



# The army's participation in maintaining the public order in the Kingdom of Hungary between 1867–1918

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## Abstract

**Aim:** As forces originally designed to protect the country against attacks from the outside are required in maintaining the public order amidst extraordinary circumstances today, it was no different in the civic Hungarian state born with the Compromise. The aim of this study is to present a specific segment of the internal policing structure before 1918, the tasks of the armed forces.

**Methodology:** Document and content analysis.

**Findings:** The dualist setup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the relationship within the Hungarian Kingdom's public order defense organisations and to the civil administration created a unique environment which military units ordered to support police organs of insufficient staffing or capacity had to comply with. In the examined time period, the army's participation in the joint fighting service of the Austro-Hungarian Empire's and the Royal Hungarian Army's engagement in maintaining the public order was common practice, since until the 1885 establishment of the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie, there was no military organised armed guard force bearing sufficient staffing, equipment and authorization, except in certain towns. As per its military organisational structure, the gendarmerie worked together with the defense forces in an effective way, and has practically taken over the majority of tasks from the armed forces. The current study examines how the armed forces' activities by the military fit into the Hungarian public administration and what was the relationship like between the administrative authority ordering and the tactical combat force being ordered. Examining the armed forces' tasks in the era is therefore necessary, both in its narrow and wider context, and paying special attention to the unique position of the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie is

also important, which could both be in the position to order the force of arms unites and be ordered.

**Value:** Due to space constraints, the present study does not allow for detailed presentation of the wider range of armed force tasks and their background laid down in the law and various rules, it rather focuses on systematically reviewing the topic and painting a general picture. The topic is still relevant today in the context of the contribution of the armed forces to law enforcement. The historical context explored in this study may also help to inform the development of regulation in the present.

**Keywords:** force of arms, Royal Hungarian Army, Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie, dualism

## Introduction

During the period of dualism, force of arms action meant a means of support of the public administration needed, by the armed forces' presence or measures which had the state monopoly of the legitimate use of force (Finszter, 2007). Society faced different problems and worked on answering different questions for each era (Kovács, 2019). In the examined period, we should differentiate between 'force of arms' and 'police measures', which in fact, did not have a strict boundary. Force of arms may be understood in its narrower and wider context. In the wider sense, it means an armed support of administrative activities, while its narrower sense covers tasks concluded by the use of troops. In the ordinary sense of the expression, force of arms means a way of support manifested by carrying arms and averting threats to the rule of law, in addition to restoring disturbed public order (Vedó, 2018).

Force of arms manifested by law enforcement and defense were also not sharply differentiated, since aside from the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie as the premier armed force of national competence, the army had also taken part in public safety tasks (e.g. demonstrations, public events, strikes) (Deák, 2015).

Although state police forces existed in the examined time period, in the Kingdom of Hungary, municipal police forces were the basis of urban policing, unable to carry out a team action on a higher scale due to their lack of staffing and preparedness (Parádi, 2018).

In 1873, the first manifestation of the state police, Metropolitan Police was established by the Law on the Unification of Pest, Buda and Óbuda.<sup>1</sup> Eight more

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1 Act 36 of 1872 on the establishment and settlement of the Buda-Pest municipal jurisdiction.

years passed until 11th April 1881, the day the National Assembly adopted the legal basis for the first national police, Act 21 of 1881 on the metropolitan police. This act has laid down the organization and staff composition of the police (Lippai, 2017).

## **Understanding the concept of the force of arms during the Dualism**

Amongst all services carried out on the order of the authority or official entitled, it is important to differentiate between force of arms, police measures<sup>2</sup> and those public safety services with a similar content but a different legal basis, such as an ultimatum or arrangement (e.g. escorting and removing persons, which had been included in multiple legislations). In connection with the military, the only development in regulation concerned its use in the force of arms and its service forms, as other (Vedó, 2014).

The public administration and legal terminology of the time used the term ‘force of arms’ in several senses with different meanings, sometimes even contradicting the measure of the word itself described in the first place. The meaning of the word has also changed, taking on a more nuanced profile over time. While ‘force of arms’ practically meant ‘public safety’ in the beginning, later on it has adopted a meaning of ‘troops’ as in today’s terminology. Force of arms required to continuously be specified and re-interpreted in public administration, as it was sometimes even used to describe a force of only a few staff. It is worth nothing, however, that even a 2-member gendarme patrol ordered to accompany a person who did not appear for their initiation was considered force of arms personnel, as they completely adhered to the conceptual criteria.

