Márton Kaposi

Visions of the Secular State and of the Earthly Paradise in Dante's Perspective

As a thinker and as a poet, Dante was very much a man of the medieval era, and if certain aspects of his œuvre do go beyond the confines of that era, this is merely because as a genius he thoroughly understood the period of human history that he witnessed. He was able to interpret his own age from the wider perspective of world history. His Christian faith and his classical education allowed him to elaborate an expansive theoretical horizon against which to project a vision of his own era, a vision especially informed by the principle of *universality* and the *linear concept of time*: an era that displaces something (e.g., paganism and barbarity) while carrying on its legacy at an improved and superior level, even allowing space for the possibility of gradually perfecting contemporary society. Dante's thinking was fundamentally grounded in Saint Augustine's views on history as reflected in his *De civitate Dei*, where – to use the terms of the classics – the emphasis is no longer on *aion*, a cyclical understanding of time, but on *chronos* as a selective process of transformation and, increasingly, the implied idea of *improvement*, which finds its solid foundation in soteriology, and its perspective in the doctrine of redemption. He believes that history, in part, is a process of fulfilment that gradually encompasses more and more of the universality of the attainable goodness, a process in which human beings certainly play a role as contributors, something the ancient Greeks referred to using the time concept of *Kairos* (Kinneavy 1986. 80–104; Vasoli 1995. 69–78; Pizzolato 2011. 17–34).

Compared to the Renaissance, Dante was less keen to return to classical antiquity, and even when he did want to revisit some of its elements, the approach he adopted was very different. By his time, mediaeval thought had already embraced many of the achievements of classical antiquity (such as the Latin language, the astronomical view of the world and an appreciation of reason), and Dante certainly went beyond exploiting only these and he was also willing to acquire new knowledge about earlier cultures (drawing lessons from their history and learning from various interpretations of their most prominent thinkers); yet his main desire was to perfect the traditions of pagan antiquity and use them

as his raw material for the further development and modernisation of Christian culture. He emphasised the difference between the two great eras of world history, especially in terms of the conflicting worldviews that their respective cultures were based upon, but he believed that the *continuity* between the two, and therefore the integration of many of the achievements of the past, were entirely natural. Instead of focusing on the sequence of events, he mostly followed Virgil and examined the trends; and, first and foremost, certain historical personalities whose actions and example he found instrumental in promoting progress. (Fülep 1995. 274; Chiesa–Tabarroni 2013. XXXV–XXXIX.)

I.

Living at the height of the Middle Ages, Dante saw two fundamental ideals of classical antiquity to carry forward: *rationality* and *humanity*, these being in the forefront of mediaeval philosophy, mainly scholasticism. Even in a Christian context, these two ideals are linked: for having been originally made in God's image and likeness, the human being was assumed to possess *reason*, while being mainly motivated in his actions by *love*. Infused by Christian ideals, the feudal system created a social structure in which every individual was granted a permanent place within a social hierarchy as well as the minimum respect that corresponded to that specific status; and, in principle, they were treated as human beings even if they belonged to the lowest level of such a hierarchy. The rapid progress of science and technology demonstrated the positive contributions of the human mind ever more clearly. While calamities and social conflicts certainly did not disappear, the increasing prominence of secular thinking and social achievements all pointed in the direction of *rethinking* what individuals could do *for themselves* in this life, and whether they could change how they saw the *relationship* between life on earth and life eternal.

Though profoundly religious but not in the least bigoted, Dante believed that it was possible to bring about some change as such an effort would be warranted by *divine providence* and by a certain flexibility of *human nature*. In addition to these widely known doctrines of the Christian religion, he found additional support in some of the ideals of classical antiquity: the human being's desire to approach divine perfection; knowledge as a source of happiness; the advantages of the intellectual virtues; human beings as social animals; the superiority of a state managed by reason; cooperation between citizens of virtue, etc. Dante addresses these first in the *Convivio* in part and later, more extensively, in *De Monarchia*; in *The Divine Comedy*, he tries to convince the reader that no one stands a chance of attaining any form of happiness without purging themselves of sin. In fact, those who are punished severely (such as Judas and Brutus) or rewarded generously (such as Justinian, Charlemagne and Saint Francis) are persons who have either

committed something outstandingly evil or did something outstandingly good for society as a whole; and outstanding figures of that ilk are also to be found among the pagans (such as Trajan and Ripheus). Holy Roman Emperor Henry VII – the potential founder of the ideal monarchy, the real-life individual Dante believed capable of taking the first steps towards creating his programme – was placed in Paradise by the poet (*Par.* XXX. 131–138). Dante makes a distinction between the private individual and the social being (the citizen and the official), but does not really separate one from the other. Rather than contrasting one with the other, by using diverse examples, he tries to instantiate the inextricable entanglement of and the mutually reinforcing interplay between their values, opportunities, and tasks. General theoretical conclusions and personal experiences, good and bad, strengthened Dante's conviction that in order to achieve individual happiness – both in this world and in the afterlife – individuals need to be supported, and that it is the best *communities* and *institutions* that have the power to bestow such support. It is communities that help to bring out the most in people, and it is institutions that keep them on the right track and do not let them stray off it (Gentili 2012. 98–114).

II.

Inspired by a core element of his thinking, the universality principle, Dante takes *the whole universe and the history of the human race* as his basis for an ideal society whose best institutions facilitate optimal human behaviour; which, in turn, may lead to the greatest possible happiness. This is why, in describing the universe, he emphasises the *possibilities* it holds and the fact that everything that exists has a purpose; and this is why, in reviewing the history of the human race since the creation of the world, he focuses on certain aspects of the two great *educational precedents*: the Earthly Paradise and the Roman Empire. His ideas about re-grounding society on the optimal foundations and about reforming society in a beneficial way are expounded in a theory that he elaborates, in concrete terms, on the basis of both theories of state and society from classical examples and works penned by the theologians and philosophers of the Middle Ages. The historical foundation of his concept is clearly reflected in the fact that as far as his secular sources are concerned, the lead role is taken by one of the most prominent classics of *antiquity*, Aristotle, partly by way of some of his *mediaeval* commentators. He draws on Aristotle's *On the Soul* as supplemented with Averroes's interpretation of the Aristotelian text, and on his *Nicomachean Ethics* as interpreted by his other commentator Saint Thomas Aquinas. Boethius de Dacia is a salient example of the transition between the two worlds. As far as the theologians are concerned, Dante relies on medieval greats (Saint Augustine, Petrus Lombardus, Saint Bonaventure, and others). Naturally, Dante's selected

sources only include those that clearly support his own grandiose vision. He, for example, makes no mention whatsoever of Saint Augustine's criticism of the vices of Rome, avoids speaking of the Commentator's doctrine of double truth, and when discussing Saint Thomas' ideas about the state, he ignores the fact that a monarchy is a form of government limited to individual countries only, not to mention the fact that not every state is monarchic in nature.

