

Spontaneity and Self-Determination

The title of the eighth chapter of *Freedom of the Will* by Ferenc Huoranszki is “Spontaneity”, which is the ability to determine one’s action in a particular situation by choice (Huoranszki 2011: 141). But the topic is really the correct interpretation of self-determination. Huoranszki argues that the two concepts should be separated, as demonstrated by negligence, in the case of which we are unable to do what we ought to (and hence lack spontaneity), but are nevertheless responsible for this inability. He also differentiates his interpretation of self-determination from that of his incompatibilist adversaries, which requires the agent to be able to determine herself in the sense of being responsible for her current character, motives and reasons.

According to some philosophers, self-determination is utterly impossible, since it would require us to be *causa sui*.¹ Others think that it is only possible in physically indeterministic worlds, since the kind of ‘ultimate’ or ‘true’ responsibility that is required for determination of the self is only possible in these.² Huoranszki claims, however, that neither of these two claims is correct. He argues that if we follow through with this strong interpretation of self-determination, we will find it to be impossible in indeterministic worlds as well, and therefore the concept should be interpreted in a more permissive way in order to be a condition of responsibility. He proceeds to provide his own interpretation, which is evidently possible in both deterministic and indeterministic worlds, and measures it against two libertarian alternatives, finding it superior to both of them. In the following paper I am going to explicate Huoranszki’s views expressed in this chapter of his book, following his line of thought. Then I will present my objections to some of the views discussed or endorsed by the author.

¹ See Strawson (1994) for such an argument.

² See Kane (1996).

8.1 REASONS, ABILITIES AND SPONTANEITY

Huoranszki agrees with his adversaries that self-determination is a condition of moral responsibility and thus important for the analysis of free will. An agent can only be morally responsible if she is able to determine herself; the question is what exactly is meant by this. Huoranszki introduces his interpretation by saying that by something being self-determined, he only means that the future state of the thing is only determined by its inner workings. If a clock works properly, its future state can be explained only by its current internal states and powers, and there is nothing metaphysically problematic in saying that an event identified as a behavior of a substance is caused by an internal change in the substance. Of course, the situation is more complicated in the case of moral agents, but Huoranszki wants to apply the same general principle.

If our motives and character causally determined our actions, we would only be responsible if we could determine them; hence the strong interpretation of self-determination. There is no sense in debating the fact that in a deterministic world 'being determined by something' is transitive (if B is determined by A and C is determined by B, then C is determined by A), and the consequence argument³ tries to use exactly this fact to make it seem unfeasible for an agent to determine herself in any freedom-relevant way in deterministic worlds. The previous states of the world and the laws of physics determine its current state, including our reasons and motives, so if our actions are determined by our reasons and motives, they are ultimately determined by external causes.

But if Huoranszki is right that self-determination in this sense is impossible in indeterministic worlds as well, we have to choose between two conclusions: we could claim that the strong interpretation of self-determination is a condition of moral responsibility, which is in turn impossible. Conversely, we could argue that the strong interpretation is incorrect, because, according to it, moral responsibility is impossible. This choice actually consists in determining the relative strengths of two incompatible assumptions: that ultimate responsibility is necessary for self-determination, and that moral responsibility is possible.

Huoranszki chooses the latter path, of course, and proceeds to delineate his interpretation of self-determination as a condition of moral responsibility. According to this, the kind of control required for moral responsibility is grounded in our ability to perform an actually unperformed action, in the dispositional sense employed by his conditional analysis of free will as the central thesis of the book. He defines this control in the following way.

³ For the argument, see van Inwagen (1983); for Huoranszki's treatment of it, see Chapter 2 in Huoranszki (2011).

What responsibility requires is that we can control our actions in the sense that we could have done otherwise. And we could have done otherwise in the responsibility-relevant sense provided we would have done otherwise if we had chosen so and retained our ability to choose and to perform the relevant sort of action. (Huoranszki 2011: 143.)

The detailed explication of Huoranszki's conditional analysis belongs to another chapter. As for his concept of self-determination as a condition of responsibility, the first thing he needs to do with it is to differentiate it from spontaneity. The latter only applies to current choices, but there are many cases where it seems natural to say that someone is responsible for not having a choice in a particular situation. The author quotes an example originally described by A. S. Kaufman:

Suppose that a lifeguard who has lied about her qualifications is unable to swim. Assume now that a child drowns whose life it was the lifeguard's duty to save. We would certainly hold the lifeguard responsible and yet, being unable to swim, she could not have saved the child's life. (Lamb 1993: 525.)

