200 km ²
Eritrea	4,474,690 ⁽²⁰¹¹⁾	79 ⁽²⁰¹¹⁾	117,600 km ²
Ethiopia	102,403,196	80	1.104 million km ²
Kenya	48,461,567	74	580,367 km ²
Somalia	14,317,996	60	637,657 km ²
South Sudan	12,230,730	81	619,745 km ²
Sudan	39,578,828	66	1.886 million km ²
Uganda	41,487,965	84	241,038 km ²


Figure 3.2. Rural Population in States of Horn of Africa⁹⁸

The Horn of Africa region farmlands account for 7 per cent, forests 19 per cent and permanent pastures 28 per cent of the total land area and the remaining 46 per cent is relatively unproductive or marginal land.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Healy, Sally. 2014. Page 220.

⁹⁷IGAD. 'The IGAD Region'. <https://igad.int/about-us/the-igad-region>, Accessed 14 March 2018.

⁹⁸ World Bank. World Bank Open Data. <https://data.worldbank.org>, Accessed on 16 March 2018.




Map 3.2. Ecological zones of the Horn of Africa¹⁰⁰ (the border between Sudan and South Sudan is not included)

The major geographic features of the region are the Nile valley and the Great Rift Valley with high plateaus and clusters of rugged mountains in between. Rift Valley extends from Syria to Mozambique, which rises more than 1 kilometer above the sea in central Ethiopia and falls to 120 meters below sea level in the Danakil Depression.

⁹⁹ Maru, Mehari Taddele. *IGAD State of the Region Report: A Popular Version*. Djibouti: IGAD, 2016. Page 5.

¹⁰⁰ Institute for Environmental Security. Ecological zones of the Horn of Africa. [http://www.envirosecurity.org/espa/horn-of-africa/Ecological percent 20zones percent 20of percent 20the percent 20Horn percent 20of percent 20Africa.pdf](http://www.envirosecurity.org/espa/horn-of-africa/Ecological%20zones%20of%20the%20Horn%20of%20Africa.pdf), Accessed on 16 March 2018.

The Ethiopian highlands rise west of the Rift Valley to an average height of 10 000 feet in the north, reaching almost 15 000 feet in Ras Dashan in the Semien, the Roof of Africa. This is the major rainfall catchment area for the entire Nile system. Two-thirds of the water that reaches Egypt in a normal year flows down through the mile-deep gorges of the Blue Nile and its tributaries to join the White Nile at Khartoum. The White Nile has its sources in the lakes of Uganda but loses much of its water in the enormous swamps of south-central Sudan, the Sudd.



Map 3.2. Topographic Map of the Horn of Africa¹⁰¹ (the border between Sudan and South Sudan and Ethiopia and Eritrea is not included)

¹⁰¹ Paul B. Henze. The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace. London: Macmillan, 1991.

The eastern Ethiopian highlands rise to over 14 000 feet in Bale. The headwaters of Wabe Shebelle and the Juba gather here and flow into Somalia. Though most of Somalia is relatively low, the northern Somali plateau rises to almost 8000 feet. While the Ethiopian highlands and southern Sudan normally experience heavy rains during the late spring and summer monsoon season, much of the rest of the Horn, whether the terrain is high or low, is rain-poor.

Northern Sudan and northern Eritrea are mostly desert; so are the coastal lowlands along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Most of the Somali-inhabited areas are semi-desert. In ancient times many of the peoples of the Horn learned to adapt to existence in extremely dry and hot climates. The Afar who can be found from Djibouti northward to Tigre and Eritrea are the most extreme example.

In ancient times parts of the Ethiopian highlands were thickly forested. Deforestation occurred over millennia, not in the past half-century, as is sometimes claimed. Virgin highland forests remain only in a few mountain areas. The Australian blue gum eucalyptus, introduced in the late nineteenth century, has changed the appearance of the landscape over the past hundred years. It is now planted everywhere in the highlands and serves as a valuable source of wood for fuel and building.

Portions of lowland Sudan and Ethiopia still possess modest stands of tropical forest. Acacia forests are the natural vegetation in most semi-arid lowland areas. Degradation of these has been particularly severe in Somalia during recent years.

The White Nile, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean are the only natural transportation arteries in the Horn. Railways function only in northern Sudan and between Djibouti and Addis Ababa. I Great distances have made highway systems expensive to build and difficult to maintain. In spite of the roughness of its terrain, Ethiopia has a much better highway system than Sudan or Somalia.

There is a great deal of cultivable land in the Horn and possibilities for irrigated agriculture have barely begun to be exploited. With intelligent pricing policies and only slight improvements in traditional farming methods, the region is fully capable of producing sufficient food for its present population. Sustained development programs taking advantage of modern technology

and know-how could transform the region from a chronic food deficit area to the breadbasket of Africa and the Middle East.

3.2.2 Population

Africa's population has nearly trebled from its estimated 478 million in 1980 to the current estimate of close to 1.2 billion, and is projected to increase to 1.5 billion by 2025 and 2.4 billion by 2050.¹⁰² Four of the top ten countries that are contributing to the increase are found in the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan.

Of the 160 million people living in the Horn of Africa, 70 million live in areas prone to extreme food shortages. 60 per cent of the land is home to 22 million pastoralists and more than 40 per cent of the population in the region is undernourished due to food insecurity and inadequate livelihoods, during the 2010-2011 droughts malnutrition was as high as 30 per cent.¹⁰³

3.3 Rural Population of Horn of Africa

Based on the characters given in chapter two the rural population in the Horn of Africa can be divided in to pastoralist and agrarian. The following sub-topics give an overview of the two communities.

3.3.1 Pastoralist Communities


Pastoralism is an economic activity and land use system with its own distinct characteristics and it is a way of life for people who derive most of their income or sustenance from keeping domestic livestock reared in conditions where most of the feed is natural rather than cultivated or closely managed.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. *The Demographic Profile of African Countries*. Addis Ababa: Economic Commission of Africa, 2016.

¹⁰³ Horn of Africa: the linkages between food insecurity, migration and conflict <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/horn-africa-linkages-between-food-insecurity-migration-and-conflict>

¹⁰⁴ Sandford cited in Desta, Solomon. Pastoralism and Development in Ethiopia. *Economic Focus*. Vol. 9. No. 3. November 2006. Page 12.

There are four major pastoralist clusters in the Horn of Africa including Tanzania in the south. The first one, Karamojong cluster is found in north-eastern Uganda, south-eastern Sudan, north-western Kenya and south-western Ethiopia. Second the Boran cluster includes peoples of southern Ethiopia's border region and northern Kenya. Third, the Somali cluster covers Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland, Djibouti, north-eastern Kenya and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the fourth, the Maasai cluster which is found in southern Kenya and northern Tanzania and includes a small number of agro-pastoralist groups affiliated to the Maasai.



Map 3.4. Pastoralist cluster groups in the Horn of Africa¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ Source: Humanitarian Policy Group. *Pastoralism demographics, settlement and service provision in the Horn and East Africa Transformation and opportunities*. London, May 2010

These significant population of pastoralists whose livelihood system is based on production in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) which are characterized by low and erratic rainfall, high temperatures, and consequently, high evaporation rates. It is 60 per cent of the total surface Horn of Africa's area with a population estimated between 12 million and 22 million people.¹⁰⁶

According to World Bank the total number of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists worldwide at 120 million, of which 50 million reside in Sub-Saharan Africa, though pastoralists constitute one of the poorest population sub-groups in the world, among African pastoralists, the incidence of extreme poverty ranges from 25 to 55 per cent, and in the Horn of Africa it is 41 per cent.¹⁰⁷

Country	Pastoralist Groups	Number	per cent of Population
Djibouti	Afar, Somali	100,000	16 per cent
Eritrea	Tigre, Rashaida, Hidarib, Afar	1,000,000	11 per cent
Ethiopia	Somali, Boran, Afar + 15 others	7,070,000	11 per cent
Kenya	Turkana, Pokot, Tugan, Massai, Gabbra, Sakuye, Rendille, Sambura, Dassanetch, Boran, Oromo, Somali	7,500,000	25 per cent
Somalia	Somali	4,800,000	55 per cent
Sudan	East: Beja, Beni Amer, Shukriyya, Rashaida	4,700,000	15 per cent
	West: Kababish, Zaghawa, Rizeigat, Messiriya, Fallata		
	South: Dinka, Nuer, Mundari, Topposa + many others		
Uganda	Ateso, Nuer, Karamojong, Banyankore, Basongora	1,030,000	5 per cent

¹⁰⁶ World Bank. "World Bank Boosts Support for Pastoralists in Horn of Africa". Press Release. March 18, 2014. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/18/world-bank-pastoralists-horn-africa>. Accessed 16 March 2018.

¹⁰⁷ World Bank. "World Bank Boosts Support for Pastoralists in Horn of Africa". Press Release. March 18, 2014. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/18/world-bank-pastoralists-horn-africa>. Accessed 16 March 2018.

Table 3.3. Pastoralist groups in the Horn of African States¹⁰⁸


The main economic sector of pastoralist communities is livestock. Due to the large proportion of the land is arid, the region has the largest numbers of livestock compared to other regions in Africa. Excluding Uganda the Horn of Africa region has 76 per cent of the world's population of camels, 8 per cent of the cattle, 9 per cent of the sheep, 30 per cent of the goats, 14 per cent of the donkeys and 5 per cent of the equines (horses and mules).¹⁰⁹

The tragic condition is though the Horn of Africa region have large livestock herds and high numbers of ruminants per capita, average annual per capita consumption of animal products is exceptionally low even by developing country standards.¹¹⁰ The rural poor, who are heavily depends on livestock production mostly trade the animals for essential food. Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan are the highest exporters of livestock in the region.

¹⁰⁸ Source: (Before the Separation of South Sudan from Sudan) Giessen, Eric van de. *Horn of Africa: Environmental Security Assessment*. Institute for Environmental Security. Hague. 2011.
www.envirosecurity.org/espa/PDF/ESA_HOA.pdf. Accessed on 12 February 2018.

¹⁰⁹ Simpkin, S. Piers. *Livestock Study in the Greater Horn of Africa*. Nairobi: ICRC, 2005. Page 1.

¹¹⁰ Knips, Vivien. *Review of the Livestock Sector in the Horn of Africa (IGAD Countries)*. Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations. September 2004.



Map 3.4 Live Stock Production System in the Horn of Africa¹¹¹

3.3.2 Agrarian Communities

Agriculture is one of the two most important rural economic activity in the Horn of Africa another being pastoral livestock production. However, in most of the states in the region farmers relies heavily on rain-fed subsistence agriculture, which is increasingly becoming vulnerable to frequent drought events.¹¹²

¹¹¹ Busby, Josh. Resilience and the Future of Pastoralism in the Horn – Part V (of the series on the 2011 East African drought) 2011-08-23. <http://duckofminerva.com/2011/08/resilience-and-future-of-pastoralism-in.html>. Accessed 16 March 2018.

¹¹² Loewenberg, S., 2011. Humanitarian response inadequate in Horn of Africa crisis. *The Lancet* 378 (9791), 555–558.

Country	Agricultural Area	Agricultural land (per cent of land area)	Contribution GDP (per cent)	Employment in agriculture (per cent of total employment)	Access to electricity, rural (per cent of rural population)
Djibouti	17,020 sq. Km	73.43	3.8	29.79	2.01
Eritrea	75920 sq. Km	75.18	14.53	57	7.18
Ethiopia	362,590 sq. Km	36.26	37.23	70.5	12.2
Kenya	276,300 sq. Km	48.55	35.6	61.9	12.2
Somalia	441250 sq. Km	70.34	-*	-*	11.2
South Sudan	285,332 sq. Km	-*	-*	-*	3.6
Sudan	681,862 sq. Km	28.7	39.46	32.90*	31.7
Uganda	144,150 sq. Km	71.89	24.44	71.68	10.3

Table 3.4. Agriculture and Rural Access to Electricity in the Horn of African states¹¹³

In Djibouti, where the majority of the population live in urban areas, agriculture contribution to GDP is about three per cent. Most of the rural lands are for livestock production by the pastoralists. 90 per cent of Djibouti's land is desert and it is heavy rely on imported food from its neighbors and international market. Eritrea with less than 5 per cent of arable land its agriculture is characterized by backward farming system, erratic rainfall and exhausted soils.¹¹⁴ Ethiopia has huge agricultural potential and about two third of the population directly depend on farming. The Ethiopian agriculture has been also set back by dependence of rain fed agriculture, land fragmentation and land degradation. Kenya's 83 per cent of land is arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) with predominant livestock production; farming is dominant in the Rift Valley and western areas covered by cropland, natural vegetation and wildlife, which is a source of income from tourism.¹¹⁵ Rain fed and irrigated farming is exercised in Somalia however more than half of the population is engaged on pastoralism. South Sudan with more than 70 per cent of the land suitable for agriculture most of the rural population practice cultivation; similarly livestock keeping is practiced throughout the country.¹¹⁶ In Sudan, a country where Blue and White Niles

¹¹³ Source: <https://tradingeconomics.com>, Accessed 15 March 2018.

¹¹⁴ Babikir, Osman et al. Agricultural Systems in IGAD Region: A Socio-Economic Review, Agroecology Vytautas Pilipavicius, IntechOpen, 10 June 2015, <https://www.intechopen.com/books/agroecology/agricultural-systems-in-igad-region-a-socio-economic-review>, Accessed on 20 March 2018.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Babikir, Osman et al. 2015.

meet, has favorable land for irrigation agriculture. However, small scale, rain-fed and traditional agricultural practices are dominant with challenges of climate change, droughts, rainfall variability, land degradation, desertification.¹¹⁷ Uganda, large fertile land and ample water sources farming is dominant in the rural areas. The main food crops grown in Uganda are banana, cassava, and sweet potatoes.

3.4. Conflict Caused by Change in Living Space in Horn of Africa

The primary cause for conflict in Horn of Africa is competition over declining resources.¹¹⁸ Resource scarcity and competition due to population pressures and environmental degradation increase the pressure on the society and the government. The central role of the state in determining resource distribution makes it a major target and, when power is over-centralized, reason for conflict.¹¹⁹

Especially in the northern countries like Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan topography and climate are contributing factors to conflict. The history of the region includes massive population movements pushed by other groups and pulled by the search for better pasture and water sources. Pastoral migration is a common way of life in the region. The Horn contains the largest grouping of pastoralists in the world: Sudan has the highest per cent age globally; Somalia is third; Ethiopia is fifth; in Djibouti, one third of the population is pastoralist.¹²⁰

The common mobile way of life is becoming a problematic when grazing land shrinks because of erratic climate. Thus, access to grazing land and water become one of the main causes for tension in both between the pastoralists and between the pastoralist and agrarian societies of the Horn of Africa. S. Piers Simpkin describes the phenomenon as follows:

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Creative Associates International. "A Guide: Costs and Causes of Conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa" ?. https://extranet.creativeworldwide.com/CAIStaff/Dashboard_GIROAdminCAIStaff/Dashboard_AIIAdminDatabase/resources/ghai/costcaus.htm. Accessed 15 March 2018.