Dante developed his concept in line with religious and secular principles and, first and foremost, endeavoured to prove the feasibility of his proposal by arguing that the *possibilities* it encompasses are, in essence, innate to God, nature, and the human being alike. Their *causal hierarchy* and the *teleological system* they form favour large-scale human ambitions that propose a certain sequence of conscious acts in order to fulfil, to the *greatest possible extent*, the ultimate end to which the human being is *ordained*. When viewed from this perspective, the purpose and the meaning of celestial happiness were well-known and accepted notions; but what Dante – a thinker more secular than his contemporaries – considered important to add was the period of earthly existence as a *preparatory* stage *leading to* happiness in the afterlife, saying that "this earthly happiness is in some sense ordered towards immortal happiness" (Dante 2013. 94). With this in mind, he took great care to show what possibilities are available in life on earth. This virtually implicit yet emphatic higher appreciation of life in this world inevitably led him to rethink the intricate and mutually pervasive interrelation between the two stages of life, and not from the perspective of the individual but rather from that of the entirety of *humankind*. Dante definitely did not question that, because of the different nature of body and soul, there was a certain contradiction between life on earth and life eternal, and he never doubted the indisputable primacy of the latter; but he did have something new to say about their obvious entanglement. (Chiesa–Tabarroni 2013. 229–230; Carletti 2006. 38–92.) He focused on the systems of external and internal conditions of human activity, the complex structure and conscious nature of the actions of human beings, and the possibilities and perspectives of their endeavours.

Dante's thinking is confined to the general theoretical framework (theology) that God created and continues to take care of the world; everything in the world has a purpose and nothing in the world is superfluous – yet nothing is so rigidly predetermined that it would bar the human being – a *reasonable* being with *free will* – from bringing about *certain changes* in the world. The world, whatever its actual makeup, does not present insurmountable *obstacles* to humans as they act in the interest of the *highest good*, and divine providence does not render *superfluous* the desire of human beings to improve themselves.

Wishing to improve their lives on earth and thereby lay the foundations for – or rather prepare – their happiness in the *afterlife*, human beings are indeed capable of meaningful action in this context. After all, God gave humanity *reason* and granted humans *free will*. One implication of this is that a key part of the hu-

man soul is *anima intellectiva* (the reasoning part of the soul) in which the human being's *intellectus possibilis* (cognitive ability) operates. This allows humans to acquire knowledge by identifying the essential while also exploring the general context. Furthermore, relying on their *intellectus activus* (active intelligence) and empirical *experience*, they can make concrete their recently acquired general knowledge (*intellectus adeptus*). With such knowledge, they can *deliberate*, set *reasonable objectives;* and using their *free will*, they can carry out a *practical* activity as a result of which new human relations and institution are created. Averroes's commentary on the philosophy of the soul – with which Dante was intimately familiar – offers an accurate summary of everything Aristotle had established about a human being's cognitive ability (*intellectus possibilis*) and mention of a human being as a creator of *new knowledge* (*nous poeticus*) This topic was discussed in detail by Alexander of Aphrodisias along with everything that the Arab Master himself discovered through his study into the nature of operationalisable knowledge (*intellectus adeptus*) that emerged from connecting the intellectus possibilis and the intellectus activus (or intellectus materialis) (Kaposi 2017. 131–156). The Commentator also offers a short summary of his conclusions about the practical applicability of the knowledge so acquired: "For so long as the form is in us in potency, it will be conjoined with us in potency and for so long as it is conjoined with us in potency, it is impossible for us to understand something in virtue of that. But when the form is made to exist in act in us (this will be in its conjoining in act), then we will understand all the things we understand in virtue of [this intellect] and we will bring about the activity proper to ourselves in virtue of it." (Averroes 1953. 501; Averroes 2009. 400.) This gives Dante a solid starting point from which he can argue that it is possible to consciously design and create a near-ideal society:

> Now the intellectual potentiality of which I am speaking is not only concerned with universal ideas or classes, but also (by extension as it were) with particulars; and so it is often said that the theoretical intellect [*intellectus speculativus*] by extension becomes practical [*intellectus practicus*], its goal then being *doing* [*agere*] and *making* [*facere*]. I am referring to actions, which are regulated by political judgment [*politica prudentia*], and to products, which are shaped by practical skill [*ars*]; all of these are subordinate to thinking [*speculationi*] as the best activity for which the Primal Goodness brought mankind into existence. (Dante 1996b. 7–8.)

At this point, relying on other works of Aristotle (*Politics, Eudemian Ethics*), Dante makes a clear distinction between two modes of action: *prudentia* (*phronesis*), which is an indirect and predominantly internal regulator of human activities, and *ars* (*techne*), which brings about the realisation of entities like formalised procedures and institutions and it acts as a predominantly external regulator of human activities. The latter also encompasses institutions such as the *state*.

It takes practical knowledge (based on solid theoretical foundations) to maintain, but also to shape, a society, and to improve social coexistence. This holds true even when these efforts are applied to the largest set of humans – *the entire human race*. To improve society by knowledge, the general preconditions of such a venture must be explored, and the shared objective – whose achievement is to facilitate that process – identified. Furthermore, people must be led to realise that such an objective can indeed only be achieved if they act together. For this to happen, the fundamental precondition is that *universal peace* reign worldwide – and that, obviously, is something we can only achieve through *conscious* actions and *joint* cooperation. As Dante concludes, "[t]here is therefore some activity specific to humanity as a whole, for which the whole human race [*universitas hominum*] in all its vast number of individual human beings is designed [*ordinatur*]" (Dante 1996b. 6). Such action is possible because it ab ovo *has an end*, and because some of the *instruments* it requires are also at our disposal: the human *abilities* needed to obtain the necessary theoretical and practical *knowledge* and to build the appropriate *institutions*. As Dante says,

> Now it has been sufficiently explained that the activity proper to mankind considered as a whole is constantly to actualise [actuare] the full intellectual potential of humanity, primarily through thought and secondarily through action (as a function and extension of thought). And since what holds true for the part is true for the whole, and an individual human being "grows perfect in judgment [prudentia] and wisdom [sapientia] when he sits at rest", it is apparent that mankind most freely and readily attends to this activity – an activity which is almost divine, as we read in the psalm: "Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels" – in the calm or tranquillity of peace. (Dante 1996b. 8.)