In this case most people would say that the lifeguard is responsible, despite the fact that she didn't have the choice of saving or not saving the child. Huoranszki claims that this is because she is responsible for having got herself in this situation in the first place. She is responsible not for her inability to save the child—not being able to swim could just be a genetic disability—but for making a prior choice, the foreseeable consequence of which is the current situation, in which she does not have a choice.

Self-determination as conceived by Huoranszki rests on spontaneity in the sense of our actions depending on our choices, and it also requires the ability to perceive moral reasons. But a third condition needs to be added as well, so we can accommodate the intuition of being morally responsible for negligence. He claims that self-determination also requires "... that we could have done something, which we have actually failed to do, and *the foreseeable consequence* of which is our present inability", or "... that we could have avoided being in the circumstances in which our lack of ability cannot exempt us." (Huoranszki 2011: 145.)

Of course, both articulations of this condition are rather vague, since they place the burden of actually foreseeing the possible outcomes of actions on the agent. I would say that the lifeguard in the above example would be responsible even if she did not realize that she would need to be able to swim in order to be an effective lifeguard, similarly to someone who would cause an accident by driving down the wrong lane of a highway and thinking that no danger would come of it. I imagine that most cases of negligence are the consequence of someone not foreseeing the consequences of her actions, even if they seem quite

foreseeable to someone else. But I would not say that for example somebody was responsible for going down with an airplane and hitting someone's house, even though such accidents are obviously foreseeable consequences of traveling by airplane, and some of the passengers—who were afraid of flying—might even have actively visualized it before takeoff.

A consequence of an action can only be sensibly deemed foreseeable from the perspective of a particular agent. And the above examples show that this concept does not afford an exact condition of moral responsibility for negligence in this sense either. No human is capable of foreseeing all the consequences of every possible action (not even those that follow logically from the known facts), nor are we responsible for every consequence of our actions that we do foresee. To claim that we are only responsible for the foreseeable consequences of our actions might seem intuitively correct, because intuitively we more or less agree on which cases to count as negligence (at least with extreme examples), but it does not clarify the exact conditions at work.

Huoranszki claims that we can determine our reasons and abilities without ultimate responsibility. The case of the lifeguard illustrates that sometimes the current situation which provides our reasons and abilities is a foreseeable consequence of our prior choices, and is thus determined by ourselves. This kind of self-determination is definitely possible, even in deterministic worlds, and it is also a necessary condition of moral responsibility. Thus the relationship between self-determination (in this sense), moral responsibility and freedom of will is as follows. Self-determination is a necessary condition of moral responsibility and freedom of will is a necessary condition of self-determination. We are only responsible for our present inabilities “if they are the *foreseeable consequences* of our prior choices, and thus could have been avoided.” (Huoranszki 2011: 146–147.)

8.2 ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY

After delineating his concept of self-determination, Huoranszki presents two alternative libertarian interpretations. According to these, the kind of self-determination required for moral responsibility consists in being able to control our motives and character, which is impossible in a deterministic world, but possible in an indeterministic one. So moral responsibility implies the falsity of physical determinism. If the libertarian wants this view to seem plausible, she must explain how physically undetermined events can make ultimate responsibility for actions possible. The falsity of physical determinism implies the nomological possibility of an actually non-occurrent event occurring at any time t , and thus a particular situation can have more than one possible outcome. The real difficulty lies in placing this nomological contingency at the fundamental physical level somewhere in the causal chain leading to an action, where it could sensibly

guarantee the possibility of agential control. But Huoranszki (2011: 147) argues that there is no such place for this contingency.

If physical indeterminacy is to be relevant for free will, it should take place before the intention for an action was formed, since the indeterminacy of the outcome of an already willful action should not concern free will. At this point Huoranszki quotes Dennett (1978: 295), who, though not himself a libertarian, recommends the process of deliberation preceding choice and action as a place for this indeterminism to occur, but this account is also highly problematic. Huoranszki (2011: 150) admits that it is quite possible that the origin of some intellectual achievements might be explained by such an indeterminacy, but not moral responsibility, since when we find someone morally responsible for neglecting an action, we do so based on their inaction, and not if and because they have indeterministically forgotten the action.

