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Edited by
Magdolna GEDEON and Iván HALÁSZ

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| Introduction |

Magdolna GEDEON, Iván HALÁSZ

‘Am Anfang war Napoleon’ (‘In the beginning it was Napoleon’). The famous opening sentence of Thomas Nipperdey’s work on the history of Germany fits more than just his homeland. The Napoleonic Wars brought about fundamental economic, political, and social changes throughout Europe; most of these changes have their roots in the Enlightenment and the great French Revolution of 1789. The main ideological drivers from the first half of the 19th century onward were the ideas of liberalism and nationalism. These were soon joined by conservatism, born in reaction to liberalism and nationalism, and socialism, which sought to deal with the social consequences of economic processes. Although Europe was often at war, there was also always a strong desire for peace, which took various forms. The ideas of European or regional integration that emerged during the period under discussion served the cause of peace. Their importance was heightened by the two world wars in the 20th century.

Thanks to the new ideas, the concept of the state gradually began to change in the 19th century. In the dynastic concept of the state, nations did not have kings, but kings had countries and peoples. Now, however, a different conceptual construct was coming to the fore. The culturally and linguistically determined peoples (nations) began to feel that they had a right to a say in politics and that their own national statehood, or at least their public autonomy, was the most appropriate framework for this. The process of German and Italian unification that would define the entire 19th century was soon under way. There was also the unresolved and sensitive Polish question in the Central and Eastern European regions, together with the aspirations of many smaller peoples, which are still felt today.

Although ideas to unite the peoples of Europe were born a long time ago, at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries (see the plans of Immanuel Kant and later Victor Hugo), movements began to emerge that sought to implement integration plans not only in theory but also in practice. These plans were also strongly influenced by political changes and the locations of their origins. The situations and positions of small and large European nations were different. The old state traditions also played an important role in this process, together with ethnic and cultural relationships (especially toward the Slavic nations). Based on this, four major eras can be distinguished: (1) from the Napoleonic Wars to the end of the First World War, (2) from the end of

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the First World War to the end of the Second World War, (3) the communist regimes between 1948 and 1989, and finally (4) from the collapse of communist dictatorships until the enlargement of the European Union.

1. From the Napoleonic Wars to the end of World War I

The series of wars that began in the late 18th century also paved the way for Napoleon to pursue a hegemony over Central Europe in a broad sense (including Germany). France had begun building a 'Grand Empire' over the European continent.[1] The series of wars that lasted for almost a quarter of a century radically changed the conditions of power in Europe.[2] The conservative participants of the 1815 Congress of Vienna attempted to reorganize Europe based on legitimacy and dynastic principles. However, nationalism, one of the most significant currents of ideas in the 19th century, laid the foundations for forming nation-states and fundamentally questioned the arrangement adopted at the Vienna Congress.

In this historical framework, the conceptual definitions of 'nation' and 'nation-state' posed an additional problem. These concepts are not clear; moreover, they have changed historically, and it does not matter whether we try to formulate them from a historical, cultural, economic, social, or political point of view. The idea of a nation-state as one homogeneous nation living within a territory—based on realities—had already been surpassed at that time.

During this period, Central and Eastern Europe were largely covered by the Austrian, Russian, and Turkish empires. Of these, however, only the Habsburg Empire was truly and exclusively a Central European state formation. The Russians and Ottomans had major centers and priorities elsewhere.

The geographically intermediate Central European great power faced enemies on almost every border. From the south and east, it was threatened by the Ottoman and Russian Empires; from the northwest, Prussia; and from the west, it was indirectly threatened by France. The small nations that existed in the Habsburg Empire's territory also saw the Empire as a kind of shield that provided protection against stronger empires.[3]

The small peoples living in the grip of the great powers realized that they could not survive in isolation and on their own. Ideas emerged for two main courses of cooperation. One aimed at reforming the Habsburg Empire while remaining within it, and the other saw the solution as a cooperation of small states that would become independent during the disintegration of the Empire.[4] Related to this was the problem of the ‘Eastern Question,’[5] which encouraged statesmen concerned about the future of nation-states to work together, especially in the Balkans. It played a particularly important role for the smaller Slavic peoples; however, the geographic identity along the Danube should not be forgotten. These attitudes sometimes complemented and sometimes intersected.

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[1] Nipperdey, 1983, pp. 11 and 13.

[2] Hobsbawn, 1962, p. 77.

[3] Mitchell, 2020, p. 9.

[4] Segesváry, 2004, p. 4.

At the Vienna Congress, Metternich, who had Habsburg’s imperial interests in mind, saw not only dynastic interests and legitimacy as the foundation of a state order for peace, but also the equality and balance of the great powers. Metternich’s policy was based on slowing down processes, conserving existing structures, and striking a special balance of interests. However, his ideas could not be realized because they kept the state and elites in mind rather than society, and the German ethnic group was given priority over the others. Views of Austria during this period were also influenced by theories about the German alliance and changes in relations with Prussia. Concepts (such as the Belvedere circle led by Franz Ferdinand) came to the fore in the late 19th and early 20th centuries that were aimed at a federal transformation of the Monarchy in which each member state would have been given full autonomy.

Fears of ethnic movements and expansive Russian and German aspirations left their mark on the concepts formulated in Hungary. At the beginning of the 19th century, those who thought about the country’s fate recognized the historical situation: that the future and integrity of Hungary and the Habsburg Empire were closely linked and that Hungary at that time could only be maintained within the Habsburg Empire. Although the ideas of internal federalization (László Teleki) intensified in the precarious, temporary state that developed after the defeat in the war of independence, they did not last long. Most Hungarian national liberals refused the idea of federalizing the country but also criticized the plans for territorial autonomy. However, by this time, it became clear that, due to the presence of nationalities, the only alternative in the region to the Habsburg Empire was a federation. However, due to the 1867 Compromise, more comprehensive federation or confederate plans were pushed back into Hungarian public thinking, making Hungary a pillar of the dualist empire. Here, the territorial autonomy was only granted to Croatia (1868), which could justify it with historical arguments. The Hungarian political elites of the time were not very willing to listen to other arguments. Budapest pursued a centralist policy toward the other nationalities and refused to grant them territorial autonomy. As compensation, the Parliament in Budapest adopted the liberal act on rights of nationalities in 1867. This act focused on individual minority rights and was relatively generous, but its practical realization was problematic.

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[5] This term refers to the opposition between the European great powers in settling the power space created by the weakening of the Turkish Empire. The problem was outlined in the peace that ended the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1874 when Russia reached the Black Sea and obtained the right of protection over the Orthodox in the Danube principalities and the Ottoman Empire. This was followed by a major shift in Russian foreign policy aimed at gaining influence over the Balkans, or at least part of it, and acquiring Constantinople and the Straits. However, realizing these goals depended not only on the Russian-Turkish power relationship, but also on the other great powers. See Majoros, 1997, p. 59.

The Czechs were the third largest nation in the Habsburg Empire, and they were able to appeal to historical constitutional arguments in public disputes. They had also bailed out the troubled Monarchy in 1848/1849. Indeed, the existence of the Habsburg Empire served their economic interests, and the Czech provinces became the most developed region of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It is no coincidence that the main proponents of the Austro-Slavic Federation were Czechs. This concept was developed as early as the first half of the 19th century under the leadership of František Palacký and Karel Havlíček Borovský. Nevertheless, in the second half of the period, they found it increasingly difficult to identify with the existing constitutional framework. The failure of the Czech-Austrian reconciliation and the Austro-Hungarian-Czech trial played a decisive role in this. In addition, Czech public opinion was seriously influenced by fear of the large German minority, which increasingly failed to identify with the framework of the historical Czech statehood and increasingly looked to the growing Second German Empire (Reich) in the neighborhood. The Czech-German antagonism in the period of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy slowly became the greatest problem in the Western part of the empire.

After the Napoleonic Wars, the smaller Slavic nations in the Habsburg Empire also began to think about their own future, their federal policy, and their possible full or partial independence. Perhaps best placed were the Catholic Croats, with their ancient territorial and legal autonomy, who enjoyed considerable popularity in Vienna. They were among the mainstays of the dynasty during the revolution in 1848/1849. The Croats were mainly concerned about events and trends in Hungary, as transforming Hungary into a nation-state could not be in their interests. They also had to redefine their relationships with the other southern Slavic peoples. The Slovenians were in a similar situation, except their public political status was less favorable, and their numbers were smaller. They, too, had to find their place within the Habsburg Monarchy and Southern Slavic solidarity. Their integration efforts were directed toward uniting Slovenes living in several provinces (Carniola, Carinthia, Styria, and Hungary).

The Serbs lived in two empires at this time. Those living under Habsburg rule were in a better legal, political, and cultural position than those under the Turkish Sultan. However, apart from ecclesiastical (orthodox church) autonomy, they had no territorial autonomy; this was the purpose of Vojvodina's autonomy. However, there was a strong desire among the Servs for national unity. The formation of modern independent Serbia was intertwined with liberation from Turkish rule and the sensitive Eastern Question – from Turkish rule and the sensitive issue of political reorganization of Southern-Eastern region in the context of interests of European great powers (so-called Eastern Question). In the early 19th century, the awakening of Serbian national consciousness led to a revolt against the Turkish rule that had existed since 1492, and, at the end of the independence struggle, an independent Serbian state was established. Plans at this time focused on how to unite all Serbs into one state and on historical models to restore Serbian statehood. Serbia's fate was also strongly influenced by the conflicts between the Russian, Austrian, and Ottoman empires. Mihailo Polit-Desancic, a Serbian statesman, believed that the conflicts between European states were triggered by their individual interests and that the search for compromise should have been a priority in the solution to the Eastern Question.[6] The Balkan nations had always been linked in some way, and he believed that confederal cooperation would have been the best way to bring the Balkan peoples together to pursue their own interests. His views were followed by Vladimir Jovanovic, who, in a study published in 1863, envisaged the Balkan peoples united under Serbian leadership.[7]

The Slovak concepts were primarily affected by the lack of an autonomous public law framework and their high degree of integration into Hungarian life. This was only tempered by the linguistic and cultural proximity of Czechs and Slovaks and the emerging pan-Slavic tendencies. In addition, the confessional (sectarian) division of Slovaks played an important role in this process and in identity-building. For a long time, the Slovak Protestants advocated Czechoslovak national unity, while the Catholics favored Slovak cultural, linguistic, and spiritual autonomy. The Slovaks thus sought to define their own identity in opposition to the Czechs on the one hand and the Hungarians on the other. Most of their plans at this time took the federal reorganization of Hungary as their starting point (1848, 1861); however, some of their ideas went beyond this framework and either sought a place for themselves within the whole of Austria or were framed in terms of various pan-Slavic constellations. These concepts have gone through different metamorphoses. One of the most prominent Slovak intellectuals, Ľudovít Štúr, for example, originally stood for the Austro-Slavic Federation, but later became one of the apostles of Russophilic Pan-Slavism. Catholic priest Ján Palárik, in contrast, was more of a believer in democratic pan-Slavism.

Like the Serbs, the Romanian national movement was strongly influenced by the fact that the Romanian nation had long lived in two empires (Habsburg and Ottoman). In addition, from the 19th century onward, a third powerful empire (Russia) also played a role in their development. For Romanians, the best place to live was not in the autonomous and then independent Romania mentioned above, but in Transylvania, a part of Hungary. However, they did not have legal status worthy of their number there. Their linguistic and cultural ties extended beyond Central Europe and made them members of the European Neolatin language community. Consequently, their main ambition for a long time was not a wider regional or European federation but unification of the Romanian lands into one state. The room for maneuvering by the Romanians, who already had an independent state in the 19th century, was, of course, unlike that of nations living as part of the larger monarchies.

The Ukrainian and Ruthenian national movements of the 19th century were influenced by motives similar to those of the Slavic peoples of Central Europe who were without independent statehood traditions. The crucial difference was that there were many more Ukrainians. They also lived in two empires that were not very friendly to each other. However, the conflicting interests of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Tsarist Russia also allowed Ukrainian patriots to exploit them to the Ukrainians' own advantage. It was not by chance that Galicia, under Habsburg rule, became culturally the 'Ukrainian Piedmont' and not the much larger and more populous Eastern Ukraine. Tsarism did not want to recognize the existence of an independent Ukrainian nation but thought in terms of national unity of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian peoples. For the Habsburgs, who already ruled a multi-ethnic empire with a complex structure and no clear national majority, recognizing Ukrainian national independence was no longer a cardinal issue. In fact, it was all very well to provoke its large eastern neighbor. Ukrainians also had to define themselves in the coordinate system of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which was not an easy process. Ultimately, however, what mattered to them was unifying Ukrainians into a state and then federalizing that state. In the circumstances at the time, they could not agree to more generous concepts.

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[6] Polit-Desancic, 1862, p. 30.

[7] Yovanovitch, 1863.

The real pan-European issue was the Polish question. Until the end of the 18th century, the Poles had independent statehood; this was not uncommon, as the Polish-Lithuanian state was for a long time one of the largest in Europe. This made the loss of independent national statehood even more frustrating for the Polish elite. Consequently, throughout the long 19th century (i.e., between 1789 and 1914), they strove to restore it, which was no easy task since they were divided among three powerful neighboring empires (Austria, Russia, and Prussia and then Germany). In the case of 19th-century Polish political concepts, it is necessary to consider the important intellectual traditions and constant attention to Western European trends. It was never an end in and of itself, as Poles felt very clearly that their fate would be decided at a minimal European level. Specific ideas were influenced not only by important philosophical traditions, but also by the strong Christian messianism that was always present in the Polish milieu. During the Romanticism period, Poles were also touched by Slavic solidarity, but Russian pressure occurred sooner here than in the case of other—non-Orthodox—Slavic nations.

In the case of different integration concepts, it should also be considered that the influence of socialist ideas was strong, especially among Poles in Russia. Moreover, they had traditionally been open to international cooperation. The later founder of the state, Józef Piłsudski, came from this environment, and the nationalistic tradition was strong

The Polish political traditions and experience, their demographic weight, and diplomatic skills (see the case of Adam Czartoryski) were enough to keep the Polish question off the table of European politics, but not enough to resolve it. However, the states that annexed them could not really integrate and assimilate them either, as they were too numerous, and their national consciousness was too strong. The Poles, too, were already aware that their problems could only be solved in the next major European conflict. For them, the main issue was unifying the Polish ethnic territories, but this could not have been achieved without involving other great powers. The Poles hoped mainly for the French but would have accepted any other help. At the same time, they had to consider the fate of the non-Polish majority areas of their once great state and their attitude toward the non-Polish population living there.

2. From the end of World War I to World War II

The victorious Entente powers formed new state units based on various interests and considerations. In some places, the national principle came to the fore, while in others, it was historical or even economic and transport aspects. The peculiarity of the post-World War I settlement was that, for the first time, a global international organization, the League of Nations, was formed, and almost all European states were members for some time.

The Paris Peace Conference established the Covenant of League of Nations, in which the parties undertook to promote peace and security. This left its mark on the ideas for the future of European states that were formulated in Austria after the break-up of the Habsburg Monarchy. Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi's pan-European plan would have served both peacekeeping and economic cooperation. In addition to economic and political cooperation, there was a plan to create a cultural alliance with Britain and the Soviet Union. They also formulated a plan that would have created an alliance of European states based on the German federation established in 1815.

At the end of the First World War, the German Mitteleuropa plan was the most significant idea of an integration nature, serving primarily German economic interests. This idea also had an impact on politicians in defeated Hungary. Although the plan was also seen as a good foundation for the creating a United States of Europe, it was opposed by many throughout Europe because of Germany's world domination aspirations. After Trianon, the plans that would have helped the country's situation mainly from an economic point of view also came to the fore in Hungary. Although the Pan-European Movement reached Hungary in the late 1920s, it was unable to have a real impact due to the distance of official government policy. Thus, the era's aspirations toward a federation cannot be called real federation ideas. Their aim was not to create an alliance of states that cooperated effectively with each other to counter external (non-European) pressures, but to maintain the political status quo against each other and resolve the almost insurmountable economic difficulties arising from the status quo.[8] In addition to military cooperation, the main goal of the alliance was to make the Hungarian revision goals impossible, and at the same time, isolate Hungary's economic and foreign policies.[9]

The consolidation of the smaller Slavic peoples of the Balkans into a state formation actually took place after the First World War. The Kingdom of Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia was established first, followed by the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. It is true that this coalition was not complete, because the defeated Bulgaria continued to maintain its independence, and an independent Albanian state was established in the region. However, the emergence of the South Slavic state also highlighted that conflicts between the nations involved could not be completely eliminated this way. The Serb-led state was not unified nationally, religiously, or economically, and the ethnic differences were made dramatic primarily by the Serbian and Croatian opposition. Political struggles revolved around the internal system of the state, centralism, and federalism. In the spirit of the South Slavic idea, King Alexander I wanted to end the division between nations by introducing a royal dictatorship. Truly effective unity did not materialize, and in the Second World War, the Axis powers occupied and divided Yugoslavia. The Balkan Pact was signed on February 9, 1934, with the participation of Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. The alliance was set up mainly against Bulgaria and Italy, but its effectiveness was rather limited due to mutual mistrust.[10]

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[8] Segesváry, 2004, p. 28.

[9] For more details, see Ádám, 1989, p. 193.

The victorious states, which were naturally better able to integrate into the existing power framework, usually pursued an ambitious foreign policy. This was particularly true of Poland, which in those years tried to act as a regional power. It was also able to make successful use of the framework provided by the League of Nations; Warsaw was able to fight for a kind of semi-permanent membership in the Executive Council of the world organization. However, it no longer had the energy to revive the larger Polish-Belorussian-Ukrainian-Lithuanian state formation, although this was an important objective at the time.

The relations between the regional victors then were greatly complicated by the tensions between the two dominant states, Czechoslovakia and Poland, which arose over territorial and border disputes. However, it would have been in the fundamental interests of these two states to cooperate, at least after Hitler came to power in Germany. In the end, Czechoslovakia was only able to implement its policy of alliance with Hungary in the southeast, when it was able to create the so-called Little Entente in 1921 with Yugoslavia and Romania.[11] The first Czechoslovak Republic was, moreover, basically interested in building an anti-German collective security system. The diplomatically very active Prague was involved in many of the fashionable initiatives of the time, but ultimately, they did not save it in 1938/1939.

Romania was one of the main territorial winners of the post-World War I settlement, as the Romanians were able to integrate almost all the territories they had claimed in the previous century into one state. Administrative centralism had more chance here, despite the presence of large national minorities. The French-based legal-administrative traditions on the one hand and the large numerical superiority of the majority nation on the other played a role in this. At the same time, Romania, in addition to revisionist Hungary, also feared the nearby Soviet Union since it was also growing at the expense of the former Russian-Ukrainian territories. This, in turn, necessitated the search for more serious great power alliances in the western part of Europe. Paris seemed the obvious choice, but Berlin was also an option.

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[10] Egeresi, 2013, p. 42.

[11] Ádám, 1989, p. 112.

In the 1930s, the balance of power in Central and Eastern Europe was profoundly redrawn by Nazi Germany's active regional policy. An essential element of this was economic cooperation, in which German industrial products were to be traded for Central and Eastern European agricultural products and raw materials. In fact, only industrialized Czechoslovakia could not fit into this scheme, which made its political situation even more difficult. It was no coincidence that the Czechoslovak Prime Minister Milan Hodža (1935–1938) wanted to use the Danube region for the eruption—that is, to establish closer cooperation between the states. The existence of an independent Poland was also inherently problematic for Germany, while the Nazi German criticism toward Czechoslovakia and Poland was also ideological. The international system established in the 1920s was therefore overturned at the end of the 1930s.

The Nazi annexation of Austria, followed by the break-up of Czechoslovakia and finally the invasion of Poland, prompted the Central and Eastern European elites to seriously reassess their policy of seeking alliances. All of this reinforced the realization that the small Central European states could only preserve their peace and security by putting aside petty differences and creating political and economic unity. All this went hand in hand with the realization that creating a federation required jointly run institutions and jointly implemented political, social, and economic reforms. It was most visibly articulated by the former Czechoslovak prime minister, the Slovak-born agrarian politician Milan Hodža, in his post-World War II draft for a Central European federation, but it was too late. A new hegemon was on the horizon (the Soviet Union), which was not interested in a federation in the region.[12]

3. Soviet dominance between 1948 and 1989 and anticommunist opposition

After World War II, the idea of uniting states to preserve peace began to take shape in reality. At the first congresses for integrating Europe, very little was said about the states under the influence of the Soviet Union participating in the unity. However, at the conference on the future of Europe held in The Hague from May 7–10, 1948, Winston Churchill had already spoken about integrating Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which he envisioned under the auspices of the United Nations. Although the practical arrangements for unity were then necessarily limited to Western Europe, the goal could not be less than that of Europe as a whole:

> It is necessary for the executive governments of the sixteen countries, associated for the purposes of the Marshall Plan, to make precise arrangements. These can apply at present only to what is called Western Europe. In this we wish them well and will give them all loyal support; but our aim here is not

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[12] Segesváry, 2004, p. 31.

> confined to Western Europe. We seek nothing less than all Europe. Distinguished exiles from Czechoslovakia, and almost all the Eastern European nations,[13] and also from Spain, are present among us. We aim at the eventual participation of all European peoples whose society and way of life, making all allowances for the different points of view in various countries, are not in disaccord with a Charter of Human Rights and with the sincere expression of free democracy. We welcome any country where the people own the Government, and not the Government the people.[14]

After it became clear in the 1940s and 1950s that deeper political integration was not yet a viable option even in Western Europe, the states there began to push for at least economic integration (ECSC, EURATOM, EEC), which in the longer term led to the birth of the European Union. However, the Soviet Union, which had settled in East-Central Europe for many decades, did not take a favorable view of this and regarded the federationist ideas of regional integration as reactionary concept.[15] This was all the more so because most of this ideas were born in émigré circles. However, Moscow was also not a fan of the great Balkan federation, which for a time was advocated by the communist leadership of the states there. The latter's fate was finally sealed by the Yugoslav-Soviet break-up at the end of the 1940s.

At the same time, in the region under its influence, Moscow also had to think about reconciling the deep divisions between the nations living there and new forms of integration. The latter included the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (MECA) in the economic sphere and the Warsaw Pact organization in the defense sphere. The only countries in the region not to participate in these were Yugoslavia, which was going its separate socialist ways, and Albania, which was completely isolated.

The Soviet Union also needed to reduce national tensions and the historic mistrust between its satellite states. The states in the region had not been on good terms with each other in the past. The ideology of 'proletarian internationalism' was intended to serve this aim, and its realization was made easier for a time by the fact that radical socialist movements were usually more nationally tolerant. The peoples of the region therefore had to get to know each other better, wittingly or unwittingly. This took many forms, ranging from scholarship programs to the adaptation of literary curricula. The latter also gave students the opportunity to get to know the greatest writers and major works of the neighboring fraternal peoples. The new institutions of cultural diplomacy were also active in the field of mutual acquaintance. The socialist countries set up networks of cultural and information institutes in each other's capitals. However, the various other forums for friendship and, later, workers' visits and intra-regional tourism, which began in the 1960s, should not be underestimated. All this brought with it some regional familiarization.[16]

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[13] The congress brought together about eight hundred Western European participants: politicians, church persons, craftsmen, syndicalists, economists, academics, writers, scholars, and artists. Five Romanian, five Polish, five Czechoslovakian, four Hungarian, and three Yugoslav guests appeared as observers. For more about the congress, see Bóka, 2018, pp. 1–43.

[14] Address given by Winston Churchill at the Congress of Europe in The Hague (May 7, 1948). Available at http://www.cvce.eu/obj/address_given_by_winston_churchill_at_the_congress_of_europe_in_the_hague_7_may_1948- en-58118da1-af22-48c0-bc88-93cda974f42c.html

[15] Segesváry, 2004, p. 43.

For a while, though, the Central Europe notion and its identity became a taboo subject. For a long time, the region east of the Elbe could only be written and spoken about as Eastern Europe. Historians have stressed the common historical features and cultural roots of Russia and Eastern Europe. For a long time, it was dangerous to depart from this terminology, because it could have called into question the 'natural' geopolitical embeddedness and integration of the region in the eyes of the existing political system. There were few greater sins than questioning the Soviet Union's leadership within the 'peace camp.'

Only beginning in the late 1970s did official pressure began to ease. In Hungary, for example, more intensive Austrian-Hungarian cultural and scientific contacts were established at that time, which also brought with them more nuanced terminology. In the wake of the works of István Bibó, Iván T. Berend, Ferenc Glatz, Péter Hanák, and György Ránki, it was again possible to speak of East-Central Europe with caution. The idea of the 'milk brotherhood' of the peoples along the Danube, which was mainly associated with László Németh, also found a following among the young nationalist intelligentsia.

The idea of a Central European common identity and regional solidarity was strongly present in the intellectual opposition groups of rights defenders that had been forming since the 1970s. This was particularly true of the Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hungarian democratic opposition circles. All this was greatly influenced by the events in Poland in the early 1980s (especially the formation and struggle of the Solidarity Free Trade Union) and the activities of the Russian human rights committees (Helsinki Groups), which began after the Helsinki European Security Summit. The Charter 77 movement in Czechoslovakia, born in 1977, had a similar inspiration. It is true that the document did not yet speak of Central Europe, but of East and West in general, by which it did not mean geographical entities, but the two political-ideological camps.[17]

These opposition groups were strongly influenced in the 1980s by the essay on the abduction of Central Europe (Paris, 1983) by the Czech writer Milan Kundera, published in the West. Kundera conceived of Central Europe as a region out of place, suffering under Eastern Russian domination. For the inhabitants of the region, Europe was not a geographical entity but an intellectual concept that was in fact often synonymous with the West. Kundera felt that the central part of Europe, historically linked to ancient Rome and the Catholic Church, had been torn out of its natural place after 1945 and had become the prey of the European East (Russia or the Soviet Union). In the meantime, however, it still retained its Westernized features culturally.[18]

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[16] Glatz, 2005, p. 46.

[17] http://www.totalita.cz/txt/txt_ch77_dok_1977_01_01.php

From an Austrian perspective, the Danube region (Donauraum) also played an important role in the discourse. Democratic Austria, which was home to many Central and Eastern European emigrants, also paid close attention to what was happening in its neighborhood and indirectly tried to help the movements there. These activities paid off after 1989. Later, the discourse on Mitteleuropa was revived in Austria in the 1970s and 1980s and also unfolded in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. This was accompanied by a renewal of the concept and a transformation of its possible interpretations. Different integration ideas and responses to conflict resolution in Central and Eastern European countries can also provide a basis for addressing the challenges facing the European Union.

4. The collapse of the communist regimes and the enlargement of the European Union (1989–2004)

After the collapse of the communist regimes, democratic elites took the lead in many states in the region, either alone or in partnership with transforming post-communist elites. Later, they repeatedly succeeded each other in power. Even before the final collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), the region began to reposition itself in foreign and geopolitical terms. The idea of a ‘return to Europe’ played an important role in this process. This could mean many different things. A significant part of the population thought of a Western standard of living, others of a region of freedom and the rule of law. The popular slogan also had a foreign policy message and basically opened the way to Euro-Atlantic integration. True, it was not always clear-cut, but since the nascent EU could not provide clear security guarantees, the question of EU and NATO membership became intertwined in many countries.

In the shadow of the prolonged collapse of the Soviet Union and the war in former Yugoslavia, the peaceful Central European region seemed best suited to rapid Western integration: on the one hand because of its economic development and on the other because of its political stability. This realization led to the 1991 Visegrad meeting of Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hungarian leaders, at which the Visegrad Cooperation was born. The Visegrad Group had three members at first and then four after the break-up of Czechoslovakia. Visegrad started as a loose forum for cooperation, but over time, it was given an institutional backing. Although other forms of regional cooperation in the former socialist region were established in the years after the change of regime (CEFTA, Pentagonal, then Hexagonal, GUAM somewhat further east, etc.), Visegrad cooperation has so far proved to be one of the most successful. Probably for this reason, it has survived the realization of its main goal, Euro-Atlantic integration, and is still an important player in Central European regional politics and in the EU’s internal discourse. Incidentally, not only are the Visegrad states now integrated into the EU, but all the states discussed here, except Serbia and Ukraine, which again results in a different situation in regional policy.

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[18] Brix, 2005, pp. 271–272.

One of the important advantages of the Visegrad cooperation is that there are many lukewarm supporters of this formation in the individual states and very few radical principled opponents. Indeed, over time, it has begun to enjoy a broad consensus that, for the time, seems to be independent of domestic political battles. It would be good if this remained so in the future. Visegrad has gradually become an active shaper of EU processes, which of course also leads, or could lead, to conflicts from time to time.

Over the past two hundred years, the elites of the national movements in Eastern and Central Europe have formulated different concepts of European and/or wider regional unity. Some of them were ambitious pan-European plans, but most of them were more regional in scope. Often, the idea behind them was to unite against a regional hegemon, but some federative plans sought to ease the national tensions that were always present in the region. Constant ethnic unrest and vulnerability to the great powers is one of the main characteristics of the region. This is what the EU project has tried and is trying to alleviate, hopefully successfully.

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| Chapter 1 |

Austrian Ideas for a United Europe (1789–2004)

Anita ZIEGERHOFER

ABSTRACT

For centuries, a unified Europe has been a place of longing for many intellectuals. This is evidenced by the manifold conceptualizations of Europe that have been proposed since the 14th century. The search for ideas about Europe in the given period that originate from Austria first leads to federalist ideas of (*Mittel-*) Europe from the Habsburg Monarchy, which represent a 'Europe en miniature.' Only toward the end of the 19th century did Bertha von Suttner call for the foundation of a European Confederation. Beginning during the First World War and then manifesting in the interwar period, metropolitan Vienna served as a starting point and laboratory for implementing the European vision. Thus, the founder of the Pan-European Union, Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi, was the first visionary of Europe who tried to turn this idea into reality. With the process of European integration starting after the Second World War, the idea of unifying European states materialized, and visions for Europe that originated from Austria became rare.

KEYWORDS

Federation plans – Habsburg Empire, *Mitteleuropa*, Pan-European Union, *Kulturbund*, European Union

Introduction

When the revolution broke out in Paris in the midsummer of 1789, the Austrian hereditary lands were subject to Emperor Joseph II's enlightened absolutist rule. After having been destabilized on a political level through the French Revolution, Europe also began to fall apart on a military level; the Habsburg monarchy suffered a significant loss of territory in the coalition wars. The reform of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation through the establishment of a *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss* in 1803 could not keep it from being dissolved by Emperor Franz II in 1806. Two years earlier, he had elevated the Austrian hereditary lands into the Empire of Austria and started to wield the title of 'hereditary Emperor of Austria.' The Austrian Empire covered the entire territory of today's Austria as well as Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, parts of Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, Poland, and the Ukraine. The revolution, the coalition wars, and the downfall of the Holy Roman

ZIEGERHOFER, A. (2022) 'Austrian Ideas for a United Europe (1789–2004)', in Gedeon, M., Halász, I. (eds.) *The Development of European and Regional Integration Theories in Central European Countries.* Miskolc: Central European Academic Publishing. pp. 25–43. https://doi.org/10.54171/2022.mgih.doleritincec_2

Empire produced a new order in Europe. This new order, represented by a restorative plan for Europe, had been the declared aim of the 1814/15 Vienna Congress and was intended to establish political stability for Europe. Through an alliance among the major powers of Austria, Prussia, France, Russia, and Great Britain (the so-called Pentarchie), this plan sought to create a 'balance of power' and thus ensure peace.

In those days, alternative concepts for Europe originating from Austria also sought to create peace. 'The territorially complex, multi-confessional and poly-ethnically structured Habsburg Monarchy was, until its downfall in 1918, one of the most innovative places of contemplation about federally-oriented state formations.'[1] There were plans for *Mitteleuropa* about the future relationship of the Habsburg monarchy and the German Confederation (*Deutscher Bund*) and about possible reforms of the Austrian monarchy. To conserve space, this chapter is limited to a brief discussion of some examples. One example is Bertha von Suttner's plan for a European confederation, which represents the first Austrian plan of this kind at the end of the 19th century. Against the background of the foundation of the League of Nations in 1919/1920, Heinrich Lammasch drafted a plan for a global confederation, while Richard Riedl theorized a European confederation. Special consideration should also be given to the arguably most well-known and intriguing Austrian plan for Europe: the Pan-European Movement. Its founder, Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi, was in fact the first visionary in this regard, seeking to realize the idea of Europe with Vienna as its departure point. In parallel, Karl Anton Rohan had also chosen Vienna as the city representing the conceptual center for his European cultural union. After the Second World War, the European integration process began, and the vision of Europe became a reality. The following discussion uses several examples to sketch Austria's contribution to the 'construction of the house of Europe,' seeking to lay the basis for further research.

1. (Habsburg) plans for Europe before World War I

'Modern history, in contrast, illustrates the application of the principle of solidarity and equilibrium among the states.'[2] This quote does not originate from a native Austrian, but from a man who strongly influenced Austrian politics between 1810 and 1848: State Chancellor Klemens Wenzel Lothar Prince of Metternich (1773–1859). During the 1814/15 Vienna Congress, he held Europe's destiny in his hands when, in his role as 'Europe's coachman,' he counted on the balance of powers represented by the Grand Alliance to reach peace for Europe.

The vacuum left by the 1806 dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire at the center of Europe was filled by the German Confederation (*Deutscher Bund*) founded at the Vienna Congress. Soon after, ideas were developed for how the area at Europe's center could be filled with life, not only in economic terms, but also with culture, intellect, and thoughts.[3] Metternich was one of the most innovative minds regarding the question of a new order in the 'small' Europe of Habsburg.[4] In 1817, he presented a plan to reorganize the Habsburg monarchy into parts with equal rights and proposed the following division: Bohemia-Moravia-Galicia, Inner Austria, Illyria, Lombardo-Venetia, Hungary, and Transylvania.[5] These areas were intended to exist autonomously and independently in relation to the emperor—united by a strong central administrative body.[6] Metternich's plans were not successful, probably also because they were focused on the state and elites rather than society, privileged the German people, and denied the significance of non-German ethnic groups.[7] These were also the main reasons for the outbreak of the revolution in March 1848. In September 1848 and then in January 1849, František Palacký (1798–1876), an Austro-Slavic delegate of Bohemian descent, presented a respective draft constitution,[8] which contained the rudiments of a concept for Great Austria, later expanded on by Popovici.[9] One of the consequences of the revolutionary year of 1848 was that the differences between Prussia and Austria became more obvious. This culminated in a heated debate in St. Paul's Church in Frankfurt regarding the question of whether the Empire should be organized with or without Austria, that is, into a 'greater' or 'smaller' Germany. The Viennese lawyer and minister Franz Sommaruga (1780–1860) proposed a constitutional draft that suggested uniting the German Confederation *(Deutscher Bund)* of Prussia and Austria into a 'Seventy-Million-Empire.'[10] Accordingly, the German Confederation (*Deutscher Bund)* and the Habsburg monarchy would form a confederation, with the Habsburg monarchy federally structured into the following: the states of the German Confederation (*Deutscher Bund*) in Austria (Inner Austria with Bohemia), Galicia, Lombardo-Venetia, Hungary with the Slovaks, and Illyria (Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, military border). Following US-American and Swiss models, the 'Austrian' parliament would be organized as a two-chamber system. External affairs, defense, financial, trade, and infrastructural policies would be national ministries. The educational system, civil and criminal law, and administrative organizations would be uniform within the Habsburg monarchy; further agendas would be in the hands of the respective country groups.[11] Sommaruga's plan probably failed because his idea of a unified Austrian state worked against the union aspirations of Prussia and small Germany.[12] Austria then tried going alone with Prussia.[13] This is why, in his essay from October 1849, the Austrian minister of commerce Karl Ludwig Freiherr von Bruck (1798–1860) suggested a Middle-European economic, currency, and traffic union between Prussia and Austria. This also meant an association with the customs union (German *Zollverein*), founded in 1834,[14] to be implemented according to steps firmly defined in a plan.[15] However, this plan, too, failed, not only on Austria's part, but also on the Prussian side. Eventually, the sole outcome of these efforts was a mere trade contract signed in 1865, which would later be referred to as the 'Königgrätz of trade policy.'[16] The idea of *Mitteleuropa*, conceptualized in the narrower sense as economic cooperation between Austria and Germany, would resurface in the interwar-period as the so-called Schober-Curtius-Plan in 1931.

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[1] Osterkamp, 2021, p. 413.

[2] Cited in Siemann, 2014, p. 307.

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[3] Koch, 2015, p. 79.
[4] Osterkamp, 2021, pp. 87–95.
[5] Osterkamp, 2021, pp. 88–89.
[6] Osterkamp, 2021, p. 89.
[7] Osterkamp, 2021, p. 93.
[8] Detailed Osterkamp, 2021, pp. 133–141.
[9] Stegherr, 2014, p. 460.
[10] Osterkamp, 2021, p. 141.
[11] Osterkamp, 2021, pp. 142–43.
[12] Koch, 2015, p. 80.
[13] Osterkamp, 2021, p. 145.

Toward the end of the 19th century, plans for a Habsburg 'Europe en miniature' were not the only plans developed in the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy. At the 1892 peace congress in Bern, the pacifist Bertha von Suttner (1843–1914), together with the Englishman Samuel Capper and the Italian Teodore Moneta (Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1907), presented the Capper-Moneta-Suttner proposal about creating a European confederation:

> Considering that the damage caused by armed peace as well as the danger looming all across Europe are due to a lack of legal basis among the various European states;
> considering that a European state union, which would also be desirable regarding the trade relations between all those countries, would remedy this state of lawlessness and create a lasting legal framework for Europe; considering, lastly, that such a state union would not in the least limit the independence of the various nations regarding their internal affairs and, thus, their forms of governance; The congress invites all European peace societies and their supporters to make the foundation of such a state union the highest aim of their propaganda, on the basis of solidarity toward their interests. It further invites all societies in the world to explicitly point out the necessity of a lasting Congress of Nations during times of political elections, to which every question of international concern would be subjected to so that every conflict could be solved through legal regulations instead of violence.[17]

In 1889, Suttner had published the book *Lay Down Your Arms*, which became a best-seller, was translated into 16 languages, and even served as the basis for a movie produced in 1914.[18] Strengthened by this success, Suttner founded peace societies not only in Austria (1891), but also in Germany (1892) and Hungary (1895).[19] For her tireless efforts for peace, in 1905 she became the first woman to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. Besides her time-intensive and exhausting engagement for peace, Bertha von Suttner also tried to promote unifying the European states, which, as can be seen from the proposal quoted above, should be formed based on legal regulations and the sovereignty of individual states.[20]

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[14] See Hagen, 2015; Schöningh, 1936, p. 6.
[15] Macho, 2013, pp. 71–73.
[16] Cited in Koch, 2015, p. 83.
[17] Hedinger, 2000, pp. 64–65.
[18] Hedinger, 2000, p. 63.
[19] Hamann, 2013, pp. 207 et seq. and 124 et seq.

Since the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, there had been various attempts to reform the Habsburg monarchy to alleviate the substantial problem of nationalism. Among those plans, those of the so-called 'Belvedere-Circle' have become particularly well-known. This elitist circle, referred to by Jana Osterkamp as a 'federalist thinktank,'[21] was founded by the heir to the throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand (1863–1914). It consisted of expert representatives of the various nations of the monarchy,[22] among them the Romanian journalist and politician Aurel Popovici (1863–1917). Just like Franz Ferdinand, Popovici saw a real opportunity in federalizing the Imperial and Royal Monarchy to overcome the problem of nationality, especially in relation to the Hungarians, Czechs, and Serbs.

Popovici was convinced that the monarchy was the right state form for this and tried to 'unite the idea of the supranational characterizing the Danube monarchy with the idea of nationality.'[23] In 1906, he drew on the model of the Republican-Democratic constitution of the US to draft his own constitution titled 'Foundations of a federalist imperial constitution.'[24] The federal state, the 'United States of Greater Austria', under the rule of Emperor Franz Josef I, was envisaged to comprise 15 mostly autonomous 'national states': German Austria, German Bohemia, German Moravia, Western Galicia, Eastern Galicia, Transylvania, Croatia, Carniola, Slovakia, Vojvodina, Hungary, Szeklerland, Trento, and Trieste, with the exception of Bosnia and the Herzegovina (Art.1).

These United States of Greater Austria would form a common customs area (Art.4); the imperial or federal government would consist of representatives of the national states, with an imperial and federal chancellor. The imperial parliament would be constituted according to a two-chamber-system (Art.7, Art.8). Seven delegates each from German-Austria and Hungary should be sent to the imperial parliament; five from Bohemia; four from Transylvania; three each from Croatia, West-Galicia, and East-Galicia; two each from German-Bohemia and the Slovak land; and one delegate each from German-Moravia, Vojvodina, Trento, Trieste, and Szeklerland (Art.13). The emperor would exert the imperial power, and each nation state would have its own parliament, government, and court (Art.20). The emperor would appoint an imperial governor in each federal state (Art.21), and each federal state would have its own constitution. Art.24 grants the federal states full autonomy within the framework of the imperial constitution. Regarding the issue of language, Art.25 stipulates that each federal state have its own language:

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[20] Hamann, 1996, pp. 264–265.

[21] Osterkamp, 2021, p. 389.

[22] Detailed Osterkamp, 2021, p. 390.

[23] Stegherr, 2014, p. 464.

[24] Popovici, 1906, p. 317–327.

> The language for international communication of the Empire is German. Thus, it constitutes the official language of all imperial authorities residing in Vienna, the imperial government, the parliament, the army, and the marine, it is furthermore the official language for communication among the federal states on the one hand and between the former and the empire on the other. In the imperial parliament, however, each member can use their own language. [25]

Civil servants would be required to fully master the national language as well as German; laws, regulations, and announcements on the part of the imperial authorities would be required to be written and published in the language of the federal state they concerned. Popovici hoped that this construct of ethnically widely homogenous provinces would reduce national-emancipatory ambitions and subject themselves to the monarchy as the superordinate entity. He was aware that the monarchy could never turn into a nation state but instead into a league of nations.[26] Still, his proposal did not meet with the emperor's approval or that of the members of the government or the various nations of the Habsburg monarchy; on the contrary, it was rejected.

The outbreak of the First World War rendered ideas such as this one obsolete. During the war, Bertha von Suttner's most important assistant und fellow, the Austrian Alfred Fried (1864–1921),[27] revived the idea of a Union of European states. In his essay 'European reconstruction,' published in 1915, the 1911 Nobel Peace Prize winner[28] argued that conferences and talks did not help if the respective states did not demonstrate 'the will which most governments are still lacking – the willingness to establish laws, to subject themselves to these terms and the farsightedness necessary to realize their usefulness.'[29]

Fried claimed that instead of the existing system of alliances, a non-politically oriented European union should be created that would operate based on the two Hague Conventions (of 1899 and 1907). According to him, not a political but a non-obligatory union of states cooperating in the fields of economy, traffic, social, and shared ideals would lead to a political intergovernmental organization.[30] Thus, he put forward a more differentiated proposal for founding a European administrative union (*Zweckverband*) than he had before the war. Accordingly, states should not subordinate to any goal, as would be the case with a political federation, but the goal should serve the states. This way, the administrative union could become a center for what is commonly European.[31] He considered the Pan-American Union, which had existed since 1889, an example of this idea.[32]

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[25] Popovici, 1906, p. 325.
[26] Stegherr, 2014, p. 461.
[27] Grünewald, 2016; Tuider, 2010; Ziegerhofer, 2019, pp. 341–356.
[28] Schönemann-Behrends, 2004, p. 33.
[29] Fried, 1915, p. 92.
[30] Fried, 1915, p. 120.

Toward the end of the First World War, Emperor Karl tried to save the monarchy. The imperial manifest of October 16, 1918, also contains Popovici's idea to unite the German-speaking parts of the monarchy into a common Austria: 'Austria should, following the will of its people, become a federal state in which each people, in their own settlement area, can form a state community of their own ...'[33]

This attempt, however, could not stop the Habsburg monarchy from falling apart within only a few days from the end of October 1918 onward: On October 28, the Czech-Slovak state was proclaimed; on October 29, the state of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs (SHS-state); and on October 31, Hungary.[34] The newly founded states had been created in the hope of implementing the right to self-determination demanded by Woodrow Wilson in his 14-point-program. Claiming this right to self-determination, the German-speaking delegates of the *Reichsrat* (Parliament) formed the provisional national assembly on October 21 and proclaimed the Republic of German-Austria on October 30, 1918. On November 11, Emperor Karl resigned from his duties in state affairs, which meant the downfall of the monarchy. On November 12, 1918, the Republic of German-Austria was officially proclaimed. On September 10, 1919, Karl Renner signed the contract of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, which caused enormous territorial losses for Austria; while the Habsburg monarchy had covered 676.614 km^2 with a population of almost 52 million people in 1910, it was now reduced to only about 6.5 million people on a territory of just under 84.000 km^2. This led the French minister of external affairs, André Tardieu, to the following statement: 'Prenez l`Autriche-Hongrie de 1914, supprimez-en la Bohême, la Pologne, la Yougo-Slavie, ce qui est allé á l´Ìtalie; que reste-t-il? L`Autriche actuelle.'[35]

2. Vienna of the inter-war period becomes the center of the United States of Europe

While at the Vienna Congress, Metternich had seen a balance of powers as the basis for a peaceful state system; the outcome of the First World War fundamentally changed this political concept. At the 1919 peace conference in Paris, the victorious powers tried to replace hegemonial and imperialist power ambitions through internationalism and therefore founded the League of Nations. This first international peace organization assumed its work at the beginning of January 1920. One year before, the last prime minister of the monarchy, university professor Heinrich Lammasch (1853–1920), published a book in which he suggested a state union to maintain peace for the twenty years to follow.[36]

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[31] Fried, 1915, p. 120.

[32] Fried, 1915, p. 122.

[33] Cited in Hoke and Reiter, 1993, p. 505 [2477].

[34] Suppan, 2016, pp. 1257–1341.

[35] Zollinger, 2008, p. 627. Translated into English, the Statement means: Take the Austria-Hungary of 1914, remove Bohême, Poland, Yugoslavia, what went to Italy; what is left? The present Austria.

This planned union was to have an international court, an international council of communication, and an international conference.[37] Instead of the League of Nations, this Union of States was to be called a ‘peace association of the states.’ In a first step, the states would be asked to solve conflicts peacefully; if that did not work, the League of Nations should intervene as the final mediating body. His suggestion to expand the League of Nations into an instrument of collective security was published posthumously.[38]

Some of Lammasch’s suggestions were put into practice in the UNO, founded in 1945. Alfred Fried’s idea of a Pan-European Union, conceptualized similarly to the Pan-American model,[39] was taken up by Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894–1972) after the First World War. Europe had lost its dominant position and now found itself in between the economically striving US and the Bolshevist USSR. For it to become a world power again, this made it necessary to position the European continent between the two world powers. Coudenhove-Kalergi, a descendant of an Old-Austrian noble family, had become stateless after the First World War. Because his family’s possessions were in the newly founded Republic of Czechoslovakia, he decided to become a national citizen there; later, after the 1938 Munich agreement, he adopted French citizenship; however, he reported feeling like a global citizen.[40] To turn Europe back into a world power, the graduated philosopher developed the concept of ‘Pan-Europe’—a plan to unify all European states. After preparing ‘literary-propagandistic’ ground for his idea with the book *Pan-Europe* published in 1923, Coudenhove-Kalergi started building the Pan-European headquarters in Vienna’s Hofburg, further Pan-European Unions in almost all European capitals, and in 1926, even in New York.[41] The Pan-European movement was registered as a society in Vienna in 1926. Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe was, indeed, original, if not revolutionary, because he was the first to propose realizing the idea of Europe in the following steps. First, a European government, the Pan-European conference, should be summoned. Next, it was envisaged that arbitration and guarantee agreements among all future member states of Pan-Europe would be closed. In a further step, a customary union was to be formed. The idea would eventually culminate in the constitution of the United States of Europe with a European constitution.[42]

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[36] Ibid.
[37] Oberkofler, 2019, p. 344.
[38] Oberkofler, 2019, p. 344.
[39] See Fried, 1910.
[40] Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1966, pp. 29–93.
[41] Detailed Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, 2003, pp. 3–26.
[42] Coudenhove, 1926, pp.151–154.

Among the advantages of this federation, according to Coudenhove-Kalergi, were the avoidance of an inner-European war, which he feared would break out between Germany and France. He therefore advocated a reconciliation between Germany and France. A unified Europe would also serve to protect from an invasion by 'red or white Russia' and would further be able to compete with the American and British industries as well as the future East-Asian and Russian economies.[43] In 1924, he described the nature, goals, and organization of the Pan-European Union:

1. The pan-European movement is a non-partisan mass movement for a unified Europe. The Pan-European Union is the vehicle of the Pan-European movement.
2. The Pan-European Union has the goal of creating a sister organization to the Pan-American Union, which is working on uniting the American continent.
3. Its goal is the unification of all states on the European continent west of the U.S.S.R. with the aim of safeguarding peace, equality and a customary union.
4. The world-political positions of the Pan-European Union are:
   a) A close mutual understanding with the British Empire;
   b) Lasting maintenance of peace between Russia and Europe and promotion of their economic relations;
   c) Friendly cooperation with the states of Pan-America and Eastern Asia.
5. The Pan-European Union refrains from intervening in domestic political affairs.
6. The Pan-European Union is structured into states; each state is represented by its own committee that self-finances autonomously.
7. The central office of the Pan-European Union maintaining the relations among all single-state unions is located in Vienna.
8. The Pan-European Union's sign is a red cross on a golden sun.[44]

Coudenhove-Kalergi imagined creating a European economic and monetary union as well as a politically united Europe with common external, security, and defense policies. Pan-Europe was intended to include all European democratic states (and all non-European possessions) except Great Britain (because of its transatlantic relations and the Commonwealth of Nations) and the Soviet Union (because of Bolshevism).

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[43] Coudenhove, 1926, pp. 154–155.

[44] Coudenhove, 1924, n.p.



Source: Pan-Europa, 1924, n.p.

An additional task of the Pan-European Union should be to raise awareness for Europe and Pan-European patriotism. To promote Pan-Europe, Coudenhove-Kalergi used all communication means available at the time and became a great networker. He was invited by almost all important European statesmen to present his idea of Pan-Europe and managed to find many potential sponsors among them and among renowned industrials (e.g., Robert Bosch).[45] The Pan-European plan was to first win political support among the population for the idea to facilitate implementing the vision of a peaceful Europe. Thus, he also developed a corporate design in the form of the flag of Pan-Europe with the Pan-European symbol (a red cross in front of a golden background), a motto, a hymn, and even a currency, which would increase people's awareness of the Pan-European vision. In parallel to building up the organization, from 1924 onward, Coudenhove-Kalergi published and mainly authored the newspaper 'Pan-Europe,' which appeared ten times a year. It represented part of his 'Pan-European propaganda quest,' which involved promoting the idea in newspapers, on the radio, and at congresses. The first Pan-European congress took place at the beginning of October 1926 in Vienna, with 2,000 people attending; after the congress, Aristide Briand became the honorary president of the Pan-European Union. In Geneva in September 1929, the French minister of external affairs gave a speech on the 10th Convention of the League of Nations in which he talked about the unification of European states. Following this talk, he was commissioned by the members of the League of Nations attending the conference to write a 'Memorandum for the Construction of the European Union.'[46] This memorandum was eventually sent to all European governments in May 1930, asking for their feedback. The Austrian government agreed its response with Germany, but instead of a rejection, there was a very general, 'elastic' reply, which represented a 'diplomatic masterpiece of hedging.'[47] Their aim, given the basic tenor of the response, was to only become a member of the planned Briand's European Union if it became commonly accepted and presented the opportunity to collaborate with other states outside the European Union.[48] The memorandum was rejected by Germany, Great Britain, and Italy. Consequently, the foreign ministry of the League of Nations formally proposed to create its own commission devoted to resolving the 'European question.' This proposal was accepted by 45 member states of the League on September 17, 1930, which meant that the idea of European unification had for the first time become legally binding. This was followed by founding the Commission of the League of Nations, which was called the 'Study commission for the European Union.'[49] This commission, which consisted of government representatives of the European League's member states, ended its work in 1937 after seven meetings, without having achieved any major results in the field of European integration.[50]

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[45] Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, 2004, pp. 106–116.

Coudenhove-Kalergi was disappointed by the result of Briand's initiative but kept pursuing his vision of realizing Pan-Europe. Soon after Adolf Hitler became Reich Chancellor on January 30, 1933, the Pan-European movement was prohibited in Germany. Coudenhove-Kalergi at that time intensified his contact with the Austrian government under Engelbert Dollfuß (1892–1934) and changed the movement's orientation: its focus should no longer be on creating a political union, but on creating an economic union of European states. Thus, Coudenhove-Kalergi organized economic and agrarian congresses in Vienna. The political and economic situation in Europe now increasingly came to a crisis; this is why Coudenhove-Kalergi once again changed the direction of the Pan-European movement, which from 1936 onward focused on uniting Europe on a cultural level. In the night before March 12, 1938, when Austria was 'annexed' to Germany, he managed to escape to Czechoslovakia in time. From there, he got to Switzerland via Italy. On September 1, 1939, Nazi-Germany attacked Poland: the peaceful unification of Europe had to give way to a terrible war.

On August 3, 1940, Coudenhove-Kalergi and his family left Europe from Lisbon and went into exile in the United States of America. Working in New York, he continued to pursue his idea of Pan-Europe.

It would be wrong to assume that only one idea for (Pan-)Europe was developed in inter-war Austria. Before the foundation of Pan-Europe, the Austrian publicist Karl Anton Rohan (1898–1975) had already founded the '*Kulturbund*' in Vienna in 1922.[51] The goal of this association was to promote the union of Europe with Great

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[46] See Ziegerhofer, 1999, pp. 377–397.

[47] Ziegerhofer, 1999, p. 391.

[48] Ziegerhofer, 1999, pp. 391–392.

[49] Neumann, 1999, pp. 209–258.

[50] Neumann, 1999, pp. 257–258

[51] Müller, 2005, p. 318; Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer, 2011, pp. 210–217;

Britain and Russia on a cultural level to be able to join society and spirit beyond the constraints of nation, class, and race politics, and confession.[52] Regarding unifying Europe, Rohan was certain that the way to Europe was via the nation: 'The prerequisite for European unity is unity within the nations.'[53] In 1924, Rohan published the book *Europe*,[54] in which, among other things, he argued the need for a unified Europe because of the economic situation at the time. Still, he thought that a political rather than an economic union should be the priority,[55] and finally—if Europe wanted to avoid being crushed by the Islamic world and China—the states had to unite.[56] Rohan, however, did not clarify precisely how a union of this kind should be organized and structured. Nonetheless, this book is seen as the manifesto of the *Kulturbund* and an ideological pacemaker for the 'conservative revolution.'[57] Until 1934, Rohan organized yearly congresses across all of Europe (Madrid, Krakow, Paris, Barcelona, Heidelberg, etc.). Until 1938, talks were even held on a weekly basis in the various groups of countries and certainly in Austria. Many political, economic, and cultural actors who also approved the Pan-European idea were supporters of the *Kulturbund*. Rohan's *Kulturbund* can be characterized in terms of the mindset of uniting the opposites: revolutionary and conservative. His understanding of Europe was based on the idea of a Reich, the multinational monarchy, and the universalism of the idea of the occident or 'Western world.'[58] The Westerners consciously rejected progress and also opposed liberalism, parliamentarism, communism, and Americanism.[59] They called for unifying Europe in the sense of an 'authoritarian-hierarchical societal and state form.' Thus, it is not surprising that Rohan admitted identifying as a Fascist and that he became a member of the NSDAP in 1938. This also explains why the idea of the *Kulturbund* met with the approval of the academic-intellectual representatives of the Fascist movement.[60]

The *Kulturbund* had its own journal called the *Europäische Revue*, which is to this day considered the 'most significant European journal of the inter-war-period in German language.'[61] Back then, this journal was seen as the organ of a young, Europe-oriented generation: modern art (Max Beckmann, Picasso) and modern buildings (Dessauer, Le Corbusier, Erich Mendelssohn) were discussed, as were C.G. Jung's psychoanalytical ideas and modern literature (Andrè Malraux, Ernest Hemingway).[62] The goal of the *Europäische Revue* was the 'formation of a young reserve in Europe, especially the gathering and advancement of its elite'[63]—*at least, Rohan considered his Kulturbund a forum of the young European elite.*

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[52] Müller, 1996, p. 464.
[53] Rohan, 1930, p. 23.
[54] Rohan, 1924.
[55] Rohan, 1924, p. 36.
[56] Rohan, 1924, p. 38.
[57] Müller, 2005, p. 332.
[58] Conze, 2005.
[59] Conze, 2005, pp. 25–27.
[60] Müller, 1996, p. 464.
[61] Paul, 2005, p. 15.
[62] Müller, 2004, pp. 396–398.

Because of their similar organizational structure, the two movements were unsurprisingly seen as competing; Rohan rejected the idea of Pan-Europe, which he discredited as a mere political movement that placed democracy at its center.[64] In 1926, he criticized Coudenhove's Pan-Europe in his journal *Europäische Revue* as being construed as hostile toward traditions, unmetaphysical, and rationalistic. He described Pan-Europe as a 'fascinating amalgamation of just and grand political visions and a weirdly dry and bloodless theory stemming from visions from the past century, which was the heyday of world-salvation systems of a provider-, defender- and future-state.'[65] Throughout his life, Coudenhove reacted with indifference to this criticism, denying Rohan's movement. Neither man, in their respective memoires, even mentioned the other's name.[66]

In the year the Pan-European movement was founded, the economic politician Richard Riedl (1865–1944) published a statute for a Union of European states that he had developed in 1923.[67] During World War I, he worked on a concept for *Mitteleuropa*, which proposed an economic collaboration between Germany and Austria-Hungary under Prussian leadership.[68] This proposal was fiercely rejected by Heinrich Lammasch, among others.[69] Still, in the following, his constitutional draft for a United States of Europe is briefly sketched. Richard Riedl was an associated Austrian delegate in Berlin between 1921 and 1925. In this function, he became an eyewitness to the Occupation of the Ruhr starting in 1923. This led him to the view that Europe's situation only allowed for a choice between another Thirty Years' War and founding a United States of Europe, which led him to draft a statute for a European union of states.[70] In this endeavor, he was driven by the assumption that this Union should not be modeled after the United States of America, but rather should be based on the German Confederation (*Deutscher Bund*) founded in 1815. His vision of a United States of Europe, though, should 'not represent a mere copy of the (German) model of 1815, but an advancement and expansion of its constructive foundations in a modern spirit.'[71] The statute of the Union of European states was published in 1926 and comprised 60 articles. According to Article 1, the union, should be called the Allied States of Europe. All European states were eligible as members; states with land outside European territory could only pertain to the union with their European parts. Membership allowed for continued state sovereignty. According to Article

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[63] Müller, 2004, p. 397.
[64] Müller, 2004, p. 356.
[65] Müller, 2004, p. 356.
[66] Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1966; Rohan, 1954.
[67] Detailed in Brettner-Messler, 1998, pp. 21–70.
[68] Detailed in Brettner-Messler, 1998, pp. 228–248.
[69] Brettner-Messler, 1998, p. 230.
[70] Riedl, 1926, pp. 1–36.
[71] Riedl, 1926, pp. 3–4.

2 of the statute, the goal of the union was to maintain peace among its members, construct permanent organs for settling all forms of conflict, and promote economic relations and cultural progress, all based on the principles of mutual respect, equality of all races, languages, and religious confessions. Following the German Federal Act, affairs of the union should be handled by the Congress of the Allied States of Europe. This congress was intended to consist of the delegations of the parliaments and the convent of governments and to be headed by a congress president (Art.5). The competences of the congress president, the convent, and the delegation, as well as the decision-making process, were laid down in the further articles up to Art.23. To ensure peace, the union should have its own defense system. As stipulated in Art.8 of the regulations of the League of Nations, Riedl sought to reduce national armaments (Art.24). Internal peace within the union should be regulated by the Permanent International Court of Justice (Art.25). Besides arbitration procedures, the union also applied mediation procedures, which is why Art.26 defined the creation of a conciliation committee. Similar to the League of Nations, the states should rule out violence against each other as ultima ratio. Articles 34 to 53 contained economic regulations. There should be freedom of residence and settlement in the entire federal territory (Art.34), as well as freedom of choosing and practicing a profession (Art.35). Among other things, the Federation should make decisions regarding issuing passports and visas (Art.39). Freedom of all forms of traffic, such as ships, trains, or other means of transportation (Art.43–49), were regulated, and the statute also contained import and export bans (Art.50). A financial commission should be especially dedicated to restoring financial order, in the sense of justice and benevolence, after the damages caused by the after-war crisis (Art.54). Finally, the members of the federation would consent ‘to the principle that differences regarding race, nationality, language and religion should not influence the civic and political rights of their national subjects, namely admission to civil service, posts and honorary posts of all kind and the practice of professions and trades’ (Art.56).