Force of arms was essentially the armed force ordered to restore the disturbed public order, in essence, to ensure the threatened legality. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between the force of arms in law enforcement and defence forces. According to the general rule, the military could only be used if public safety organisations at the given place and time were lacking available force. In summary, all activities were considered the force of arms’ task, which required physical force, or its demonstration. Therefore, those organisations were eligible to fulfil force of arms’ duties, which had the right and ability to use physical force in order to complete the given public safety task (Parádi, 2011). Law

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2 Minister of Justice Decree No. 8405/1874 on the use of law enforcement and police assistance during judicial executions.

enforcement's duties which required team action only accounted for a part of the force of arms' tasks, as a last resort, only when all other types of solutions were insufficient (Ravasz, 1995; Ravasz, 2004). Even the era's police literature viewed military action as the last resort, which was only complementary to the main tasks of the police, which were to constantly guard the nation and exercise discretionary power (Concha, 1901).

The basic force of arms' task of the Hungarian Royal Gendarmerie was law enforcement in the wider sense of the expression, whereas the military was only required to participate in troop activities. Until the complete establishment of the gendarmerie, however, public administration authorities could use armed forces' troops in a strictly regulated manner. Later on, armed forces were only participating in these activities if the gendarmerie's power was insufficient (e.g. if they feared violence or wanted to prevent it by demonstrating force).

Armed forces' power was not only applied for public safety reasons in extraordinary cases, but when the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie was being built up, although not in the traditional sense of the word. Based on the supreme decision of 22 April 1885, soldiers were assigned to the gendarmerie being organised, as 'auxiliaries to the force of arms' (Némethy, 1900).

Force of arms' auxiliaries were being commanded until 1887, afterwards, law enforcement application of individual soldiers was prohibited.

The need to establish the gendarmerie's force of arms was often raised as early as 1867, and more and more official proceedings required ministerial-level directives to be issued. In his regulation of 22 June 1867, the justice minister stipulated that the force of arms' demands stemming from private and judicial cases should be met *'by the use of substitutes for the gendarmerie who shall be trusted with the tasks of the gendarmerie'*.<sup>3</sup> However, in cases where public safety officials were not available, the army continued to support the official procedures. Costs of their deployment were borne by the ordering authority. In the developing civic state, however, the continuous application of the army for maintaining public order was neither desirable, nor possible, hence, a professional and centralised organisation was needed, which could cater to all areas of the public administration's needs. The majority of the issues were resolved with the establishment of the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie, as the first service order of the corps stated that the gendarmerie was under the administrative authorities' command, in order to maintain public silence, order and security. The gendarmerie had to obey these authorities' commands and could not override

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3 Decree of the Hungarian Royal Ministry of Justice of 22 June 1867 on the use of military force for executions.

them.<sup>4</sup> A more significant armed power, however, could still only be exhibited by the army, no other guard body was able to support the gendarmerie's force of arms as they were lacking staff or equipment. During the age of dualism, 33 378 people served in the state and municipal law enforcement organisations of the Kingdom of Hungary (Parádi, 2011). Compared to today, organisations were modest in numbers, and had fragmented and scattered garrisons, which significantly limited the length and size of their concentration of power, moreover, their equipment and weaponry were generally not suitable for restoring public order via troop action.

Most probably due to their limited number of staff and their greater prestige resulted in the gendarmerie force assigned to force of arms troop duties was no bigger than a post or platoon. The greatest concentration of force established during the Dualism was of battalion strength (Parádi, 2008).

The gendarmerie was a military-organised force, therefore, knowledge on how to use troops for force of arms duties was included in the training, and mostly was based on military training and combat operations carried out as part of a task force. Personal weaponry was also suitable for troop action (Parádi, 1997; Parádi, 2012; Parádi, 2011b). Bayonet assault and employment of weapons may seem radical today, however, it is important to note that force of arms action was tailored to the equipment available, which was military. Therefore, the gendarmerie employed military tactics and took force of arms action as infantry (or cavalry) combat force. The basic principle was the same throughout the European law enforcement organisations at the time, even in the French gendarmerie, the regular use of the baton only came up in 1929 (Kilián, 1929b).