Huoranszki concludes that the indeterminism relevant to libertarian ultimate responsibility must occur after the process of deliberation and before an intention is formed. Most libertarians believe that choice is only possible if the formulation of intentions is an indeterminate physical process or event, thus they take practical deliberation not to determine the preferences resulting from it. But if choices are indeterminate only in this way, this means that the actions of agents are actually not controlled by themselves, but by pure chance. To avoid this contradiction between preferences and chance, some libertarians argue that agents can only choose in some exceptional situations. This comes down to two lines of thought: one can either go the way of plural rationality, as Kane (1996) did, and hold that our will is only free if our rational deliberation does not determine which actions we judge to be the best; or one can choose what Huoranszki calls the indifference strategy, holding that our will is only free if our motives do not determine what we do. The essential difference between these two accounts is that the former specifies rational indifference and the latter psychological indifference. In the remainder of the chapter, Huoranszki argues that neither of these views captures the sense in which self-determination is a condition of free will and moral responsibility.

8.3 MOTIVES, CHOICES AND RESTRICTIVISM

According to Peter van Inwagen (1989), there are three kinds of situation in which we can do otherwise: first, so called Buridan's Ass cases, where there is no qualitative difference among the possible alternatives; second, when our duty is in conflict with our inclinations; third, when we have to choose between incommensurable values. On all other occasions we cannot do otherwise, which

implies that in most cases, even when we are morally responsible for our actions, we do not act out of our free will. Hence this view is called restrictivism.

Huoranszki examines the indifference strategy first. Though the three above-mentioned cases differ significantly, he calls all of them indifference, and the advocacy of the view that we can only act freely in such cases the indifference strategy. By indifference he means that there is no strong ordering of the possible outcomes (regardless of this resulting from lack of or equal motivations), which results in agents not needing to act against their own preferences. He finds it implausible that we do not act out of our free will when we act according to our preference. In fact he sees this as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the indifference strategy and maintains the opposite view, that “only those who *can* choose and act according to their preference (even if they may not actually do) act of their own free will.” (Huoranszki 2011: 152.) Accordingly he shifts the burden of proof, claiming that “unless the restrictivist has a strong argument to the contrary, we have no grounds to think that our will is free only if and when we are indifferent.” (Huoranszki 2011: 152.)

The proposed argument for restrictivism comes from van Inwagen (1989: 406), who uses an example from Dennett, in which he is asked to torture someone in return for a small sum. Dennett claims that he—in his present state—is simply unable to do this or indeed anything else he finds morally reprehensible. Van Inwagen argues that this means that the ability to do otherwise is unnecessary for moral responsibility, since we would obviously take Dennett’s inability to comply with the request as proof of his morality, with which it would conflict to do so.

Huoranszki finds this argument inconclusive. It would only be sound if “from the fact that *S would never choose to do A* we could infer that *S cannot make a choice about whether or not to perform A*” (Huoranszki 2011: 154), which he thinks is fallacious, since not being motivated to do something and not being able to do it is simply not the same thing. So it comes down to how we think about abilities: we could either agree with Huoranszki that there are unactualized abilities, or disagree with him, as incompatibilists usually do. Notice that this is the same difference in presuppositions that leads Huoranszki to reject the consequence argument, and van Inwagen to endorse it. Thus the only thing this line of thought proves is that compatibilists and incompatibilists tend to disagree on this matter, but this we already knew. Huoranszki also mentions an argument from van Inwagen, which uses the No Choice principle.

Consider an action A (like torturing someone in return for a small sum) which *S* would regard morally indefensible. According to van Inwagen’s argument, *S* cannot make a choice about whether or not he finds A indefensible. And he cannot make a choice about whether or not he performs an action that he finds indefensible.