Accordingly, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities were granted full equality, for example, concerning the right to use their own language at court, when interacting with authorities (Art.57), or in schools (Art.58). Riedl’s plan reads as a compilation of the Peace Treaties, the Statute of the League of Nations, and the German Federal Act of 1815. Dungy concludes that Riedl instrumentalized the League of Nations in the post-war era to implement his imperialist idea.[72]

In the inter-war period, Austria was not alone in providing fertile soil for one of the best-known ideas for Europe. The *Mitteleuropa* idea/Danube-Federation also saw a renaissance, mainly because of the new order of the world of states established at the Paris Peace Conference. It was mainly the newly founded Czechoslovakia that took the initiative in this regard by founding the ‘Little Entente’.[73] During 1930, *Mitteleuropa* awakened in Austria in the form of an economic union of Germany and Austria.

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[72] Dungy, 2020, p. 13.

[73] Koch, 2015, pp. 85–87. Suppan, 1995, pp. 171-197.

However, because of Art.88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, Austria was prohibited from becoming a part of Germany. The Treaty of Versailles contained a similar annexation ban (Art.80). At the beginning of 1931, the idea of *Mitteleuropa* became politically explosive because of the so-called Schober-Curtius plan. On March 19, 1931, the Austrian foreign minister, Johannes Schober, and his German counterpart, Julius Curtius, agreed on the creation of a German-Austrian customs union. Due to a premature press release, this plan became public, and France and Czechoslovakia considered it a violation of the Paris Peace Convention. The judges of the Permanent International Court of Justice at The Hague were commissioned by the League of Nations to examine the legal compatibility of the planned customs union with the Geneva Protocol of 1922. With a slim majority of eight to seven votes, they decided on September 5, 1931, that the planned customs union represented a breach of Geneva Protocol No. 1; six judges thought project also violated Art.88.[74] The annexation of Austria to Nazi-Germany on March 12, 1938, and the outbreak of the Second World War placed the idea of Europe in the background but did not manage to completely erase it.

3. From the post-war-period until 2004

After the end of the Second World War, Winston Churchill initiated the process of European integration with his famous Zurich Speech in September 1946.[75] In the same year, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi founded the European Parliamentarian Union. The unification of Europe was intended to be started by members of European parliaments—albeit without the participation of occupied Austria. In 1954, he eventually renewed the Pan-European movement in German Baden-Baden.[76]

Two years earlier, in 1952, the first step to unify European states started with the foundation of the ECSC. The further steps from the founding of the EEC in 1957 until today are well known to us. The unification of European states from 1952 onward happened against the background of a divided Europe. Austria only regained its state sovereignty in 1955 and started twice (once in 1963 and again in 1967) as a founding member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) to apply for association with the European Community (EC). Erhard Busek (*1941), vice mayor of Vienna and later vice chancellor, initiated the discussion about Mitteleuropa.[77] Against the background of the Prague Spring in 1968, he rekindled the discourse on Mitteleuropa in the 1970s and 1980s: 'He took up the tradition of Vienna's Christian social vice mayor during the period between the wars, Ernst Karl Winter.'[78] Busek travelled to Central and Eastern

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[74] Olechowski, 2019, p. 383.

[75] https://www.cvce.eu/en/collections/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/e8f94da5-5911–4571-9010-cdcb50654d43

[76] See Posselt, 1987.

[77] See for example Brix and Busek, 2018.

[78] Gehler, 2020, p. 918.

Europe and launched activities in the fields of education and culture—'he represented an anti-Naumann, a Central Europa with Vienna, Prague, and Budapest—and without Berlin, that is, also on the basis of a divided Germany, which not without reason gave rise to the suspicion and resentment of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.'[79] In 1989, vice chancellor Erhart Busek co-initiated the Central European Initiative in Budapest,[80] which currently has 18 member states. In the same year, the foreign ministers of Austria and Hungary, Alois Mock and Gyula Horn, cut apart a piece of the 'iron curtain' between Austria and Hungary. This happened on June 27, and a few weeks later, Austria formally applied to become a member of the European Union. On August 19, 1989, under the patronage of Otto Habsburg and the Hungarian minister Imre Pozsgay, the Pan-European Movement Austria organized a pan-European picnic. On this occasion, the borders between Austria and Hungary were opened for a few hours at St. Margarethen/Burgenland.[81] This picnic, the severance of the fence at the border between Austria and Hungary and later that between Austria and Czechoslovakia achieved by Alois Mock and Jiri Dienstbier, represented key steps toward the collapse of the Eastern bloc system. Since 1995, Austria has been a member of the EU and welcomed its enlargements in 2004 and 2007. Because of their historical relations with Austria as their neighbor, these countries are also highly attractive to Austria in economic and cultural terms.

Since 1986, the EC has been a place of longing for Austria; nine years later it joined the European Union. At this time, visions for Europe originating from Austria became rare.

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[79] Gehler, 2020, p. 918.

[80] https://web.archive.org/web/20170913001845/https://www.bmeia.gv.at/europa-aussenpolitik/europapolitik/zentraleuropaeische-initiative/

[81] Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer, 2010, pp. 212–213.

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| CHAPTER 2 |

The Development of Integration Theories in Hungary

László PALLAI

ABSTRACT

Since the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, the idea of integration has been on the agenda in Hungary, as well as in Central and Eastern Europe. It materialized in the formulation of various federation and confederation plans. Even though these ideas were generally far removed from political reality and therefore, had little chance of being realized, they were nevertheless reformulated. In the 19th century, the federation ideas of the Habsburg Empire were dominant, which also meant preserving the territorial unity of historic Hungary. Between the two world wars, the most influential and resonant ideas were those of the Pan-European movement and those from the Germans in various forms of Mitteleuropa. After the Second World War, Soviet-style forms of integration prevailed. Following the political transitions, the so-called Visegrad concept gained new momentum and is now dominant in the region.

KEYWORDS

federation, confederation, Hungarian integration ideas, Habsburg Empire federalization, Mitteleuropa plans, Pan-European Movement, socialist integration, Comecon, Visegrad concept

1. The Concept of Integration in the 19th century

At the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, during the era of the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars, modern national ideologies, along with nation-states, started to blossom. This not only brought about a change in the history of ideas, but also had major political consequences. From the beginning of the 19th century, the creation of nation-state frameworks became the dominant idea and political aspiration of national movements for approximately two centuries. This was accompanied by significant and continuous territorial rearrangements in Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently, the territorial framework of states and empires, which were previously considered stable, became precarious. This continuous challenge had to be faced by Hungarian politicians, thinkers, and the entire politicizing public in the 19th century.

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Uncertainty spawned constant fears, in which the territorial integrity of the Habsburg Empire and Hungary within it was seen as a threat based on the development of ethnic-religious relationships. No ethnicity in the Habsburg Empire comprised more than 20% of the population, which was divided into seven religious denominations. By the 1800s, the number of ethnicities overtook the Hungarians, largely due to the settlements after the Turkish era. Without Croatia and Slavonia, the Hungarian population represented only 44% of the total population; after the assimilation during the dualist era, this ratio had risen to 54% by 1910. However, the nationality question remained the most significant domestic political issue. In Transylvania, which played a key role in the Hungarian national consciousness, the Romanians were already an absolute majority by the early 19th century. The unfavorable development of ethnic proportions for Hungarians made surviving historical Hungary volatile. From the early 19th century up until the end of the Great War, representatives of the idea of integration and federation wanted to ensure the stability and continuity of Hungarian statehood.

Similar to Central and Eastern Europe, the integration plans formulated in the 19th century showed many general features in Hungary. However, the nature of most of these was such that they predicted the necessary fall of the concepts. By accepting that history is, among other things, the science of thinking about the past, the integration plans, by their alternative nature, are an equally important part of the past, regardless of whether the political environment provided opportunities for them to materialize.

In the case of the Hungarian representatives of the idea of integration, the substantial question arises as to what motivated the formulators of newer concepts, given the failure of previous plans. The ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity of the region was a motivational factor, as it clearly inspired these plans in parallel with the idea of the nation-state. Contemporary theories and works, especially the enlightenment and its impact, influenced the contributors, but Alexis de Tocqueville's (1805–1859) momentous work on the American system was a reference point, as were the integration plans of the Polish emigrant in Paris, primarily referring to Adam Czartoryski (1770–1861) and his circle. The cantonal system of Switzerland also served as an example. Many thinkers in the federation and confederation saw the possibility of solving internal conflicts and issues by creating a kind of a historical compromise between the peoples.

From the mid-19th century, the thinking of many peoples in the region, especially the Hungarians, was ruled by another factor: fear and uncertainty. The establishment of German unity and its form and the increasing Russian expansion kept the need for the smaller nations' security on the agenda. A conception emerged around this time, which continued into the 20th century, especially its first half, that only an organization or federation of the peoples along the Danube could provide an alternative and security against German and Russian expansive efforts.

Plans formulated in both the region and Hungary carried certain continuity and uniform features, but these also apply to the failure and non-realization of the concepts. Among them, lack of partnership, fear, suspicion, and distrust toward each other's plans and Hungary should be emphasized. This was further fueled by the fact that many of the plans were too broad, too sketchy, and often stuck at a general level, which created opportunities for misunderstanding and misinterpretation. Another significant factor was the lack of support from the great powers or the contradictions of it. Western powers tended to support the existing systems of the 19th century, which were often criticized by those very same powers and were considered obsolete and conservative, rather than the dubious federation concepts that created an uncertain and unknown future. Social and economic prerequisites for laying the foundations of integration were missing, such as social class or citizenship and a certain level of economic development, which would create the socio-economic embeddedness of integration by unfolding the international division of labor. The drafters were unable to win over the public, as they existed on the periphery of political life. The developers of the integration ideas were mostly emigrants, opposition or marginalized political circles, intellectuals, and social scientists. This is especially true for the Hungarian plan formulators. The drafts were generally far from political reality.

As Hungary was part of the Habsburg Empire in the 19th century, the Hungarian drafters of integration plans started with an analysis of the general state of the Empire. Chancellor Metternich (1773–1859) himself, as the dominant Central European politician in the first half of the 19th century, was aware of the danger of the nation-state idea for the future of the Habsburg Empire. He envisioned control and management of national movements by broadening the imperial framework, which, however, meant only postponing solving problems. 'The competence of Metternich allowed Austria to control the course of events through a lifetime … However, the result could only be delayed, but not avoided.'[1] According to other theories, the pre-1848 era of the Habsburg reign was the period of missed historical opportunities from the point of view of consolidating the region. 'The great tragedy of Austria was that the necessary compromise between the unity and diversity was not realized in time: such a compromise that would have been the balance between historical and national federalism.'[2] In contrast to this solution, 'for Metternich, Central Europe meant only the unchanged existence of the Austrian Empire, the rule of Italy and Hungary and the hegemony within the German Confederation.'[3]

In the first half of the 19th century, among the Hungarian representatives of the idea of integration, Miklós Wesselényi's (1796–1850) idea should be mentioned; it preceded many similar drafts formulated in the region.[4] Wesselényi, as a determining politician of the Hungarian reform era, originated his theory from the previously mentioned factors that threatened Hungary's integrity, that is, the movements of nationalities and the Russian and German expansive threats.

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[1] Kissinger, 1996, p. 79.

[2] Häusler, 1995, p. 229.

[3] Lendvai, 1995, p. 36.

[4] Ibid. p. 26; Wesselényi, 1992.

He warned of the danger of Pan-Slavism and Orthodoxy in his pamphlet 'Szózat a magyar és a szláv nemzetiség ügyében' (Speech on the Matter of Hungarian and Slavic Nationality).[5] The work was published in Hungarian in 1843 and in German a year later. He also recognized the historical situation that determined the approach of most 19th century political thinkers, that is, that the future and integrity of Hungary and the Habsburg Empire were closely linked. 'It was clear to the main leaders of the reform movement that this Hungary could only be maintained within the framework of the Habsburg Empire.'[6] Wesselényi's work was the first in Hungary prior to 1848 that urged reorganization of the empire under public law. However, it is a fact that among the writings of the Hungarian Jacobins (1794–95), there had long been the idea of organizing the parts of the absolutely controlled Habsburg Empire belonging to the Hungarian crown into a federal republic adapted to linguistic borders[7]; however, we do not know exactly what sources or samples the drafters based their plans on.[8] At the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, the republican system seemed completely unacceptable, since it would evoke the very dangerous happenings in France.

Wesselényi saw the greatest danger concerning Hungary to be the Russian foreign policy, which consciously sought to 'weaken the states and their governments where Slavs live, so as to alienate them from those...'[9] He believed this effort threatened not only the integrity of the states inhabited by the Slavs, but also European peace. Therefore, he urged that the confrontation with Pan-Slavic ideas be raised to a Pan-European issue. Wesselényi recognized precisely that the Habsburg Empire was not only threatened by the Russians, but that its conflict with Prussia over the German question was also intensifying. The empire could disastrously weaken under this dual burden, which would also have a serious effect on Hungary's domestic politics. The German threat itself is not detailed, but only the consequences of the German national movement for Austria. In this double grip, Wesselényi felt that a forced community of fate and interdependence had developed between Hungary and the Habsburg Empire. Russophobia, the fear of Pan-Slavic ideas, became a constant element of the Hungarian political public opinion. Where's the way out? asks Wesselényi. The answer is: 'The Slavic nations cannot and shall not remain oppressed and without a national constitution.'[10] The opinion of the historian who edited Wesselényi's work also harmonizes with this idea, according to which the essence of Wesselényi's program is that 'the remedy against the barbaric expansion exploiting the constitutional rights of the Slavic can only be the constitutional liberty,'[11] which has to lead to a new 'state alliance.' This would consist of five units: Austria's German inhabited territories with the Slovenians; Lombardy with the Italian part of Istria, Czechia, and Moravia;

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[5] Gergely, 1985, pp. 35–42.
[6] Niederhauser, 1995, p. 29.
[7] Gergely, 1985, p. 36.
[8] Ibid. p. 37.
[9] Wesselényi, 1992, p. 51.
[10] Ibid. p. 148.
[11] Ibid. p. 5.

Galicia; and Hungary together with Croatia and Dalmatia. Considering the national effort of Balkan peoples, the independent Romanian and uncertain South Slavic state would be linked to the resulting formation. Undoubtedly, despite its progressive nature, the draft 'reflected the downsides of 19th century Hungarian nationality and national political thought … the distinction of other nationalities as political entities, their territorial separation, or even their language considered its use intolerable in the administration …'[12]. As Wesselényi puts it: '… all official works and documents, for which the law does not provide otherwise, shall proceed and be edited only in Hungarian.'[13]

Multiple drafts appeared beginning in the early 19th century from Hungarian politicians, citing medieval examples of more active southeastern Europe and Balkan foreign policy, referring to the states of Louis I (1342–1382) and Matthias Corvinus (1458–1490).[14] Anti-Russian sentiment also served as a basis for these ideas, which was further complicated by the great dilemma of the possible solution of German unity, according to which the German inhabited parts of the Habsburg Empire would go to united Germany. What happens to the non-German territories in this scenario? Lajos Batthyány (1807–1849), Hungarian prime minister, said in the spring of 1848 that the 'Hungarians would be able to form a great empire, becoming a fine bastion against the Russian expansion.'[15]

The experience of the revolutions of 1848–49, the reactions of the great powers, and the anti-government actions of the Hungarian nationalities confirmed the decades-long concern of politicians and the public that Hungary's territorial unity and independence should be rightfully feared by the nation-state movements along with the German and Russian aspirations. After the fall of the revolution, a significant emigrant movement appeared in Europe and in many overseas countries, primarily the United States. The movement was led by the most influential intellectual and political leader, Lajos Kossuth (1802–1894), governor-president and the most significant politician of the 19th century. Kossuth was not only the best-known Hungarian politician in Europe but also among overseas countries. A contact was established with other emigration groups, including the still most prestigious and organized Poles, who were greatly influenced by their federal drafts. The earlier statement that emigration movements were particularly receptive to integration ideas also applies to Hungarian emigration after 1848. The high degree of susceptibility to various federal plans in the period after 1849 is also justified by the fact that, until the adoption of the 1867 Compromise, the future of Habsburg-Hungarian relations and the structure and state structure of the Habsburg Empire were completely uncertain. Everyone could see clearly that the absolutist (Bach era) regime that emerged after the defeated war of independence would not be sustainable for long. In this transitional state, the federal plans offering the alternative solution already mentioned were not accidentally given more leeway.

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[12] Romsics, 1997, p. 27.

[13] Wesselényi, 1992, p. 251.

[14] Romsics, 2007, pp. 319–352.

[15] Ibid. p. 338.

In his draft, Lajos Kossuth considered the internal causes and international lessons of the fall of the Hungarian revolution. The great tragedy of 1848–49 was that the Hungarian government and Hungarian political interests confronted the will of most nationalities and, as a result, the nationalities became the instrument of the Austrian counter-revolutionary efforts; this was also recognized by the Hungarian emigration. According to many, the only alternative to the Habsburg Empire in this region could be a federation. However, this realization had already been formulated after the defeated war of independence. Previously, the federation system and territorial autonomy for the nationalities was totally unacceptable to Hungarian politicians and most of society. The Nationality Act, drafted on June 28, 1949, in the final days of the war of independence, would have given the nationalities broad rights in language usage, but it was too late.

Among the emigration, the first prominent representative of the federation plans was László Teleki (1811–1861), the Hungarian government's ambassador in Paris. Learning from the years 1848–49, he wrote the following to Kossuth on March 14: 'It is not only Austria that is dead, but also St. Stephen's Hungary.'[16] Doubts and uncertainty about the Habsburg Empire's sustainability were also shared by others. Whereas a few years earlier, Miklós Wesselényi could only envision the successful territorial unity of Hungary with the Habsburgs, in 1849, he no longer believed that the Habsburg Empire would continue for long. In the spring of 1849, he spoke of a Budapest centered new Central Europe.

As previously mentioned, the most prestigious leader of the emigration was Lajos Kossuth, so his plans for the future settlement of Central Europe attracted the most interest.[17] In Vidin, immediately after the emigration in October 1849, he formulated a confederation idea consisting of Hungary, Poland, Serbia, and the Romanian principalities. In 1851, he drew up a more detailed draft constitution, which was further developed in 1859. It adopted many elements of the American draft constitution and many existing European ones. It also built on Hungarian historical traditions while respecting the individual and communal rights of nationalities.

This was developed further in his 1862 proposal for a confederation of Hungary, Transylvania, Romania, Croatia, and Serbia, called the 'Danube Confederation.' Common affairs—foreign policy, foreign trade, customs, military affairs—would be managed by the federal parliament and common government. The joint government bodies would meet in different member states each year, and this venue would provide the next head of the confederation. The question of official language would be settled with mutual agreement between the member states; not surprisingly, Kossuth suggested French. Despite Kossuth's original intentions, thanks to a Milanese newspaper, the draft was published too soon, causing concern and opposition regarding territorial issues in many of the countries potentially affected. Thus, Kossuth was forced to explain both himself and the plan, which damaged the draft.

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[16] Romsics, 2007, p. 317.

[17] Pajkossy, 2002, pp. 931–957.

Between 1849 and 1867, not only great politicians like Lajos Kossuth formulated integration plans, but so did Mihály Táncsics (1799–1884), who could not be compared to Kossuth in his statesman abilities. He was a writer and publicist who was particularly sensitive to social questions, including the peasant problem; thus, many consider him one of the first socialist politicians. He is inseparable from the revolution in Pest on March 15, 1848, as the release of Táncsics, who had been sentenced to prison for press offenses, became one of the defining events of this famous day of the revolution. He wrote his work 'Hét nemzetség szövetsége' (The Union of Seven Nations) in 1857; however, for several reasons, it did not find the same resonance as did Kossuth's integration plans, either among his contemporaries or posterity. According to a prominent historian on the subject, Táncsics's work can be 'listed among the well-intentioned but naïve and in many respects illusionary utopias.'[18] Táncsics took the historical principle into account in the question of borders. He drafted a European confederation, where foreign policy would only partially be common, but units of measurement customs and the monetary system would be. He did not mention military matters. His conception is, in many ways, underdeveloped, contradictory, and incomplete. Therefore, Táncsics's idea remained completely unheeded.

The Compromise of 1867 placed the Habsburg-Hungarian relationship on new foundations. It ended a long period of conflicts with mutual concessions. Contrary to the federation plan drafts, the Compromise was supported by a broader scope of Hungarian public opinion. Many recognized that no other real alternative could be achieved in that time. Initially, there was criticism, but one had to realize that to be a political actor in Hungary after 1867, the fact itself and acceptance of the Compromise had to be the starting point. Kossuth expressed his concerns in his so-called 'Cassandra letter' to Hungarian society, but he remained in the minority. In the long run, he saw clearly that the Compromise bound the fates of Hungary and the Habsburg Empire together. He was firmly convinced through the lesson of 1848/49 that the future dissolution of the empire was inevitable. With the Compromise, the unity of historic Hungary depended on the fate of the Habsburg Empire. History has proven Kossuth's prediction to be right in the long run, as the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire after the First World War brought with it the disintegration of old Hungary. However, no other feasible solution was possible in the last third of the 19th century. It is also important to point out that stabilizing the Habsburg Empire through the Compromise was welcomed by Western powers. Predictability in the Central European region was necessary for European balance.

Since both the Austrian and Hungarian political forces and public opinion supported the Compromise, the dualist state structure itself was stabilized. Western politicians welcomed this solution, so there was no chance of any realistic alternative to compromise, such as plans for federation or confederation, for decades after 1867.

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[18] Romsics, 2007, p. 317.

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, there were concepts of a Hungarian expansionist aspiration toward the Balkan, with aligned economic arguments, such as opening new markets.[19] This was the birth of the so-called 'Hungarian imperial' idea of Turanism, which called for building a common future between Asian people or people with Asian roots, including the Hungarians from Central Europe through Southeast Europe to Central Asia. The Turan Society was established in 1910 with their own journal, the *Turan*, first published in 1913. Their long-term goals were the following:

> The Hungarian nation has a great and bright future ahead of it, and it is certain that the heyday of Germanism and Slavism will be followed by the heyday of Turanism. We Hungarians, the western representatives of this great awakening power, have the great and difficult, but glorious task of becoming the spiritual and economic leaders of the Turanian nation of 600 million people.[20]

The movement is undoubtably important in terms of ideological history, but it had no significant impact on Hungarian foreign policy.

The First World War brought a radical change both in the relationships between great powers and the fate of the Habsburg Empire, including the territorial integrity of Hungary. Since the Entente had no official or approved concept about the future of the Habsburg Empire, representatives of Hungarian political and intellectual life were mostly concerned with the German concepts of war, which received a lot of publicity. From the mid-19th century, German political and economic actors saw the central- and south-eastern European region as a target area for their economic expansion. Multiple theories in connection with the realization of the German Mitteleuropa came to life even before the First World War.[21] At the start of the war, the Mitteleuropa plan became a permanent feature of German war aims. This is illustrated by Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's (1856–1921) letter to Secretary of State Clemens von Delbrück (1856–1921) on the German policy guidelines at the beginning of the war:

> The creation of a Central European Customs Union with France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland, Italy, Sweden and Norway through common customs treaties seems feasible. This alliance, without a common institutional leadership, with ostensible equality of its members, but in reality under German leadership, should ensure the domination of the German economy over Central Europe. [22]

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[19] Ibid. pp. 328–334.

[20] Ibid. p. 324.

[21] Meyer, 1955.

[22] Németh, 2001, p. 172.

Delbrück himself formulated concepts about the exemplary economic objectives, similar to the representatives of German industry.[23] Lively debate was stimulated in connection with the envisaged customs union with the Monarchy since the different interests and potential of the German industry and agricultural sectors were apparent. No concrete form of economic cooperation was clear. either. The possibilities of a customs union, customs alliance, and a traditional trade agreement were all raised. The book *Mitteleuropa* by the liberal and Lutheran pastor Friedrich Naumann (1860–1919), which was published in 1915, fit into this line of thought. It is undoubtably the most significant work in terms of its impact and resonance. It sold 100,000 copies in just a year, becoming the most successful publication after the memoirs of Bismarck in pre-1918 Germany.[24] After its publication, it was also published in Hungary, which sparked lively debate among economists, politicians, and intellectuals.[25]

In 1916, the leading newspaper of the Hungarian bourgeois radicals, the 'Huszadik Század' (20th century), organized a debate on the issue. Participants were divided on the concept. Oszkár Jászi (1875–1957), a renowned social scientist and the most respected figure among the bourgeois radicals, supported a concept that would effectively achieve trade, the dismantling of customs borders, and general economic and cultural development within a larger political framework rather than in an isolated small state, regardless of his disagreement with the German ideas of great power and world domination. However, other leading politicians in the debate, such as the social democrat Zsigmond Kunfi (1879–1929) or Christian socialist Sándor Giesswein (1856–1923), opposed the plan precisely because they saw the realization of the German expansionist ambitions in them. Along with Jászi, many believed that peace and free development could only be achieved by creating the United States of Europe, for which Mitteleuropa could become a solid basis. However, he did not envisage its creation for the same purpose and in the same way as the already cited German aspirations for world domination. To sum up the debate:

> Neither the Austrian nor the Hungarian ruling powers were able to come up with a constructive, historically viable counter-idea to the idea of Central European integration, and if they did attempt it, they were drowned in a whirlpool of nationalism or even in the shallow kelp forest of national nihilism.[26]

In 1917 and 1918, the aggressive German ambition for great power, its plan for creating a German-led Mitteleuropa in which the dualist Monarchy and Hungary within could only play a subordinate role, discouraged Jászi from supporting the creation of Mitteleuropa in this form. Pál Szende (1879–1934), another bourgeois radical economist writer, warned of the dangers of the increasing dependence on Germany in an emotional article in the ‘Világ’ (World).

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[23] Elvert, 1999, pp. 35–44.
[24] Fröhlich, 1996, p. 179.
[25] Irinyi, 1973.
[26] Ibid, p. 266.

> Hungarian statesmen are competing to offer Germany all that is valuable and important for the future of the Hungarian state. István Tisza[27] wants to send the Hungarian infantry to the front in Flanders, while Wekerle[28] is sacrificing Hungarian industry and trade on the altar of allied loyalty. We know from the statements of the prime minister that he is preparing a long customs alliance with Germany. The matter is urgent, immensely urgent.[29]

At the end of 1918, with the defeat of Germany, the Mitteleuropa plans were off the agenda; furthermore, the defeat of the Central Powers also meant the radical dissolution of the Habsburg Empire and Hungary with it. Jászi drafted a plan in October 1918 to ensure the future cooperation of the peoples by the Danube. The Monarchy would have been reorganized on a federative basis, which would have kept the historical borders of Hungary without Croatia. The name of his conception was the ‘United States of the Danube.’[30] In the autumn of 1918, Jászi became the Minister of Nationalities in the Károlyi bourgeois democratic government, but he had no real room to maneuver. His concept of federalizing the Monarchy was not welcomed by the neighboring nations or by the Entente powers, as it was too late. In the spring of 1918, it was decided that instead of any reform of the Monarchy or a more moderate territorial dismemberment, radical dissolution and creating a small state framework would determine the new power structure in Central and South-Eastern Europe. With this, the Hungarian state of St. Stephens was torn into pieces. As the government that came into power in the autumn of 1918 did nothing to prevent this (although it could have done very little), it was often held responsible for the territorial losses.

2. Between the world wars

By signing the Treaty of Trianon (1920), Hungary found itself in a highly controversial situation. After nearly four centuries, it regained full state autonomy, but suffered conditions of territorial loss that it had never before experienced. In Central Europe, the imperial framework was replaced by a small state system. After creation, the successor states sought to completely abolish former economic relations, pursuing a so-called import-substitution industrialization, which seemed almost impossible and wasteful in the small state framework.

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[27] Tisza István (1861–1918) Hungarian politician, prime minister 1903–1905, 1913–1917.

[28] Wekerle Sándor (1848–1921) Hungarian politician, prime minister 1892–1995, 1906–1910, 1917–1918.

[29] Szende, 1918, p. 1.

[30] Hanák, 1985.

The treaties closing the First World War brought neither political nor economic security and stability. The victorious powers were constantly forced to obtain new guarantees to enforce the peace.

> The negative consequences for the European economy of the great restructuring of the world economy after the First World War were the basis for the efforts to promote closer economic cooperation and economic union between European states, i.e., these efforts were intended to fulfil a basically defensive function, the task of halting and reversing unfavorable developments.[31]

In the 1920s, the new Central European order, which appeared to be politically durable and viable, required constant corrections and crisis management in the economic field. The dissolution of the Monarchy helped France's political aims, but 'made the economic reconstruction of the region very difficult.'[32] These circumstances also motivated the plans, which not only formulated the idea of European integration, but also considered economic rapprochement between the successor states as possible and necessary.

> In the 1920s, European integration was not part of the official foreign policy initiatives of individual countries; its proponents sought to win adherents and exert pressure on the leading European powers primarily through social and political movements and organizations.[33]

Among them were many Hungarian economists and economic writers.

According to the Reformed pastor Miklós Makay (1905–1977), who regularly published in various economic and foreign policy publications,

> The present system of nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe is both an obstacle to the capitalist trend of socio-economic development, which, as it advances, calls for the realization of ever larger economic units, viable in the light of prevailing conditions, and an imperfect solution to the modern nation-state structure of modern state development.[34]

While rejecting the current situation, he was also aware that there can be no return to pre-war political conditions. He suggested such a Central and Eastern European Confederation as a way out that would be the first step toward creating Pan-Europe.[35] However, he did not elaborate on how to do this.

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[31] Kövics, 1992, p. 37.
[32] Ránki, 1985, p. 4.
[33] B. Bernát, 1989, p. 683.
[34] Makay, 1928, p. 599.
[35] Ibid. p. 600.

The international association experts were aware of the dangers of trade policy restrictions on the successor states. The Finance Committee of the League of Nations on Hungary's report on December 20, 1923, states that 'It is of utmost importance that the free exchange of goods and trade treaties between Hungary and its neighbors be restored.'[36] This criticism was not only made against Hungary. Previously, another committee of the League of Nations noted that the trade policies of most European countries were not consistent with Article 23 of the Charter, which states that dismantling barriers and obstacles to trade is the responsibility of member states.[37] The fact that the United States was not a member of the League of Nations prevented it in the first place from acting as the organizer of world trade. Therefore, most economic issues were resolved outside the framework of the League of Nations.

Between the two world wars, the most significant integrational movement by international standards was the Pan-European movement. In Hungary, the Pan-European idea evolved after 1924, when the initiator of the movement, R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894–1972), wrote a letter asking Pál Auer (1885–1978), renowned international jurist, to start the organizing work. Auer himself took the job from Antal Rainprecht (1881–1946), a member of parliament, former supremus comes. Many politicians from the opposition, economic journalists, artists, writers, and poets joined the movement. In Hungary, however, they were less active than in other countries because of the constant distrust surrounding them due to the stoic aloofness of official Hungarian politics. The organizers were aware of this. Auer wrote of their ambitions:

> We were striving for a unified, institutionally organized economic community of the Danube, and at the same time we had the idea that the agricultural products of this economic community should be bought up by the countries of Western Europe at a preferential rate to those of overseas countries. Yet we also hoped that close economic cooperation would not only ensure peace between the Danube states and the resolution of minority problems, but also our greater independence from Germany.[38]

Elemér Hantos (1881–1942) was the most active, internationally recognized, and best-known representative of the integrational idea between the two world wars. He was an economist, a university professor, and State Secretary of Commerce between 1916 and 1918, and, during this period, he was also an expert for the League of Nations. The main thrust of his activities was economic rapprochement between the successor states. For his extensive organizational and academic work in favor of integration, he was known by his contemporaries as the 'Central European Coudenhove-Kalergi.'[39]

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[36] Gratz, 1925, p. 88.

[37] Kövics, 1992, p. 44.

[38] Auer, 1971, p. 160.

[39] Németh, 2019.

Elemér Hantos agreed with the Pan-European idea but envisaged it as a gradual process, linking together the regional economic communities. The establishment of a Central European Economic Bloc could serve as the first step in this process.[40] He saw the realization of Pan-Europe as a process, the first element of which would be the organization of Central Europe; the second, the Franco-German reconciliation; and the third, the institutionalization of a united Europe.[41] Hantos's insight proved correct, since the basis of the Western European integration that unfolded after 1945 was also the Franco-German rapprochement, the so-called historic reconciliation. He saw the victory conditions of the two ideas as identical. 'Economic opportunity and necessity are the realpolitik touchstone of the concept of pan-Europeanism.'[42]

In the 1920s, Elemér Hantos propagated his economic policy program in the framework of the Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftstagung (MWT), alongside the League of Nations and other organizations.[43] The MWT was founded in 1925 at the instigation of the Viennese wholesaler, Julius Meinl (1869–1944), an internationally renowned advocate of free trade. The founders' vision was to provide an institutional framework to formulate and support European economic convergence in Central Europe. As in 1924 and 1925, the integrational idea seemed to gain new momentum. The founding meeting in Vienna, on September 8 and 9, 1925, was attended by economists and economic and financial actors from all around Europe who condemned the exclusionary economic policy. The main participants joining the association were bankers, traders, and financial experts such as Richard Reisch (1866–1933), president of the National Bank of Austria, who had realistic perceptions in their own fields about the harmful effects of economic isolationism and autarkic economic policies. Hantos was constantly the most active person on the Hungarian side. The organization's main practical achievement was creating a public and international forum for economic issues affecting Central Europe. It could not have done more. The organization embraced Hantos' concept that the Central European question could only be solved if one element of economic life was not arbitrarily singled out, but a comprehensive cooperation was formulated, while recognizing its complexity. Accordingly, in the second half of the 1920s, the MWT's practical work focused on possible forms of convergence in transport, monetary, and customs policy. In October 1926, transport was the main topic of international discussion; in 1927, it was tourism; in 1928, the focus was the Danube question; in 1930, it turned to current trade policy issues; and in 1931, it was the agricultural question. The conferences explored the roots of certain economic problems but could not achieve more than formulating general expectations and proposals, as they had no political authority. According to Hantos, from an economic point of view, Germany was part of Central Europe, but it was not desirable to have it involved in creating the economic integration between the successor states, since the whole region would then fall under such a German influence that it would provoke opposition from the Western powers.

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[40] Hantos, 1928, p. 23.
[41] Ibid. pp. 26–27.
[42] Ibid p. 27.
[43] Schwarzenau, 1974.

The MWT set up a series of institutions to raise awareness of the interdependence of Central European states, to work on specific concepts, and to formulate concrete programs and plans. As part of this process, the Vienna Institute was set up in March 1929 to primarily deal with transport and monetary issues, the Institute in Brno in 1929 to study cooperation between the various production sectors, and the Central European Institute in Dresden in 1929–30. In May 1930, the Hungarian institute, with a focus on agricultural issues, was also set up under the leadership of Gusztáv Gratz (1875–1946), a politician, publicist, and economic journalist. Between the two world wars, Gratz, along with Hantos, was the most active member of the economic integration movement of Central Europe in Hungary.

The global economic crisis meant a new era both in political and economic relations. These circumstances were also Elemér Hantos's starting point. He thought the concept he created in the 1920s was still relevant. The only change was that market issues had become the main problem in international economic relations. The old financial problems—exhaustion of funds and unfavorable exchange rates—were still relevant, although in a new light. The basic elements of his idea had not changed substantially. He saw proof of upsetting the balance between supply and demand in the Monarchy's economic fragmentation, which was not only a mistake in terms of the 1920s economic processes. He also saw the root of the Central European States' economic problems in the 1930s in the territorial changes brought along by the peace treaties, in addition to the adverse effects of the world economy. The negative effects of the new borders on economic life could not be mitigated in the 1920s. He saw that creating an economic balance in the region could be achieved by solving this issue.

In his 1933 memoirs, published in several languages, he explored the roots and effects of the global crisis on the successor states.[44] The identified causes were the unfavorable economic effects of the new political borders, the question of reparations, the economic policy practices of the successor states, the adverse development of exchange rates, and the mistrust that made normal economic contacts difficult. He also stressed that the crisis in the region had complex roots and that possible solutions should reflect this complexity.

> Because the crisis in the Danube region is not simply an imprint of the world economy, it is not a temporary, changing cyclical crisis, but a long-lasting, permanent structural crisis, which requires different instruments than those prescribed for general crises.[45]

The least thing to do for economic rapprochement would be a trade agreement, while the maximum would be a customs union. Hantos saw serious obstacles in achieving both. 'The political impossibility of a customs union is matched by the inadequacy of trade agreements.'[46] However, the idea of a customs union was so politically burdened that even the very idea would discredit the rapprochement. According to Hantos, there was a middle ground:

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[44] Hantos, 1933.

[45] Ibid. p. 5.

> If, on the one hand, liberal trade treaties and simple preferential customs are not enough, and, on the other, a more radical form of customs union is unfeasible, there is no other alternative but a middle ground in trade policy leading to a customs and economic alliance.[47]

Official Hungarian politics distrusted the integrational efforts, as exemplified by the Hungarian government's view on the Pan-European movement. When Pál Auer organized an international meeting on the rapprochement of the Danube states in February 1932, it had to be prepared partly in secret. Later he recalled:

> I was aware that this initiative was not compatible with the policy of the Hungarian government of the time, and that if official circles had known about it in advance, they would have tried to prevent the meeting from taking place.[48]

The atmosphere was well indicated by the fact that while many former politicians appeared, active ones tended to stay away. The aloofness of official Hungarian politics was also caused by the range of the movement's domestic supporters. They included many liberals, freemasons, and intellectuals of Jewish origin, that is, representatives of ideologies and ideological trends that were less in line with the official political course of the time.

Leaders of the Little Entente made it clear that embracing certain integrational plans could not lead to a change in borders or in Central Europe's political structures. The most important elements of Hungarian foreign policy between the two world wars were a peaceful revision and protection of minorities. In his parliamentary speech on February 22, 1932, Beneš (1884–1948), reacting to the Tardieu Plan, said that if the proposals were to

> entail any political commitment, if their aim or consequence were to be some international organization, confederation, or other similar political organization by any other name, then I think that we must reject such cooperation from the outset. The States of the Little Entente are united on this question.[49]

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[46] Ibid. p. 79.
[47] Ibid. p. 80.
[48] Auer, 1971, p. 158.
[49] Auer, 1971, pp. 160–161.

French Foreign Minister André Tardieu (1876–1945) proposed that the five agricultural states on the Danube grant each other customs preferences to provide a mutual market for their products to solve the agrarian crisis and prevent German foreign economic ambitions in the Central European region. Many of his contemporaries thought they had discovered the concepts of Elemér Hantos in this plan, as it was also known as the Hantos Plan.

In the Hungarian Parliament, the debate on economic integration plans, including the Tardieu proposal, broke out during the discussion of the 1932 budget. On this occasion, István Bethlen (1874–1946), expressed his views in greater detail, although not as prime minister but as one of the leading figures in the foreign policy principles and methods of the period.

> Indeed, whatever the merits of the plan, however much it may have served to put Central Europe back on its feet, its defect is that it has a somewhat Danube Confederation flavor and that the preference it offers is somewhat expensive. I therefore ask the Hungarian Government, since it is in our interest to have a free hand toward other markets, since it is in our interest to be able to contract on equal terms with Italy, France, Germany and Czechoslovakia, not to give up any of their free hand in this respect, to work to amend the Tardieu plan in a direction that suits our interests.[50]

The plan was defended by the aforementioned Gustave Gratz. He provided data to justify the reality of the concept and saw it as a means for Hungary to regain its old markets and thus remedy the crisis. I am firmly convinced that through economic cooperation we can regain, at least in part, the natural advantages of the larger economic areas, the advantages we enjoyed economically in the old monarchy, in the old common customs territory.'[51] His view was shared by few. The official Hungarian foreign policy, against all plans for integration, was first to revise, then create economic or any kind of rapprochement, and not vice versa.

Many of the active politicians could identify with the integration as a necessary and inevitable trend. In 1931, Pál Teleki (1897–1941), politician, two-time prime minister and internationally renowned geographer, wrote:

> Everything that brings the peoples of Europe closer together, whether in the economic or cultural field, is intended to overcome customs duty and transport difficulties (sic), the protection of European production and the organization of any aspect of it, the grouping or organization of certain branches of production for the whole of Europe, agreements between or among European agricultural and industrial states, similar agreements between countries

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[50] *Az 1931. évi július hó 18-án meghirdetett országgyűlés nyomtatványai. Képviselőházi Napló VI. kötet.* 1932. p. 440.

[51] Ibid. VII., p. 74.

> which are geographically —virtue of economic complementarity—related, the frequent contact of European politicians within and outside the League of Nations, European conferences… all this is a very good and important step toward development.[52]

Although Bethlen and the official Hungarian foreign policy saw realization of any kind of integration in the region only after achievement of the Hungarian revisionist goals as in line with the general features of integration ideas, he himself, as an influential personality but no longer an active politician, outlined a federation idea toward the end of the war.[53] On February 3, 1944, he wrote a letter to Tibor Eckhardt (1888–1972), a leading figure in Hungarian emigration in the West during the Second World War, with the aim of presenting his ideas of federation to the powers. The integration plans of politicians who were forced into opposition or emigration, like those of Bethlen, were far removed from real political processes and opportunities. The post-war fate of Hungary and its neighbors had already been fundamentally decided. The future scenario was starting more and more to be written by Moscow.

From the second half of the 1930s onward and especially during the Second World War, Hungarian politicians and intellectual leaders became increasingly preoccupied with fear of the great power relations and the consequences. Feelings and phobias that had been present since the mid-19th century, the fear of German and Russian expansionism now posed an even more realistic challenge. Many voiced concerns about the threat to the independence and national existence of the small peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. The great power ambitions in the region of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union had become timelier and more palpable than ever. The question rightly arose whether small statehood still had a chance along the Danube. These concerns were also confirmed by western, and especially British, statements. An article in the London Times in March 1943 shocked society throughout the region.

> There will be security in Eastern Europe only if that area is dependent on the military power of Russia… The events of the inter-war period have proved that neither any group of small states nor any group of Western powers can provide security for any nation.[54]

László Németh (1901–1975), one of the most influential writers and thinkers of the period, painfully and disappointedly declared: ‘so that’s how we are bought and sold—little peoples to hordes.’[55] It was not by chance that Hungarian intellectual life in these years was preoccupied with the future of small statehood and the relationship between small nations and great powers. As an alternative, they again thought of some kind of integration solution.

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[52] Teleki, 1931, p. 220.

[53] Urbán and Vida, 1991, pp. 32–38.

[54] Juhász, 1983, p. 222.

[55] Ibid. p. 223.

In this crisis and uncertainty, the so-called ‘Szárszó Meeting’ took place between August 23–29, 1943, near Lake Balaton, with the participation of nearly 500 writers, poets, sociologists, and social scientists. The main slogans—questions of fate, search for a way forward, community of values—in themselves show the fear of the future, whatever the outcome of the war might be. Several of them also expressed the need for interdependence, rapprochement, some interconnection, integration, or creation of a new identity among the peoples of Central Europe.[56]

3. Integration theories 1945 to present

The fact that the Second World War ended with the presence of Soviet troops in Central and Southeastern Europe had a profound impact on the history of these countries for decades. Nevertheless, for a brief period between 1945 and 1947, the idea of integration in these countries was revived. Each side, however, used the idea of rapprochement for different political ends.[57] The most active negotiations took place in the Hungarian-Romanian-Yugoslavian relationship. Although the Soviet presence was clear, even the politicians were not clear about their future: what the great powers wanted from the region or to what extent the western victors would interfere in the region’s political life. The use of the positive message of the idea of federation for current political purposes is well illustrated by a passage from the September 1945 election program of the Hungarian Communist Party:

> The main goal of Hungarian foreign policy is to ensure the peace and harmony of the Danube peoples, to pave the way for the idea of Kossuth, the Danube Federation. To this end, efforts should be made not only to intensify trade but also to establish a Romanian-Yugoslav-Hungarian customs union.[58]

Many territorial issues were still open until the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, concluded by the anti-fascist powers with Germany’s small European allies. The most important of these was the status of Northern Transylvania. As it turned out in hindsight, the Soviets were completely unfounded in their attempts to persuade the Hungarian government of the possibility of a limited territorial revision of Transylvania. Nor did the Romanian side clearly know that all of Transylvania would be theirs. In this period of temporary uncertainty, Romanian Prime Minister Petru Groza tried to reassure both the Hungarians in Transylvania and the Hungarians in mainland Hungary that there was no need for any territorial correction of Transylvania, since the future establishment of the Federation would automatically resolve all territorial disputes. After concluding the peace, when Romania regained all of Transylvania, the Bucharest government tended to talk less and less about the possibility of a federation.

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[56] Ibid. pp. 268–324.

[57] Gyarmati, 1986.

[58] Ibid. p. 71.

After 1947, during the period of the Cold War and the sovietization of Central and Eastern Europe and after the deterioration of Yugoslav-Soviet relations (1948), the idea of federation was dropped from the agenda. Moscow rejected all attempts to achieve this, and multilateral cooperation between the socialist countries was replaced by a system of bilateral treaties, with the agreements with the Soviet Union being the most important for every country.

For Hungary, too, membership in the Soviet bloc, the Warsaw Pact of 1955, and the Comecon of 1949 determined the possibilities and direction of its political and economic life and foreign relations. The Comecon was originally a framework for economic integration but was in fact a political response to the Marshall Plan. It did not do any real work until the early 1960s since the typical autarkic economic policies of the 1950s and the international division of labor were in themselves a contradiction.

The 'New Economic Mechanism' that unfolded from 1968 onward, increasing corporate autonomy, widening of the scope for foreign trade, and opening up of a freer reflection among economists on socialist economic integration, put a possible reform of the Comecon on the agenda. It is important to stress that this did not affect the basic relations with the Soviet Union. There was nothing to rethink in political and foreign policy relations, except in the field of economic governance. The government of Prime Minister Jenő Fock (1967–1975) created a favorable political climate for technical discussions, one of the aims of which was to improve the international division of labor within the Comecon.[59] On a theoretical level, a so-called 'little-Comecon' solution emerged. This would build closer cooperation within the Comecon between Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and the GDR, countries that had a greater historical precedent and rationality in economic cooperation. The suppression of the 'Prague Spring' in 1968 and the change of direction in Hungarian and Soviet domestic policy after 1971 put a stop to any idea of reform and made it impossible to rethink economic relations between the socialist countries.

Since the early 1980s, a debate has been developing among writers, poets, philosophers, and historians in several socialist countries, especially Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, on the conceptual, substantive, and spatial possibilities of interpreting Central Europe. This led to rethinking the possibilities of cooperation between the small nations of Central Europe. 'By denying the line that divided Europe, the proponents of the idea of Central Europe were in fact proclaiming the unity of Europe, and Central Europe meant Europe.'[60] Central Europe was increasingly saturated with positive emotional content. György Konrád (1933–2019), writer and sociologist, clearly stated that 'Central Europeans are those who are offended, disturbed, anxious, and tense by the division of our continent.'[61] Advocates of Central Europe had to face up to the negative legacy of the German world domination of the concept of Central Europe or Mitteleuropa. The 'discovery' of Central Europe, so often referred to, was thus also a demand for purifying Mitteleuropa, that is 'The peoples of the region were here long before Naumann and Hitler and will remain here after them.'[62] Since many thinkers saw the Monarchy as the embodiment of the Central Europe that had once existed, there was a marked nostalgia in the public mind for dualism. At the time of the bipolar world order, the debate about the nature of Central Europe was received by western public opinion with a certain lack of understanding. For them, 'Central Europe is nothing but a phantom concept born of nostalgia.'[63]

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[59] Feitl, 2008.

[60] Heiszler, 1993, p. 64.

After the collapse of the bipolar world order and the regime changes in Eastern Europe, all political forces in Hungary made it clear that they saw their future in Euro-Atlantic integration, that is, in NATO membership and accession to the European Union. In 1999, Hungary became a full member of NATO. In the early 1990s, the idea of joining European integration and the institutionalization of regional cooperation in Central Europe were parallel issues.[64] There have been several attempts to achieve the latter. In November 1989, the 'Adriatic-Danube Programme' was launched with the participation of Italy, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Hungary. Czechoslovakia joined in 1990, and it was now called the 'Pentagonal.' Poland joined in 1991, and it was renamed the 'Hexagonal.' In 1992, the Central European Initiative was created, with 16 members by 2006. These attempts at cooperation have failed to produce any significant results and have not been able to solve the basic economic problems of the post-socialist countries, such as capital poverty and infrastructure backwardness. The Member States wishing to join have negotiated individually with the European Union. Hungary, along with 10 other countries, became a member of the European Union on May 1, 2004, in the largest enlargement process in the history of the EU.

In 1991, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland launched the so-called 'Visegrád Group,' the historical precursor of which was the meeting of the three Central European rulers in 1335. On March 2, 2017, the 'Visegrad Four,' which grew from three to four after Slovakia's independence, adopted a declaration that forms the basis for the closer cooperation between the 'V4' that still exists today. The 1992 idea of the internationally renowned founder of Central European cooperation is still relevant today: 'Central Europe today is not a reality, nor a utopia, but an alternative.' [65]

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[61] Konrád, 1988, p. 5.

[62] Hanák, 1988, p. 190.

[63] Hanák, 1993, p. 294.

[64] Illés, 2002.

[65] Hanák, 1993, p. 301.

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Chapter 3

Romanian Theories of Central European Integration

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ABSTRACT

Central Europe, especially Eastern Europe, has always been the geographic convergence point of several Great Powers that exercised their influence on the region regardless of the wishes of smaller states or national/ethnical groups. At the mid-19th century, the political equation changed, and the desire for a new regional order was emerging at the ethnic group or small nation level. Their elites proposed projects and lobbied for several political constructions that would advantage their nations and help them define their new political development with some kind of autonomy/independence. The nation states and political turmoil in the second part of the century launched several integration and political construction projects designed to reshape the face of Eastern Europe following a more realistic representation system. During the 1848 revolution, many political and intellectual elites tried to consolidate new political construction projects for the Romanian principalities or minorities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Central Europe became a place where the old order had reached its capabilities in managing and integrating the ethnic groups and nations in a satisfying way; imperial reflexes were no longer a solution for national inspirations. The Romanian principalities unification, the Ausglich, or the former Greek independence war, were just the tip of the iceberg of the need for political reshaping in Eastern Europe. In contrast, projects like the Danube Confederation were designed to secure autonomy and replace the old imperial approaches into a fragmented region. Mitteleurope and Eastern Europe became the central point of political debates, and the need for nations to secure their future became a significant issue on the political and cultural agenda. From the Romanian point of view, Popoviciu or Maiorescu's projects and ideas became the central point of the debate. This chapter is a chronicle of these efforts and ideas, the flow of intellectual work in the European space to reshape the Eastern European region according to the needs of small nations and ethnic groups.

KEYWORDS

federalization, Danube Confederation, Popovici, Ausglich, Mitteleuropa, Eastern Europe, national aspirations, Palacky, Densusianu

Introduction

Romania, as it emerged after the 1859 union of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, had the ambition to become the 'Belgium of the East.' The country was

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modernized late, hence the obsession to reduce the gap separating it from Western as well as nearby Central Europe. Moreover, the proximity of Transylvania—a significant proportion of which was inhabited by the Romanian population, and which was part of the Habsburg Empire until the 1867 Compromise (*Ausgleich*) when it was placed under Budapest's tutelage—provided those in the Old Kingdom of Romania an even stronger pretext for comparison. Transylvania was undergoing a rapid process of modernization in every sector (from industrialization and infrastructure to all levels of the education system), while the extra-Carpathian area seemed to have barely emerged from the Middle Ages. The reforms initiated by Alexandru-Ioan Cuza were implemented with great difficulty, sometimes incompletely, thus failing to considerably improve the people's living standards. Although the great estates (as well as the mid-sized ones) conferred on Romania the title of 'Europe's granary,' from a social perspective, the country was in the grip of neo-serfdom[1] while state-building seemed to reflect Titu Maiorescu's 'forms without substance.'[2]

In other words, Romania as it was born in 1859 was predominantly a rural country. It was just embarking on the path of modernization,[3] having a great number of poor and uneducated people and a small intellectual elite that chose Western Europe as a source of ideological inspiration. Thus, it is not surprising that for young Romanians, every study trip abroad was an opportunity to feel astonished but also to reflect on the realities that dominated their country of origin. In 1889, while on his way to Western Europe, Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, a future Professor at the University of Bucharest and proponent of the theory of Romanianism,[4] shared the following view in a letter to his father:

> We, Romanians, are so backward that whichever specialty I might choose, I will never be able to achieve anything of major importance [...] Iordache Golescu, even though he reflected on Romania's spiritual and material poverty, he was still a happy man because he believed that, through goodwill, the situation of Romanians could be improved. I do not believe this. I believe that we are destined to remain among the perpetually poor peoples. The wheel of fortune will never turn for us. Others, who opened their eyes to civilization before us, stole all our luck [...].[5]

The situation, however, did not improve significantly in the following period. At the turn of the century, there still was considerable talk in the Romanian cultural milieu of the superficial construction of the Romanian state and the mediocrity of many institutions, as they included few intellectuals, who were not among the ones with original ideas. However, there were also debates and a genuine desire to find solutions to improve the situation. For instance, the publication of Nicolae Iorga's three famous books *Opinions sincères* (1899), *Opinions pernicieuse* (1900), and *Cuvinte adevărate [True Words]* (1903),[6] which discuss customs, mentalities, institutions, and personalities, among others, was the result of this state of relative cultural backwardness. The books also represented a warning regarding the transplantation, through those superficially instructed abroad, of institutions that seemed at odds with the country's actual stage of development.

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[1] Dobrogeanu-Gherea, 1908, p. 498.

[2] Maiorescu, 1868, pp. 301–307. On this theory, see Schifirneț, 2002, pp. 121–139.

[3] In 1899, 81.2% of Romania's population (5,956,690) lived in rural areas, with only 18.8% in urban areas (16% in county seats, 2.8% in the other towns), with few regional disparities. Regarding education, 78% of the population was illiterate: 50.6% in urban areas, 84.5% in rural areas (Colescu, 1944, pp. 44–45, 109, 118).

[4] Rădulescu-Motru, 1936.

[5] Rădulescu-Motru, 1990, p. 40. On this aspect, see Nastasă, 2006.

For this reason, Romanian intellectuals—few as there were by the time—did not put forward state building and reform projects able to really mobilize a society that was, as mentioned above, disharmonious in many of its segments. Another reason may have been that the cultural values were either borrowed, mainly from the West and without fitting local conditions, or so-called 'traditional,' taken from the highly-idealized rural world. In fact, the reality was that the Romanian peasants were terribly poor and uneducated, their tradition being dominated by the values of a backward Orthodox Church that promoted superstitions and occult practices to excess, without the slightest care for the social needs of the poor and destitute.

These realities marked the evolution of the manner of thinking of Romanian intellectuals who were primarily interested in reducing these disparities, but who also reflected on projects that could ensure the country's advancement and build a state could support development. In this context, as early as the beginning of the 19th century, Romanians realized that their association with the East through dependency on the Ottoman Empire hindered their access to the benefits of modernization. Napoleon's troops had circulated in this area, as well as in all Central and Eastern Europe, the ideas of the French and American Revolution. However, some elements of progress imported through other channels had appeared here as early as the eighteenth century. For instance, the Phanariot prince Constantin Mavrocordat took inspiration from the administrative reforms introduced during the short-lived Austrian occupation of Oltenia (1718–38)[7] and from the Enlightenment, mainly of French origin. His name is also associated with the most comprehensive government program (February 7, 1740), which promoted reforms in almost every sector and was published in the summer of 1942 under the title 'Constitution' in *Mercure de France*. Mavrocordat was mentioned as 'Prince des deux Valachies et de Moldavie.'[8]

Moreover, this was a period when Romanians broke their cultural ties with the Slavic world and increasingly became associated with the Balkans, a geographic area dominated primarily by the Greeks, although the territory was under Ottoman rule. We would interpret this distancing as a sign of modernity. In this context, the

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[6] Iorga, 1899; Iorga, 1900; Iorga, 1903.

[7] Papacostea, 1998.

[8] Mercure de France, Paris, July 1742, pp. 1506–1525.

Romanians revived the old spirit of the Byzantium with its decisive influence over their culture, although sometimes this was intermediated by the South Slavs. In other words, the eighteenth century marked the integration of Moldavia and Wallachia—as 'borderlands' removed from the civilized world—into the Balkan-oriental world.[9] This happened mainly, but not exclusively, through the Phanariot rulers.[10] Gradually, however, due to the infusion of revolutionary ideas and the 'discovery' of Western Europe, Romanians started to perceive their belonging to the eastern part of the continent as the cause of their political and cultural backwardness. Thus, in the mid-nineteenth century historical context, the Romanians felt their association with the Balkans to be increasingly unpleasant.[11] Consequently, historians of this period included Romania in Southeastern Europe to highlight that it firmly belonged to the continent's civilization.[12]

Looking comparatively at the East and West, Romanians wanted to be culturally and ideologically attached to the latter through the indispensable link represented by Central Europe. Thus, not surprisingly, the Romanian society's evolution toward modernity was associated with several political and state models that would ensure security, self-assertion, economic and social progress, and so forth. Moreover, in the last quarter of the 19th century until the outbreak of the Great War, one can speak of a 'Transylvanian spirit' as a civilizing factor within the Romanian cultural milieux. In the interwar period, it actually became fashionable for certain well-known Romanian scholars to invent Transylvanian origins or relatives, as this meant an association with Central Europe and the Habsburg Empire. For instance, Mateiu I. Caragiale 'concocted' a birth certificate that indicated Tuşnad as his birthplace, even claiming that his mother was living in Vienna, while his estate was decorated with various Hungarian heraldic emblems and flags. Similarly, the literary critic George Călinescu claimed in a newspaper article that he was Transylvanian ('Eu sunt ardelean'/ I am a Transylvanian),[13] reflecting upon the many virtues of the people living on the other side of the Carpathians. Transylvanian ancestry had always been coveted by many intellectuals in the Old Kingdom of Romania, from those born in the heart of Moldavia (such as the poet Alexandru Vlahuţă) to those whose origins were lost in the mists of time, but who hoped or were certain to have the faintest connection with Transylvania as an area belonging to *Mitteleuropa*[14]—this Germanic-Habsburg matrix already assimilated into the 'West'—and as a source of civilization.

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[9] Boia, 2001, p. 11. See also Teodorova, 1997.

[10] See Pippidi, 1983. See also Papacostea-Danielopolu, 1979; Georgescu, 1980, pp. 87–290.

[11] See also the concept of 'Balkanization' having a profoundly negative meaning.

[12] In 1914, after the Balkan Wars, N. Iorga, together with the geographer Gh. Murgoci and the archaeologist V. Pârvan, founded an institute that for decades bore the name 'The Institute for South-east European Studies' and that still exists today (in 1963 it was merged with the Institute of Balkan Studies and Research founded in 1937).

[13] Tribuna poporului, I, 31/1944, (15 Oct.), p. 1 and 3.

[14] Nastasă, 2004, pp. 14–23.

In this context, one should point out the 'domination' that the *Weltsprachen* exercised over the extra-Carpathian area. Germany—along with France—served as a transmission belt for the high European spirituality.[15] Moreover, until the outbreak of the Great War, many Romanian students from the Monarchy and the Old Kingdom of Romania[16] viewed the Habsburg Empire as a very attractive destination. The latter was associated with the same German spirit that fascinated part of our intelligentsia, that is, the respect for order and discipline, rationalism, and thoroughness.