Dante is aware of this, but also wants others to see clearly that they can only master the *wisdom* (*sapientia*, *sophia*), the *sagacity* (*prudentia*, *phronesis*) needed for concretisation, and the *practical knowledge* (*ars*, *techne*) required for realisation – which form the theoretical basis of the knowledge needed to transform people's views and for a radical reform of the institutions of society – if they cooperate *in the process of acquiring* that knowledge.

In order to make a convincing case for what he sees as the advantages of a society organised in *unity* and therefore prospering in blissful *peace*, Dante deploys the accordant conclusions of two distinct types of argumentation: *deduction* and *analogy* as derived from philosophical ontology and anthropology on the one hand, and *induction* on the other, bolstered by the philosophy of history, always relying, of course, on the relevant religious tenets for further support. At the same time, Dante consistently emphasises the secular nature of the monarchy that can maintain such a society; and he relies on *scientific* facts in his argumentation and uses *logical* procedures.

As far as *deduction* is concerned, Dante – pointing to Aristotle and Pythagoras – affirms that "*being*, *unity* and *goodness* are related in a sequence, according to the fifth sense of the term 'priority'. Being naturally comes before unity, and unity before goodness: perfect being is perfect unity, and perfect unity is perfect goodness; and the further removed something is from perfect being, the further it is from being one and consequently from being good. […] This is how it comes about that unity seems to be the root of what it is to be good, and plurality the root of what it is to be evil." (Dante 1996b. 26.) The current fragmentation of society is the root of most evil as it is, in a way, an institutionalised obstacle to peace and understanding. In fact, it is understanding – the unity of wills pulling in the same direction – by which reasonable people are able to aspire; they are able to harmonise their free wills and conjoin their conscious actions. The close cooperation thus arising might be highly economical as it would require just one goal for society to fulfil what would otherwise involve having several goals to fulfil. In addition to the categorical principle of universal validity, Dante had previously also applied an eloquent *analogy* to show how harmonised activities can lead to significant results, namely the integration of the curial nature of the Italian language (Corti 1993. 108–109). As Dante writes, "For although it is true that there is no such tribunal in Italy – in the sense of a single institution, like that of the king of Germany – yet its constituent elements are not lacking. And just as the elements of the German tribunal are united under a single monarch, so those of the Italian have been brought together by the gracious light of reason [*gratioso lumine rationis unita sunt*]." (Dante 1996a. 43.) Note the anthropological perspective, namely the key role attributed to *reason* as a unifying force.

To demonstrate the truth of the above by way of contrast, Dante also deploys a more complex, fundamentally *inductive* line of argumentation, which starts out with an analysis of the disadvantages of the *division* of humankind – specifically, the most *determining cause* of conflicts, the unfettered desire to possess, or *insatiate greed* (*cupiditas*), characterised by its drive to obtain more and more as long as there remains *something to be got*. Appropriating that which belongs to someone else is a great sin: in private life, it is seen as *robbery*, while in the public sphere it is seen as *unjustified conquest*. Those who commit such sins deserve a special mention by God: "For I the Lord love judgment, I hate robbery for burnt offering" (Isaia, 61, 8). For cupidity (*cupidigia*) is the greatest enemy of justice, and cupidity – as Aristotle also notes – is integral to the mental constitution of the human being; it is based on "a sordid love of gain" (Aristoteles 1978. 83). and while proper education can go a long way to curb it and laws can limit its excesses, it is very difficult to eradicate. Dante's other master, Boethius is even more of a pessimist: "For each of these has naturally its own proper working; there is no confusion with the effects of contrary things – nay, even of itself it rejects what is incompatible. And yet wealth cannot extinguish insatiable greed, nor has power ever made him master of himself whom vicious lusts kept bound in indissoluble

fetters; […]". (Boethius 1897. 76.) It is therefore an essential task to eliminate *cupiditas* in both private and public life. It is a process that can only be initiated by politics – as a universal practice exerting a top-down influence – doing away with the rule of sovereigns (kings, princes, etc.) holding sway over partial areas (countries, provinces, cities, etc.) and subjecting the whole of humankind to a *single secular supreme power*, the *emperor*, by creating a *single empire* (monarchy). For, as Dante says, the single most important action is to eliminate the *opportunities* for any individual to act on their desire to possess – their insatiate greed. Because of his primacy, the monarch (the emperor), Dante believes, is in a favourable position to begin with: "But there is nothing the monarch could covet, for his jurisdiction is bounded only by the ocean; whereas this is not the case with other rulers, whose sovereignty extends only as far as the neighbouring kingdom […]" (Dante 1996b. 18). Consequently, the empire is best placed to enforce justice and to guarantee peace. And as far as creating a state of peace is concerned, institutionalisation finds further support in *love*: "[…] just as greed, however slight, dulls the habit of justice in some way, so charity [caritas] or rightly ordered love [*recta dilectio*] makes it sharper and brighter" (Dante 1996b. 18). Extending the fight for the elimination of insatiate greed, in a top-to-bottom approach, to the citizens it is obviously essential to have universal peace, but beyond its impact on public life, it has just as much bearing on the private life of the individual: "for greed easily leads men's minds astray" (Dante 1996b. 18); for cupidity, just as the *capital vice* of avarice, endangers the salvation of the soul as the race for material goods of little importance tends to make us forget about our aspirations for attaining the truly important spiritual values. Consequently, eradicating *cupiditas* is a fundamental task both politically and morally (Szabó 2008. 77–79). Dante dedicates several passages to the consequences of cupidity, the destroyer of all, in his *Divine Comedy*; he is embittered by seeing how it can turn a person into a demon already at a tender age, which leads to the destruction of the individual's private life, while also pushing him as a citizen to commit acts that risk corrupting public life. He does make a distinction between *avarice* (*avarizia*), which is primarily a *private sin*, and *insatiate greed* (*cupidigia*), which belongs more to the public sphere; however, even in making this distinction, he is more interested in how the private sphere's lust for wealth leads to territorial conquests in political life. He brings up Pope Hadrian V's lust for wealth (*avarizia*) in Canto XIX and Hugh Capet and Charles I of the House of Anjou in Canto XX of the *Purgatorio* as examples of how personal gain eventually transmogrified into poorly exercised episcopal and secular supreme power. In Canto XXVII of the *Paradiso*, he writes not only about the dangers of allowing greed in private life to enmesh itself with greed in public life but he also expresses the hope that this unfortunate state of affairs would eventually be eradicated and that the ship of humankind will eventually sail in the *right direction*:

O greediness, you who – within your depths –
cause mortals to sink so, that none is left
able to lift his eyes above your waves!
The will has a good blossoming in men;
but then the never-ending downpours turn
the sound plums into rotten, empty skins.
[…]
That you not be amazed at what I say,
consider this: on earth no king holds sway;
therefore, the family of humans strays.
But well before a thousand years have passed
(and January is unwintered by
day's hundredth part, which they neglect below),
this high sphere shall shine so, that Providence,
long waited for, will turn the sterns to where
the prows now are, so that the fleet runs straight;
and then fine fruit shall follow on the flower.

(*Par.* XXVII. 121–126, 139–148 – translated by Allen Mandelbaum.)

These hopes of Dante rest on much stronger foundations in *De Monarchia*, in which the elimination of the lust to conquer features as a *plan*. A future emperor will not be able to conquer, and citizens – strengthened in their virtues – will not strive to wrong fellow citizens but to enrich the community of humankind.

The relationship between the *emperor* and the *citizens* of the universal state is manifold; among other things, it is highly reasonable and humane. What creates a connection between them first and foremost is, on the one hand, a *system of political institutions* cleansed of its fundamental contradictions but characterised by the requisite degree of consideration, and, on the other hand, the prevailing of *moral virtues*, a prerequisite not only for peaceful public life but also for happy private life. This is also the basis on which respect or sympathy, but especially *love* operates as an important force of coherence. As Dante does not separate the *human being* from the *citizen* in members of society, he likewise does not separate the *human being* from *the embodiment of supreme power* in the emperor; and this is, in effect, what enables him to present the emperor as a complex and outstandingly effective *efficient cause* (causa efficiens) that, by relying on optimised social institutions, he has the ability to shape society – which needs improvement itself – as a *material cause* (*causa materialis*). Through his *unique position* and through *the completeness of his personality*, the monarch is able to fulfil his multifaceted function, which, while it implies a wide range of tasks to tackle, boils down directly to ensuring that people can live in peace. "Therefore since the monarch is the most universal cause among mortals that men should live the good life (for other rulers are a cause only by virtue of him, as we have seen), it

follows that the good of mankind is dear to him above all else. Who doubts that the monarch is most strongly disposed to the working of justice […]?" (Dante 1996b. 19.) Free people living in peace and surrounded by an atmosphere of love can develop their intellectual and moral virtues, which only helps ensure that they will consistently have the opportunity to attain happiness *in this world*, and which even improves their chances of attaining happiness in the *afterlife*.

An important element to Dante's concept of the state – one he inherited from classical antiquity – is that he believes *politics* go hand in hand with *paideia*, the positive role that a citizen – who combines his free will with the knowledge he has acquired – plays in shaping society, enjoying his individual happiness as the fruit of his wisdom but also always willing to work in harmony with others, in both theory and practice, in order to promote social progress. While Dante – quite naturally – did not value the concept of *paideia* quite as highly as the free Greeks, he did consider it essential that the citizens of the ideal state do not merely engage in whatever enriches their own souls but they should also *take part* in the growth and development of society. It is quite understandable that Dante does not primarily see *happiness in this life*, emerging from optimal social relations, as an end in itself or as a value of itself, but, as it is widely known, as only *a secondary purpose* to a greater end; still, he emphasises that its *value as an instrument* is not to be ignored (Ogor 1993. 91–104; Leeker 1993. 120–131).

That creating *world peace* requires the cooperation of the *entirety* of humankind is fairly obvious; however, Dante also tries to make his readers grasp that while peace is indeed a fundamental *condition*, the cooperation of the *multitude* also plays a decisive role in *the exercise of power*. This is even more obvious in the matter of political affairs and taking things further, in the growth and development of society. While the emperor plays a key role in creating the ideal monarchy, the multitude of citizens also have a role to play if the ideal society is indeed to become reality. The emperor as the supreme efficient cause can rely on the multitude as his single most important *instrument;* yet the general population is itself one of the efficient causes – one of the maintainers and operators – of a society of higher order. And, indeed, it is mainly this dual role with which the general population contributes to ensuring that nature as it exists and the world order (the *sublunary* world, *civitas terrena*, which also includes society) continues to operate as originally ordained, even if subject to certain minor changes. As Dante sees it,

> just as a craftsman would never achieve artistic perfection if he aimed only at the final form and paid no heed to the means by which that form was to be achieved, so too nature would fail if it aimed only at the universal form of divine likeness in the universe, yet neglected the means to achieve it; but nature is never less than perfect, since it is the work of divine intelligence: therefore it wills all the means through which it achieves the fulfilling of its intention. Since the goal of the human race is

> itself a necessary means for achieving the universal goal of nature, it is necessary that nature should will it. For this reason Aristotle in the second book of the *Physics* rightly shows that nature always acts with an end in view. And since nature cannot achieve this end by means of one person alone, since there are many functions [*operationes*] necessarily involved in it, and these functions require a vast number of people to carry them out, it is necessary for nature to produce a vast number of people fitted to different functions: as well as celestial influences, the qualities and characteristics of regions here below. In human institutions the power conferred on an individual elected to office will reflect that person's abilities; in the natural world power and aptitude are correlated in the same way, for it is unthinkable that nature should be less careful in its provisions than human beings on earth who make a large contribution to this. (Dante 1996b. 46–47.)

While in this passage Dante emphasises the historical role the Romans were destined to play, he also makes reference to Aristotle's *Politics* and makes it palpably clear that transforming society is a *practical* activity that fits into the overall order of reality. In other words, life on earth – in the sphere applicable to human beings – creates a sort of well-being for them that does not amount to committing a sin; instead, it is seen as humankind's contribution to the fulfilment of the order of the universe. It is how "the qualities and characteristics of regions here below" [*locorum inferiorem virtutes*] are engaged on the whole. This is how, by creating the optimal medium for humankind's *physical* existence, the community helps each and every *individual* to fulfil their preordained purpose.