So he cannot make a choice about whether or not to perform A. And as everyone agrees, if *S* has no choice about whether or not to perform A, then his will is not free. (Huoranszki 2011: 154.)⁴

Huoranszki disagrees with the premise that agents can have no choice about whether or not to perform an action they find indefensible. He thinks that restrictivism is based on the mistaken view that “[m]otives are motives for actions and not choices” (Huoranszki 2011: 155) and offers the following example as a *reductio ad absurdum* of this. There are many situations where we only slightly prefer one choice to another, for example chocolate cake to cheesecake. In these cases Huoranszki would say that he chooses to order a chocolate cake *because* he prefers it slightly, but the restrictivist would have to say that he did not have a choice because he had a preference. If in this situation someone would ask the restrictivist why he ordered the chocolate cake instead of the cheesecake, for which the restaurant is famous, he would have to reply ‘because I could not have done otherwise’. Huoranszki finds this pretty much in conflict with how we normally think of preferences and choices, and proposes the use of the expression ‘I could not have done otherwise’ for when the agent has a pathological aversion to cheese, or when there is no cheesecake on the menu, and other similar cases. I will examine Huoranszki’s treatment of pathological aversions later. As for the above argument, apart from showing that the restrictivist is inclined to use some rather uncommon language,⁵ it seems to come down once again to the question of unactualized abilities, and thus merely restates the well-known difference between his and his adversaries’ views on them.

Huoranszki closes the discussion of the indifference strategy by examining the notion of self-determination that it implies. According to the advocates of this strategy, responsibility is rooted in the undetermined choices that occur when we are indifferent towards multiple outcomes. We are not able to do otherwise when we have a preference, but we can still be responsible for our actions in these cases, because we have shaped our present selves (and motives) by our prior undetermined (indifferent) actions. So, in most cases, we are not directly responsible for our actions, but for being as we became because of our prior undetermined choices.⁶ Thus the ultimate ground for our present moral responsibility is our prior indifference, which Huoranszki finds absurd. He thinks

⁴ For van Inwagen’s original argument see Inwagen (1989: 408–409).

⁵ This is also true of Huoranszki in other cases. Think of Dennett’s example, in which he similarly tricks the compatibilist into using the word ‘able’ in an uncommon way. The premise is that Dennett is unable to do anything he finds morally reprehensible, but the compatibilist cannot allow this to be true for his sense of ‘being able to do something’ (which allows for unactualized abilities, unlike the one Dennett uses in the premise), and is thus led to argue for Dennett being able to do something he is unable to do. Language makes this seem like a contradiction, but in fact the two instances of the word ‘able’ have different senses.

⁶ See van Inwagen (1989: 418–421).

that the indifference strategy is doomed to failure because of this conclusion and because “we are able to choose and perform actions, in the relevant sense, which we are not motivated to do” (Huoranszki 2011: 159), by which, in my understanding, he means that the arguments for restrictivism are not as convincing, as the use of words they commit to is counterintuitive.

8.4 PLURAL RATIONALITY

After deeming what he calls the indifference strategy unsuccessful, Huoranszki moves on to discuss the other possible libertarian strategy: plural rationality. This strategy excludes Buridan’s Ass-type cases, leaving only two kinds of choices we can make out of our free will. The main reason for this is that in Buridan’s Ass-type cases we do not have any reason to perform a specific action, while in the other two cases it could be said that whatever we do, we do it with a reason. So the ground for freedom of will and moral responsibility is that the relative strengths of conflicting reasons prior to a decision do not determine which reason the agent will choose to act on.

This indeterminacy of preferences can be interpreted in two ways: either by saying that reasons cause actions only probabilistically, or by saying that it is not determined whether or not a reason causes a particular action. The first option is not very plausible: probabilistic causation means that it is not up to us that a specific reason succeeds in causing an action, and thus would be quite problematic as a ground for moral responsibility. Would Dennett really be morally responsible for taking the small sum of money for torture in his thought experiment if the cause of this action would in fact be merely that one of his conflicting reasons lost in a game of chance? Sure, if the history of the world was replayed, the outcome might be different, but only by chance and not because of any effort on my part. So it is understandable that Huoranszki ignores this option and goes on to quote Robert Nozick (1980: 295), who suggested that the indeterminacy relevant to libertarian free will should be interpreted the second way.

According to Nozick, decision consists in choosing one of the competing reasons as the one that will determine the subsequent action. So, at the point of decision, all the possibilities are open, and, instead of choosing an action, we actually choose a reason which causes an action. This account has the advantage of not requiring indifference: we need to have conflicting reasons to exert volitional control, but they do not need to be of equal strength. Thus the plural rationality strategy seems to allow much more free choices. Nozick (1980: 295) also claims that this allows that if the history of the world was replayed until the point of decision, “it could have continued with a different action”. I will propose some objections to this at a later point.