While around 1892/93 the Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga was more attracted to provincial Austria than to 'powdered and bureaucratized Vienna,'[17] a Romanian intellectual from Transylvania educated in the empire's capital found Viennese society in the years leading up to the Great War 'affable, friendly, hospitable and courteous toward all foreigners.' The latter were welcomed and 'provided with every comfort so as to gain these foreigners' admiration of Vienna and the Viennese.'[18] This image is closer to the real feelings of the Romanians and confirmed by a significant number of other travelers who visited the city, starting with Dinicu Golescu in the 1830s. He found everything 'exemplary'—the discipline of its citizens; functioning of public services; cleanliness, architecture, and urban planning; monuments; welfare and education systems; and so forth.[19]

1. Evolution over history

For many centuries, the great powers—from the Byzantine Empire, Holy Roman Empire, Venetian Republic, and Ottoman Empire to Russia in the nineteenth century—strove for hegemony over this area of the continent. Although the region included a significant number of Slavs, the ideology of Pan-Slavism never became prominent in the area. This does not mean, however, that Russia did not use this ideology to justify its expansionist ambitions, aiming to incorporate all Slavic peoples.[20] Furthermore, one should mention the constant tensions between Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism. Thus, it is not surprising that as early as 1843, Miklós Wesselényi proposed a constitutional and federal transformation of the Habsburg Empire and the creation of a German-French-English bloc to thwart Russian expansion.[21]

In these circumstances, fearing Pan-Slavism, the Romanian leaders of the 1848 Revolution proposed to the German National Assembly (*Nationalversammlung*) in Frankfurt am Main that all Romanian-inhabited territories should unite into a single autonomous state 'closely connected with Austria.' In other words, in the prevailing revolutionary turmoil, Romanians distinguished themselves as staunch supporters of the Habsburgs. Additionally, the idea of federalization became increasingly tempting following the events leading to the 1871 unification of Germany that thus became not only 'federal' but also a destabilizing factor in Central Europe.

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[15] Boia, 1985, pp. 51–69.

[16] Bauer, 2005, pp. 106–116.

[17] Iorga, 1984, p. 154.

[18] Cosma, 1922, pp. 1–2.

[19] Golescu, 1990, pp. 19–44. See also Ioncioaia, 1996, pp. 415–437.

[20] Kohn, 1960.

[21] Wesselényi, 1843, pp. 41–49.

Pan-Slavism or Pan-Russianism as a form of political centralization was also unacceptable to the Romanians living outside the Carpathian Arch, considering certain historical experiences that could not be overlooked. Thus, in 1848, the Transylvanian Ioan Maiorescu, who had been living in Wallachia since 1836, became the diplomatic agent of the provisional government in Bucharest accredited to the government in Vienna and to the Frankfurt Assembly. On September 24, 1848, Maiorescu submitted to Baron Heinrich von Gagern, president of the Frankfurt Assembly, a memo in which he proposed unifying Bukovina, Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania into a single kingdom ruled by an Austrian prince and under German suzerainty.[22] This was not an isolated case, given that in the same year, the Czech revolutionary František Palacký pointed out in a memo also sent to the Frankfurt Assembly that the state founded by the Habsburgs would be 'indispensable to the security of Europe and humanity. Honestly, if the Habsburg Empire did not exist, it should be invented in the interest of Europe, of humanity.'[23]

From then on, the sentence more accurately reflected the reality, given that the year 1848 highlighted more than ever not only the multinational structure of the Empire but also issues related to the coexistence of peoples, and confirmed the incompatibility between nationality and territoriality.[24] Basically, this explains why, since the early nineteenth century, relationships between these peoples were often contentious. We must consider the rhythms in which their national consciousness developed, rhythms that differed from one people to the other. In other words, to quote Bernard Michel's assertion, 'Central Europe's nations have never lived in the same century.'[25]

In this context, the idea of confederation or a dynastic union agitated the spirits of Romanian revolutionaries who, in the laboratories of the 'provisional government' in Bucharest, concocted a state-building project for Eastern Europe. This confederation of nationalities may have been, as Alexandru G. Golescu-Arăpilă wrote to Ștefan C. Golescu from Paris on September 18, 1848, that is, in the midst of the revolution, a response to 'Hungarian despotism': 'In spite of this, the issue is very simple: liberty for all, equality for all, this is the motto; federative unity, not Hungarian unity, this is the path ahead; a confederation of all nationalities in the East, this is the goal.'[26]

However, in the turmoil of that year, Nicolae Bălcescu, one of the leaders of the 1848 Revolution, subsequently advocated the idea of forging an alliance with the Hungarians. His proposal was supported by two other Romanian revolutionaries, Ioan

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[22] Barbu,1988, p. 425.
[23] Béhaur, 1991, p.106.
[24] Pasteur, 1996, p. 9.
[25] Michel, 1995, p. 261.
[26] Fotino, 1939, p. 189.

Ghica and Cezar Bolliac, the latter having the reputation of a fervent pro-Hungarian. Around 1850, this time from exile, the major figures of the Romanian revolution proposed creating an eastern confederation—the United Danube States—that would unite Romanians, Hungarians, South Slavs, perhaps the Czechs, and even North Italians and Greeks. In addition, in the summer of the same year, Bălcescu met Giuseppe Mazzini in London to discuss this project conceived with the help of his countrymen I. Ghica, D. Brătianu, and Al. Golescu-Arăpilă, as well as several Hungarians, Poles, Czechs, and others. Although Lajos Kossuth, the former leader of the 1848 Hungarian Revolution, was less than enthusiastic about the project, his countrymen László Teleky and György Klapka showed interest in it. In this context, in June 1851 G. Mazzini addressed a manifesto to the Romanians, which they subsequently translated into Romanian and printed in the Cyrillic alphabet for distribution in Moldavia and Wallachia.[27] In autumn of the same year, D. Brătianu expressed his conviction that 'a great Danube Confederation' will be established.[28] However, about a year later, I. Ghica changed his mind and viewed the idea of a 'confederation of national republics' as a 'utopia.'[29]

Later, after 1859, when the Oriental question was still timely in the context of the Franco-Italian-Austrian War, the idea of a Danube Confederation was discussed again during the negotiations between Al. I. Cuza and G. Klapka, on the one hand, and Camillo Cavour and Jérôme Bonaparte, on the other. The idea that circulated at the time was that of a confederation made up of three Danube states—Hungary, Serbia and Moldo-Wallachia—and founded on a Hungarian-Romanian convention adopted in Italy on May 22, 1859, and signed by Vasile Alecsandri for the Romanian side.[30] Thus, an attempt was being made to take advantage of the situation in Europe, underlining the opportuneness of a confederation previously designed by G. Klapka, who had introduced the idea of a 'protective federalism' of the small 'non-German' states against the influence of Russian expansion.[31]

Therefore, the project of a 'Danube Confederation' reflected the spirit of the time. Lajos Kossuth also advocated such a construct between 1852 and 1856, taking inspiration from American federalism. In his vision, this future regional federal structure made up of Hungary, Croatia, Romania, and Serbia would solve the national question.[32]

In other words, the ever-increasingly circulated key term for the cohesion between these apparently minor states was the Danube, the river that crosses a significant part of the European continent from west to east and on whose course several metropolises (Vienna, Bratislava, and Budapest) of vital importance for several states developed. Paradoxically, Romania's capital, Bucharest, is not built on this river, but neither is it very far from it.[33] Nevertheless, the term remained,[34] becoming topical once more at the end of the Great War through Oszkár Jászi's project to transform Austria-Hungary into a 'United Danube States,' a powerful supranational construct and a buffer between Russia and Germany.[35] Besides, Jászi was greatly interested in the national question in the Empire. Thus, he passionately advocated the federalist path as opposed to the disintegration of the Habsburg colossus, promoted reconciliation, and supported Friedrich Naumann's vision for *Mitteleuropa* (1915) and especially the idea of a Danube Confederation.[36]

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[27] For the text, see Marcu, 1930, pp. 44–50.
[28] See Ciorănescu, 1954, pp. 193–212.
[29] Georgescu-Tistu, 1935, p. 147.
[30] Urechia, 1894, pp. 7–8; Kossuth, 1880, pp. 236–238; Bossy, 1931, p. 47.
[31] Klapka, 1855, p. 177–178. For later, see Borsi-Kálmán, 1986, pp. 133–180.
[32] Kossuth, 1898, pp. 9–12.

Seemingly following Jászi's logic, in 1952, not long after the end of the Second World War and in a completely different historical context, the exiled Romanian jurist and diplomat Vespasian V. Pella proposed creating a system of partially superimposed associations, a Danube Union made up of Austria, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, together with a Balkan Union made up of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, which would also include Romania and Yugoslavia. The same year, however, Pella's project was refuted by another exiled jurist and diplomat, G. A. Pordea. Aiming to elucidate in his book the consequences of applying federalist principles in Eastern Europe, Pordea pointed out that the countries in this area differ from the western countries in two major aspects: a complex ethnic structure and the activism of the national sentiment. Obviously, his analysis focused mainly on Romania and the consequences of federal relationships with other European states given that Transylvania included a significant Hungarian minority. Therefore, he argued that implementing a federal system would jeopardize the unity and national character of the Romanian state.[37]

Thus, for more than a century, the idea of a confederation in which the Danube played a unifying role—only apparently and mainly from a terminological perspective—was obsessively reiterated. Returning to the nineteenth century, with the notable exception of the revolutionary year 1848, Romanian intellectuals only started to be seriously interested in the idea of Central European integration after the 1867 Compromise. This event was the source of great disappointment among the Slavs and Romanians, perhaps also because at that time, the idea of a vast East-Danube empire under Hungarian hegemony also circulated.[38]

Obviously, in the above-mentioned countries, the issue of integration into Central Europe was also discussed and reflected upon before 1867; however, not in a systematized form and in conformity with the modern principles of the state as it was in the second half of the nineteenth century. The Compromise provided Romanian intellectuals with the ideological support for designing and redesigning formulas of integration into a geographically defined political and state structure, but in an era of 'nationalities' and 'nationalisms,' which clearly complicated matters. In this context, given the diversity of the Habsburg Empire, federalism seemed a very attractive political project, although it also presented certain ambiguities and sometimes even aspects that jeopardized stability. Furthermore, different visions of federalism circulated: some imagining it as a constitutional construct in which authority was distributed between two or more layers of government, while others viewed it as a political system where power was divided between a center and regions.

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[33] In the 1980s, Nicolae Ceaușescu ordered the construction of a canal that would connect Bucharest with the Danube and, implicitly, the Black Sea.

[34] The concept of 'Donaumonarchie' (Danube Monarchy) for Habsburg rule also circulated in the 19th century (see Bled, 1989, pp. 9–10).

[35] Jászi, 1918.

[36] See Hanák, 1985; Litván, 2006.

[37] Pordea, 1952, p. 176.

[38] Marcu, 1936, p. 983.

At this point, the Romanian intellectuals in the Old Kingdom of Romania showed very little interest in formulas that envisioned their country's integration into a state structure that covered Central Europe.[39] In the years leading to the Great War, they were rather interested in the idea of a Balkan Federation, which we discuss below. In the second half of the 19th century, however, they were up to date with everything that happened in Central Europe. They were well-informed about and reflected on the analyses and theories of federalism and dynastic unions, elaborated by some thinkers in the region.

As regards the *Mitteleuropa* variant of the Habsburg Empire, it interested first and foremost the Transylvanian Romanian political leaders and intellectuals who were placed in an inferior position to the Hungarians after the 1867 Compromise. However, the Czechs also shared this ideal with the Romanians, especially given that Prague had once been the capital of the Holy German Empire. At that time, the optimal solution was Central-East European federalism based on the 'historical' and not 'national' criterion. In fact, most people in this area believed that the existence of the Habsburg Empire was the best guarantee of protection against German and Russian expansionism into Central Europe.

In truth, there were not really any viable alternatives to this idea of 'reforming' the Empire, given that, at that time, the advocates of federalism did not have the necessary support. In that context, the 1867 'dualism' was the result of a difficult decision, which then seemed like a 'realistic' and immediately achievable solution, even conforming to European interests. However, it was certainly the Compromise that later encouraged certain non-Hungarian and non-Austrian thinkers to come up with the project of a Central European Federation with Vienna as the capital. In other words, the ability to create a dualist state meant that it was also possible to go one step further toward a federal structure, in other words, an associative framework in which other nationalities could play a significant role and everything was individualized based on the national criterion. Therefore, there was an aspiration to transform the Empire from an autocratic state (*Zwangsmaschine*) into a multinational state (*Völkerstaat*).

Although the Compromise could have stimulated Romanians to rethink a potential state structure for Central Europe, the advanced proposals were timid, mostly unarticulated, and were rooted in their rivalry with the Hungarians. In this context, it is worth mentioning that in January 1868, a Romanian periodical suggestively called *Federațiunea* (The Federation) was first published in Budapest. Alexandru Roman was its editor-in-chief, and it appeared until 1876. As the name suggests, this periodical fervently supported the federalization of the Monarchy, the same as another Romanian gazette called *Tribuna* (The Tribune), which was otherwise perceived as pro-Habsburg.

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[39] For a geographical definition of Central Europe, see Kirschbaum, 2007, p. XIX.

In 1868, Nicolae Densușianu published in *Federațiunea* the serialized article entitled *Poporul român în federațiune* [*The Romanian Nation in a Federation*],[40] which, despite its prolixity and theoretical shortages, endeavors to establish the relationship between federalism and the national principle. For instance, while describing Romanians and Hungarians as 'neighboring peoples,' Densușianu maintains that only a 'federation' between these 'states and nations' 'will forever be the strongest guarantee for their future.'[41] Evidently, his arguments stem from the common history of the two nations, and their 'reconciliation' can only be achieved through a 'federation' that would also bring about 'a regeneration of the peoples under the House of Habsburg.'[42]

This period witnessed a growing number of projects on this subject.[43] At a public conference called *Sămănătorii de idei* and held on March 16. 1868, V. A. Urechia claimed: 'Hungarians and Bulgarians will be able to aspire to independence and to a future only if they draw culturally closer to the Romanians, only in union and in confederation with them.'[44] In 1871, while serving as Prime Minister, Count Karl Sigmund von Hohenwart attempted to introduce in Austria a federal system founded on historical rights and decisions taken in the empire's provinces, an idea founded on the principle of historical-political individuations. In fact, the project aimed at striking a deal with the Czechs, precisely to confer consistency to the Empire by establishing harmonious relations with the Slavs. Ultimately, however, the project could not be implemented, as von Hohenwart was forced to resign.[45] Even a polymath like Nikolai I. Danielevski, who was also Pan-Slav activist, elaborated as early as 1869 a project for federalization of Central and Southeast Europe under Russia's authority, which achieved wider dissemination only in 1871.[46]

In 1871, Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Andrássy, who remained in office until November 14 that year and was subsequently appointed imperial minister of foreign affairs, proposed transforming the Ottoman Empire into a German-style confederation that would also include Romania. The Romanian prime minister, Lascăr Catargiu, agreed in theory to the proposal but demanded that Greece should not be included. Soon, however, the Romanian government abandoned the idea of turning the country into a Romanian Bavaria within a Turkish Prussia, especially given that the Serbs were also reluctant about Andrássy's project.[47]

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[40] Densusianu, 1868, pp. 449–450, 454–455; 122, 123, pp. 481–482 and 487–488.

[41] *Federațiunea*, I, 114/1868, p. 449.

[42] Ibid. issue 122, p. 482; issue 123, p. 487.

[43] See Mérei, 1965.

[44] Urechia, 1878, pp. 226–227.

[45] Buchsel, 1941.

[46] Meneghello-Dincic, 1958, p. 309.

Even Archduke Rudolf, heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian crown, together with his entourage, supported the idea of federalism and the existence of a great Austrian state. The reorganization envisaged creating a supranational state, a Greater Austria, that would have included a Greater Serbia, Greater Romania, and Greater Poland, respecting at the same time the rights of the Hungarian nation. The Archduke's premature death in 1889, however, put an end to this project.[48]

2. Popovici's project

In this context, the first coherently articulated Romanian project on integration into Central Europe was elaborated by Aurel C. Popovici (1863–1917) in 1906. Born in Lugoj—a town in the region of Banat, which came under Hungarian rule after the 1867 Compromise—Popovici pursued his secondary studies in Brașov and Beiuș and then enrolled in the Faculty of Medicine in Vienna. However, due to his heavy involvement in the political struggle of the Romanians in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Popovici neglected his academic studies even after he moved to Graz, consequently never completing them.

As a matter of fact, in the second half of the 19th century, many Romanian students in Vienna remained captive in their ethnic 'community,' organized in a society called 'România Jună' [Young Romania]. Because of their nationalism, they were unable to enjoy and take advantage of the fabulous intellectual atmosphere of this metropolis at the turn of the century.[49] While Jews and Czechs, for instance, had greatly benefited from and even contributed to the Viennese cultural boom, Romanians seemed to refuse to come out of their shell, being preoccupied with trivial and culturally narrow-minded matters, such as nationalism. They were basically engrossed in ideology and politics, often getting into fights over these issues. Therefore, Romanians in Vienna showed discord even among themselves, being torn by fierce political passions.

This is the context in which Popovici became one of the signatories of the 1892 Memorandum, for which he was tried and sentenced to four years in prison. Without going into details, we should mention, however, that the Memorandum caused a serious rift not only between Romanians and Hungarians but also among Romanians, given that this document was not the product of a majority and not all signatories were viewed by their compatriots as representative of their nation. As a matter of fact, with few exceptions, some of the signatories became famous only through their association with the Memorandum. This was also why the emperor refused to meet the Romanian delegation in Vienna in May 1892. The Viennese authorities, politicians, and press all distanced themselves from the signatories of the document. Not even the Romanian deputies in Bukovina showed any support for them.

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[47] Iorga, 1916, pp. 124–125.

[48] Bled, 2006.

[49] Schorske, 1980.

After his trial in 1894, Popovici left Transylvania and went into exile in Bucharest. In 1912, he moved to Vienna, and after the outbreak of the Great War, he took refuge in Geneva where he died on February 9, 1917.[50] In the context of the political struggles within the Romanian community in the Empire, Popovici distinguished himself as an ardent supporter and promoter of Central European federalism as well as nationalism and anti-Semitism.[51] He actually started to argue in favor of federalism as early as 1894, but only with regard to Hungary, in his book *Chestiunea naționalităților și modurile soluționării sale în Transilvania și Ungaria*[52] [*The Nationality Question and the Ways to Solve It in Transylvania and Hungary*], nationalism thus becoming a political instrument.[53]

Apart from the radical Romanian nationalists, there were also others, such as C. Brediceanu, Vincențiu Babeș, and Al. Mocioni, who pleaded for harmonization of the Hungarian and Romanian objectives. In their view, Romanians should look for a solution in Budapest, not Vienna. There even circulated the political concept of 'Romanian-Hungarian Dualism,' elaborated by Babeș in 1891, which further infuriated Romanian nationalists. In this context, Babeș, who acted as president of the Romanian National Party in Transylvania in 1891-92,[54] proposed Popovici as chief editor of the periodical *Luminătorul* in December 1891, but strong opposition put an end to this idea. For instance, Corneliu Diaconovici, while praising Popovici as a cultivated individual, maintained that the publication should not be entrusted to someone who had received his education in 'cafes' and had 'his head in the clouds,' which could potentially cause problems.[55]

Although late compared to other 'federalist' contributions, Popovici's 1906 project seems to encapsulate the various reorganization plans of the Empire, systematizing at the same time all the previous ideological contributions in this respect. In this context, the book that would bring him renown, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Groß-Österreich,*[56] follows the reasoning of František Palacký, whom he quotes generously and who had proposed as early as 1848 creating a federal Austria based on the national criterion and on equality among all ethnic communities and religious denominations. Essentially, at the turn of the century, federalization seemed the most viable solution for Central Europe, especially given that the 1867 Compromise had proven that a confederate alliance was very much possible.[57] As a matter of fact, the Romanian Prime Minister D. A. Sturdza, in a discourse held in Iași on October 13, 1895, argued: 'the

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[50] For further details, see Crișan, 2008.
[51] Neumann, 2002, pp. 864–897.
[52] Popovici, 1894.
[53] On this aspect, see Tănăsescu, 2017, pp. 439–461.
[54] Cipăianu, 2015.
[55] Polverejan and Cordoș, 1973, pp. 187–188.
[56] Popovici, 1906, p. 427.
[57] See Leoncini, 2007, pp. 23–31.

Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as it is made up, is a necessity of the utmost importance for the balance of power in Europe and for the security of our kingdom.'[58]

In his book, Popovici proposed reorganizing the Austro-Hungarian Empire based on the nationality principle. In his opinion, nationality was at that time the only criterion able to organize state formations.[59] Unlike other similar goals, such as securing peace and freedom of economic exchanges, Popovici's goal was the political self-assertion of the Romanian nation within the Empire. In fact, Romanians—who believed that they were prevented from politically asserting themselves—wanted first and foremost to become unshackled from the Hungarian 'oppressor.' Thus, Popovici positioned himself in opposition to the 'historical federalism' or aristocratic federalism to which emperor Franz Josef had intended to return through his Diploma of October 20, 1860, which marked the end of neo-absolutism and the beginning of constitutional government.[60] The same year, one of Popovici's compatriots, Vincențiu Babeș, also rejected federalism founded on the autonomy of historical provinces, arguing that it must be founded on national autonomy instead.

In short, Popovici's project envisioned transforming Austria into a federal state founded on national, not 'historical,' individualities. Essentially, he proposed creating fifteen autonomous territorial units of a federal parliament, a common army, customs union, and so forth. Furthermore, each territorial unit—headed by a governor appointed by the emperor—was supposed to coincide with national and linguistic boundaries and have its own official language, although German would be the Empire's official language, spoken by everybody. In other words, given that each nationality had its own aspirations (which many times did not coincide with those of other nationalities), Popovici proposed renouncing the invocation of history, abolishing Dualism, and creating Greater Austria based on the dynastic principle, military force, and national federalism.[61] As a result, the peoples of the Empire would remain attached to Austria due to the existence of a community of interests. In addition, Popovici's solution thus called into question the domination of Hungarians over the other nationalities in Transylvania.

Popovici's ethnic federalism, namely his federation of nations founded on national autonomy, was in opposition with the historical federalism supported by the Austro-Marxists Karl Renner and Otto Bauer and founded on 'personal autonomy' within the Empire. This meant that the nationalities were organized not based on territorial principles, but as an 'association' between individuals.[62] In other words, the Empire had to be preserved but by means of its transformation from a hegemonic structure of national and social submission into a federation of national and cultural groups. In this federation, the various ethnic groups were not subordinated to one another, but coexisted within a pluralistic structure. Popovici's book thus 'contributed decisively' to neo-conservative theory.[63]

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[58] Maiorescu, 1915, pp. 9, 138.

[59] Popovici, 2010, p. 313 [Chapter IV. *Federalism and the decline of the empires*].

[60] Malfér, 2010, pp. 95–120.

[61] Popovici, 1997, pp. 21–22.

[62] Renner, 1906; Bauer, 1907.

From another perspective, the United States of Austria was situated somewhere between Russian federalism and the German Confederation. Thus, the Austro-Hungarian Empire's federalism would have guaranteed the conservation of all its nationalities, from the Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, Czechs, Romanians, and Slovaks to Ruthenians, Saxons, and Szeklers. However, Popovici showed little interest in the small ethnic enclaves, such as the Szeklers, Saxons, Swabians, and so forth, as they were, in his opinion, meant to disappear with the development of big industry.

We will not make any critical observations on Popovici's conception of federalism at this point, given that he was not alone in the Empire in thinking this way. However, the models he invoked (The United States of America and Switzerland) had no relevance to his proposal, as both these federal states were political rather than national constructs. In contrast, although Popovici displays in his book a certain degree of verbal aggressiveness, prolixly supporting the firm authority of the state, but not decentralization, he demonstrates a firm grasp on the concepts of *Bundestaat* (federal state) and *Staatenbund* (confederation of states), considering the former the best option.

There have been several unsupported claims that the Austrian Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand was enthused by Popovici's project. It is true, however, that the prince had been a staunch supporter of the Empire's federal reorganization long before Popovici's book was published. Let us not forget that, as early as 1849, the Czech František Palacký had drawn up a federative program that attributed a major redemptive role to Austria. However, while Palacký perceived the Empire from the perspective of ethno-cultural groups as a state that respected national individualities, including citizens' rights, Franz Ferdinand envisaged a construction mainly founded on administrative criteria. It meant a sort of disintegration of the colossus that would have diminished civic participation in decision-making, even though it seemingly allowed for wide local autonomies. Another reason the Archduke supported this was because he hoped for a future mixture of nationalities and their ultimate assimilation, namely Germanization.[64] Popovici's project, on the other hand, aimed to protect Romanians against Magyarization, but not so that they could be Germanized.

There were too many who deluded themselves by attributing to Franz Ferdinand the title of great reformer of the Empire,[65] but he let everyone believe this. It was rather his alleged anti-Hungarian attitude that enthused Romanians and the Slavic nationalities, letting them all believe that he had in mind a federal Austria, that is, a 'Greater Austria,' and that he even shared the trialist, federal-trialist, or trialist-federal ideas. In fact, the Archduke was not anti-Hungarian, but wanted greater equality among the nationalities of the Empire. Besides, he never embraced any of the projects aiming to reform the Monarchy, including Popovici's.

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[63] Nemoianu, 1989, pp. 31–42.
[64] Skowronek, 2017.
[65] See Bled, 2013.

In addition, there have been claims that Popovici was 'close' to Franz Ferdinand, being a member of the so-called 'Belvedere Circle.' In fact, Popovici never joined this organization in which Romanians were noticeably underrepresented. Nonetheless, his book caught the attention of some who were in the Archduke's inner circle. Alexandru Vaida-Voevod was the first Romanian co-opted to the 'Belvedere Circle'—a sort of political cabinet of the Archduke.[66] He was later joined by five other compatriots. In any case, Romanians formed the smallest group of collaborators—which included, among others, the hierarchs Miron Cristea, Augustin Bunea, and Demetriu Radu, the Greek-Catholic Bishop of Oradea—compared to the other nationalities, such as the Poles, Hungarians, Croats, Serbs, Slovaks, Ruthenians, Albanians, and so forth, who were represented by prominent figures like Ottokar Czernin, Milan Hodza, Conrad von Hötzendorf, and József Kristóffy, as well as some minor ones.

In this context and given that all the various testimonies are second hand, Popovici's so-called 'audiences' with Franz Ferdinand are debatable. However, we know that in late February 1906, soon after his book was published, Popovici met with Vaida-Voevod and Teodor Mihali in Vienna where they were received in audience by Maximilian Beck, who at that time acted as the legal adviser of Franz Ferdinand and later as Prime Minister of Austria. After expounding upon the federalist project, they asked Beck to present it to the Archduke.[67] It appears that he was first received in audience by the Archduke in Vienna in February 1907.[68] The second audience—which included other proponents of the federalist idea, such as Vaida-Voevod, Iuliu Maniu, and others—occurred during the Archduke's visit to Sinaia in the summer of 1909[69] and caused an uproar in the Hungarian press.[70] A third and final audience, which included Vaida-Voevod and during which they discussed a potential Romanian-Hungarian 'reconciliation' proposed by Count Tisza,[71] took place on February 16, 1914. In the autumn of the same year, while in Vienna, Popovici allegedly told Bernfeld-Burnea that he was 'totally opposed to Romania's entry into Transylvania.'[72]

Without bringing any major theoretical contribution to the concept of federalism, Popovici's construct was supported by several Transylvanian Romanian political leaders such as I. Maniu, Al. Vaida-Voevod, and Vasile Goldiș—who would play major political roles in interwar Romania—as well as by hierarchs such as Teodor Mihali, Aug. Bunea, M. Cristea, and D. Radu.[73] Furthermore, a small group of federalist Transylvanian Romanians living in Vienna, among them Sterie Ciurcu and Lazăr Popovici, also supported Popovici's thesis. The significance of the latter's endeavor resides in the context in which he wrote his book, that is, against the backdrop of the deepening political crisis between Vienna and Budapest, when even dualism was challenged, and of the intensification of Magyarization in Hungary, which prompted Romanian leaders in Transylvania to increase their activism. Consequently, the Romanian National Party almost doubled its representation in the Budapest Parliament from 8 seats in 1905 to 15 in 1906.

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[66] See Williamson Jr., 1974, pp. 417–434.
[67] Maior, 1993, pp. 95–97.
[68] Crișan, 2008, p. 223.
[69] Mândruț, 1994, p. 297.
[70] Crișan, 2008, pp. 224–225.
[71] Vaida-Voevod, 1995–1996, pp. 307–316.
[72] Marghiloman, 1927, p. 353.
[73] Mândruț, 1994, p. 296.

Vaida-Voevod, one of the most active deputies in the Budapest Parliament, publicly supported Popovici's federalist project, and both distinguished themselves by their virulent anti-Semitism. Therefore, it is not surprising that Vaida-Voevod supported Karl Lueger, president of the Austrian Social-Christian Party and participated in the latter's campaign for the mayor's office in Vienna. In this context, it should be noted that Popovici's book aroused great interest in Leuger's party, which, shortly after its congress in September 1905, proclaimed the necessity of federalization.[74] Therefore, given the way he elaborated his project and that his book was well received, especially in the social-Christian press, the *Wiener Reichspost,* Popovici 'became the theoretician of right-wing federalists.'[75]

Furthermore, Vaida-Voevod mentioned Popovici's federalist formula in many of the articles that he published in Austrian newspapers and magazines as well as in the Romanian paper *Lupta* [*The Struggle*], promoting and defending it whenever necessary. At the same time, he endeavored to gain the support of Franz Ferdinand, attributing acceptance of federalism to him. There were actually quite a few people in the Archduke's entourage, especially social-Christians, who defended Popovici's theses.

For instance, in December 1911, two other members of the 'Belvedere Circle,' the Romanian Iuliu Maniu and the Slovak Milan Hodža, submitted a memorandum to Archduke Franz Ferdinand. In the memorandum, they emphasized the need to transform the Monarchy into a great and inclusive area integrated from an economic and political perspective, thus going beyond the dualist structure. From their perspective, this was the only option under which the Empire would remain among the great powers.[76] Hodža, who was a moderate, would later promote the federal organization of Central Europe in a book he published in 1942, which discusses this issue from a historical and political perspective.[77]

In contrast, there were only a few mentions and short presentations of Popovici's book in Transylvania. The poet and politician Octavian Goga, for instance, took an anti-federalist stance, and V. Goldiş broke with Popovici's federalist theories in early 1907. In Romania, although the book's publication was financed by D. A. Sturdza's[78] government, few intellectuals and politicians showed any enthusiasm for it. The liberal politician Ion I. C. Brătianu, who had a somewhat cautious attitude, was not fully opposed to it, while the conservative Take Ionescu voiced his skepticism regarding resolution of the crisis that affected the Austro-Hungarian Empire, being convinced that someday it would disintegrate.

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[74] Geehr, 1993.

[75] Graur, 1935, p. 221.

[76] Leoncini, 2007, p. 27.

[77] Hodža, 1942. See also Mûdry-Šebik, 1968, pp. 1547–1554; Hiroshi, 2012, pp. 35–51.

[78] Graur, 1935, p. 222.

Although upon first reading, Constantin Stere appears to dismiss Popovici's book, which shows such great concern for 'our old Habsburg empire' where everybody is displeased and each 'nationality' formulates its own reform program without consideration for the others,[79] upon closer reading we notice that he takes the critique of this book—which a Viennese gazette called 'das grundlegende Werk' (fundamental work)—very seriously, describing it as 'loyal and moderate.'[80] The ideologue of 'Poporanism' (Populism) also believed that the Empire had to be reorganized to survive and become 'a centre for the crystallisation of the cultural and political life of all peoples living in the Danube Valley and the Balkans.' However, Stere disagreed with Popovici's opinion that the Empire was 'indispensable to Europe's life and healthy political evolution' because he—like Popovici—asked himself: 'Would a federal Austria be more viable if Russia became a constitutional state that would grant wide autonomy to its various nationalities?'[81]

Petru P. Carp and Titu Maiorescu expressed a favorable opinion of the overall approach of Popovici's book, as did Barbu Ștefănescu-Delavrancea and especially Nicolae Filipescu and Alexandru Marghiloman, together with their political partisans. The latter noted in his political journal that Filipescu agreed with Maiorescu's older project 'which dreamed of a Romania under the Crown of Austria.'[82] Additionally, Ottokar Czernin attributed a variant of trialism to Filipescu that envisioned Romania's union with Transylvania and, together with Austria, establishing a state that mirrored the relationship between Bavaria and the German Empire.[83] Not least, King Carol I of Romania also appreciated Popovici's book and used it to have a firmer grasp on the situation in Transylvania, especially on the relationships among Romanian politicians there.[84]

3. Popovici's legacy and the post-world war years

However, following the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, the federalism imagined by A. C. Popovici became obsolete. It was only within the political context of the late 1930s that his book seemed to regain its topicality, especially through the valorization of his nationalistic vision and, obviously, through the rediscovery of his 'project' on the United States of Austria. In addition, considering that the 1930s were marked by strong anti-Semitism, there was also a reactivation of his aggressive anti-Semitic discourse, which he promoted during his exile in Romania, and which extolled the virtues of Christianity, mainly those of Orthodoxy.[85]

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[79] In *Viața Românească,* I, 1/1906, p. 171.

[80] Ibid. no.2, p. 325.

[81] Ibidem, p. 324.

[82] Marghiloman, 1927, *Note politice, 1897–1924,* vol. I (1897–1915), p.87 (entry of November 22, 1911).

[83] See Filipescu, 1925; Graur, 1935, p. 244.

[84] Marghiloman, 1927, *Note politice, 1897–1924,* vol. I (1897–1915), p. 89.

In Bukovina, Romanian activists generally held federalist or autonomist views. The federalist camp was headed by Alexandru Petrino and included other prominent figures such as Gheorghe Hurmuzachi, Ioan Mustață, and Gheorghe Flondor. For a short while, between April and December 1872, there was also a Society of National Autonomists (Societatea Autonomiștilor Naționali). Its mouthpiece was the paper *Der Patriot*, and its doctrine was known as the *Bukowinerthum* (Bukovinian Doctrine), which promoted establishing closer ties with Vienna.[86] Subsequently, from 1902 to 1903, first in Vienna and Brünn, and then in Chernivtsi, Aurel Onciul printed the gazette *Privitorul* [*The Observer*], which promoted, among other things, unifying Romania with Austria.[87]

In Bukovina, George Grigorovici—as leader of the Romanian Social Democratic Party in Austria and a twice-elected deputy in the Vienna Parliament (1907 and 1911)[88]—also presented a project to transform the dual Monarchy into a federal state based on the nationality principle rather than nationalism, which he rejected. Furthermore, Grigorovici also had in mind creating a Greater Romania, but from a federalist perspective.[89] Therefore, it is not a surprise that, in 1923 during the debates on Romania's Constitution, he submitted a project for the federal organization of the new state established shortly after the Great War.[90]

Although he never proposed a project for integration into or the (re)organization of Central Europe, we should also mention Eugen Ehrlich due to his complex and detailed analysis of the downfall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Together with Émile Durkheim and Max Weber, Ehrlich is considered one of the founders of the sociology of law. His book oeuvre—especially his book *Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts* (Leipzig, 1913)—is highly valued.[91] Born into a Jewish family in Chernivtsi in 1862, Ehrlich was invited to teach at the University of Vienna as a visiting professor; beginning in 1900, he became a tenured Professor at the University of Chernivtsi, where he also acted as a university Rector from 1906 to 1907. He was one of the most prominent representatives of the Austrian Free Law School. One of Ehrlich's most celebrated disciples was the 'spontaneist' Friedrich von Hayek, who was openly hostile to Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud; Hayek received the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1974 and promoted the concept of 'open society.'

After the union of Bukovina with Romania in 1918, Ehrlich wanted very much to stay at the now-Romanian university in Chernivtsi. To this end, he contacted not only the Ministry of Education in Bucharest but also several prominent members of the Romanian academic milieu, especially N. Iorga and Dimitrie Gusti. The latter published several articles by Ehrlich in his journal *Arhiva pentru ştiinţă şi reformă socială* [*The Archive for Science and Social Reform*]. One of the articles, *Sfârşitul unei mari împărăţii* [*The End of a Great Empire*],[92] deserves special mention due to its thorough analysis of the downfall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Without going into detail, Ehrlich perceived dualism as 'an unfortunate construct' and argued that the history of Austria is 'to a certain degree, the history of missed opportunities.' He further claimed that Austria's failure stemmed from an absolutism tempered by indifference: an empire suffocated by highly experienced, slow, and venal bureaucrats, more accurately depicted by Kafka than by Karl Kraus.[93] It is not fortuitous that Ehrlich rediscovered the dichotomy *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaf* in an empire where many thinkers reflected on its reorganization, but with no redeeming results. Finally, Ehrlich reproached Hungary for maintaining a certain degree of cultural and linguistic isolation within the Dual Monarchy, that is, for her famous *délibáb*, which had not only literary but also political connotations. Regarding the latter connotations, William M. Johnston argued that 'readiness to see the world through rose-colored glasses induced Magyars to exaggerate their grandeur, while they ignored the misery of subject peoples.'[94]

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[85] See, for instance, Nandriș, 1937, p. 38.
[86] Olaru, 2002.
[87] See Iorga, 1922, p. 156.
[88] Russindilar, 1998.
[89] Brătuleanu, 2012, pp. 435–447.
[90] Ciorănescu and Penelea-Filitti, 1996, pp. 65–69.
[91] For further details, see Rehbinder, 1986.

Regarding the subject of this chapter—ideas of integration into a powerful Central European state—we should also mention Constantin Dumba's contribution. Born into an Aromanian family, Dumba was a great landowner in Romania and had an outstanding diplomatic career in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.[95] As a staunch supporter of Transylvanian Romanians, he was opposed to the trialist project drawn up by the Marxist theoretician Karl Kautsky in 1917.[96] The latter argued that, apart from the union between Austria and Hungary, a third state made up of Dalmatia, Bosnia, parts of Serbian-inhabited southern Hungary, and Croatia should be created within this federation. Dumba, who had been Ambassador to the Kingdom of Serbia between 1903 and 1905, argued that the constant state of conflict between Serbs and Hungarians would only weaken the Empire. In his view, the reorganization of the state should be carried out in such a way that it would temper the xenophobia of the various nationalities across the Empire, whose national movements demanded its disintegration and the creation of nation-states on its ruins. His opinions were also considered because he was the nephew of Nicolae Dumba, a very wealthy individual who lived in Vienna, and a friend of Emperor Franz Josef.

Relevant among the Central European integration projects is also the idea of a Balkan Federation; this circulated with greater intensity in the years leading up to the Great War and stemmed from the new political reality created in the region by

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[92] Ehrlich, 1921, pp. 80–124.

[93] See Le Rider, 2018.

[94] Johnston, 1983, p. 347.

[95] Dumba, 1932.

[96] Kautsky, 1917.

Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the autumn of 1908.[97] This idea was actually older and closely connected with the aspirations for independence of the most important ethno-cultural groups living in the Ottoman Empire. However, it became topical again in the second half of 1908, also fueled by the Young Turk Revolution. This movement gave hope for the creation of a Balkan Federation that would also include a constitutional Turkey.

In this context, Cristian Rakovski, a left-wing ideologue Romanian citizen and a supporter of the Young Turk Revolution, promoted the idea of a Balkan Confederation that would include Turkey, Romania, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro. Since it concerned areas that were ethnically not clearly delineated, Rakovski hoped that the peoples' nationalisms, which stemmed from their struggle for independence from the Turks, would relieve the obstacles. Although Bosnia-Herzegovina's annexation by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in October 1908 considerably diminished the enthusiasm, the idea would resurface on several occasions. For instance, in the summer of 1915, at a conference held in Bucharest, Rakovski insisted on the idea of a federation, maintaining that such an organizational form would serve as a guarantee against Russian expansionism and as a vehicle for the independent development and progress of Balkan countries.[98] Furthermore, his idea would be re-discussed on the eve of the Second World War when, following the 1938 *Anschluss*, it appeared logical that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Turkey, and Romania 'create a Balkan Confederation with its capital city in Bucharest.'[99]

4. Conclusions

In conclusion, we find it challenging to define the term integration,[100] which we have only discussed as forming a new political and state system. We consider it only in that this political dimension could also suggest additional topics for analysis that have been unfortunately neglected by historiography. Furthermore, the few Romanian intellectuals who reflected on this issue kept bringing it into discussions of the link between integration and the dissolution of national authority in the Central European region, how traditional government structures could be replaced with new types of institutions and new forms of authority, and so forth.

We note, however, that the Great War put an end to the idea of Central European integration centered around Vienna through the disintegration of a construct that for centuries seemed to confer stability on the region and the creation of a 'Europe of nationalities' represented by the so-called 'nation-states' (although the victorious powers ultimately ignored the geographic distribution of East-European populations).

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[97] See Perivolaropoulou, 1994, pp. 29–35.

[98] Damianova, 1989, pp. 27–31.

[99] Grofșorean, 1938, p. 76.

[100] See Rosamond, 2000, pp. 12–14.

In fact, as became obvious two decades later, this planted the seeds of another world conflagration. Furthermore, as a paradox, the Second World War generated the firm project of European unification that succeeded the projects of Central European integration and aimed to ensure peace and block and eradicate any pretext for war.[101] The way the Treaty of Versailles attempted to solve Europe's problems, especially those of Central Europe, contributed to exacerbating interwar nationalisms, which ultimately led to the most tragic consequence of World War II: the Holocaust. These extreme nationalisms were quite different from the 19th century 'nationalisms' in that they incited racial hatred and caused the unimaginable horrors of the conflagration.

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[101] Schwok, 2016.

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| CHAPTER 4 |

Croatian Concepts of Integration

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ABSTRACT

The administrative fragmentation of historical and ethnic ‘Croatian lands’ in the Habsburg Monarchy and the insufficient political power of the Croats affected the formation of diverse Croatian national integration ideologies in the ‘long 19th century’. The Yugoslav concept influenced the South Slavic unification in 1918, but experience with the unitary state under Serbian domination led to demands for an autonomous Croatian unit or independent state. The provisory Croatian autonomy of 1939–1941 and excessive fascist state between 1941–1945 were replaced by the autocratic crypto-centralist communist federation. The federation provided for constitutional autonomy of the republics and nations, but, in the end, endangered Croatia’s territorial integrity. The establishment of the Croatian state in 1991 was understood not only as a way out of this situation but also as an ‘escape from the Balkans’ and ‘re-integration’ into Central and Western Europe.

KEYWORDS

Croatian national integration, Croatian state-building, Croatian nation-building, Yugoslavia, dissolution of Yugoslavia

Introduction

The process of building a modern Croatian nation was marked first by the fact that all countries that were considered ‘Croatian lands’ by historical and/or ethnic criteria were encompassed in the Habsburg Monarchy in the period between 1797 and 1918.[1] Second, through all that time, the Croatian people remained divided in different administrative areas of the Monarchy. The center of the Croatian national integration policy was based in the Kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia, whose autonomous positions enabled the conception and, in part, implementation of integration policies. The Kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia were in a way ‘residuum’ of the medieval Croatian Kingdom that was associated with the Kingdom of Hungary in 1102. These

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[1] In 1797, the Habsburg Monarchy gained the former Venetian Republic’s territory from south of Trieste to the Budua, with a mostly ethnic Croatian population. These areas were organized as crown lands, the Kingdom of Dalmatia and Istria, and made part of Cisleithenia.

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were the grounds on which Dalmatia's accession to the Monarchy in 1797 was followed by introducing the official use of 'the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia' as the country's name. The Croatian political elite expected the King to join this Croatian medieval region with Croatia-Slavonia, but this was postponed indefinitely. Since the 1840s, the alternative name 'Triune Kingdom' came into conventional political use, stressing the political integrity of the projected 'national territory'.

The primary goals of the Croatian national integration policy until 1918 were to reintegrate the Croatian-Slavonian Military Frontier into the civil order of Croatia-Slavonia (which was done by 1881), unify Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia (with Dubrovnik and the Bay of Kotor), and annex Rijeka (*Fiume*) to Croatia-Slavonia.[2] Secondary interest was paid to the predominantly ethnic Croatian Međimurje (Muraköz) and the western coast of Istria, as well as to the rest of that ethnically predominant Croatian peninsula, and, since 1878, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The content of the Croatian national integration ideologies that were shaped in such a complex environment ranged from broader integrative frameworks to the idea of a Greater Croatia. Yet, it was the concept of South Slavic unification, realized in 1918 in the dialectic of historical determinism and contingency, that basically determined the framework in which Croatian national interests pulsated until 1991.

1. Concepts of integration in the long 19th century

1.1. Early integration ideas

The year 1790 in the Habsburg Monarchy was marked by the end of the absolutism of Joseph II, from which the Croatian-Slavonian nobility, members of feudal *natio Croatica*, learned that due to their economic backwardness and immature political organization, they alone could not defend themselves from Habsburg centralism. Therefore, in 1790–1791, the Croatian-Slavonian Diet transferred part of its competencies to the Hungarian government to strengthen the defense of common interests while maintaining autonomy. However, this framework soon became grounds for imposing the concept of a single Hungarian political nation and Hungarian as Croatia-Slavonia's official language. The members of the Croatian feudal elite and young bourgeoisie responded to this challenge by emphasizing the nation as a linguistic-cultural community and the framework for bridging over particular regional identities.[3]

This transition from the protonational phase to the early phase of Croatian nation-building was marked by the influence of the then dominant theory of the common Illyrian origin of the peoples from the Alps to the Black Sea, followed by the demand to create a Greater Illyria.[4] The Illyrian name actually included Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, and Bulgarians. The Serbs and Slovenes did not accept the Illyrian name, while the Bulgarians were too far, so Illyrianism became a framework for developing a common Croatian national consciousness. After the King's ban on using the Illyrian name in 1843, Illyrianism was replaced by the South-Slavic name, with the promotion of Croatian unification as part of the unification of the South Slavs advocated by the National Party, the former Illyrian Party.

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[2] The Croatian-Slavonian Military Frontier was the part of Croatia-Slavonia bordering the Ottoman Empire that was subjected to the Vienna Court's military administration in 1578, and gradually returned to Croatia-Slavonia from the 18th century to 1881. Maria Theresa 'returned' Rijeka (*Fiume*) to Croatia-Slavonia in 1767, but in 1779, put it under the administration of the Hungarian government as a separate autonomous area.

[3] Stančić, 2008, pp. 114–120.

The second integration concept at that time was advocated by the Croatian-Hungarian Party. It emphasized the idea of an unconditional Croatian-Hungarian alliance based on traditional links. This party derived the Croatian national identity on a regional basis, directing its activity only toward Croatia and Slavonia.[5]

In 1848, politicians from the National Party accepted the idea of Austro-Slavism, which saw the Habsburg Monarchy as the framework for realizing the interests of its Slavic members, who began to form a series of ethnic groups. In this spirit, the Croatian-Slavonian Diet in 1848 accepted the plan of an Austrian federation in which Croatia-Slavonia would be one of the 'federal' units, based on its natural and historical right to self-government. It would then enter the alliance based on the linguistic-national principle, with Vojvodina and the lands with Slovenian population.[6]

The Pan-Slavic movement, which looked toward the powerful Slavic Russia as the leader of the Slavic peoples, also gained some popularity, but the influence of such ideas weakened due to the imperialist tendencies manifested in Russian foreign policy.

1.2. Formation of the main Croatian national integration ideologies

The early Croatian nationalism up to 1848 was grounded on an amorphous Illyrian cultural basis that evolved toward an understanding of the Croatian nation on a political basis.[7] The return of constitutionality in 1860 and debates regarding the Monarchy's organization and the Croatian-Hungarian union witnessed the shaping of modern Croatian political parties and ideologies. The Croatian-Slavonian Diet of 1861 refused to accept the King's February patent based on the Vienna center's domination and decided to renew the alliance with Hungary, but with special Hungarian guarantees of Croatian-Slavonian autonomy and expanded territorial integrity. The proposal was rejected by the Hungarian side, which insisted on the 1848 Hungarian laws as the starting point for negotiations, significantly narrowing the autonomy and territorial integrity of Croatia-Slavonia.

It was the National Party that stood behind the Diet's resolution, but the party's integration ideology was much more complex. The party's leader, Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer, passed on the Illyrian tradition and accepted the idea of Yugoslavism as a response to the supremacy of Austrian Germans and Hungarians; as an advocate of liberal Catholicism, he also pleaded for bridging the gap between Western and Eastern Christianity. The National Party envisioned South Slavic unification in the form of some undefined decentralized state with Serbia. In that community, Serbia would be the bearer of state and military tradition, while the Croatian side would introduce a developed culture and oversee educating fellow countrymen who had long been separated from development in the rest of Europe.[8] In this spirit, the laws founding the Yugoslav University and Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb were passed by the Diet in 1861; these were to become research and educational centers primarily for South Slavs. It was Zagreb, and not Vienna, Budapest, or Paris that should have become the center of education for the brothers from the backward Ottoman Empire, where they could adopt ideas in their own language and in the common folk's spirit rather than being educated in a colonial manner.[9] The King did not approve these laws in 1861, but in 1867, the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts was founded, and it largely passed on the South Slavic orientation of its founders. The University was established in 1874 and profiled itself primarily as a center of education for students from the 'Croatian lands' in the Monarchy, even though numerous students from other regions of the Monarchy and the Balkan environment were also enrolled.[10]

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[4] Despalatović, 1975, p. 87 and Stančić, 1996, pp. 135–136.

[5] Kolak Bošnjak, 2015, pp. 153–173.

[6] Iveljić, 1996, pp. 125–137 and Čepulo et al. 2010, pp. 57–64.

[7] Čepulo, 2019, p. 5.

Dissident members of the National Party formed the Independent National Party, which advocated alliance with Vienna and acceptance of the February Patent under conditions that granted some form of Croatian autonomy and, perhaps, fast annexation of Dalmatia. The Party disappeared in 1865 under criticism of surrendering the Croatian historical autonomy granted in the Hungarian-Croatian constitutional framework to Vienna fundaments.

The Unionist Party, however, advocated renewal of the traditional alliance with Hungary but based on balanced negotiations. This view was in a way realized in the sub-dual Croatian-Hungarian Compromise of 1868 that guaranteed Croatia-Slavonia broad autonomy and its territorial integrity but left it without its own finances, provided for the Hungarian government's superior control, and left the city of Rijeka outside Croatia-Slavonia.[11] Interference by the Hungarian government in autonomous politics further compromised the unionist idea, and the Unionist Party disappeared from the political scene in 1873.

Frustration over the impossibility of realizing Croatian national interests in an alliance with Vienna and Pest fueled the idea of an independent Greater Croatia. This was grounded in the idea of a Croatian historical and natural right to the state encompassing the territories of the medieval Croatian Kingdom and ethnic Croatian regions. The idea was first formulated by Zagreb's lawyer, Eugen Kvaternik, who sought support for it from St. Petersburg to France. Kvaternik emphasized the historical rights upon which the Croatian people should terminate the social contract with the Habsburgs, restore an independent Croatian state, and elect a new King. Hence, he included in the Croatian state all countries between the Southern Alps, the Adriatic, the Danube, and the Drina, and considered all inhabitants of that area to be Croats, while recognizing the existence of the Serbian people only in Serbia and southern Hungary.[12] Kvaternik's main associate, Ante Starčević, was influenced by the French Revolution, Rousseau's theory of the people's sovereignty, and the liberal principles of representative democracy.[13] He asked that a single Croatian political nation be formed, grounded in Croatian historical identity regardless of the individual ethnicity, as the basis of the Croatian state. Starčević advocated a tougher attitude toward Vienna, criticized the Yugoslav ideology, and fiercely dealt with Serbian denial of the existence of the Croatian nation and language. Kvaternik and Starčević together founded the Party of the Right (referring to the Croatian right to state) in 1861, which had significant social influence, especially among students and youth. However, due to the undemocratic electoral system, it remained only a marginal force in the Diet with no influence on official policy. The idea of an independent Croatian state had long-term 'epochal' potential, but no realistic prospects for realization at that time.

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[8] Gross and Szabo, 1992, pp. 162–163.

[9] Gross and Szabo, 1992, p. 149.

[10] Čepulo, 2007, pp. 141–142.

[11] Čepulo, 2015, pp. 32 et seq.

The diversity of the ideological scene at that time was contributed to by the agile Imbro Tkalac. In Vienna, he advocated federal reorganization of the Monarchy into an asymmetric community of Danube provinces and peoples, with a central government in Vienna, but without economic exploitation and political domination by the Austrian Germans. After his release from prison, he wandered from Russia to Paris and Rome, where he finally crossed paths with the Monarchy, predicting that a federation of free sovereign peoples within the European community of nations would be resurrected on its ruins.[14]

1.3. Dalmatia, Rijeka **(Fiume),** *Istria*

Although Dalmatia was the cradle of the medieval Croatian state, the area's long-term inclusion in the Venetian Republic and Ottoman Empire weakened the sense of Croatian affiliation, especially among the city's elite who were educated in Italian. Therefore, in the 19th century, members of this elite worked on shaping a particular ethnic Dalmatian identity, upon which the Dalmatian autonomist movement emerged in the 1860s, bitterly rejecting idea of annexing Dalmatia to Croatia-Slavonia.[15] Such politics were supported by the Serbian parties in Dalmatia (Serbs made up about 17% of the province's population, mostly concentrated in the mountainous hinterland and the Bay of Kotor) that advocated unifying Dalmatia with Bosnia and Herzegovina as the first step toward future unification with Serbia.[16]

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[12] Raditsa, 1964–65, p. 47.

[13] Gross, 2000, pp. 9–13.

[14] On the political role of Imbro Tkalac, see Feldman, 2012.

[15] For details relating to the Autonomist movement in Dalmatia, see Vrandečić, 2002.

[16] Stančić, 1981, p. 234.

Autonomists initially achieved success at the polls in 1861, but Croatian parties had held the majority in the Dalmatian Diet since 1870; by 1883, autonomists won almost all local governments except the provincial capital of Zadar. The main parties, the National Party and the Party of the Right, were grounded on ideologies similar to those of their umbrella organizations in Croatia-Slavonia. They primarily focused on developing a Croatian national consciousness and unifying Dalmatia with Croatia-Slavonia. Over the course of time, the Autonomist movement turned into a political margin except in its only, albeit important, stronghold in Zadar.

In Rijeka, the expanded multicultural population supported the city's autonomy and opposed its inclusion in Croatia-Slavonia. However, several Croatian politicians from that region played an important part in political life in Croatia-Slavonia, where annexation of Rijeka remained *conditio sine qua non* of every political attitude. In Istria, the Croatian clergy led the struggle to introduce the Croatian language as the province's official language and enlightened the uneducated Croatian ethnic majority in rural areas. However, the idea of annexing Istria was only modestly present in Croatia-Slavonia.[17]

1.4. Croatian integration and the ethnic Serbs' policy

The majority of Serbs who, after the reunification of the Military Frontier in 1881, made up about a quarter of Croatia-Slavonia's population, emphasized the importance of their political parties. The fundamental issue was the relationship of Serbs with Croatian autonomy and the idea of the Triune Kingdom as a Croatian nation-state at the time of nation-building. Apart from the 'internal' issues, the Serbian policy in Croatia was also affected by the fact that large numbers of Serbs lived in the Kingdom of Hungary, beyond Croatia-Slavonia's borders, and by the establishment of the Serbian national state at the borders of Austro-Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia, which opened the prospect of creating a pan-Serbian state.

The starting point of Croatian politics of that time was the attitude that the Triune Kingdom was a Croatian national state with a single Croatian political nation consisting of all members of the Triune Kingdom regardless of ethnicity, yet with the particular ethno-cultural (but not political) identity of the Serbs.[18] The Serbian side, in contrast, considered ethnic Serbs a separate political nation and bearers of autonomy together with the Croats.[19] In this, the Croatian side recognized the basis of a potential separatist policy. A rather serious political clash based on these diverse attitudes broke out in 1875 over the law on secularizing the hitherto religious primary education. The law granted extensive additional particular rights to Serbs regarding education in the Serbian language, literature, history, and religion; equal use of the Cyrillian alphabet was already granted. However, Serbs rejected the law, denying in principle the competence of the Croatian-Slavonian Diet to regulate primary education for Serbs. They claimed the Serbian National-and-Church Congress, which had a seat in the then still separated Military Frontier, as exclusively competent in such matters for all Serbs in the Hungarian half of the Monarchy. The Croatian side bitterly reacted to this attitude as an attempt to establish separate Serbian political autonomy (cultural autonomy was not neglected) and the first step toward future unification of ethnic Serbs with Serbia.[20] The other controversy broke out in 1878 when the address from the Croatian-Slavonian Diet to the King to administratively associate occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina with Croatia-Slavonia was bitterly rejected by ethnic Serbs, who considered all of Bosnia and Herzegovina exclusive Serbian historical land that should be annexed to the Kingdom of Serbia. The whole story of Croatian-Serbian relations is more complex, yet its early appearances indicated two nation-building processes with competitive goals on at least partially the same territory.

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[17] For an overview of the political and social processes in Istria, see Trogrlić and Šetić, 2015.

[18] Gross and Szabo, 1992, pp. 150–151.

[19] For unbiased research on the ethnic Serb politics in Croatia, see Miller, 1997, pp. 42–43.

The dichotomy over these issues burdened Croatian-Serbian relations; this was skillfully used by Ban Károly Khuen-Héderváry (1883–1903) in his policy of controlling Croatian autonomy in favor of the Budapest and Vienna centers. However, the social and political changes that took place by 1905 led to cooperation between the most of the Croatian opposition and Serbian parties in Croatia-Slavonia and the support of Serbian parties in Dalmatia to its annexation to Croatia-Slavonia, under condition of grants of equality for Serbs. This compromise shaped the ‘policy of the new course’ that led to the Croatian-Serbian Coalition, the cluster of political parties that became the main political force in Croatia-Slavonia from 1906 to 1918.[21]

1.5. Trialism and Yugoslavism

The obvious problems in the Monarchy’s functioning encouraged the search for an alternative to dualistic order while retaining the Habsburg Monarchy as a powerful protector from the neighboring countries’ expansionism. Different versions of trialism appeared, and the most influential idea was establishing a third, South Slavic unit.[22] The idea received an important promotion from the May Declaration accepted by the ‘Yugoslav Club’ of South Slavic MPs in the Imperial Council in May 1917. The declaration called for establishing an independent South Slavic unit of the Monarchy based on ethnic principle and Croatian historical state rights as an existing legitimistic and institutional basis.[23]

This idea was at odds with the idea of integral Yugoslavism, which advocated overthrowing Austro-Hungary and creating an entire state of South Slavs led by the Kingdom of Serbia. The idea of integral Yugoslavism was conveyed to Croats by members of the intellectual youth who often visited Belgrade, where they came under the influence of Serbian organizations that promoted struggle against Austro-Hungary as the main obstacle to the Serbian national goals.[24]

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[20] Čepulo, 2019, pp. 36 et seq.

[21] Banac, 1984, pp. 98–99.

[22] Matijević, 2009, pp. 74–78 and Matković, 2010, pp. 123–124.

[23] Trogrlić, 2016, pp. 1009–1011.

[24] Banac, 1984, p. 103.

Before the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, some anti-Habsburg-oriented Croatian politicians, especially those from Dalmatia, emigrated to neutral Italy. There they established a Croatian Committee that expressed solidarity with the attacked Serbia and were soon transformed in the Yugoslav Committee, which included representatives of Slovenes and Serbs from the Monarchy. The Committee's aims were to oppose the Italian occupation of the eastern Adriatic coast promised to Italy in the secret Treaty of London (1915), to work on unification with the kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro under balanced terms, and to fight against any solution to the South Slavic question under the Habsburg dynasty. Ante Trumbić, the experienced president of the Yugoslav Committee, often debated with Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić over the principles of unification. He had no illusions about Pašić's Greater Serbian intentions, but never abandoned the policy of alliance with Serbia. Anti-Habsburg determination also connected the Yugoslav Committee with the Czechs and Slovaks, and Trumbić spoke about the possibility of connecting the two territories via a corridor.[25]

The May Declaration was an impetus for a joint counterproposal by the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee in the form of the Corfu Declaration, which was adopted in July 1917 at the seat of the Serbian government in-exile on the island of Corfu. The declaration called for unifying into the new unitary state a 'three-named' people of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, led by the Serbian Karađorđević dynasty, with a constitution passed by an (unspecified) qualified majority. With this compromise declaration, the Serbian government abandoned its concept of unification in the form of an enlarged Serbia, while the Yugoslav Committee abandoned the decentralized structure as a condition for unification.