It was its competence that was an important feature what distinguished gendarmerie from other public security armed guards and mainly from police. Police in the Dualism had autonomous material competence. On the other hand, securing the implementation of administrative efforts meant the task of the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie, if it was needed by applying physical force, coercive measures and ultimately employment of weapons.

In view of the above, public security bodies did not have monopoly in providing the duties of force of arms. For such duties, according to the above, the army could be still applied. The troops of Royal Hungarian Army were involved in it primarily (Egyed, 1912), however the priority of the joint fighting service would have consequent from it in such cases according to the legal regulation. Commandeering of military units of the army was allowed by the

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4 Instruction in line of duty for Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie, 1881, 3.§.

contemporary laws on the army, and the ways of commandeering were set in decrees and regulations. The inclusion of the defence forces in law enforcement troop tasks is also not a Hungarian invention, as the situation was similar in the neighbouring countries, and leading powers of the continent, Germany and France too (Parádi, 2011). By utilising the military for force of arms tasks did not curb what was outlined in legal article 53 of 1912 on exceptional power, as it did not only occur in times of exceptional rule and the force of arms could be drawn into the civilian authority's jurisdiction. Civilian administration had to pay reimbursement per separate settlement to the defence ministry after force of arms and help usage. Until a more detailed regulation, the army could be utilised just as much as forces specifically existing for reasons of finance services, public administration and public safety tasks (such as blockades, maintaining a cordon, escorting prisoners, anti-robbery missions), executing regulations and bans issued by authorities, as tax enforcement forces<sup>5</sup>, postal escorts, to assist in floods and other disasters, to guard treasuries, prisons and other institutions under civil administration<sup>6</sup> (Balla, 2008).

During Dualism, based on the above, there were clearly no insurmountable obstacles when it came to the cooperation in using outside and inside defence forces between related fields. The metropolitan police's detective corps could for example be used in tasks against the enemy's intelligence (Szigetvári, 2016) and even the military was used in force of arms tasks. Practice back then was to consider how suitable a body was for a particular task.

The important difference in practice between the force of arms tasks of the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie and the army was that while the personnel ordered to execute such tasks could only be provided in such numbers that could still make it possible to carry out tasks under all circumstances—i. e. at least a squad, but preferably a platoon—the gendarmerie could also be divided into smaller groups. Army-led force of arms were always led by an officer and individual soldiers did not have their autonomous power to act. Whereas gendarmerie officials had the autonomous power to act. In practice, this meant that observers were not allowed to take action if an offence was committed in front of the army personnel, whereas gendarmes were obliged to take action.

As time passed, regulation of the force of arms became more detailed in its broader and narrower sense too, and was treated as a priority issue by civil administration. The regulation of troop action law enforcement, treated as the public safety equivalent of military tasks, was primarily in the jurisdiction of

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5 However, during WWI, approximately 250 finance officers lost their lives (Suba, 2014).

6 10 767/1905. MOD Decree on the use of defence forces and joint army of force of arms.

the defence minister, while the justice and interior minister was responsible for how the civil authorities were assigned and costs were borne.

The defence minister's regulation of 1876<sup>7</sup> and an instruction issued as an annex provided the first complete and accurate regulation of the procedure to be followed by both public authorities and military headquarters. The regulation clearly states that military personnel may only be used for law enforcement if public authority power of the 'political authorities' is insufficient. Except for the most urgent cases, these civil authorities decided whether their power was sufficient and whether they required military assistance (Deák 2014). If the assigning officer went to the competent garrison site of the army requiring urgent assistance, he immediately had to report this to the interior minister via telegram.

The regulation is an annex to the *'Instructions to the public authorities on procedures to follow in case of recourse to conventional soldiers or military'* which outlines the purpose of the law enforcement as such: *'...to support public authorities, in order to provide them with sufficient material power to withstand violent opposition towards their legal provisions and official functions.'* (Utasítás, 1876).