¹¹⁹ Creative Associates International. ?.

¹²⁰ Creative Associates International. ?.

Pastoralist communities have, in their search for acceptable grazing land, often clashed with other pastoralists seeking the same resources. More recently, however, pastoralists are impinging increasingly on fertile land cultivated by sedentary groups near waterways. This development fuels tension and conflict with new groups who do not necessarily share the same goals or needs as the pastoralists. In the past, pastoral conflict usually involved pastoralists with common interests; the causes for conflict were thus well understood, and could easily be resolved. New conflicts involving members of different livelihoods are more complicated, harder to resolve, and consequently tend to reoccur and escalate.¹²¹

In addition to this some studies suggest that it is the pastoralists in the Horn of Africa which are likely to be the first people wiped out by climate change.¹²² The fact that pastoralist live in a place with limited water and grazing land, loss of the existing resource will lead to a catastrophe. Taking in note that no difference between a civilian and an armed men in pastoralist areas.

In Sudan, because of the armed conflict since 2003, according to Human Rights Watch as of 2008, more than 200,000 people have died and 2.5 million people have been forced from their homes in Darfur.¹²³ Desertification led to food scarcity, water scarcity, and famine, in turn leading to civil war and ethnic cleansing. This is a shrinking of living space land fueled by population increase and political grievance. Musa Abdul-Jalil and Jon D. Unruh explain the Darfur conflict as following:

Arab pastoralists of northern Darfur with longstanding grievances regarding their perceived lack of land and political participation (the two inseparable in Darfur) saw an opportunity to gain access to land, and so were easily recruited into the Janjaweed. ... The primary war-related land tenure issue in the Darfur conflict, which has driven many other aspects of the war including perceptions of 'genocide', is how the Arab pastoralist militias (Janjaweed) have gone about operationalizing the prospect that they would be able to keep the lands they were able to 'liberate' during the course of the conflict. Instead of pursuing and engaging the rebel militias in order to obtain such lands, the Janjaweed and its constituencies went directly to the land itself and conducted scorched

¹²¹ Simpkin, S. Piers. *Livestock Study in the Greater Horn of Africa*. Nairobi: ICRC, 2005. Page 8.

¹²² Christian Aid Cited in Meier, Partick et al. Environmental influences on pastoral conflict in the Horn of Africa. *Political Geography* 26 (2007) 716 - 735.

¹²³ HRW. Crisis in Darfur: What Happened in Darfur? September 2008. <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/features/darfur/fiveyearson/qanda.html>, Accessed on 12 April 2008.

earth campaigns against the civilian agriculturalist population, emptying the countryside, and seizing the land.¹²⁴

Pastoralist conflicts in the region are not strictly limited to national boundaries although most of these communities are divided by the political boundaries of the states. The impact of conflicts caused by policy failures, exacerbated by climate change and natural resource degradation, transcends national boundaries.¹²⁵

Today, the geographic belt separating desert from savannah in the northern Africa become a major security concern. Terrorist groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram in north-eastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad area and al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya are causing a turmoil. Some scholars argue in addition to the religious radicalism the environmental conditions have also a contributed for the instability.

Gunther Bachler describe the condition as follows:

Fertile land is basic resource of local food supply. When it is damaged or reduced, it propels local population into competition and conflict, especially in countries with a large agricultural sector or subsistence economies. Africa is a sad example for the increasing importance of soil degradation in war. In the 1970's and 80's, armed conflicts mainly caused by the manifold effects of decolonization and in part overshadowed by the cold war were concentrated in Southern Africa and on the Horn. Today, another and different "war belt" stretches from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. The single countries of this belt, Senegal, Mali, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, all belong to the Sahel Zone, which has been particularly affected by over-grazing, drought, and soil erosion.¹²⁶

Another security threat in the region is transnational cattle rustling and banditry caused by militarization of the rural communities in the region resulted from access to modern weapons as

¹²⁴ Abdul-Jalil, Musa & Jon D Unruh. "Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict". *War & Society*, (2013) 32:2, 156-181.

¹²⁵ Berhe, Mulugeta Gebrehiwot. Economic Integration as a Peace building Strategy in the Horn of Africa with Particular Focus on Ethiopia and Its Four Neighbors. *Journal of African-Centered Solutions in Peace and Security*. Volume 1, Issue 1 August 2016. Page 63.

¹²⁶ Bachler, Gunther. The Anthropogenic Transformation of the Environment: A Source of War? Historical Background, Typology and Conclusions. Proceedings of the international conference on 'Environmental Crisis: Regional Conflict and Ways of Cooperation', Ascona, Switzerland, 2-7 October 1994.

a result of civil wars and inter-state wars or training from rebel movements is one of the most important cause of insecurity in the borders of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda.¹²⁷

Country	Community/Clusters	Targeted areas of raids
Ethiopia	Koroma Nyangatom	North-eastern Kenya South-eastern Sudan
Kenya	Marakwet Turkana Subiny	North-eastern Uganda Southern Ethiopia South-eastern Sudan
Sudan	Boya Didinga Toposa Murle	Northern Kenya North-eastern Kenya North-eastern Uganda Southern Ethiopia
Uganda	Karamajong Dodoth Jie	Northern Kenya South-eastern Sudan North-eastern Kenya Kenyan Rift Valley

Table 3.5 National and Transboundary Armed Cattle Rustling in the Horn of Africa¹²⁸

Drought is cyclical and omnipresent and is worsened by over-cultivation. Large areas of once fertile soil are desertified, available land is reduced, and competition over remaining land intensifies.¹²⁹

Cultivable land is limited; in Ethiopia, for example, only a quarter of the total land mass is planted.¹³⁰

Land tenure in the region remains a critical issue for example in Somalia after 1991 clan based warlords fought over the control of key resources, embedded in the capital Mogadishu, port-towns, and the fertile lands between the Juba and Shabelle rivers.¹³¹

¹²⁷ Wasara, Samson S. Conflict and State Security in the Horn of Africa: Militarization of Civilian Groups. *African Journal of Political Science* (2002) Vol 7 No. 2

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Creative Associates International. ?.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

The Greater Horn of Africa suffers from extreme population pressures, calculated both in terms of population density and growth rates.¹³²

Natural erosion and improper agricultural practices have greatly damaged the land's productive capacity. Food production growth rates have fallen behind population growth rates. This population growth combined with commercially-driven increases in the animal population has led to denudation, intensified erosion, falling yields, and possibly climatic change: precipitation has declined since the 1950s, drought is now common and famine inevitably follows, even when early warning systems have alleviated famines caused by droughts.¹³³

Land degradation is caused by climatic change and human activities such as farming and cutting trees. Resource competition, intensified by drought, heightens social inequalities. Often, the first to feel the effects of droughts are small farmers and poor pastoralists in the rural.¹³⁴

The balance between people and nature is threatened as drought reduces the available resources needed by livestock. Pastoralists are forced to roam in smaller areas and overgraze vegetation, overexploit water sources and prevent regeneration.¹³⁵

Instability caused by environmental pressures almost always leads to further insecurity as people arm themselves for protection against theft of their resources and violence. The availability of weapons moves war-producing environmental causes (the Greenwar cycle) to higher levels of intensity. The Greenwar cycle develops new tensions and exacerbates political and racial antagonisms. Though not limited to poor sections of society, prejudice and xenophobia often stem from poverty and powerlessness. Whole communities have become refugees in order to avoid direct combat.¹³⁶

¹³¹ International Displacement Monitoring Center. Somalia: Window of opportunity for addressing one of the world's worst internal displacement crises. A profile of the internal displacement situation 10 January 2006. www.refworld.org/pdfid/44031be04.pdf. Accessed on 27 March 2018.

¹³² Creative Associates International. ?.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

Heather R. Croshaw on his study of on ‘Darfur, Conflict and Climate Change’ elucidated the climate change effects with is related to the socio-political situation in the ground by the ‘Conflict Tree’ below.




Figure 3.1 Heather R. Croshaw’s Conflict Tree¹³⁷

The renowned Ethiopian scholar Professor Gebru Tareke summarizes crises of the Horn of Africa as the following:

A volatile region, the Horn is where demography, identity, and borders intersect and overlap in limited space. Among others, three intertwined factors explain the historical

¹³⁷ Croshaw, Heather R. Darfur, Conflict, and Climate Change: Identifying Opportunities for Sustainable Peace. Masters project submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Environmental Management degree in the Nicholas School of the Environment and Earth Sciences of Duke University. April. 2008

infelicity and pandemic of organized violence in the region. First, there is the continuing contest for state construction and the consolidation of state power, a process that began long before the dawn of European colonialism. The tensions and conflicts that rival nationalisms and counterhegemonic movements generate are accentuated by scarce and diminishing resources in the face of exploding populations and rising social demands. Second, following independence, the state became both the source and site of conflict because, in the absence of a dominant class with a grip on the economy, the state acts as the chief custodian and allocator of national resources. This often spurred violent competition for political power, since differential access to the state meant unequal access to wealth and privilege. ... Third, foreign actors both fueled and sustained the bloody conflicts.¹³⁸

Before closing this topic it is essential to mention the reciprocal effect of conflict over the environment where ‘environmental degradation causes conflict which causes environmental degradation, creating a vicious cycle of environmental decline’ and cyclical conflict. In the Horn of Africa region with the exception of Kenya and Djibouti there were long armed conflicts which created high cost on the environment which left the lands mostly the rural areas which are the theatres of military operations, unlivable. Agricultural activity ceased because of land mines and cost lives even after the end of the armed conflict. Forests and wild animals has been affected especially in guerrilla warfare. A good example for this is the man made famine in war torn South Sudan.¹³⁹ Also another social crisis is also the spread of sexually transmitted diseases like AIDS by government and guerrilla fighters. These social pressures will create another social tension which leads to conflict.

¹³⁸ Tareke, Gebru. *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa*. Addis Ababa: Eclipse Printing Press, 2016. Page 4 – 5.

¹³⁹ UN News. Famine declared in region of South Sudan – UN. 20 February 2017. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/02/551812-famine-declared-region-south-sudan-un#.WLA6eBCaGO0>,

3.5. Summary

The Horn of Africa is composed one of the oldest states in the world Ethiopia and the newest state South Sudan and the other states are Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda and presently Somaliland still looking for statehood. In 1986 the states of the region established IGADD to fight drought in the region latter it changed to IGAD.

The Horn of Africa is mostly arid and has farmlands account for 7 per cent, forests 19 per cent and permanent pastures 28 per cent of the total land area and the remaining 46 per cent is relatively unproductive or marginal land. The region has high population growth and around 160 million people are living in the Horn of Africa, 70 million live in areas prone to extreme food shortages. 6 per cent of the land is home to 22 million pastoralists and more than 40 per cent of the population in the region is undernourished due to food insecurity.

The rural population of the region are pastoralist and agrarian. Pastoralists are people who derive most of their income or sustenance from keeping domestic livestock and whose livelihood system is based on production in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) which are characterized by low and erratic rainfall, high temperatures, and consequently, high evaporation rates. It is 60 per cent of the total surface Horn of Africa's area with a population estimated between 12 million and 22 million people. All eight states has pastoralist communities.

The agrarian communities are those whose livelihood is based on sedentary farming. Except Djibouti all states of the region has prominent land and population who depend of agriculture.

The conflict in Darfur is the well-known change in living space conflict in the horn of Africa, where desertification led to food scarcity, water scarcity, and famine, in turn leading to civil war and ethnic cleansing. This is a shrinking of living space land fueled by population increase and political grievance.

Generally the Horn of Africa suffers from extreme population pressures and environmental degradation which resulted the scarcity of productive land which in turn lead to conflict for the scarce resources.

4. Ethiopia


4.1 Introduction

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is a federal state with nine ethno-linguistically divided regional states and two city administrations with the total land area is 1.104 million km². The population of Ethiopia is 107 million, which makes it the second most populist country in Africa. The median age in Ethiopia is 18.8 years and around 80 per cent of the population live in rural areas.

Ethiopia is located between longitudes of 33° and 48° east and in the tropics of latitude 3° and 15° north. There are five traditional climate zones based on the altitude of the places in Ethiopia.¹⁴⁰ *Wurich* (cold to moist), more than 3,200 meters in elevation with an average annual temperature below 11.5°C with an average annual rainfall of 900 – 2,000 mm and covers only 0.98 per cent of the country. These are the highest picks of Ethiopian highlands in the central and northern Ethiopia. *Dega* (cool zone), between 2,300 – 3,200 meters in elevation with an average annual temperature of 11.5 – 17.5°C with annual rainfall between 900 – 2,000 millimeters and covers 9.94 per cent of country mostly in central and northern Ethiopia. *Woina Dega* (cool to sub-humid or tropical), includes the highlands areas of 1,500 – 2,300 meter in elevation has an average annual temperature of 17.5°C – 20.0°C with annual rainfall between 800 – 1,200 millimeters and covers 26.75 per cent of the country also found mostly in central and northern Ethiopia *Kolla* (tropical zone or warm semiarid), between 500 – 1,500 meter in elevation and has an average annual temperature of about 20.0°C – 27.5°C with annual rainfall about 200 - 800 millimeter and it covers 52.94 per cent of the country. This zone almost circled Ethiopia with an exception to the north tip and found in all regional states but mostly in Afar, Ethiopian Somali, Gambela and Benishangul-Gumuz. *Berha* (desert or hot arid) less than 500 meter in elevation and has an average annual temperature of above 27.5°C with annual rainfall below 200

¹⁴⁰ NRMRD-MoA cited in Kidanewold, Belete B. et al. “Surface Water and Groundwater Resources of Ethiopia: Potentials and Challenges of Water Resources Development” In Melesse, Assefa M. et al. *Nile River Basin: Ecohydrological Challenges, Climate Change and Hydropolitics*. Switzerland; Springer International Publishing. 2014. (pp. 98 – 117) Page 99.

millimeter and it covers 9.39 per cent of the country. It is found in the western tip of Gambela, south of Oromia and Ethiopian Somali states and most of the areas of Afar. The Danakil Depression, in Afar is about 125 meter below sea level and the hottest region in Ethiopia where the temperature climbs up to 50°C.