2. Yugoslav solutions (1918–1941)

At the intersection of these ideas, the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs was formed on October 29, 1918, in Zagreb, encompassing the South Slavic areas of the Habsburg Monarchy. The difficulties that this provisional state faced dramatically accelerated its intended unification with Serbia and Montenegro.[26] Serbia, which in the meantime had annexed Montenegro, did not agree to decentralization as a condition for the unification that was practically carried out as unconditional on December 1, 1918, when regent Alexander proclaimed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Macedonians and Montenegrins were presumably absorbed by the Serbs, and the large Albanian population was ignored.

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[25] Suppan, 1996, p. 563.

[26] The main problems of that provisory state were internal disarray and advancing Italian occupation of the territory with the Croatian and Slovenian ethnic majority promised to Italy by the Treaty of London. Italy finally gained these territories with the Treaty of Rapallo signed between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and Italy in 1920. The Treaty of Rome signed in 1924 between the same parties ceded the city of Rijeka to Italy.

The *Vidovdan* Constitution of the new state was accepted in 1921 by a plain majority, with mostly Serbian votes supported with the additional traded votes of the Bosnian Muslims. It established a unitary state based on the idea of a single 'three-tribal people' with an official (in reality non-existent) 'Serbo-Croatian-Slavic language.'[27] With a relatively Serbian majority (38.8%), the new state passed on the traditions of the Serbian nation-state with a single language and centralized administration. The dominant Serbian elite considered Serbs 'the war winners' and 'the liberators,' who made heavy sacrifices for unification and therefore had the right to dominant influence.[28] Although the concept of a single triune nation was almost generally accepted by the intellectual and political elites, Croats (23,7%) expected equality and preservation of their cultural traditions in accordance with the long experience of living in an organized multicultural community.[29]

The political conflicts that arose on that basis led to constant government crises, with Stjepan Radić's Croatian Republican Peasant Party soon taking over the role of the all-Croatian national movement. Radić was extremely reluctant to unite too quickly into a new state, and after its creation, he proposed establishing a Croatian peasant republic within it. He refused to recognize the *Vidovdan* Constitution, trying unsuccessfully to internationalize the Croatian question.[30] Radić's political influence increased in 1927 when he joined a coalition with Svetozar Pribićević, a disappointed radical Yugoslav integralist and leader of the Serbs from the former Austro-Hungarian territories. Pribićević believed that the Belgrade elite encouraged and exploited Serbo-Croatian conflicts for its own interests. He advocated cooperation between Croats and Serbs and accepted Radić's program of federalizing the country, subject to guarantees of rights for Serbs.[31]

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, banned by law in 1921, first accepted the ideology of a unitary nation and the state but replaced it in 1924 with a critique of Greater Serbian hegemony and the function of Yugoslavia as part of a *cordon sanitaire* around the Soviet Union. The Party advocated breaking Yugoslavia up into national Soviet-type republics that would join the Soviet federation of the Balkan-Danube republics. In 1937, this attitude was replaced by a more realistic commitment to turning Yugoslavia into a Soviet-type federation.[32]

The Croatian unrest that followed the assassination of Radić and two Croatian Peasant Party MPs in Parliament by a member of the (Serbian) National Radical Party was the impetus for King Alexander's *coup d'etat* in 1929. The King introduced 'the dictatorship,' changed the country's name to Yugoslavia, and proclaimed full Yugoslav integralism in the 1931 imposed Constitution.[33]

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[27] Čepulo, 2021, p. 27.
[28] Goldstein, 2011, pp. 12–13.
[29] Banac, 1984, pp. 141 et seq.
[30] Biondich, 2000, pp. 178–179.
[31] Banac, 1984, pp. 177 et seq.
[32] Čepulo, 2021, p. 305.
[33] Lampe, 2000, pp. 163–176.

This triggered radical Croatian nationalists to found the extreme organization '*Ustasha*—Croatian Revolutionary Organization' with its leader Ante Pavelić. The *Ustashas* resorted to assassinating Yugoslav politicians, with the ultimate goal of creating an independent ethnic Croatian state in the entire ethnic and historical territory of the Croats, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, and considering Muslims an integral part of the Croatian people. The fascist and Nazi movements had a significant influence on the party's ideology. The main patron for *Ustasha* was Italy, where it had training camps, which were also supported by Hungary. In 1934, the *Ustashas*, in cooperation with the Macedonian revolutionary organization VMRO, organized the assassination of King Alexander in Marseilles, manifesting the breadth of anti-Yugoslav resistance.[34]

In contrast, in cooperation with Belgrade, the new leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, Vladko Maček, turned to seeking a solution to the 'Croatian question' and condemned the *Ustashas* as 'Italian mercenaries.' In 1939, this policy resulted in an agreement between Maček and the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Dragiša Cvetković, upon the foundation of the autonomous Banate (*Banovina*) of Croatia, which was established by a decree of the Royal Regency just before the outbreak of World War II. With the establishment of the *Banovina*, unification of Croatia and greater parts of Dalmatia was finally achieved. Portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina with a Croatian ethnic majority were merged with it, and the *Banovina* enjoyed much wider autonomy than the former Kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia.[35] Nonetheless, the *Ustashas* and other radical Croatian nationalists rejected the agreement and tried to internationalize the Croatian question, expecting the support of the Axis Powers. Serbian nationalists, on the other hand, demanded establishment of a Serb unit that would include parts of the *Banovina* with a Serb majority. However, the imminent collapse of Yugoslavia in 1941 interrupted further development.[36]

In the 1930s, wider European integrations were also discussed in Zagreb. In 1931, Fran Ilešič, a professor of the Slovene language at the University of Zagreb, proposed creating a military-political-economic bloc from the Baltic and Black Seas to the Adriatic, which would include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The proposal stemmed from fears that a major economic crisis could upset the European balance based on the Versailles order; its main goal was to prevent restoration of German domination and the spread of communist ideas from the USSR.[37]

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[34] Goldstein, 2011, pp. 126 et seq.

[35] Šlabek, 1997, pp. 62–66.

[36] Steindorff, 2007, pp. 168–170.

[37] Zlodi, 2004, pp. 981–995.

3. World War II and Croatia (1941–1945)

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia joined the Triple Alliance under very moderate conditions on March 25, 1941. Two days later, a *coup d'etat* was carried out under the influence of the British Secret service, after which Hitler ordered an attack on Yugoslavia. After a quick capitulation, the king and the Yugoslav government fled to London, where the émigré government, which included Croatian politicians, was divided over the national question and support to the (Serbian) *Chetnik* movement that was proclaimed the 'Yugoslav Army in Homeland.' Various ideas emerged among Croats in the émigré government, such as creating a federal peasant state of Southern Slavs or a confederation of peasant peoples between the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Seas, but the idea of preserving Yugoslavia prevailed.

Hitler's conception of the break-up of Yugoslavia included creating a Croatian state, but Vladko Maček, who believed in the victory of Western democracy, rejected the German invitation to become the leader of that state.[38] Thus, on April 10, 1941, the Independent State of Croatia (ISC) was proclaimed in Zagreb; its leadership was taken over by Ante Pavelić, who came from Italy with 300 *Ustashas*.[39] Following the Nazi-fascist model, Pavelić established a system of government in which all power was concentrated in the hands of the Head (*Poglavnik*) as an incarnation of the will of the Croatian people. He soon passed racial laws modeled on the Nuremberg Laws and organized a persecution of Serbs, Jews, and Roma. For Muslims, as part of the Croatian people, he opened a large mosque in the wider center of Zagreb. The ISC was proclaimed a kingdom under the Italian influence, but the duke of Spoleto soon abandoned his intention to perform the duty of Croatian king; thus, apart from the formal name, there were no traces of a monarchical organization. The ISC acceded to the Triple Alliance and was recognized by all Axis states with Italian and German troops stationed and operated freely in the country. Italian patronage was also paid for by the Treaties of Rome, through which Italy received a significant part of the Croatian coastal area. These territories were taken over by German troops after the Italian capitulation, regardless of Pavelić's annulment of those treaties.[40] A certain degree of the ISC's independence in foreign policy was reflected in the protest to Hungary over the annexation of Međimurje, which the ISC did not recognize. The attempt of Slovak-Romanian-Croatian cooperation was directed against reconstructing pre-Trianon Hungarian borders, but in practice, it remained limited only to the cultural field.[41] The plan of some high-ranking *Ustasha* officials to join the ISC with the Allies in 1944 was initially thwarted, and the conspirators were executed.[42]

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[38] Biondich, 2007, p. 212.

[39] Goldstein, 2011, p. 133.

[40] For a concise review of the Independent State of Croatia, see Goldstein, 2011, pp. 131–140.

[41] Rychlick, 2004, pp. 949–950.

[42] Steindorff, 2007, pp. 186–187.

After the German attack on the Soviet Union, a partisan liberating movement was formed in Yugoslavia under the leadership of Josip Broz-Tito and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Under its auspices, a civilian power structure was established, and in 1943, the Anti-fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (ACPLY) declared itself the Parliament, banned King Peter's return to the country until the people's decision after the war, and accepted the decision to build Yugoslavia on democratic and federal principles, based on the right to self-determination and secession of Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Slovenes, and Serbs. Only after that were the land's anti-fascist councils constituted, among which was the Land Anti-fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Croatia (ACPLC). In 1944 ACPLC proclaimed the Federal State of Croatia as an integral part of the six-member Democratic Federal Yugoslavia, which was not internationally recognized at the time.[43]

4. In the Communist Federation (1946–1990)

In 1945, the Yugoslav Communists quickly turned their victory into a monopoly of power, and in 1946, the Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was adopted according to the Soviet model. In the following year, the constitutions of the republics were adopted, including the Constitution of the People's Republic of Croatia.

In accordance with the Allies' decisions, Yugoslavia was rebuilt after the war within the previous borders, with corrections regarding the imposed unjust solutions. Thus, the peace treaty with Italy in 1947 and the London Memorandum with Italy in 1954 ceded to Yugoslavia areas with ethnic Croat and Slovene majorities that Italy had acquired by the Treaty of Rapallo and Treaty of Rome.[44] These areas were then included in the republics of Croatia and Slovenia according to ethnic criteria. However, the London Memorandum only provisionally resolved the disputed border issue, and it was only the 1975 Osimo Agreements between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and the Italian Republic that confirmed the situation on the ground, and permanently determined the Italian-Yugoslav border that Croatia and Slovenia, as SFRY's successor states, inherited in 1991.[45]

The self-confident Tito, who enjoyed a special reputation in the international communist movement due to his success in liberating the country, began to lead independent regional politics, planning to create a Balkan federation with Bulgaria and, in the future, Albania and Greece.[46] Stalin took it as a challenge to his leadership in the communist movement, and the fierce conflict between the whole Communist block and Yugoslavia erupted in 1948. It resulted in Tito's radical purge of the potential intra-communist opposition and a turn in foreign policy. After accepting Western aid, Yugoslavia developed a new model of socialism and established a policy of equidistance between the two blocs. In further development, these politics led to creating a non-aligned movement in 1961, together with African and Asian countries, which contributed to the country and Tito's international perception. Along with Malta and Cyprus, Yugoslavia was the only European country in this movement.[47]

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[43] Goldstein, 2011, p. 150.

[44] A similar decision was proclaimed by ACPLC in 1943 and 'enforced' by ACPLY the same year, but it had only internal meaning since Democratic Federal Yugoslavia was not yet recognized. This was the first time in history that the largest part of Istria, west of river Raša, was associated with Croatia.

[45] Rudolf, 2013, p. 23.

[46] Banac, 1988, p. 37.

Although Yugoslav federalism was formally based on the concept of shared sovereignty, in reality the decision-making system was highly centralized, thanks to the concentration of powers in the federation and party-state regime, which did not leave much room for republican autonomy.[48] However, the gradual loosening of discipline from the 1960s, with Croatian and Slovene communists continuing to advocate decentralization, and Tito's dramatic showdown in 1965 with the centralist Serbian-Montenegrin block in the communist leadership, resulted in radical decentralization in 1967–1971. In the debates over the constitutional amendments at the time, the Croatian communist leadership, which enjoyed mass support in Croatia, took the lead in seeking wider independence of the republics, emphasizing Croatian interests and their neglect in federal politics. Although this movement did not in any way call into question the Yugoslav framework, Tito cut short its further development; in 1971, numerous arrests and dismissals of the communist officials and proclaimed nationalists in Croatia followed. However, the new Constitution of the SFRY in 1974 further decentralized the previous system and strengthened the positions of the republics. Among other things, republics were allowed to establish international cooperation within the established federal foreign policy. This was used by Croatia and Slovenia, which, in 1978, together with some Italian, Austrian, and South German provinces, established the Working Community Alps-Adria in Venice with a coordinative agenda in transport, culture, and ecology. The meaning of this cooperation should not be overestimated; yet in the circumstances at the time, it symbolically promoted the Central European and Mediterranean identity of the two republics. This is why the project aroused suspicion and even certain criticism from other republics.

It was a modest, but also the only possible integration reach of the official Croatian policy in the Yugoslav framework. Croatian emigration was more dynamic yet burdened with Western support for the independent position of Yugoslavia regarding the USSR. Vladko Maček, who left Croatia at the end of the war, was convinced that the West would support communist opponents and worked on reconstructing Yugoslavia with a multi-party system. In New York in 1947, he established the International

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[47] The importance of the non-aligned movement has essentially declined with the disintegration of the bipolar world, but it still exists, with the Republic of Croatia as an observer.

[48] Čepulo, 2021, p. 324.

Peasant Union with agricultural parties having émigré leaderships from Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia, but it did not have a significant impact.[49]

Most of the Croatian emigration throughout Yugoslavia's existence was convinced of its disintegration due to internal weaknesses, which would open space for forming an independent Croatian state. A moderate part of the emigration advocated Croatia's accession to the Liberal International and the political and economic integration of European states, even at the expense of losing part of its national sovereignty. Some emigrants viewed Croatian integration in the geopolitical structure of the Adriatic and Danube regions. They believed that Warsaw Pact countries such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria could enter a neutral zone that would be a balance between the Soviet Union and the West, and projected accession to that community of Croatia and other former Yugoslavian republics plus Albania.[50] Similar opinions were expressed in the 1970s by the future President of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, who wrote about the peaceful 'Scandinavization' of the Yugoslav space as a precondition for normalizing inter-ethnic relations.[51]

5. Toward state independence and European integration (1990–2013)

Tito's death in the circumstances of the advancing economic and political crisis in 1980 freed space for disintegrative processes through which particular, primarily national, interests embodied in the interests of republican elites were sought, for which the established system did not provide a real solution. The crises began with the Serbian-ethnic Albanian conflict over control of Kosovo but escalated into Serbian complaints of discrimination against Serbs in all of Yugoslavia, with demands for 'Serbian unity' and recentralizing the federation with an outcome of Serbian supremacy as the most numerous nation. The populist all-Serbian movement led by Slobodan Milošević was fiercely opposed by Slovenia, which saw the introduction of a state of emergency in Kosovo as a pretext for breaking the autonomy of the republics. Slovenia invoked the right of the people to self-determination and secession and began preparations for secession from Yugoslavia with the support of the Croatian communist leadership concerned about Serbian threats to Croatia's territorial integrity.[52]

The Yugoslav crisis deepened after nationalist parties won multi-party elections in the republics. The new Croatian president, Franjo Tuđman, who remained at the helm of the ruling Croatian Democratic Union party, advocated Croatia's independence. Yet, unlike Slovenia, he pleaded for the establishment of a confederation of former Yugoslav republics as a transitional stage toward independence, aware of the dangers of armed conflict for Croatia. However, Serbia rejected all such proposals. Therefore, the proclamation of Croatian independence together with Slovenia on June 25, 1991, was to some extent a forced act avoiding Croatia remaining in a 'rump Yugoslavia' without Slovenia.[53]

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[49] Boban, 2007, p. 256.

[50] Petričević, 1972, pp. 458–459.

[51] Bekić, 2016, p. 24.

[52] Čepulo, 2021, pp. 370–371.

The starting point of Tuđman's policy was the attitude of the Croatian historical affiliation to Western civilization and the imperative to return to it. He enthusiastically accepted Samuel Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations as complementary to his view.[54] Tuđman also advocated the 'correction' of 'unnatural' Croatian borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina by their 'thickening,' that is, annexation of predominantly Croatian ethnic and historical areas (Turkish Croatia), similar to the borders of the Banate of Croatia.[55] Some leading members of Tuđman's party and the largest part of opposition confronted such politics, opening a political crisis in Croatia. Yet the attitude of the 'return to Europe' was generally shared by all political factors of any significance in Croatia, and joining the West and Euro-Atlantic integration remained a fundamental and unchallenged determinant of contemporary Croatian politics.

Tuđman believed that the key solution for the problems in Southeast Europe was an agreement between Croats and Serbs. This is why, despite the rebellion and secession proclaimed by part of the ethnic Serbs in Croatia that were encouraged and supported by Serbia, he met with Slobodan Milosevic on several occasions. This sparked repeated yet unproven accusations of their agreement to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina.[56]

Croatia was the first to recognize the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because of Tuđman's views, it was faced with accusations of interfering in that country's internal relations and plans for its disintegration, primarily due to the 1992 proclamation of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna and conflicts between the Croatian Defense Council (of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Bosniak forces in 1993.[57] These hostilities were stopped by US mediation. The Washington Agreement, signed by Presidents Tuđman and Izetbegović in 1994, established a federation of Croats and Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This federation was supposed to enter into a confederation with Croatia; however, this did not happen. Tuđman's attitudes and part of his policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina remained the 'original sin' of Croatian politics, which is why all Croatian governments, from Tuđman's death to joining the European Union and beyond, avoided formulating a more active policy toward that neighboring country.

The disintegrative and integrative processes were also influenced by the opinions of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia. These opinions had non-binding force but were unanimously accepted by the EU countries; in the overall development, they established de facto mandatory standards for the former Yugoslav republics. Contrary to Serbia's position and in accordance with the position of the republics that declared independence, the Commission stated that the Serbs' right to self-determination in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia did not include the right to secession but did include the right to grants of human and minority rights within the two states. It also stated that inter-republican borders could not be changed unilaterally but became international borders in accordance with the principle of *uti possidetis iuris*.[58] This has significantly weakened, although not eliminated, plans for cross-border national integrations and territorial annexations in the Balkans.

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[53] Čepulo, 2021, pp. 378–379.
[54] Bekić, 2016, p. 16.
[55] Bing, 2006, pp. 346–347.
[56] Goldstein, 2021, pp. 163–164.
[57] Bing, 2006, p. 349.

After the armed liberation of a significant part of its occupied territory in 1995 and the peaceful reintegration of the remaining part in 1998, Croatia shifted its focus to realizing foreign policy interests by joining international integrations, primarily the EU and NATO.[59] However, since declaring independence, Croatia has faced a form of undeclared limited international isolation, especially due to the policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina and President Tuđman's autocratic administration. This perception of Croatia and the fact that Slovenia managed to join the circle of countries rapidly approaching the EU pushed Croatia into the circle of the Western Balkan countries from Croatia to Albania, which were the object of the EU's common policy of neutralizing tensions and encouraging mutual cooperation. That policy raised concerns in Croatia about the possible intention of establishing a Western Balkan integration on the periphery of the EU. This was the reason for the 1997 amendment to the Croatian Constitution that banned Croatia from entering any form of a renewed South Slavic state or other Balkan state union.[60]

Tuđman's continuation of an autocratic policy after the cease of hostilities provoked a change in government after his death in 1999.[61] The new government replaced the semi-presidential system with a parliamentary government, organized the summit of the EU and Western Balkans countries in Zagreb in 2000, and submitted its application for accession to the EU in 2003. Acceptance of this application in 2004 detached Croatia from the rest of the Balkan countries, but the accession process has become much more complex and time-consuming than before. This was not only because of the EU's poor experience with the admission of Bulgaria and Romania but also because of its strict insistence on full Croatian co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).[62] This obstacle was definitely resolved after the arrest in 2005 of one Croatian general in Spain who the Croatian authorities had previously allowed to flee.[63] Croatia was then admitted to NATO in 2009, but the expected acceleration of negotiations with the EU was thwarted due to Slovenia's obstructions aimed at achieving the outcome it projected in the delimitation of the Croatian-Slovenian sea border. After this dispute was resolved in November 2009, the negotiations were finally accelerated, and on July 1, 2013, the Republic of Croatia became a member of the EU.

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[58] Ragazzi, 1992, p. 1491.

[59] Suppan, 2013, p. 151.

[60] Goldstein, 2021, p. 209.

[61] Tanner, 2001, p. 310.

[62] Čepulo, 2021, pp. 408–411.

[63] Three Croatian generals were indicted before ICTY with one being acquitted at the first instance in 2011and two others on appeal in 2012. Goldstein, 2021, pp. 341, 346.

6. Conclusion

The Croatian integration concepts until 1918 were determined by the fact that during the Middle Ages, Croats were divided into several states and remained administratively divided within one complex Monarchy during the nation-building period, lacking the political power to unite. Consequently, the prevailing integration concepts up to 1918 searched for a broader framework that could bridge particular Croatian identities and unite them into a single community. The idea of Croatian integration, therefore, first appeared as part of a broader 'Illyrian' and then South Slavic cluster. The idea of an independent Greater Croatia based on the French model of a political nation, unfeasible at the time, appeared only in late 1850. The unionist idea of a traditional alliance with Hungary was compromised by Hungarian inflexibility in the unbalanced union, yet it also reflected the incompatibility of the Croatian and Hungarian nation-building processes.

That Croatia was not formed as a state was the reason all Croatian integrative conceptions focused on national integration in the context of the relevant Central European and Balkan environment and lacked a 'state-policy' interest for the wider European environment.

South Slavic unification took place in the historical contingency of 1918 by merging the Central European-Mediterranean and Balkan areas that were connected by linguistic vicinity but separated by different mentalities and cultural patterns, as well as competitive religious affiliations, lacking any historical precedent. The new unitary Yugoslav nation-building was grounded on the Serbian national tradition. This caused the Croats to become indignant, resulting in their demands to establish a Croatian autonomous unit or independent state as the only paradigm that would ensure protection of Croatian national interests. The provisional Croatian autonomy and excessive fascist state created in turbulent and contingent circumstances before and during the Second World War were replaced by a renewal of the Yugoslav framework set on the new foundations of an imposed Soviet-style federation. Contrary to the previous unitary paradigm, this model emphasized the political autonomy and equality of nations in the decentralized structure of the state. However, in the reality of the undemocratic system of the party-state type of government, Yugoslav federalism functioned as crypto-centralism, this time marked by the ideological core and not by the predominance of some particular national interests.

The disintegration of authoritarian integrative instruments in Yugoslavia in the circumstances of the disappearance of the bipolar world resulted in the growth of competitive nationalisms embodied in the republican leaderships, with two basic projects of national emancipation and integration. One was the project to establish an all-Serbian nation-state at the allegedly Serbian ethnic and historical space, regardless of the republican borders. The other was a project to emancipate all other republics (except Montenegro) into nation-states. The Croatian project of gaining independence was dialectically paired with the integration. It included establishing the Yugoslav confederation as a transitional form toward full independence and then accessing independent Croatia in the European and Euro-Atlantic integrations as an adequate framework for Croatian national interests.

The history of Croatian integration concepts, even those that followed independence, thus indicates a permanent and pronounced orientation toward broader integrative forms. Such a tendency reflects almost the only Croatian experience of living in a multicultural framework; however, it probably even more reflects the experience of a small nation with a developed identity but insufficient capacity to independently realize and defend national interests in an international order based on national statehoods.

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| CHAPTER 5 |

The Birth of Modern Serbia (1804–2004)

Integration, concepts, ideas, and great powers

Lajos FORRÓ, Srđan CVETKOVIĆ

ABSTRACT

This chapter follows the origin and development of the modern Serbian state in the last two centuries. At the crossroads of great empires, the Serbian state ascended in the 19th century. The national program formed in the first half of the 19th century as the basis of its foreign policy meant gathering the Serbian national corps into one state. It was gradually realized by maneuvering between the great powers, but also through conflict with them. In the 19th century, Serbian politics was most often correlated or in conflict with the interests of Austria, Russia, and Turkey. During Yugoslavia's time in the first half of the 20th century, France, Britain, and Germany took over, while in Socialist Yugoslavia during the Cold War, relations with the US, the USSR, and some non-aligned countries prevailed. In the post-communist era, the main problems in Serbia's foreign policy were its relationships with the US and NATO and with the EU and Germany. Geostrategic interests and Serbia's position meant that it was exposed to severe exclusions and numerous wars with both its neighbors and the great powers.

KEYWORDS

Serbia, great powers, national program, state, foreign policy

1. Birth of Serbian modern national ideology

Throughout their history, the Serbs as a people have experienced two great rises. One of these took place in the 14th century, while the other occurred in the 19th century. At one point in the 14th century, through great military successes and conquests, the Serbian state under the Nemanjićs spread to most of the Balkan Peninsula. Although Dušan's empire lasted only a very short time and quickly disintegrated under the onslaught of the Ottoman Turks, this memory of the state's greatness and the idea of its renewal remained alive through mythology and epic oral and church tradition.

The historical myth of greatness was therefore an important foundation and precondition for building a modern Serbian state. A spark that ignited the flame of

Forró L., Cvetković, S. (2022) 'The Birth of Modern Serbia (1804–2004)', in Gedeon, M., Halász, I. (eds.) *The Development of European and Regional Integration Theories in Central European Countries.* Miskolc: Central European Academic Publishing. pp. 113–135. https://doi.org/10.54171/2022.mgih.doleritincec_6

national pride and social transformation enabled the creation of a modern Serbian state during the 19th century. Almost five centuries after the Battle of Kosovo, the Serbian people reentered the historical scene. However, the road to a nation-state was not easy; it was fraught with many sacrifices, dilemmas, and divisions. The journey can be regarded in stages. While the birth of the modern state collided and conflicted with the neighboring Balkan nations, its struggles with the Great Powers were even greater. Among the European nations, the Serbian people have certainly made some of the greatest sacrifices in their struggle for independence.[1]

In the first stage, the newly awakened national consciousness initiated the liberation struggle. The struggle was embodied in two Serbian uprisings against the Turks (1804–1815); during this time, the Serbs were among the first peoples in the Balkans to embark on a path of liberation and the creation of a nation-state. Although unsuccessful in the beginning, the First Serbian Uprising awakened national pride and energy. This uprising formed a good foundation and inspiration for the Second Serbian Uprising, after which Serbia was among the first in the Balkans to gain some independence. Through their great sacrifices, they managed to gain a certain autonomy; thus, along with the Greeks, they were among the first nations in this part of Europe to acquire certain attributes of statehood. Their awareness of belonging to one national group, an Orthodox faith, language, common history, and the idea of territory—no matter how vague when it came to ethnic borders—were certainly important sources and support for the struggle for national liberation. This phase of the struggle was completed in 1835 with the Sretenje Constitution, the seed of Serbian statehood.[2]

In the second stage, a broader national program was established. In the middle of the 19th century, the image of the Serbian people and their borders, territory, characteristics, religion, customs, language, and most importantly, independent state structure, was gradually rounded and sharpened. Following the general trend of nationalism in Europe at that time, numerous ideas and plans were considered to complete the territory and create a state of all Serbs in the Balkans.

In the last phase, complete independence was realized. The Serbs, as a people with a reestablished independent state that was finally recognized among other peoples, appeared on the historical stage in 1878, finding their place in the community of the European peoples and the world. They incorporated themselves into the framework of world history and culture in a real and spiritual sense, gaining the basis for further development of their national being and cultural model. However, the newly created Serbian state's development was interrupted to some extent by the First World War and then again by its drowning in the wider Yugoslav community in 1918.[3]

The resurrection of the Serbian state after centuries of Turkish slavery was based primarily on two pillars of tradition. One important guardian of the collective national consciousness was the Serbian Orthodox Church as the bearer of Serbianness in the spiritual and organizational sense. The other epic tradition was folk singing, which expressed the memory of the Serbs' once glorious medieval history.

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[1] Jelavich and Jelavich, 1986; Ljušić, 2001b; Ljušić, 1986.

[2] Ćorović, 2003a; Radoš, 2005; Radoš, 2001.

[3] Ćorović, 2003b, p. 11.

From the very beginning and acquisition of autocephaly (1219), the Serbian Church had a double character; spiritual-religious but also national. Orthodoxy and sainthood as a special expression of the Serbian understanding of Orthodoxy were important elements of Serbian existence and survival under the Turks. The feeling of unity in constant temptations and struggles helped the Serbs build a sense of uniqueness and common spirituality. The Serbian Orthodox Church played a significant role in protecting the Serb population under the Turks. Despite all the problems, the church organization, whose strength varied, was the only mechanism that operated under the Turks, gathering the Serbian people around churches and monasteries and Serbian institutions.[4]

Historical myths, legends, epic songs and plays, and overall oral traditions were other important traditional elements of integration and national cohesion. Over the centuries, a whole world of national heroes has emerged, such as Kraljević Marko (Prince Marko) and the legend of Miloš Obilić. The myth of betrayal in Kosovo as the cause of defeat, although largely historically controversial, fueled and maintained the Serbs' national feeling. There are also the legends and songs about the *hajduks*, who were a kind of Balkan Robin Hood fighters for national and social justice. Among other things, this embellished and idealized but strong and convincing image of the past was a good basis and motive for fanning the uprising and gaining independence. Passing these myths and largely idealized views of the past from generation to generation, the Serbs encouraged themselves, and, at the same time, found solace in a life in Turkish slavery otherwise filled with misery, misfortune, and fear. According to many historians, these are the most important elements that enabled the survival of the Serbian national consciousness during almost five centuries of Turkish occupation.[5]

2. What is Serbia? National programs and territorial self-determination

The cultural centers from which the idea of uniting Serbs and restoring statehood were born during the 19th century were diverse and changeable, following time and the process of liberation. Before the First Serbian Uprising, they were university centers, primarily in the Habsbourg Monarchy (Novi Sad, Vienna, Pančevo, etc.). The intelligentsia and cultural life at that time were mostly related to Serbs from across the river Drina, the so-called Prečani, who were educated in cultural centers and universities in Central Europe (such as Vienna and Budapest). Only with the process of gradual liberation and Serbia's rise did new and increasingly important cultural centers in Belgrade, Kragujevac, and others emerge.[6]

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[4] Ljušić, 2001a.

[5] Ljušić, 2001a, p. 11.

[6] Gavrilovič, 1981, p. 463.

Therefore, the first circles of learned people in the newly liberated Serbia grew up first around church seats (like the circle around Metropolitan Stevan Stratimirović) or came from the ranks of Serbs in Austria (like the educator Dositej Obradović). Ideas about what Serbianness is, where her borders are, and her place in the family of European nations were first defined among these circles.[7] The visions about the territory where the Serbs lived and where the Serbian state should be renewed were quite vague. On the eve of the First Serbian Uprising, the Serbs had vague national programs, plans, and awareness of belonging to the nation, as well as a vague awareness of territory.

The idea of uniting all Serbs into one state was formed at the beginning of the 19th century as a program of national integration and creation of a nation-state within maximum limits. This phenomenon of the early 19th century was common among European nations that had experienced national awakenings during and after the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. During the national revival in the 19th century and after centuries of life without a state, Serbian scholars sought historical models to restore Serbian statehood. This 'sacred historical right' was mainly based on Dušan's short-lived Serbian empire from the 14th century, which was territorially the most extensive Serbian medieval state.[8]

At first, the insurgents placed their highest hopes in 'brotherly Russia.' In 1807, various Serbian high church dignitaries (Arsenije Gagović, Stevan Stratimirović) traveled to Russia and proposed plans to the Russian Tsar to renew the 'Slavic-Serbian Empire.' In 1807, Montenegrin Bishop Petar I Petrović Njegoš sent a plan to the Russian Tsar for the renewal of the Slavic-Serbian Empire, with the expansion of Montenegro to Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Dubrovnik, which would become the capital.[9] After the expulsion of the Turks from the Belgrade *pashaluq (Tur. District)*, the basic idea was to create a Serbian state. The national program was more clearly expressed after the Smederevo Assembly in 1805, especially after the battle of Deligrad and Mišar in 1806 and the final occupation of Belgrade. Under the influence of more educated Serbs from Srem, Banat, Bačka, and the 'Military Border,' the idea of a new Serbian state especially sought to include the Serbian people who lived under Austrian rule. The uprising thus became a struggle for the freedom of all people and Serbs outside the Belgrade *pashaluq*. Because it also became a struggle for national and social freedom due to its promise to abolish feudal relations, historians often call it the 'Serbian revolution.' Vague legends about the uprising and territorial aspirations spread from Bosnian Krajina to Dubrovnik and the Bay of Kotor, to Kosovo and Metohija, Southern Macedonia, Krajište and Zagorje, in the east behind Stara Planina and Timok, and south to Thessaly and Epirus. In some insurgent hopes, they even reached the Peloponnese. Ideas of liberating Serbia and the Balkans—'a free citizen in his country and a free peasant on his property'—were two achievements that were extremely attractive to both the broad masses of people and their neighbors.[10]

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[7] Among them are Gavrilović, 1983, p. 464.

[8] Lampe, 2000, p. 52.

[9] Plan Petra I Petrovića o formiranju slaveno-serbskoga carstva, http://www.njegos.org/petrovics/slavserb.htm
Pavlowitch, 2003, pp. 26–41.

National unification, a modern idea that was in full swing at the time and flooding the entire continent, flooded the Balkans as well. As the century of nationalism, the 19th century led to the inevitable disintegration of multinational states. The great empires shook under the onslaught of national energy, and legitimist and national ideas and movements collided, as did the conflicting national ideas themselves. More powerful nations oppressed those weaker, which often tied the ship of their national policy to a great power.

3. Prince Miloš's national program

The first Serbian national program in renewed Serbia was conceived in 1832 at the court of Prince Miloš in Kragujevac. It was, in fact, a plan for the propaganda and general uprising of Christians in European Turkey, presented by Prince Miloš at his court in Kragujevac to the British diplomat David Urquhart. This 'writing' would later serve as the basis for 'Načertanija' by Ilija Garašanin. Prince Miloš's ideas were further drawn and systematized by Urquhart. The concept of Miloš's plan, which can be expressed as Serbia's desire to escape from the Russian protectorate with the support of England and France, would serve the Polish political emigration's study of Serbian politics at the time. When the Serbian government began drafting a plan, František (Franjo) Zach, a member of the Polish political emigration who was of Czech descent, conveyed basic ideas from Urquhart's concept. Combining other sources, he offered the first national program to Interior Minister Ilija Garašanin, who would shape it into the 'Načertanija' of 1844.

According to Miloš's original program, the Serbian state should extend from Bihać in Bosnia to Dobrudja and Bitola and Shkodra in the south and to eastern Rumelia in the east. The Christian regions of European Turkey, together with Serbia and Montenegro, were to become part of that Serbian state. Propaganda, headed by the leaders, was to be spread in that territory, which was divided into eastern and western parts. The leaders had agents who would appoint chiefs in the *nahiyes*, which were the smallest administrative districts in the Ottoman Empire. These chiefs appointed serfs in the villages, who acted as one of the most important levers in the feudal social system. This secret organization's plan was arranged in such a way that no one was allowed to know anyone except their immediate superior. The entire organization was to be headed by the Supreme Administration, and Ilija Garašanin was intended to be the Supreme Head of the entire secret organization.[11]

Miloš the Great's policy toward Porta was determined primarily by the Great Powers' attitude toward Turkey and the treatment of the so-called 'Eastern Question,' with Turkey often considered ‘a sick man on the Bosphorus.’ From the Treaty of Edirne until the Paris Congress in 1856, the European powers’ attitude toward Turkey was the *status quo*, so national revolts and revolutionary movements in the Ottoman Empire were either ignored or even condemned. Therefore, Miloš was the first to consider that what Serbia got with the *Hatisherifs* from 1830 and 1833—a significant form of autonomy—was the most that could be obtained at that international political moment. However, it still encouraged ideas about renewing the Serbian state, even myths about renewing the Serbian empire, hoping to further weaken Turkey in the future under more favorable international circumstances. This primarily referred to Bosnia and Old Serbia, the sources of the largest number of immigrants to Miloš’s Serbia. In this setting, after 1830, Miloš developed a policy of secretly supporting popular movements in Turkey to achieve freedom at the right time. From 1834 to 1838, a series of riots broke out around Niš, Pirot, and Western Bulgaria, where Miloš appeared as a mediator to ease the people’s situation.

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[10] The Tican revolt in Srem and the Kruščica revolt in Banat broke out under the influence of these ideas and currents, Gavrilović, 1981, p. 92.

[11] Stojančević, 1969; Pavlović, 2009, pp. 26–41.

It was not far from the idea of liberating the Serbian people to the idea of cooperating and liberating other Christian peoples in the Balkans, for which Miloš and Serbia primarily sought associates in the Bosnian and Rumelia provinces. The first were Bulgarians, Greeks, and even Arbanasi, seen as potential allies with whom Miloš enjoyed a considerable reputation, especially among Bulgarians and in Bosnia. He had his trusted people from Sarajevo in Bosnia through Herzegovina and Montenegro and then among the Arbanasi (especially with the Mirdita tribe) to Prizren and Skopje in Rumelia.[12] Books were printed in Serbia and then distributed to priests and teachers in Bulgaria.[13]

In addition to Miloš’s, another document from that time is interesting for the then Serbian view of the national question. In Vuk Stefanović Karadžić’s writing, *All Serbs and Serbs of anywhere*, he advocated the thesis that all Štokavian speakers, regardless of religion, tradition, or regional affiliation, are Serbs. The document was published in 1849 in Vienna, as part of the book *Treasure box for the history, language, and customs of Serbs of all three laws* (Kovčežić za istoriju, jezik i običaje Srba sva tri zakona), but it was written in 1836, which is why some authors consider it the first project of ‘Greater Serbia.’[14]

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[12] Gavrilović, 1981, p. 145.

[13] Gavrilović, 1981, p. 272.

[14] In the article, Vuk claims that Serbs include all those who speak Serbian, and he calls all Shtokavian dialects Serbian. Thus, he concludes that there are ‘Serbs of three laws’ (i.e., religions), but only those of ‘Greek law’ (Orthodox faith) call themselves ‘Serbs’; the others ‘will not accept this name,’ so the ‘Turkish law’ they call Turks. They call themselves ‘Roman law’ ‘by the places where they live, for example, Slavonians, Bosnians (or Bosniaks), Dalmatians, Dubrovnik citizens, or in Bačka Bunjevci, in Srem, Slavonia. and Croatia Šokci, and around Dubrovnik and in Boca Latins.’ Vuk believed that the Štokavian dialect was Serbian and that only the Čakavian dialect could be the true Croatian vernacular, while the Kajkavian dialect was Slovenian. Therefore, it was appropriate to apply this theory to the territory inhabited mostly by Croats, reduced to Istria, the northern Adriatic coast, and most of the Adriatic islands. Although this was not Vuk’s original idea, but an opinion present in the early Slavic studies of the 19th century (Josef Dobrovský, Pavel Josef Šafařik), some of Vuk’s contemporaries assessed it as bias and nationalism. Malcom, 1995.

4. National policy of the Ustavobranitelji ('Defenders of the Constitution') (1842–1858)

The Ustavobranitelji's national policy was a kind of paradox. Although they and Prince Alexander were considered Turkophiles, serious work began in their time on the program for national liberation and the creation of the Serbian state. In that sense, they were in connection and cooperation with the so-called Illyrian movement. The Illyrian newspaper 'Branislav' was published in Belgrade, from where it was secretly sent to Austria. In addition, the Ustavobranitelji members and Miloš sought to achieve the widest possible cooperation—including not only the Serbs in the Balkans but all nations—to gradually liberate themselves from Turkish rule and create a nation-state. To achieve that, the regime developed dynamic propaganda activity and offered help to neighboring nations. Garašanin's commissioners covered the Balkan Peninsula from Bosnia to Bulgaria and from the Habsburg Monarchy to Macedonia.[15]

Of all the national programs created in Serbia in the modern age, Ilija Garašanin's Načertanija, written in 1844, had by far the greatest significance. Garašanin was the Minister of the Interior of the Ustavobranitelji government, and the document was created based on the document draft of František Zach, a Czech agent of the Pan-Slavic movement. It was a secret document that determined the directions of Serbia's foreign policy, leading her toward national unification, neighboring countries, and the Great Powers. The Načertanija remained secret until the beginning of the 20th century, but it was also the foundation of Serbian politics until the beginning of the First World War. All later programs originated from the Načertanija and emphasized a modernized version of Pan-Slavism.

Contrary to Zach's concept, which emphasized Pan-Slavism, Garašanin's Načertanija was in line primarily with Serbian national goals and diminished its distinctly anti-Turkish character. The essence of the Načertanija is reflected in the following statement: 'From this knowledge comes the *certa* and the foundation of Serbian politics, that it is not limited to planting borders, but that it seeks to embrace all the Serbian peoples that surround it.'[16] Unlike Zach's concept, Garašanin left open the possibility of cooperation between Serbian and Russian politics in the Balkans, provided that Russia pursued its policy sincerely. According to this document, the national goals were to be achieved primarily through cultural and educational activities among the Serbian people and the unliberated Serbs in Turkey and the Habsburg monarchy. The Načertanija emphasized for the first time the principle of unifying all Serbs and thereby left the theoretical foundation of Serbian nationalism in the 19th and 20th centuries.[17]

The ideas of national romanticism that flourished in Central Europe in 1848 only slightly touched Serbia. For the most part, the Serbian public at the time thought that the rights demanded by the revolutionary movements in Europe had already been won in Serbia. Revolutionary ideas among young liberals about the complete liberation of the Turkish government and the renewal of 'Dusan's empire' found few supporters among the people. They remained a lonely, isolated attempt by young idealists, who were educated mainly in the Habsbourg Monarchy and united in associations of mostly students and high school students (e.g., Dušan's regiment).

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[15] Stranjaković, 1932; Gavrilović, 1981, p. 273.

[16] Garašanin, 1844.

[17] Jakšič and Vučković, 1963, pp. 430–466.

5. The foreign policy of Prince Mihailo (1860–1868)

Mihailo was the second son of Prince Miloš and Ljubica Obrenović. After his father abdicated, he and his father went into exile. However, soon after the death of his older brother Milan, he ascended to the throne of Serbia. Since he was a minor, he was temporarily replaced by a Viceroyalty consisting of Jevrem Obrenović, Toma Vučić Perišić, and Avram Petronijević. He was overthrown in a revolt led by Toma Vučić Perišić. Afterward, he traveled to Europe and married Countess Julia Hunyadi.

After Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjević and the Ustavobranitelji were overthrown at the St. Andrew's Assembly, Mihailo returned to Serbia. Following his father's death in 1860, he became the Prince of Serbia for the second time. This time he had more experience in diplomacy and government. One of his great successes was removing Ottoman fortresses, crews, and fleets from Serbia. Prince Mihailo was the first to have the idea of creating a Balkan alliance, but due to distrust toward Montenegro and Bulgaria, that alliance was never reached. He was killed in 1868 in the assassination in Košutnjak.

The most significant results Prince Mihailo achieved during his rule were in foreign policy. To achieve these, he skillfully used his wife, who was of Hungarian origin. Through Countess Julia Hunyadi de Kethelj,[18] he wanted to get closer to the Hungarians who at that time nurtured good relations with the Viennese court. Of course, he also had sympathizers in the Austrian capital, such as Vuk Stefanović Karadžić. His highlights include two significant foreign policy endeavors, although complete unification of the Balkans against the Turks could not be accomplished due to his untimely death.

His first outstanding foreign policy achievement occurred when, after a long initiative in 1867, the Turkish garrisons left the six fortified Serbian cities.[19] This would not have been possible without the help of the Great Powers. France and Russia supported the initiative, while Austria and Great Britain called for caution. The issue was finally resolved when the Habsburgs changed their position and sided with the Serbs, counting on strengthening their influence in the Balkans.[20]

The principality's second great foreign policy achievement was forming the First Balkan Alliance.[21] Mihailo set his goal as overthrowing the Ottoman government, which is why he tried to ally with other countries in the region that were under the

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[18] Jovanović, Kovčić and Nikolić, 2018.

[19] Jelavich, I, 1996, p. 220.

[20] Ćorović, 2001.

[21] For more information see: Sotirović, 2008, pp. 65–82.

Turkish yoke. Ilija Garašanin, Serbia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, played a major role in forming the Alliance. Serbia and other countries in the region were clear that power over the Balkans could be very attractive to the Great Powers. Consequently, they wanted to fight the Turks on their own, as they did not want to fall under Austrian or Russian governance.[22] The European crisis helped form the Alliance. In 1866, Prussia defeated Austria, which was most opposed to Serbian expansion, and space was opened to create an alliance. Montenegro joined the agreement in 1866, followed by Greece in 1867 and Romania in 1868. However, implementation of the plan was hampered by Mihail's death.

6. The foreign policy of Milan and Aleksandar Obrenović (1872–1903)

Prince Milan Obrenović assumed governance of the state in 1872; until then, the Viceroyalty had ruled in his place. He was not a favorite ruler, in part due to his debauched life and the fact that he could not adopt Pan-Slavic feelings. He supported the uprising against the Turks in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1875, but it was too late. He was also under internal pressure. The Serbian uprising of 1876 ended in a catastrophic defeat, and Serbia was saved by the fact that Russia joined the war in 1877 and defeated the Turkish forces. England prevented the conquest of Turkey's capital by sending a navy to the region, forcing Russian forces to stop. Russia's foreign policy at that time was determined by territorial expansion to the detriment of Turkey, and she often supported the Balkan countries that aspired to independence, including Serbia.

The Russo-Turkish war ended with the Peace of San Stefano,[23] and the warring parties made peace without involving the Great Powers. The agreement also affected the Balkan countries: Montenegro's territory doubled, while Serbia and Romania became independent states. Serbia got Niš and Novi Pazar, and Romania got Northern Dobruja. However, the real winner was Bulgaria, which annexed Macedonia and part of the northern coast of the Aegean Sea. Serbia, who aspired to certain parts of Macedonia, was dissatisfied, but since Russia supported Bulgaria in this matter, it could only expect support from Austria.[24]

The Great Powers did not accept peace; Great Britain and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy forced Russia to consider the issue again. Nor did the Berlin Congress[25] give an advantage to the Serbs. Greater Bulgaria was abolished, but the Austro-Hungarian

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[22] Jelavich, I., 1996, p. 294–295.

[23] The Russo-Turkish war of 1877–78 ended with the Peace of San Stefano on January 31, 1878. In an agreement made without the involvement of the Great Powers, Turkey had to pay war reparations, and Russia got Bessarabia.

[24] Jelavich, II., 1996, pp. 30–31.

[25] The Berlin Congress was held between June 13 and July 13, 1878. The Great Powers, Turkey, and the Balkan countries participated in creating an agreement under which Bulgaria lost Thrace, Macedonia, and her territories south of the Balkans, which became autonomous territories. Ottoman Empire. Serbia got the region of Pirot, Romania, and the South Dobruja. The Monarchy could occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina for 30 years; England got the island of Cyprus.

Monarchy gained the right to supervise Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Novi Pazar's Sandžak. For Serbia, which claimed the rights to these territories, it was a real disaster. Nation-states were formed, but since the borders were not drawn on ethnic grounds but to maintain a balance of power, ethnic problems still made the territory difficult to manage.

Russia and the Monarchy practically shared the right to control the Balkans, and Serbia fell under the sphere of interests of the latter great power. Subsequently, Serbia's foreign policy has been determined by her relationship with Vienna. In that spirit, one trade agreement[26] was signed and then one political[27] agreement.[28] The latter meant Serbia's dependence, which caused a crisis in the country. However, Milan still relied on the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which supported Serbia's transformation into a kingdom. The ruler took the title of king in 1882.

Serbia was saved by Vienna in 1885 when Milan attacked Bulgaria over territorial disputes. Many thought that the state of Alexander Battenberg would be easy prey for Serbia, considering that the prince lost favor with the Russians due to internal political skirmishes. However, in 1886, the Bulgarian army defeated the Serb forces near Slivnica. The war quickly ended with strong intervention by the Monarchy, and the conclusion of peace left the borders intact.

After Milan's abdication, his son Aleksandar Obrenović inherited the throne in 1889. As he was a minor, the Viceroyalty ruled Serbia until 1893. At that time, the Monarchy did not consider Serbia a serious source of danger. However, Russia realized that it should not have supported Bulgaria against Serbia because of Bulgaria's lack of gratitude. King Alexander visited Petrograd in 1891, where Tsar Alexander III promised that he would not allow the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that he would help Serbia in her actions in Macedonia.[29]

During his reign, King Aleksandar had changeable relations with Russia and the Monarchy. In 1892, he relied on the Liberal Party instead of the Radical Party, which was close to Russia, and reestablished the constitution from 1869.[30] He returned from exile, and appointed his father Milan, who was in favor of the Monarchy, as the supreme commander of the army. Naturally, Russia did not like that move.

Aleksandar's marriage also contributed to getting closer to Russia. The king married a ten-year-old widow, Draga Mašin, which caused great indignation among his entourage. The parents opposed the marriage, and the Serbian government resigned. In that tense situation, the emperor hurried to the ruler's aid, supporting the marriage. The resulting improvement in relations was that, to balance the influence of the Monarchy, Russia opened a consulate in Serbia. However, a military coup was organized against Aleksandar in June 1903, and the conspirators killed the royal family. Petar Karadjordjević then returned to the throne from exile.

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[26] The Monarchy supported the conclusion of agreements, according to which it could supply her industrial products on favorable terms.

[27] Under a treaty signed in 1881, the two countries pledged neutrality in case the other went to war with someone else. In addition, Vienna supported Serbia‘s territorial claims to the south; Milan, in turn, had to promise that before concluding the agreement with other states, it would first negotiate with the Monarchy. Jelavich, II., 1996. p. 31.

[28] Ćorović, 2001.

[29] Ćorović, 2001.

[30] Jelavich, II., 1996, p. 33.

7. Foreign policy of Peter I Karadjordjević and wars to liberate Kosovo and South Serbia

The new king denied that he was in any way connected with the assassination; despite these protests, there were indications in the foreign press, even in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.[31] Petar was raised in Genf and Paris, so he was not well acquainted with Serbian internal relations. However, he immediately introduced radical changes in foreign policy. Instead of central powers, especially the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, he sought alliances with France and Russia. Of course, the Habsburgs could not accept that, and consequently, trade conflicts broke out between the two countries. In addition, Serbs and Bulgarians wanted to conclude an agreement[32] that violated the Monarchy's interests. In 1908, Vienna responded with an embargo which prevented livestock from being exported to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy's territory. The intimidation failed, and Serbia became even closer to France and Russia.[33]

Serbia refused to renounce Bosnia and Herzegovina and expected Russia's support in that. The conflict deepened after Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. The Great Powers resolved the situation that threatened to start an armed conflict. Seeing the unity, Russia also stopped supporting the Serbs, and on March 30, along with England, France, and Italy, she called on the Serbs to recognize the annexation.[34]

The Russians played a double game in this matter, as they later tried to turn the Balkan states against Austria-Hungary; among them, of course, was Serbia. However, control was increasingly slipping out of Russian hands, and Serbia and her neighbors were beginning to unite against the Ottoman Empire. The Balkan Alliance was established by an agreement signed between Serbia and Bulgaria in March 1912. Among other things, it determined the division of certain parts of Macedonia. Greece and Montenegro joined the Alliance, and while the Great Powers realized, Montenegro attacked Turkey. Almost immediately, Montenegro's allies got involved and quickly achieved success. Austria-Hungary and Russia, which were interested in maintaining the *status quo* with Turkey, immediately issued warnings. Under the influence of the Great Powers, the parties stopped fighting, and in 1913, the Treaty of London was concluded, ending the First Balkan War.[35]

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[31] Népszava, 1903. június 13. p. 1.

[32] Based on an agreement in 1905, the two countries agreed to establish a real trade alliance in 1917.

[33] Jelavich, II., 1996, p. 34.

[34] Hornyák, 2005.

[35] Jelavich, II., 1996, pp. 89–92.

During the war, the Ottoman Empire lost a large part of its European territories. The Great Powers, especially Austria-Hungary, which, with Italy's support, did not want Serbia to expand toward the Adriatic, created an independent Albania. Serbia was thus left without the long-awaited ports, and because of that, it submitted a request with Greece for Macedonian territories intended for Bulgaria. A secret alliance was soon formed against Bulgaria, which preventively building on a quick military success, attacked Serbia on June 29 and Greece on June 30. Romania, Montenegro, and Turkey joined the fight against Bulgaria. The Second Balkan war ended in the absolute defeat of Bulgaria. The Peace of Bucharest, signed in 1913, regulated the division of Macedonia and strengthened the formation of Albania. Serbia's territory, along with the Macedonian territories, had almost doubled.

Serbia's strengthening sharpened its differences with Austria-Hungary. In the Balkan wars, exhausted Serbia was not interested in participating in the new conflict, but members of the Black Hand[36] organization[37] were not satisfied with Prime Minister Nikola Pašić because they did not believe he acted strongly enough in advocating Pan-Slavic ideas. Based on the organization leader's suggestion, it was decided to assassinate the heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Prime Minister opposed the assassination, fearing international sanctions but was unable to prevent it. Thus, in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, Gavrilo Princip[38] killed the heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, thus starting the First World War.[39]

At the beginning of the war, the elderly Petar handed over the tasks of governing the country to his son Aleksandar, who ruled the country as a regent until 1921. As World War II is not the subject of this chapter, we deal only with Serbia and the background of the later Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians.

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[36] For more information see: Szeghő, 2014.

[37] Unification or death is a secret military organization better known as the Black Hand and was founded by Dragutin Dimitrijevic Apis in 1911. Its goals included preparing to unite Serbs into one state. To realize their plans, they did not distance themselves from committing terrorist acts. These were not carried out by a membership of Serbian military officers, but mostly by young Serb nationalists on the other side of the border. After the outbreak of World War II, the contradictions between the organization and the regent became so strong that Alexander, with the help of the White Hand organization, eliminated the leaders of the Black Hand. Dragutin Dimitrijevic Apis was convicted in Thessalonica and executed along with several of his associates.

[38] Gavrilo Princip (Obljaj, July 25, 1894–Theresienstadt, April 28, 1918), was a Bosnian terrorist of Serbian origin. He was a member of the terrorist organization Young Bosnia, whose goal was to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia. He killed the heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand, on the orders of the Black Hand organization and tried to commit suicide after the assassination. As he failed, he was brought before the court with his associates. Because he was young, he could not be sentenced to death, so he received 20 years in prison. Princip did not live to see the end of World War II; he died of tuberculosis on April 28, 1918. His identity has been disputed to this day—some consider him a fighter for Serbian freedom, while others see him as the king's assassin and a terrorist.

[39] Tarján M., (without date)

8. Challenges of Yugoslav integration

8.1. Yugoslavia as a monarchy (1918–1941)

The ideas of Pan-Slavism and Yugoslavism, which lived in cultural circles in the Balkans, met their time by coinciding with the interests of the victorious Great Powers. The enormous strategic significance of integrating the South Slavic community after 1918 as a barrier to Pan-Germanism and German expansion paved the way for this idea, although it was not generally accepted among the South Slavic peoples. Thus, after the end of the First World War, a state was created on the ruins of the Habsburg Empire, which gathered the South Slavs who lived in the territories of Serbia, Montenegro, and the Slavic parts of Austria-Hungary. At the beginning of the First World War, the Kingdom of Serbia set the unification of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians as her war goals by adopting the Niš Declaration on December 7, 1914. The formation of the Yugoslav Committee in London in 1915 and the Montenegrin Committee for National Unification in 1917 soon followed. Negotiations regarding the organization of the future state were conducted directly on two occasions: in Corfu in 1917 when the Corfu Declaration was adopted, and in Geneva in 1918 when the Geneva Agreement was signed. After the war, the State of Slovenians, Croats, and Serbs was formed in Zagreb under the leadership of the Yugoslav Committee, while the Montenegrin delegates at the disputed Podgorica Assembly simultaneously decided on Montenegro's accession to Serbia. At the same time, on November 25, the delegates of the Grand National Assembly of Vojvodina decided to directly join the Kingdom of Serbia. Serbia's unification with the countries of the independent state of Slovenians, Croats, and Serbs into a single Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians was proclaimed by Regent Aleksandar I Karadjordjević on behalf of his father, King Peter I Karadjordjević, on December 1, 1918.[40]

The Great World War ended with negotiations, and the Peace of Versailles between the victorious Allied coalition and Germany was signed on June 28 in the old royal court in Paris. The Allied goal in Germany was to 'destroy the militaristic spirit forever.' The treaty with the small Austrian Republic, which remained after the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy, was concluded on September 10, 1919, in Saint-Germain; with Hungary at Trianon on June 4, 1920; and with Bulgaria in Neji on November 27 of the same year. The last, and more formally for the Yugoslavs, was peace with Turkey in Sèvres on August 10, 1920.[41] With these agreements, the newly created Slavic state became the largest Balkan country. Following unification, the issue of the country's external borders, which were disputed in many places, was considered. After its founding in 1918, at least one border, that with Albania, was a continuous place of low-intensity conflict. Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy, and partly Austria were also considered hostile neighbors. Thus, the Carinthian issue was resolved in a referendum in which it was decided that Carinthia would remain part of Austria. The Dalmatian port of Zadar and several Dalmatian islands fell to Italy, which tried to occupy and annex Montenegro. Hungary resisted the 'shredding' of St. Stephen's crown for a long time, but in the end, they had to give in. Bulgaria ceded the Strumica area to Yugoslavia, and in Neji, the strategically important sections of Caribrod and Bosiljgrad within the old borders. Initially, under the government of Aleksandar Stamboliyski, Bulgaria was friendly; after his assassination in 1923, relations with subsequent governments were strained.[42]

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[40] For the historical context and preconditions for forming Yugoslavia, see: Ekmečć, 1989; Čulinović, 1961, p. 5; Petranović, 1988, p. 15; Mitrović, 2012, pp. 17–33.

[41] More about the origin of Yugoslavia and different visions: Petranović, 1988a, pp. 3–30; Mitrović, 1969.; Bataković, 2008; Dimić, 2001; Petranović and Zečević, 1991; Matković, 1998.

Under pressure from England and France, Yugoslavia relented on November 20, 1920, and signed an agreement with Italy in Rapallo. The city of Rijeka was proclaimed the Free State of Rijeka. However, it was soon occupied, and then, in 1924, annexed by Italy. Tensions around the border with Italy continued, as Italy sought more Dalmatian coasts. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians sought Istria, part of the former Austrian coast, which had been annexed by Italy but had a large Slovenian and Croatian population. On January 27, 1924, the Yugoslav government reached an agreement with the Italian government. It recognized the annexation of Rijeka to Italy and concluded a pact of friendship and mutual assistance to preserve the order created by the peace treaties.[43]

As a new addition to the map of Europe after the First World War, a remarkably diverse, Yugoslav state oscillated dramatically during its existence and wandered in search of its place in the world. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia first maintained close and tight relations with the Allies of the First World War, especially the traditional allies France and the United Kingdom, between 1920 and 1934. In France, in the interwar period, the Yugoslav cultural and political elite were educated. During the first decade, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes 'tied her small boat to a French ship,' seeking to use Francophone politics and participation in regional alliances such as the Little Entente in 1920 (with Czechoslovakia and Romania) and the Balkan Pact in 1934 (with Greece, Romania, and Turkey) to stabilize the status of war winner. The world economic crisis of the 1930s and the change in power relations in Europe led to increasing economic, and thus foreign policy, opening toward Italy and Germany.

The winner of the First World War was first recognized as a pillar of the so-called Versailles order. It sought to develop close cooperation, primarily with Czechoslovakia and Romania. The seal of this cooperation was King Alexander's marriage to the Romanian Princess Maria in 1922. The Little Entente, a military-political alliance of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, was founded in 1920. The cooperation of these countries was based on the need to remove the threat caused by the revision of the Versailles Order of the Outcomes of the First

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[42] Čulinović, 1961, p. 298.

[43] The Neptune Conventions of June 20, 1925, regulated the main traffic and legal issues related to Rijeka. Čulinović, 1961. p. 306.; Mitrović, 2012, p. 303 and on.