The letter order specified those authorities who could directly turn to the Army Command for requiring force of arms. The k) subparagraph of paragraph 2, already included the Transylvanian Gendarme Marshal and the Flank Commanders, which appeared in later regulations with a continuously expanding personnel. Persons listed could resort to the nearest garrison with their claim by naming the aim of force of arms. Of course, the force dispatched was designated by the commander of the unit, which was prepared for meeting the tasks of force of arms. The Royal Hungarian Army provided force of arms only if the troops of the joint fighting service were not available or were insufficient in manpower (Utasítás, 1876).

It was an important restriction that the Garrison Commander could commandeer force of arms units within the area of the garrison's territorial competence anytime, but outside the area of its territorial competence, he only had the power to do so if it did not decrease its military capabilities significantly. In urgent cases, the duty officers and troop commanders could also send detachments of force of arms from their combat personnel if they took the responsibility for any such action. However, foreseeable demands were always submitted through the Royal Hungarian Ministry of the Interior, which had their orders completed by the General Headquarters of Budapest.

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7 Minister of Defence Decree No. 1962/1876 Instruction on the procedure to be followed by the public authorities when using the military or military force of the army.

In the case of real commandeering tactical combat force of arms resorted by non-militarian authorities, the civil servant was relegated, and until making further measures, decisions were purely based on military viewpoints. It was a serious guarantee against using military force for political or selfish reasons, however, more detailed rules were not precisely worked out at the time.

The Decree and Letter Order mentioned above were amended and revised by the Circular Decree of 1886 by the Minister of Defense (henceforward referred to as MOD) on 16 January 1887.<sup>8</sup> The '*Letter Order*' issued as an annex of the new decree did not contain significant amendments, it rather meant updates to the changes in the organization of the administrative authority. Due to the new situation resulting from the establishment of the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie, k) subparagraph of paragraph 2 lists among the bodies directly entitled to request military force of arms, the Marshal Commands of Gendarmerie and every gendarme officers in duty, if necessary. The fact that the Royal Hungarian Ministry of Interior conveyed the claim to the competent Corps Command meant a change in the assignment system of the force of arms regarding foreseeable demands.

A subsequent amendment and significant addition was made by the MOD Letter Order of 1896 '*the procedure needed to be followed by administrative authorities when using MP or military force of arms in the Lands of the Hungarian Crown*'. (Utasítás, 1896).

This Letter Order, unlike the previous ones, contains significant and detailed rules concerning interfering and commandeering the force of arms. Paragraph 2 highlights that the assignment of military force of arms shall be carefully considered because the timely application of gendarme troops and the lawful prosecution of troublemakers is more effective than demonstrating the military force. If the available gendarme troops are not sufficient to accomplish a task, the Minister of Interior should be requested to provide more gendarme troops as reinforcement. An important arrangement boosting the ethos of the civil state was the fact that the military power could only be requested if the reinforced gendarmerie force was insufficient. It can therefore be concluded that the gendarmerie force of arms strengthened so much after 1886 that they were already considered the primary executor of troop missions. It had to be taken into account that in cases affecting bigger areas or requiring severe armed struggles, the army's force of arms was the primary way to counter the breach of peace.

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8 Minister of Defence Decree No. 4539/1886 Instructions on the procedure to be followed by the public authorities in the event of recourse to the armed forces.



According to the contemporary interpretation of the law, the force of arms assigned to a particular combat mission which? was provided by the army and the gendarmerie and police could turn to the army's force of arms. However, they could also concentrate power within their own organisations. According to the detailed text of Act 21 of 1881 on the Budapest Police, in the event of bigger public gathering or an actual rebellion that jeopardizes public order and peace, the help of conscript service or the army could be availed. Police – although the Metropolitan Police also established a subsidiary force of arms within its organisation later on – all in all, could not accomplish the mission of handling masses of people, therefore they turned to a more appropriate armed force to counter it. Subsequently, turning to the military force of arms was being pushed more and more into the background, and gendarmes were gaining a bigger and bigger role instead.

However, there may have been instances where a representative of an organisation having the capacity to use force of arms could have asked to detach the force of another organisation for a reason of need. The MOD Letter Order of 1896 still listed gendarme officer in duty, among authorities and bodies empowered to require military force of arms, but only Gendarme Marshalls could request the Royal Hungarian Minister of Interior to provide them with force of arms upon prior coordination. This also proves that detailing force of arms was not in fact determined by the specific body but the competence in the particular mission, which resulted in a very flexible and rapid reaction structure in the force of arms.