Map 4.1. Political Boundaries in Ethiopia¹⁴¹

Ethiopia has four seasons. *Kiremt* or *Meher* (summer in Europe) June, July and August months with heavy rain fall. *Belg* (autumn in Europe) September, October and November are the spring season for Ethiopia also known as the harvest season. *Bega* (winter in Europe) December, January and February are the dry season with frost in morning especially in January. *Tseday*

¹⁴¹ Source: Rigaud, Kumari et al. Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 2018. Page 131.

(spring in Europe) March, April and May are the autumn season with sporadic showers, where May is the hottest.

Ethiopia in 2015 has 12.5 per cent of forest coverage of the total area. Deforestation has been a problem for long because the energy consumption within the country is mainly from biomass (firewood, charcoal, crop residues and animal dung) accounting for about 91 per cent, out of which about 89 per cent is for household cooking and baking both in the urban and rural regions.¹⁴² Electric energy (electric light in particular) coverage is grew form 1 per cent in 1991 to 27. 2 per cent in 2015, rural coverage is 12.2 per cent. Currently Ethiopia is building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which will be the largest dam in Africa, 1,800 meter long, 155 meter high and with a total volume of 74,000 million m³ with estimated production of 15,000 Gigawatt hours per year and behind the dam it will create a man-made lake of 150 square kilometers in size.

Agricultural land, land area that is arable, under permanent crops, and under permanent pastures is 36.5 per cent. Arable land, land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas are counted once), temporary meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market or kitchen gardens, and land temporarily fallow 15.1 per cent of the total area. Water surface 9.4 of total area with 9 major rivers, including the world longest Nile River and more than 12 vast lakes. Ethiopia's economy is still highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture which constitutes 46 per cent of GDP where dependence on rainfall makes the country vulnerable to climate-related shocks, which in turn threaten the food and humanitarian security.¹⁴³

Ethiopia has diverse society where each of 75 'nations, nationalities and peoples'¹⁴⁴ represented at the upper house, House of Federation. Each nations, nationalities and peoples has a full right of self-government. Catholicism, Ethiopian Orthodox (Coptic), Islam, Traditional faiths and Protestant are the main religions in Ethiopia.

¹⁴² Gabisa, Elias W. and Shabbir H. "Gheewala. Potential of bio-energy production in Ethiopia based on available biomass residues." *Biomass and Bioenergy*. 111 (2018) 77–87. Page 79 – 80.

¹⁴³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland. "Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with Ethiopia 2014–2017". [http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=137909&GUID=percent 7BA1BB9117-A768-42B0-A5E5-0D179FFE68BD percent 7D](http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=137909&GUID=percent%207BA1BB9117-A768-42B0-A5E5-0D179FFE68BD%20percent%207D), Accessed on 1 March 2018.

¹⁴⁴ Nations, Nationalities and Peoples are the official naming of ethnic groups in Ethiopia. See FRDE's 1995 Constitution.

Ethiopia is one of the oldest civilization in the world. The first known specific application of the term to the Ethiopian region is found in the Greek version of a trilingual inscription of the time of Ezana the Aksumite king who introduced Christianity into Ethiopia towards the middle of the fourth Century AD.¹⁴⁵ However, according to *Kibre Negert* (Glory of Kings),¹⁴⁶ an ancient book written in fourteenth century, the history of Ethiopian monarchs go back to the story of Queen of Sheba and King Solomon of Israel in 10th century BC where, all the Ethiopian Kings assert they are form Solomonic dynasty. The last monarch of Solomonic dynasty was Emperor Haile Selassie, who was overthrown by military coup in 1974.

Modern Ethiopia, with its current political boundary is formed in the second half of the nineteenth century. The coronation of Emperor Tewodros II in 1855 ‘inaugurated the modern History of Ethiopia’.¹⁴⁷ He centralized power by attempting to control all powers to himself by ended the period, where each regional lord has his own armies. After him Emperor Yohannes (1872-1889) and Emperor Menilek (1889 – 1913) continue the nation building. It is at the time of Emperor Menilek, the Ethiopian empire got its current shape. He able to incorporate all the small southern kingdoms to the Ethiopian empire and won the colonial Italian army at the Battle of Adwa in 1896.

The mid-twentieth century in Ethiopia, from 1916 through to the revolution in 1974, was dominated by a single man, Emperor Haile Selassie.¹⁴⁸ He decree the first modern constitution, establish modern army academy and air force, open the first university and army admitted Ethiopia to League of Nation and latter to Untied Nation, found Organization of African Unity him as its first chairman, and Addis Ababa as its headquarter. However, the country remain backward because of feudal economic system and other social and political reasons. In late 1960s and at the beginning of 1970s students and different sections of the society revolt against the emperor and the system. Though he survived a coup plot by his commander of the Imperial

¹⁴⁵ Zewde, Bahru *A Hisotory of Modern Ethiopia: 1955-1991*. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press. Page 218. Page 1.

¹⁴⁶ For more see Brooks, Miguel F. (Ed.) *Kibre Negest (The Glory of Kings)*. Asmera; The Red Sea Press, Inc. 2002.

¹⁴⁷ Zewde, Bahru *A Hisotory of Modern Ethiopia: 1955-1991*. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press. Page 218. Page 27.

¹⁴⁸ Clapham, Christopher. “The Ear of Haile Selassie”. In Prunier, Gerard and Eloi Ficquet (ed). *Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia*. London; Hurst & Company, 2015. Page 183.

Guard, General Mengistu Niway and his brother Girmame Niway, by the 1974 revolution made him to be removed by committee the junior military officers (*Derg*) removed him from power.

The committee of the junior officers, numbered 120, officially established the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC). The first vice-chairman, Major (later Colonel) Mengistu HaileMariam won the internal power struggle among *Derg* and became the Chairman of the provisional council until 1987 and later the President of People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) from 1987 – 1991.

Even though the military control government power, the motors of the revolutions were university students with the two pillar political and economic question, 'the question of nationality' means equality among different ethnic groups and religions and the question of "land to the tiller" means the abolition of landlord tenant-relationship of the feudal system. Unlike his predecessor Haile Silasie who allied with United States, Mengistu joined the Soviet camp and proclaimed 'Ethiopian Socialism'. He nationalized banks and foreign companies also make a major land reform in 1975. However, the military insurgencies of Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and Tigrayan Liberation Front (TPLF) in the north weaken the military government. After the military defeat of *Derg* in 1991 Eritrea separated from Ethiopia under EPLF and TPLF formed Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) with other three ethnically organized parties and after the end of the Transitional Government (1991 – 1995), it launched new constitution in 1995 and formed Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE).

After 1991 Ethiopia become a federal state with ethnically nine states and two city administration. Though the political system is parliamentary democracy and multi-party, it is *de facto* one party state where EPRDF won the majority seats in the parliament in 1995, 2000 and 2005 elections and one opposition seat in the 2010 election and it won 100 per cent of the seats in the 2015 where all elections disputed by the opposition.

Ethiopia is dominant geopolitically in the region. A major alliance of United States on war on terror and with strong military it has been playing a key role in the peace and security of the region. Ethiopia, is also considered by some as an anchor state because of its military and

peacekeeping involvement in its neighbors, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan.¹⁴⁹ Except with Eritrea it has a positive relationship with all its neighbors and key player in IGAD.

On economic side, Ethiopia performs better than most African countries in terms of economic growth according to Ethiopia has led the region and most of the world, charting annual growth of over 10 per cent from 2004 – 2014.¹⁵⁰ Also IMF predicted Ethiopia will beat Ghana as fastest-growing economy in Africa.¹⁵¹ Ethiopia's public budget priorities the growth-oriented pro-poor sectors of education, agriculture and food security, water and sanitation, health and roads.¹⁵²

4.2 Rural Ethiopia

Rural societies and land are almost inseparable because land is an asset of enormous importance for billions of rural dwellers especially in the developing world and control over land forms a significant part of the identity and maintenance of rural society.¹⁵³ For agrarian societies farming is the center of the livelihood and for the pastoral communities' livestock production the only way of surviving, which grazing land is very vital.

FDRE's Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation No. 456/2005 put three rural residents in Ethiopia first, the 'peasant' means member of a rural community who has been given rural land holding right and, the livelihood of his family and himself is based on the income from, the land. The second group 'pastoralist' means a member of a rural community that raises cattle by holding rangeland and moving from one place to the other, and the livelihood of himself and his family is based on mainly on the produce from cattle; Third, 'semi pastoralist'

¹⁴⁹ See Burgess, Stephen F. Stabilization, Peacebuilding, and Sustainability in the Horn of Africa. *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (SPRING 2009), pp. 81-118 and Pereira, R. Recipient States in Global Health Politics: PEPFAR in Africa. International Political Economy Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.


¹⁵⁰ Humanitarian Foresight Think Tank. East Africa and the Horn in 2022: An Outlook for Strategic Positioning in the Region. March 2017. IRIS. <http://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/OBS-Prospective-huma-East-Africa-Horn-mars-2017.pdf>. Accessed on 20 March 2018.

¹⁵¹ Monteiro, Ana and Ntando Thukwana. IMF Sees Ethiopia Beating Ghana as Fastest-Growing Africa Economy. April 17, 2018. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-17/ethiopia-pips-ghana-as-africa-s-fastest-growing-economy-for-imf>. Accessed on 21 April 2018.

¹⁵² Mo Ibrahim Foundation. "An Ethiopian success story: Agriculture". 26 April, 2017. <http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/news/2017/ethiopian-success-story-agriculture/>, Accessed on 2 February 2018.

¹⁵³ Boto, Isolina and Camilla La Peccerella "Land access and rural development: new challenges, new opportunities." Brussels rural Development Briefings a series of meetings on ACP-EU Development issues, Briefing session No. 9. Brussels, 25th February 2009.

means a member of a rural community whose livelihood based mainly on cattle raising and to some extent on crop farming;



Map 4.2. Major Farming Systems in Ethiopia¹⁵⁴

Land degradation, which characterizes the Ethiopian agriculture has been aggravated mainly by overpopulation, frequent soil tillage, inefficient crop and livestock production system, and soil erosion.¹⁵⁵ Approximately 80 per cent depend directly or indirectly on agriculture for their livelihoods, consequently, reduction in soil fertility and soil quality strongly contributes toward

¹⁵⁴ Source: FAO in Hailelassie, Amare et al. "Assessment of Soil Nutrient Depletion and Its Spatial Variability on Smallholders' Mixed Farming Systems in Ethiopia Using Partial versus Full Nutrient Balances." *Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment*. 2005. 108 (1): 1–16.

¹⁵⁵ Hawando cited in Tsegaye, Wondwossen et al. "Adoption and farm-level impact of conservation agriculture in Central Ethiopia". *Environ Dev Sustain* (2017) 19:2517–2533.

the deprivation and deterioration of the rural livelihoods in the country.¹⁵⁶ Furthermore, the insufficient and erratic rainfall patterns challenge the performance of agriculture in many areas across the country.¹⁵⁷

The agriculture sector plays a central role in the life and livelihood of most Ethiopians, where about 12 million smallholder farming households account for an estimated 95 per cent of agricultural production and 85 per cent of all employment.¹⁵⁸

In Ethiopia, agriculture is the largest sector of the economy, providing jobs for 80 of the workforce and accounting for more than 40 per cent of the country's GDP.¹⁵⁹ Despite the shift in the

economic structure, agriculture remains a major source of economic growth for the country, the principal source of income for the rural majority, and critical for food security for all Ethiopians.¹⁶⁰ Ethiopian agriculture is dominated by subsistence, rain-fed farming systems, with low external inputs and low outputs; this is due to smallholder farmers having only limited access to agricultural inputs, financial services, improved production technologies, irrigation and agricultural markets, limited use of chemical fertilizer and improved seeds.¹⁶¹

More importantly feeble land management practices make Ethiopia one of the highest rates of soil nutrient depletion in sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁶²

Ethiopia loses as much as 2,000 million tonnes of soil annually due to erosion, which is equivalent to a soil depth of one metre over an area of 19,000 ha that could feed a

¹⁵⁶ Tsegaye, Wondwossen et al. "Adoption and farm-level impact of conservation agriculture in Central Ethiopia". *Environ Dev Sustain* (2017) 19:2517–2533.

¹⁵⁷ Araya et al. cited in Tsegaye, Wondwossen et al. "Adoption and farm-level impact of conservation agriculture in Central Ethiopia". *Environ Dev Sustain* (2017) 19:2517–2533.

¹⁵⁸ FAO. "Food and Agriculture Organization: Ethiopia Country Programming Framework". Addis Ababa, September 2014.

¹⁵⁹ Mo Ibrahim Foundation. "An Ethiopian success story: Agriculture". 26 April, 2017. <http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/news/2017/ethiopian-success-story-agriculture/>, Accessed on 2 February 2018.

¹⁶⁰ Bass, Steve et al. *Making Growth Green and Inclusive: The Case of Ethiopia*. OECD Green Growth Papers, 2013-07, Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

minimum of 66,000 families at the current average food consumption level. At the national level, 5 million ha of land is seriously affected by erosion, sedimentation and drought problems.¹⁶³

Ethiopia is the largest producer of coffee in Africa, with a reputation for producing some of the world's finest varieties. More than 60 per cent of Ethiopian coffee is produced as forest or semi-forest coffee.¹⁶⁴

Livestock production, which is the main economy in the pastoralist areas, make Ethiopia the tenth largest livestock population in the world with approximately 50 million cattle and source of GDP at 16 per cent of the total, and generate 14 per cent of the country's foreign exchange earnings.¹⁶⁵

Livestock production also provide a certain degree of security in times of crop failure, provides farmyard manure to improve soil fertility and as a source of energy.¹⁶⁶

4.2.1 Land Tenure System in Ethiopia

Making a brief historical background about land tenure system, how people own and use a piece of land in Ethiopia will be very important to understand Ethiopian rural societies.

Ethiopia is the only country in sub-Saharan Africa in which feudalism and military expansion served as a means of nation building¹⁶⁷ and the only African state which has never come under the European colonialism. This unique history gave Ethiopia its own independent historical evolution of land tenure system, which is absence of private land ownership. In Ethiopia land had been and remains to be the backbone of the economy and therefore, the issue of landholding system has always been the centerpiece of Ethiopian politics.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶³ Biswas, Asit K. et al. Land use and farming systems in the Horn of Africa. *Land Use Policy*. 4 (4), October 1987.