World War, to which Italy, Hungary, Austria, and Bulgaria were committed. However, the alliance soon disintegrated because the Kingdom of SCS did not participate in Romania and Czechoslovakia's actions against Hungary. In response to growing Italian expansionism, the Royal Yugoslav Government signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Great Britain and France in 1927. In 1934, for a similar reason, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Greece, Romania, and Turkey established the Balkan Pact, which was intended to maintain balance on the Balkan Peninsula. The alliance existed until the beginning of the Second World War when Yugoslavia declared neutrality (1939), which is why it could not side with Greece when Italy attacked it. The definitive end of the alliance occurred in 1940 when Romania joined the Triple Alliance and the 'Axis Powers' of Germany-Italy-Japan.[44]

The Kingdom of Italy under Mussolini had even stronger territorial aspirations against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and allied with Albania, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, states with similar state plans. In Italy, certain elements were opposed from day one to creating a greater Yugoslavia because they did not want to have a strong and consolidated neighbor on the east coast of the Adriatic Sea that they believed could become their rival. Mussolini's idea was for Italy to take on the role of the ancient Roman Empire, become a real empire, and be the leading power in the Mediterranean. In that sense, Italy worked against the interests of Yugoslavia in Albania and soon managed to completely oust her. On November 27, 1926, the Albanian leader, Ahmed Zogu, allied with Italy, which very quickly became an Italian protectorate. Then, on September 1, 1928, Ahmed Zogu proclaimed himself king.[45]

In the 1930s, Germany and Italy ruthlessly trampled on all international agreements and their obligations, seeking a new world order. The rise of Nazi Germany and its rapprochement with fascist Italy destabilized these alliances. Like other countries in the region, Yugoslavia was reluctant to adapt to this change by approaching Germany, so Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović and Prince Regent Pavle Karadjordjević met with Hitler. After King Aleksandar Karadjordjević was assassinated in Marseilles on October 9, 1934, by terrorists supported by Italy, Milan Stojadinović's foreign policy sought to neutralize the anti-state element of the extreme Croatian and Macedonian emigration, which had their strongholds in these countries, by approaching Italy and Germany. Stojadinović himself was fascinated by the idea that he could keep Yugoslavia neutral during a new war. He was replaced by Prince Regent, Pavle Karadjordjević, in an attempt to persuade Croatian circles to a state agreement and preserve the divided country's stability. However, even after the agreement was reached on March 25, 1937, relations with Italy failed to become much more sincere. Rome continued to be the source of all troubles, and most Yugoslavs rejected Germany's inherited anti-German mood and revisionism, especially the harsh methods of force used against the Czechs and Poles. Milan Stojadinović's policy of relying on the Axis powers, therefore, had no support among the people, although it brought certain practical results.[46] The involuntary rapprochement with Germany culminated in Yugoslavia's accession to the Triple Alliance on March 25, 1941. The pact was signed under much more favorable conditions than with other countries; Yugoslavia was formally promised neutrality and access to the port of Thessaloniki. With the overthrow of the Cvetković-Maček government, which signed this pact in a coup two days later, and the new government's failure to cancel the pact, Yugoslavia became the target of the Axis powers' revenge. She was defeated in the short-lived April War, occupied, divided among the victorious powers, and temporarily wiped off Europe's political map.[47]

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[44] More in Sladek, 2019.

[45] Mitrović, 2012, p. 32; Petranović, 1988, p. 163; Čulinović, 1961, pp. 304–306.

The attitude toward the first socialist country, the USSR, was extremely hostile. Apart from ideological reasons, there was also the important fact that the Bolsheviks killed members of the imperial family, otherwise closely related to the Karadjordjević dynasty. Moreover, they systematically encouraged revolutions in other countries, including Yugoslavia, through the Comintern. During the interwar period, the Communists were one of the most aggressive anti-state elements until the second half of the 1930s, when they gradually changed their policy toward Yugoslavia. There was warming at the end of the thirties, but Yugoslavia only established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in June 1940, among the last European countries to recognize the USSR.[48]

The Commissar Government of Milan Aćimović was soon established after the collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. It was followed by the Government of National Salvation, which was formed on August 29, 1941 and replaced the former Quisling administration. The intent was to calm the uprisings, stifling the resistance movement and bringing order to the authority of General Milan Nedić. During the entire occupation period, the Serbian Quisling government was de facto subordinated to the German military administration known as the Territory of the Military Commander of Serbia (German: Militärverwaltung in Serbien). The German military administration was formed in 1941, after the invasion of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Unlike the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), the Germans never enabled international recognition for the puppet regime in occupied Serbia. Serbia had the status of a country under full occupation, and it could not have official diplomatic relations with the Axis powers.[49]

8.2. Yugoslavia as a Federal Socialist Republic (1945–1990)

The idea of Yugoslavism underwent a significant transformation after the Second World War. Yugoslavia was territorially expanded, but because of that, the internal organization was drastically changed. The unitary monarchy began to federalize with the formation of the Banovina of Croatia in 1939, and from this, the union of six socialist republics was formed in 1945. Two provinces were established in Serbia's territory. However, the borders in Yugoslavia at that time, at least according to Tito, were 'lines on granite' (a type of stone). However, since the beginning of the 1960s, the national question has played an increasingly important role in the federation, and in the 1970s, the republics gained such power that constitutional experts considered the SFRY as almost a confederation. At the same time, after 1945, there was a significant change in the ethnic picture in Vojvodina and Dalmatia, where the ethnic revenge policy led to the complete expulsion of the German Volksdeutscher and Italians. The harsh regime toward the Hungarians was alleviated after Machash Rakoshi intervened and the rapprochement of the two 'fraternal' communist regimes.[50]

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[46] Pavlović, 2009; Petranović, I. 1988a, pp. 304–305.

[47] More in: Petranović, 1989.

[48] Petranović, 1988a, pp. 360 and further; Mitrović, 2012, pp. 71–101, 252–294.

[49] Dimitrijević, 2011, pp. 38–44; Petranović, 1989, p. 746.

After the Second World War, the revolutionary victory, and the coming to power of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the foreign policy orientation changed radically. The Soviet Union, the archenemy of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, became a key foreign policy partner and protector by 1948, and there was a rift between the Yugoslav and Soviet communists. Initially, in all spheres of society, all communist countries in Eastern Europe followed Soviet policy and completely imitated the Soviet social model. At first, Yugoslavia was extremely negatively oriented toward the United States and Western capitalist world. In the summer of 1946, the Yugoslav army even shot down two American planes, creating a major incident and an element of discord. Only after the attack from the USSR and the Inform Bureau's resolution condemning the Yugoslav communist leadership was Yugoslavia forced to look for an alternative and play for a 'third way.' US policy was becoming a tactic to 'keep Tito swimming.' In the context of the Cold War, this meant their support for Tito was to be followed by other communist countries in the Eastern Bloc. This policy, created in leading US circles in the early 1950s, was more or less implemented until the end of the Cold War era.[51]

The dispute between Yugoslavia and Italy over the city of Trieste and its surroundings lasted for a whole decade after the end of the war and threatened to turn into an armed conflict. It was a permanent cause of discord in relations with Italy and the West. The border with Greece was also porous, allowing aid to be supplied to the Greek communists, the losing side in the civil war, and against the will of the USSR. After the split with the Informbiro, the borders with Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania became scenes of incidents in which numerous border guards on both sides were killed. With relations normalized, the neighborhood ceased to be an open enemy but was viewed with suspicion. Yugoslavia, with rare exceptions, sought its foreign policy partners outside the Balkan region.[52]

The Balkan Pact, which took force on May 29, 1953, is a military-political alliance formed by Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey whose motive was defense against external aggression by the USSR and its satellites. The situation in the USSR was not entirely clear even after Stalin's death (March 1953), so creating an alliance was a kind of additional guarantee of potential Western support. Yugoslavia had already begun to receive material and military aid from the United States, so a closer alliance with its new NATO partners was an additional guarantee to the American side that Yugoslavia would not engage in an easy reconciliation with the USSR after Stalin's departure. Reconciliation with Greece and closer relations with Turkey gave importance to the entire region and thus to Yugoslavia. One of the pact's extremely important motives was solving the status of the border with Italy. Yugoslavia had a very firm stance on the status of the territories liberated by the partisans and the city of Trieste. The transition of the 'Trieste question' from the sphere of the Cold War confrontation as it was in the beginning to the dispute between the allies (Italy) and potential ally (Yugoslavia) gave the Yugoslav side an incomparably better diplomatic negotiating position. The Alliance also enabled closer cooperation with the West without joining NATO. Yugoslavia showed interest in the idea of forming a European defense community, which was discussed at the time. The discussion was initiated by the United States to encourage stronger European integration and renew West Germany's military role.[53]

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[50] More in Petranović, 1988b, pp. 67–99.; See also Dimić, 2001.; Matković, 1998.

[51] Contextualization of all relationships in Bekić, 1988, pp. 229–251, 368–382, 411–432; Petranović, 1988b, p. 152.; Tripković, 2012; Bogetić, 2010.

[52] Petranović, 1988b, p. 162; More on the Trieste crisis in Dimitrijević and Bogetić, 2009.

After 1948, Yugoslavia first found herself in short-term isolation, as all her neighbors belonged to either the capitalist West (Italy, Austria, and Greece) or the Soviet East (Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania). The humorous acronym that Yugoslavia was surrounded by BRIGAMA (Serbian for WORRIES) was that each letter of the word was the initial letter of the name of a neighboring country. To legitimize her unusual position as a communist country economically aided by the capitalist West, Yugoslavia resorted to a policy during the Cold War of balancing between opposing blocs and vigorously developing relations with non-aligned countries. As a result, she found herself among the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, which was Yugoslavia's third and final basic foreign policy doctrine. At the same time, the 'Third Way' brought distant Afro-Asian countries closer to the Yugoslavs, but also distanced them geographically and politically from their immediate surroundings.[54]

Josip Broz Tito played a key role in creating and developing the movement. Trying to strengthen Yugoslavia's role as one of the founders of the movement, he spent a huge part of his time forging contacts with statesmen of non-aligned countries. At the initiative of Tito and Nasser, the Conference of Heads of States or Governments of Non-Aligned Nations was organized in Belgrade in September 1961 and was attended by representatives of 25 countries plus three observers. In the following years, despite the resistance of superpowers and contradictions among the non-aligned countries, the institution of periodic conferences came to life, and the number of participants grew. Increasing the number of members strengthened the specific weight of the movement, but at the cost of its cohesion. The great differences between the members and their mutual conflicts threatened the movement's unity during the eighties, and the crisis and collapse of the socialist bloc called into question its purpose, as seen at the last conference in Belgrade (1989) near Yugoslavia's end.[55]

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[53] More in Dimitrijević, 2003; Bogetić, 2010, pp. 27–34.

[54] More in Bogetić, 2010.

[55] Gedis, 2003, pp. 224–227, 269–272; Bogetić, 2012, pp. 13–18.

Socialist Yugoslavia pursued a dynamic foreign policy, symbolized in the activities of Josip Broz Tito, the head of the party and state. Even during the war, he made direct contact with Churchill and Stalin. However, Yugoslavia's true breakthrough on the international scene occurred after her exit from the Eastern bloc, the opening to the West, normalization with the East, and taking one of the key positions in the movement of non-aligned countries. Maintaining this position, Tito met with the world's leading politicians for the rest of his life. After becoming Yugoslav president (1953), Josip Broz Tito visited seventy countries, many of them several times, leading as many as 160 state delegations (38 to socialist countries, 35 to the West, 87 to Third World countries).[56]

During the Cold War, the importance of Yugoslavia and the role she played in international relations significantly outweighed her size and importance. The door was open not only to political and economic cooperation but also to receipt of global cultural influences, and vice versa, Yugoslav sports, tourism, art, science, music, and film also crossed borders. This exchange provided the Yugoslav model of self-governing socialism with not only recognizability but also a kind of popularity. The country was visited by the world's most influential statesmen (Khrushchev, Nixon, Brezhnev, Ford, Nehru, Nasser, etc.), world-famous actors, scientists, and even astronauts, as well as a growing number of tourists, both from the West and East. Pablo Picasso made a poster for the film *Neretva*, while the film *Walter Defends Sarajevo* became a hit in China. Ivo Andrić became the first Yugoslav Nobel laureate, the world's leading philosophers gathered at the summer school in Korčula, and Sarajevo hosted the Winter Olympic Games (1984). 'Ordinary' Yugoslavs also travelled; with passports, it was easy to enter most countries of the world without visas. However, Yugoslavia's position was largely conditioned by the bipolar context of the Cold War, the end of which found it without a new concept. The crisis that deepened Yugoslav society after Tito's death led to the state's disintegration, international isolation, and war. After this, all of Yugoslavia's successors tried with varying success to attain membership in the European Union and thus redefine their position in the world.[57]

8.3. Slobodan Milosevic's regime–Bloody disintegration and slow transition (1990–2000)

At the end of the eighties, while the Eastern European communist regimes were declining in power one after another, the unreformed Communist Party of Serbia was in power in Serbia under it received the new name of the Socialist Party of Serbia. Slobodan Milošević managed to successfully impose nationalist ideas on communist ideology and left-wing phraseology and present himself as a protector of Serbian interests in the wars that marked the disintegration of the SFRY. The Milosevic regime initially supported conservative communist structures in the USSR, hoping that the coup there and the return to the old would enable him to stay in power longer. The regime also tried to find an alternative to European integration, trying to get as close as possible to Russia and China in foreign policy. From the very beginning, Milošević was faced with two types of pressure. One came from within: the aspirations for democratization and the essential deviation and dismantling of the communist system by opposition parties and citizens. The second was the international community's pressure, which, in addition to the democratization that was still in the background, sought to use it to solve the national question in the Balkans and end the wars for Yugoslav's heritage. In the conflict over the concept and manner of unfolding the crisis, the West, the United States, and Germany sided with Croatia and Slovenia. The situation was complicated by the bloody war in Bosnia, where Milošević, as in the case of Serbs from Croatia, first emerged as a factor that encouraged Serb nationalism and aspirations and then pushed against the wall after the 1995 Dayton Accord became a 'guarantor of peace and stability.'

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[56] Petrović, 2010, pp. 318–324

[57] Petrović, 2012, pp. 319–324.

The International Community's policy of sanctions and coercion inevitably contributed to the economic difficulties and citizens' suffering, and thus to the public's long-term dissatisfaction with Milošević's government. However, this potentially 'positive' outcome had other counterproductive effects that allowed the regime to consolidate power. Coercion and sanctions did not weaken Milošević's control over the ruling party coalition, 'gray' economy, coercive apparatus, and media, but increased the new elite's dependence on the regime. Illegal breaking of the blockade and deep-rooted corruption, along with various ways of drawing citizens' foreign currency savings, had become a constant source of government revenue. It thus strengthened the military and police forces, 'bought' social peace and votes, and even financed private business ventures.

Although it accelerated the process of disintegrating Serbia's already weak economy, the bombing of the NATO pact in 1999 provided the regime with a perfect alibi for the country's catastrophic situation. The controversial incidents used to justify imposing sanctions and bombing in public, along with the fact that the West's treatment of Serbia was unequal to that of other war participants, strengthened the sense of injustice among many Serbs and redeemed the regime in their eyes. This also resulted in weakening those elements in society that represented a democratic and pro-Western alternative and saw the regime as the main culprit for the country's catastrophic situation. Finally, exclusively using a policy of coercion as their means, Western governments missed at least two important opportunities (1992 and the time of local victory and demonstration in 1996/1997) to provide help and advice to the opposition that would contribute to a faster regime change. It was only after the 1999 bombing, in preparation for the 2000 elections, that Western governments finally took on such a role; their efforts, albeit constructive, were unable to counterbalance the consequences of the economic sanctions and seventy-eight days of bombing. Thus, some analysts and historians in Serbia believe that the 'October Revolution' in Serbia happened despite the intervention of the West and not because of it.[58]

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[58] Dragović-Soso, 2003.

After the fall of Milošević, Zoran Djindjic's government (2000–2003) did much to return Serbia to the world and reintegrate it into the international community. However, the political legacy was a huge burden on that government. On the outside, it was a question of recognizing Kosovo and defining the borders imposed by the United States and the EU. On the inside, there were problems of democratization, inherited unreformed secret services, and a deeply criminalized state apparatus. Caught between these demands and the resistance of nationalist circles on the one hand and political-criminal structures from the 1990s on the other, Zoran Djindjić became the target of another political assassination that otherwise marked the modern history of Serbia. It can be said that even today, twenty years after October 5, Serbia is dragging her feet on the problems of the Milošević regime: on the one hand, the imperative of recognizing Kosovo as a state and, on the other, demands for the democratic democratization of the political system.[59]

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[59] Antonić, 2001, p. 169.; V. Marić, 2021, pp. 11–21.

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| CHAPTER 6 |

Integration concepts and praxis in Slovenia

Žarko LAZAREVIĆ

ABSTRACT

The chapter deals with the political, economic, and social integration strategies and practices of the modern period that were developed to integrate the Slovene ethnic territory. The concepts discussed represent the different political realities in the periods of the Habsburg monarchy, Yugoslavia, and the independent state. The concept of 'United Slovenia' formed the basis of national ideology in the first period. Toward the end of the 19th century, the idea of 'United Slovenia' was combined with the idea of Yugoslavism. The goal was to increase the relative importance of Slovenes and improve the chances of realizing the maximalist goal of the national ideology. The 20th century was marked by the idea of Yugoslavism as a space for preserving and strengthening Slovenian identity. Later, in the period of the communist authorities during the second part of the 20th century, a new concept of integration was developed, that of the 'Unified Slovenian cultural space.' The aim of this concept was to unite the ethnic area on a cultural level, regardless of state borders. In the late 1980s, during a profound political, economic, and social crisis, a new integration concept emerged that aimed at full statehood for Slovenia and integration of the ethnic territory through incorporation into the European Union.

KEYWORDS

Slovenia, Yugoslavia, Habsburg monarchy, national ideology, national movement, integration concepts

Introduction

Like other peoples, the Slovenes became a nation in the sense of a modern political community in the 19th century. The formation of the Slovenes as a distinct ethnocultural entity took place in an environment and territory where the aspirations of different communities were intertwined.[1] In this process, the Slovenes faced a disadvantage as a numerically small community that was also administratively divided into different historical provinces. The relative weight of the Slovene national movement was already modest, and the fact that the Slovenes were divided into multiple

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[1] Zajc, 2008, pp. 103–114.

Lazarević, Ž. (2022) 'Integration concepts and praxis in Slovenia', in Gedeon, M., Halász, I. (eds.) *The Development of European and Regional Integration Theories in Central European Countries.* Miskolc: Central European Academic Publishing. pp. 137–155. https://doi.org/10.54171/2022.mgih.doleritincec_7

provinces in which they were a minority became even more apparent. Moreover, there were no strong centers in the Slovene territory. Ljubljana became a real Slovene center only toward the end of the 19th century. While it played this role in the political and cultural sense, only in the 20th century did it become a real Slovene center. The centers on the verge (Trieste, Graz, Zagreb) extended their spheres of influence deep into the Slovene area. They became places that directed economic and cultural flows and encouraged mass emigration from the central Slovene territory to the periphery. All three major cities were home to large Slovene minority communities.[2]

All this made integrating the territory extraordinarily difficult, as it was hard to formulate a unified strategy of national assertion in such diverse social and political contexts. Therefore, efforts to assert the Slovene language represented the cornerstone of a strategy that could be shared by Slovenes in different provincial contexts. The concept of the Slovene national question appeared in the political vocabulary and persisted well into the 20th century. It included the struggle for equal development of language and culture. Early on, the national movement also experienced disappointments that made it necessary to reconsider the maximalist goal of national ideology. Further disillusionment followed in the 20th century when the Slovene national space was divided among four countries.

This chapter is divided into several thematic sections that consider the historical context and present the different stages of integrating the population and the space. First, the focus is on the issue of defining Slovene identity—that is, on the period of Slovene national awakening. The second part deals with the concept of the United Slovenia program and the integration of this territory in the 19th century. The presentation is supplemented by an outline of the idea of Yugoslavism among the Slovenes. This is followed by an analysis of the Yugoslav period and finally, the departure from the Yugoslav idea toward an independent Slovenian state.

1. The national awakening

Consciousness of the kinship of the people was present even before the national movement arose. An important period in this respect was certainly the Reformation. At that time, Primož Trubar codified the Slovene language and writing by publishing religious literature. He was aware of the linguistic unity of the entire territory, regardless of administrative boundaries. Therefore, he decided to take the dialects of the central Slovene area as the linguistic standard, which also facilitated communication in the remote regions. Trubar’s decision was the starting point for forming a cultural pattern that became the basis for defining the Slovene nation. Even after the Counter-Reformation and re-Catholization, the Slovene language continued as a linguistic practice. It was used mainly in the religious press, but the partial public use of Slovene and printing of the few books in Slovene still strengthened the consciousness of the area's unity, even if only in a small circle of educated people. However, these later became the nucleus of the awareness of the linguistic and thus ethnic homogeneity of the population.

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[2] Lazarević, 2014, pp. 339–356.

The situation began to change more rapidly during the Enlightenment. The reforms during the reigns of Maria Theresa and Joseph II were crucial. Introducing compulsory education and the part of the Slovene-speaking administration at the lowest levels raised important questions. As Vasilij Melik wrote, 'it was necessary to decide which language the compulsory schools, the new offices and the courts should use.'[3] This proved crucial for establishing the Slovene nation, as the national movement could not be stimulated by relying on long-standing state tradition, which did not exist. Until then, Slovenes had not been given a unified name; regional names and identities prevailed, and the geographical term Slovenia did not yet exist.[4] Thus, the Habsburg Monarchy played an important role in affirming the Slovene language and identity by fully unifying linguistic practice for the purposes of education, promulgating laws, and implementing administrative practices: it unified the Slovene ethnic space culturally, through linguistic regulation.[5]

The publication of the Slovene grammar, *Marko Pohlin,* in 1768 is considered the beginning of the national movement. In addition to regulating the language, the author clearly held that using Slovene was crucial for the cultural education of broader segments of the population and that it was suitable for every situation.[6] A similar assertion was made by Ožbalt Gutsman, who, in addition to a grammar, also wrote a German-Slovene (1789) dictionary,[7] thus further qualitatively consolidating Slovene for everyday use. In the first half of the 19th century, France Prešeren, who later attained the status of a cultural saint, raised the Slovene language to the highest artistic level with his poetic work.[8] The common consciousness of ethnic space was also consolidated by Anton Tomaž Linhart, who emphasized the unity of territory and population in his book *Poskus zgodovine Kranjske* in *ostalih dežel južnih Slovanov Avstrije* (*Attempt at a History of Carniola and Other South Slavic Lands in Austria*, 1791). Between the river Drava and the Adriatic Sea, he saw a single people, whom he did not yet call Slovenes. The concept of the book is based on 'the history of a people whose language, culture and history unite it into a distinct whole, different from other peoples, independent of administrative and political divisions.'[9]

From the beginning of the 19th century, the terms Slovene language and Slovenia were increasingly used in public. Thus, the term 'Slovene language' gradually replaced the earlier regional terms, such as the Carniolan language. The fact that others began to adopt the name, thus acknowledging Slovene identity, did much to confirm the term.

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[3] Melik, 2002, pp. 26–28.

[4] Kosi and Stergar, 2016, pp. 458–488.

[5] Almasy, 2016, pp. 490–508.

[6] Melik, 2002, pp. 26–28; Prunk, 1992, p. 22.

[7] Prunk, 1992, p. 23.

[8] Paternu, 2000, pp. 152–159.

[9] Vodopivec, 2010, p. 19.

The term ‘Slowenische Sprache’ gradually gained acceptance in German, which was challenged by the use of the Slovene language.[10] Gradually, language also became a marker of ethnicity, which was a significant change from the earlier conditions where it had been perceived merely as a means of communication.[11] In the next phase, this also raised the question of naming the territory where the Slovene-speaking population lived. Notwithstanding the ethnic territory’s administrative fragmentation, the name Slovenia became more and more accepted in, of course, an informal way. When it was finally published in a newspaper in 1844,[12] it was effectively formalized. The use of the term Slovenia then slowly spread among the population. It emerged as an intellectual and cultural concept, an imaginary country and was widely used in political rhetoric but did not exist in everyday administrative and political life. It took a whole century for it to briefly become an official political-geographical concept after 1918, permanently becoming official after the establishment of the Socialist People’s Republic of Slovenia in 1945.

The process of defining Slovene identity as a nation and Slovenia as an imaginary country was thus completed in the first half of the 19th century. The development did not proceed in a straight line, nor was it a broad movement. The definition of the identity was relevant only in intellectual circles, which, however, were distributed throughout the entire ethnic area. For no part of the relevant area can it be said that the idea of Slovene identity penetrated the broad masses of the people.[13] Crucially, however, the foundations were laid for the population’s comprehensive nationalization in the second half of the 19th century.[14]

2. United Slovenia

The year 1848 was important in the process of the national movement, as it was a time when hopes for great changes were widespread. It seemed that the Habsburg Monarchy could be reorganized by taking greater account of the interests of the various ethnic communities, which by this time had already become clearly defined nations. The year 1848 obviously heralded an era of nationalisms that would in many ways be irreconcilably opposed. In this revolutionary year, the Slovenes were not on the sidelines; they clearly emerged as a political entity. Based on the national consciousness movement of the last decades, which had been progressing steadily since the publication of the first grammar book in 1768, awareness spread of the Slovenes as a distinct cultural and political entity. This provided the conditions for a clear definition of the goals of the national ideology, the creation of a platform for political action, and mobilization of the masses.

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[10] Melik, 2002, pp. 26–28.
[11] Vodopivec, 2010, p. 14.
[12] Melik, 2002, p. 28.
[13] Kosi and Stergar, 2016, pp. 458–488.
[14] Kosi, 2008, pp. 93–101.

Like other nations, the Slovenes published their national program in the year that dreams were allowed. The program emphasized the need to overcome the reality that Slovenes were divided among the various Austrian provinces of Carniola, Gorizia, Trieste, Istria, Carinthia, Styria and Prekmurje in the Hungarian state. Matija Majar drew up the program United Slovenia. With it, he clearly laid down the basic demands of the national movement: the entire ethnic territory was to be united into a single autonomous entity, Slovenia, with Slovene as the official language in administration and education. Language as the basis for national identification was evident in Majar's writing. He states the following, 'Slovene nationality is synonymous with the Slovene language. For us this is a condition sine qua non!' The autonomous entity should align with the Kingdom of Croatia within the Habsburg Monarchy. Majar's words were unequivocal: 'Each nation should live in its own homeland as it pleases: the Germans as Germans, the Italians as Italians, the Hungarians as Hungarians,' and the Slovenes as Slovenes.[15] The petition was sent to the Viennese Royal Court and presented at various political events, rallies, and forums. It was accompanied by a map of the ethnic territory, drawn by Peter Kozler.[16]

The concept of a United Slovenia was important for three reasons. First, it became a platform for political mobilization. The signing of the United Slovenia petition was launched and found popular support in both rural and urban areas. At this point, it became clear that the cultural work of the Vormaerz had been successful after all. Judging by the many petition signatures, the efforts to assert the Slovene language and identity as cultural and ethnic categories were well received.[17] This fact gave the political representatives the necessary confidence and encouraged the national movement. The second important aspect was the decision for the Habsburg framework, but with a firm rejection of the Habsburg Monarchy's integration into the German state, which was one of the options in the political discussions at that time. Majar was also clear on this issue:

> Under no circumstances do we want to be a part of the German Union (Deutschen Bund). We are and will remain loyal to our illustrious Emperor and our constitutional government; we want to be and will be in a friendly alliance with all the nations of our Empire, including the Germans; but we have nothing to do with the rest of Germany and the German rulers. Any alliance with these Germans would obviously be to our disadvantage.[18]

The third point involved the connections with the South Slavic area within the Habsburg Monarchy. Connections with Croatia were a constant feature of the 19th century. In a sense, 1848 anticipated the Yugoslav idea, which gained political momentum toward the end of the 19th century.

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[15] Pančur, 2005, pp. 24–25.
[16] Kozler and Knorr, 1853.
[17] Granda, 2000, p. 136.
[18] Prunk, 1992, p. 56.

The United Slovenia program contained a maximalist idea that had little chance of realization in the Habsburg context. The Habsburg Monarchy's organization was based on historical provinces; from the central government's point of view, any change in territorial organization represented a risk to the established balance of power and stability. Not to mention the problems of the Slovenes in the Prekmurje region, which was an integral part of the Hungarian kingdom. Any change toward a United Slovenia would be impossible without the Hungarian government's agreement. The Slovene national movement representatives were aware of this fact and therefore generally spoke of Slovene ethnic territory, but not specific regions. From that point of view, the idea of a United Slovenia was revolutionary in that it called for reorganizing the Habsburg Monarchy on a national basis, making it unworkable in such a context. In the Habsburg dimensions, the Slovenes' relative political weight as a community was modest. At that time, even the greatest optimists with an undisguised desire for higher numbers could not count more than 1.5 million inhabitants[19]—and not even all of them accepted the Slovene identity.

3. Political and economic integration

The unification of the ethnic area took place in the second half of the 19th century, based on two forms of nationalism: ethnic and economic. First, the populations was nationalized. In the 1860s and 1870s, the efforts for a national awakening turned into a mass movement. By organizing political manifestations, called Tabor in the Czech model, the population was encouraged to define themselves as Slovenes. These manifestations were usually large-scale events, in some cases involving as many as tens of thousands of people. Politically, they were based on the idea of a United Slovenia. The gatherings demanded that the Slovene language be equal with German and that Slovene be introduced in schools, churches, and administration. The language and its public use became an important element of national identity until the end of the Habsburg Monarchy. The struggle for equal rights for the Slovene language was accompanied by efforts to raise the level of science and art and bring it closer to the current trends of cultural creation in Western European countries.[20] The process of nationalizing the population did not take place in a vacuum, but also collided with competing nationalist aspirations due to the population's ethnically mixed structure. Studies show[21] that it took place in an atmosphere of conflict. Political antagonisms based on ethnicity then continued to paralyze Slovenian territory until the First World War, with national differentiation even reaching the family level.[22]

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[19] Melik, 2002, pp. 36–49.

[20] Dolenc, 2010, p. 78.

[21] Cvirn, 1997.

During this period, the Slovene national movement remained united based on the goal of nationalizing the population as quickly as possible and organized into a single national party. The national idea and network of cultural associations integrated the ethnic space based on the idea of Slovene as an ethnic denomination, putting aside ideological differences. The national movement began to compete in elections and quickly reaped the fruits of its labor. The National Party and its candidates won elections at various political levels. The movement soon had representatives in the provinces and National Assemblies in Vienna, and it took power at the local level, especially in the countryside. Later, the ideological-political differentiation between the Catholic and Liberal orientations took place within the national movement, which also acquired a clearly recognizable political party structure in the 1880s and 1890s. Toward the end of the century, the ideological-political split continued as the Social Democratic Party also became organized. This resulted in a triad of political interests. Schematically, the Catholic side represented the countryside, the liberal pole the urban environment, and the social democratic pole the workers. Although they differed in the ideological-political sense, these three camps did not deviate from the United Slovenia principles in their concept of national ideology. However, in the last decades of the 19th century, they increasingly approached the Yugoslav idea.[23]

With a slight delay, the process of nationalizing the population was complemented by economic nationalism. The leaders of the national movement were convinced that political and cultural emancipation alone was not enough. Any fully developed nation urgently needed economic emancipation as well; otherwise, emancipation was incomplete. It soon became clear that the economic elements could also provide important leverage in the political struggle. In the name of the generally beneficial goals concerning political strengthening, arguments and appeals soon appeared to secure national differentiation in the economic sphere as well. To strengthen its own economic base, the national movement began to also implement the slogan 'To each his own' in the field of economics. Economic life was to take place entirely within one's own national community. The boycott of nationally maladjusted merchants, craftsmen, enterprises, banks, and others was a fundamental instrument in this process. This was a political arbitrage aimed at diverting economic flows to those proponents of the economic initiative who defined themselves as Slovenes. At the same time, a system of economic institutions was built, owned, or controlled by members and supporters of the national movement.

Cooperatives were the most typical example, as they combined elements of national and social solidarity on the one hand and economically responsible action on the other. They seemed to be the appropriate means of creating a parallel economic system with an ethnic connotation. Moreover, cooperatives were relatively independent of the authorities and required few resources other than political will. Under the conditions of developing capitalism and advancing individualization, they created a sense of security while propagating reciprocity within the ethnic community. Uncertainty, both political and economic, could be avoided by relying on compatriots with similar, if not identical, interests. Thus, cooperatives functioned like a social safety net. Moreover, they gave the impression of belonging to the people, treating everyone equally, and being democratic. They were extremely widespread, and their network was very dense. In this way, the cooperatives contributed to the further integration of the Slovenian territory. Their initiators did not adhere to provincial borders but covered the entire ethnic space. Within politically (party) differentiated cooperative networks, they enabled circulation of services, goods, knowledge, and capital according to uniform standards and ensured a unified appearance in the market.[24] Integration was accelerated by the advent of the mass press (various magazines, newspapers, and books) and the railway network, which overcame barriers to communication.[25]

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[22] Aplinc, 2005, pp. 44–111.

[23] Zajc, 2008, pp. 103–114.

4. The Yugoslav idea

In the early days of the national movement, the question was raised of relations with the South Slavic territory within the Habsburg Monarchy. The initiators of the national movement were aware that quantity was an important criterion in political relations at the international and national levels. They were also aware of the limited relative political and economic importance of their own nation and territory. Therefore, in 1848, they firmly rejected closer ties between the Habsburg Monarchy and the potential German unified state. The fear of assimilation remained actual throughout the 19th century. Moreover, the territory settled by the Slovenes was administratively divided into individual provinces. Consequently, the Slovene communities found themselves in different political positions and different socio-political contexts. For this reason, the national movement was politically organized at the regional level. At the beginning of the 20th century, only the Catholic-oriented Slovenian People's party, which organizationally covered the entire national territory, surpassed this. Regional party organizations made it difficult to build a common platform, as political strategies were tailored to diverse regional circumstances. Efforts to improve the Slovene ethnic group's situation had to be made at the local level, where the principles of equality of nations and languages were implemented. Practices in the various parts of the ethnic area were very different. The fragmentation further weakened the actual political power of the national movement and political representation.[26]

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[24] Lazarević, 2001, pp. 351–364.
[25] Cvirn and Studen, 2001, pp. 57–62.
[26] Melik, 2002, pp. 78–85, 670–686.

Because of the kinship of the Slovenes with the Slavic peoples and especially the South Slavic peoples, the idea gradually emerged that the Slovenes were part of a larger community, and that by establishing links with the South Slavic peoples, they could increase the relative importance of their national movement while contributing to an acceptable long-term solution within the Habsburg framework. Traditionally, the idea of integration with the South Slavic area was prevalent in liberal political circles. Later, however, the Catholic Party took the initiative when, toward the end of the 19th century, it became clear to its leaders that it would be impossible to reach an agreement with the German parties regarding Slovene demands at the regional or national level. At this point, the idea of closer ties with Croatia came to the fore. At the beginning of the 20th century, the three dominant political options (Catholic, Liberal, and Social Democratic) shared the opinion that a rapprochement with Croatia was necessary. The ideas of such cooperation were not very clear, nor was the knowledge of the geographical area and its political, social, and economic situation the best. The liberal side confined itself to expressing sympathy for the South Slavic nations, while the social democrats included the Yugoslav dimension in the name of their party (Yugoslav Social Democratic Party). Somewhat clearer were the ideas of the Catholic political camp, which placed much of its hopes on Croatia's specific constitutional position in the Hungarian half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.[27] By relying on Croatia and its state-legal position, Slovene demands would hopefully gain political weight.

Before World War I, the Yugoslav idea of trialism became much stronger, calling for reorganizing the Habsburg Monarchy into three entities; the South Slavic nations (Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs) were to become the third constituent unit of the Habsburg Monarchy. For the political elites, this seemed to be a perfectly acceptable solution to the Slovene national question. Later, in May 1917, when they were already thinking about the situation after the end of the war, the Slovene, Croat, and Serb deputies read the so-called May Declaration in the Vienna Parliament. They addressed it to the highest authorities—the royal court and the government—and demanded solving the South Slavic question by creating a Yugoslav unit within the monarchy. Numerous rallies followed, where the demand for a Yugoslav unit was supported by the people who signed the text of the May Declaration. The mass support was to ensure greater relevance of the demands for reorganizing the monarchy. The May Declaration addressed the fundamental issues of the Habsburg Monarchy and the place of Slovenes within it, but potentially also outside of it, which, if demands were not heeded, was advocated by some of the political elites as a last resort. Most of the elites accepted the May Declaration as a minimum political condition for staying within the Habsburg Monarchy.[28]

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[27] Prunk, 1992, pp. 140–150.

[28] Perovšek, 2018, pp. 16–20.

5. The Yugoslav experience

The experience in the Yugoslav state must be divided into two periods: the period of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the period after World War II, when Yugoslavia was transformed into a communist country. Although the socio-political contexts were different, the dilemmas in both periods remained the same and concerned the relationship between regional autonomy and centralism. Schematically speaking, the dominant part of the Serbian political elite held the view that the country could not be successfully run without centralizing decision-making processes in the central government. In contrast, the dominant part of the Slovene (and Croatian) elites saw the country's stability in regional political and cultural autonomy. Proponents of centralism also advocated cultural (national) unification of the country, while proponents of autonomy insisted on existing identities being allowed to develop freely. The second option was fully implemented in the 1970s.

The dilemma became relevant in the first years of the new state. The establishment of the Yugoslav state in 1918 was an important turning point. It marked the end of the search for an adequate solution to the Slovene national question at the end of the First World War, including advocacy of the right to self-determination under the impact of the famous Wilsonian points. When it became absolutely clear that no solution could be reached within the existing framework, the representatives of the Yugoslav nations in the former Habsburg Monarchy (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina) proclaimed a short-lived state of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs in November 1918. The attempt was unsuccessful, as the new state was unable to gain international support or recognition. In the tense international situation and threatened by the Italian occupation of the territories promised to it in the Treaty of London (1915), the representatives of the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs agreed to a rapid unification with the Kingdom of Serbia on December 1, 1918. This led to the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (SHS), later renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.[29]

On the one hand, the Kingdom of SHS was a new state; on the other hand, there was legal and political continuity with the Kingdom of Serbia.[30] The core of the political and economic system of the Kingdom of SHS was represented by the legislation and state institutions of the Kingdom of Serbia.[31] The new state was organized and administered as an enlarged Serbia—that is, in the manner to which Serbian administrative and political elites were accustomed. In its heterogeneity and political divisions along ethnic lines, the Kingdom of SHS resembled the former Habsburg Monarchy in many ways. The diverse past—in other words, belonging to different state communities, traditions, and cultural circles—had already sown the seeds of constant political tensions, if not discord, at the very beginning of coexistence in the new Yugoslav state. Due to differing perceptions,[32] the new state was constituted in an atmosphere of conflict, characterized by an obvious discontent among the majority of Slovene (and Croatian) elites. Disillusionment and a sense of inferiority in Slovenia and Croatia set in and persisted for decades afterward.[33]

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[29] Perovšek, 2018, pp. 103–117.

[30] Kršev, 2012, pp. 115.

[31] Gnjatović, 2007, p. 92.

In political rhetoric, Yugoslavia was a nation-state, as the state ideology propagated the tripartite Yugoslav political nation consisting of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. The concept represented the lowest common denominator for unifying three distinct historical and cultural traditions. In the Slovenian public, resistance to such attempts was evident very early on, when the first attempts at cultural unification were made in the state, based (and would always be based) on Serbian and Croatian traditions. As early as 1921, most of the Slovene public supported the so-called Autonomist Declaration, in which intellectuals firmly rejected any idea of merging Slovene culture or national identification into a Yugoslav identity. They pledged to preserve all regional identities and cultures, not just the Slovene one, and defined Yugoslavism only in terms of state affiliation, not national affiliation. They also laid down the basic principle that was then applied until the end of the Yugoslav state: Yugoslavia made sense to Slovenes only if it allowed for free and unhindered national, political, cultural, and economic development. This position was reaffirmed in the 1930s when Josip Vidmar, a well-educated young liberal, reiterated his insistence on an independent Slovene identity and culture. During the period of the dictatorship, he enjoyed the broad support of the general and most of the political public because of his unwavering positions.[34]

Just as great as the hopes were the disappointments when the Yugoslav state was founded—and not only because of the internal organization of the new state. Yugoslavia brought the final realization that the concept United Slovenia was over. The geopolitical processes, over which the Slovenes had no influence, cut sharply into Slovenian reality. What they feared most actually came to pass: after 1918, Slovenian territory was divided among four countries—Austria, Italy, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. The pain was all the greater because most of the Slovene population in Carinthia had voted for annexation to Austria in the referendum of 1920. One-third of what was considered the motherland remained outside the Yugoslav framework. With the annexation of four countries, four customs policies, four financial systems, and four economic and social policies, the processes of alienation between the different parts of the Slovene national territory began. The importance of Yugoslavia became even more emphasized. In it, the Slovenes, with their status as a constituent nation and their active participation in the country's government, had the opportunity to develop identity, culture, and an economy. The political elites appreciated this, despite further disappointments such as the proclamation of the confederal status of Croatia (Banat of Croatia) before World War II.[35]

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[32] We are referring to the state's system (centralism vs. autonomy,) the adoption of a constitution, monetary reform, administrative practices, and division.

[33] Vodopivec, 2005, pp. 461–484.

[34] Dolenc, 2010, pp. 75–115.

World War II was a severe test for the Slovene nation. Slovenia was divided into four zones of occupation, with Italy occupying the west, Germany the center, and Hungary the east. In the south, a small area was occupied by the Quislingan Independent State of Croatia. During World War II, the Slovenes were subjected to genocide and cruel violence. From the point of view of the occupiers, it was only a matter of time before the Slovene identity would be extinguished. The German and Hungarian occupiers were ahead of the game, while the Italian occupier planned to eliminate the Slovene identity a little more slowly. The Slovene situation during World War II served as one of the examples of Raphael Lemkin's concept of genocide. Under these circumstances, a successful resistance movement emerged, led by the communists. The communists established the principles of self-determination, the concept of United Slovenia, and the restoration of Yugoslavia as motivating slogans; therefore, the resistance movement was organized throughout the Slovene national territory. After the end of the war, the Yugoslav Army occupied the areas populated by Slovenes in Italy and Austria but had to withdraw under the pressure of the Western Allies. Nevertheless, it was precisely thanks to the resistance movement that Yugoslavia managed to adjust the border with Italy in favor of Slovenia and Croatia. This represented one of the few border changes in Europe after World War II. There was a consensus on the desirability of restoring the Yugoslav state after the war and Slovenia's position as an autonomous entity within it. Of course, ideas about what post-war Yugoslavia should look like varied according to ideological viewpoints.[36]

The establishment of the communist regime after World War II brought many changes to Yugoslavia as a whole. The state was reorganized as a federation along ethnic lines. Thus, for the first time, the (Socialist) Republic of Slovenia was created as an integral part of the Yugoslav state alongside the republics of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Macedonia. At the same time, Yugoslavia initiated a radical transformation of its society and economy, embodied in the concept of a communist revolution. The communists promised to transform the country into a community of equal nations, which included the possibility that each part of the state could develop its own identity. After the controversy between the Serbian writer Dobrica Ćosić and the Slovene professor of literature Dušan Pirjevec, it became completely clear that the individual nations were not ready to give up their national and cultural identities in the name of communism and Yugoslavism.[37] The views that came out of Slovenia were easily identified within Croatia as well as in Montenegro and Macedonia, where people were not given the opportunity to develop independent identities in their own republics until after World War II.[38]

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[35] Perovšek, 2005, pp. 447–460.

[36] Godeša, 2006.

[37] Gabrič, 1995, pp. 345–353; Gabrič, 2004, pp. 425–448.

[38] Ivešić, 2021, pp. 142–161.

The view emerged that national equality could only be achieved by strengthening the positions of the individual republics and consolidating the elements of statehood. An essential component of this republican statehood was the ability to decide for themselves the issues that were subject to federal jurisdiction. These principles were gradually institutionalized from the mid-1960s and fully implemented with the 1974 Constitution. This was followed by delegating broad powers to the individual republics, which became autonomous in their decisions but obliged to coordinate their interests at the federal level. Responsibilities for defense, international relations, and to some extent, taxation, customs, and monetary policy, remained at the federal level. Therefore, inter-republic relationships and policies became the key points of the Yugoslav state's functioning.[39] The communist ideology or Communist Party was supposed to be the cohesive force that would bring together the different interests.[40]

The deep economic and political crisis of the 1980s had significant consequences for society. The consensus that had enabled redistribution of power between the republics and the federation dwindled, and new ways were sought to end the crisis. The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts of 1986 played a crucial role in this process. The memorandum authors stated unequivocally that Serbia was politically and economically inferior, even discriminated against, in Yugoslavia after 1945. Decentralizing the economic and political systems was seen as disintegrating the country. According to the memorandum authors, centralization and strengthening the powers of the federal authorities were crucial to overcome the deep crisis.[41] Serbian political elites gradually began to implement these principles in political practice, which led to confrontations with the other republics.

Any attempt at centralization that could endanger the already achieved degree of autonomy or national identity was firmly rejected in Slovenia. In response to the Serbian Memorandum, intellectuals, rallying around the monthly journal *Nova revija*, published a special issue devoted to the 'Slovene national program.' The contributions shared the idea that to overcome the Yugoslav crisis, it was necessary to ensure comprehensive statehood and transform the political, social, and economic systems toward a liberal-democratic system in which there was no place for the Communist party's monopoly. With regard to Yugoslavia, they wrote that the Federation was a compromise. The role of the Federation was to ensure development of the small Yugoslav nations; the Federation was not to appear as a superior and dominant force trying to unify and homogenize.[42] Both the public and official policymakers increasingly accepted these views as a political program.[43]

By the late 1980s, economic and political tensions in Yugoslavia escalated significantly. As a symptom of the profound and socially divisive crisis, monthly inflation reached 58.8% in December 1989, an annual rate of 25,616%.[44] In this situation, Serbian pressure to centralize the country intensified. In the late 1980s, in a series of extremely heated debates, three concepts for transforming Yugoslavia crystallized. The first option was a centralized federation, most strongly advocated in Serbia. In Slovenia, this option was rejected because it was seen as an obstacle to Slovenian development. As experience had shown, a policy of centralizing macro-administration would only create instability due to significant regional disparities in Yugoslavia.[45] The second option, proposed by Slovenia and Croatia, was to transform Yugoslavia into a confederation of states with full political and economic independence, which would precisely define mutual relationships and the content of common policies. However, this was unacceptable to the federalist concept supporters. Both the first and second options presupposed the need to reach a new agreement on the state's institutional structure and the content of common policies. In 1990, after the multiparty elections were held in Slovenia and Croatia, the option of independence for the individual Yugoslav republics appeared to be a very realistic option.[46]

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[39] Borak, 2010, p. 36.

[40] Mencinger, 1990, pp. 490–495.

[41] Mihailovic and Krestic, 1995, pp. 95–118.

[42] Vodopivec, 2010, p. 423.

[43] Zajc, 2016, pp. 129–144.

In a situation where no agreement could be reached, a third option began to be put into practice. From the Slovene point of view, the concepts of statehood/independence, conceived as a solution to the 'national question,' and the political and economic transformation of the communist system into a parliamentary political model and market economy merged into two aspects of the same process. In the second half of the 1980s, a consensus was reached on the urgent need to reform or even abandon the communist economic and political order. During this period, numerous movements and opposition groups emerged, demanding the abolition of the one-party communist system and economic transformation into a market economy. In 1989, the ruling Communist Party and opposition groups, which later transformed into political parties, agreed to hold free elections. In the April 8, 1990, elections, the non-communist DEMOS coalition (the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, the Social Democrats, and the Greens) won a majority. The coalition DEMOS formed the first non-communist government, headed by Christian Democrat Lojze Peterle. The goal of the new government was an independent Slovenian state that would join Western European political, economic, and military organizations.

The collapse of the communist bloc and with it the end of the Cold War division of Europe paved the way to realizing these ideas, not only in Slovenia but also in the other Yugoslav republics. Amid general chaos, Yugoslavia collapsed after a decade and a half of deep political and economic crisis. In 1991, after a brief war, Slovenia emerged as an independent country. In 1992, it became a full member of the international community by joining the United Nations.

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[44] Žižmond, 1991, p. 7.

[45] Mencinger, 1990, p. 492.

[46] Žižmond, 1992, p. 111.

6. Independent Slovenia and its integration into the European Union

Slovenian statehood began with a new constitution that completely abolished the socialist legacy. It defined Slovenia as a democratic and social state under the rule of law, respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. The political transition was followed by an economic and social transition under the government's lead by liberal democrat Janez Drnovšek. The transition from a socialist to a market economy took place gradually, avoiding various shocks to reduce the inevitable social costs of transformation. Political elites opted for a slow and controlled transition to a market economy and for confidence in their own abilities. They focused on long-term stability of the economy as a whole and on keeping social costs as low as possible. Slovenia gradually transformed its economic system. Three processes were extremely important: privatization, denationalization, and economic liberalization. Liberalization allowed free enterprise and integration into the international economic space; privatization was a tool for transforming the socialist sector of the economy, while restitution was a way to return property that had been nationalized after 1945.[47]

The transformation process had several goals. The first and most important was the institutional alignment of the state, society, and economy with the Western European countries. In the second stage, after 'Europeanization' was completed, integration into the European Union was to follow. Integration into Western international structures became a common goal of the political elites, one that also enjoyed broad public support. Joining the European Union would ensure democratic development and promote economic progress in the long term, thanks to stability and a predictable democratic environment. At the same time, joining the NATO pact would provide long-term security. The first cooperation agreement with the European Union was concluded in 1993, followed by the Europe Agreement in 1996; at the same time, negotiations were underway to join the NATO Pact. Both processes were brought to a successful conclusion and confirmed in the referendum on accession to the EU and NATO. On March 23, 2003, the population voted overwhelmingly in favor of accession to both organizations. Slovenia joined NATO on March 29, 2004, and the European Union on May 1, 2004, along with several other former communist countries. Immediately after joining the European Union, preparations began to meet the conditions for adopting the euro as a national currency. The prevailing opinion among the political elite was that only the introduction of the euro would fully complete the process of Europeanization—that is, Slovenia's integration into the European area. At the same time, accession to the European Union also reaffirmed the concept of United Slovenia. The entire ethnic territory was given the opportunity to develop cooperation in the political and economic spheres and to integrate the cultural sphere without obstacles, regardless of state affiliation, in the same regulatory environment, and with open borders.[48]

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[47] Lorenčič, 2016, pp. 51–65.

Accession to the European Union was made with the expectation that the European framework could protect and promote each member's national development. This is a long-term prism through which Slovenes have judged their position in the past. Tine Hribar, a philosopher and important thinker on Slovenian statehood, expressed this very clearly when he wrote the following:

> Just as there are no open borders without borders, there are no open cultures without cultures themselves—cultures with their own centers... These cultures—of diverse and varied origins, present today as the cultures of European nations—constitute the foundations of a cultured Europe. This does not mean, however, that they constitute what is usually called European culture. European culture—that is, what is called culture—does not exist. There is no single European culture, just as there is no single European culture as a particular way of understanding the world. There is, however, Europe as a meeting place of different cultures—that is, a plural space of diversity... In short, European cultures, including Slovenian culture, are not branches on a tree whose boot is European Culture. Instead, they are self-sustaining, self-contained, and independent trees.[49]

7. Conclusion

In 1896, Ludwik Gumplowicz, a professor at the University of Graz, published an article on the Slovene nation in the Parisian journal *Revue internationale de sociologie.* The article was merely informative, but it was important for another reason: it was precisely the Slovene case that convinced Gumplowicz to change his doctrine on nations. In the spirit of the times, Gumplowicz had long insisted on a distinction between historical and non-historical nations. Only historical nations that possessed a state were nations in the proper sense of the word, while he called others undefined ethnic communities or tribes. The Slovene case, however, convinced him to change his views. He redefined a nation as a community that expresses itself in a common language and has a common cultural essence, not just a common origin.[50] Statehood as such did not matter much, at least not in Central Europe. The process of a national constitution proceeded differently, either starting from the state framework or from the cultural and historical heritage. The Slovenes were an example of a coherent national community formed on a common linguistic-cultural basis, despite territorial division.

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[48] Vodopivec, 2010, pp. 456–457.

[49] Hribar, 2004, p. 426.

[50] Cvirn, 1993, pp. 356–357.

They were a part of the broader process of forming modern nations as cultural, political, and economic entities in the 19th century. In a broader sense, the formation of the Slovene nation can be described using Hroch's stages of nation-building. Miroslav Hroch distinguishes three hierarchical stages in the development of national movements. He defines the first phase—phase A—as the period of romantic interest in a nation. The next stage, Phase B, is dominated by 'patriotic or national agitation.' This, then, is the period of national revival. The last phase, phase C, involves a strong national mass movement.[51] The first phase lasted until the Vormaerz, when the concepts of Slovenia and Slovenes were defined, named, and specified in terms of territory. The second phase followed after 1848, when the population's strong nationalization began. The third phase took place in the last decades of the 19th century, when the nationalization process was more or less completed. At this point, one can speak of the Slovenes as a modern cultural (cultural institutions, mass press), political (ideological partisanship, distribution of interests), and economic community (faster economic development).

The concept of United Slovenia formed the basis of national ideology throughout the 19th century. It included the demand for constituting a separate political-administrative entity that would encompass the entire territory inhabited by Slovenes. The concept was more of a propaganda and motivational slogan than a realistic platform for political action. Because of its ethnically mixed structure, Slovene emancipation was framed as a response to the political and economic aspirations of other nations—mostly pitting Slovenes against the Germans and, on the fringes of Slovene territory, against the Italians and Hungarians. The low relative importance of the Slovenes as a community posed a challenge to the leaders of the national movement. Therefore, toward the end of the century, the idea of United Slovenia was combined with the idea of Yugoslavism, due to the Slovenian kinship with the Croatian and Serbian nations. The association's aim was to increase the relative importance of Slovenes and improve the chances of realizing the maximalist goal of a national ideology. The 20th century was marked by the idea of Yugoslavism as a space for preserving and strengthening the Slovene identity. At the same time, it also meant turning away from the idea of a United Slovenia in the political sense and strengthening the policy of a 'unified cultural space.' The aim of this concept was to unite the ethnic territory on a cultural level, regardless of national borders. In the late 1980s, when a profound political, economic, and social crisis completely destroyed social and political cohesion in the Yugoslav state, a new national concept emerged. It aimed at Slovenia's full statehood and integrating the ethnic territory through its incorporation into the European Union. The state borders were no longer an obstacle to integrating the Slovene territory.

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[51] Hroch, 1985, pp. 22–23.

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| CHAPTER 7 |

The Czech Concepts of East Central European Integration

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ABSTRACT
The beginning of this chapter analyzes the conditions of the creation of the Czech nation and its geographical position; the chapter then focuses on the Czech concepts of European integration, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries. In the past, the Czech or Czechoslovak state has been relatively significantly involved in efforts for international cooperation and integration processes. The difficult international situation of a state often surrounded by several hostile neighbors, as it was between the world wars, usually contributed to this. In the years 1526–1918, Czech lands were part of the Central European Habsburg monarchy. In the 19th century, the Czech national movement primarily considered two integration concepts. These were based on transforming the monarchy into the protector of small—especially Slavic—nations (Austroslavism) or, exceptionally, efforts to cooperate with powerful Russia (Pan-Slavism). Between 1918–1938, Czechoslovakia strived for international cooperation and European integration; from 1948–1989, it was part of the Soviet bloc. The fall of the communist regime in 1989 was a major advantage to the majority interest of the society to 'return to Europe,' symbolized by joining Western European organizations.

KEYWORDS
Central European Habsburg monarchy; Austroslavism; Pan-Slavism; Czechoslovakia; Soviet bloc

1. The circumstances of modern nation-building

The modern Czech nation identity was created as the result of the Czech national movement, usually referred to as the National Revival (Obrození in Czech). It began during the Enlightenment at the end of the 18th century and by the middle of the 19th century, had created a modern nation. It encountered primarily German dominance in Central Europe and Austria, since during the 1848 revolution, many Germans still considered the Czech lands a natural part of the planned united Germany.[1] However, in contrast to that of the Slovaks, for example, the Czech national movement

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[1] Urban, 1982, pp. 32–44. Rákosník, Spurný and Štaif, 2018, pp. 39–42.

Petráš, R. (2022) 'The Czech Concepts of East Central European Integration', in Gedeon, M., Halász, I. (eds.) *The Development of European and Regional Integration Theories in Central European Countries.* Miskolc: Central European Academic Publishing. pp. 157–175. https://doi.org/10.54171/2022.mgih.doleritincec_8

was supported by older tradition: the tradition of the Czech state and Czech Crown, the numerical predominance of the Czech population, and generally until the 17th century, even political dominance. Moreover, there was a certain preference for the Czech language until the defeat of the estates in 1620. Consequently, unlike Hungary, where there were many different language groups dominated by Latin until modern times, it is possible to consider the medieval Czech nation and nation-state. In the middle ages, the occasional manifestations of national feeling among Czechs in Central and Eastern Europe were already quite exceptional. Sharp anti-German attacks were already found in Dalimil's chronicle, which was probably completed after 1314 (or 1325).

Since the settlement of the Slavs in the 6th century, Czechs or formerly Czech-speaking Slavs, have always been numerous in the Czech lands. However, while the Czech lands have basically been free since Charlemagne's campaign in 805, at other times, they were a quite centralized part of a confederation of states, sometimes even a few. It was considered an Empire (officially, since 1512, the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation) from 800 or 962 until 1806 and was also part of the Habsburg monarchy from 1526 (a follow-up to earlier bonds, mainly from 1490) to 1918. Among them, the population that spoke German dialects predominated, which, from the 13th century until 1947, comprised a one-quarter to one-third minority population in the Czech lands. Unlike the Slavs in the east of present-day Germany, the Czechs were not Germanized, in spite of repeated onsets that occurred mainly in the 13th and 14th centuries during the great German colonization of Central Europe and then again in the 17th and 18th centuries.[2]

The minority issue of Germans in the Czech lands was one of the key elements of development from the 13th century until the tragic end after the Second World War. However, it cannot be ignored that more significant national conflicts did not begin until 1848. In older times, the population's religious division played a much more crucial role, beginning with the Hussite Reformation in 1419. Until the severely forced re-Catholicization after the defeat of the estate uprising in 1620, the Czech lands had complicated religious conditions. At the time the modern national movement developed, Catholicism was an issue that many key figures in the Czech nation considered forced and foreign, including the respected father of the nation, František Palacký (1798–1876), and the first president, Tomáš G. Masaryk (1850–1937), who were closer to Protestantism. Both key representatives focused on developing the Czech nation—Palacký as a respected historian, Masaryk as a philosopher—and sought to derive the modern Czech nation from the Protestants defeated in 1620. This led to long-standing disputes over the so-called meaning of Czech history.

The complex issue concerning the Czech nation is its relationship with the Slovaks. The linguistic proximity of Czech and Slovak is extraordinary, as the languages are mutually intelligible. The differences are smaller than for many groups considered to be one nation, regardless of the very different dialects, as is the case with the

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[2] Facing, 2002.

Germans; in contrast, for the Chinese, for example, the dialects are mutually incomprehensible.[3] However, there is a quite different historical tradition, where on the one hand there is a traditional Czech state incorporated into the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, while on the other hand, it was one of the groups of multinational Hungary, which was considerably Hungarianized. However, since 1490—temporarily even in older times—both groups have lived permanently in one originally very free, later centralized, confederation of states ruled by the Habsburgs since 1526. Linguistic proximity was well known; after all, in Slovakia, the Czech language was often used as the formal language. However, the real interest in the second group was quite low.