It was a novelty in the Letter Order of 1896 of force of arms that it included a detailed regulation on troop assignments. The military force of arms was always assigned in writing, with indicating the aim and time of the application, and the official body appointed to be in liaison with the force of arms.

To provide guarantee, the Order included another important regulation. Similarly, to the gendarmerie's service operation provisions, military force of arms was also to not take part in authority activities. This restriction was so serious that in cases of police inefficiency, assigned representatives of other authorities and even 'trustworthy men' delegated by other authorities could be employed, but not soldiers.

The same regulation restrained the gendarmerie's force of arms actions, which put both the ordering administrative authority and the gendarme officers being ordered in transparent conditions of responsibility. Both parties responded to cases occurring within their own organisations, made their own decisions and bore the consequences. The proper freedom of choice was also available when commandeering the force of arms, which – according to the text of the 1896

Order – had to occur ‘preferably in agreement’ with the official representative of the civil authority. A properly sized police force had to be commanded along the barriers made by troops of the army or the gendarmerie, so that carrying out an identity check and blocking the crowd could be ensured.

The Decree of the Minister of Justice issued on the subject of commandeering the force of arms made it clear for judicial authorities that the new regulation was to be absolute and it also promulgated the order for the force of arms too, in its annex.<sup>9</sup>

By developing the legal system and introducing as many regulations aimed as guarantees as possible, the Ministry wanted to avoid giving any opportunities for using the force of arms for party aims or for private interest. The circle of those authorised to assign forces was to be modified on the basis of any subsequent negative experiences. For example, an 1905 MOD Decree added lord lieutenants to the circle authorised for commandeering force of arms, however it was annulled by a Decree issued in 1906 by the Ministry of Interior (henceforward MI).<sup>10</sup> It was justified by the scope of the lord lieutenants’ duties and the fact that the state wanted to entrust the deployment of the force of arms to the representatives of the administrative apparatus, especially trained for this task.

With regulating the detailing and commandeering of force of arms, restraints of the freedom of assembly were getting clearer and clearer. According to the instruction in line of duty of the gendarmerie of 1900, gendarme officers had to pay special attention to labour movements, strikes, other concourses, about which they had to give a report immediately to the administrative authority. In the case of people gathering and people’s assemblies, the gendarmerie had to respond according to the instructions of the administrative authority, but as far as the practical implementation is concerned, they did not receive more instructions than the general provisions. The regulation of the freedom of assembly was not complete for a long time and the ‘instruction of administrative authorities’ got bigger emphasis while filling the legal gap. However, by developing the legal regulation, the scope of gendarme actions became more defined and it was increasingly set on a more and more legal basis.

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9 Minister of Justice Decree No. 58 440/1896 amending Instruction No 8405/1874 IM. on the use of military force.

10 Minister of Defence Decree No. 9732/1905 amending the instructions to the gendarmerie; Minister of the Interior Decree No. 40 192/1906 on the abolition of the right of archbishops to exercise the prerogative of military power.

## **Actions of the army and the gendarmerie as force of arms**

Characteristically of the civic way of thinking in the age of dualism, force of arms was interpreted as a kind of preventive and deterrent service. Thus, reconnaissance and the preparation of the force of arms were emphasised and regulated in detail. While gendarmerie regulations also dealt with practical questions of implementation, the reconnaissance activity of the force of arms and the prevention measures in fact, did appear in military regulations. Army and Gendarmerie Commands, at their discretion, for preventive reasons, could introduce such regulations that were needed for the immediate intervention by the force of arms.

As the events became visible and protesters took to the streets, civil authorities detailed the force of arms. In the period of events requiring troops to accomplish a mission, the civil servant was withdrawn and until the legal order was restored, the commander of the force of arms took control. The commander introduced measures required to silence the riot, on a clear military basis and he proceeded with them according to the Field Manual of the Royal Hungarian Army (Szabályzat, 1875). It was a basic rule that every tactical combat force of arms had to be as strong as needed for the accomplishment of its mission and to ensure the honour of the arms under every circumstance.