¹⁶⁴ Bass, 2013.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Except Italian invasion from 1936 to 1941 which was concluded by the defeat of Italians with the support of British army.

¹⁶⁸ Olike, Tafesse. "Ethiopia: Politics of Land-Tenure Politics under Three Regimes: A Carrot-and-Stick Ruling Strategy" in Attilo, Alezander et al. Ethiopia: Politics, Policy Making and Rural Development. Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa University Press. 2006.

The Imperial Regime and Rural Peasant Revolts

The Ethiopian feudal monarchy has a complex system of land holdings in the north: communal (*rist*), grant land (*gult*), freehold, or sometimes referred to as private (*gebbar* tenures), church (*samon*), and state (*maderia*, *mengist*) tenure systems. However the most dominant land systems in the northern and southern Ethiopia explained well by Girma Kebede and Mary J. Jacob as follows:

Pre-1974 Ethiopia was a feudal agrarian society in which a small minority group (the royal family, big landlords, high ranking clergymen, senior military and civil servants and big businessmen) controlled a large proportion of the nation's wealth. The royal family and landed aristocracy, for instance, owned between 50 and 60 per cent of the country. Eighty percent of the rural population were left as tenants paying one-quarter to one-half of their annual produce to landlords.

... In the northern Ethiopia (Tigray, Gonder, Gojjam, northern Shewa. and parts of Wollo) there existed a communal ownership, *rist*, in which land was considered to be the property of all members of a kinship group who could claim ancestry to the following fathers of the area. Communal ownership allowed peasant farmers access to land but they had to pay certain dues. Moreover, they did not have legal title to it, and local potentates, royalty and church notables had more land than the common farmers. Fragmentation of land holdings become a common feature of communal land ownership because of the limited amount of arable land and the increasing size of the population. Land had to be divided and re-divided from one generation to another.

Like their southern counterparts, the northern peasants were liable to all types of government levies and local tributes. They had to provide free labor to churches. Since individual holdings were too small, many peasants had to lease land at exorbitant rents from the church and local aristocrats.

... [In the southern Ethiopia landholding was characterized by private ownership] a few big landlords owned most land; the law permitted landlords to exact as much as three-quarters of the peasants' produce as rent. Tenants were also liable to government taxes for education, health, income and land.¹⁶⁹

The land system both in north and south are same tenancy system except the time difference of when it started. In the north it dates back to 16th century when the Kingdom of Gonder established and in the south after the Menilik II expanded his empire to the south in the 19th century.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹ Kebede, Girma and Mary J. Jacob. Drought, famine and the political economy of environmental degradation in Ethiopia. *Geography*. Vol. 73, No. 1 (January 1988), pp. 65-70

¹⁷⁰ Oliko, 2006.

According to Kebede and Mary such land system contributed also for the environmental degradation.

[The peasants] could hardly be expected to invest their labor in schemes such as reforestation, soil and water conservation and irrigation canals since much of the benefit deriving from such increased efforts would have gone to the landowners and government in the forms of rents and taxes.¹⁷¹

The exploitative nature of the land tenure system led to rebellions against the government. The first peasant rebellion against Ethiopian empire was at northern province of Tigray in 1943, which is called the *Wayane* rebellion.¹⁷² The second was the Bale rebellion, south-eastern province which lasted from 1963 to 1970, the peasants' inability to pay the increased taxes accompanying new land measurements in 1963 led to large-scale alienation.¹⁷³ The third was the Gojjam farmers' uprising of 1968 when the government attempt to introduce the new agricultural income tax. The fourth rebellion was the Yeju in Wello, north east of the country rebelled in 1948 and 1970 peasants rose after the appeals against alienation of their land was ignored and by the encroachments of mechanized farming on pasture-land respectively.¹⁷⁴

The fifth rebellion was Gedeo uprising in the southern Ethiopia, in 1960; the cause of the revolt was described by Bahru Zewde as follows:

The coffee-rich lands of the district had invited a veritable land-grabbing rush among the northern nobility and gentry.... In the process, many Gedeo had been reduced to tenancy. The economic exploitation of the Gedeo was coupled with the degradation of their culture. As in many other instances of peasant rebellion in Ethiopia, the Gedeo uprising was preceded by futile appeals of and petitions to higher authorities. The peasants then challenged the oppressive system by refusing to pay the *erbo*, the quarter of his produce that a tenant was expected to pay to the landlord. The clash with the authorities began when the peasants went on to collect the coffee without waiting for the assessors who could customarily determine the amount of *erbo* to be paid.¹⁷⁵

However, all the rebellions and uprisings were quench by the government troops. When Dessalegn Rahmato summaries the rural rebellions or agrarian protest of Ethiopia at the Imperial regime:

¹⁷¹ Kebede, Girma and Mary J. Jacob. Drought, famine and the political economy of environmental degradation in Ethiopia. *Geography*. Vol. 73, No. 1 (January 1988), pp. 65-70

¹⁷² Zewde, Bahru *A Hisotory of Modern Ethiopia: 1955-1991*. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press. Page 215.

¹⁷³ *Ibid*, 216.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 218.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 218.

Traditional rural protest may be seen as the articulation, by peaceful or violent means, of local grievances and discontent. It aims to right what are perceived to be specific wrongs, and to defend existing privileges and property rights, and not to bring about a new social or political order. Among the peasantry, protest is frequently directed against taxes, rent, corve labor, and the expropriation of ancestral lands; among the propertied classes, it is aimed against reforms that impinge upon the economic and political privilege of these classes.¹⁷⁶

***Derg*, the New Land Policy and Resettlement**

The Post-1974 Socialist government declared under the proclamation No. 31/1975, a proclamation to provide for the public ownership of rural lands:

Article (3) 1 As of the effective date of this Proclamation, all rural lands shall be the collective property of the Ethiopian people.

Article (3) 2 No person or business organization or any other organization shall hold rural land in private ownership.

Article (4) 3 The size of land to be allotted to any farming family shall at no time exceed 10 hectares (1/4 of a *gasha*).

Article (4) 5 No person may use hired labor to cultivate his holding; provided that the foregoing prohibition shall not apply to a woman with no other adequate means of livelihood, or where the holder dies, is sick or old, to the wife or the husband or to his or her children who have not attained majority.

Article (5) No person may by sale, exchange, succession, mortgage, antichresis, and lease or otherwise transfer his holding to another; provided that upon the death of the holder the wife or husband or minor children of the deceased or where these are not present, any child of the deceased who has attained majority, shall have the right to use the land.

Concerning the pastoralist society the proclamation states:

Article (24) As of the effective date of this Proclamation, nomadic people shall have possessory rights over the lands they customarily use for grazing or other purposes related to agriculture. Nothing in the foregoing shall affect international agreements relating to nomadic lands.

Article (25) As of the effective date of this Proclamation, all obligations of the nomadic people to pay dues to *balabats* or any other persons are hereby annulled.

Thought the land reformation has some positive impact on the rural peasants by ending exploitation by the landlords, on the other hand 'the peasantry did not wish to give up individual

¹⁷⁶ Rahmato, Dessalegn. *The Peasant and the State: Studies in Agrarian Change in Ethiopia 1950s-2000s*. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press. 2009. Page 113.

or communal control over land. Moreover, nationalization of resources reduced any incentives for agricultural investment or environmental reclamation. In Tigray, the situation provided an opportunity for revolt'.¹⁷⁷

Beside the land reformation a major policy taken by *Derg*, which made a permanent economic, social and political effect on the rural societies was mass resettlement. Proclamation No. 31/1975 also states 'the Government shall have responsibility to settle peasants or to establish cottage industries to accommodate those who, as a result of the distribution of land in accordance with the provisions of this proclamation, remain with little or no land' (Article (18)). The plan was to remove populations around 1.5 million in the northern of 8 million victims of famine, where there is land scarcity and to resettle them in the south, to provide them agricultural opportunities that had almost vanished in the northern highlands.¹⁷⁸ Getachew Woldemeskel argue that the government's effort to tackle the problems of land scarcity, famine, and ecological degradation in the highlands has resulted in the spread of these problems to regions which were previously unaffected.¹⁷⁹

However, still the present government of Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) country's Agricultural and Rural Development Strategy clearly states that voluntary resettlement will be one of the mechanisms by which the government will try to ensure food security, bring about development, and create a conducive environment for technological transfer; and also assist the establishment of socio-economic institutions that guarantee sustained and enduring economic development, facilitate the improvement of good governance and foster the process of democratization.

¹⁷⁷ Lanz, Tobias J. Environmental Degradation and Social Conflict in the Northern Highlands of Ethiopia: The Case of Tigray and Wollo Provinces. *Africa Today*, Vol. 43, No. 2, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa (Apr. - Jun., 1996), pp. 157-182 Published by: Indiana University Press. Page 163 – 164. Page 174.

¹⁷⁸ Woldemeskel, Getachew. The Consequences of Resettlement in Ethiopia. *African Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 352 (Jul., 1989), pp. 359-374

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

Post-1991 Land and agricultural Policy

Except small changes (for example the right to lease out land) the land policy of contemporary Ethiopian federal state is same as its predecessor. Land is no private ownership of land, 'which was regarded as a means to increase productivity of Ethiopia's smallholder agriculture.'¹⁸⁰

FDRE's Constitution states about Land rights as the following:

Article 40 (3) states that 'The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is exclusively vested in the State and in the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a common property of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia and shall not be subject to sale or to other means of exchange'.

Article 40 (4) Ethiopian peasants have right to obtain land without payment and the protection against eviction from their possession. The implementation of this provision shall be specified by law.

Article 40 (5) Ethiopian pastoralists have the right to free land for grazing and cultivation as well as the right not to be displaced from their own lands. The implementation shall be specified by law.

Article 40 (6) Without prejudice to the right of Ethiopian Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples to the ownership of land, government shall ensure the right of private investors to the use of land on the basis of payment arrangements established by law. Particulars shall be determined by law.

FDRE's Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation No. 456/2005 states three land holding systems:

Article 2 (11) 'Minimum private holding' means rural land in the holding of peasants, semi-pastoralists and pastoralists other bodies who are entitled by law to use rural land;

Article 2 (12) 'Communal holding' means rural land which is given by the government to local residents for common grazing, forestry and other social services;

Article 2 (13) 'State holding', means rural land demarcated and those lands to be demarcated in the future at federal or regional states holding; and includes forestlands, wildlife protected areas, state farms, mining lands, lakes, rivers and other rural lands;

¹⁸⁰ Crewett, Wibke et al. Land Tenure in Ethiopia: Continuity and Change, Shifting Rulers, and the Quest for State Control. CAPRI Working Paper 91. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. September 2008.

Also Article 5 (1) a. states ‘peasant farmers/pastoralists engaged in agriculture for a living shall be given rural land free of charge. However, some argue that ‘the proclamation does not clearly indicate the exact duration of usufruct for land holders, tenure security remained the problem’.¹⁸¹

Ethiopia Poverty and food insecurity is concentrated in rural areas; roughly 30 per cent of the population live below the national poverty line, where most rural households live on a per capita income of less than USD 0.50 per day unable to meet their basic needs and are chronically food insecure.¹⁸²

About a third of rural households farm less than 0.5 hectares which, under rain fed farming system, limited use of chemical fertilizer and improved seeds, limited improved production technologies, irrigation and agricultural markets and poor land management practices that have led to severe land degradation and the highest rates of soil nutrient depletion in sub-Saharan Africa as a result of this vulnerability to droughts is greatest in the pastoral areas of the lowlands and the densely populated, food-insecure districts of the highlands.¹⁸³

The post-1991 Ethiopian government a new strategy to alleviate the deep crises in the rural areas and on the agriculture sector. After 1991, it execute the strategy of Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization (ADLI) that sees agriculture as the engine of growth with the major aim of improve agricultural extension services; promote better use of land and water resources; enhance access to financial services; improve access to domestic and export markets; and provide rural infrastructure.¹⁸⁴

Here the writer believes to put the saddened comment of the prominent Ethiopian land agrarian expert, Dessalegn Rahmato about Ethiopian rural agrarian peasants, written in his book published in 2009.

¹⁸¹ Chala, Teshome. Analysis of politics in the land tenure system: Experience of successive Ethiopian regimes since 1930. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*. Vol. 10(8), pp. 111-118, September 2016.

¹⁸² FDRE Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Ethiopia’s Agriculture Sector Policy and Investment Framework (PIF) 2010-2020. Draft Final Report. 15 September 2010.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

After more than fifty years of programs of “rural development” and considerable outlay of resources, despite the change of governments and development ideologies, Ethiopian peasants are, in many ways, not much better off today than they were at the beginning of the 1950s. True, there is a limited network of rural roads, some modern transportation, expanding education and health services in scattered villages, but the benefits of these pale into insignificance besides the colossal suffering endured by rural society during this half century. There have been five virulent famines, several silent ones, and numerous rural pandemics in these years in which perhaps up to two million people have perished. Every year since the mid-1970s millions of peasants are officially declared to be facing hunger, and recurrent mass starvation is avoided only because of emergency assistance provided by foreign donors. The country as a whole, and the countryside in particular, has become a museum of diseases, and millions of peasants suffer from malaria and cholera outbreaks, and the AIDS pandemics. All comparative measures of well-being employed by international agencies, such as nutritional status, child mortality, access to health services, education and clean water, etc., indicate that conditions in rural Ethiopia are truly appalling, perhaps the worst in Africa. Independent assessments show that more than half the rural population lives in grinding poverty, with about a third considered destitute and standing on the edge of the abyss. Over these years, the loss of natural resources through soil erosion, deforestation, and other forms of environmental degradation, has gone on unchecked and on a massive scale. In brief, the last half-century has been a time of misery and unmitigated suffering for rural people.¹⁸⁵

4.3. Rural Security in Ethiopia

4.3.1 Security in Agrarian Societies

Most of the agrarian community is at the high lands of Ethiopia, which can be divided into the northern and southern. The northern agrarian areas are parts of Tigray region and the Amhara region of Gonder, Gojam and Wello and the second, south of Addis Ababa, the parts of Oromia region, the Aris and Balle highlands and the parts of Southern Nations Nationalities and People’s region. Over population, famine, poverty, land scarcity and lack of agricultural resources are the characteristic of the agrarian rural areas.¹⁸⁶ And the main push factors for individuals out of rural area are lack of assets expressed in the form of diminishing farmland sizes in all their rural localities and shortage of landholdings, lack of rain, recurrent drought, absence of an effective extension system, limited investment in irrigation based agriculture, high population pressure,

¹⁸⁵ Rahmato, Dessalegn. *The Peasant and the State: Studies in Agrarian Change in Ethiopia 1950s-2000s*. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press. 2009. Page 24.