His summary is very clear:

> And since every nature is ordered towards its own ultimate goal, it follows that man's goal is twofold: so that, just as he alone among all created beings shares in incorruptibility and corruptibility, so he alone among all created beings is ordered to two ultimate goals, one of them being his goal as a corruptible being, the other his goal as an incorruptible being. Ineffable providence has thus set before us two goals to aim at: i.e., happiness in this life, which consists in the exercise of our own powers and it is figured in the earthly paradise; and happiness in the eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of the vision of God (to which our own powers cannot raise us except with the help of God's light) and which is signified by the heavenly paradise. Now these two kinds of happiness must be reached by different means, as representing different ends. For we attain the first through the teachings of philosophy, provided that we follow them putting into practice the moral and intellectual virtues; whereas we attain the second through spiritual teachings which transcend human reason, provided that we follow them and put into practice the theological virtues, i.e. faith, hope and charity. These ends and the means to attain them have been shown to us on the one hand by human reason, which has been entirely revealed to us by the philosophers, and on the other by the Holy Spirit, who through the prophets and sacred writers, through Jesus Christ the son of God,

> coeternal with him, and through his disciples, has revealed to us the transcendent truth we cannot do without. Yet human greed would cast these ends and means aside if men, like horses, prompted to wander by their animal nature, were not held in check "with bit and bridle" on their journey. It is for this reason that man had need of two guides corresponding to his twofold goal: that is to say the supreme Pontiff, to lead mankind to eternal life in conformity with revealed truth, and the emperor, to guide mankind to temporal happiness in conformity with the teachings of philosophy. And since none can reach this harbour (or few, and these few with great difficulty) unless the waves of seductive greed are calmed and the human race rests free in the tranquillity of peace, this is the goal which the protector of the world, who is called the Roman Prince, must strive with all his might to bring about: i.e., that life on this threshing-floor of mortals may be lived freely and in peace. (Dante 1996b. 92–93.)

In *De Monarchia*, Dante considers it necessary to emphasise that while temporal happiness on earth is of a lower grade than eternal celestial happiness and may be attained in a different way, it is not *without value*. It is the *emperor* who leads people to this state on the basis of the guidance afforded by *philosophy*, but it is vital for success that the *citizens* themselves develop and exercise their *intellectual and moral virtues* at a high level. He does not enumerate the virtues in *De Monarchia*, but he did so in Treatise IV of the *Convivio*. In Chapter 17 Book IV of the *Convivio*, Dante discusses eleven of the twelve virtues that feature in Book II of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (courage, temperance, liberality, righteous indignation, magnificence, proper pride, good temper, ready wit, truthfulness, friendliness, and fairness) while in Chapter 19 he discusses shame (*vergogna*) (Aristoteles 1978. 32–34). Neither in *Convivio* nor in *De Monarchia* does he emphasise that attaining earthly happiness closely correlates with divine grace, and he makes no mention of certain virtues that are of key importance from a religious perspective, such as patience and humility (MacIntyre 1981. 312). Rather, his argumentation leads the reader to conclude that a combination of the *requisite knowledge* with the *requisite virtuousness* is themselves an almost sufficient basis for attaining secular happiness (Kempshall 2007. 127–172). He lays much greater stress on the exploration of possibilities and on the development of the instruments required to arrive at the solutions, and on the related tasks and responsibilities of all individuals of outstanding talent. Because "all men whom the Higher Nature has endowed with a love of truth" and "to whom it is given to know the best that is in us, it is not proper to follow the tracks of the herd, but rather we ought to confront their errors" (Dante 1996b. 3; Dante Epist., XIII. 2). Indeed, it is most natural that "they are not directed by law, but rather the law by them" (Dante Epist., XIII. 2). No other possibility exists and it takes the force of a monarchy's reasonably drafted laws to permanently eliminate "cupidity" (*cupidigia*), so all those who undertake the lion's share of creating such laws and controlling society do indeed deserve a prominent position.

III.

Having laid out and proven his theoretical foundations, and having shown that the creation of an ideal monarchy is an attainable goal, Dante proceeds to describe *two exemplary precedents*. In his effort to bolster his argumentation in *De Monarchia*, he turns his attention to a detailed discussion of the imperial era of Rome. However, in addition to discussing the *secular example actually existing* in history as a model, he also considers the legend of the Golden Age (the rule of Astraea), although he does so in a later passage and also from the perspective of a quite different mindset (Nardi 1967. 276–310). What he presents, in a peculiar way, in the last six cantos of the *Purgatorio* is, however, a version of the Golden Age that is sanctioned by *Christianity*. This mainly illustrates the *questionable nature* of the church's competence in secular affairs, much in the same vein as his discussion of the imperial model of Rome is intended to exemplify the *optimal nature* of the secular monarchy. Dante believes that the role of the church and of the pope is *ab ovo of religious nature*; consequently, he views certain popes' aspirations to supreme secular power as an unwarranted expansion of their competence, *a special form of cupiditas* as it were, even though – as several instances in the *Divine Comedy* illustrate – certain popes (Boniface VIII, Clement V, Nicholas III) failed to fulfil their ecclesiastical roles and committed certain sins (simony, violence, etc.) in the context of secular activities while exercising competences they had no right to exercise (Madarász 2015. 15–32). In this respect, the legitimacy of the foundations on which the Roman Empire had been built represents the exact opposite (Brokmeier 2003. 249–261).

Dante carefully deduces and demonstrates his doctrine that the emperor's power is not mediated by the pope but it comes directly from God: "Thus it is evident then that the authority of the temporal monarch flows down into him without any intermediary from the Fountainhead of universal authority; this Fountainhead, though one in the citadel of its own simplicity of nature, flows into many streams from the abundance of His goodness" (Dante 1996b. 93). One of these channels is that of the pope, and it ranks with its secular counterpart: that of the emperor. The way Dante recalls the image of the Earthly Paradise – and especially the ruinous fate of the triumphal chariot and the figure of the barren tree – not only illustrates the collapse of the church's efficiency and authority in secular matters and suggests that it is ordained for creating non-secular organisations. More importantly, the big picture as a *whole* (the triumphal processions) represents the versatility and the *original power* of the church, and these factors guarantee the efficiency of religious life. Dante never challenged the authority of the church, nor the notion that it was ordained to be the caretaker of people's *spiritual lives*, nor its suitability for leading them to eternal celestial happiness. As for the ideal monarchy, the fundamentally idyllic atmosphere of the Earthly Paradise draws the reader's attention to the realisation that *peaceful*

social relations represent the *original state* of humankind. The *Golden Age* (the rule of Saturn) was not to be found on Mount Parnassus, it was *not* merely a figment of the poet's imagination (even though Virgil had also written about it) but in fact it was historical reality – a lost bit of historical reality, but still historical reality – represented in the Bible, an undoubtedly credible source, as the miraculous dwelling place of the ancestral couple:

> *Here*, mankind's root was innocent; and *here*
> were every fruit and never-ending spring;
> these streams—the nectar of which poets sing.
> (*Purgatorio*, XXVIII. 142–144 – translated by Allen Mandelbaum.)