Huoranszki quotes an objection to the plural rationality strategy from Richard Double (1991: 204), according to which it is impossible to explain an agent's actions rationally, unless the conflicting sets of reasons have equal prior chances of causing an action. Double assumes that probabilistic explanations require that, given the cause, the chance of the occurrence of an event be higher than the chance of its non-occurrence. If the initially weaker (less probable) reason prevails, we cannot explain the choice rationally. According to Huoranszki (2011: 161–162), if Double is right, the plural rationality strategy collapses into the indifference strategy, but he finds Double's argument unconvincing and offers three counterarguments, of which I will only explicate the first (and in my opinion the strongest), which he illustrates with an example derived from van Fraassen (1980: 105):

Consider the case when someone contracts paresis as a result of untreated syphilis. On the one hand, paresis is only contracted by those who have untreated tertiary syphilis. On the other hand, only a very low percentage of those who have untreated tertiary syphilis contract paresis. (Huoranszki 2011: 161.)

Examples like this show that probabilistic explanations only require that, given the cause, the chance of the occurrence of an event be higher than in the absence of the cause. After dismantling Double's argument against the plural rationality strategy, Huoranszki sets the grounds for his own, which will be put forward in the next chapter. He concludes that the plural rationality strategy has to accept reasons dependence (while his compatibilist account does not) and—supporting this view with a quote from Kane—that it has to assume some form of restrictivism.⁷ Kane claims—following Dennett and van Inwagen—that we are not responsible in any situation where we are unable to do otherwise. Since many of our motivated actions fall into this category, Kane must adhere to the concept of ultimate responsibility, in the sense that when agents' actions are determined by their character and motives, they are responsible to the extent that “they are responsible for being the sort of person they had become by that time” (Kane 1996: 39). Huoranszki sees a fundamental difficulty at this point. While his compatibilist view conceives an action being self-determined as the agent determining what she does, ultimate responsibility means that agents are responsible only if they can determine their selves. Thus, in the case of both libertarian views discussed, responsibility for our actions is rooted in our responsibility for being the sort of persons we are, and it is this view he will argue against in the next chapter.

⁷ For the quote see Huoranszki (2011: 163); for the original see Kane (1996: 120).

OBJECTIONS

I will now present my objections to some of the claims discussed in this chapter. The first of these will be to the probabilistic treatment of the relative strengths of reasons, and the second to Huoranszki's interpretation of pathological aversions.

Probability and the strength of reasons: I find the probabilistic treatment of competing reasons employed by Double—and to some degree by Nozick—quite problematic. Double's argument against the plural rationality strategy presupposes that reasons have a relative probability of successfully causing their respective actions prior to one of them actually doing so. On this line of thought, having reason R_A for choosing action A with a 50% probability of being effective, and reason R_B for action B with the same probability, would mean that the two reasons are of equal strength, while probabilities of 70% and 30% would indicate this numerical proportion of their strengths.

To see the difficulties with this view, the concept of probability it employs needs further investigation. There are many rival theories of probability,⁸ but in this case we have two distinct ways to conceive it. We can either think of genuine probability, which means that our probability attributions reflect a genuine openness of future (indeterminacy) in the physical world, and if we kept rewinding the history of the universe, then two possible futures, with 50% chances of actualization would occur with roughly the same frequency. Or we could think of subjective probability, in which case the probability is not 'in the world', but in our lack of full physical knowledge of it. This means that saying that an event has a 50% chance of occurring has nothing to do with rewinding the history of the universe—it merely means that, given the known facts, we have equal reason to expect its occurrence and its non-occurrence. Obviously the latter conception is compatible with physical determinism while the former is not.

Now if we examine the treatment of the strength of reasons as the proportion of the probabilities of them becoming effective with this distinction in mind, it is evident that neither kind of probability is able to play this role. Let's say that in Dennett's torture for money example, the amount of money offered amounts to a reason of 10% strength, while the opposing reason is of 90% strength. If we conceive this in terms of genuine probability, it would mean that if we continually kept rewinding the history of the universe, the agent would take the money in roughly one tenth of the instances of the decision. But this is absurd; if the sum of money amounts to a weaker reason than Dennett's dedication to human rights (or whatever stands on the opposing side), then he will never take the money. If I am strongly opposed to torturing anyone for the given amount of money, then no matter how many times the history of the universe is rewound,

⁸ For an extensive discussion of the interpretations of probability, see Sklar (1993: 90–127).