¹⁸⁶ Melesse, Birhanu and Kavitha Nachimuthu. A review on Causes and Consequences of Rural- Urban Migration in Ethiopia. *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications*. Volume 7, Issue 4, April 2017 37 – 42. Page 37.

lack of off-farm employment opportunities, and imposition of heavy taxes.¹⁸⁷ Especially the northern highlands were under intensive agricultural and human use.

Tobias J. Lanz on his studies of the two northern highland former provinces of Tigray and Wollo he argue how environmental degradation lead to conflict as the following:

Environmental and social degradation created a context that increased the likelihood of social conflict. After the drought of 1973, social and environmental systems went from crisis to chaos. The result of this sequence was national revolution. Thus, environmental and social degradation created the climate that was conducive to conflict. When the drought hit, it triggered the collapse of the rural structure, thereby creating an impetus for revolution. After the socialist regime came to power, the government intervened to force its agrarian policies upon the Highlands. Degraded societies responded by engaging in civil war (Tigray) or inaction (Wollo), to which the state reacted with military conflict and control, respectively.

The drought of 1984 brought widespread chaos to social and environmental systems alike. Whereas Wollo province was too famine-ridden to engage in revolt against the state, the widespread chaos created social and environmental conditions against which Tigrayans revolted, escalating the conflict. In the Tigrayan case, the ethnic factor and state policies facilitated conflict¹⁸⁸

The places where Lanz studied, Tigray and Wollo areas of Ethiopia were places recurrent drought and famine attacked (See Table 4.1). According to his study the environmental degradation in these regions lead to a civil war against the government in case of Tigray (also in Eritrea which was a part of Ethiopia) and in case of Wollo it turned to famine while the population did not engaged in violent social conflict.

Population growth in rural areas and insufficient demand for agricultural goods in urban areas continues to pressure economic transformations within the country.¹⁸⁹ Increasing land pressure

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. 39.

¹⁸⁸ Lanz, 1996.

¹⁸⁹ Dorosh, Paul and Emily Schmidt. *The Rural-Urban Transformation in Ethiopia*. Ethiopia Strategy Support Program 2 (ESSP2) Working Paper 13 June 2010

(within the context of already small land holdings), as well as environmental degradation will limit and diminish per capita on-farm incomes.¹⁹⁰

Relatively thin markets for agriculture in small towns and urban areas are also of concern. Ethiopia lacks a sufficiently large urban (non-farm) population to generate enough demand for its own agricultural products.¹⁹¹

The Ethiopian government and World Food Program (WFP) with other partners established a Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in 2005 in mostly agrarian states of our regions; Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNP).¹⁹² PSNP is aimed at enabling the rural poor facing chronic food insecurity to resist shocks, create assets and become food self-sufficient by providing multi-annual predictable transfers, as food, cash or a combination of both, to help chronically food insecure people survive food deficit periods and avoid depleting their productive assets while attempting to meet their basic food requirements.¹⁹³ Theoretically PSNP is a program is mix of public works employment which are in soil and water conservation and unconditional transfers. Today the programme also expanded to other three states of Afar, Harare and Somali; and Dire Dawa city administration. However some argue PSNP created a dependency syndrome and the government used it to reward its supporters or punish those who rally behind the opposition.¹⁹⁴

The Ethiopian agriculture system is fragile because of it relies on rain-fed crops in two distinct growing seasons, *Kiremt* (vital for producing over 80 per cent of Ethiopia's agricultural production) and *Belg*. Due to climate change the short rains have become delayed and shorter,

¹⁹⁰ Dorosh, Paul and Emily Schmidt. *The Rural-Urban Transformation in Ethiopia*. Ethiopia Strategy Support Program 2 (ESSP2) Working Paper 13 June 2010

¹⁹¹ Dorosh, Paul and Emily Schmidt. *The Rural-Urban Transformation in Ethiopia*. Ethiopia Strategy Support Program 2 (ESSP2) Working Paper 13 June 2010

¹⁹² Waldyes, Tesfalem & Kalkidan Yibeltal. Analysis: Perpetual Poverty in the Shadow of Ethiopia's 'Safety Net' September 8, 2016. <http://addisstandard.com/analysis-perpetual-poverty-in-the-shadow-of-ethiopias-safety-net/>, Accessed on 21 April 2018.

¹⁹³ WFP. Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia. <https://www.wfp.org/content/protective-safety-net-programme-ethiopia>, Accessed on 21 April 2018.

¹⁹⁴ Bansa, J. Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme: Chasing Two Rabbits, Catching Neither. September 8, 2016 <http://addisstandard.com/ethiopias-productive-safety-net-program-chasing-two-rabbits-catching-neither/>, Accessed on 21 April 2018.

and the long rains equally have become unpredictable.¹⁹⁵ Drought is the main challenge for the people whose livelihood is based on agriculture when droughts are a cyclic phenomenon.

Presently climate change has already had visible impacts in Ethiopia, with devastating droughts in some areas, associated crises in food security, and health impacts.¹⁹⁶ Increasing temperature and declining rainfall, particularly in northern parts which are exceptionally vulnerable to drought, with annual rainfall being only 100mm in the north-east which highly impact the livelihoods of the rural poor.¹⁹⁷ Studies conclude that the frequency and intensity of drought is likely to increase over the coming decades, which will present a serious threat to biodiversity, ecosystems, water, agricultural and human health.¹⁹⁸

Girma Kebede and Mary J. Jacob described the land problem of the agrarian northern Ethiopia as follows:

Sedentary agriculture has been practiced for over two thousand years. Axum, on the Tigray Plateau, was the center of the Axumite Kingdom, one of the oldest empires in the world.

Unfortunately, centuries of relentless exploitation of the land have resulted in severe ecological alternations. The region is the most exploited and environmentally degraded place in the entire nation. It is almost completely devoid of its natural vegetation and in many parts one sees bare rock without soil cover. Processes of denudation and deforestation have been accentuated by demographic factors. Continued increase in population has created the need for more land for settlement and agricultural purposes and sustained a growing demand for more construction material and firewood. The Shortage of land has driven of its natural vegetation cover, soil erosion become rampant, a process in turn accelerated by the rugged topography coupled with seasonally heavy rainfall. Due to the shortage of arable land, land is continuously utilized year after year, thus giving diminishing yields. Animal manure and even crop residues and stubble are used for fuel due to firewood shortages, thus depriving farmlands of badly needed nutrients and organic matter. The absence of organic matter in the soil retains less and less water, it becomes more and more prone to drought. In other words, the same about of

¹⁹⁵ Lane Bunkers. Interview. <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-drought-causes-and-solutions>. Accessed on 8 March 2018.

¹⁹⁶ Bass, Steve et al. *Making Growth Green and Inclusive: The Case of Ethiopia*. OECD Green Growth Papers, 2013-07, Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013.

¹⁹⁷ Bass, Steve et al. *Making Growth Green and Inclusive: The Case of Ethiopia*. OECD Green Growth Papers, 2013-07, Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013.

¹⁹⁸ Bass, 2013.

rainfall becomes less effective than it used to be. Even with the best of rains the productivity of the land decreases.

... Centuries of exploitation, degradation, and neglect have not only enormously reduced the productive capacity of the northern Ethiopian highlands, but have also diminished the ability of the land to withstand climate anomalies. A slight decline in rainfall becomes a period of famine.¹⁹⁹

4.3.2 Security in Pastoralist Societies

Pastoral areas in Ethiopia, located in the arid and semi-arid lowland areas in the east, north-east, west, and south of the country, cover two thirds of the land mass of the country and support 12-15 per cent (or 10-12 million people) of the country's human population and a large number of livestock.²⁰⁰

The main pastoralist communities in Ethiopia are the Somali pastoralists constitute 53 per cent of the pastoral population followed by the Afar 29 per cent, the Borana 10 per cent and the remaining 8 per cent are found in Gambella, Benishangul and Tigray regions.²⁰¹ Also pastoralist communities found in Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples' Region in Nyangatoum and Bume areas.²⁰²

Since highland Ethiopia is sedentary, and the country's political elite throughout its modern history has been recruited from this tradition of production, the pastoral-nomadic societies of Ethiopia have gained little in the way of politico-administrative experience.²⁰³ The four regional states, (which most pastoralist communities live) of Afar, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz and

¹⁹⁹ Kebede, Girma and Mary J. Jacob. Drought, famine and the political economy of environmental degradation in Ethiopia. *Geography*. Vol. 73, No. 1 (January 1988), pp. 65-70

²⁰⁰ Desta, Solomon. Pastoralism and Development in Ethiopia. *Economic Focus*. Vol. 9. No. 3. November 2006. Page 12.

²⁰¹ Desta, 2006.

²⁰² Seide, Wondwosen Michago. The Nuer Pastoralists – Between Large Scale Agriculture and Villagization: A case study of the Lare District in the Gambella Region of Ethiopia. *Current African Issues (CAI) No 64*. Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, 2017. Page 10.

²⁰³ Vaughan, Sarah and Kjetil Tronvoll. The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life Page 49. *Sida Studies No. 10*. 2005.

Gambella continue to be regarded, ‘Peripheral’ Regions²⁰⁴, to some extent, as marginalized and ‘emergent’ in view of their relatively low levels of political capacity, stability and influence, economic resources, physical infrastructure, and social, health and educational facilities. Challenges to pastoral livelihoods involve competitions over scarce resources, violent conflicts and massive charcoal production from communal woodlots.²⁰⁵ Ethiopian pastoral areas have the lowest access for basic public services such as education and human health, roads, telephone, markets and poverty and food insecurity is wide spread.²⁰⁶ Some associate the socio-economic problems because of the pastoral-nomadic lifestyle.²⁰⁷

Presently the federal government exclusively deals with the pastoral communities under the ministry of Federal and Pastoralist Affairs and established Pastoralist Affairs Standing Committee in the parliament to oversee pastoralist matters. Also regional offices are present at states with pastoralist communities.

The pastoralist communities are the most vulnerable part of the society. For example, the 1973/74 drought that affected the pastoral areas in general and the Afar pastoralist in particular decimated 72 per cent of the cattle herd, 45 per cent of sheep, 34 per cent of goats and 37 per cent of camels, in the 1983-5 and 1990-2 droughts the Borana pastoralists in southern Ethiopia lost 50 to 60 per cent of their livestock and in 2005/6 drought that hit Afar, Borana and Somali has claimed a huge loss in livestock.²⁰⁸ Some studies suggest the overgrazing, bush encroachment, population pressure, increased settlement, decrease in livestock mobility, limited

²⁰⁴ Tadesse, Medhane. *The Quest for Conflict Settlement in Ethiopia's Periphery*. Addis Ababa: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2006.

²⁰⁵ Fekadu Beyene The Challenges to Pastoral Transformation to Sedentary Farming: The Case of Karrayyu Pastoralists Page 66.

²⁰⁶ Desta, Solomon. Pastoralism and Development in Ethiopia. *Economic Focus*. Vol. 9. No. 3. November 2006. Page 13.

²⁰⁷ Vaughan, Sarah and Kjetil Tronvoll. The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life Page 49. *Sida Studies* No. 10. 2005.

²⁰⁸ Desta, 2006.

knowledge of rangeland management, soil erosion, lack of burning (firewood)²⁰⁹ make the pastoralists in Oromia and south east Ethiopia more vulnerable.

Since the imperial time the pastoralist were under threat. The Gile, an Oromo pastoralist group were evicted from its land in the Upper Awash Valley in 1954 for plantation agriculture.²¹⁰ Also in 1960s the Afar pastoralists lost their land to cotton plantation along the Awash River Valley.²¹¹ This eviction from well-watered grazing pasture force them to move to less fertile marginal areas which force them to overgrazing of all vegetation available, which in turn leads to soil erosion.²¹² On the other hand when the pastoralist move to the well-watered places it will lead to conflict with other groups.

The following are three studies of pastoral conflict between the Afar and Issa (Somali), between the Oromo and the Ethiopian Somali and between the Nuer and Akuwak in Gambella region give a highlight on conflict over land resources.

The Afar – Issa Conflict

The Afar region is one of the nine regional states of Ethiopia with a population more than four million. It shares international border with Djibouti and Eritrea. Its topography is flat and the altitude ranges from 116 meter below sea level to 1,600 above sea level. The annual temperature range from 25°C – 48°C. The average annual rainfall is 187 millimeter. Pastoralism is the main way of life and livestock farming is the major economic activity. 90 per cent the states of population is leading a pastoral life by rearing camels, cattle, goats, sheep and donkeys.²¹³

The Awash River the only river in that country that flows eastward. The Awash River Valley is the life line of the people who inhabit it, the only permanent source of water and valuable dry

²⁰⁹ Abate, T. et al. Traditional rangeland resource utilisation practices and pastoralists' perceptions on land degradation in south-east Ethiopia. *Tropical Grasslands*. (2010) Volume 44, 202–212

²¹⁰ Markakis, John and Nega Ayele. *Class and Revolution in Ethiopia*. Trenton: The Red Sea Press. 1986. Page 56.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Kebede, Girma and Mary J. Jacob. Drought, famine and the political economy of environmental degradation in Ethiopia. *Geography*. Vol. 73, No. 1 (January 1988), pp. 65-70

²¹³ Ethiopian Government Portal. Afar Regional State. http://www.ethiopia.gov.et/afar-regional-state?p_p_id=56_INSTANCE_aSAHtwuT19fl&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-1&p_p_col_count=1&_56_INSTANCE_aSAHtwuT19fl_page=2, Accessed on 6 March 2018.

season pasture land,²¹⁴ where also ethno-territorial and livelihood differences intersect and overlap in a complex relationships that often interface multiple identity groups in violence.²¹⁵

The Afar come into contact and frequently clash with several neighboring groups; the sedentary cultivators Ittu, Nole, Argoba, and the mobile pastoralists Kereyu, Gurgura, Issa. Clashes are more frequent during periods of drought, and 2002 was a year of severe drought that ended in famine. Afar conflict with the Issa Somali is the most serious, because the latter are contesting the exclusive claim of the former to the grazing lands of the vast Allighedi plain east of the Awash River.²¹⁶ The Issa are neighbors and traditional enemies of the Afar, eternally fighting over pasture land and water points.²¹⁷

According to Medhane Tadesse, Afar-Issa Somali dichotomy goes back to the population movement and Muslim vs. Christian (lowland-highland) conflict at the medieval period. The Afar were weakened by the military pressures of the Christian state and were forced by the Somali to leave their highlands.²¹⁸ Medhane Tadesse also argue unlike the belief by many as religious war, the Somali military leader Ahmed Gagn war with the Christian northerners main aim was the manifestation of the pastoralist and semi-pastoralist people of eastern Ethiopia in search of fertile land. Another important development at this time of 16th century is just like the Somalis was the Oromo movement which was caused by demographic and ecological factors led to search of grazing land. This led to the incursion of Issa Somali clans and Oromo in the fertile Harar Plateau in the western Ethiopia and the displacement of Afar clans and their concentration in the narrow strips of the Awash River and the arid areas of Allaideghi Plains.²¹⁹

²¹⁴ Markakis, John. Anatomy of a Conflict: Afar & Ise Ethiopia. *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 30, No. 97, (2003), pp. 445-453.