Escorted by Matelda, Dante not only emphasises the beauty of this miraculous place but also its *fertility* and how it affords humankind all that is required for a life without care or worry – this, in fact, reminds the reader of the classical tradition, namely, the cult of Proserpina; and, in a way, adds a different hue to the biblical tradition (Mercuri 1994. 175–180). When God created a home of such beauty and richness for the original couple, He offered all humankind a very favourable opportunity: humanity could have lived in such *complete* temporal happiness *here on earth* that nothing could have surpassed it, save eternal celestial happiness:

> The Highest Good, whose sole joy is Himself,
> made man to be – and to enact – good; He
> gave man this place as pledge of endless peace.
> (*Purg.* XXVIII. 91–93 – translated by Allen Mandelbaum.)

The Earthly Paradise is a realm of opportunities for *human completeness*: it offers humanity safety and joy, the *tranquillity* of *personal* fulfilment, and *peace for the community*. While this *peace* was disrupted by the fall, the crucifixion of Christ the Saviour *gave humanity back* the possibility of that peace, and in fact gave humanity a taste of that peace: for at the time when Christ was born, under the rule of Emperor Augustus, *peace* held sway *across the entire globe*, which Saint Paul expressed poignantly when he "called that most happy condition »the fullness of the time«" (Dante 1996b. 28). Hence the history of the Roman Empire does not only prefigure and model the ideal monarchy; it also demonstrates that a prerequisite without which a global empire cannot last is that the *entire world must attain a state of peace* – and that such a state of peace can be recreated because it is *not alien to* the desires of the world's citizens, nor is it alien to human nature, but in fact it is the *original* precondition of society's *normal* existence, something originally granted to humanity by God. The fact that peace could be *resurrected* during the time of Augustus was certainly the will of God, as it was surely out

of God's "inclination" that Augustus could gain power "justly" over the Roman people, that he could become the ruler of the world, and that he could build a global empire that – thanks to its overall balance and many other values – was worthy of becoming the birthplace of both Christ and Christianity.

The *original* peace of the Earthly Paradise and the *transitional* peace of the Roman Empire prefigure or *model* – in a way, as an *allegoria in factis* – the monarchy that Dante recommends, although done in a highly abstract manner: the former in the *sensus anagogicus*, and the latter in what is a borderline between the *sensus litteralis* and the *sensus allegoricus*. They may be seen as models – as regards their meaning rather than their temporal sequence. Namely, that the *earthly Roman Empire* anticipates the future empire, primarily its social and *institutional structure*, while the *Earthly Paradise* mainly anticipates its *human relations* and *spiritual atmosphere*. Taken together, the two can lead one to the celestial Paradise; they can play the role of a "liber scale", provided that human beings do indeed strive to fulfil their ordained purpose. In the ideal state of the *Monarchy*, *interpersonal* relations are characterised by an atmosphere of *peace* and *love*, while in the society that Dante presents in *Purgatorio* from a perspective other than its institutions and whose *subjective* aspects are shown in a harsher light by the earthly Paradise, the human being is to receive much more good: there, everything is *great* and *joyful*. While Dante's vision of society in *De Monarchia* presents more of the preconditions of happiness, his vision of the Earthly Paradise shows more of the individual's actually attained happiness. In other words, the latter gives the reader more insight into celestial happiness and it is therefore much more attractive:

> While I moved on, completely rapt, among
> so many first fruits of eternal pleasure,
> and longing for still greater joys, the air
> before us altered underneath the green
> branches, becoming like an ardent fire,
> and now the sweet sound was distinctly song.
> (*Purg.* XXIX. 31–36 – translated by Allen Mandelbaum.)

This vision of the *peace* and *beauty* of the Earthly Paradise, appealing to our faith and intellect, *partly* confirms the human conviction that celestial happiness is attainable; and, by appealing to humankind's sagacity and morals, partly *motivates* human beings to realise that the temporal and the eternal are interconnected and that human beings should start changing their lives *as soon as possible*. However, it is impossible to create conditions better than the current state of affairs and closer to the conditions of the Earthly Paradise by merely harnessing the mortal forces of human *knowledge* and *determination*; beyond God's grace and other interventions, humankind must also *cleanse itself* of its sins. This is why

mortals have to drink from the waters of Lethe and Eunoe. Forgetting the bad (Lethe) and remembering the good (Eunoe) was not meant to improve the situation of the ancestral couple; it was actually meant to help their *descendants* in the future. Dante cannot emphasise strongly enough that an ideal society and state cannot be created merely as a result of the *monarch's* actions – however complex and comprehensive they may be. Neither is it limited only to the sphere of *public life* with its proper institutions (just officials); *citizens* must undergo a complete change to stand a chance of attaining happiness in life on earth. As part of the ideal model of cleansing that he presents in *Purgatorio*, Dante points out the significance of the good – the original as symbolising the ideal – in general terms by his description of the last stage of his journey: as the *light* becomes gradually stronger, he drinks from the water of *remembering* – from a river created, in this specific form, by his own imagination – reminding us, with some emphasis, of the *original* state of humankind (Le Goff 1981. 478–479).