Besides the force of arms, the commandeered numerical strength determined the representation of the administrative authority. While the presence of a police organ was enough accompanying a smaller patrol personnel of the force of arms, bigger troops required the accompaniment of a Chief of Police or leader civil servant. Without the presence of an administrative servant or a policeman, the force of arms detailed by the army did not act, unless it experienced severe violence. On the other hand, tactical gendarme forces could initiate action by their own decision if it did not jeopardize the force of arms' objective. However, it was uniformly true for all forces of arms that if the employer authority were unreasonably and permanently absent, the force of arms withdrew to its detachment until further orders. The force of arms were not allowed to critique the police action, but if it was 'obviously and clearly' unlawful, the force of arms could refuse to cooperate on the basis of the gendarmerie duty instructions (Szolgálati utasítás, 1900).

The commander of the force of arms carefully surveyed the location and the expected mission before commandeering, then he accommodated the allocation of the available forces to that. The commander organised the force or arms into groups of four troops, so-called 'double-patrol pairs', led by a non-commissioned officer. The 'double-patrol pairs' could be sent on a separate mission

during commandeering, but they could also remain in the division unit (Pajor, 1912). Important to note that hiding concentrated troops or pretending that no forces of arms were present – even if administrative servants requested – was banned. If they had not banned the aforementioned actions, the goal of concentrating the forces could not be achieved, thus deterring the crowd from violent acts would also not have been successful, which is – in essence – the ultimate goal of all measures.

The basic forms of commandeering were the hedge column and the moving line. According to the wording of the Field Manual for the Royal Hungarian Army, the goal of creating such lines was basically to separate and keep crowds off certain areas during celebrations and events attracting so that they remain free to move through. The detailed force was usually activated in two hedge columns with proper spaces. The nature of the hedge column was that of securing a formation, which had to demonstrate force and calmness towards the assembled crowd. The Field Manual emphasised that the commanders of hedge columns shall keep the order within their detachments without raising their voices and running when it is not necessary, and where it is in fact, necessary, they should intervene in a supportive or educational way. The hedge column was an ideal form to flexibly follow the behaviour of the crowd and provided the possibility to move, to displace the crowd and even to let patrols easily step out. However, its function was still peaceful, being designed for surrounding the crowd, securing the traffic and demonstrating the presence of the force of arms. It followed the dynamism of the crowd with taking into consideration the primacy of prevention. This is supported by the fact that the military personnel applied in the hedge column, marched out without a rucksack, and held firearms with a hidden bayonet, on their shoulders or at their legs.

If the nature of the expected mission was a mass dispersion rather than a general securement, the location of the hedge column was chosen depending on the possibilities of the area. It was positioned at a 10-20-step distance from the crowd in order to keep an eye on the people and have enough time to defend itself in the case of an attack. They tried to line up in a way so that a wall of a house or any other obstacle is behind their backs, so they could not be attacked from that direction. If it was not possible and the crowd besieged the troops, they took the defensive position back-to-back.

The most important mission was to capture the organisers of the riot, therefore the patrol separated directly for this function, after pulling out from the side, noted down the personal description of the captured people, the circumstances of the capture and the names of the people who took part in the capture so that the data was available in a later proceeding. They were handed over to

the authority servant detailed by the troops. If the crowd attacked the troops by throwing stones at them or bearing any other arms, they had to be warned again of the employment of weapons. If warning was no longer possible, the commanders had to order fire on the resisting crowd. Before the employment of weapons, namely before the bayonet attack by the infantry and the cavalry's assault, the buglers had to blow the 'assault' signal, expecting it would back the crowd off and prevent violence. On the one hand, the bugle sign was a warning to the crowd, that the force of arms would employ weapons soon, on the other hand, resisting veterans would come round while recognising the sound of a bugle.

Before the disbandment of the rioting crowd more ultimatums had to be shouted. If these did not lead to sufficient results, only then arms could use force. However, employment of weapons was not inevitable when employing force of arms. Many examples show that in front of the furious crowd, peacefully dispersing the masses using the authority of the gendarmerie could be effective, which meant 'escorting' people out of the area.