²¹⁵ Gidey, Mu'uz. "The Issa-Afar Conflict in the Post-1991 Ethiopia". Senior Thesis for the Partial Fulfillment of MA in Peace and Security Studies. Addis Ababa University. 2009.

²¹⁶ Markakis, 2003.

²¹⁷ Markakis, 2003.

²¹⁸ Tadesse, 2006.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

The Afar and Issa-Somali have maintained an unrelenting and implacable enmity over the centuries which continue even today.²²⁰ The conflict transformed through time. In the past, when faced with deteriorating natural conditions, both groups would move to a nearby fresh pasture, there were enough empty corridors to freely move, now there are practically none.²²¹

At the time of Ethio-Somali war in 1977-78, the Issa supported the irredentist Somali government and the Afra supported the Ethiopian government. This led to militarization and politicization of the traditional resource conflict between the two groups. After the 1991 failure of the Somali government illegal livestock trading was flourished because of absence of border control and made it easy for Issa-Somali to do business among their kinship on the other side of the border. This led to high demand of livestock and intensify livestock raiding. As a result Afar settlements were raided and burnt down to ashes and their livestock looted.²²² John Markakis explain as follows:

The new ethnically based administrative borders between the Afar and Ethiopian Somali states were not defined because both states have conflicting territorial claims and were not able to resolve them. Thus frequent clashes between Afar and Issa herdsmen over water holes, a resource that has become scarcer with time, and these clashes became deadlier through the use of automatic weapons.

State presence in the pastoralist zone is generally nominal, except in areas where state requires a higher profile. Moreover, there is no political incentive for greater involvement, since pastoralist communities carry little political weight at state level. As a result, conflict within and between these communities is often ignored and allowed to run its course. Unless, that is, it impacts on wider state concerns, such as border security, movement on major transport routes, control of trade, livestock epidemics, or it connects with and reinforces threats by armed opposition movements to the state or regime. When it takes place, state intervention focuses on symptoms not causes and is not sustained security.²²³

²²⁰ Tadesse, 2006.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid.

The Oromo – Somali conflict

Oromia and the Ethiopian Somali regional states are the first and the second largest states respectively by area in Ethiopia. They also share the largest internal border, inhabiting the lowland semi-arid western part of Ethiopia. The Somali are nomadic pastoralists while the Oromo in the eastern Ethiopia are pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. The Somali are characterized by camel pastoralism, while the Oromo are characterized by cattle.²²⁴

The state of Oromia borders internally Afar, Amhara and Benshangul states in the north, the Ethiopian Somali in the east, state of Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' and the Gambella state in the south and international borders with South Sudan and Kenya in the west and south respectively. The geography of Oromia is quite diverse. It is mountainous in the center and north to flat grassland in the west, east and south.

The Ethiopian Somali state is located in the eastern and south eastern part of Ethiopia. Internally it has common boundaries with Afar in the north and with Oromia in the west and shared international boundary with the Republic of Djibouti in the north, with Somalia in the east and south and Kenya in the south. The Ethiopian Somali state has approximately 80 per cent is flat lowland and 7 per cent mountainous and the 80 per cent of the climate desert and arid.²²⁵

Historically, the relationship between the two facilitated by religious similarity. Especially the Arsi and Bale Oromo and the Somalis are Muslims. It is the Borena Oromo who keeps their traditional beliefs. However, their relationship also has been characterized by territorial competition which often leads to disputes and conflicts over resources, including wells and grazing land. These conflicts can cause the displacement of tens of thousands of people.²²⁶

²²⁴ Adugna, Fekadu. "Oromo-Somali Relations". <http://www.eth.mpg.de/3371034/projekt>. Accessed on 24 March 2018.

²²⁵ Ethiopian Government Portal. Somali Regional State. http://www.ethiopia.gov.et/somali-regional-state?p_p_id=56_INSTANCE_E8ilXdpW9I8o&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-1&p_p_col_count=1&_56_INSTANCE_E8ilXdpW9I8o_page=2, Accessed on 6 March 2018.

²²⁶ BBC. "What is behind clashes in Ethiopia's Oromia and Somali regions?" 18 September 2017. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41278618>, Accessed on 4 March 2018.

In the past both Somali and Oromo local pastoral groups have suffered in terms of huge property and human life loss as a result of an ongoing cycle of violence.²²⁷ These were local conflicts largely created by a fierce competition over land and water under harsh ecological and climatic conditions. In recent periods, the different state and political forms have also affected these local conflicts.²²⁸ Some studies agree that the conflict between these local groups was restrained to the rural areas only.²²⁹

After 1991, the new government arranged the Ethiopia in to federal structure along ethnic lines. However, for the two states which share more than 1000 km long of not clearly demarcated border land from the Jijiga highlands in the northeast to the Ethiopia-Kenyan borderlands in the southeast, dispute intensified with the introduction of decentralization. Some studies argue that beside the previously existed conflicts over scarcity of resources, the new policy of dividing the regions based on ethnicity brought new form of conflicts at the local level.^{230 231}

During *Derg* regime the implementation of agrarian reform policies, land redistribution and formation of peasant associations have also changed the relationships between the local pastoral, agro-pastoral, and farming groups because previously communal grazing land, and areas previously owned by Somali mobile pastoralists was redistributed to Oromo farmers in the area which heightened local tensions between the pastoralist Ethiopian Somali and the peasant Oromo.²³²

²²⁷ Liban, Muhyadin Odowa. Local conflicts between Somali and Oromo people in the context of political decentralization in Ethiopia: Comparative case study on Ma'eso and Babile Districts. A Research Paper presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Obtaining the Degree of Master of Arts in Development Studies. Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, December 2006.

²²⁸ Liban, 2006.

²²⁹ Liban, 2006.

²³⁰ Liban, Muhyadin Odowa. Local conflicts between Somali and Oromo people in the context of political decentralization in Ethiopia: Comparative case study on Ma'eso and Babile Districts. A Research Paper presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Obtaining the Degree of Master of Arts in Development Studies. Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, December 2006.

²³¹ Global IDP Project. "Ethiopia: Border war and ethnic clashes leave over 150,000 internally displaced". 13 May 2005 <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-border-war-and-ethnic-clashes-leave-over-150000-internally-displaced>. Accessed on 4 March 2018.

²³² Shide cited in Liban, Muhyadin Odowa. Local conflicts between Somali and Oromo people in the context of political decentralization in Ethiopia: Comparative case study on Ma'eso and Babile Districts. A Research Paper

In recent years there were fierce conflict between the two groups. In December 2003 in Somali region, fighting between Oromos and Somalis claiming land ownership and rights led to the displacement of 19,000 people (some 2,835 families), whereas 70,000 others were displaced by drought.²³³

In 2004, a referendum to decide on the fate of more than 420 *kebeles* located in 12 different *Woredas* across five zones of the Somali Regional state and 80 per cent of were given to Oromia. Following the outcome, ethnic tensions have led to the displacement in late 2004 and early 2005 of more than 80,000 people on both sides.²³⁴

In 2009, some 70,000 people have fled their homes in southern Ethiopia, Borena Zone, Oromia regional State, after a deadly conflict broke out between the Borena Oromo and the Gherri Somali because of the construction of new borehole.²³⁵ The construction was near to the border between two ethnically based regional states Oromia and Somali regions a boundary which has never been properly demarcated, where the Oromia regional government thought it was drilling the borehole on its own territory; people in Somali region thought it was on their side of the boundary.²³⁶

In July 2012, there was a clash in the southern part of Ethiopia involving the Garri and Borana communities, in which more than 30,000 people crossed into Kenya to escape the fighting and

presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Obtaining the Degree of Master of Arts in Development Studies. Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, December 2006.

²³³ OCHA Ethiopia cited in Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. “Ethiopia: Government recognition of conflict IDPs crucial to addressing their plight: A profile of the internal displacement situation”. 26 April, 2006

²³⁴ Addis Standard, 2017.

²³⁵ BBC. “Water pipe sparks Ethiopian conflict.” 13 March 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7929104.stm>. Accessed on 27 February 2018.

²³⁶ BBC, 2009.

dozens have been killed.²³⁷ The clashes, in the Moyale area, are thought to have been sparked by a simmering dispute over land rights.²³⁸

In March 2017, weeks-long cross border incursions by armed militiamen into many localities in eastern and southern part of Oromia, have left more than 100 people dead and the destruction of unknown amount of properties.²³⁹

In April 2017, violent conflicts were reported in the southern border town of Moyale where members from both Oromo and Ethiopian Somali ethnic groups were killed. The cause of the violence again was scarce water and land resources. And in September 2017, Intense fighting between the Ethiopian Somali and the Oromo ethnic groups in the eastern Ethiopia has left “more than 30 people”, including “more than a dozen army members”, dead and several others injured.²⁴⁰ In October 2017 the federal government confirm that 75,000 Oromos and around 392 Somalis were displaced due to the bloody conflict.²⁴¹

The Oromia region communication bureau, confirmed that starting from December 14, 2017 armed Somali men attacked Hawi Gudina *woreda* (of west Hararghe Zone), Ebsa and Tao *Kebeles*, killing 29 Oromo and more than 360 houses were also completely burned.²⁴²

²³⁷ Somalilandpress.com cited in Feyissa, Tigist Kebede. Conflicts among Pastoralists in the Borana Area of Southern Ethiopia: The case of Borana and Garri. Master’s Thesis in Peace and Conflict Transformation Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education University of Tromsø. Autumn, 2014.


²³⁸ BBC. Ethiopia: 20,000 flee Moyale clashes - Red Cross. 28 July 2012. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19028609>. Accessed on 4 March 2018.

²³⁹ Addis Standard. Despite Nationwide State of Emergency, Several Border Incursions Leave more than 100 dead in east and South East Ethiopia. March 3, 2017. <https://addisstandard.com/news-despite-nationwide-state-emergency-several-border-incursions-leave-100-dead-east-south-east-ethiopia/>, Accessed on 1 April 2018.

²⁴⁰ Addis Standard. Another Heavy Death Toll from a Conflict in Eastern Ethiopia. September 1, 2017. <https://addisstandard.com/breaking-news-another-heavy-death-toll-from-a-conflict-in-eastern-ethiopia/>, Accessed on 4 March 2018.

²⁴¹ Endeshaw, Dawit Somali-Oromia conflict persists despite federal intervention. 7 October 2017. <https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/politics/somali-romia-conflict-persists-despite-federal-intervention>. Accessed on 4 March 2018.

²⁴² Abera, Etenesh. Displaced Ethiopians: Escaped but Trapped in a Bleak Prospect <https://addisstandard.com/feature-displaced-ethiopians-escaped-but-trapped-in-a-bleak-prospect/>, Accessed on 4 March 2018.



Map 4.3. Displacement sites due to the Ethiopian Somali-Oromia conflict (November-December 2017)²⁴³

Fekadu Beyene on his study of the Oromo-Ethiopian Somali relations, he state that post 1991 administrative boundaries that are based on ethnic identity are totally new to the pastoral system and it has completely transformed the historically embedded cooperative resource use relationships into a more competitive one. As a result, the Somali and Oromo pastoralists in southern Ethiopia have emphasized claims over territory rather than maintaining long-existing cooperative relationships.²⁴⁴ An increase in human population and a general increase in livestock population, have increased pressure on the rangeland resources, causing scarcity, competition

²⁴³ Ethiopia: Conflict Displacement Situation Report. 23 January 2018. <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-conflict-displacement-situation-report-23-january-2018>. Accessed on 7 April 2018.

²⁴⁴ Beyene, Fekadu. Natural Resource Conflict Analysis Among Pastoralists in Southern Ethiopia, *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 12:1, 19-33, 2017.

and eventually violence over access.²⁴⁵ Moreover, the emerging land use systems for farming among the Oromo that contradict the customary communal land use systems generated structurally induced scarcity for the Somali clans in the southern Ethiopia.²⁴⁶

The same reason was given by Trine Lober and Peter Worm who argue that the conflict in the pastoralist areas in Ethiopia got fueled after the introduction of the new political order of ethnic federalism in 1991, transforming pastoralists' relationship to their territory, customary institutions, the government, and other competing pastoral groups by hardened ethnic and territorial boundaries, and conflicts have been redefined along ethnic lines rather than resource needs.²⁴⁷

The Nuer and Anuak Conflict

The Gambella Peoples' Region of Ethiopia is located at the south western Ethiopia bordering South Sudan. The Nuer, Anuak and Mezhenger are the major ethnic groups with their own three zonal administration, nonetheless other ethnic groups also live in the region. Itang special district was also created in 2010 after a conflict between Anuak and Nuer. Its population is 406,004 in 2013²⁴⁸ where 90 per cent of them live in rural.²⁴⁹ Gambella region is mostly plane and humid and hot climate, with 615 millimeter annual rainfall annual temperature of 21 – 35 °C. It has the only navigable Baro River. Most of the people of the region are pastoralists. In some parts of the region, they are also producing sesame and other oils, mango, bananas and so on.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Reda in Beyene, Fekadu. Natural Resource Conflict Analysis Among Pastoralists in Southern Ethiopia, *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 12:1, 19-33, 2017.

²⁴⁷ Lober, Trine and Peter Worm. "Pastoral Conflicts and Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia's Lowlands: Investigating Complex Power Relations and Emerging Ethnic Identities". Project report, Roskilde University, ENSPACE, Project Report, May 18, 2015, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/43030895.pdf>. Accessed on 20 February 2018.