For Slovaks, therefore, at the time the modern national movement developed, the crucial question was whether to join the more advanced Czech nation, which was also much more numerous; in contrast to the long-standing usual double, it was up to four times larger at the beginning of the 20th century. It was not until the 1840s that the idea of an independent nation prevailed, but Czechs still viewed Slovaks just as a specific part of the Czechoslovak nation. At the end of the monarchy, the Czech nation had numerous advanced elites, although it usually lacked the nobility, while the influential classes in Slovakia were mostly Hungarianized. The issue of attitude toward Slovaks then, of course, spread to the newly formed Czechoslovakia, where the concept of the Czechoslovak nation provided the Czechs (and Slovaks) with a two-thirds majority, keeping key Germans as the minority even though they were greater in number than the Slovaks.

In the past, the Czech or Czechoslovak state has been relatively significantly involved in efforts for international cooperation and integration processes. The difficult international situation of a state often surrounded by several hostile neighbors, such as it was between the world wars, contributed to this. King George of Poděbrady's project (1420–1471, with the king elected in 1458), was prepared between 1462–1464 with the help of foreign experts such as Antonio Marini of Grenoble. The aim was to create an association of Christian states to maintain peace. To this day, these attempts have a considerable response, and even the UN claims its legacy; however, the first real international organization to address the issues was not established until 1919. The official reason was to defend the Christian world against the aggressive Turks, who conquered Constantinople in 1453 and ended the millennial history of the Byzantine Empire, which followed the Roman Empire. The real reason, however, was the Czech state's threatening isolation due to religious differences.[4]

At the beginning of the 15th century, a reformation inspired by Jan Hus took place in a large part of the Czech lands, preceding the European Reformation initiated by Martin Luther by about a century. This led to several unsuccessful crusades against the Czechs from 1420–1431, and, despite the compromise concluded with the church, there were still efforts to eliminate the Czech Hussites and completely subordinate them to the Catholic Church. The only Czech king who was a Hussite was George of

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[3] Hobsbawm, 2000, pp. 54–57.

[4] Kuklík and Petráš, 2007, p. 33.

Poděbrady (elected in 1458 from Czech nobility). He was, due to faith, in permanent conflicts with domestic Catholics (for example, the center of Silesia Wroclaw never recognized him as a king), but also with foreign rulers (later primarily the Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus).[5]

An extensive and detailed plan to create an international organization was therefore prepared. Its apparatus and the permanent Congress of State Representatives were to be based in Basel, with the most complex issues to be dealt with by a special council composed of monarchs. Wars were to be unacceptable and disputes settled peacefully; a certain type of international court was also to be established. While this is one of the most remarkable Czech contributions in terms of developing international organizations and thus integration, it nevertheless failed.[6]

2. Territorial self-definition of Czechs and the Czech lands

The Czech state was established during the 9th century and by the beginning of the 11th century, its borders largely corresponded to today's Czech Republic, with the significant exception of eastern Silesia. These borders are primarily created by mountains: the Krkonoše Mountains in the north, the Krušné Mountains in the northwest, the Šumava Mountains in the southwest, and the Beskydy Mountains in the east. The traditional and dominant center of the Czech lands is Prague, whose traditions date back to before the state was established in the 9th century. The state consists of two main parts—Bohemia and Moravia—with Bohemia approximately twice as large as Moravia in population and area. A small part of Silesia is also part of today's Czech Republic. All of Silesia (in size comparable to Bohemia), which has been Polish since 1945, was part of the Czech lands in 1327–1742. However, nostalgia for the lost 'ancient territories,' which is one of the dangerous aspects of international politics, does not manifest itself in the Czech lands. To this day, Poles think of the territories in the east belonging to Poland in 1919–1939, those during the famous Polish-Lithuanian Union 1386–1795, or those of the Hungarians of St. Stephen's Crown, which existed from the 11th century to 1918. History is also invoked by much more influential nations. such as Germany or Russia. The Czechs do not have such considerations or even requirements, because today's borders correspond to its historical ones. A certain connection exists with Slovakia, which formed the eastern part of Czechoslovakia between 1918–1992, but the Czechs generally appreciate the good relations between the two countries and the possibilities of smooth travel within the EU.

The problem here was rather the opposite, when German nationalists considered the Czech lands as an age-old part of Germany, even though it was fragmented. Under Austria, the situation gradually moved toward disintegrating the traditions of the Czech state within this system, the western parts of which could then become part of Germany. For example, the oldest university in Central Europe, Charles University in Prague, was called the oldest German university in the 19th and 20th centuries. However, the creation of Czechoslovakia and the crushing defeat of German nationalism in 1945 combined with the expulsion of millions of Germans from the east apparently ended such efforts.

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[5] Veber, 2004, pp. 75–78.

[6] Kuklík and Petráš, 2007, p. 33.

In the history of the Czech lands, there are certain differences between Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. However, their significance at individual stages differs considerably; at the time of the national movement at the end of the 18th century and in the first half of the 19th century, the difference was relatively considerable. After the defeat of the Czech estates in 1620, the traditional Czech crown (Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia until 1742, Lusatia until 1635) gradually disintegrated and became more of a formality, with the countries being tied directly to Vienna. The positions of Czech nationalists also differed considerably; the strongest were in Bohemia, those in Moravia were significantly weaker, and the part of Silesia belonging to the monarchy after 1742 was more Polish and German. The Czech national movement referred to the traditions of the Czech crown and talked about the so-called historical state law. However, only the extension of Czech rights was realistic.[7]

After Czechoslovakia was established, the differences between Bohemia and Moravia weakened, and Silesia, with dangerously strong Germans and Poles, was merged with Moravia in 1927. In 1949, an administrative reform established regions, which removed the traditional land border, especially by creating the Jihlava region, which includes historically Czech and Moravian areas. However, certain demands of part of Moravia's population appeared at the time of the liberation in 1968,[8] especially in the democratic conditions after 1989. Many inhabitants took the opportunity to declare their Moravian or Silesian nationality.

3. The Czech concepts of Slavic integration in the long 19th century (1789–1918)

From 1526, the Czech lands were part of the Habsburg Empire, which, after the defeat of the estates in 1620, gradually limited the traditions of the Czech lands. While the medieval Czech state slightly preferred the Czech language, which remained until 1627, the leading elites later quickly denationalized. In the 18th century, Czech was more of a language for the countryside and poor; however, the national movement known as the Revival from the end of the 18th century, sought to change this. If integration was considered, it was usually based on transforming the monarchy into the protector of small—especially Slavic—nations (Austroslavism) or, exceptionally, efforts to cooperate with powerful Russia (Pan-Slavism). In the conditions of the then politically weak Czech nation, it was difficult to imagine, for example, independence and cooperation with countries such as France or Britain.

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[7] Rákosník, Spurný, and Štaif, 2018, pp. 36–37.

[8] Petráš, 2007, pp. 315–316.

The key question of the Czech national existence, as well as that of some other Slavic nations (Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes, after 1878, Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), specifically Ruthenians, partly Poles, but also Hungarians) was their position within Austria, originally the Habsburg Empire, which was established in 1526. On the contrary, the paradoxically preferred German population lived mainly outside the monarchy and had (especially until 1870) several of its own states. The Austrian national orientation was unknown, except by the official elites. The small or even medium-sized nations, especially Slavic ones, were the ones existentially connected with the monarchy. In the middle of the 19th century, the monarchy had a population of approximately 36 million, which consisted of 8 million Germans, 5 million Hungarians, 15 million Slavs (including 4 million Czechs and 2 million Poles), 6 million Italians (most lost in 1859 and 1866), and 2 million Romanians. The more capable representatives of the Slavic nations realized that possible independence would be quite risky in difficult European conditions. Especially after 1878, the Balkans showed the risks of a multinational empire disintegrating; the word Balkanization was and still is a pejorative for experts.[9]

The Habsburg Empire protected itself from the Turks and the dangers of Islam for the first two centuries. At the end of the 17th century, it lost its importance except in southern Hungary. In the 19th century, however, two fundamental threats appeared that persisted even after the crucial changes caused by the First World War; these, in fact, still exist today. From the west, there was a risk (even if only partial) of the unification of the very large German nation, which had previously culturally dominated Central Europe; many nations then feared assimilation. From the east, the threat was Russia's domination that had existed since 1760 when it first conquered Berlin. Russia was undeveloped with a tough absolutist regime, while Central Europe was liberalizing. There was also a cultural difference due to the Orthodox religion. However, the Slavic nations were partly influenced by the great Slavic state.

Concerns about German nationalism, Russian backwardness, and absolutism had led many politicians in the monarchy to support the state since the 1840s, even though they were well aware of its weaknesses. As they were largely members of the Slavic nations, we consider Austroslavism. In accordance, Austria became the mainstay of the small Slavic nations. The most significant development of Austroslavism, which was also the result of demographic and cultural issues, occurred among the Czechs. After the privileged Germans and, after 1867, the Hungarians, they formed the largest nation, as well as the largest Slavic group. In addition, next to Vienna, the Czech lands were the richest and most advanced, which stands out in comparison with, for example, the south of the monarchy or Galicia.[10]

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[9] Šesták, 1986, pp. 1–3.

[10] Petráš, 2012.

Before the revolution in 1848 and the liberalization of the development of politics with Austroslavism, Karel Havlíček Borovský, the most famous Czech publicist and a renowned artist and politician, visited in 1846. He brutally lost his original ideals of Russia during his visit and began to harshly reject pan-Slavism. A key figure of the Czech nation, historian František Palacký, who was also recognized by the Germans, then developed and scientifically elaborated the concept of Austroslavism.[11] Even in the initial period of liberation in the spring of 1848, the Germans took Germany's unification with the Austrian and Czech regions of Austria for granted. The emerging German parliament in Frankfurt invited Palacký as a representative of the Czech lands. However, in his famous letter to Frankfurt dated April 11, 1848, he refused to participate in forming great Germany or to send representatives of the Czech lands to the Frankfurt Parliament. However, this is also considered to be what initiated the Czech-German conflict, which ended with the expulsion of the Germans after 1945.[12]

Palacký was recognized as the father of the Czech nation and was also respected by the state when the monarch appointed him as a member of the House of Lords, although he did not have an aristocratic origin. He theoretically elaborated the concept of Austroslavism in his 1865 study, Idea of the Austrian State (Idea státu rakouského) and in a number of articles in newspapers and magazines. The idea of Austroslavism was strongly affected by the Austro-Hungarian Compromise in 1867, when the two largest nations that were not Slavic concluded a deal at the expense of the others. Confidence in the possibility of reshaping the centuries-old Habsburg Empire declined significantly, although some of these ideas survived until the end of 1918.[13]

In addition to the idea of Austroslavism, other concepts manifested themselves at the end of the monarchy. The idea of integrating into great Germany had only a minimal response. Individuals claimed their German nationality after 1848, at the time of strong nationalism and the growing Czech-German conflict; they were, however, considered national traitors. Even people who rejected nationalism then risked being expelled from the Czech national society. The most famous case of this type appeared in December 1886 when an article was published in the first issue of the magazine Čas Our two question (Naše dvě otázky). It spoke critically about the Czech national society, asking whether the intensive effort to create a national culture was not a waste of time and whether it would not be spent more effectively within the great German nation.

> Imagine the unequal duel of the Czechs with Germany, the duel with a knife! At the very least, maintaining a mere, bare nationality would require an immense amount of effort and self-denial of the most noble intelligence, a sacrifice that would wane over time.[14]

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[11] Hroch, 1999, p. 88.

[12] Kořalka, 1990, pp. 18–22.

[13] Rákosník, Spurný and Štaif, 2018, pp. 39–42.

[14] See for example http://archiv.ucl.cas.cz/index.php?path=Cas/0.1887/1/1.png

This provoked a furious controversy between Czech nationalists, and most of society completely rejected such considerations. Although the little-known young Hubert Gordon Schauer (1862–1892) submitted the article, many considered then already well-known Tomáš G. Masaryk as the real co-author. There was talk of a philosophy of national suicide because Masaryk was then scientifically interested in the highly controversial issue of suicide.[15]

Considerations in addressing the issue of small nations in Central Europe and their actual assimilation were, at the time of strong nationalism, logically utterly unacceptable for the majority. However, hindsight can also be seen in their unreality. In the 19th century, there were real reflections on assimilating numerous groups, such as the Slovenes and Czechs, and even Hungarians and Poles. However, in recent decades, countless long-assimilated groups such as the Cornwall have been revived. National conflicts would seem to be easily resolved by denationalization, but this is met with considerable resistance.[16]

At first, before the spread of national conflicts between the Czechs and the Germans, it seemed that provincial patriotism could also prevail. Certain trends could be found in part of the nobility or official elites; the most famous of the theoretical thinkers is the priest, mathematician, and philosopher Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848). In 1805–1819, his sermons for students received great response, but they provoked the intervention of the absolutist regime. He considered himself Czech in the provincial sense, even though he was of German-Italian descent.

Another idea that was supported in the Czech environment was Pan-Slavism. In the 18th century, awareness that a group of Slavic nations existed was related to the development of linguistics; the success of the Russian troops, which repeatedly passed through the Czech lands during the Napoleonic Wars, played an important role for the public. To understand the appeal of Pan-Slavism, it is necessary to be aware of the situation in Europe in the first half of the 19th century, when modern nationalism was emerging. Some elements of Pan-Slavism appeared earlier, for example, among the Yugoslavs (e.g., the Croatian Juraj Križanić) during the Turkish threat in 17th century, but the main appearance was in the 19th century.

In Europe, three main groups of nations are included as Indo-Europeans: Romans, Germans, and Slavs. In the 19th century, the Roman nations had great France; still famous Spain and Portugal with their overseas territories, fragmented but for their culture and history; and respected Italy. The Germans had the main naval power, and the most developed country in the world, Britain; numerous and advanced Germans with the great Austria and Prussia; and the important Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden. Despite their size, the Slavs lived as a rather secondary population in Austria and Turkey, where they were also religiously oppressed. There was also great Russia, with a key role in the defeat of Napoleon, which, despite its backwardness—for the Slavs of Central Europe and religious and cultural differences—was tempting. In particular, the Poles had already had dark experiences with the tsarist empire, which, in Europe in the 19th century was usually considered a supporter of reaction and backwardness. However, the Czechs knew little about this empire.

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[15] Urban, 1982, pp. 383–385.
[16] Petráš, 2006, pp. 694–740.

At the time of the Czech National Revival, some writers enthusiastically professed Pan-Slavism. The most prominent of them was Jan Kollár (1793–1852), who came from Slovakia but promoted the use of Czech instead of Slovak. A difficult blow to reflections on Slavic unity meant a real acquaintance with the backward conditions of the tsarist empire, where the key was *Pictures of Russia* (*Obrazy z Rus*) (1843–1846) by Karel Havlíček Borovský (1821–1856). In contrast, the rather limited Pan-Slavic tendencies in the Czech lands were sometimes used by the Germans to attack, claiming that the Czechs were the backbone of the European reaction and that they wanted to control the monarchy and oppress the Germans in Bohemia. Many actions seeking only (in fact, Austroslavistic) cooperation between the Slavs in the monarchy and possible cultural cooperation with other countries were attacked as cooperation with tsarist absolutism. This was also the case with the Slavonic Congress of June 1848, one of the manifestations of democratization after the fall of Metternich's absolutism in March 1848. The chairman was František Palacký, who was promoting Austroslavism against Pangermanism. During the negotiations, riots broke out in Prague, and the congress could not even be officially ended.[17]

After the establishment of Bach's neo-absolutism, various political ideas, including Pan-Slavism, were suppressed. These would come alive again with the liberalization after the defeat in Italy in 1859. In 1867, there was another Slavonic congress in Moscow, which had been being prepared since 1865. It is often described as an anti-Austrian event organized by Russia, which is not true. The tsarist regime only agreed to the event, which acquired a sharp anti-Austrian tone due to the great irritation of the Austro-Hungarian dualism in 1867. The congress, where the central role had an ethnographic exhibition, was attended by the main representatives of Czech politics František Palacký and František Ladislav Rieger, acting as the main representatives of the Slavs of Austria-Hungary. Rieger rejected radical Pan-Slavic plans for religious, linguistic, and national unification, emphasizing the already distinctive Slavic nations. In Moscow, he did not even hesitate to boldly support the Poles, who after the lost uprisings of 1830–1831 and 1863–1864, were severely oppressed by Russia. According to him: 'True brotherly love between us, true noble Pan-Slavism is possible only if each Slav will recognize his brother equal in origin and rights.'[18] Of course, the tsarist regime was not pleased with such an approach, and the local propagandists of Pan-Slavism realized that cooperation with the Czechs and other Slavs from Austria who were accustomed to liberal conditions could also undermine the tsarist regime. Some individuals in Bohemia professed Orthodoxy, but with the stabilization of Austria-Hungary after dualism and a strong alliance with Germany on the international level since 1879, Pan-Slavism lost any real significance.

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[17] Urban, 1982, pp. 39–50. Šusta, 1923, p. 68.

[18] Šesták, 1986, p. 33.

A new, rather inconspicuous wave of Czech Pan-Slavism appeared around the end of the 19th century and was partly connected with the economic interests of expanding Czech industry. At that time, there were already several independent Slavic states in the Balkans, which attracted investments not only from France and Germany, but also from Britain and Austria, although to a lesser extent. Czech entrepreneurs and intelligentsia used Slavic reciprocity here, while Germans and Hungarians aroused distrust due their completely different language and being supporters of an often hostile and arrogant great power. In particular, in Serbia, the Mašín family, originally from Nymburk, gained enormous influence when Svetozár Mašín (1851–1886) became the first husband of Queen Draga of Serbia. His brother Aleksandar (1857–1910) was the army commander who, in 1903, orchestrated the overthrow and murder of the Obrenović dynasty, including Queen Draga. Incidentally, this coup infuriated Vienna, as Serbia, which came from being an obscure to an enemy during the new dynasty and even supported internal opponents, as in Bosnia, which led to the assassination in Sarajevo.

Even greater economic opportunities were offered in massive undeveloped Russia, where numerous Czech migrants headed, mainly to Volyn. The most important politician associated with these activities was Karel Kramář (1860–1937), the first prime minister of Czechoslovakia from November 1918 to July 1919; he was later chairman of the key right-wing national party of National Democracy and the chief opponent of President Tomáš G. Masaryk. On a study trip to Russia in 1890, he met his future wife, Nadezhda, and, after a scandalous relationship, married her in 1900 in Crimea, where the couple built their summer residence.

Before the beginning of the First World War, apparently in May 1914, Kramář prepared an extensive Constitution of the Slavic Empire that assumed the unification of the Slavs under the tsar's rule in the event of a victorious war. The Czech state (Czech Czardom) should have been part of a sort of loose federation, affiliated not only with Slovakia, but also German Lusatia and a part of Silesia. This document was relatively elaborate, but many naive ideas were evident; for example 'The population of the Czardom is 15 million, of which 10 million are Czechoslovaks, 1 1/2 million Hungarianized Slovaks and Germanized Czechs, able to re-apply for their breed, 3 million Germans and about 1/2 million Jews.'[19] The idea of an easy return to the ancestral nation was almost absurd, as shown by the development after the Second World War, when the so-called re-Slovakization of the Hungarians took place in Slovakia. As soon as anti-Hungarian pressure eased, almost everyone returned to their original nationality.[20] He also sent the document to Russia, where, however, it apparently did not arouse interest. During the First World War, Kramář was imprisoned and sentenced to death in Austria, but in the new Czechoslovakia, except for the first months, he was not even a 'national martyr.' Other than during the first months when he was prime minister and led a delegation to a peace conference,[21] he had little impact and was one of the voices of opposition until his death. During the civil war in Russia, he enthusiastically supported the Czech intervention and hoped for the fall of the Bolsheviks.[22]

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[19] Galandauer, 1988, p. 248.

[20] Petráš, 2007, pp. 100–102.

[21] Petráš, 2015, pp. 34–44; Kuklík and Petráš, 2017, pp. 50–54.

4. Period between world wars

The disintegration of the traditional state system that had existed since 1526 (and in some elements, even longer), significantly complicated the situation in Central Europe at a time when Balkanization was spoken about pejoratively, that is, as the problem of small mutually hostile states as was common in the Balkans, especially after 1878. More capable politicians were well aware of this problem and sought to develop international cooperation, both global and regional. Interwar Czechoslovakia was primarily economically, but to some extent also in population, one of the largest successor states; perhaps even more important was its considerable political stability. Despite the usual permanent political bickering in the only democracy that remained in the region, the state's foreign policy remained in the hands of its creators, that is, in foreign exile during the First World War. Almost until their death, Tomáš G. Masaryk (1850–1937) and Edvard Beneš (1884–1948), the first and second presidents, remained key figures. Beneš had been a key creator of foreign policy since the time of the foreign resistance during the First World War; in the interwar era, he became the longest-serving Minister of Foreign Affairs in the world, and, even as president, he controlled foreign policy.[23]

Masaryk was the creator of theoretical concepts of international relations, while Beneš adhered to real politics. In the exile during the First World War, Masaryk prepared a fundamental publication, New Europe (Nová Evropa), where he justified the fight against Austria-Hungary. He recommended transforming Europe into a federation of democratic states. However, such a drastic reconstruction was hardly realistic at the time, so he also supported less radical integration efforts. Czechoslovakia, as a state closely tied to the conditions created after the First World War, supported the first real international organization that was to ensure stability, the League of Nations.

One of the key organizations initiating later European integration was the Pan-European Union founded in 1922–1924 on the estate of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in Poběžovice near Domažlice. Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894–1972) of Austrian-Japanese origin was one of the main supporters of European integration, having Czechoslovak citizenship and specific support from Prague. At the beginning, he was a young and completely unknown politician, so as early as 1919, he met with president Tomáš G. Masaryk, whom he wanted to convince to become the 'Washington of United Europe.' Masaryk greatly appreciated his activities but believed that the time was not yet right. Masaryk recommended him to important personalities and secured a Czechoslovak diplomatic passport for him but refused personal leadership due to his busy presidency and advanced age, as he considered these activities long-term. In contrast, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumed that the Pan-European movement would not develop in Czechoslovakia.[24]

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[22] Kuklík and Petráš, 2007, pp. 60–61.

[23] Pichlík, 1991. Petráš, 2009.

Coudenhove-Kalergi antagonized numerous Czech politicians by supporting the German-Austrian Customs Union in 1931, which was considered a threat of partial occupation of Austria and thus the siege of Czechoslovakia. He also supported various concepts of the Danube Federation, about which Prague often had little enthusiasm. The Czechoslovak section of the Pan-European Union, founded in 1926, supported the activities of the French politician Aristide Briand (1862–1932), but at other times even reflected on the Central European economic area, dominated by Germany.[25]

Although Czechoslovakia's official policy supported stability and thus the activities of the League of Nations, it was cautious in its plans for wider integration of states, because especially in the union with Austria or even Germany, along with the influence of German minorities, a group promoting Berlin's interests could be easily aroused. At the same time, Prague had to look at the complex interests of France, an ally without whose support the survival of the state would be uncertain. Czechoslovakia also feared Germany's occupation of Austria, which the locals wished for, but there was a risk in strengthening a dangerous Germany. It repeatedly opposed attempts to restore the monarchy and the return of the Habsburgs with threats of war. The so-called Little Agreement—cooperation with Yugoslavia and Romania—was to serve against Hungarian nationalism.

From the foreign resistance during the First World War through 1948, Czechoslovakia's foreign policy was largely dominated by Edvard Beneš (1884–1948), Minister of Foreign Affairs and, from 1935, President. He was a supporter of European stability and a promoter of collective security, focused on France, and later, on the USSR. Other concepts did not stand a chance, whether it was the above-mentioned efforts of Karel Kramář (1860–1937) to defeat the Bolsheviks and cooperate with liberated Russia, or the efforts of the first Slovak as Prime Minister in 1935–1938, Milan Hodža (1878–1944), to the so-called Danube Federation with Austria and Hungary cooperating with Italy.

5. After the Second World War and during socialism

The Second World War created fundamentally different conditions in many ways, which were crucial for the Czech lands. These have been under long-term pressure from the Germans, in fact, since the construction of the Holy Roman Empire and the extensive medieval German colonization. However, this process, described by German nationalists and their sharp opponents as the pressure to the east, 'Drang nach Osten', suffered a crushing blow during the world wars and with the expulsion of the Germans.[26] On the contrary, the Soviet Union penetrated Central Europe, so that ties to Russia (Pan-Slavism), which in the 19th century were more of a theory against the power of Austria and its allied Germany, had now became reality. The original ideas during World War II, supported by President Beneš and his exile in London, were that Czechoslovakia would become a kind of bridge between the West and the USSR. This was indicated by promoting the welfare state and extensive nationalization in Western Europe; in the USSR, it was hoped for democratization, where Slavic Czechoslovakia with a democratic tradition could be a model. However, within a few years, Czechoslovakia became a satellite of Moscow, and the world disintegrated into vigorously separated blocks divided by the so-called Iron Curtain.

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[24] Veber, 2004, pp. 128–133.

[25] Moravcová, 2001, pp. 258–270.

During World War II, a regional integration plan was also considered that involved thoughts on a Polish-Czechoslovak union.[27] The two states that had been liquidated by Nazi Germany, which, however, followed the long-term negative attitude of German politics toward the Slavic countries in the east, considered their union to permanently defend against the famous German pressure to the east. However, the issue of integration proved more complicated, and the whole plan completely failed. The traditions and problems of Poland and Czechoslovakia differed significantly, and relations between Prague and Warsaw were usually very tense in the interwar era. This may come as a surprise, given that these were two new Slavic states threatened not only by German nationalism, but also by Bolshevism. Despite this closeness, the real ties between them were limited and, for example, interest in the culture of the second nation had been surprisingly low for a long time. Especially among the less numerous Czechs, there was often minimal interest in science, literature, or the films of its relatively large neighbor, although the qualities of many segments of Polish production were not denied and there was no chauvinistic resistance to the other nation. From the Polish culture, the attention of the Czechs was attracted only by what became renowned in the world or at least in Central Europe.

Many historians and political scientists point out how surprisingly different the development was in these neighboring countries, the two states of the Western Slavs, whose languages have long been mutually intelligible. Quite commonly, they differ greatly in different historical stages, with stability in one country and conflicts in another, which switches in a few decades or even years. At the end of the millennium in the 1980s, communist Poland was in a deep economic crisis and almost defeated by Solidarity; by contrast, Czechoslovakia was remarkably stable, the opposition was innumerable, and the population believed in socialism.[28] In the 1990s, democratic Poland was now politically unstable, while the Czech Republic had a stable, strongly right-wing and pro-Western government and was building an unrestricted market led by the ODS and Václav Klaus, which even endured the disintegration of Czechoslovakia without any problems. Such aspects prevent integrating multiple states (or nations) that are seemingly close culturally and linguistically, as illustrated here with the example of the Poles and Czechs.

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[26] Petráš, 2017, pp. 191–198.

[27] Kuklík and Petráš, 2007, p. 137.

[28] Vykoukal, Litera and Tejchman, 2000, pp. 558–570, 687–699. Petráš, 2007.

These differences became apparent even in the efforts to integrate during World War II. The Polish plans were far-reaching and difficult for Czechoslovak politics to accept. The Poles assumed their own dominance in the planned state system, which corresponded to approximately twice the population number of the Czechs and Slovaks, but logically did not attract representatives from Czechoslovakia. Even more troubling was the highly anti-Soviet character of the union under the Polish plans, as Czechoslovak President Beneš was aware of the USSR's strength. He had tried to reach an agreement with the USSR and use it as support after being disappointed by France and Britain at the 1938 Munich Conference. Poland also considered including other states, especially Lithuania, which was occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940; this would have hindered relations with Moscow.[29]

During the communist regime of 1948–1989, Czechoslovakia was part of the Soviet bloc and thus a Soviet satellite; the situation had been heading toward this since its liberation in 1945. This dependence increased greatly after the Soviet occupation, which suppressed the 1968 reform efforts. After 1970 came the so-called era of normalization; the key pillar of the regime was fear of another Soviet intervention. The possibilities that Czechoslovakia could initiate or at least participate in integration attempts without support from Moscow were therefore minimal. While Yugoslavia completely freed itself from dependence in 1948, Romania pursued a partial independence policy from the 1960s. The USSR feared a relatively large Poland (with a strong tradition of anti-Russian patriotism), and Czechoslovakia had been a clear satellite of Moscow since 1948, especially in 1968.[30]

Notably, the period following the Second World War was literally the golden age of integration in Europe.[31] This was conditioned by the catastrophic weakening of the Second World War and fear of the USSR. There were three key tendencies: keeping the USSR out, keeping the US in Europe as a key shield against Moscow's military superiority, and preventing Germany's new aggression. Logically, according to the Soviet line, communist Czechoslovakia was sharply critical of Western European integration tendencies when, for example, the European Communities described NATO as an economic base—and therefore, according to Moscow's official propaganda and thus Prague, an offensive aggressive pact serving the interests of capitalism.

As an analogy of Western European integration, organizations in the Soviet bloc also emerged, but their real significance was minimal for a long time, because the integration here—rather Soviet dominance—functioned even without contractual obligations. This was especially the case with the military organization of the Warsaw Pact, which was always in fact subject to Soviet command. The development of the economic organization was more complicated; for example, in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (RVHP in Czech – COMECON in the West), the interests of individual countries and even interest groups such as huge industrial enterprises were already manifested.[32]

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[29] Veber, 2004, pp. 168–170.

[30] Nálevka, 2000, pp. 21–36.

[31] Kuklík and Petráš, 2007, pp. 158–163.

The COMECON was established in January 1949 but was initially a mere formal box. The USSR was more interested in its own direct economic control, operating through numerous advisers in individual states, and not real integration between the bloc states. It was not until 1954, after Stalin's death forced new methods, that the organization began to take off in real life, and key documents for its functioning were signed in 1959. However, efforts for deeper economic integration failed, especially in 1961. Attempts at transnational management of individual economies were supported by developed countries like the GDR and Czechoslovakia. However, less developed countries like Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland feared that integration would complicate their often just-beginning industrialization, so that they would become more like raw material and food suppliers for industrialized COMECON countries. In the seventies, integration made little progress, mainly based on the 1971 plan—a comprehensive program of further deepening and improving cooperation and developing socialist economic integration. After the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, the individual bloc countries realized that Moscow was willing to intervene even in states without a revolution (as in 1956 in Hungary) and would not tolerate fundamental policy deviations. In 1974, the bodies of the COMECON also changed. From a formal legal point of view, the COMECON did not fundamentally differ from other organizations aimed at economic integration; we do not find the USSR's de facto privileges in the relevant international treaties.[33]

Nevertheless, integration within the COMECON had not gone far compared to Western Europe, as individual economies had remained largely autarkic. Even in Czechoslovakia, there was official criticism that this not very large country had, for example, almost all engineering production, which in the West was common only in much larger countries such as Britain or West Germany. Limited opportunities to involve bloc countries in world trade remained a key issue. 'The COMECON has continued to be primarily a tool to facilitate bilateral barter trade, partly because it has never succeeded in establishing a currency that would be truly transferable between members.'[34] For Czechoslovakia, therefore, this organization could seemingly secure advantageous markets, but the reality was different. It was not surprising that the organization (like the Warsaw Pact) disappeared quickly after the fall of communist regimes.

In Czechoslovakia itself, especially after the 1968 Soviet troop invasion, the communist regime meant cultural disintegration and the so-called 'Biafra ducha,' according to the horrific war in Africa at the time. At least part of society, especially its more educated classes, was aware of the paradox that countries traditionally clearly west oriented fell to the east after the Iron Curtain. Probably best known are Milan Kundera's reflections; born in 1929, he is a Czech writer who has lived in France since 1975. These include *The Czech Destiny* (*Český úděl,* 1968), created soon after the Soviet occupation, which like Václav Havel, antagonized him, and especially *The Abduction of the West or the Tragedy of Central Europe* (*Únos západu aneb Tragédie střední Evropy,* 1983).[35]

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[32] Durman, 2004, pp. 189–200.

[33] Kuklík and Petráš, 2007, pp. 219–221.

[34] Plechanovová and Fidler, 1997, p. 157.

6. Situation after 1989

The democratization of Eastern Europe, particularly in 1989, marked one of the key milestones in the world. However, the new democracies faced conditions with which they had no experience. Many of them lacked a strong or even any democratic tradition. On the other side of the fallen Iron Curtain stood countries that had been exclusively democratic since the mid-1970s when the last dictatorships of southern Europe ended. These countries had already been incorporated into integration structures for many decades. Even Czechoslovakia, a unique democracy in the region that supported integration attempts during the interwar period, had no experience, because its gradual development had begun only at the end of the 1940s.

Almost all of them quickly joined the organization of European democratic states—the Council of Europe—but its importance was limited. However, the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which significantly developed the human rights protection system, was of great legal importance. Being included in this organization did not produce any major political discussions and generated no major response from the Czech public.[36]

Integration into politico-military and economic structures was much more difficult. These required complex internal discussions and had fundamental strategic aspects as they conflicted with Moscow's interests. While joining the European Union had substantial public support in the former Soviet bloc, it faced difficult economic conditions, so joining NATO was a major political problem. In countries with a traditionally good relationship with Russia (Bulgaria, partly Slovakia, later independent Montenegro), this was a contentious issue that is often addressed to this day.

In the key 1990s, the Czech Republic had a significant advantage in society's majority desire to 'return to Europe,' which was symbolized by joining Western European organizations. Perhaps even more important was the decent economic situation (especially in comparison with the then poor Poland) and political stability that occurred from about June 1992 until November 1997 under the right-wing government led by Václav Klaus (born 1941). Of course, the advantageous geographical position of Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic) also played a role; it had no Russian borders (as in Poland or the Baltic countries) or warring Yugoslavia (as in Hungary) and, on the contrary, bordered Germany and Austria. The reverse of this objectively very good position the Czech Republic held was often a somewhat arrogant tendency not to bind to other states of the former Soviet bloc and to enter integration groups without them. Possible deeper cooperation of the so-called Visegrad countries, therefore, did not arouse any enthusiasm from the key figure, Václav Klaus. Václav Havel, who was a supporter of this cooperation, also had less influence as president. Prague greatly underestimated the broader context, since the West was primarily interested in a much larger and strategically important Poland, whose rapid accession to the European Union was, however, hindered by economic weakness.

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[35] Rákosník, Spurný and Štaif, 2018, pp. 227–230.

[36] Kuklík and Petráš, 2007, pp. 186–189.

The Czech effort to quickly build a market economy and participate in Western structures also fundamentally contributed to the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. In the June 1992 elections, the right-wing pro-Western coalition won in the Czech Republic, albeit narrowly, while in Slovakia, Vladimír Mečiar with national, left-wing but also undemocratic tendencies became prime minister. The Czech national team quickly concluded that maintaining the federation would be very difficult and negotiated the division of the state by the end of the same year. When at the time of the fundamental progress of European integration at the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty, the state fell apart right in the center of Europe, and despite great agitation and often even concern in Western Europe, the division took place without any problems. The parliament was elected in June 1992 and the then formed government of the Czech Republic became the body of an independent state. The division took place with the perhaps surprising disinterest of the Czech public, while for Slovaks it meant their own statehood. Most of the public showed enthusiasm mixed with concern.

In the following years, the economic transformation in the Czech Republic was quite successful. In Slovakia, there were obscure conditions; the state dropped out of real applicants for integration and became isolated in the region. It was no coincidence that in 1999, only the Czech Republic with Poland and Hungary were admitted to NATO. Later, however, Slovak conditions stabilized, and Slovakia together with the Baltics, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia not only joined NATO in 2004, but also joined the EU the same year, together with the Czech Republic and other countries in the region. The significant difference in the Czech and Slovak orientation thus disappeared.

In the Czech Republic itself, the situation has become rather complicated. Although it was still one of the richest of the former socialist states and gradually economically overtook even older members of integration, Poland, for example, grew faster economically. More striking, however, is the complicated political situation characterized by several strong disputes and the frequent survival of governments with only close parliamentary support. The individual parties do not have mutual respect or even try to cooperate, and reluctance or disgust dominates even among their voters. In contrast to the optimistic period of (almost) all of society’s support for the ‘return to Europe,’ the ‘stupid mood’ indicated by President Václav Havel (1936–2011) has been rather typical since the end of 1997.

These permanent political disputes, with society's prevailing disgust, of course undermine the possibilities of new integration concepts that require long-term consensus and a positive public attitude. Although the Czech Republic became part of the Western European integration (NATO in 1999, the EU in 2004), it happened with a notable lack of interest from the public, and society's mood did not improve. Since 2008, the global economic crisis has had a negative effect, demonstrating to the countries that were admitted in 2004 that the EU does not guarantee rapid economic and social growth. The migration crisis that culminated in 2015, the crisis of European integration symbolized by Britain's difficult departure, and the 2019 coronavirus epidemic further worsened the social mood.

The inhabitants of the Czech Republic are among the most Eurosceptic in the EU. In particular, pushier EU plans, such as the environmental or refugee friendliness in 2015, cause agitation, ridicule, or outrage in most of society. Foreign policy is typical in its prevailing support of the US and Israel. However, many influential politicians, such as former President Václav Klaus and the current Miloš Zeman (born 1944), are considered supporters of Russia or even China. The broader conception of Czech foreign policy is generally lacking, contributed to by the unstable political situation and the strong hostility of several parties. Perhaps only the effort for cooperation with Slovakia and sometimes with Austria can be mentioned, when in principle, since 2015, there has been talk of the so-called Slavkov cooperation.

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| CHAPTER 8 |

The Slovak Concepts of Integration

Iván HALÁSZ

ABSTRACT

The first part of this chapter deals with the factors that determined Slovak national development; conflict between Catholics and Protestants played an important role in this process. Another important factor was the Czech-Slovak linguistic and cultural proximity, which allowed continuous interaction, but slowed independent Slovak identity-building processes. Slovaks lived for a long time on the northern periphery of the old Kingdom of Hungary, where, despite their relatively high number of people, they did not have autonomy. Slovak politics had to settle relations with the Czechs and Hungarians in the 19th and 20th centuries. The Slovaks also tried to geographically define the region they inhabited. An important role in this process was played by its proximity to the Danube and the mountainous character of the country under the Carpathians. In building cultural and political identity, however, the sense of Slavic unity, which Hungarian politics called Panslavism, has traditionally played an important role. Most Slovak political concepts dealt with achieving territorial autonomy and federalizing Hungary. Several concepts also touched on the idea of a wider Slavic federation. Russophilism was strong in Slovak politics for a long time, but at the end of the 19th century, Czech-Slovak cooperation seemed more realistic. Czechoslovakia was finally born as a result of the First World War. After 1918, the democratic Western orientation was strengthened, and several politicians considered cooperation along the Danube important. In the shadow of the Soviet and German threats, Central Europe concepts were born. The most famous is former Prime Minister Milan Hodža's concept, which was conceived during his US emigration. After the Second World War, all of Czechoslovakia became part of the Soviet Eastern Bloc. Some Slovak communists thought about joining the Soviet Union directly, but Moscow no longer needed them. Other orientations have long been taboo. Solidarity in Central Europe, on the other hand, has strengthened in anti-communist opposition circles. The country's Western integration began after 1989, but the pro-Russian political orientation was also strong. In these years, Central European solidarity and identity have promoted democratic orientation and European Union integration.

KEYWORDS

assimilation, Carpathia, Danube-region, Europe, nationalism, slavism, Slovakia

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1. The conditions for becoming a modern nation

Modern Slovak national identity, like that of other Central and Eastern European nations, was conceived in the long 19th century (1789–1918). During this pivotal period, Slovaks lived in the old Kingdom of Hungary, which in turn had been part of the mixed and multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire since 1526. In fact, in the 16th and 17th centuries, it was the Slovak-inhabited areas that formed the northern backbone of royal Hungary, which was not invaded by the Turks, and for a time, Bratislava became the country's crown city and seat of its central administration. Slovakia's image was also influenced by the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, which led to deep-rooted conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in the region. This had an impact even in the first half of the 20th century. Most Slovaks initially became evangelicals, but the Counter-Reformation was able to convert most of them back to Catholicism. Protestants, however, remained a distinctive minority, spiritually and culturally significant. In the first half of the 19th century, therefore, two different concepts of nationhood coexisted among Slovaks—the idea of Czechoslovak national unity favored by Protestants and the Catholic concept of nationhood, which advocated Slovak cultural, linguistic, and spiritual independence. This concept was represented by Catholic priest and linguistic innovator Anton Bernolák (1762–1813). The contradiction was only bridged in the 1840s, when the young Lutheran intellectuals led by Ľudovít Štúr (1815–1856), who were more or less in line with Slovak literary romanticism, accepted the Catholic view of the national autonomy of Slovaks in Hungary. The Catholics, on the other hand, abandoned their literary language based on the West Slovak dialect and adopted the new literary language based on the Central Slovak dialect favored by the Evangelicals. The centuries-old Catholic-Protestant antagonism did not disappear completely, but like the Germans, Hungarians, Flemish, and Swiss, the Slovaks were elevated to the ranks of the multi-lingual European peoples.

The national movement of the 19th century Slovaks had to define itself essentially in relation to two neighboring peoples—the culturally and linguistically close Czechs on the one hand, and the powerfully and demographically dominant Hungarians on the other. For the Slovak evangelicals, who did not produce their own Bible translation in the 16th century, the liturgical and literary language since the Reformation had been Czech, supplemented by local Slovak words. The nearby Czech provinces were also a strong educational and economic attraction for Slovaks. The successful Czech national modernization of the 19th century provided an attractive example for the weaker Slovaks, who after a while began to see in this orientation a potential counterweight to the growing Hungarian nationalist and assimilationist aspirations. While the latter were seriously hampered by the difference between the Hungarian and Slovak languages and the rural nature of a large part of the population, they were facilitated by the fact that the two peoples had lived for almost a thousand years in a state framework in which the Slovaks had never had public territorial autonomy. Moreover, the areas inhabited by Slovaks, mostly in mountainous areas, were quite regionally fragmented and ethnically diverse. Almost a thousand years of Hungarian-Slovak coexistence and the similar denominational background of the two peoples naturally resulted in a similar mentality, which facilitated the Magyarisation of the higher social status urban Slovaks. The rapid assimilation of numerous northern minorities and the erosion of the Slovak educational and cultural infrastructure also contributed to the change in ethnic proportions. Slovaks made up about 10% of the population in Hungary, but their political and social weight was far below this proportion.

After 1918, however, Slovakia, which became part of Czechoslovakia, developed rapidly. Although Slovakia did not get the public autonomy it coveted, the Slovaks officially became a constituent nation, their language was made official, and a Slovak-language university and Slovak National Theatre were founded in Bratislava. High quality Czech-Slovak grammar schools were established in the cities. However, the weaker Slovak industry could not compete with the more advanced Czech industry, and Slovakia gradually became deindustrialized. The trend was only reversed on the eve of the Second World War, but it was too late; ethnic differences, combined with external pressure from the great powers, had split the first Czechoslovak Republic.

Born independent in 1939, Slovakia was a prisoner of Nazi Germany. In 1944, however, Slovakia experienced a serious anti-fascist uprising, the memory of which is still strong today. In Czechoslovakia, which was restored after 1945, Slovak politicians initially failed to achieve federalization, which did not take place until 1968, but objectively, the weight of Slovaks in the common state gradually increased. In the second half of the 20th century, Slovakia underwent a major industrialization process and the urbanization that went with it. In addition, during and immediately after the Second World War, the country underwent significant ethnic homogenization. Despite this, Slovakia is now the only truly multi-ethnic state in the Central European region, thanks to the presence of a Hungarian minority of around 9% and hundreds of thousands of Roma inhabitants. Before the regime change, Slovakia was in fact ready for state independence, both infrastructurally and economically. The latter was achieved in early 1993. Since 2004, Slovakia has been a member of the EU and NATO.

2. The territorial self-definition of Slovaks

Before 1918, Slovakia had no clear public borders, as it was an integral part of the Kingdom of Hungary. The need for legal demarcation of the Slavic/Slovak territories in the Highlands first appeared in the plans of the Jacobin conspirators in Hungary in the 18th century. The symbolic demarcation of Slovak territories played a decisive role in 19th century literature; the Slovak self-image created by poets and writers became rather mountainous. The main symbolic significance was attached to the Tatras and the two fast-flowing long rivers, the Garam and the Váh, which originated in the mountains and eventually flowed into the Danube. Like many other stereotypes, the image was somewhat one-sided. This was pointed out by Ján Lajčiak (1875–1918), one of the most original but rather marginalized Slovak evangelical intellectuals at the turn of the century, in his book *Slovakia and Culture*.[1] With doctorates from Leipzig and Paris, Lajčiak argued that Slovakia's image was far from being as clear-cut as many people thought, but he also acknowledged the dominance of the mountainous character. More important, he said, were the climatic conditions, which were home to a variety of agricultural crops and ranged from the 'oat' lands of the north to the 'date' areas of the south.[2]

The political and geographical delimitation of Slovak territorial claims began during the 1848/49 revolution and continued in the 1860s. It was then that the memoranda and drafts were drawn up that sought to define the exact boundaries of the Slovak territories.[3] The most famous attempt was made in 1861 at the Turcszentmárton Memorandum Assembly. The aim at that time was to create a legally autonomous Slovak District of Upper Hungary. The Upper-Hungarian Slovak District was to consist not only of pure Slovak counties, but also parts of ethnically mixed regions.

Dionýz Štúr (1827–1893), a Viennese geographer and brother of the Slovak language reformer, Ľudovít Štúr, was the first to formulate the geological-geographical concept of Slovakia. He delimited its territory by the Beskids to the west, north, and east, and by the Danube and Tisza to the south. In one of the more detailed versions, he divided this territory into the area below the Tatras and above the Tisza with the help of the Mátra. In Jozef Hložanský-Balej's draft, Slovakia, called White Hungary, would have stretched from the Morava River to the Tisza and from the Danube to the Carpathians. The Mátra Mountains would also have been included. The concept, which also seemed maximalist, already included German-majority Bratislava and the Slovak islands around Eger, Komárom, and Vác.

The administrative boundaries of present-day Slovakia were finally drawn after the First World War and, with minor changes, still exist today. In some respects, they are more modest; in others, they are broader than the (selected) concepts mentioned above. In any case, the Carpathians and the Danube and Tisza rivers have played a role in their definition. These concepts still resonate in Slovak public thinking and even in popular culture.[4] Thus, feelings of 'along the Danube' and 'under the Carpathians' are present in Slovak geographical identity, although—for understandable reasons—not in the same form as the Hungarian perception of the Carpathian Basin. Here, the 'Carpathian identity' is rather limited to the parts below the mountains and does not encompass the whole region. Sometimes 'Carpathian-ness' is explicitly associated with rurality; this is the case, for example, in the writings of ethnographer and political scientist Juraj Buzalka.[5] Nor does this form of identity give rise to any particular sense of kinship with other Carpathian peoples, with the possible exception of the Rusyns.

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[1] He wrote the work in 1910, but it was not published until after his death in 1921.

[2] Lajčiak, 2007, pp. 54–55.

[3] Szarka, 1995, pp. 48–77.

[4] For example, one of the most famous Slovak rock bands has a hit song called 'From Tatra to Danube, the orphans sing.'

[5] Buzalka, 2012, pp. 62–71. The author here prefers to speak of 'the Carpathian country'.

Since for many centuries, the Slovak territories formed the legally undefined inner periphery of larger state units, Slovak territorial self-definition was essentially intertwined with these state formations—that is, above all with Northern or rather Upper Hungary and, more broadly, with the Habsburg Empire.[6] For a long time the latter was the center of Europe. However, Slovak public thought was also influenced from further afield, whether by the German-inspired Reformation, the French Enlightenment, liberalism, or Slavic sentiments toward Russia. The latter were formulated among Central European intellectuals educated in German universities in the early 19th century, but then reinforced the vector of Slavic thought in Eastern Europe.

The outcome of the First World War, however, put the Western orientation in the foreground, as Czechoslovakia owed its existence to the victory of the Western Entente allies. The views of Štefan Osuský (1889–1973), a top Czechoslovak diplomat, ambassador to Paris, and representative of the League of Nations, are interesting from the point of view of post-1918 positioning. In 1921, he was also the Secretary General of the Czechoslovak peace delegation. Returning from Slovak emigration to the United States, Osuský saw his nation's destiny as part of a mixed-ethnic Central Europe, which was, however, permanently linked to the culture of Western Europe by the events of the First World War. Somewhat optimistically, he saw his nation as having fled from the East to the West in 1918. He was aware that his homeland was a periphery within Czechoslovakia, but he also saw Slovakia as an indispensable periphery. He saw its importance mainly in its freedom from the Danube, which connected the new republic with Eastern and Southeastern Europe. This was a key factor for landlocked Czechoslovakia, which lacked a sea exit. In 1931, the diplomat, who was keen on geopolitics, did not rule out the reorganization and partial reintegration of Central Europe although not based on the Habsburg Empire or aristocratic conservatism, but on the platform of an equal democratic nation-state.[7]

Ľubomír Lipták (1930–1999), one of the most distinguished Slovakian historians of the 20th century, expressed interesting thoughts on Slovakia's 'in-between' or 'transitional' situation. According to him,

> ... nothing is so far removed from historical reality as the idea that Slovakia is connected to something, the idea that it is consciously exploiting its geographical location. On the contrary. It is astonishing that Slovakia's favorable location, well known and experienced both in the past and in the present, has not served as the basis for either a single concept or a myth. Slovakia appears mainly as a 'buffer', a point of conflict, a borderland, sometimes in slogans, lines of poetry, poems or, for example, in the background of some discussions of Slavicism.[8]

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[6] Štúr also placed the Slovaks among the Slavs here. Štúr, 1993, pp. 138–139.

[7] Osuský, 1997, pp. 116–118.

[8] Lipták, 2000, pp. 31–32.

Lipták saw Slovakia as a transitional territory.

> It lags far behind the developed countries of Western and Central Europe, but it is far from being one of the most underdeveloped regions of Europe. While the Czech lands were a kind of easternmost vanguard of Western capitalist civilization, but always one step below the most advanced, Slovakia is the western outpost of the poorer half of Europe, and somewhat above its eastern neighbors in the industrial race.[9]

Lipták also dispelled the illusion that Slovakia is the heart of Europe or its most important crossroads, when

> it is more like an island in the way of huge historical currents. These currents undercut its shores and sometimes overwhelm it [...] It is not so large, important, significant or insurmountable that it can act as a barrier to hold back the flow of history for even a moment or to set a substantially new course as a protective barrier.[10]

Lipták also saw ideas as arriving late in the region, whose fate is essentially determined by its frontier character, and thus as a frontline area even in apparent peacetime.

> In a word, here is a front, even if there is no war, a battlefield even if there is no battle.... It is not a sword, but a shield, which must be strong enough to protect against the blow even if the arm of the defender of the true faith has been resisted in battle with the infidel, and even if the arm has been broken.[11]

Slovaks with memories of anti-Turkish battles see themselves, along with others, as having played their part in defending Christian European civilization. Osuský saw the Slovaks' place alongside the Hungarians, and Lipták as the main organizing force within Austria. For this reason, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation struggles here took place in the shadow of the Ottoman crescent.[12] In any case, most Slovak thinkers of the last 200 years saw the place of the Slovaks predominantly in Central Europe along the Danube and differed at most in whether they considered this good or bad luck, and in which direction they were looking outward.

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[9] Lipták, 2000, pp. 33–34.

[10] Lipták, 2000, p. 36.

[11] Lipták, 2000, p. 39.

[12] Osuský, 1997, p. 114. and Lipták, 2000.

3. The integrationist ideas of Slovak thinkers in the long 19th century (1789–1918)

Obviously, it is not possible to cover all the Slovak integration ideas of the last two centuries in one chapter. For this reason, this chapter focuses only on the most influential, rather positive, and predominantly European ideas, and, within that, Central European concepts. Between 1789 and 1918, the Slovak nationalist intelligentsia first attempted to define itself in cultural-intellectual, linguistic, and territorial terms. This was also true of geopolitical self-definition, which, in the words of the literary scholar and Hungarianist Rudolf Chmel, was 'always more of a labyrinth than a straight path.'[13] Incidentally, this is probably also true of the other Central European nations.

One of the serious problems of the emerging Slovak national identity was that while the religious affiliation, history, and social development of its population (i.e., Gothic, Renaissance, Reformation, Baroque, Enlightenment, etc.) made it part of a Central Europe close to the West, the dominant thinkers of the 19th century preferred to see it in the Orthodox Slavic East. This was especially true of the dominant national conservatives, who soon enough began to see the West as the epitome of materialism and liberal immorality—influenced in no small part by Slavophile-oriented Russian nationalist ideologues. Anton Štefánek, as the first Slovak sociologist, saw Slovakia's belonging as problematic: 'Slovakia and Slovak culture are part of the area of Western European civilization, but historically and racially they belong to the East and the South.'[14] In fact, according to some, there was no tradition among Slovaks of thinking of Europe as the West. The Czech philosopher Jan Patočka and the Slovak liberal literary scholar Milan Šútovec also noted the anti-Western bias and lack of Western moorings.[15] In Slovak public thinking, westernism was often replaced by a more central Europeanism, but this was not always consciously so. According to Chmel, Slovaks have arrived at a Central European identity drawn cautiously to the West and in a latent rather than overt, transparent way.[16]

The Central European identity of the Slovaks, linked to their existence within the medieval multi-ethnic, and multicultural Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Empire, was nevertheless a fact that most people did not even try to question, or at most, did not consider good. This attitude has now changed. This was best expressed in a 2003 speech by Pavol Hrušovský, a Christian Democrat politician and former Speaker of th Slovak Parliament, on the 10th anniversary of independent Slovakia's establishment: 'Through Christianity, our face is similar to that of other European countries. Hungary has become Central European through its history. The national enlightenment has shaped our face in Central Europe.'[17]

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[13] Chmel, 2009, p. 323.

[14] Chmel, 2013, p. 399. The work cited is Štefánek, Anton: Základy sociografie Slovenska. Bratislava, 1944.

[15] Chmel, 2013, pp. 396–397.

[16] Chmel, 2009, p. 324.

The Slovak territories were thus integrally combined into larger Central European entities and rarely saw beyond their horizons. Rather, they tried to find their own national place within them, which in turn required them to disintegrate their former frameworks. Given the supranational (non ethnic) Hungarian (Hungarus) political tradition based on the counties' autonomy, it is not surprising that the Slovak nationalists also saw the solution essentially in the autonomy of their territories in public law and territory and in the federalization of Hungary in the long term.[18] These ideas would mostly have respected Hungary's constitutional framework, but some of the concepts of 1849 envisaged the Slovak crown province to have been already created within Austria and did not consider Hungary's borders. Concepts after 1860 again returned to the Hungarian territorial platform. An exception was the plan for a federalized Greater Austria, developed by the Romanian Aurel Popovici and born in the Belveder circle of Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand. Among Slovak politicians, the later Czechoslovak prime minister and then young member of parliament Milan Hodža (1878–1944) belonged to this circle. Under the plan, Slovakia, with a smaller territory than today, would have been one of the 15 federal units, with 2 representatives in the 42-member central government.[19]

The most spectacular supranational integration plans, however, were born on a platform of Slavic solidarity and reciprocity. Indeed, the sense of Slavic belonging proved to be an important spiritual support for a national movement that was both outnumbered and one of the most integrated parts of contemporary Hungary. Consequently, the Slavic concepts of unity boosted the Slovaks' self-confidence, making them feel like the largest nation in the world, living from Elba to the Chinese borders. At the same time, another alternative that was rather dangerous for Hungarian state unity was presented during negotiations with the Hungarian majority elite. These ideas provoked a rather violent rejection reaction from the majority Hungarian nation, regardless of their reality and real strength. [20]

One of the first 'apostles' of the Slavic unification idea in Hungary was Ján Kollár (1793–1852), who, after his studies in Jena, spent most of his life in Pest, where he was the pastor of the Evangelicals. Kollár's concept was not yet explicitly political, as he himself was loyal to the Habsburgs all along. He saw the key to Slavic prosperity in cultural and literary cooperation and mutual support within the Slavic nation of four tribes (Czechoslovaks, Illyrians, Poles, and Russians). His concept, which started out as apolitical, eventually inspired a whole generation of Romantic writers and politicians, who went on to play a definite role in the events of 1848/49. It was then that the plan for a Slavic-based—federalist—transformation of Austria was born among the Slavic peoples of Central Europe, and it was attempted to give it a new impetus at the First Slavic Congress in June 1848. The congress took place in Prague because Czech liberal politicians were one of the main driving forces behind the federalist transformation. Their leader was the historian František Palacký, an evangelical who had studied for a time in Slavic Protestant institutions in Upper Hungary. Palacký feared a unifying Germany and a despotic Russia; this is why he wanted to save Austria, which was able to unite the region. In his first draft for a federal reorganization, he largely considered the historical borders of the individual kingdoms and provinces that made up the Habsburg Monarchy. However, this was not the case in the second because he saw the future of the Czechs, Moravians, and Slovaks, whom he regarded as one nation, in a single territorial unit.[21]

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[17] Hrušovský, 2003, pp. 36–37.

[18] It is characteristic that the main drafters of the concrete drafts almost always included two Slovak national activists from Gömör with law degrees—the nobleman Štefan Marko Daxner and Ján Francisci from a family of tailors.

[19] Hodža, 2004, p. 61.

[20] Szarka, 1995, p. 9.

Ľudovít Štúr, one of the most influential Slovak thinkers of the 19th century, attended the Slavic Congress, where together with Jozef Miloslav Hurban, he represented the Slovaks (1817–1888). At the time, he was also a supporter of Austro-Slavic ideas, and after a while, he even sided with the Habsburgs during the Hungarian War of Independence, which could be seen as a civil war. However, after the victory of the anti-revolutionary forces, he became disillusioned and spent the rest of his short life in Modor, where he wrote one of his most influential political works, a political analysis entitled *Das Slawenthum und die Welt der Zukunft* (Slavdom and the World of Future, 1853). Written in German and translated into Russian, it was not published in full in Slovak until after the fall of communism. The book became popular with Russian nationalist thinkers who wanted to unite the Slavs, and Štúr became one of the most widely quoted exponents of Russophile Pan-Slavism. In his work, he no longer predicted a great future for Austria, and he became increasingly skeptical about whether the Habsburgs could ever lead a Central European empire transformed to accommodate a Slav majority. Major nations such as the Germans, the Hungarians, and the Italians stood in the way of Slavic transformation. Other forms of a Slavic federation based on democracy were also not an option, he argued, because tsarist Russia would obviously never participate in republican and democratic attempts, and the demographic, religious, and mental differences between the Slavic nations were too great. Štúr therefore saw the only realistic solution in joining tsarist Russia, which was truly destined to unite and lead the Slavic peoples, who must abandon particularism. However, unification would require concessions on both sides. The Russians would first have to abolish the long-obsolete and scandalous serf system and establish village communities of free people and self-governing counties. At the central level, however, the author was not bothered by the denial of tsarist autocracy and the principle of separation of powers. He also rejected Western-style bureaucracy. The representatives of the counties would have formed only a kind of deliberative senate, which could not instruct government. The author did not specify the details of the accession of individual Slavic peoples, but only advocated autonomy for the Serbs. The

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[21] Romsics, 1997, pp. 29–30.