Relying on the instruments of poetry, Dante gives a description of the two rivers of opposite effects but supplementary roles; but in doing so, he definitely does not ignore certain elements that originate in classical mythology. In Greek mythology – which often abounds in variations on the same theme – several names derive from the word *mneme*, which means *memory*: the goddess Mnemosyne is well known as the mother of the nine muses; *Mneme*, who is one of the three muses in another tradition; and Mnemosyne, a *spring* in Boeotia originating near the spring Lethe and trickling across the shrine of goddess Mnemosyne. Zeus fathered the muses so they can help lighten the burden of cares and sooth pain – the two roles expressed with the words *lesmosyne* and *lethe*, respectively – but, for the sake of balance, the chief god also made sure people do not forget about what is *good*, an aspect that receives special emphasis in the variant about the muse *Mneme*. In comparison to these versions, however, certain features of the Mycenaean 'cult of the dead' bear closer resemblance to Dante's vision – the most prominent one being that the souls of the dead had to *drink* from the *spring* Mnemosyne so that they do not forget, even as they enter the underworld, about who they are as persons and about their personal identities, as this would help ensure that the living do not forget them either. Incidentally, there was also a river called *Euenos* in Aetolia; it was wading across this river that the centaur Nessus, lethally wounded by the arrow of Heracles for his act, carried off Deianeira (Kerényi 1951. 100–104, 240). When naming his own mythical river of remembering, Dante opted for a name that sounds very similar and means *remembering* (*eu* + *nous* ~ good sense, good remembering), assigning the river the role of preparing the living for a more meaningful life. However, the Eunoe with the river Lethe also have the function of providing balance and guidance in Dante's vision. This mythical background also helps the reader realise that it is possible to reinstate the originally good state of humankind through certain cooperation between God and

humanity because humankind still encompasses much good that deserves to be recreated in a modernised form.

What distinguishes Dante's vision of society and state from even the most sophisticated medieval concepts is that, despite its quite utopian nature, it adopts a *sufficiently realistic* perspective to not try and subvert the then-possible *hierarchy* within the state between the citizens and the supreme power; and in terms of the latter, between the emperor and the pope. Unlike Marsilius of Padua, Dante does not challenge the primacy of the pope in matters of religion, and unlike Thomas Aquinas, he does not subordinate the emperor to the pope in terms of secular power. Like most other theories of state, Dante too puts forward a new proposal for creating balanced, peaceful social relations and just rule, but his emphasis is on the secular nature and the *rational* instruments of his proposal. The closest his vision ever gets to that of Thomas Aquinas is when he presents the *peace* of the Earthly Paradise as the *original state* of the human being and an *essential* feature of the human condition, even though in his *De regimine principum* written half a century earlier, Thomas refers to the well-governed state saying that "One must relate these things to the peace of the heart, not to the peace of the body" (Aquinas 1997. 195), and when he speaks of the rise of the fifth *global empire* after the four pagan ones, what he has in mind is the unification of the *Christian world* on the basis of Christ being God-man; after all – according to the prophecies of Isaiah and Daniel – "this rule or monarchy brings to naught and destroys all other lordship, because all kingdoms are subjected to the same one […]. Indeed, the reason it will last through eternity is at hand, because that one is joined to eternal rule, since he is both Lord God and human." (Aquinas 1997. 187–188.) Dante does not challenge the notion that peace is a gift from God, but his proposal addresses the matter of reinstating the peace among people and among provinces, emphasising the *original* nature of peace in order to underscore the *possibility* of its reinstatement. The peace in social relations and the internal peace of individual members of society can only reinforce one another.

The *emperor's rule* that safeguards both *private life* (as lived in the idyllic peace of the *future state* or Earthly Paradise presented by Dante through the description of the social relations characterising the two *ideal-typical societies*) and *public life* (rationally and justly coordinating the freedom and cooperation of the citizens of the global empire encompassing humankind in its entirety) appears as a *state* whose *personal* as well as *institutional* guarantees are not merely the most acceptable *in theory* but, as attested to by *historical* precedents, are indeed possible. Dante offers a complex characterisation of this – granted, much too idealised – state from *both* vantage points, although he attributes more importance to, and he has more new ideas to propose, its *personal* components. It is the *emperor* as the representative of the supreme power that can initiate the transformation of the status quo; however, such a transformation inevitably requires the active participation of the *citizens*, themselves also educated, aware, well intentioned,

and active. Hence, those agents *exerting (to poioun)* the effects of improvement and those *suffering (to paschon)* the effects are not entirely distinct from one another and are not in rigid confrontation with one another; as a result, it is possible to *integrate* their respective achievements. As far as the *institutions* are concerned, special emphasis is laid on the fact that they are *secular*, that their role is to enforce justice, and that the persons operating within their ranks must use their skills in the interest of the *public*. An individual's additional contribution of knowledge, love, or dignity also acquires significance in public life inasmuch as it helps to attain the public good. Those assuming leadership positions at various levels of the ideal state should be characterised by *libido servandi* rather than by *ius dominandi* (Falkeid 2011. 144–149).

From a *practical* perspective, such an over-idealised vision of reasonable social coexistence and such an abstract concept of the state are certainly mere *utopia*. However, when evaluated from a *theoretical* vantage point, they are *limit concepts* (*limes*) that manifest an ideal that is *approachable* at best (a thought not at all alien to philosophy or even, despite its secularistic air, to religion), but ones that also clearly outline the *possibility* of approaching that ideal, and, in fact, muster examples of their partial *realisations* as actual historical precedents.

IV.

In attempting to partly reinterpret – but more importantly, to paint a more intricate picture of – the relationship between life on earth and life in the hereafter, Dante did not merely expound a variant of the theory of double truth with an innate tendency to shift towards further theoretical differentiation. Rather, he attempted to point out, in general terms, the advantages of the complementary nature of the two types of truth and the positive social impact of the expected practical consequences of this complementarity. He never doubted the indisputable social significance of religion, challenged the notion that the church played a role in making human beings better, or questioned the divine origin of secular power. All he emphasised was that the pope did not have the competence to exercise secular power because God ordained him to help souls attain eternal celestial happiness. He proposed that it was the emperor as the sole representative of supreme power who could resolve conflicts between individuals fighting for secular goods, create the original peace that is essential to humankind, and guarantee the freedom of human beings through his just rule, and allow the whole of humanity to cooperate in its efforts to attain happiness on earth as well as in the hereafter – earthly happiness being seen as a state preparing celestial happiness – that is to say, to fulfil the ultimate end humankind is ordained for. He was able to show the fundamental religious and philosophical *principles* were involved. In terms of the *individual*, he outlined the ideal of a reasonable human

being; in terms of peaceful *interpersonal relations*, he reminded his readers of the humane social concepts of the Earthly Paradise; and in terms of an institutional system that operates justly, he described a vision of the monarchy and proposed the secular *state* of the Roman Empire as a real and credible historical precedent.

