

The Cities along the Syr Darya in 11th–13th cc.: Jand and Sighnaq between the Cuman-Qipchaqs and the Khwārazmshāhs Anushteginids^{*}

KONSTANTIN GOLEV**

Institute for Historical Studies at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences,
52, Shipchenski prohod Blvd, 17 Bl. 1113 Sofia, Bulgaria

Received: September 26, 2019 • Accepted: October 29, 2020

© 2021 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest



ABSTRACT

The article examines the relations between the Central Asian Cuman-Qipchaq tribes and two of the most important cities along the Syr Darya, Jand and Sighnaq for the entire period of Cuman-Qipchaq domination over the steppes of Western Eurasia (mid-11th – first decades of the 13th c.). During most of this period the nomads had to deal and often to fight with the Khwārazmshāhs Anushteginids for influence over the strategic settlements of the Syr Darya region. On the basis of various written sources, the paper offers a detailed profile of this protracted and controversial coexistence.

KEYWORDS

Cumans, Qipchaqs, Khwārazmshāhs, Jand, Sighnaq, Syr Darya, Nomads, Cities

* I am indebted to Denitsa Goleva who proofread the draft of the present article, to Prof. Reuven Amitai and the anonymous reviewer for their comments and suggestions, as well as to Natasha Bregel for her kind permission to reproduce parts of the late professor Yuri Bregel's map of Central Asia in the 13th c.

** Corresponding author. E-mail: k.golev@ihist.bas.bg

INTRODUCTION

In the course of an expansion which continued for several decades the Cuman-Qipchaq tribes¹ imposed their hegemony over the entire western half of the vast Eurasian steppe corridor. This space became known to the contemporaries as Dasht-i Qipchāq – the Qipchaq Steppe.² Around mid-11th c. this heterogeneous and politically decentralized tribal community already dominated over the steppes that stretched from the outskirts of the Carpathians to the Black Irtysh.³ During their expansion the Cuman-Qipchaqs came into contact with the sedentary societies that neighbored the steppe lands in Western Eurasia. Bayhaqī reports in 421 AH (January 9 – December 28 1030 AD) that the Qipchaqs were among other turbulent nomadic tribes – Küjet and Chaghraq, in the region of Khwārazm (Bayhaqī 1393/2014, vol. I: 71–72; Bejkhaki 1969: 153; Beyhaqī 2011, vol. I: 168).⁴ The Rus' *Primary Chronicle* mentions their appearance on the steppe frontier of the Pereyaslav Principality s.a. 1054.⁵ In 1078 the Cuman-Qipchaqs supported the Pechenegs in their forays against Adrianople, which was situated in the interior of the Byzantine Balkan provinces (Michael Attaleiates 1965: 193; see also Skylitzes-Kedrenos 1965: 339). According to Anna Komnena (2001: 285) in the last decade of the same century the Cumans were already well-known visitors in the main imperial administrative center on the Crimean littoral – Cherson. It was in the timespan between the 1070s and the 1090s that the appearance of these nomads was attested also in Hungary.⁶

The aforementioned instances mark the Cuman-Qipchaq advance westward and the gradual establishment of relations between them and the neighboring sedentary societies – the so-called

¹ The designation Cuman-Qipchaqs is a *terminus technicus* which is applied to the heterogeneous tribal community that dominated the steppes of Western Eurasia approximately between mid-11th and mid-13th century. It is a combination of two of the ethnonyms with which these nomads are mentioned in the medieval sources.

² Dasht-i Qipchāq is the Persian name for the space inhabited by the Cuman-Qipchaqs (in Arabic Bilād al-Qibjāq or al-Qifjāq). Its western equivalents were the Rus' Polovtsian Plain (поле Половецкое) and the Latin Cumania. Initially, the different toponyms signified the regions of the steppe that were nearest to the respective medieval authors rather than the vast Cuman-Qipchaq habitat in general. Thus, Rus' and Western Europeans generally refer to the plains north of the Black Sea, while the Persian authors have in mind the Central Asian steppes. Only after the Mongol invasion did the Western world acquire a better understanding of the size of Cumania, while the Persian name Dasht-i Qipchāq, on the other hand, also encompasses the European steppe inhabited by the Cumans, already under the control of the Jochids of the Golden Horde (Rasovsky 1937: 71–73).

³ The Cuman presence in the steppes east of the Carpathians is well documented, but the sources are much more scarce as regards the eastern fringes of Dasht-i Qipchāq. According to Rashid al-Dīn the Qangli grouping, which was part of the heterogeneous Cuman-Qipchaq tribal community, neighbored the Naimans along the Black Irtysh river (i.e. in the Altay region), see Rashid al-Dīn/Rūshan-Mūsavi 1373/1994, vol. I: 126; Rashid al-Dīn/Karīmī 1338/1959, vol. I: 95; Rashiduddin/Thackston 1998–1999, Part I: 68; Rashid-ad-Din/Khetagurov 1952: 137. Along the course of Irtysh numerous archaeological findings have been discovered, which have been interpreted as remains from the Qipchaq tribes, see Merts 2019: 125–129. I am indebted to Lyubov Ermolenko, who drew my attention to the last-mentioned publication.