²⁴⁸ Knoema. Gambella. <https://knoema.com/atlas/Ethiopia/Gambella>. Accessed on 3 March 2018.

²⁴⁹ Ethiopian Demography and Health. Gambella. <http://www.ethiodemographyandhealth.org/Gambella.html>. Accessed 3 March 2018.

The Anuak are depend on agriculture, mainly maize and sorghum supplemented by fishing, the Nuer reside mostly at the border of Ethio-South Sudan where too dry for rain fed agriculture depend on livestock production and the Mezhenger are mostly dependent on beekeeping.²⁵⁰

Conflict between the two dominant ethnic groups, the Anywak and the Nuer, for political power has long defined the political economy of the region.²⁵¹ Traditionally the cattle of Nuer encroached the Anuak pasture for the grazing season but when population increased when the Nuers crossed the border of Ethiopia because of the war between the Sudan and Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) access to grazing land and water became scarce.²⁵² Due to this constant invasion of Nuers, the Anyuaa have felt dominated by those who first came in small numbers that have steadily brought their presence and dominated their region.²⁵³

Currently, other major security problem in the region is cattle raiding by Murule. Murule is tribe from South Sudan, in the eastern Jonglei region near the Ethiopian border. In 2016 the Murle snatched 102 to 125 children and more than 2,000 livestock armed with machine guns from the border villages, where the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) crossed the border to South Sudan for search.²⁵⁴ As the result the Ethiopian government proclaimed two days of national mourning. Yet again, on March 2017, more than 1,000 gunmen from South Sudan have killed 28 people and kidnapped 43 from Gambella region's Gog and Jor areas, which border South Sudan's Boma region.²⁵⁵

²⁵⁰ Sewonet, Abraham. "Breaking the Cycle of Conflict in Gambella Region: Assessment Mission: 23 December - 29 December 2002". UN-Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia. 2002. www.who.int/disasters/repo/8684.pdf. Accessed on 3 March 2018.

²⁵¹ Seide, Wondwosen Michago. *The Nuer Pastoralists – Between Large Scale Agriculture and Villagization: A case study of the Lare District in the Gambella Region of Ethiopia*. Current African Issues (CAI) No 64. Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, 2017.

²⁵² Sewonet, 2002.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Aljazeera. Ethiopia army in South Sudan to find abducted children. 21 April 2016 <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/ethiopia-army-enters-sudan-hunting-kidnapped-children-160421055058522.html>. Accessed on 3 March 2018.

²⁵⁵ Aljazeera. Ethiopia reports deadly raid by gunmen from South Sudan. 15 March 2017. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/ethiopia-reports-deadly-raid-gunmen-south-sudan-170315130515870.html>. Accessed on 3 March 2018.

According to the study made in the region pasture and water for livestock shrinks each year mainly related to recurrent droughts but also ‘due to perpetual fear of cattle raiding by the Murle, the Nuer do not go to remote and much greener pastures, which pushes them to use the same pasture over and again’ which lead to overgrazing.²⁵⁶

4.4 Conflict over Nile River

Egyptian leaders has been warning to take a military action in case of any threats against Egypt’s main water resource Nile River. President Anwar Sadat in the spring of 1979, days after signing the historic peace treaty with Israel said, “The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water”.²⁵⁷ The threat was not directed at Israel, but at Ethiopia, the upstream neighbor that controls 85 per cent of the headwaters of Egypt's life line, Nile River.²⁵⁸ He also said, if Ethiopia take any action to block our rights to Nile waters, there will be no alternative but to use force.²⁵⁹ In 2013, Mohamed Morsi said “We are not about to start any aggression against anyone whatsoever, or affront anyone whatsoever. But we have very serious measures to protect every single drop of Nile water, every single drop of water.” He added latter “if it [Nile] diminishes by one drop then our blood is the alternative.”²⁶⁰ However, Ethiopia has been building Africa’s biggest dam on Nile River since 2011 named Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and it is completed more than 65%. This was a big and bold step for Ethiopia which has been complaining about the unequitable water sharing agreements since the colonial time.

In 2005 the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi expressed his anger and frustration on Egypt concerning the Nile sharing. He said:

While Egypt is taking the Nile water to transform the Sahara Desert into something green, we in Ethiopia - who are the source of 85% of that water - are denied the possibility of using it to feed ourselves. And we are being forced to beg for food every year.

²⁵⁶ Seide, Wondwosen Michago. The Nuer Pastoralists – Between Large Scale Agriculture and Villagization: A case study of the Lare District in the Gambella Region of Ethiopia. Current African Issues (CAI) No 64. Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, 2017.

²⁵⁷ Starr, Joyce. Water Wars. *Foreign Policy*, No. 82 (Spring, 1991), pp. 17-36

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Krishna cited in Swain, Ashok. *Managing Water Conflict: Asia, Africa and the Middle East*. London: Routledge, 2004. Page 104.

²⁶⁰ BBC. “Egyptian warning over Ethiopia Nile Dam”. 10 June 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22850124>, Accessed in October 9 2017.

I think it is an open secret that the Egyptians have troops that are specialized in jungle warfare. Egypt is not known for its jungles. So if these troops are trained in jungle warfare, they are probably trained to fight in the jungles of the East African countries.

And from time to time Egyptian presidents have threatened countries with military action if they move. While I cannot completely discount the sabre-rattling I do not think it is a feasible option. If Egypt were to plan to stop Ethiopia from utilizing the Nile waters it would have to occupy Ethiopia and no country on earth has done that in the past.

The current regime cannot be sustained. It's being sustained because of the diplomatic clout of Egypt. Now, there will come a time when the people of East Africa and Ethiopia will become too desperate to care about these diplomatic niceties. Then, they are going to act.²⁶¹

In May 2010, however, five riparian countries signed agreement in Uganda which outlines the principles of equitable rights or water use allocations.



Map 4.4. Nile River Basin countries and GERD ²⁶²

²⁶¹ Mike Thomson “Nile restrictions anger Ethiopia.” February 3 2005.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4232107.stm>. Accessed on 20 May 2018.

²⁶² <https://www.theodysseyonline.com/oil-dilemma-water>. Accessed on 20 May 2018.

Though recently there is positive development between Ethiopia and Egypt concerning the GERD, last year the Ethiopian government accused Egypt for its internal security troubles. A document assessing the security and political situation in Ethiopia was presented at the National Security Council meeting, held on October 2017 states that, all anti-people forces are supported by Egyptian and Eritrean governments to destroy the constitutional system by sectarian violence and riots.²⁶³

4.5 Land Grabbing?

Presently the Ethiopian government is strongly promoting foreign large scale agriculture investment. Commercial farming was started by few members of the nobility in the 1950s and 1960s but after the 1974 revolution the new socialist government nationalized the farms. After 1991 change of government and market liberalization most of the state farms privatized. At the moment, Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) of government encourage commercial farms by both domestic and foreign investors for the reason of utilizing foreign exchange earnings from agricultural exports to achieve food security through trade and ultimately to finance technological imports to accelerate industrialization.²⁶⁴

As in most of the Horn of African states large scale agricultural investments are located in pastoralist areas which raise environmental and land grabbing concerns. Also the government policy towards pastoralism is that it has to transform to settled agriculture.²⁶⁵ Thus, it is not a coincidence that most of the land leased to large scale commercial farming was used for pasture and shifting cultivation by the pastoralists. Since the 1960s successive governments have tried to change pastoral land into large-scale commercial farmland, as pastoral land is usually considered to be ‘empty and vacant’.²⁶⁶

²⁶³ Addis Standard. “As exclusive Document Presented at the Ethiopia National Security Meeting” November 13, 2017. <http://addisstandard.com/8852-2/>. Accessed 14 May 2018.

²⁶⁴ Lavers, Tom. ‘Land grab’ as development strategy? The political economy of agricultural investment in Ethiopia Published in the Journal of Peasant Studies 39(1): 105-132

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Flintan cited in Seide, 2017.

Wondwosen Michago Seide in his study on large scale agriculture in Lare district of the Gambella region, which has the largest land given for large scale agricultural farming, describe that the regional government has a positive outlook towards the new investment on the virgin land of the region; on the other hand members of the local community indicated that investors are taking the most fertile land and less flood-prone areas near roads and rivers.²⁶⁷ More than 50 foreign investors, from India, Turkey, Pakistan, China and Sudan as well as Saudi Arabia, have leased Ethiopian land and the largest in Gambella is owned by Saudi Star Agricultural Development which has a project of 0.5 million hectares of farm.

Region *City Administration	Population Density (People/ha)	Foreign Investments in active projects (ha)	Identified for future investment (ha)
Addis Ababa*	5,536	171	0
Afar	21	10,000	409,678
Amhara	117	20,702	347,430
Benishangul Gumuz	15	83,931	691,984
Dire Dawa	237	0	0
Gambella	12	202,012	1,238,005
Multiregional	N/A	45,017	-
Oromia	105	214,003	438,212
SNNPR	152	79,770	529,181
Somali	N/A	0	N/A
Tigray	55	300	0
Total		655,907	3,654,491

Table 4.3. The regional distribution of investment land²⁶⁸

The government is also using the policy of villagization in Gambella region because of the dispersed was not efficient to provide basic economic and social service like drinking water, health care, schools etc.²⁶⁹ However this policy is not welcomed by the community for the reason

²⁶⁷ Seide, 2017.

²⁶⁸ Lavers, Tom. 'Land grab' as development strategy? The political economy of agricultural investment in Ethiopia Published in the Journal of Peasant Studies 39(1): 105-132, January 2012

²⁶⁹ Ingebretsen, Emily. A Thirsty Third World: How Land Grabs Are Leaving Ethiopia in the Dust. *wH2O: The Journal of Gender and Water*. Volume 4 Issue 1, 2017

that as some claim the people are uprooted from their home to provide land for the large scale commercial farmers.²⁷⁰

A local from Gambella's neighboring state Benishangul Gumuz told the guardian about the investment as follows:

"This is not development. Investors are destroying our lands and environment. There is no school, [no] food security, and they destroy wild fruits. Bamboo is the life of people. It is used for food, for cattle, for our beds, homes, firewood, everything. But the investors destroy it. They destroy our forests.

This is not the way for development. They do not cultivate the land for the people. They grow sorghum, maize, sesame, but all is exported, leaving none for the people."²⁷¹

On the other hand Jemal Ahmed, Chief executive of Saudi Star Agricultural Development argue that the investment is helping the local people and the country. He said:

"After colonization and slavery, Africans are still not able to use their resources ... take Gambella, that land is infested with mosquitoes. The indigenous survive by eating roots from the forest. They don't have food shortages but their mortality rate is so high. They don't go to school. The only thing you see when you fly is not factories or businesspeople: you see NGOs

...I get happy when I see an Anuak boy operating a Caterpillar machine the way an American boy would do on the Mississippi delta.

... Saudi Arabia is a rich country and imports food. We have rich lands but we need capital. If Saudi hunger for food lets us bring in capital that is a blessing for Ethiopia.

... If I had invested \$200m in Thailand, we could easily have produced more rice, why do we do it in Gambella, with no roads, no electricity, and no skilled workers? Because if we don't, no one else will. The Indians came but they could not do it. We have a sentimental attachment to our people. Gambellans are Ethiopians too."²⁷²

²⁷⁰ Honre cited in Ingebresten, 2017.

²⁷¹ Smith, David. Ethiopians talk of violent intimidation as their land is earmarked for foreign investors. 14 April 2015 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/14/ethiopia-villagisation-violence-land-grab>, Accessed on 20 April 2018.

²⁷² Financial Times. The great land rush Ethiopia: The billionaire's farm. March 1 2016, <https://ig.ft.com/sites/land-rush-investment/ethiopia/>, Accessed on 15 March 2018.

4.6 Refugee

Ethiopia is the second largest refugee-hosting nation in Africa after Uganda, and sixth largest refugee-hosting nation in the world after Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Islamic Republic of Iran and Uganda. Ethiopia is hosting 791,600 refugees as of June 2017.²⁷³ Conflicts in neighboring South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan and Yemen made the refugee influx so high. The majority of refugees in Ethiopia reside in camps located in remote areas near their respective countries' borders.²⁷⁴

FDRE's Refugee Proclamation No. 409/2004 states Ethiopia is open for refugees to any race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. And until 2009 Ethiopia followed 'encampment policy' for refugees, which the government provide areas that are located at a reasonable distance from the border of their country of origin or of former habitual residence; in 2010 the government applied 'out of camp policy' for Eritreans and in 2016 the Ethiopian government pledged to relax its encampment policy for all refugees, raising the number of 'out of camp policy' beneficiaries to 10 per cent of the refugee population, amounting to about 75,000 refugees.²⁷⁵

Since 1990, close to 50 per cent of the foreign-born population in Ethiopia originated in Somalia (many of whom are refugees), and between 30 to 35 per cent have come from Sudan; between 2010 and 2015, South Sudanese migrants, an estimated 75 per cent of whom may be refugees, and also in 2015 Eritrean migrants accounted for 10-15 per cent from which 60 per cent are refugees.²⁷⁶

There is a likelihood of conflict spillover when a neighboring state is civil war. Though the Ethiopian government has open door policy to refugees, this policy has cost the host community

²⁷³ UNHCR. Figures at a Glance. <http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html>, Accessed on 31 March 2018. 31 March 2018.

²⁷⁴ Ruauadel, Heloise and Susanna Morrison-Métois. Responding to Refugee Crises: Lessons from evaluations in Ethiopia and Uganda as countries of destination. OECD Working Paper. September 2017.

²⁷⁵ Mallett, R. et al. "Journeys on hold: How policy influences the migration decisions of Eritreans in Ethiopia". Working Paper 506, Overseas Development Institute, London, 2017. <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11336.pdf>, Accessed on 30 March 2018.