Russians were linked to the Serbs by the Orthodox religion, which, according to the Evangelical Štúr, was the true Slavic religion. The Slavic peoples who joined must look to this religion, for in it lies their future. He then wanted to create a common literary language, which could in fact be Russian, that would create the great literature. This did not mean that he wanted to completely abolish the individual Slavic languages, but rather to accept a kind of Russian primacy.[22]

These views have long influenced Slovak political thought, especially during the depression years under Austro-Hungarian dualism, when the vision of national death appeared in the minds of Slovak intellectuals. This attitude was particularly strong in Turócszentmárton, which was the seat of the Slovak National Party and the center of Slovak political journalism. The main exponent of conservative-based, rather anti-Semitic, and anti-Hungarian Slovak Russophile Pan-Slavism during these years was the writer Svetozár Hurban Vajanský (1847–1916). This is not to say that other ideas of integration and cooperation were not born, but they, too, revolved predominantly around Slavic cooperation.[23]

The most spectacular of these was the democratic Pan-Slavism of Ján Palárik (1822– 1870). A Catholic priest who was almost executed in 1848, Palárik was one of the leading figures of Slovak national liberalism (the New School) in the 1860s and a promoter of the Hungarian-Slovak reconciliation. In the conflicts between Russians and Poles, he was more sympathetic to the latter.[24] His concept of Slavic unity sought to be more than literary reciprocity, but he did not want to challenge the existing state framework or drown in pro-Russian messianism. Palarik did not want to unite the Slavs under one government at all, nor did he want a unified Slavic empire. He wanted all Slavic nations to have as much autonomy as possible, but he wanted them to cooperate more intensively. Accordingly, Palárik formulated three main principles: rejection of a centralized Pan-Slavic empire, the obligation of each Slavic nation to acquire as much autonomy as possible within the state in which it lived, and, in the long term, achievement of a federation of free and independent Slavic states. In no way did he want to sacrifice constitutionalism and democracy on the altar of national unity. He also wanted to cooperate with Hungarians and Romanians within Hungary.[25] Palárik considered internal strengthening of the Slovaks as important, which should have come mainly from within. Regarding Austro-Hungarian relations, he was more in favor of a personal union than a dualist realistic union. Although he still envisaged the fate of the Slovaks within a more just Hungary, he basically believed in a tripartite monarchy consisting of Hungary, Czech unity, and an Austrian (i.e., German-Slovenian) part based on the residual principle. The parts of Galicia and Bukovina inhabited by Poles, Ukrainians, and Ruthenians would have been annexed to the Kingdom of Hungary, while preserving national self-government. The Slovaks would also have had national self-government within Hungary. The Catholic priest Palárik considered it important to reorganize the Slovak territories into an independent ecclesiastical province. However, he did not consider the 1868 Nationality Act sufficient, and in the twilight of his life, he was greatly disturbed by the Hungarian press's campaigns against Pan-Slavism. It was from these and the denial of national equality that he feared most for the future of the Kingdom of Hungary.[26] In the long term, he too considered territorial autonomy the optimal solution, but, as a member of the New School, he could temporarily accept municipal autonomy, which he considered a good starting point.

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[22] Štúr, 1993, pp. 159–174.
[23] Martinkovič, 2011, pp. 156–245.
[24] Vavrovič, 1993, pp. 134–163.
[25] Vavrovič, 1993, p. 142.

The first decades of dualism, however, were spent in a rather lethargic state of frustrated Slovak politics; this favored the potential miracle of the Orthodox-Slavic East, whose main representative was the aforementioned Svetozár Hurban Vajanský. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, however, it was no longer the only option. The Slovak members of parliament within the Nationalities Club began to cooperate intensively with the Romanian and Serb members of parliament,[27] and the younger generation of intellectuals looked to Czech-Slovak cooperation for a solution. This group was mainly organized around the journal Hlas (Voice), and Vavro Šrobár (1867–1950), a doctor, was one of its leading figures. The pragmatic Czech policy, which produced gradual but steady economic and political growth, proved to be an attractive model for young Slovaks. The old nationalists rejected this line because, as the old Russophile Vajanský put it: 'it is better to dissolve in the Russian sea than in the Czech swamp.'[28]

This policy finally paid off after the First World War. During the war, relations between pragmatic Slovak politicians and the Czech parties intensified. Šrobár was present at the proclamation of Czechoslovak independence in Prague in October 1918, and Milan Rastislav Štefánik (1880–1919), an astronomer and French army officer, was Minister of War in the Czechoslovak emigration government. In this capacity, he represented the Slovak member of the founding triumvirate and the more conservative wing of the government, which was still in favor of a constitutional monarchy even when most of the government had already adopted a republican position. During the First World War, however, he was clearly pro-Western, which is not surprising given that he spent much of his short life in France and its colonies.

Interestingly, the ideas of Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy, including his pacifism, were quite influential among the Slovak intellectuals at the end of dualism. One of the most colorful, but now almost forgotten, figures of this period was the evangelical pastor Ján Maliarik (1869–1946), who spent his life working for world peace and a world state, despite his secluded rural job. At the beginning of the First World War, he wrote a series of personal letters and memoranda to Woodrow Wilson, who referred to him as 'God's beloved child,' to Tsar Nicholas II, who called him 'my golden dove,' and to Franz

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[26] Vavrovič, 1993, pp. 160–162.

[27] Szarka, 1995, pp. 87–89.

[28] Chmel, 2009, pp. 325–326.

Joseph, who simply called him ‘My Father.’ It is typical that this local cosmopolitan also wanted to start constructing a United Slavic States with the Czechoslovak-Polish Union. However, for him it was not the end goal, only an intermediate step on the road to constructing a ‘universal world state.’ He did not abandon this idea even after the world war, when he discovered Mahatma Gandhi for himself. During this period, he sent further letters to the Hitler, MacDonald, Mussolini, and Stalin ‘brothers.’ His letters often brought Maliarik into the sights of the various authorities and services, which, however, ultimately found him not politically dangerous because of his state of mind. Everybody just smiled at him, even though his analyses and appeals were not as foolish as they seemed at the time.[29]

4. The years between the two world wars

Between the two world wars, Slovak political life was essentially tripartite. At the center were the democratic forces based on the platform of the first Czechoslovakia of Masaryk, which were politicized in the various national parties (agrarian parties, social democrats, national democrats, etc.). The multi-ethnic communist movement initially had a much more reserved attitude toward Czechoslovakia as a product of Versailles, but this attitude changed in the 1930s. This was particularly the case among young intellectuals (Vladimír Clementis, Laco Novomeský, Gustáv Husák, and others), who were now interested in ‘not only the revolutionary character of Moscow but also the cultured character of Paris.’ However, in the tense circumstances of the Second World War, for some, joining the Soviet Union seemed a realistic option. ‘Why look to Beneš for a solution when Stalin has the tried and tested recipe,’ Gustáv Husák once said.[30] Fortunately, his suggestion did not materialize in this direct form. The third wing of Slovak politics was represented by the autonomist Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party, which had grown out of the political Catholicism of the former Hungary. Its main leader was the parish priest Andrej Hlinka of Rossahegy. In 1918, they welcomed the creation of Czechoslovakia, but were disturbed by the lack of public autonomy for Slovaks and wanted to federalize the republic in the long term. It was not until 1938 that they achieved autonomy, and in 1939, the Slovak Provincial Assembly, which they ruled, declared an independent Slovakia, which then fought on the side of Nazi Germany in the Second World War. Within the party, there were always different tendencies. Although the majority basically accepted the Czechoslovak state framework and feared Hungarian revisionism, there was a strong presence of politicians—strongly Catholic—who would have liked to link the Slovak future with Catholic Poland. Obviously, they were also afraid of Polish predominance and of restoring a common Hungarian-Polish border, but they saw territorial autonomy as a suitable guarantee. Two of the main representatives of this wing were Karol Sidor and

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[29] Holec, 2001, pp. 210–220.

[30] Chmel, 2009, p. 328.

Pavol Čarnogurský. Sidor was briefly head of the autonomous Slovak government in 1939 and later became ambassador to the Vatican. During the war, he and like-minded Polish colleagues considered creating a Polish-Slovak confederation or a larger Central European Catholic bloc. The Czechoslovak-Polish confederation was, incidentally, not far from official Czechoslovak anti-fascist emigration at the time, until Stalinist diplomacy signaled to the exiled President Edvard Beneš that it should not be pushed. Edvard Beneš, unpopular among Slovaks, was Czechoslovakia's hereditary foreign minister and then head of state between the two world wars. In these positions, he hoped for Czechoslovakia's security mainly from the Western powers and the states of the Axis. He was very much afraid of German and Hungarian revisionism. In the 1930s, he also tried to involve the Soviet Union in the collective security system, but his policy failed in 1938.

Within Czechoslovak governmental politics, one of Beneš's great opponents was Milan Hodža, prime minister from 1935 to 1938. A Slovakian pro-agricultural politician who spoke Hungarian well, he supported his country's foreign policy but considered it somewhat one-sided. As a representative of agrarian interests (mainly small and medium-sized farmers), from 1930 onward he sought a solution to the agrarian crisis in Central and Eastern Europe, which he saw mainly in internal cooperation and joint action along the Danube. To do this, however, he needed to improve relations with Czechoslovakia's southern neighbors, and to do that, he needed to build a bridge between the Entente and the states of the Rome Protocol, taking at least part of the interests of the Republic of Austria and Hungary into account. Hodža's Danube Plan was based on the need not to increase agricultural tariffs and to gradually eliminate quotas, regulate agricultural production considering geographical and market aspects, harmonize the communication network, simplify bureaucracy and payment methods, and improve the legal status of nationalities. He also wanted to set up a Central European Agricultural Committee to coordinate the policies of the states in the region, coordinate their interests, facilitate marketing, and dispose of surplus produce. The idea of a customs union was also mooted. This plan was ultimately abandoned due to internal differences and German disapproval, and further developments are well known.[31]

During the Second World War, Hodža emigrated and later organized first Slovak and then alternative Czechoslovak political circles in exile. His opposition to Beneš prevented him from being integrated into the London government-in-exile. Eventually he left for the US, where he drafted the famous Central European federation (1942), which would have provided a bulwark not only against a predominantly German Germany but also against the Soviet Union. Hodža was far more skeptical of Stalin than Beneš, who hoped to play the role of a bridge. While he tried to focus on economic interests, he also tried to consider the cultural interests of the small nations in the region. Although his author was politically Westernized, he saw Central Europe as a distinct cultural entity within European civilization.[32] He also drew up a draft constitution for a Central European Commonwealth, which would have achieved deeper integration than the British model. The federation he envisioned would need a federal president elected by a conference of national prime ministers and a federal congress. He would appoint the federal chancellor and members of the government, as well as the army commander. The federation of eight member states (Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) would form a customs union, have a common currency, and federal laws. It would have had not only defense and foreign policy, but also finance and trade policy. A common postal and telecommunications system would have been important, as would a justice minister. In his vision, each member state would have been represented in government by a minister without portfolio. The federal congress would control the common budget and legislation. Its members would be elected by national parliaments with a two-thirds majority, with at least one representative per million inhabitants. The mandate of the members would be linked to the terms of national parliaments. The common language would be decided by a two-thirds majority, but each member would be able to use his or her own language, which would be interpreted. The federation, which would only be dissolved in the event of a constitutional amendment, would have its own Supreme Court and a superstructure citizenship. Every citizen of the federation would have to learn at least one world language, preferably one on which the federation would agree.[33] Although the plan appealed to the Americans, it could not be implemented because of public developments. In the historical context of Slovakia, it was one of the most detailed integration ideas and seemed to have been devised by a former prime minister. In any case, its author wanted to go beyond the division of the Central and Eastern Europe peoples into winners and losers of the First World War.

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[31] Hodža, 1997, pp. 190–192

5. The post-World War II period and the years of state socialism

For the post-1948 leadership, there was no doubt about the geopolitical position of Slovakia as part of Czechoslovakia. It was clear that the whole Czechoslovak state was part of the Soviet-led ‘peace camp.’ This was underlined by the presence of the Soviet army on the ground after 1968. Vladimír Mináč (1922–1996), a former partisan and writer, one of the most influential national communist intellectuals of the 1970s and 1980s, probably did not even broach this issue in his popular essays. Geopolitical affiliation was one of the taboo subjects. After the change of regime, Mináč, who became one of the ideologists of the national left camp, turned to East-West bridge theories of various orientations. In his view, Slovakia, with its traditional intellectual, geographical, and political ‘cleavages,’ was ideally suited to link the East with the West. In fact, Mináč’s ideas took on a messianic tone: ‘our country is the only one in the whole of Europe which, thanks to its history, culture, and culture, is ready to fulfil the historic task of becoming a center of pan-European understanding.'[34] However, it was only in 1995 that he wrote these things down.

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[32] Hodža, 1997, p. 231.

[33] Hodža, 1997, pp. 231–239.

During the period of state socialism, alternative ideas were only very vaguely expressed, and more so in emigration and dissident circles at home. The question of Slovakia's civilizational belonging did not occupy a significant place in the thinking of Slovak oppositionists. Hungarian minority activists were perhaps the most Westernized, but the European orientation was not questioned by others. The defense lawyer Ján Čarnogurský (1944), a leading figure among Catholic dissidents, differed from the others only in his desire to overcome the old East-West divide in post-communist Europe and in his emphasis on Pan-European cooperation. The Russian civilization line was perhaps most sharply represented by Milan Šimečka (1930–1990), a highly influential opposition Marxist philosopher who was ousted after 1968 and considered the whole Soviet-style communism to be simply a Russian national ideology.[35] In fact, in 1968, Šimečka, who was one of the main intellectual representatives of reform communism in Slovakia, interpreted the reform process as a return to the European democratic socialist tradition.[36] These views were not far removed from those of the philosopher Miroslav Kusý (1913–2019), who was one of the signatories of the Charter '77 opposition declaration in Slovakia. The democratic opposition was becoming increasingly westernized—one of its emblematic figures was the writer Dominik Tatarka (1913–1989), also a 'Chartist,' who became disillusioned early on after flirting with communism. Hana Ponická (1922–2007), writer, journalist and 'Chartist,' was also a 'Westernized' oppositionist in the former bourgeois Czechoslovak tradition. No particular geopolitical concepts were developed in these small intellectual circles, but links were established with anti-establishment opposition groups in neighboring states. The events in Poland had the greatest impact on everyone. This also reinforced the 'Central Europeanism' of opposition circles.

6. The period after 1989

The 1989 regime change in Slovakia also led to the advance of Western ideas, and the new watchword was a return to a Europe of democracy and prosperity. This slogan was first put forward by the forces of regime change but was later adopted by some post-communist political circles and ultimately made Euro-Atlantic integration possible. The beginnings of the search for a foreign policy path in Slovakia were similar to those in other Central European countries, but there were obviously national specificities everywhere. In Slovakia, they stemmed from the traditional Eastern (Slavic) intellectual vector. Central European solidarity also played a major role, and one of its emblematic figures was the lawyer Ján Čarnogurský (1944), who before 1989 belonged to the Catholic-Christian wing of the anti-establishment opposition and helped found the Christian Democratic Movement in 1990, of which he was for a time President.

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[34] Chmel, 2013, p. 405.

[35] Marušiak, 2010, p. 219.

[36] Marušiak, 2010, p. 218.

Čarnogurský repeatedly reflected on the future of Slovakia and Central Europe. At a summer conference in Warsaw in 1989, he spoke of Slovakia's central geographical location, which made it impossible to reorganize the Central European region without his country. He saw Christianity as the most important common ideal after the fall of communism.[37] As Slovak prime minister, he did not call for full independence in the short term during the Czech-Slovak state disputes, but in an integrated Europe, he called for Slovakia to have a 'separate chair and a separate star.' He envisioned a Europe in which the Slavic part would form a separate entity with Russia at its center. Without Russia, the Slavic peoples would be merely a peripheral appendage of Western Europe. Like the former national communist Mináč, he saw Slovakia as a potential bridge between the European West and East. It was a position he did not want to risk by joining NATO, which would obviously annoy Moscow.[38] He was not opposed to EU accession, but in 2005, he was already proposing that the Central European states form a bloc within the EU to counterbalance the predominance of the Franco-German tandem. However, the idea of a Central European bloc working closely together within the EU was not far removed from the more liberal and Western Slovak thinkers, although less ideologically motivated (Slavic, Catholic, anti-liberal, etc.). [39]

Čarnogurský later returned to the idea of unifying the European East and West. He saw Slovakia's main advantage in the fact that it was the Slovaks in the Visegrád region who had the least strained German and Russian relations. This could therefore be Slovakia's most authentic contribution to shaping the Visegrad bloc's external relations.[40] Moreover, the Slovak ex-politician consistently criticized the policy of confrontation between the EU and Russia, which is harmful to both sides. He continued to believe that a Pan-European framework was more optimal for Slovakia than Euro-Atlantic integration.[41] Čarnogurský's views, however, were not a unanimous success within his own party, which positioned itself as a clear Western force and viewed with some disapproval the geopolitical proximity of its president, who had a reputation as an anti-communist fighter, to the views of the former national communist Mináč.[42] The threat to Slovakia in the 1990s was not that it would fail to fulfil its role as a bridge between East and West, but rather that it would end up outside Euro-Atlantic integration and in authoritarian-oligarchic-clientelistic Eastern Europe.

Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar, who established Slovak state autonomy in 1993, has been increasingly resented in the West for his authoritarian actions, even though he did not openly deny his country's integration ambitions, and his Russian policy initially appeared pragmatic in many respects.[43] Moreover, the prime minister's policies were deeply divisive for Slovak society, which feared that it was missing a historic opportunity. An isolationist, Mečiar increasingly saw that if Europe did not want his country, it would have to turn to Russia. Russia and Slovakia signed and ratified a treaty of friendship and cooperation and a military cooperation agreement in 1993 and 1994, respectively. At that time, Slovak-Russian, Slovak-Belarusian, and Slovak-Serbian relations did improve, but this was not enough to compensate for the losses suffered in the West. Mečiar spoke Russian well, and the Russian side was happy to let him go in the knowledge that Slovakia would indeed be able to play the role of the East-West bridge, which was one of the Slovak politician's favorite ideas. Moreover, Moscow did not criticize his domestic political methods, and the Slovak political elite of the time was mentally close to its eastern counterparts.[44]

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[37] Chmel, 2009, p. 329.

[38] Čarnogurský, 1997, p. 291 and p. 360.

[39] Lukáč, 2004, p. 231.

[40] Chmel, 2009, p. 333.

[41] Marušiak, 2010, p. 234.

[42] Marušiak, 2010, p. 223.

Slovakia's foreign policy orientation therefore became an important issue in the crucial 1998 parliamentary elections. The foreign policy fault line did not follow the left-right fault line, as there were pro-integrationist and pro-Russian or isolationist forces on both sides.[45] In 1998, the duel ended in a landslide victory for the pro-integration forces. The new center-left-center-right government, led by Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda, finally made up for Slovakia's integration deficit in 2004, not only by joining the EU but also by gaining NATO membership. The revitalized Visegrad cooperation played an important role in this process and has become very important in Slovak foreign policy.[46] Therefore, it is not surprising that the EU and the US have supported Central European cooperation. As early as 1989, former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski tried to breathe new life into the idea of a Czechoslovak-Polish federation, which had been born during the Second World War, but was clearly rejected by Czechoslovak diplomacy in 1990. The Polish-born American expert understood that a broader Central European framework might be a better solution.[47]

Slovak Central Europeanism was thus clearly subordinate and subservient to the country's integration with the West. It also improved the strained Hungarian-Slovak relations. Accordingly, there were no EU critics or skeptics at the time. However, the fact is that the Slovak Parliament adopted a declaration on January 30, 2002, stating that Slovakia intends to maintain its sovereignty in cultural-ethical matters after EU accession.[48] This seemed to reflect a fear of the liberal EU, which must be countered in Central Europe. Nevertheless, EU integration and Central Europeanism have become and remain important not only for Slovak liberals, but also for conservatives and democratic leftists. Rudolf Chmel, a renowned Slovak Hungarianist and literary scholar, who also held government posts at certain times (Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Culture), became an important liberal representative of Slovak Central Europeanism. Among the younger generation, the historian and foreign policy expert Pavol Lukáč (1970–2004), who died young, did much to promote the idea and bring back the remains of former Prime Minister Milan Hodža. When the Slovak center-right camp led by Dzurinda looked to the pantheon of historical figures for EU and NATO-compatible role models, Hodža, who, in addition to the Czechoslovak state founder General Štefánik, had propagated the Central European federation project, became the ideal figure to underpin the foreign policy identity of the center-right liberal-conservative forces.[49]

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[43] In other words, it was aimed at guaranteeing Slovakia's energy security, recovering former Soviet debt, preserving Eastern markets, creating a common bank, and maintaining military-industrial cooperation. On this, see Žiak, 1998, pp. 236–239.

[44] Žiak, 1998, pp.286–289.

[45] Marušiak, 2010, p. 225.

[46] Lukáč, 2004, p. 233.

[47] Lukáč, 2004, pp. 208–209.

[48] https://www.nrsr.sk/web/?sid=nrsr/dokumenty/vyhlasenia

The long period of Robert Fico's governments (2006–2018) began after the Dzurinda governments, interrupted only in 2010 for a short one-and-one-half-year period (2010–2012). The new government, initially closer to the Slavic identity and ideology of reciprocity and symbolic Russian friendliness, did not, however, break with the Visegrad identity of Slovak foreign policy, which gradually became a lasting and cross-camp value for Slovakia. This has taken on a new meaning in recent years (for example, during the migration crisis of 2015 and the subsequent refugee quota debates) but has not been significantly changed by the rejection of Kosovo's independence, the withdrawal of Slovak troops from Iraq, or pro-Russian gestures during the Russian-Georgian (2008) and Russian-Ukrainian (since 2014) conflicts. Even the Slovak National Party has started to embrace it. Indeed, one of the great advantages of the Visegrad idea is that, while it has many lukewarm supporters, it has few staunch opponents in Slovak politics. This moderate Visegrad consensus currently characterizes the whole political spectrum, from progressive liberals to certain populist and extreme nationalist forces. The latter prefer to attack EU and NATO membership and do not yet castigate Central European solidarity. Obviously, the situation would be different and the idea would be accepted if someone were to make a sustained and sincere attempt to oppose the Visegrad cooperation with the EU, but that would be a move that would be a mortal danger for the whole region.

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| Chapter 9 |

European and Regional Integration Concepts in Poland (1789–2004)

Magdolna GEDEON, Iván HALÁSZ

ABSTARCT

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was one of the largest states in early Modern Europe. Its internal public law structure was complex and had several federal features. The existence of different levels of autonomy was no stranger to him. Many nations and denominations (churches) were mixed in this state, which ceased to exist at the end of the 18th century, but the ideal of independent Polish statehood lived on. In the 19th century, several Polish independence uprisings broke out, mostly against the Russians, but none of them were successful. Various concepts were born among Polish politicians; these often dealt with a Central and Eastern European federation with Polish leadership. In the first half of the 19th century, the Poles held Slavic solidarity concepts that sought to reconcile Slavic Poles and Russians. These concepts were popular mainly among the conservative and romantic intellectuals. In time, however, Slavic solidarity took a back seat. In the second half of the 19th century, the Polish socialist movement was born, which sought more moderate national politics toward the Belarus, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian national movements and wanted to unite some nations of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in a fairer federation. These ideas were also close to Józef Piłsudski, under whose leadership Poland again became an independent state at the end of 1918. He arrived from the Polish Socialist Party, and during the First World War, he organized the Polish legions. At a similar time in tsarist Russia, the Polish National Democratic Party was the second important political movement in the early 20th century. This nationalist movement was born in tsarist Russia and propagated the rebirth of Poland in the form of a smaller but more Polish national state. Roman Dmowski, a leader of the NDP, had a conflict with Piłsudski that was an important conceptional problem of the second Polish Republic in the interwar period. The new Poland was big state with regional ambitions, but it had two dangerous neighbors—Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The Polish leaders therefore had to think about various federal alternatives, most of which revolved around solidarity in Central and Eastern Europe. Such were the Intermarium or Jagellonian plans. The Polish tragedy during the Second World War and Soviet dominance after 1945 only reinforced these ideas. Many Polish intellectuals began to see the future in European unity, although such ideas existed as early as the 19th century. Some of the Polish emigration to Paris worked to reconcile them with the peoples of Eastern Europe (Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Belarusians). The journal *Kultura* played the crucial role in this process. Poland after 1989 again plays an important European role in three regional contexts: Central Europe, the Baltic Sea, and North-Eastern Europe.

KEYWORDS

Baltic sea, Central Europe, federation, Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Ukraine

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Introduction

The Polish-Lithuanian state union was one of the largest states in Europe before the 18th century, inhabited by people of different religions (Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim) and nationalities (Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Germans, Tartars, etc.). The nobiliary Rzeczpospolita (Republic) as a state never had a homogeneous structure; however, the Union of Lublin, concluded in 1569, eventually created a union of two formally equal state formations. The Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Principality of Lithuania had a common monarch, general parliament, and foreign policy. Otherwise, both units retained their own political community of nobles, army, treasury, legal system, and customs borders.[1]

There was further internal fragmentation within the Union. The Kingdom of Poland, for example, consisted of at least two major historical regions with their own characteristics: Greater Poland (Wielkopolska) and Lesser Poland (Malopolska). In the northeastern periphery, there was Royal Prussia, which was also the vassal of the King of Poland, as was the province of Kurland, which is today located in Latvia. Regional (Vojvodinal or district) identities were also strong within these territorial entities. Historic Lithuania was particularly diverse, as it included the Belarusians of the Orthodox religion in addition to ethnic Lithuanians and a significant part of present-day Ukraine. At one time, the old version of the Belarusian language had been the official language. However, in 1697, through the voluntary political-cultural assimilation of the Lithuanian nobility of various origins, Polish became the official language throughout the Grand Principality.[2] The memory of the Union of Lublin and the political structure based on local autonomy left deep imprints on the thinking of the Polish intelligentsia, which would have also been reflected in the various conceptions of integration that emerged in the future. In addition, Poland, which had already been a part of Latin culture, has always been closely associated with the currents of the Western European frame of mind, whether it was the 16th-century Latin humanism or 18th-century French enlightenment. Latin cultural attachment brought with it a thorough knowledge of the ancient Roman republic tradition, which influenced the Polish nobility's thinking and partly led to the (in)famous Polish 'noble democracy.' Another important feature was the high proportion of nobility with a relatively uniform status. Nowhere in Europe did this class have as much political weight as here, as they also elected the king.[3] Moreover, the concept of a free noble nation played an important role in the opposition of the upper classes of Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine.[4] For these reasons, the Poles had failed for a long time to notice the national aspirations of Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine, which later led to many tragedies. By the end of the 18th century, 'noble democracy' had finally weakened the central state power so much that the Polish-Lithuanian state union fell as a victim of the neighboring great powers (Austria, Russia, Prussia) and ceased to exist.

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[1] Řezník, 2006, p. 44.

[2] Ibid. pp. 44–47.

[3] The key event was the extinction of the Jagiellonian dynasty in 1572. The Lithuanian origin Jagiellonians, after the Piasts dynasty, were the second group that was able to permanently hold the Polish throne.

[4] Dylągowa, 1998, pp. 159–160.

The division of the country took place in three stages (1772, 1793, 1795). The Polish question, on the other hand, occupied Europe throughout the long 19th century (1789–1914). The Polish independence rebellions in several waves (1794, 1830/31, 1863/64) and the emigrants in their wake also gave impetus to this. The loss of state independence deeply shocked the Poles, who from the first minute were trying to restore the independence of their statehood, either on their own or with external help. To do this, however, they had to solve two interior questions—the relationship between the Polish nobility and the peasantry and the problem of nationality.

Polish plans were also marked by relationships with neighboring states and their peoples, similar to the concepts of integration and Europe that arose among other peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. The Polish attitude toward the great powers who divided the country developed dynamically over the decades. Although they relied most heavily on French help during the Napoleonic Wars, they could have temporarily reconciled themselves to one or another of the dividing powers if those powers had been able to grant them greater independence within the existing framework. For a long time, Slavic Russia seemed like such a state.

At first, trust in the French did not seem in vain, since Napoleon I founded the Duchy of Warsaw in 1807, for which he even wrote a constitution. The Duchy of Warsaw existed until 1815, when the Congress of Vienna annexed its western part to Prussia, declared Krakow a 'free city,' and the remaining territories continued to function as protectorates of the tsarist Empire under the name of the Kingdom of Poland (Congress Poland). The latter initially had significant autonomy in the early periods, but after the suppression of the rebellion in 1830/1831, Tsarism progressively abolished it. In 1874, the kingdom's separate status was almost completely abolished, and Prussia increasingly resorted to a centralization policy. Therefore, at the end of the 19th century, only Poles living in the Austrian province of Galicia had real autonomy. Plans to recreate Polish statehood during the period of the partition (1795–1918) often included references to a federal state structure, which would have largely related to the union of nations of the former Polish-Lithuanian state union. Their creators envisaged the country's independence mostly within a confederation with Russia, the Habsburg Empire, or Germany.[5]

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[5] Choluj, 2006, p. 116.

1. The early modern concepts (16th–18th centuries)

As a political concept, Europe appeared in Polish public thought in the early 16th century, as the historian and doctor Maciej Miechowita (1457–1523) had already published it in his work *Tractatus de duabus Sarmatiis Europiana et Asiana et de contentis in eis* in 1517. Under the influence of Erasmus of Rotterdam, Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski (1503–1572) published his influential work *De Republica emendanda* in 1551, the third volume of which dealt with the issue of war and peace that was constantly a concern for Europeans. Besides Christianity and the rule of law, he thought that the cooperating community of European states also had a role to play in preserving peace. According to him, in case of conflicts, the monarchs of the neighboring states should have appointed some kind of arbitrators, who could then act as mediators.[6]

The most influential concept of early Polish unification was linked to the Polish king Stanisław Leszczyński (1677–1766), who twice sat on the Polish throne (1704–1709 and 1733–1736) and then as the Prince of Lorraine from 1738 to 1766. His work *Memorial de L'Affermissement de la paix generale* was created under the influence of the French Enlightenment. Leszczyński, who was striving for universal peace, wanted to entrust the role of peacekeeping to the European republics, which, in turn, would have been selflessly led by France as one of the strongest states of the age. The author's reference to republics meant the Netherlands, England, and Sweden, which were states where parliament's role was already important. According to Leszczyński, this association of states should have primarily acted as a mediator but should have even had the right to intervene if necessary.[7] Finally, we must mention the Warsaw teacher Józef Skrezutuski (1743–1806), who belonged to King Stanisław Poniatowski's circle. He was focused on eternal peace in Europe, which he wanted to achieve by creating the Republic of European States. He believed the republic should function as a voluntary confederation, with a joint congress for conciliation and another for settlement of bilateral disputes. Moreover, he considered it necessary to have a common legal system based on common legal principles recognized by all member states. He wanted to ban violations of common legal norms, armed initiatives, and organizations against common security.[8]

2. Polish ideas of integration in the long 19th century (1789–1918)

At the beginning of the 19th century, Polish public thinking was seriously influenced not only by the ideas of the French Enlightenment but also the popular Slavic ideas of that time of cooperation. Literary romanticism, which had begun at the time, and the emerging cultural-linguistic nationalism further strengthened the Slavic dimension of Polish public thinking. However, the Slavic orientation also posed several dangers for them, as the Poles had just come under the control of Russia, their old regional rival. Moreover, Orthodox Russians had always treated the Catholic Poles, considered 'Latinized Slavs,' with suspicion.[9] The strong Polish state traditions hampered the building of an effective Russian Empire.

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[6] Stoczewska, 2003, pp. 7–9.

[7] Ibid. p. 13.

[8] Ibid. p. 14.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the youthful friend of Tsar Alexander the First, Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski (1770–1861), was at the heart of forces hoping to improve the Polish situation.[10] The Prince did not particularly like Napoleon, but he was aware that the French Revolution would mark a major cornerstone in the state-building process, which would focus on the issue of equality of nations and freedom.[11] However, as a diplomat, he was also aware of the importance of a balance of power. The aim of Czartoryski was to create a Poland connected to Russia, which was one of the centers of Slavism at the same time.[12] In a memorandum to the Tsar during the time of the Congress of Vienna, he outlined a project for a political alliance between Poland and Russia that would have represented the interests of all Slavs, especially the Balkans.[13]

The Vienna Congress, however, only partially implemented the plan for Slav-based Polish-Russian cooperation. At that time, Stanisław Staszic (1755–1826), a representative of the Polish Enlightenment, formulated his plan for a future European community. He said the division of Poland had violated international law. As a forerunner of Slavophilia, he urged unification of the Slavic nations (then under Russian leadership), from which, in the long run, European unity could have been developed.[14] According to him, the Prussian/Austrian threat and the defense against Napoleon linked Slavophilia to the idea of European unity.

The idea that went beyond Slavic cooperation was formulated by Józef Maria Hoene-Wroński (1776–1853), a Polish philosopher, physicist, and mathematician. 'The philosophical system of Hoene-Wronski was an attempt to find a universal principle that organizes all fields of science which should lead to discovering the absolute truth.'[15] In his work published in Paris in 1819,[16] he described how a federation of European states could have been created, which would have ensured the Continent's security. In his opinion, the federation should be first be formed by states inhabited by one nation, where the defining criterion of a nation is having its own language. This alliance would be the transition to a federation of all peoples. However, forming a world federation could only be achieved if all nations recognized the absolute and pure truth. The goal of all mankind would be to attain the absolute, and thus the quarrels would end.[17]

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[9] Głębocki, 2000, p. 42.

[10] Czartoryski, as a child of one of the most influential Polish magnate families, was a lifelong believer in a federal solution to European conditions. From 1802 to 1806, he was Minister of Foreign Affairs of the tsarist Russian Empire, thanks to which he became acquainted with how the policy of the great powers operated. In 1830, he had already become one of the conservative leaders of the Polish War of Independence, and after it until his death in 1861, he was the leader of the Polish emigrant movement.

[11] Stoczewska, 2003, p. 16.

[12] Borodziej, Brzostek and Górny, 2005, p. 44.

[13] Borodziej, Brzostek and Górny, 2005, p. 48.

[14] See more: Steggherr, 2019, pp. 195–202.

[15] Europe of Free Nations, 2008, p. 6.

[16] Hoene-Wronski: Creation absolute del'humanite, Paris: Éverat, 1819. For details see: Borodziej et al., 2005, Vol. 2 [Regesten], pp. 29–30.

August Cieszkowski (1814–1894) shared the views of Hoene-Wroński on the special role of Slavism in God's plan. Cieszkowski envisioned the need for unifying mankind in a religious way.

> In Cieszkowski's opinion, the prayer 'Our Father' is a revelation of humanity's future, heralding a new age which would fulfil Christ teaching and establish—by way of evolution of political and social relations—the Kingdom of God on earth. This Kingdom, constituting the most stage in the social development, would mean transition of nations from the state of nature to the state of the civilization of societies, to the state of nations' citizenship, to the state of Peoples Republic. Kingdom of God on earth, that is, a republic of independent nations, by joining nations and states, would not deprive them of their individual national features or independent existence but would allow them a harmonious cooperation and eternal universal peace.[18]

On November 29, 1830, a national rebellion broke out in Warsaw against the Russian rule that aimed to achieve Polish independence, the reunification of Poland and Lithuania, and restoration of the 1772 borders. Besides national radicals, the rebellion was supported by the incidentally moderate Prince Czartoryski, who in his book on the art of diplomacy predicted a kind of state arrangement in Central and Eastern Europe that would, along with the rebirth of the historic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, also restore the historic Czech-Hungarian Kingdom as independent state.[19] The Prince was convinced of the legitimacy of nations' aspirations for self-determination, and long before the attempts of 1848, formulated the idea of the United States of Central Europe. The Russian power threatening the Central and Eastern Region of Europa and the growing Prussian threat inspired him to raise his word of warning for the benefit of all the people of the region:

> What is needed in this part of Europe is a state that, by its composition and nature, can be nothing more than a defensive force. It is in Europe's own interest for this state to be a permanent and strong component of European balance.[20]

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[17] Stoczewska, 2003, p. 16.

[18] Europe of Free Nations, 2008, p. 11.

[19] Romsics, 1998, pp. 1–2.

[20] Segesváry, 2004, p. 14.

Czartoryski believed that both small and large states had the right to independence and to develop their national characteristics. However, small states could only provide these if they had appropriate forces to defend them. Thus, Czartoryski proposed to unite smaller and weaker states into one federation:

> Europe has almost the right to demand this from small states, because this is the only way for them to make an effective contribution to the successful and expeditious development of the European community. The confederate state, like the federation of states, is a desirable form of consolidation of individual countries, because its purpose has purely defensive nature and inherently cannot threaten the great powers.[21]

After the suppression of the November rebellion, the pre-1830 Slavic-based concepts based on the Russian-Polish alliance no longer seemed to be up to date for Poles forced to emigrate. Contemporary Polish philosophers therefore began to think in a broader European context. Then, Wojciech Bogumił Jastrzębowski (1779–1882), a philosopher, scientist, and soldier, published his work on the Constitution of Europe (*Konstytucja dla Europy*). In this work, the author had already surpassed the ideas of an emerging confederation led by a strong state. In 77 stages, he laid down federal rules for the nations of Europe that, in his opinion, could create European unity. According to the constitution, parliaments would be the national legislators, and delegates from all nations would form the Congress, which would be the European legislator. Legal systems at both levels (European and national) should be based on divine natural law. The former would have been determined by national parliaments and the latter by the European Congress. The European Congress would have to meet in different cities each year, and its working language would be the most widely spoken European language. However, the author did not specify which language this meant. Congress would be the chief arbitrator, but it would also supervise the Joint Armed Forces. The enthusiastic author wanted to dismantle the national armed forces and wanted all weapons to be taken into common ownership. The collected weapons should then have been stored in one place and could only have been in the command of the European Congress.[22]

Jastrzębowski outlined not only the plan for a new Europe, but also a vision of nations independent of territory. He broke away from the idea of nation-states with this idea, which was a central element of political thinking at that time. He saw the nation as a unity created by language, independent of the location of the language user/speaker. According to Jastrzębowski, by acknowledging diversity of languages, cross-border unity could have been established, and thus a law-oriented nation could have been created in Europe.[23]

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[21] Ibid. p. 14.

[22] Stoczewska, 2003, pp. 17–18.

[23] Choluj, 2013, p. 95.

Thousands of Polish intellectuals emigrated to France and Britain after the November rebellion was defeated.[24] The Czartoryski-led group called Hôtel Lambert was the best organized part of the emigrants in Paris. Hôtel Lambert had a European network whose members represented Polish interests with the support of English and French diplomats. This group had been in diplomacy for forty years, essentially acting as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a non-existent state.[25]

However, there were several groupings among the emigrants. Of these, the Polish Democratic Society (Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Polskie – TDP) [26] should be highlighted. This Society rejected politics, history, and traditions, replacing them with the revolution of nations and of humanity. They did not acknowledge that the then heavily idealized aristocratic first Republic of Poland could be an example of European democracy; instead, they proclaimed its obscurantism. This perception was changed after 1833/34 when the hope of a European revolution was dissipated. At that time, members of the Society turned again to Polish traditions and Slavic reciprocity. The role of Poland was emphasized in the plan for the democratic unification of all Slavs and thus, for the formation of a community of European people. However, the idea of Slavic unification with Russian leadership did not disappear completely.[27]

Polish independence aspirations also appeared in the realm of an idea conceived in romantic literature, in the so-called political messianism. According to this perception, Poland, divided into three parts, would become the Messiah of nations and bring healing and a peaceful world to all the peoples of Europe through its own pain. One of the representatives of this trend was Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855).[28] According to Mickiewicz's views on the future of Europe, it was necessary to establish European unity:

> ...the Christian religion which he expected to be radically renewed, introducing the Christian morality into politics, particularly into international relations, as well as national dogma, that is, the idea of integrating Europe to promote its constituent nations. The future Europe was to be a confederation modelled upon the Polish-Lithuanian union, but its construction would be possible only as a result of a universal peoples' war a European-wide revolution which would destroy bondages and injustice of the Holy Alliance Europe.[29]

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[24] The Great Emigration consisted of about eleven thousand emigrants, the pick of Polish intellectual and political life.

[25] The Hôtel Lambert is named after a palace on Île St. Louis in Paris that Czartoryski bought in 1843 and used as his residence. See: Hahn, 1973, pp. 345–374.

[26] The most populous group of Polish emigration was formed on March 17, 1832 in Paris. See: Borodziej, Brzostek and Górny, 2005, p. 53.

[27] See more: Borodziej, Brzostek and Górny, 2005, pp. 52–59.

[28] Choluj, 2013, pp. 93–94.

[29] Europe of Free Nations, 2008, p. 10.

Concepts based on the need for Poland's fate to be linked to the Habsburg House first emerged in 1848. A group of Krakow conservatives wanted to take advantage of Austria's weakness and envisioned a new Austria. They desired the Slavic Federation to be under Habsburg law in the future.[30] To this end, the Slavic Congress in Prague was organized in June 1848. The congress was convened and chaired by František Palacký from the Czech Republic, who was the most influential representative of Austroslavism in the Czech Republic.[31] This congress was attended by representatives of the Slavs living in the territory of the Habsburg Monarchy and Poles from the Grand Duchy of Poznań as part of Prussia. The leading figure of the latter, Karol Libelt, a Polish philosopher and leader of the Polish League in Berlin, summarized his ideas shortly before the events of March as follows: '... our vast Poland, which stretches from sea to sea, will no longer be reborn as a unified state with national government, but a federation of Lithuanians, Ruthenians, Prussians and other nations.' Although Libel heavily criticized the oppression of the Slavs by the Germans, he emphasized the independence of nations participating in the federation, even if they were not Slavs. In his conception, the federation was open to, among others, Jews and Germans.[32]

Representatives of Hôtel Lambert favored unification with the Ukrainians and urged an agreement between the Slavs and Hungary. The Czechs who hosted the Prague Congress, however, deviated from these plans. Palacký advocated transforming Austria in a federal way, which according to him would have resolved the Slavic question. In this concept, he said, Austria (and its nations) would have escaped a double danger: the Germans and the Russians.[33] On June 12, Palacký presented the Manifesto of Slavic Congress for the Nations of Europe, which reflected a compromise between Palacký's Austro-Slavism and the All-Slavic idea of Libel.[34]

Austro-Slavism was accepted by many of the Poles, including the Czech sympathizer, Jerzy Lubomirski. He and Antoni Zygmunt Helcel

> presented a plan for an Austrian-Slavonic-union (Akt unji rakusko-słowiańskiej) which would include Slavonic peoples in the Austrian Empire. The aim of the proposed union, based on his principle of equality of its members, was to ensure independence of the Slavonic peoples, their territories, and constitutional systems. Hungarians were invited to join in; envisaged was also an alliance with Tyrol and the German part of Styria.[35]

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[30] Cetnarowitz, 1996, p. 69.

[31] The ideas of reforming the state structure of the Habsburg Empire, which advocated the equality of Slavs and thought prospectively of bringing the empire under Slavic control, are collectively called Austro-Slavism. See. Romsics, 1998, p. 3.

[32] Choluj, 2006, p. 116.

[33] Borodziej, Brzostek and Górny, 2005, p. 61.

[34] See more: Trzeciakowski, 2004, pp. 331–346.

[35] Europe of Free Nations, 2008, p. 18.

The plan of the emigrant Valerian Krasinsky, published in London at the end of 1848, sought to unite the Hungarian and Slavic parts of the Habsburg Empire with Prussian and Russian Poland. Poland would have become the driving force behind this, due to its numerical superiority and historical past. Krasinsky, however, did not want to remove the Habsburgs from the head of the federation, remaining a part of the united states in its internal structure. Like the Czech Austro-Slavic politicians, he marked the basic function of the federation's foreign and security policy as stopping Russian-Pan-Slavic and German-Pan-German expansionism. However, Czartoryski spared much less of the Habsburg empire and the dynastic principle. The national principle had increasingly become the basic principle of his radicalized idea of settlement.[36]

The 1848 revolutions overwhelmed the idea of solidarity between nations in Poland and throughout Europe. Due to the fall of the Hungarian Revolution, the democratic members of the TDP turned against the idea of a Slavic federation because it was perceived as a cover-up of Russian Pan-Slavism.[37] The repeated shaking of Polish Slavophilia could also observed in the Czartoryski camp. One of the most active associates of Czartoryski from the late 1840s was Franciszek Duchiński, who contrasted Catholic Christianity and Ruthenianism with Slavic cooperation.[38] He argued for 'the complete independence' of 'Little-Russia' (consisting of the Chernihiv, Poltava, and Kharkiv provinces of the Russian Empire), regarding it as a distinct nationality that possessed 'all rights to such sovereignty.'[39]

> Czartoryski's camp attracted several men with dual Polish-Ukrainian loyalties (historically known as gente Rutheni, natione Poloni) such as Duchiński, the writer and activist Michal Czajkowski, and the Ruthenian priest Hipolit Terlecki, who recognized a separate Ukrainian ethnicity (customs, language, and faith) within a broader Polish national community.[40]

His main thesis was that Russia's conversion to the Christian religion had been made essentially according to the Catholic rite, and only the schism disrupted the religious unity of the Slavs. He argued that instead of committing itself to godless Western values, Poland should bring its own spirituality into line with its domestic way of life. This would unite the Slavic nation and lead them in accordance with Western morality. According to him, the Slavs could choose between two paths: the Slavic Federation would either succeed under the banner of Slavic Catholicism or be crushed under Russian tyranny.[41]

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[36] Romsics, 1998, p. 4.

[37] Borodziej, Brzostek and Górny, 2005, pp. 62–63.

[38] The essence of Ruthenianism was the recognition of the Ukrainians claim to independence and their common defense against non-Slavic Russia.

[39] Bilenky, 2012, pp. 112–113.

[40] Ibid. p. 113.

[41] Borodziej, Brzostek and Górny, 2005, pp. 63–64.

The accession of Tsar Alexander the II to the throne in 1855 initiated important changes throughout the Russian Empire, which were 'softening' the political situation.[42] Many Polish emigrants abandoned political idealism and planned to return home. Both the idea of European unification and the Slavic alliance disappeared from the works of authors discussing the future. They were replaced by the idea of a federation of former Polish and non-Polish parts of Rzeczpospolita.[43]

Although the Spring of the Peoples and the Crimean War escaped Russia-Poland, the idea of national unity and independence survived among Polish patriots, who broke into two main camps. In 1831, the so-called whites considered autonomy as an achievable goal, but the reds wanted full independence. The latter had sparked the rebellion of January 1863, which lasted for 14 months. On the one hand, its defeat resulted in more intense Russification,[44] while on the other, it triggered another wave of emigration.

Representatives of the democratic movement abroad planned to rebuild the Polish state as a national community based on the freedom and equality of nations. The January rebellion caused, in some respects, the democratic idea of popular solidarity in a new, socialist form to flourish. At that time, ideas like unifying the nations of Europe, the independence of Poland, and creating a democratic Slavic federation reappeared.[45] Thus, for example,

> the proclamation the Representative Committee of the Union of Polish Emigration (which led the Union in the years 1866–1871), dated November 29, 1866, stated that the aim of the Polish refugees was the struggle for independence carried out in association with other subjugated peoples, for example the Slavs, and also with the peoples of Hungary and Romania; opposition to the imperialist idea of Panslavism; and the unification for the sake of universal alliance. Their ultimate aim was a federation of European nations.[46]

The conservative wing of emigration, under the leadership of Władysław Czartoryski, son of Adam Czartoryski who died in 1861, paid increased attention to the situation in Galicia. Because Polish-led Galicia had had autonomy since the mid-1860s. Władysław Czartoryski therefore considered the good situation of Poles in Galicia to be the cornerstone of Polish hopes. He believed that this part of the country could be the center of the struggle for independence without compromising the interests of the Habsburg Monarchy. In line with the 1848 ideas of the Czechs' František Palacký, he saw that a strong state should be established or maintained between Germany and Russia. According to him, in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Poles could play a mediating role between the antagonistic Hungarians and the Slavs, thus facilitating the trialist transformation of the dualist monarchy.[47]

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[42] Davies, 2006, pp. 694–695.

[43] Borodziej, Brzostek, and Górny, 2005, p. 65.

[44] Whites relied primarily on the landowner nobility and insisted on their prerogatives, while reds came from students, urban craftsmen, and young officers. Romsics, 1998, p. 9.

[45] Borodziej, Brzostek and Górny, 2005, p. 68.

[46] Europe of Free Nations, 2008, p. 18.

This concept in part also appeared in the inscription of the Provincial Assembly of Galicia based in Lemberg, addressed to Emperor Franz Joseph. Polish representatives in Galicia in a later brochure also condemned Czech relations with Russia, thus distancing themselves from broader Pan-Slavic concepts. In the long run, they could also imagine the originally dualistic (Austro-Hungarian) monarchy as a trialist (Austro-Hungarian-Polish) formation. However, a different form of federation was also acceptable to them.[48]

One of the most determined Galician federalists was Francis Smolka, who, in his two-volume work *Political Letters on Russia and Poland* called on Austria to make peace with its own nations. In the Galician Sejm, Smolka proposed forming a federation with the participation of Hungary, Austria, the Czech Republic, Galicia, and Bukovina. This plan was also supported by other Galician Democrats.[49]

The Franco-Prussian War and establishment of a united Germany in 1871 changed the situation of Western Polish emigration in an unfavorable way. The attention of the French turned elsewhere, and under the influence of Russian propaganda in Europe, many began to see troublemakers in the Poles. Those who stayed at home also had to think through their further plans. Among the conservatives, Slavic-centric concepts appeared again, while others expected Germany, which was getting stronger at that time, to drive back Russia. Conservatives were strong, especially in Krakow. For a time, one of the founders of the Slavic Club also worked, the philosopher and linguist Marian Zdziechowski (1861–1938), who founded the journal *Slavic World* at the turn of the century. His case also indicates that the Slavic aspect did not disappear permanently from Polish thought.[50]

From the 1870s, new political trends emerged among the Poles, including people's and socialist movements. Universalism played a more prominent role in the socialist program. The idea of a universal community of peoples was the crowning plan for the federation. The main difference between the various trends of socialism was that the future prosperity of the suppressed strata necessarily adhered to the supranational or universalist framework, or they could have imagined it within the framework of a nation-state.

According to Bołesław Limanowski (1835–1935), a Polish historian and sociologist of Lithuanian descent and one of the early founders of the socialist movement, a free Poland to be restored should have sought a free federation with Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus. This idea, which should not be confused with Panslavicism, then played an important role in the later politics of the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjałistyczna – PPS), which he founded. This concept was also shared by the later founder of the State, General Józef Piłsudski. Incidentally, like Limanowski, he also came from Lithuanian Polish nobility.[51]

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[47] Borodziej, Brzostek and Górny, 2005, p. 70.

[48] Ibid. p. 71.

[49] Ibid. p. 71.

[50] https://www.polskietradycje.pl/postacie/widok/121.

Contrary to this concept, Ludwik Waryński (1856–1889), the founder and then leader of the early socialist party Proletariat, argued that the task of the socialists was mainly the class struggle rather than taking over the tasks of the bourgeoisie. The proletariat belonged together regardless of national differences, and the liberation of the proletariat went beyond the fate of Polish independence aspirations. The Polish revolutionary, who was young when he died in prison, had close ties with other Russian revolutionaries.[52]

The outbreak of the first Russian revolution in 1905 posed serious theoretical and tactical dilemmas for the various trends of the Polish socialist movement in Russia. The revolutionary faction of the PPS (PPS-Frakcja Rewolucijna) would have immediately launched a war for Polish independence. The left-wing part of the party (PPS-Lewica) wanted to convene a constitutional assembly (Konstytuanta) in Warsaw, which would have determined the fate of the Russian parts of divided Poland. One of their leaders, the later communist Maksymilian Horwitz (1877–1937), set the party's goal as convening a republican parliament that would have been on an equal basis with the St. Petersburg parliament. The Republic of Poland would have been part of a federation of nations of the old Russian Empire established on a republican-democratic basis.[53] The program of the PPS-Proletariat of 1906 also stated that, although it would be in the interest of the Polish proletariat to unite all Polish territories in one state, this goal was almost impossible to achieve, so federalization of the existing imperial structure should be sought. The radical socialists saw an opportunity for this because of the changes in Russia. According to them, Polish independence would inevitably be resolved in the future European Community.[54]

The outbreak of the First World War caused another crisis of orientation among Poles living in the territory of the three great powers. The Polish Socialists of Independence hoping for the victory of the Central Powers, from which they were expected to weaken Russia, which was considered their main enemy. Most politicians of PPS therefore began to support the German-Austrian Covenant in 1914. Józef Piłsudski began to organize legions with which he wanted to take part in the fight against Russia.

Orientation toward the Central Powers could also be observed in other political groups. In July 1914, the National Committee (Naczelny Komitet Narodowy) was formed in Krakow, with the participation of representatives of the Socialists, Conservatives, Nationalists, and Populists. Its participants were united by the plan to supplement Galicia with the Russian part and thus transform Austria into a monarchy of three nations. Among others, Michał Bobrzyński (1849–1935), a former Galician governor and then a conservative historian in Vienna, assisted in drawing up the program.[55]

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[51] Cottam, 1972, pp. 38–39.

[52] Graczyk, 2018. Available at: https://historia.interia.pl/drogi-do-wolnosci/news-ludwik-warynski-i-pierwszy-proletariat,nId,2619134.

[53] Borodziej, Brzostek and Górny, 2005, p. 78.

[54] http://lewicowo.pl/program-polskiej-partii-socjalistycznej-proletariat/

Polish national politics also had a nationalist wing that relied more on the victory of the Entente and saw the Poles' place as on the side of the Russians, from which they expected unification of the Polish territories and then their serious autonomy and emancipation. Its chief leader was Roman Dmowski (1864–1939), who saw the main lurking threat of the Poles' aspirations and modernization program in strengthening the Germans. The National Democratic Party, which he founded and then led, was also characterized by strong anti-Semitism. Dmowski, as Piłsudski's main rival, did not believe in a federation to be established in the territory of the old Polish-Lithuanian state; instead, he became an advocate of assimilating a Polish nation-state. However, he did not want to assimilate the large number of Jews. At the time of the First World War, he was close to the Czech-Russian Neo-Slavic movement, which was thinking about the Slavic transformation of Austria according to Slavic aspects and about Slavic federalism. At the beginning of the First World War, Dmowski still voted for Russia, but his main long-term goal was to create a Polish nation-state that would be under Russian protection if protection was necessary. He moved his headquarters to Switzerland and then to France, making him one of the main advocates of Polish interests in the peace talks around Paris. However, he was Foreign Minister only for a short time in 1923.[56]

In 1916, the Central Authorities decided to create a conflicting but not completely independent state from the Kingdom of Poland, which belonged to Russia before the war but which they now occupied. According to this plan, the new Polish state would have belonged to the allies of the two Central European empires and would unite with them in a customs union. In foreign relations, however, German diplomacy would have represented the Poles.[57] In contrast, Nicholas II declared the reconstruction of Poland a Russian war target. The tsarist government had declared that it would not stand in the way of a future voluntary Polish-Russian federation. The Polish question thus became an important element in the policies of the warring superpowers in the last two years of the war. However, neither side wanted to give a clear promise of independence.

Ignacy Paderewski (1860–1941), a world-renowned composer-pianist who wrote a memorandum to the American President, Woodrow Wilson in early 1917, played an important role in the Entente-friendly Western Polish emigration. He envisioned an independent Polish state to be restored as a federation within the boundaries of 1772. In addition to the Polish territories belonging to Russia, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine, Paderewski would have linked Prussian Silesia and parts of Prussia to the federation. He also envisioned Galicia, Czech Silesia, Spiš, and the Orava region as part of the federation. He emphasized the liberal nature of the new state and made explicit reference to individual and collective human rights. The federation he envisioned was stylistically called The United States of Poland, which would have divided the autonomous Kingdoms (specifically the Kingdoms of Poland, Lithuania, Polesia, Halic-Podolyn, and Volhynia). In the long run, this state, together with other Entente-friendly Central and Eastern European states (especially Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia), could have been one of the means of counterbalancing German influence.[58]

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[55] https://www.britannica.com/biography/Michal-Bobrzynski; Borodziej, Brzostek and Górny, 2005, pp. 83–84.

[56] https://dzieje.pl/postacie/roman-dmowski and https://www.rp.pl/historia/art1614171-ojcowie-niepodleglosci-wspoltworcy-odrodzonej-rzeczypospolitej

[57] See Proklamacja z dna 5. listopada 1916 r. és Rozporządzenie z dnia 6 grudnia o Tymczasowej Radzie Stanu w Królestwie Polskim. In: Konieczni and Kruszewski, 2002, pp. 330–332.

Toward the end of First World War, therefore, a significant number of centrist and socialist Polish politicians, honestly or for tactical reasons, stood in some form on the platform of a wider federation in which Poles would have played a leading role. However, it soon became clear that among Belarusians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians, this idea did not find an echo at all, unlike what many had hoped. Several aspects and systems of argument were combined in these ideas of federation. These included general concerns about the dominance or outright aggression of neighboring large states, as well as a common European heritage, Slavic and/or Christian solidarity, and community consciousness. Neither the geographical and economic affiliation of the wider region to Europe nor the leading role of the reborn Poland among the neighboring Slavic peoples were incidental, either. The behaviors of the authors of these federal plans were sometimes contradictory, often lacking a proper link, and often ignoring each other's views. The frequently strong and sometimes dreamy personalities of the authors of these visions of the region and Europe's future prevented them from crossing their narrower horizons and drawing up a common plan.[59]

3. Decades between the two World Wars

Although the Polish state, which was formed in the autumn of 1918, did not need to defend either Germany or Russia, its existence faced serious challenges because of these two states. The ideas of a federation during the war did not materialize, but the reborn Polish state clearly acquired lands of nationality, which it then tried to Polishize. Nevertheless, there was no shortage of varying depths of federal proposals.

For example, Józef Buzek (1873–1936), director of the Polish Statistical Office, a key member of the Constituent Sejm and a future participant in the Polish pan-European movement, drafted a Polish constitution on May 30, 1919, in which, based on the American model, he proposed creating a federation of 70 provinces.[60] The population of each territorial unit would have ranged from 200,000 to 500,000 people, and each would have had its own constitution. Although the structure would have been determined without consulting the units concerned, it would have had to be reviewed after four years.[61]

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[58] Kusielewicz, 1956, pp. 65–71.

[59] Borodziej, Brzostek and Górny, 2005, p. 87.

[60] Sokół, 2021, p. 24.

In the rebirth of Poland, the dominant politicians considered the 'first Rzeczpospolita,' that is, the state before the partitions, as the main point of reference, which was also applied to the imminent delimitation of borders. This tradition also played an important role in the two contradictory ideas of that time. One was the so-called incorporation concept of the national democrat Roman Dmowski (1864–1939) and the other was the federation plan of the originally socialist Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935).[62] Dmowski planned to unite Polish territory with the 1772 borders, except for places where foreign ethnic groups settled during the 19th century. According to him, the territories inhabited by Belarusians and Ukrainians should have been annexed to the eastern part of Poland and then polonized. For this reason, he opposed the independence of Ukraine[63] and the Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian-Ukrainian federation plans.[64] Instead, he wanted to build a strong Polish nation-state. The plan originally also presupposed cooperation with civic and Slavic Russia, but this failed due to the victory of Bolshevism.[65]

For Piłsudski, the so-called Curzon Line,[66] recommended by Western diplomacy as the eastern border of Poland, was unacceptable, and he wanted to extend the country's territory beyond the 1772 borders. His offer, which he would have been militarily ready to implement, was a federation with Poland for Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians. These states would have been given cultural autonomy, but they would have been politically dependent on Poland. Enlargement of the Polish-Lithuanian Union with Belarus and Ukraine offered an option for the rebirth of the Jagello Empire.[67]

Later, the idea of the Intermarium was a further development of this idea, developed by historian and archivist Witold Kamieniecki (1883–1964).[68] The Intermarium would have extended from Scandinavia through the Baltic States to the Black Sea. This federation of independent Slavic states would have guaranteed peace and security in the area between Germany and Russia. Poland was destined to play the role of founder and patron in Warsaw.[69] The Intermarium project was accompanied by intense diplomatic activity. This was all the more necessary as Poland's neighbors were not enthusiastic about the plan. The plan undertaken by Piłsudski was somewhat contradictory to the regional aspirations of Czechoslovakia, which, besides the Little Entente, also supported the Federation of Slavic States. At the same time, the Poles wanted to include Hungary in the federation, but Czechoslovak diplomacy rejected it because of a fear of Hungarian revisionism. Therefore, a Polish-Hungarian-Romanian covenant was being planned in Warsaw as an alternative. Incidentally, in autumn 1919, Polish diplomacy wanted to win Britain to their cause of a north-eastern federation with the Baltic states, in which Warsaw would also have played a dominant role. However, due to the Polish-Lithuanian conflict and the British fears of gaining French influence, this plan stalled. Finally, after the Treaty of Riga (1921), the Intermarium plan lost its relevance.[70]

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[61] Borodziej, Brzostek and Górny, 2005, p. 88.

[62] Józef Piłsudski was the head of state of independent Poland (1918–1923), the marshal of the second Republic of Poland, and the leader of the coup in May 1926.

[63] Ld. Kornat, 2011.

[64] Morawiec, 2012.

[65] Kornat, 2011.

[66] Demarcation line between Poland and Soviet Russia proposed by Lord Curzon of Kedleston in Versailles, in 1919.

[67] Borodziej, Brzostek and Górny, 2005, p. 89.