REFERENCES

Aquinas, Thomas 1997. *On the Government of Rules. De regimine principum, Ptolemy of Lucca with portinos attributed to Thomas Aquinas*. Translated by James M. Blythe. Philadelphia, Univerity of Pennsylvania Press.

Aristoteles 1978. *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Translated by David Ross, revised with an Introduction and Notes by Lesley Brown. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Averroes 1953. *Commentarium magnum Aristotelis De anima libros*. Recensuit F. Stuart Crawford. Cambridge/MA, The Mediaeval Academy of America.

Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordoba 2009. *Long Commentary ont the De Anima of Aristotle*. Translated and with Introduction and notes by Richard C. Taylor with Thérèse-Anne Druart, subeditor. New Haven – London, Yale University Press.

Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus 1897. The Consolation of Phylosophy of Boethius. Translated into English Prose and Verse by H.R. James. London, Elliot Stock. 62.

Brokmeier, Paul 2003. Zur Legitimation der Herrschaft bei Dante Alighieri. in: *Gewalt und ihre Legitimation im Mittelalter. Symposium des Philosophischen Seminars der Universität Hannover 26 bis 28 Februar 2002*. Würzburg, Königshausen und Neumann.

Carletti, Gabriele 2006. *Dante politico. La felicità terrena secondo il pontefice, il filosofo, l'imperatore*. Pescara, Edizioni Scientifiche Abruzzesi.

Chiesa, Paolo – Andrea Tabarroni 2013. Introduzione. In Dante Alighieri *Le Opere*. Vol. IV. *Monarchia*. Roma, Salerno Editrice.

Corti, Maria 1993. *Percorsi dell'invenzione. Il linguaggio poetico e Dante*. Torino, Einaudi.

Dante Alighieri 1996a. *De vulgari eloquentia*. Edited and translated by Steven Batterill. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Dante Alighieri 1996b. *Monarchy*. Translated and edited by Prue Shaw. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Dante Alighieri 2013. *Le Opere*. Vol. IV. *Monarchia*. A cura di Paolo Chiesa e Andrea Tabarroni, con la collaborazione di Diego Elleo. Roma, Salerno Editrice.

Dante Alighieri *Epistola XIII*.

https://faculty.georgetown.edu/jod/cangrande.english.html

Dante Alighieri *The Divine Comedy*. Translated by Allen Mandelbaum.

https://www. worldofdante.org.

Falkeid, Unn 2011. Da libido dominandi a libido servandi. Il Paradiso VI letto nella luce de La Monarchia. In *Leggere Dante oggi. Atti del Convegno internazionale 24–26 giugno 2010, Accademia d'Ungheria in Roma*. Ed. by Éva Vígh. Roma, Aracne.

Fülep, Lajos 1995. Petrarca. In Id. *Egybegyűjtött írások*. [Collected Papers]. Vol. II. 1909–1916. Ed. by Tímár Árpád. Budapest, MTA Művészettörténeti Kutató Intézet.

Gentili, Sonia 2012. Bene comune e naturale socialità in Dante, Petrarca e nella cultura filosofica in lingua volgare (sec. XIII–XIV). In *Il bene comune: forme di governo e gerarchie sociali nel basso Medioevo. Atti del XLVIII Convegno storico internazionale, Todi 9–12 ottobre 2011*. Spoleto, Cisan.

Kaposi, Márton 2017. Az emberi értelem fogalmának koncepcióformáló szerepe Dante társadalomfelfogásában. [The Conception-Forming Role of the Human Intellect in Dante's Society Concept]. *Magyar Filozófiai Szemle*. 61/1. 131–156.

Kempshall, Matthew S. 2007. Accidental Perfection: Ecclesiology and Political Thought in 'Monarchia'. In P. Acquqviva – J. Petrie (ed.) *Dante and the Curch. Literary and Historical Essays*. Dublin, Four Courts Press.

Kerényi, Károly 1951. *Die Mythologie der Griechen*. Zürich, Rhein-Verlag.

Kinneavy, James L. 1986. Kairos: A Neglected Concept in Classical Rhetoric. In *Rhetoric and Praxis: The Contribution of Classical Rhetoric to Pratical Reasoning*. Red. J. Dietz Moss. Washington/DC, The Catholic University of America Press.

Leeker, Joachim 1993. Gottgewolter Weltherrscher oder Kulturpolitiker auf dem Kaiserthron? Augustinus in der italianischen Literatur des Trecento. *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*. 120–131.

Le Goff, Jacques 1981. *La naissance de du Pugaoire*. Paris, Gallimard.

MacIntyre, Alasdair 1981. *After Virtue*. Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press.

Madarász, Imre 2015. Egy pápa az „éneklő pokolban". VIII. Bonifác alakja az olasz irodalomban, [A Pope in „Singing Hell". The Figure of VIII Boniface in Italian literature]. In uő. *Klasszikus kapcsolatok*. Budapest, Hungarovox Kiadó.

Mercuri, Roberto 1994. Beatrice drammatis persona della „Commedia". In *Beatrice nell'opera di Dante e nella memoria europea, 1290–1990*. In *Atti del Convegno internazionale 10–14 dicembre 1990*. A cura di Merri Pichia Simonelli. Fiesole (Firenze), Cadmo.

Nardi, Bruno 1967. Tre pretese fasi del pensiero politico di Dante. In Id. *Saggi di filosofia dantesca*. 2. ed. Firenze, La Nuova Italia.

Ogor, Robert 1993. Das gemeinsame Ziel des Menschensgeschlechts. In Dantes 'Monarchia' und des Averroes Lehre von Einheit des separaten Intellekts. *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie*. 91–104.

Pizzolato, Luigi 2011. Presenza ed assenza di Agostino in Dante. In Il centro e il cerchio. Atti del Convegno dantesco, Brescia, Università Cattolica, 30–31 ottobre 2009. In *Testo. Studi di teoria e storia della letteratura e della critica*. A cura di C. Cappelletti. Pisa–Roma, Serra.

Szabó, Tibor 2008. *Dante életbölcselete*. [Dante's Philosophy of Life]. Budapest, Hungarovox Kiadó.

Vasoli, Cesare 1995. Agostino nel 'Convivio' e nella 'Monarchia'. In Id. *Otto saggi per Dante*. Firenze, Le Lettere.