It is important to discuss the troop units' right to employ weapons when accomplishing a force of arms duty and how it worked in practice because it does not follow the general rules of how the gendarmerie could employ weapons. The gendarmerie force of arms could apply physical force in accordance with the Field Manual of the Royal Hungarian Army, while the Letter Order on Gendarmerie had to be observed regarding the employment of weapons by the gendarme patrol accomplishing police measures. Therefore, armed struggle applied for suppressing riots, was accomplished by the military force of arms and gendarmerie force of arms on the basis of the same regulations. The cases in which armed forces could be rightfully applied is summarised as follows:

1. In cases where the expressed and reasonable request of the authorised administrative servant at riots and forward movements if previous warnings on restoring the legal order did not lead to results and the military commander was also convinced on the necessity of the intervention.
2. In cases where the detailed troops are being insulted, attacked by weapons, if the crowd pushes towards the troops with weapons for hostile purposes and it is feared that the operation of the troops will be prevented or too restricted.
3. If the administrative representative is not at the scene, the commander of the troops is obligated to call for restoring the legal order if persons, properties or public institutes are being attacked, and intervenes at their discretion when it does not lead to results (Vedó, 2014b).

However, the strict rules concerning the employment of weapons still had to be observed in the above cases, i.e. the principles of ‘maximum possible tolerance’ and ‘purposefulness’. ‘Maximum possible tolerance’ meant that weapons could only be used in order to antagonise the assaultive or rebellious person, and to render the dangerous evildoer incapable of escaping.<sup>11</sup> The other element of the tolerant weapon use was the fact that armed forces had to pay special attention to protect elders, women and children.

The principles of ‘purposefulness’, on one hand said that the gendarme officer who was authorised and obligated to use his weapon could only do so in a military manner (for instance, they could only use the carbine for shooting and never to hit somebody or for scimmages), on the other hand, it stated that the gendarme officers should target the main armed rioters and the instigators instead of shooting into the air. The gendarme policeman had to bear strict responsibility for overstepping his rights to employ weapons. Any shot fired from the unit without a preparation command had to be regarded as an unlawful employment of a weapon.

The Field Manual of the Royal Hungarian Army also mentions the above restrictions in summary form. According to its wording, even if certain challenges arose, or the excited crowd started shouting – which was usually considered an inevitable part of riots – the unit could not use weapons, as long as the hostile expressions towards the unit became a serious threat. However, when the employment of weapons became necessary, the unit had to instruct the entire riot to disband or capitulate and they were not allowed to start discussing any forms of compromise.

Intervention of the cavalry division units of the force of arms is also important to note, which – according to the military and gendarmerie regulations – was an effective asset in keeping the infuriated crowd in check. First, military cavalry division units were often applied for this mission. At such occasions, the peacetime company teams of the arm at service each formed a segment and organised a company from four such segments (Berkó, 1928; Balla, 2008; Ravasz, 1995).

Later on, to support the force of arms, a cavalry division subunit was established in every district of gendarmerie, which was applied successfully. The cavalry division was perfect for clearing out spaces without using armed force, however it had to be applied in close formation and the dispersed mass was not to be chased. It was also an important cavalry task to prevent the enlargement of the crowd by patrolling (Schrédli, 1930).

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11 Instruction in Line of Duty for the Hungarian Royal Gendarmerie. 1900. 64.§.

## Summary

In summary, the Hungarian law enforcement structure of the era was not structured around force of arms activities, especially in relation to the troop tasks of the force of arms. In the observed time period, the Hungarian practice followed the time-tested and economical solution, namely if it was necessary, troops of defense forces were applied for missions requiring troops of the force of arms, in cases where either numerous personnel, or an intervention was needed at multiple locations, simultaneously. By developing the legal regulation and the development of the civil state, the law enforcement type force of arms was prioritised, which was supported by the fact that the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie was the proper and capable force to be responsible for this task. The normative regulation was based on adopting tactical military practices into the area of public security, therefore they could be applied for both professional, trained gendarmes and the conscript, trained force's personnel. As a consequence of the administrative structure and the era's concept about maintaining the order, the force of arms and its frontier areas interacted in thousands of ways with the civilian authorities, thus their intervention continuously stayed under control. By the end of the era, the developing regulation was based on more elaborated and proper, detailed regulations, (Parádi & Vedó, 2018) most of which formed the basis of the regulations issued between the two world wars.

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