²⁷⁶ Donnenfeld, Zachary et al. Ethiopia Development Trends Assessment. Ethiopia Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Service (EPMES) 2 March 2017. <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ethiopia-assessment.pdf>, Accessed on 30 March 2018.

especially the bordering areas. Some studies claim that the refugees from Somalia have often worked closely with ethnic Somali separatists in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, supporting them in their own political efforts which exacerbated the conflict in Ethiopia.²⁷⁷ The residents of Dollo Ado, the Gerimero community, bordering Somalia, where there is a refugee camp for the Somali refugees, claim to be the first settlers of Dollo Ado and they are complaining about the rising cost of living and insecurity fearing that some of the refugees are members of terrorist groups such as Al Shabaab; also there is potential for conflicts as the natives and refugees fight for scarce resources.²⁷⁸

The major manifestation conflict spillover and threatening of rural security had been in Gambella regional state of Ethiopia. Gambella is found in the western Ethiopia bordering with Sudan and after the separation in 2011 with South Sudan. A comprehensive study by Medhane Tadesse describe how the refugee inflow to Ethiopia in this region create demographic and environmental crises which lead to continuous conflict.

More than 30,000 refugees to enter in to this region at the time of Sudanese civil war in the 1980s which outnumbered the local population.²⁷⁹ The condition created ecological disaster, generated local market crises because of the imported grains to feed the refugees, the presence of armed groups steered militarization of the society and most importantly it changed the demography of the population.²⁸⁰

The Gambella region is mainly inhabited by the Nuer, Anuak and Mezhenger. The Nuer also live in South Sudan with is the second largest ethnic group after the Dinka. The 1992 border agreement between the Ethiopian Empire and the British placed majority of Anuak in Ethiopia and majority of Nuer as British subjects on the other side. At the time of the civil war when UNHCR build refugee camps for Nuer refugees²⁸¹ on the traditional Anuak territory, the Anuak

²⁷⁷ Salehyan, *Idean and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch* Refugees and the Spread of Civil War. Refugees and the Spread of Civil War, *International Organization*. 60(2): (2006) 335–366.

²⁷⁸ Kamau, Anne W. An Economic Perspective on the Refugee Crisis in Africa's Horn. September 12, 2011. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/an-economic-perspective-on-the-refugee-crisis-in-africas-horn/>, Accessed on 30 March 2018.

²⁷⁹ Kurimoto cited in Tadesse, 2006.

²⁸⁰ Tadesse, 2006.

²⁸¹ Almost all refugees from South Sudan are Nuer. Gebresenbet, Fana. Security Implications of Hosting Refugees: The Case of South Sudanese Refugees in Gambella, Southwestern Ethiopia. September 6, 2017.

frequently class with the refugees when they search for food or fuel wood.²⁸² In such conflicts the Ethiopian Nuers support for the South Sudanese Nuer against the Anuak, this raise a question of loyalty and citizenship which has two opinions from both sides.

The Nuer consider, an Ethiopia Nuer is a member of clans or sub-clans found in Ethiopian side from the border demarcation period of Menilik II; by knowing each other of which clans or sub-clans is Ethiopian or not and a Nuer who grown up in Ethiopia and learned in Ethiopian schools. The Anuak consider, Ethiopian Nuer is the one who has not been in the refugee camps and attended schools in Ethiopia. The Anuak raise the issue of being in a refugee camp for the reason that most of the Nuer were at the refugee camps before they become Ethiopian government officials in the region²⁸³

The issue of demography intensified after 1991 introduction of ethnically based administrative division and the federal system relies on numbers to decide oh who rule the region the Anuak looked the exodus of Nuer in to the Gambella region.²⁸⁴

Most importantly the root cause of the conflict:

... The crucial political significance of the land has also made Nuer access to vital natural resources increasingly precarious. The Anuak land claim makes up at least 70 per cent of the region's land mass. ...The scarce land type is the fertile alluvial riverside land, suitable for moisture cultivation during the dry season. This land type cover only 0.5 per cent of the total land area of the region, most of which falls within Anuak territories. ... The Anuak are settled in fixed areas, while the Nuer shift their settlement seasonal, in search of water and grazing land and also in the wet season when their areas are flooded. The Anuak on the other hand are settled in the fertile lands which are mostly the riverbanks of the Baro River. Both groups clash every year, but the degree of the conflict may vary. Nowadays, Anuak are easily defeated by the well organized and better prepared Nuer as in the other cases obviously pastoralists are better armed. ... Recently, the Nuer

<https://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/security-implications-of-hosting-refugees-the-case-of-south-sudanese-refugees-in-gambella-southwestern-ethiopia/>, Accessed on 30 March 2018.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

succeeded in evicting the Anuak even from the riverbanks and from around 20 *Kebeles* of Itang *Woreda*. However, they continued to acquire more land slowly until they occupied both banks of the Baro/Sobat River. ... Realizing their military weakness the Anuak are demanding the government to help them reclaim lost territories. However, the Nuer reject such claim saying that land is the property of the state and they will never leave the land they occupied at the present. As a result, tension continues to rise between the two, mainly along the Baro riverbanks. The competition over natural resources; land for grazing and water for cattle and also land for grazing.²⁸⁵

4.7. Famine and Drought in Ethiopia

It was a national humiliation for Ethiopians to be on the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary to exemplify the word 'famine' using the phrase 'famine in Ethiopia' until was removed in its recent editions. The recurrent famines in Ethiopia shattered mostly the poor rural peasants and pastoralists. Famine and drought has also important security implication, it contributed to the collapse of the last two governments of Haile Silassie and *Derg*. Also currently the map of drought affected areas and conflict areas overlap.

Famine is a socio-economic process which case the accelerated destitution of the most vulnerable, marginal and least powerful groups in the community, to a point where they can no longer, as group, maintain a sustainable livelihood.²⁸⁶ The technical definition requires that one in five households in a given area face extreme food shortages; that 30 per cent of the population be malnourished; and that the death rate exceed 2 people per 10,000 per day.²⁸⁷

The following table shows the times, places, the affected population and the cause of the famine in Ethiopian history.

²⁸⁵ Tadesse, 2006.

²⁸⁶ Walker cited in Devereux, Stephen. *Famine in the Twentieth Century*. IDS Working Paper 105. Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 2000.

²⁸⁷ IPC Global Partners. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Technical Manual. Version 1.1. FAO. Rome. 2008.

253 – 242 BC	Ethiopia	Deduced for Low Nile Floods
1066 – 1072	Ethiopia and Egypt	Deduced form Low Nile floors and Egyptian famine
1252	Ethiopia	First of seven famine years during next thirty years
1258 – 59	Ethiopia	Severity unrecorded
1272 – 75	Ethiopia	Severity unrecorded
1435 – 36	Ethiopia	Severity unrecorded
1454 - 68	Ethiopia	Severity unrecorded
1543 – 1562	Hararghe	Attributed to God’s anger at murder of Emperor Gelawdeos
1800	Ethiopia	Large human and livestock death toll
1812 – 1816	Tigray	Severity unrecorded
1826 – 27	Ethiopia	Failure of cotton and grain crops
1828 - 29	Shewa	Much human mortality, but very severe on livestock
1831	Tigray	Severity unrecorded
1835 – 38	Tigray and Eritrea	Drought, cholera, epidemic; high human cattle loss
1864 – 66	Tigray and Gonder	Heavy death toll
1876 - 78	Tigray and Awash Valley	Heavy livestock death tolls
1880	Tigray and Gonder	Much loss of livestock
1888 – 92	Ethiopia	Drought and spread of rinderpest caused loss of 90 per cent cattle and 1/3 human population
1895 - 96	Ethiopia	Minor Drought. Loss of livestock and human lives.
1899 - 1900	Ethiopia	Drought deduced from levels of Lake Rudolf and low Nile floods
1913 – 14	Northern Ethiopia	Lowest Nile floods since 1695. Grain prices said to have risen thirtyfold
1920 – 22	Ethiopia	Moderate drought, similar to 1895/96
1932 – 34	Ethiopia	Deduced from Low Lake Rudolf drought in Northern Kenya.
1953	Tigray and Wollo	Severity unrecorded
1957 – 58	Tigray and Wollo	Rain failure in 1957 with locust and epidemic in 1958
1962 – 63	Western Ethiopia	Very severe
1964 – 66	Tigray, Wollo	Undocumented. Said to be the worse than 1973/75 droughts
1969	Eritrea	Estimated 1.7 million affected.
1971 – 75	Ethiopia	Sequence of rain failures. Estimated ¼ million dead. 50 per cent livestock lost in Tigray and Wollo
1978 – 79	Southern Ethiopia	Failure of <i>Belg</i> rains

1982	Northern Ethiopia	Late <i>Meher</i> rains
1984 – 85	Ethiopia	Sequence rain failure. 8 million affected Estimated 1 million dead. Much livestock loss.
1987 – 88	North, East and South Ethiopia	Drought undocumented severity in peripheral regions.
1990	Northern Ethiopia	Rain failures and regional conflicts. Estimated at least 3 million people facing starvation.
1999 – 2000	Ethiopian Somali region	Drought, about 100,000 people died

Table 4.2. Chronology of Drought and Famine occurrences in Ethiopia²⁸⁸

Beside the apparent cause of famine, drought scholars put forward different arguments for the source of famine. Girma Kebede and Mary J. Jacob argue:

Famine is caused not by the lack of precipitation that triggers it but lack of political commitment to develop adequate contingency plans to cope with drought, by agricultural policies which pay little attention to food and agriculture, by environmentally destructive agricultural practices and deforestation that accentuate soil erosion, and by lack of a fair distribution of society's wealth.²⁸⁹

Since 2015, El Nino²⁹⁰ effect which is causing global changes of both temperatures and rainfall, caused one of the worst droughts in many parts of Ethiopia. Poverty and food insecurity are concentrated in rural areas, and the poorest sub-sector of rural households are chronically reliant on social safety net programmes and food aid.²⁹¹ Moreover, there is acute food insecurity is affecting up to 7 million people, combined with malnutrition and water shortages in the pastoralist and agro-pastoralist southern and south-eastern lowlands.²⁹² Due to drought and large-scale displacement in the southern and south-eastern lowland areas of Ethiopia, humanitarian needs are expected to remain significant in 2018.


²⁸⁸ Source: Webb, Patrick and Joachim von Braum. Drought and Food Shortages in Ethiopia: A preliminary Review Effects and Policy Implications. Washington D.C. International Food Policy Research Institute. 1990. And

²⁸⁹ Kebede, Girma and Mary J. Jacob. Drought, famine and the political economy of environmental degradation in Ethiopia. *Geography*. Vol. 73, No. 1 (January 1988), pp. 65-70

²⁹⁰ El Nino is the phenomenon of rising temperatures of surface sea water, which causes different extreme events such as floods and droughts.

²⁹¹ FDRE Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Ethiopia's Agriculture Sector Policy and Investment Framework (PIF) 2010-2020. Draft Final Report. 15 September 2010.

²⁹² OCHA. Ethiopia. <http://www.unocha.org/ethiopia>, Accessed on 6 April 2018



Map 4.5. Food Insecurity in Ethiopia from October 2017 - January 2018 ²⁹³

²⁹³ Famine Early Warning System Network. East Africa: Ethiopia. <http://www.fews.net/east-africa/ethiopia>. Accessed on 16 March 2018.

4.8 Summary

This chapter discusses the main focus of the study Ethiopia. Ethiopia is the most populous state in the region where Rural Ethiopia where around 80 per cent of the population live in rural areas directly or indirectly depend on land. Ethiopia has different climatic and topographic regions. Ethiopia multi ethnic country which has long history state formation, it was a feudal monarchy until the 1974 revolution where the military socialist government took power until 1991. The post 1991 Ethiopia is an ethnically based federal state.

Land is the most important asset for both rural communities of Ethiopia, Pastoralist and agrarian. Different land administration policies in different regimes has an important impact for both in security and development terms for the rural community. There were armed conflicts with the government and within the community because of the land tenure policies.

Land degradation and drought in northern Ethiopia lead to civil war in in 1970 and 80s. In the northern highlands centuries all practiced agriculture and deforestation made the land unproductive.

The pastoralist areas of Ethiopia are located in the arid and semi-arid lowland areas in the east, north-east, west, and south of the country, cover two thirds of the land mass of the country. The pastoralist communities are the most vulnerable part of the society. Overgrazing, bush encroachment, population pressure, increased settlement, decrease in livestock mobility, limited knowledge of rangeland management, soil erosion are the major problems there reason that pastoralist move to the well-watered places it will lead to conflict with other groups.

The three major pastoralist conflicts this conflicts covered in this chapter caused by changed living space are the Afar – Issa Somali, the Oromo - Somali and Nuer – Aknuak. All three of conflicts show the pastoralist communities are fighting for grazing land and water.

Ethiopia's building of dam on Nile River also become major security concern. Beside verbal threats with Egypt which existed for long Ethiopian government is accused Egypt for indirectly involved in internal security turmoil.

The other rural security concerns in Ethiopia are 'land grabbing' issues mostly in Gambella region where the government leasing land to large scale commercial farmers, Refugee influx in

to Ethiopia which lead to demographic change and more competition of land. At last the chapter covers famine and drought which contributed to the collapse of the last two governments.

5. Conclusion

This monograph is a literature review and analysis of rural environmental causes of conflict and rural challenges in Ethiopia and it also gives an overview of the region of Horn of Africa. The major findings of the study are that almost all places where there is land resources scarcity there is conflict. On the other words, the map of conflict areas overlaps on the map of drought areas or places where there is changed living space.

Most of the conflict over land resources is between the pastoralist communities in the region and especially in Ethiopia. Thus land use planning for the pastoralist communities by creating corridors to facilitate the movement of pastoralists and their herds and securing access to water and grazing lands, land use planning can be a vital peacebuilding tool.²⁹⁴ Concerning pastoral communities, where most if not all past and present major pastoral development investments initiated and funded by outsider institutions.²⁹⁵ However not an only local government initiative but also indigenous or grass root or bottom-up policy development solution is important. Also, the perspective of the government, a sedentary way of life is regarded as a path to modernization and development for the pastoralists must be revisited. Instead of heavily emphasized the administrative boundary that is based on identity politics within the political structure of the country should be diverted to resource-sharing arrangements between pastoralists.²⁹⁶

Most importantly the government has to give great emphasis to water and soil conservation, agroforestry and reforestation projects and to the uncontrolled population growth.

²⁹⁴ Giessen, Eric van de. *Horn of Africa: Environmental Security Assessment*. Institute for Environmental Security. Hague. 2011. www.envirosecurity.org/espa/PDF/ESA_HOA.pdf. Accessed on 12 February 2018.

²⁹⁵ Desta, Solomon. Pastoralism and Development in Ethiopia. *Economic Focus*. Vol. 9. No. 3. November 2006. Page 12.

²⁹⁶ Beyene, Fekadu. Natural Resource Conflict Analysis Among Pastoralists in Southern Ethiopia, *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 12:1, 19-33, 2017.

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