[68] Witold Kamieniecki was a Polish historian, diplomat, senator in the Second Republic, professor at the University of Warsaw, and head of the Lithuanian Federalist Committee (1917/18).

[69] Morawiec, 2012.

Between the two world wars, the plan to create the United States of Europe was raised several times within various circles; the Pan-European Union was established in support of this. Poland was one of the states where Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi managed to find serious supporters. In 1927, the Polish Committee of the Pan-European Movement was established in Warsaw and led by Aleksander Lednicki (1866–1934). Lednicki was a member of the leadership of the Russian Liberal Constitutional Democratic Party (shortly cadet) during the time of tsarism. He also held various positions in independent Poland.

The influence of the Pan-European movement on the Polish elites changed following the political twists and turns of the spiritual father of the movement. In Poland, which had alliances with the Entente and felt like a winner of the war, initially had high hopes for the League of Nations and various multilateral concepts. This determined their relationship with the Pan-European plans. On the other hand, they no longer liked the fact that Coudenhove-Kalergi, who was afraid of Bolshevism, was also seeking the support of German politicians and was aware of the need to settle the fate of the German state.[71] The conflict between him and the Polish section of the pan-European movement deepened in 1927, when the Earl advised the Poles to resign Danzig to the Germans; as compensation, they would receive some parts of Lithuania. Lednicki condemned the plan, and national democrats saw the Pan-European movement as a cloak for Franco-German reconciliation. The Polish Pan-European movement, whose leadership, in a decree in 1931, described Coudenhove-Kalergi's ideas about German-Polish relations as harmful and dangerous to European peace, gradually began to decline. In 1933/34, the Polish Foreign Ministry repeatedly made negative statements about the Pan-European movement and did not advise the Poles to participate in the Pan-European congress. The Polish section's activity decreased, and Lednicki committed suicide because of a financial affair.[72]

The Jagiellonian concept formed the basis of the federal plans that relied on the tradition of Jagiellonian power in Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in the 15th and 16th centuries. These ideas idealized the leadership and power of the old

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[70] Borodziej, Brzostek and Górny, 2005, p. 91.

[71] Stoczewska, 2003, p. 20.

[72] Borodziej, Brzostek and Górny, 2005, pp. 95–96.

Rzeczpospolita. Witold Kamieniecki understood Jagellonism as an integration system that would have connected the area between the Baltic Sea and the Carpathians to Poland. Based on this idea, Stefan Gużkowski envisioned a federation that Austria, Bulgaria, and Estonia in addition to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and Hungary would have been joined to. According to him, the federation would have been based on the principle of *coperare sine violantia* instead of the slogan of 'divide et impera.' The original Polish conceptions of the European Federation stem from the messianic tradition of the 18th and 19th centuries.[73] A prominent representative of this trend was the philosopher Wincenty Lutosławski (1863–1954), who, in addition to advertising abstinence, also practiced yoga. Lutosławski proclaimed the romantic concept called the 'Symphony of Nations,' in which all nations would contribute to a harmonious whole.[74]

Feliks Koneczny (1862–1949), a professor at the universities of Krakow and Vilnius, formulated a more concrete and realistic concept. Koneczny was skeptical of the League of Nations and the durability of the Versailles system because both were created artificially and served the dominance of the strongs. Alternatively, he called for a European federation that would aim to protect the weak against the strong. According to him, regional and then continental federalization was unavoidable to guarantee peace. Koneczny believed in gradation and, in today's terminology, in multi-speed integration. Initiating the integration process required at least two strong states to function as the cores of integration. In the background, he was also afraid of German and Russian militarism. Incidentally, he considered the values of European Christian civilization a good foundation for integrating states and nations.[75]

Socialists (PPS) were the main Polish political forces after 1918/20 that were concerned with the concepts of European integration and Eastern European federation. In this, they were able to rely on their previous traditions. At the congress of the party in 1920, it was announced that the realization of socialist principles could even lead to the birth of a European United States, guaranteeing security for Europe. They also enthusiastically accepted the formation of the League of Nations, but over time, they became more realistic about the possibilities of this organization. The survival of the Franco-German opposition also warned them to be cautious, so they put greater emphasis on economic cooperation. The customs union, the principle of maximum trade preference, and the harmonization of immigration policy would have been the main cornerstones. They imagined European integration as a gradual process.[76]

The implementation of the Polish federation's plans between the two World Wars was prevented by antagonisms within the Eastern and Central European regions, in which Poland was an active participant. Several smaller states were distrustful of Warsaw's plans to apply for medium-power status. The Czechoslovak-Polish relationship was overshadowed by territorial disputes in 1919/20, even though these two new states had, in many respects, similar geopolitical interests and powerful allies. The situation was also hampered by the tensions between winners and losers in the Versailles system. All these things together then took great revenge in the bloody Second World War.

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[73] Borodziej, Brzostek and Górny, 2005, pp. 96–97.

[74] Kusiak, 2014.

[75] Stoczewska, 2003, pp. 23–24.

[76] Ibid.

4. The years during the Second World War

The second World War prompted almost all actors to rethink their previous policies; this was especially true for Czechoslovakia and Poland. This realization encouraged the two emigrant governments to find a way to each other. The convergence kept the minds of the socialists, who had always been open to European and regional integration, occupied, as well as the People's Party, which represented peasant interests. The head of the emigrant government, General Władysław Sikorski, also supported the issue of cooperation. Sikorski relied heavily on Joseph Hieronim Retinger (1888–1960),[77] who foresaw the emergence of several regional federations in post-war Europe, which should have brought together mainly small nations. This tendency would primarily strengthen Poland's geopolitical position, as it was wedged between its two strong and aggressive neighbors.[78]

The Czechoslovak-Polish union plan of the early 1940s finally proved to be the most concrete idea at the time. Although originally focused on these two states, in the long run, it wanted to be open to several states in the region (e.g., Austria, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, etc.). The preparatory document on the constitutional foundations of the federation envisioned a joint Federal High Council, which would have included the two heads of state and 2-2 delegates from their parliaments. A joint president would be appointed to head of the federation. Based on a rotation principle, the post would always have been filled by a politician from another country. They also counted on a joint Federal Prime Minister and Secretaries of State leading each Ministry. The task of the elected Federal Assembly would have been to adopt the budget and common laws and to ratify international treaties. The Union would also have had a common Constitutional Court. However, realization of these ambitious plans was sealed by the resistance of Moscow, throughout distrustful of the Polish government, and the hesitation of Czechoslovakians. In 1943, the Czechoslovakians concluded a special cooperation friendship agreement with the Soviet Union, which largely buried the cause of the Czechoslovak-Polish union.[79]

During the Second World War, it also emerged among Polish emigrants that the Central European Union could be created as a hereditary constitutional monarchy headed by the Prince of Kent, George from the Windsor House. Edvard Beneš did not find monarchist ideas realistic.[80] The writer Jerzy Braun (1901–1975), who was the last delegate of the London government to Poland and for some time the Chairman of the National Unity Council (i.e., the underground parliament) was a member of the group of people who stood close to General Sikorski. At a young age, he was under the influence of the messianic ideology of Hoene-Wroński, politicized in Catholic organizations, and later became a member of the Labour Party. Braun was also thinking of building a multi-stage European federation, one of the first stages of which would have been the Central-Eastern European Federation. Its borders would have been washed by three seas (the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas), the most important rivers being the Oder and the Danube. It would have been based on Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation.[81]

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[77] The Polish intellectual politician, with excellent western connections and with a somewhat mysterious background, always believed in European integration. In the 1950s, he was a midwife at the birth of the Bilderberg Group.

[78] Stoczewska, 2003, p. 28.

[79] Ibid. pp. 29–30.

5. Ideas for integrating Poland and Polish emigration between 1945 and 1989

Poland suffered a great deal in the Second World War and found itself in an ambivalent situation in 1945 in several respects. On the one hand, it got rid of the German Nazi occupation and officially ended the war on the side of the victors; on the other hand, despite all its resistance, it soon became an integral part of the 'Eastern Bloc' led by the Soviet Union. Located between historic Germany and Russia, Poland (along with Finland and Romania) played a key role in the post-war Soviet plans. This greatly narrowed its geopolitical elbowroom. Thanks to the victories of Second World War, the country partly 'moved' to the west, but in the meantime, its ties with the East were strengthened. The Poles gained former German territories in the west, but in exchange, they lost the eastern part of their former country, which went to the Soviet Union.

In the first months, the country had two governments—the émigré government of London, which has long been recognized by the anti-fascist coalition, and the Lublin-based Polish National Liberation Commission (Polish abbreviation: PKWN) set up by the Soviet Union. The latter served Soviet and communist interests. In 1945, under the pressure of the Great Powers, a mixed Interim Government was formed from these two initiatives. Circles of emigrants dissatisfied with this step, however, continued to maintain the Expatriate Government of London, which had increasingly lost its importance but persisted until 1990. The Provisional Government composed of coalitions, on the other hand, gradually came under communist influence. One and one-half to two years after the election in 1947, the power structure and political hinterland of the Polish People's Republic were finally established.[82]

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[80] Podstawski, 2003, p. 45.

[81] Ibid. pp. 44–45.

[82] This process was described by Davies, 2005. Next important work: Paczkowski, 1995.

It is interesting to note that in the first transitional years after the Second World War, the plan to establish several parallel federations appeared again in the ranks of the Polish Independence Movement for 'Independence and Democracy.' This draft envisaged Latin, German, Scandinavian, and, separately, a Western and an Eastern European federation, which together would have formed the European Confederation. This Confederation later would have been one of the building blocks of the new global system, alongside the British Commonwealth, China, the Soviet Union, and the US. The intellectuals belonging to the moon yard of the People's Party later tried to rethink this multi-stage cooperation concept, but it no longer had any real significance.[83]

Between 1948 and 1989, Poland, led by the Communists and its intellectuals, could not afford to deal with integration plans that Moscow did not support. However, the Polish People's Republic was involved in various Soviet-led Eastern European integration and cooperation initiatives. Between 1947 and 1956, it took part in Kominform, which united communist parties. From 1949, it participated in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and after 1955, in the Warsaw Pact for military defense. The latter two ceased only after the change of regime. Soviet troops were stationed in the country until 1993, which defined its sovereignty and international elbowroom.

Geopolitical restraint was especially true of any concept that would have questioned the post-World War II power constellation and the Soviet Union's leadership. The different alternative ideas of integration were therefore born mostly in the circles of the opposition (dissenting) and emigration intellectuals. In the first years after the Second World War, the ideas that had emerged in the previous two decades had an impact within the ranks of the remaining political parties. Among the remnants of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and the National Democrats (SN), which were forced to emigrate, the idea of a Federation of Central European states still existed in the late 1940s; this would have comprised Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania as well as Poland.[84]

After 1948, Polish alternative political thought had three main emigration centers: the marginalizing emigrant government in London, the US-funded 'Free Europe Radio,' and the Journal *Kultura* in Paris. The most genuine ideas for integration came into being thanks to the latter's operation, whether it was European integration or reconciliation with different neighboring nations. In Poland, after some time, interesting debates began in various intellectual journals related to the Catholic Church and in opposition or semi-opposition intellectual newspapers (*Tygodnik Powszechny, Znak, Więź,* etc.) Opposition groups organized in the 1970s and 1980s, such as the Workers' Protection Commission (KOR), the Free Trade Union of Solidarity, and the Confederation of Independent Poland, gave new impetus.[85]

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[83] Stoczewska, 2003, pp. 30–31.

[84] Master, 2014, p. 159.

[85] Ibid. p. 159.

The Polish integration thinking at that time was basically determined by three factors: subordination to the Soviet Union, the tragic experiences of the Second World War, and, in this context, the effort to put relations with neighboring nations on a new basis.

There are also three main lines of thinking in relation to the Soviet Union in the hinterland of the Solidarity Trade Union. The alternative left wing, dissatisfied with the dictatorship, sometimes called the revisionists,[86] actually treated Soviet dominance as a fact and accepted the post-war status quo. They had no favorable opinion about American imperialism, either. At the same time, they found the Western social democratic and critical Marxist tradition attractive. The realist wing of the movement,[87] which had a close relationship with the Catholic Church, also accepted geopolitical realities, but required more elbowroom for Poland. They did not want a conflict with the Soviet Union, but they were expected to take greater account of the independence and sovereignty of the Polish State and civilizational impregnation of Polish culture. The third trend was the most radical, because the restoration of real Polish independence was most important to them.

At the same time, these circles were concerned not only about the Polish-Soviet relationship, but also about Polish-German relations. The Poles still did not trust the Germans. Those who supported a more moderate independence,[88] on the other hand, saw before themselves the basis for future Polish-German reconciliation and compromise.[89] According to them, the Poles should have recognized the Germans' right to national unity, and the Germans should have accepted the new Polish-German borders.[90]

One of the most original and important intellectual centers of emigration was the Journal *Kultura*, led by Jerzy Giedroyc (1906–2000), chief editor. In its background was the Institute of Literature, which he founded in 1947, working first in Rome and then in the town of Maisons-Lafitte near Paris. As a lawyer, the editor-in-chief first worked in Polish administration before the war, fought in the Second World War, and in the spring of 1945, oversaw the European Department in the Ministry of Information of the London Emigrant Government. Besides the journal *Kultura*, he had been publishing historical booklets since 1962.[91]

Giedroyc developed a very serious, intellectual workshop hosting several trends around him. Giedroyc did not just want to run a journal in line with a political trend; he also tried to stay away from the internal quarrel of the London Emigrant Government.

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[86] Jacek Kuroń was one of its emblematic leaders.

[87] An important representative was the later prime minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

[88] Their main brain-truster was the opposition group called the Polish Independence Consensus, which relatively early, proposed achieving Polish independence and withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact. They dealt a lot with Polish-German and Polish-Jewish relationships.

[89] Their leader was Zdisław Najder. This idea, for example, was close to Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, who was Foreign Minister after the change of regime.

[90] Master, 2014, p. 161.

[91] Paczkowski, 1995, pp. 416–417.

The thoughts expressed in the journal also reached Poland. Therefore, not surprisingly, after the change of regime, the ideas expressed in the Journal *Kultura* played an important role in laying the foundations for new Polish foreign policy thinking, especially concerning its Eastern dimension. According to Giedroyc, Poland's weight in the world depended on its influence in Eastern Europe. Lech Kaczyński, former head of state, later summed it up that '... the more friends we have in the East, the greater our importance in the West.'[92] This led to the realization that Polish-Ukrainian historical reconciliation should be ended as soon as possible and that the birth of an independent Ukraine should be supported.

The reconciliation policy also applied to another successor state of the medieval and early modern Polish-Lithuanian community—Lithuania. A Catholic priest, Józef Majewski, stated in his letter published in 1952 in an issue of *Kultura,* that to do so, Poles would have to give up their future demands on the two cities with predominantly Polish culture and past, Lemberg (Lviv) and Vilnius. Because the forward-looking author recognized that the Poles could not demand the return of the Oder-Neisse border and the return of territories ruled by the two cities at the same time, a federation with these states has been advocated.[93]

However, the Polish Emigrant Journal of Paris not only dealt with Poland's Eastern neighbors, but also published articles on the future of all Europe. Among the authors, Józef Bocheński (1902–1995) and Juliusz Mieroszewski (1906–1976) were the most supportive of the idea of a European federation. They both saw the future not only in economic cooperation, but also in a European political and cultural union. The Dominican monk and scholar Bocheński—similar to Giedroych—saw that Poland could only feel itself safe in a united Europe, where the inhabitants would not only feel themselves to be Polish, but also European from the 'Polish canton.' Mieroszewski, who was a journalist dealing with German affairs before Second World War, considered Poland would either be one of the cantons of Europe or it would not exist at all. At first, he wanted to fight the Soviet Union on all fronts; however, he later realized that it would be redundant, and rather believed in the progressive evolution and particular Europeanization of the Soviet State. The cited authors also wanted to see Ukraine in the European Federation to rein Russia's expansion.[94]

Feliks Gross (1906–2006), a left-wing lawyer and sociologist who was close to the Polish Socialists before the war, published his views on European federalism in the 'New Europe' periodicals in the US. He argued that we should not return to pre-war economic foundations because he said the myth of self-sufficiency and political nationalism led us to the last European catastrophe. He saw the solution in setting up regional federations, which would then create the European Union. He considered the federation of the nations of Eastern and Central Europe as the most important. According to him, the EU was intended to function as a pledge for a policy of collective security and a good neighborhood.[95] Zbigniew Jordan (1911–1977), one of the most important philosophers of the Polish emigration, stated that the existence of the atomic bomb would change the content of security. Moreover, if the nations of Europe want to survive, they will sooner or later be forced to join in a federal union. The idea of a federation was not far from that of the historian Oskar Halecki (1891–1973), who saw one of its possible role models in the former Polish-Lithuanian community.[96]

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[92] Illés, 2010, p. 3.

[93] Ibid.

[94] Master, 2014, p. 160.

6. The period of free Poland and integration thinking between 1989 and 2004

Poland was a foregoer country during the democratic transition of Central-Eastern Europe. For the first time, roundtable talks were held there, followed by also involving the democratic opposition in governance. Krzysztof Jan Skubiszewski (1926–2010), a Foreign Minister who was previously a professor of international law who had been a non-partisan supporter of the Solidarity Union since the 1980s, helped redefine Polish foreign policy after the change in regime. First, he became the Head of Foreign Ministry in the Government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki; he continued to hold this position in the next three government periods[97] and until 1993.[98] During this period, the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union ceased to exist, Germany was reunited, and Poland built new relationships with the western member republics of the former Soviet Union. Several regional co-operations have also emerged (Visegrád and Weimar Triangle). The Poles have signed a series of good-neighborhood treaties and their Euro-Atlantic integration has just begun.[99]

Roman Kuźniar presented the goals of Polish foreign policy after the change in regime in an analytical three-pole formula. His keywords were: sovereignty, security, and development. The first one was achieved between 1989 and 1992 when the Warsaw Pact ended and Russian troops withdrew from the country. The second objective was achieved with NATO accession in 1997. In the third stage, Poland integrated into the EU, which most people have seen as a pledge of economic development and prosperity.[100] The starting point of these objectives was the gradual departure from Russia on the one hand and the optimization of Polish-German economic and political relations on the other. The improvement in Polish-German relations owing to German unity was supported by Poland, and Poland's western borders were finally recognized by Germany. At first, the historically strained Polish-Russian relations developed quite well, even though in 1992, Poland set full NATO membership as a reachable goal.[101] During this period, the American-Polish relationship has also deepened. The Polish democratic transition's major achievement was that the opposition was not as deep as at the time of the debates between J. Piłsudski and R. Dmówski.[102]

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[95] Ibid.

[96] Halecki, 1993. p. 151.

[97] These leaders were the following politicians: Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Jan Olszewski and Hana Suchocka.

[98] Kranc, 2010.

[99] Master, 2014, p. 179.

[100] Kuźnier and Szczepanik, 2008, pp. 28–30.

In Poland, which was in a difficult economic situation in the early 1990s, there was a broad consensus on European integration efforts. The popularity of the West was also increased by the fact that creditors gathered in the Paris Club eventually released a part of the Polish public debt; the remission reached 70% in the case of the US. Polish government debt fell by 17 billion dollars.[103] Within the PHARE program, which was originally aimed toward Poland and Hungary, between 1990 and 2003, Poles received an amount equivalent to almost four billion euros.[104] Germany has progressively become Poland's main foreign economic partner, while members of the Visegrád Group are only in second place.[105]

The integration consensus began to loosen after achieving the main integration goals. At that time, there was also a fault line in Polish politics that divided the proponents of deeper integration and greater national sovereignty almost everywhere. Proponents of looser EU cooperation have been characterized not as much by German federalist conceptions but by the cautious British attitude. For the Polish national right-wing parties, the 'nation-state Europe' France has called for for a long time was more sympathetic than the 'Europe of the regions' favored by the Germans. The key Polish political forces judged the German leadership in the EU differently and there has been deeper integration since then. The regional road searches are also subject to this dilemma. This applies to Visegrád, which is only one of the options for the Poles. The Eastern Partnership program of the EU is important for Warsaw; this idea was raised by Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski in 2008.[106] Poland was then actively advocating the NATO membership of Ukraine and Georgia.[107] One of the most important old-new regional Polish initiatives is the Three Seas Initiative, which builds on the conceptual background before 1939 but was re-launched by President Andrzej Duda in 2015. The target group of these initiatives is 12 Eastern and Central European countries located between the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas. For the present, the project focuses on energy policy, transport, and digitalization.[108]

To evaluate Polish integration concepts, we consider Poland's often tragic history, the outstanding size of the Polish nation, and the geographical location of the Polish state. It shall never be forgotten that this is the most populous society in Central and Eastern Europe, and it has benefited greatly from the changes in the last three decades. Moreover, Polish foreign policy thinking has a long tradition and strong European roots. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine European stability without the Polish contribution. Finally, it is important to note that Poles not only have great diplomatic potential, but also a scientific and professional background. Among other things, this is reflected in some of the above concepts.

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[101] Tálas and Sz. Bíró, 2010, p. 68.

[102] Illés, 2010, p. 4.

[103] Danielewski, and Kloc, 1991, p. 19–23; Master, 2014, p. 171.

[104] Master, 2014, p. 200.

[105] Gniazdowski, 2015, p. 167.

[106] Illés, 2010, p. 8.

[107] The current Polish-Ukrainian relationship is again becoming more complicated, partly due to history and partly due to migration.

[108] Kőbányai, 2021.

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| CHAPTER 10 |

The Development of Integration Theories in Ukraine

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ABSTRACT

In the following, we cite the first lines of the preamble of the Constitution of Ukraine (1996): 'The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, on behalf of the Ukrainian people—citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities, expressing the sovereign will of the people, based on the centuries-old history of Ukrainian state-building…'. The function of the preamble is to summarize the purpose of the legislator. These cited lines of the preamble of the Ukrainian constitution have not changed since it was adopted, placing the state idea first. It has public legal, historical, and symbolic meanings; at the same time, the Ukrainian territories for several decades formed peripheries of larger state units that could not be legally separated. The administrative boundaries of the country were accepted only in the 20th century, and the country became independent only in 1991. The periods of decisive significance concerning the Ukrainian national idea and the independent state were the following: the first East Slavic state, the Kyivan Rus'; from Slavic vassals of the Golden Horde medieval regions of Galicia and Volhynia, the Cossack Age (Zaporizhian Host); the period of the Ukrainian national revival in the 19th century; the period of the Ukrainian People's Republic following the First World War; the Soviet Ukraine, when the borders of the present state were established; and the establishment of the present independent Ukrainian state.

KEYWORDS

Ukraine, history, federalization, autonomy, national movement, independent statehood, integration development.

Introduction

The fact that Ukrainian territories did not form a unified state, moreover, that they were parts of different countries for a very long part of their history, was a decisive reason for their self-identification against neighboring countries, their quest for allies in neighboring countries, and their integration into one country.

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The self-designation 'Ukrainian' originates from the 19th century. Up until then, they were identified by the ethnonyms 'Ruthenian'[1] and 'Rusyn,'[2] while the Poles called them 'little Poles' and the Russians called them 'little Russians.' The name 'Ukraine' was first used in reference to a part of the territory of Kyivan Rus. Later, the term Ukraine was used for the Cossack Hetmanate lands on both sides of the Dnieper. The importance of the Cossack era is stressed in the present Ukrainian anthem: 'Soul and body, yea, our all, offer we at freedom's call / We, whose forebears, and ourselves, proud Cossacks are!' Ukraine is the official full name of the country, as stated in 1991.

1. Medieval and early modern period

The origin of the Slavic peoples is one of the controversial issues of modern history. There is no evidence to prove that they had been living on the Eurasian Steppe before the 6th century. The question of homeland region is also quite open: most contemporary historians think it was in the central and eastern part of the present Poland and the northwestern part of Ukraine. In conjunction with the movement of peoples, the great migration of the Slavs from the postulated homeland region, the basin between the Vistula and the Dnieper north of the Carpathian Mountains, started in the 6th–8th centuries. Under the rule of the Rurik dynasty that emerged from the Varangian ethnic group from the southern part of Sweden in the 9th century, East Slavic tribes founded and baptized the 'Kyivan Rus', which meant acceptance of Orthodox Christianity.[3] Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia claim to be legal heirs of the Kyivan Rus, similar to Germany and France, who want to consider the Carolingian Empire[4] their own state. The present Belarus and Russia belong to the same political and economic community, while Ukraine turned toward the West. In consequence, Russian politics questioned the existence of the independent Ukrainian people, which, beginning in 2014, has brought about severe territorial conflicts and Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

Kyivan Rus was finally destroyed by the Mongol occupation in the first part of the 13th century. The Mongol khanate, the Golden Horde (Ulug Ulus), considered the disintegrated Slav principalities as vassals up to the early 15th century. In these Slav principalities, the first distinguishing features were linguistic-cultural, which were followed by full linguistic separation. East Slavic groups could be definitively distinguished: Ukrainian, Belarus, and Russian identities appeared.[5] As for Ukraine, in the period of disunity, the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia (Kingdom of Rus) meant historic continuity.

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[1] Derived from the Latin 'Rutheni'. 'For centuries thereafter Rutheni was used in Latin as the designation of all East Slavs, particularly Ukrainians and Belarusians. In the 16th century, the word more clearly began to be associated with the Ukrainians and Belarusians of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as distinct from the Muscovites (later known as Russians)…'. Himka, 1996.

[2] Slavic equivalent of 'Ruthenian.'

[3] Екельчик, 2010, pp. 33–34.

[4] Екельчик, 2010, p. 51.

The Cossacks appeared in the late 13th century and represented a disorganized military force on the territory bordered by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russia, the Crimean Khanate, and the Ottoman Empire. The appearance of the Cossacks was a new social phenomenon. In the beginning, they represented a profession and did not form a separate social category. Military service was considered the goal of their lives, by which they tried to rise financially and socially.

Since the mid-16th century, a part of the Cossacks began to serve the Polish kings. These were the registered Cossacks, who acquired rights and privileges inside Polish society. Concerning their significance and financial situation, wealthy Cossacks could have belonged to the Polish nobility; however, they did not get the letter of privileges granting a noble title. This caused social tension, which in 1648 led to the uprising under the command of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky (also known as the 'Ukrainian people's war of liberation'); a part of the peasantry also joined the movement.[6]

As a result of their initial success, the Cossacks re-evaluated the movement's goal. In Chyhyryn, at the Hetman residence—one of the traditional places for the appointment to the office of Hetman of Zaporizhian Host—ambassadors of several European states were present and acknowledged the sovereignty of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's state. In 1649, the Treaty of Zboriv was concluded, and the Ukrainian Cossack state—the Cossack Hetmanate, including the territory of the Kyiv Voivodeship, Bratslav Voivodeship, and Chernihiv Voivodeshi—was declared autonomous. However, the Treaty of Bila Tserkva in 1651 reduced autonomy in the territory of the Kyiv Voivodeship. By 1654, the movement weakened, Khmelnytsky needed allies, and after a long diplomatic search, he agreed with the tsar in Moscow.

As for Ukraine, the 1654 Treaty of Pereyaslav (also known as the Pereyaslav Agreement) meant that the supremacy of the Poles was changed by that of the Russians. In exchange, Moscow promised to protect the Ukrainian territories against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and other enemies. The territory of the Cossack Hetmanate was divided along the river Dnieper—the regions of Right-bank Ukraine (present-day districts of Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad) and Left-bank Ukraine (Chernihiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Cherkasy) were established. The hetman considered himself the vassal of the Russian tsar, but he could govern in a quite sovereign way. After Khmelnytsky's death, the Cossack Hetmanate (Left-bank Ukraine) was gradually repressed until, in 1774, it was irreversibly destroyed and fully integrated into the Russian public administration.[7]

In the First Partition of Poland in 1772, former Galicia-Volhynia—the Habsburg Empire—took control of Galicia and the Russian Empire of Volhynia. Based on the

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[5] Plokhy, 2006, pp. 10–15

[6] For details, see Чухліб, 2003, pp. 50–65.

[7] For details, see Morrison, 1993, pp. 677–703.

Treaty of Jassy in 1792, Russia definitely acquired the northern coastline of the Black Sea and the Crimean peninsula, where the New Russia Governorate (or Novorossiya Governorate) (present-day districts of Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Odesa, Donetsk, and the Crimean Peninsula) was established. Since then, Sevastopol has been the Black Sea headquarters of Russian naval forces. In 1793, Right-bank Ukraine was annexed by the Russian Empire in the Second Partition of Poland, becoming part of the Little Russia Governorate (or Malorossiya Governorate).[8]

2. Period of the Ukrainian national revival

By the end of the 18th century, Ukrainian territories were parts of the Habsburg and Russian Empires. Concerning the awakening national idea, Galician Ukrainians played the main role because of the Habsburg Empire's more tolerant toward nationalities and the increasing oppressive politics of the Russian Empire. By the beginning of the 19th century, language became probably the most important motivational power of the national awakening. '… in the nineteenth century, questions and propositions about the Ukrainian language never existed in isolation, as purely linguistic issues but were always connected with larger processes: the shaping of Ukraine as a legacy, polity…' .[9]

National language was one of the most important and most promising means of designating the Ukrainian identity and the separation from Russian and Polish identities.[10] Both in Russia and Poland, influenced by western modernizing ideology, the intelligentsia who considered themselves Ukrainian and wanted to be protected against the effects of homogenization and assimilation made significant decisions concerning the Ukrainian literary language at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. For the old Ukrainian elite, the Old Church Slavonic was considered the literary language, which the development of the Russian language was also based on. The new intelligentsia—Hryhorii Skovoroda, Ivan Kotliarevsky and others—who wanted to strengthen the distinction from the Russian language, were to renew the Ukrainian language based on the 'folk language' (*narechie*). Some Russian philosophers, like Alexander Herzen and Nikolay Chernyshevsky, opposed the violent Russian national ideology and russification and supported the principle of national self-determination.[11] The national revival, which was developing on a linguistic basis, was placed on a political basis by ideologists in the second half of the 19th century.[12]

Greek Catholic canon Jan Mohylnycki was the first to celebrate a mass in 'folk language,' whose literary version was sometimes mentioned as the Ukrainian language.

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[8] Subtelny, 1988, pp. 145–148.

[9] Koznarsky, 2017, p. 8.

[10] Шандра, 2013, pp. XV., XVIII.

[11] Romsics, 1998, p. 221.

[12] Грицак, 2019, p. 44.

In Buda, the University Press published a catechesis in 1815 and a Slav-Rusyn ABC book in 1816. Among others, the catechesis influenced the Slovak linguist and historian Jozef Šafarik, who corresponded on it.[13]

Big university towns—Lviv in Galicia, Kharkiv and Kyiv in Russia—were a decisive cross-border influence. A national idea was built on the support of the question of culture and language; political demands were claimed later at the end of the 19th century.

The establishment of the university in Kharkiv was, in the first place, due to Vasily Karazin. The goal of the landowner of Ukrainian origin was to ensure the new generation of educated tsarist clerks. The university was organized using a western pattern; in the first years, neither Ukrainian nor Russian was used; the languages of education were Latin, French, and German. Foreign experts were needed to bring along the ideas of modern Europe, such as romanticism and nationalism. Educators and students at the university in Kharkiv tried to interpret their own surroundings in the spirit of these ideas. Scientists like Izmail Sreznevsky of Russian origin, the Ukrainian Petro-Hulak Artemovsky, Hrihorii Kvitka-Osnovianenko, and Mykola Kostomarov, who had a double identity, became more and more interested in Ukrainian folk literature and folklore. It was particularly important that they began to consequently use the ethnonym 'Ukrainian' instead of 'little Russian.'[14]

Emperor Nicholas I was primarily stimulated to establish Kyiv University by the unsuccessful November Uprising (1830–1831) of partitioned Poland against the Russian Empire. The university's primary task was to strengthen Russian culture among the mainly Polish speaking nobles, but the establishment of the university and the research in progress also contributed to strengthening Ukrainian national ideas. The university granted scientific backgrounds for developing Ukrainian national ideas. However, the educators, students, and young activists surrounding them were not satisfied with scientific results; they came forth with social, economic, and political demands.[15]

Three outstanding personalities of Ukrainian national revival—Markiyan Shashkevych, a priest of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church; historian and ethnographer Ivan Vahylevych; and professor of Ukranian language and literature, Yakiv Holovatsky—studied at Lviv University. They founded the influential Ukrainian literary group 'Ruthenian Triad' (*Ruska triitsia*), whose goal was to make 'folk language' a literary language without Old Church Slavonic and other foreign linguistic elements. As the local censorship in Lviv prevented publication of the work summarizing their ideas, in 1837, Sashkevych et al. published *The Mermaid of the Dniester* [*Rusalka Dnistrova*], the first literary collection in the vernacular Ukrainian language, in Buda. The authors stressed the idea of the national unity of 'Ruthenian-Ukrainian' people living in the territory of the Habsburg and Russian Empires. Unfortunately, most of the one thousand volumes they wanted to take home were confiscated by the authorities, so only a few of them could be sold or given away. However, the Ukrainian language made the first steps on the path of a slow but irreversible development, resulting in a language that literature and science can use.[16]

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[13] Білий, 2010. p. 17.

[14] For details, see Салтовський, 2002.

[15] Маґочій, 2012, p. 347.; Грицак, 2019, p. 72.

More and more young people took part in the active cultural life of the universities, which started to support the Ukrainian national revival. By the middle of the century—in addition to scientific interests—political issues concerning the separation of Ukrainians were appearing. The first group in the areas along the river Dnieper that had a concrete political program was the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood founded in 1845 by young Ukrainian intellectuals. The society's programs are formulated in the documents *Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People* [*Knyhy bytiia ukraïns'koho narodu*] and *The Statute of the Slavic Society of SS Cyril and Methodius: Its Main Ideas* [*Ustav Slov'ians'koho tovarystva sv Kyryla i Metodiia. Holovni ideii*]. According to Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak, the ideas of the group were based on the ideologies of three movements: Ukrainian autonomism, the Polish democratic movement, and the Russian Decembrist revolt. In addition to Christianism, protests against social injustice as well as a Ukrainian national revival were also present.[17] Fierce debates accompanied the development of the group's programs. All three of the main ideologists of the secret society had different viewpoints. While Panteleimon Kulish considered national revival to be of primary importance, Mykola Kostomarov focused on general human and Christian values, and for Taras Shevchenko, social justice was the most essential.[18]

In May 1848, Greek Catholic priests and secular intellectuals founded the Supreme Ruthenian Council (Holovna Rus'ka Rada), Galicia's first legal Ukrainian political organization, which was led by Hryhoriy Yakhymovych, Metropolitan Archbishop of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. The manifest *Appeal to the Ruthenian People* in 1848 declared:

> We Galician Ruthenians belong to the great Ruthenian nation that speaks one language and counts fifteen million people, two and half million of whom inhabit the Galician land. It had its own perfected language, its own laws, and princes, in a word, it was flourishing, prosperous, and powerful.[19]

This manifest can be considered the first official document declaring the idea of the unity of the Ukrainian people living in the territory of the Habsburg and Russian Empires.

The new generation of Ukrainian intelligentsia established the first organization whose members formulated concrete political goals. They were known as the

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[16] Subtelny, 1988, pp. 240–241.

[17] Грицак, 2019, pp. 75–76.

[18] Грицак, 2019, p. 77.

[19] Procyk, 2019, p. 185.

Brotherhood of Taras, after the poet and founder of the modern written Ukrainian language, Taras Shevchenko. In 1893, they published their program *Profession de foi of Young Ukrainians*, criticizing the apoliticity of the previous generation of the Ukrainian national revival and explaining their ideas concerning political autonomy for Ukraine and dominance of the Ukrainian language.[20]

In his 1881 paper, *Historical Poland and Great Russian Democracy* [*Istoricheskaia Polsha i velikorusskaia demokratiia*], scholar and civic leader Mykhailo Drahomanov stated the following: 'The independence of a given country and nation can be achieved either by its secession into a separate state (separatism), or by the securing of its self-government, without such separation (federalism).' Of these two alternatives, Drahomanov preferred the latter.[21] Drahomanov argued that the psychology of national identification is itself multi-layered and merges with other forms of identification, and expressed in various languages and manners that 'Ukrainians would, perhaps, always be left with two literatures [Ukrainian and Russian], not one.'[22]

3. Historical development of territoriality

The revolutions of 1848 (the Springtime of Nations) made it possible for the participants in the Ukrainian national movement to continue their cultural fight on a political basis; this was the first time Rusyns in Hungary (mainly living on the territory of present-day Transcarpathia) could join. There was no counter-revolutionary organization present in the territory of the Greek Catholic Eparchy of Mukachevo, where most Rusyns of Hungary lived. At the same time, an adverse process was emerging in the territory of the much smaller Eparchy of Prešov. Adolf Dobriansky, leading the group of pro-Habsburg Rusyns, canon Alexander Dukhnovych, and Greek Catholic bishop of Prešov Yosyf Gaganets decided which of the Rusyn territories in Hungary should be annexed to Galicia. However, the Austrian government refused the demands of the Dobriansky-group, which had few supporters among Rusyns in Hungary; at the same time, no hostile actions were implemented against them.[23]

In Galicia, the Austrophile orientation, whose followers believed that the only chance the uprising of Galician Ukrainians had was their unshakable loyalty toward the Habsburgs, played an important role in Galician political life up to the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Adolf Dobriansky made proposals suggesting federalizing Austria and Hungary, which at the same time aimed at also protecting the rights of the non-Hungarian nationalities living in Austria and Hungary. In his 1871 political program, he listed the areas where the representatives of Rusyns were living. The detailed list indicated 'Rusyns living beyond the Carpathian Mountains, in the

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[20] Грицак, 2019, pp. 158–159.
[21] Rudnytsky, 1987, p. 396.
[22] Cited by Shkandrij, 2001, p. 189.
[23] Molnár, 2018, p. 113.

Hungarian Kingdom' were also present.[24] Federalization attempts failed; as a result of the Austrian-Hungarian Compromise in 1867, the Monarchy was changed into a dual state. Contemporary Hungarian and Galician Polish media discussed the idea that to the right of the Hungarian crown, Galicia should join St. Stephen's State, similar to the sub-dualist autonomous status granted in the Croatian Compromise. This step closed the dualist transformation of the Monarchy. Gyula Andrássy, as Prime Minister of Hungary (1867–1871), did not take actual political steps, but as Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary (1871–1879), he tried several times to support Galician autonomy.[25]

The Polonophile orientation did not recognize the separate ethnicity of Rusyns, who were considered an ethnic group of the Poles. Therefore, it had very weak support, and by the beginning of the 20th century, it was overshadowed in Rusyn groups. The Russophile orientation became popular among those who believed that they were betrayed by the Habsburgs, who handed the province entirely to the Poles. The representatives were attracted by the authority of the Russian Empire and culture. The Russophile idea was a union under the Russian tsar's supremacy—assimilation with Russians 'living between the Carpathian and Ural Mountains.' However, they had no comprehensive political program, focusing almost solely on literary questions and did not endanger the territorial unit of the Habsburg Empire.[26]

Ukrainian ideologists first reached the idea of Ukrainian statehood independently at the end of the 19th century. Yulian Bachynsky, who studied at Lviv University, was the first author in history to argue that Ukraine should be independent. In his book *Ukraina irredenta* (1895), he defined Ukraine as the contiguous territory from the Sian River in the Habsburg Monarchy to the Caucasus, including the nine Ukrainian-speaking tsarist provinces.[27] Mykola Mikhnovsky's work, *Independent Ukraine* [*Samostiina Ukraina*], which presented a program for 'a single, united, indivisible, free, and independent Ukraine from the Carpathian to the Caucasian mountains' was published in Lviv in 1900.[28]

Prominent intellectual Mykhailo Hrushevsky, first President of the Ukrainian People's Republic, suggested a federative state in his works published before the First World War. He did not consider Ukrainian sovereignty important; he thought that a federative Russian state would be the solution. The disintegration of tsarist Russia made it possible to gain Ukrainian independence, and Ukrainian territories could be united in one state. According to Hrushevsky, in the Ukrainian state, each people was important. They wanted to use autonomy to exercise their own rights; at the same time, they wanted to make it possible for other people as well. The wholeness of national life they wanted to reach for Ukrainian people should not suppress other people; fulfilment of their cultural and national development should not be limited.[29]

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[24] Dobriansky, 1871, pp. 4–6.
[25] Ress, 2007, p. 535.
[26] Топильский, 2017, p. 27.
[27] Liber, 2016, pp. 32–33.
[28] Liber, 2016, p. 33.
[29] Грушевський, 1991, p. 103.

The First World War enlivened nationality movements in Russia, the already politicized Ukrainian movement included. In March 1917, the mostly social democratic Ukrainian activists founded the Central Council (also called Central Rada) in Kyiv, whose task was to give voice to Ukrainian claims during the empire's expected transformation process. Out of the Ukrainian political claims, the All-Ukrainian National Congress convened in April 2017 was especially important. In his article *On the All-Ukrainian Congress*, published in March 1917, Mykhailo Hrushevsky called on Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians 'of all regions, lands, nooks and crannies of our national territory standing on the Ukrainian political platform.'[30] On the Congress, the Ukrainian organizations representing different political orientations presented their visions concerning the future of Ukrainian territories, resulting in a consensus of the demand of Ukrainian autonomy inside Russia.

The Central Council initiated discussions with the Russian Provisional Government, established following the February Revolution and abdication of Emperor Nicholas II. As the discussion with the Russian Provisional Government ended in a complete failure, the Central Council issued the First Universal of June 23, 1917, which proclaimed Ukraine's autonomy stating that 'from this day on we alone will create our life.' The Second Universal of July 16. 1917, proclaimed that the Central Rada would be 'the single supreme body of revolutionary democracy in Ukraine.' After the 1917 October Revolution (Bolshevik Coup), the Central Council did not recognize the Bolshevik Power; at the same time, they declared that they were interested in the civil democratic transformation and federalization of Russia.[31] The Third Universal of November 20, 1917, proclaimed the creation of the Ukrainian People's Republic within a federated Russia. At last—opposing the more and more significant Bolshevik breakthrough—the Fourth Universal of January 22, 1918, proclaimed that the Ukrainian People's Republic 'hereby becomes an independent, free, and sovereign state of the Ukrainian people, subject to no one.'[32] These universals were more than actual political declarations; they held symbolic meaning. Issuance of universals was common in the period of the Zaporizhian Host.[33]

On January 22, 1919, exactly a year after the issue of the Fourth Universal, the 'Act of Unification' of the Ukrainian People's Republic[34] and Western Ukrainian People's Republic[35] was officially announced on the St. Sophia Square in Kyiv. In Ukraine, the Day of Unification has been officially celebrated since 1999. A day before, the representatives of the Transcarpathian Ukranophile movement declared in Khust that they were willing to join 'Great Ukraine.'

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[30] Солдатенко, 1999, p. 145.

[31] Kasianov, 2015, p. 86.

[32] Plokhy, 2015, p. 209.

[33] Kasianov, 2015, p. 82.

[34] Dnieper Ukraine ('over Dnieper land') or Great Ukraine.

[35] Eastern Galicia and part of Bukovina. Proclaimed November 1, 1918 on the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The territorial and social basis of the Ukrainian People's Republic was decreasing; however, Ukrainian politicians managed to send a delegation to the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, where the representatives of the Central Powers—Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria—signed the peace agreement with Ukraine within a short time, as they wanted to put pressure on the Soviet Union.[36] For Ukraine, recognition of the independent state was a satisfying success, the more so as the Central Powers promised to support them in the armed struggle against the Bolsheviks. When on March 3, 1918, Bolshevik Russia signed a separate peace treaty, the military troops of the Central Powers occupied Ukrainian territories.

Different German attitudes appeared concerning Ukrainian statehood. In the opinion of the German general Erich Ludendorff, the existence of Ukraine depended on the presence of the German army. General Wilhelm Groener's opinion was similar; he said that—supposing that the existence of a state depends on an efficient army and good finance—one could not speak about a Ukrainian state. The State Secretary of Foreign Office Paul von Hintze thought the occupation of Ukraine made it possible to approach Russia; he wanted to Ukrainianize Russia starting from Kyiv.[37]

It was more obvious than before that the Ukrainian state initiative was actually unable to control the territories belonging to it. As for compliance with the peace terms, German and Austro-Hungarian military leadership found a simple solution: they dismissed the seemingly incompetent leaders of the Ukrainian People's Republic and appointed Pavlo Skoropadskyi, the greatest landowner of Ukrainian territories. Skoropadskyi was of Ukrainian origin and called himself the hetman of the Ukrainian State.[38] However, the agreement with the occupants limited Skoropadskyi's scope of activities. The existence and fall of the hetman system depended on the First World War position of the Central Powers. As soon as their defeat became obvious in the autumn of 1918 and the German and Austro-Hungarian military leadership withdrew their troops from Ukrainian territories, Skoropadskyi had to leave, too.

A new leadership tried to grant the existence of the Ukrainian state, but it failed. Following the end of the First World War, Western Ukraine became part of re-emerging Poland for nearly two decades. Contemporary and historical works in the first part of the 20th century stated that Andrey Sheptytsky, the Metropolitan Archbishop of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, strengthened the Ukrainian national movement.[39] The two most important Ukrainian political organizations were the National Democratic Alliance (Ukrainske Natsionalno-Demokratychne Obiednannia – UNDO) and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiia ukrainskykh natsionalistiv – OUN). The radical OUN did not hold back from terrorist offenses. Their ideology was based on the national perception of political journalist and theorist Dmytro Dontsov, the 'spiritual father' of the OUN, who condemned the liberal nationalism of the Ukrainian revolution. They considered the nation an all-important objective and wanted to achieve independence at any cost.[40] They considered the declaration of the state's independence, which was called Carpatho-Ukraine (present-day Transcarpathia) and belonged to Czechoslovakia in mid-March 1939, as part of the Ukrainian Piemont,[41] the Ukrainian state building effort.

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[36] Lieb and Dornik, 2015, pp. 53–55.
[37] Lieb and Dornik, 2015, pp. 66–67.
[38] Hagen, 2004, p. 115.
[39] Плохій, 2019, p. 309.

In 1922, most parts of Ukraine were integrated into the Soviet Union as a constituent republic. Each of the three Soviet Constitutions (1924, 1936, 1977), as well as the Soviet Ukrainian constitutions, involved the principle of secession, but it was actually never realizable. There was no place for dissidents (persons opposing the current political structure and nationalists were then called 'ideological deviationists') in the Soviet state. The Ukrainian question again became the question of protecting the Ukrainian language and identity. Ukrainian social activist Ivan Dzyuba argued in his samizdat essay *Internationalism or Russification?* (1965) that Ukrainian culture should be allowed to develop into a full-fledged and modern national culture and should not be treated as an ethnographic, provincial version of a higher all-Russian culture. He stated that there was continuity between the tsarist and the Soviet treatment of Ukraine.[42] It is of special interest that the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic were founding members of the United Nations (1945). Until 1958, the permanent mission of Ukraine was led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs rather than the permanent representative. Since Ukraine's independence, membership in the United Nations has been a priority of Ukraine's foreign policy.

The Soviet Union established a huge Ukrainian republic within its own borders. The borders of the Ukrainian constituent republic had been expanding since 1922. In 1939, following the Invasion of Poland, German and Soviet troops divided the territory of Poland, and Galicia became part of Ukraine. In 1940, the Soviets annexed Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, which became parts of Soviet Ukraine. In 1945, by Treaty between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, Trans-Carpathian Ukraine (present-day Transcarpathia) united 'with its immemorial motherland, the Ukraine.' These territorial gains were internationally recognized by the Paris peace treaties of 1947.

In 1954—on the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav—the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union issued a decree transferring the Crimean peninsula from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to Soviet Ukraine 'taking into account the integral character of the economy, the territorial proximity, and the close economic and cultural ties between the Crimea Province and the Ukrainian SSR.'[43]

Within the given borders, independent Ukraine became the second biggest state in Europe (after Russia).[44] However, even the most resolute Ukrainian patriots could not expect in early 1991 that Soviet Ukraine had a real chance to become an independent state, preserving its territorial unity. For the time being, the maximal political objective of the People's Movement of Ukraine (popularly known as Rukh) led by Viacheslav Chornovil was a federal Ukrainian state integrated in the confederation of previous Soviet republics. The most popular political act of the Rukh was the Human Chain on January 21, 1990, which commemorated the act of unifying the Ukrainian lands in 1919.

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[40] For details, see Erlacher, 2021.

[41] Magocsi, 2002, pp. 2–4.

[42] Szporluk, 1989, p. 30.

[43] Jones, 2014, p. 121.

[44] Area total 603,628 km^2.

4. Independent Ukraine

As in 1917/18, when the fourth Universal declared the state's independence, in 1990/91, Ukrainian independence was discussed in two documents. The phases were the same: first the re-thinking of the country's position within the existing state in power, then the entire independence of the state. The 'Declaration on the state sovereignty of Ukraine' adopted by the parliament of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada) on July 16, 1990, wanted to break away from the Moscow-based control in several questions, but did not want to leave the Soviet state. For example:

- 'proclaims the state sovereignty of Ukraine as supremacy, independence, completeness and indivisibility of the authorities of the republic within its territory and independence and equality in external relations.'
- 'The Ukrainian SSR is independent in the solution of any questions of the state life.'
- 'The Ukrainian SSR performs supremacy in all the territory.'
- 'The Ukrainian SSR independently determines the economic status and enshrines it in the laws.'
- 'The Ukrainian SSR independently establishes procedure for the organization of conservation in the territory of the Republic and procedure for use of natural resources.'
- 'The Ukrainian SSR is independent in the solution of questions of science, education, cultural and spiritual development...'

The Declaration was a large legal document, whose several paragraphs have been included in the present Constitution adopted in 1996.

The 'Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine' was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on August 24, 1991. The short document consisted of a few lines referring to 'the thousand-year tradition of state development in Ukraine,' 'realizing the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine,' '—solemnly declares the Independence of Ukraine and the creation of an independent Ukrainian state—UKRAINE. The territory of Ukraine is indivisible and inviolable.' The Act was affirmed through a national referendum on December 1, 1991. Since 1992, Ukraine's Independence Day has been celebrated on August 24th. The disintegration of the Soviet Union was declared after the Ukrainian referendum, followed by the founding of the Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS), which was a way leading to civilized divorce rather than integration.

The location of Central Europe has always depended on the actual balance of political powers. In the 17th and 18th centuries, it coincided with the territory of the Roman-German Empire. Up to the establishment of Germany based on the German small unit, German centrality did not change much; however, the approaches differed. In 1867, when Austria-Hungary was established, this virtual Central European area was spreading onto the Hungarian Kingdom and the northwestern parts of the Balkan peninsula. During the First World War, the focus was placed on cultural arguments rather than economic–cultural ones. Central Europe covered the area between the North and Baltic Seas and the southern edge of the Adriatic and the Danube plain, allowing the connection of countries situated on the edge and on the Russian language boundary to the East, a significant part of the Ukrainian Plain included.

As a matter of fact, the eastern orientation of political Central Europe was due to the First World War. A regional consequence of the Treaty of Versailles—the primary treaty produced by the Paris Peace Conference at the end of First World War—was the term Intermediate Europe, which became part of Central European discourse and was to define the buffer zone in the small states' region between Russia willing to expand to the west and Germany willing to expand to the east. After the Second World War, the term Central Europe became meaningless; the iron curtain divided the region—Eastern Europe was to the east and Western Europe to the west. Since the 1970s, the term Central Europe has reappeared as a historical, cultural, geographical, and social–geographical unit, a 'symbolic reality,' that did not want to be identified with Eastern Europe.[45]

According to Georgii Kasianov, countries established after the disintegration of the Soviet Union now form the post-soviet space, without the Baltic states, which—joining the European Union in 2004—'returned' to Europe. Based on political geography, the area can be divided into new units: new Eastern Europe, including the countries of the Eastern Partnership (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine), the Central Asian region (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan), and Russia, which is traditionally situated between 'East and West' and is willing to play a special role in the region as well as in the whole world.[46]

Since Samuel P. Huntington created the theory of 'torn countries,'[47] stating that in the case of Ukraine, there is a multiple faulting line. The 'Two Ukraines' discourse has made analysts eager to clarify if this dividedness can be determined and if so, in which contexts. This approach has historical socialization (regional) roots, remembering mainly the historical Right-bank and Left-bank Ukraine.

It was an unexpected event of the Orange Revolution (Pomarancheva revoliutsiia) in 2004 that, during the presidential election campaign, the competing political sides stressed regional differences instead of economic-social issues. This way, the Two Ukraines discourse left the world of science and, widely spread, actually dominated the public discourse on Ukraine.

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[45] Mező, 2001, pp. 81–103.

[46] Касьянов, 2018, pp. 80–101.

[47] For details, see Huntington, 1996.

The Western world did not apply the category of political opposition in the case of the deeply divided country. In their opinion, there was a 'geopolitical war' between 'European-oriented' Western Ukraine and 'Russian-oriented' Eastern Ukraine. Canadian politologist Denis Soltys thought that placing the border of civilization on the Dnieper-line Huntington recreated the interpretation of international relations based on the categories of 'influx zones,' and it was a mistake to state that the West could define the borders of its 'own' civilization at its own discretion. The contrary could be observed in Ukrainian commentaries, and the problem of regionalism was often completely ignored.

The myth of 'Two Ukraines' (i.e., the nationally conscious Ukraine and the 'other' one—the first being the right norm) especially appeared in the publications of publicist and political analyst Mykola Riabchuk. Politologist Volodymyr Kulyk called attention to the fact that this approach ignored the differences between the given groups and other fault lines present in Ukrainian society. Writer Tatiana Zhurzhenko also argued against this concept. She thought it was unacceptable to create an etic fault line based on ethno-linguistic criteria, which would result in the Ukrainian speaking world being characterized by civil society and democracy, while Russian speaking people were identified with corruption, a shadow economy, and bad music. Historian Yaroslav Hrytsak stressed that it was incorrect to draw conclusions concerning the deepness of fault lines solely based on the two extremes, that is, (Western Ukrainian) Lviv and (Eastern Ukrainian) Donetsk.[48]

Russia has been Ukraine's most important commercial partner since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Ukraine has been exposed to Russian import, concerning energy carriers, mineral products, and nuclear fuel. Ukraine is traditionally a transit country, situated on the transportation route of energy carriers; therefore it has great geopolitical significance. Pipeline gas and oil from Russia to Europe is primarily transported across Ukraine.

Independent Ukraine renounced the atomic weapons situated in its territory. In exchange, the three atomic great powers—Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom—who signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, and later China and France, who issued a supporting declaration, granted the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

In 1995, the two countries signed the Russian-Ukrainian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, which declared the mutual respect of territorial integrity. However, the agreement concerning the division of the Black Sea Fleet was only concluded in 1997 and was ratified by the two parliaments in 1999. In addition, the Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Parameters of the Division of the Black Sea Fleet (1996) and the Agreement between Ukraine and Russia on the Black

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[48] For details, see Портнов, 2007, pp. 93–138.

Sea Fleet in Ukraine (or the ‘Kharkiv Pact’) (2010) declared that Sevastopol remained the basis of the Russian naval forces on the Crimean peninsula. Russia wanted to prevent termination of the latter agreement, which led to the annexation of the Crimea in 2014.

It is a myth to think that Ukraine was oriented once to the East and once to the West. The country built parallel connections. Ukraine was the first CIS-country to sign an agreement of cooperation with NATO, joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) (1994), and signed the Charter of a distinctive partnership (1997), the basic foundation underpinning NATO-Ukraine relations. In 2020—after Australia, Jordan, Georgia, Sweden, and Finland—Ukraine was the sixth to join the NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partners program founded at the NATO summit in Wales in 2014.

Ukraine is a member state of the Council of Europe (1995) and the World Trade Organization (2009). At the end of 2013, Ukraine should have signed the Association Agreement with the EU and joined the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) representing an integral part of the Association Agreement. Contemporary Ukrainian political leadership backed off, which led to a deep crisis in domestic politics—the Euromaidan Revolution or Revolution of Dignity (Revoliutsiia hidnosti) in late 2013 and early 2014, followed by the conflict with Russia in 2014. According to Timothy Snyder,

> [t]he Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea and then the support of armed separatism in Donets’k and Luhans’k oblast ended a long moment in European and Atlantic history in which a certain order was thought to be durable and sovereignty taken for granted. [...] The subject was no longer a revolution within one country but the nature of the international order.[49]

After the political leadership opposing the approach toward the European Union was overthrown, the Ukraine Association Agreement entered into full force on September 1, 2017. Ukraine is a priority partner within the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

The successor states of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (‘the Lublin Triangle’[50]) are Ukraine’s key partners. Since the democratic change, the eastern politics of Poland have not changed: the sovereignty of the Baltic states, Belarus, and Ukraine, should be granted by all means as these countries create a buffer zone between Poland and Russia. Warsaw would do its best to strengthen them, take part in their nation building attempts needed in society, and support them in approaching the western world. In 2004, in the period of the Orange Revolution and in the winter of 2013/14, during the Euromaidan Revolution, Lithuania seemed like a mediator and a strong supporter of Ukrainian democratic processes and European integration. Ukraine is in close cooperation with Moldova and Georgia, forming a trilateral alliance called the Association Trio in 2021 to promote their common joining of the EU.

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[49] Snyder, 2015, p. 695.

[50] Denomination based on Union of Lublin (1569), created the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

According to Richard Sakwa

> there are two contrasting visions of statehood, and ultimately the Ukrainian crisis of 2013–14 is a battle between the two. The first is monist nationalism, driven by the idea that after several centuries of stunted statehood the Ukrainian nation has had to seize the opportunity to join the front ranks of nation states. … The model of integrated nationalism shares some of the concerns of the classic ideas of integral nationalism – the latter denoting the creation … a united people with a single language, culture, and mythology…Integrated nationalism is fundamentally oriented toward a civic model of state development and is tolerant of diversity and rights.[51]

It can be best reflected by the laws concerning settling the situation of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine (the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and certain areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions) and the Ukrainian language as a 'key factor of the unity of the Ukrainian state,' which should grant the 'monolithicity of Ukrainian society,'[52] that is, the Law of Ukraine 'On Education' no. 2145-VIII of September 5, 2017, and the Law 'On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language' no. 2704-VIII of April 25, 2019. The state language became the main cohesive power of state sovereignty, while at the same time, the situation for national minorities—with the exception of 'indigenous peoples'(Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks)[53]got worse than before 2014.

The breakup with Russia, officially considered an aggressor by Ukraine, and the commitment to the West were incorporated into the constitution. The Law of Ukraine 'On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine (Regarding the Strategic Course of the State for Acquiring Full-Fledged Membership of Ukraine in the European Union and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization)' no. 2680-VIII of February 7, 2019, added the following to the preamble of the Constitution of Ukraine (1996)[54]:

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[51] Sakwa, 2015, pp. 14., 20.

[52] 'The legal status of the Ukrainian language as the state language, enshrined in the provisions of Articles 10.1 and 10.2 of the Constitution, is at the same time a fundamental constitutional value, a specific feature, and a key factor of unity of the Ukrainian state and an integral part of its constitutional identity. As an institute of Ukrainian statehood that combines legal and value components, the Ukrainian language is called on to perform an integrative (unification) function and to ensure the monolithicity of Ukrainian society at various levels. The Ukrainian language as the state language is an important tool for regulating the activities of all state power and local self-government authorities; it has a crucial role in ensuring the political unity of the state and social cohesion in accordance with one of the aspirations guided by the constitution drafter in adopting the Constitution on June 28, 1996.' Summary to the Decision of the Grand Chamber of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine no. 1-r/2021 of July 14, 2021, in the case upon the constitutional petition of 51 People's Deputies of Ukraine on the constitutionality of the Law 'On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language' (available at: https://ccu.gov.ua/en/docs/3434).

[53] See most recently Law of Ukraine 'On the indigenous peoples of Ukraine' no. 1616-IX of 1 July 2021.

[54] Frosini and Lapa, 2020, pp. 79–85.

> The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, on behalf of the Ukrainian people—citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities … caring for the strengthening of civil harmony on Ukrainian soil, and confirming the European identity of the Ukrainian people and the irreversibility of the European and Euro-Atlantic course of Ukraine…[55]

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[55] Constitution of Ukraine (1996), (in Ukrainian on the site of the Verkhovna Rada available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80#Text; in English (amended 2019): https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/8233/file/Ukraine_Constitution_am2019_EN.pdf).

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