I will not do it. Opposition to something can only be manifest as a disposition to decline it, and if I would take the money, I could hardly claim to be opposed to doing so. It can truthfully be said that sugar cubes have a disposition to melt when placed in warm beverages, but if I found one that would not do so, that would mean that it lacks such a disposition. In this sense, Dennett's original interpretation of the example is correct.

My conclusion is that since a reason being the strongest can only mean that it is effective, the prior genuine probability of a stronger reason being effective is always 100%, just as the heavier of two objects is always heavier. That the mass of an object is 25% of another one does not mean that the lighter object is heavier roughly one fifth of the times if we rewind a physically indeterministic universe. Therefore the correct way to conceive the relative strengths of competing reasons is the one employed by Huoranszki (2011: 156): by the amount of change in circumstances needed for a change of preference. Just as the difference between the weights of two objects is understood as the amount that needs to be added to one of them in order for them to become equal.

This conclusion also poses a problem for Nozick's claim that the plural rationality strategy would allow different outcomes for decisions if we rewound the history of the universe, while maintaining the agent's volitional control. If we assign a genuine chance to outcome B of a process of deliberation that has actually resulted in A, we have to assign a genuine probability to it. And this only takes us back to the above problem, but at a meta-decision level: if genuine probability (and not meta-reasons, for example) governs which reason we choose to act on, the process of decision is a coin flip, and not the outcome of a volitional effort. If it is governed by reasons for choosing reasons (meta-reasons), we have to assign a genuine probability of 100% to the strongest reason, or temporarily avoid gauging their strengths by adding a further level of rationality, where we would encounter the same problem. Of course we could also assign subjective probabilities, but once again, this does not result in any genuine openness of future. The only way we could plausibly say that an agent who has made a (plurally rational) choice could have done otherwise is in Huoranszki's dispositional sense, as having an unactualized ability. But if we are willing to accept this as a valid interpretation of the ability to do otherwise, we have no reason not to accept his conditional analysis as well, and abandon the plural rationality strategy and libertarianism.

Pathological aversions: Huoranszki (2011: 155) claims that having a pathological aversion to something—unlike simply being opposed to it—is sufficient to deprive us of our free choice. So, according to Huoranszki, if I prefer chocolate cake to cheesecake, this does not mean that I do not have a choice between them, simply that I am determined to choose chocolate cake, which is compatible with making a choice. But if there was no cheesecake on the menu, or if I had a pathological aversion to it, I would be unable to order it (in the strong

sense that I wouldn't even have an unactualized ability to do so) and thus be deprived of my choice in this matter. But I find this interpretation of pathological aversion highly problematic.

Pathological aversion is a psychological term, used to describe an irrational opposition to something. But notice that this conception of rationality is purely subjective; it only means that the agent's behavior does not conform to the observer's expectations. If someone never chooses cheesecake when offered a choice between a variety of desserts, we can say that she dislikes cheesecake. When someone does not eat the cheesecake when it is the only food available to her, we may speak of an aversion. When someone does this for days, the psychologist would be compelled to call it a pathological aversion. But this only means that the case is extreme and interesting in a medical sense. The meaning of the word pathological in this psychological sense derives from an earlier medical term meaning that a case is unexpected and thus worthy of pathological examination.

Many people whom we might describe as having a pathological aversion to cheese would still eat it after some time if it was the only food available and thus their only chance of survival. And even those who wouldn't, could probably be persuaded by, for example, an evil extradimensional alien threatening to force-feed them five kilograms of gorgonzola and then destroy the whole universe unless they eat one very thin slice of a cheese of their choosing. And even if there was an incredibly weak-willed person who would refuse the slice of cheese in this extreme case, and we would name this as the measure of pathological aversion, it would still only differ in a quantitative and not a qualitative way from strong dislike, and so it would hardly constitute a different case in a metaphysical sense.

Because of the above reasons I conclude that there is no objective demarcation between dislike and pathological aversion; the latter is merely a subjective term applied to an extremely strong dislike, similarly to saying someone is extremely tall instead of just tall. Thus it is fallacious to assume that pathological aversion is metaphysically different from a strong dislike in the sense that the former deprives us of our free choice, while the latter does not. In fact either both of them deprive us of free choice, or neither does, and since I believe Huoranszki's arguments against the former view are conclusive and also essential to his account of free will, I cannot see how he can maintain that pathological aversion deprives us of our free choice.

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