⁴ Few years later members of the same three tribes flowed 'from all sides' into the forces of the Khwārazmshāh Hārūn b. Altūntāsh (1032–1035), who was preparing for a campaign against his overlord Mas'ūd of Ghazna (1030–1040); Bayhaqī 1393/2014, vol. III: 1117; Bejkhaki 1969: 827; Beyhaqī 2011, vol. II: 392.

⁵ 'В семь же . лѣт . Приходи Болушь с Половци . и створи Всеволодь миръ с ними . и возвратишася [Половци] вспать ѿнюду же пришли'; PSRL, vol. I: 162; see also PSRL, vol. II: 151, where the event is given under the year 1055.

⁶ In the last decades of the 11th century the Hungarian kingdom of the Árpáds was an arena of pillaging raids by steppe nomads called by the Latin sources with the collective name *Cuni*. This ethnonym could be used by the later Hungarian chroniclers both in order to designate the Cumans in particular, as well as eastern nomads in general. This is why modern scholars are not unanimous in the identification of the attackers of 1068 and 1085–1086.



outside world.⁷ Initially the nature of these relations was invariably dominated by military clashes and predatory raids. The dynamic early stage of the Cuman-Qipchaqs' settlement in Western Eurasia has been called *Landsnahme* by Peter Golden and was characterized by the constant testing of the military potential of the neighboring sedentary peoples. This period included the decades approximately from the mid-11th c. until the first quarter of the 12th c., when it was gradually replaced by a new, more balanced phase of relations with the surrounding agricultural societies. Naturally, this evolution did not exclude mutual raiding (Golden 1991: 99–100; see also Golden 1987–1991: 79). In the course of time various nomadic groupings had established traditional relations with the elites of the neighboring sedentary states, covering the entire specter from direct confrontation to alliance. These controversial relations were often reversible and even the numerous marriages with steppe 'princesses' could not guarantee the loyalty of the nomadic in-laws. Nevertheless, with time an uneasy symbiosis was established between the Cuman-Qipchaqs and their settled neighbors. Although this coexistence was repeatedly shaken by mutual confrontation, it led to the gradual integration of the nomadic groupings in the political orbits of the neighboring states. This process was especially pronounced in the cases of the Rus' principalities and the Anushteginid dynasty (1097–1231) of Khwārazm (Golden 1991: 146–150).

Thus, the absence of a formidable steppe adversary for nearly two centuries allowed the Cuman-Qipchaqs to adapt themselves to the ecological and geopolitical features of their Western Asian habitat where they felt completely comfortable. That is why their groupings as a whole did not demonstrate desire to leave the steppes unless they were forced to do so by catastrophic events.⁸ A defining feature in the behavior of the Cuman-Qipchaq tribes for the entire period of their dominance in Dasht-i Qipchāq was their eagerness to acquire luxury goods or agricultural products through constant contacts with the societies of the *outside world*. This zeal could be materialized in the shape of predatory raiding, rendering of allied military support or the expectations for a tribute/gifts from the neighboring rulers, but it invariably characterized the relations of Cuman-Qipchaqs with the surrounding sedentary neighbors. This phenomenon is deeply rooted in the peculiar features of the extensive steppe economy (which was particularly vulnerable to natural disasters) as well as in the sociopolitical structure of the Eurasian nomads, which allowed them to field easily mobile and relatively large armies with specific military know-how.

That is why the Cuman-Qipchaqs always strived to be in close contact with the *outside world* and constantly entered its territories. It is worth mentioning that in this respect the behavior of

But it seems that the incursions of the beginning of the 1090s, when King Ladislaus I (1077–1095) defeated twice nomadic invaders, could be connected with the Cumans with greater certainty; *Chronici Hungarici* 1999: 412–414; *The Hungarian Illuminated Chronicle* 1969: 129.

⁷ The term *outside world* is introduced by Anatoly Khazanov as a general denotation of the nonnomadic societies (mainly agricultural and urban) which border the nomads, but significantly differ from them in terms of economics, social structure and way of life. According to Khazanov (1994: 3), the very existence of nomadism is impossible without contact with these societies. In addition to Khazanov's work see also Barfield 1989; Golden 1998; Golden 2011.

⁸ Such was the case with the Cuman-Qipchaq grouping of the chief Otrok, which migrated to Georgia in the first quarter of the 12th c. under the pressure of Vladimir Monomakh, but returned in the steppes after his death (Golden 1984: 45–87; Murguliya–Shusharin 1998). Separate individuals or small groups could migrate to neighboring sedentary countries under various circumstances, as demonstrated by the presence of Cumans in the Byzantine army; see the sources, referred in Golev 2018a: 97. n. 20. Yet, as a whole there was no voluntary mass nomadic migration from Dasht-i Qipchāq before the advent of the Mongols. Some Cuman-Qipchaq tribes in Central Asia represent an exception to this tendency. By the late 12th c. they have been closely integrated in the ascending Khwārazmian Empire, and as a consequence large groups of nomads migrated into its territory.



the representatives of the sedentary elites did not mirror that of their nomadic neighbors. If we do not count military campaigns, visits of sedentary nobles in the steppes were rare and were usually caused by unfortunate circumstances.⁹ Yet, such a reluctance could not be observed in the behavior of their fellow compatriots stemming from lower social strata. The Cuman-Qïpchaq chiefs controlled a number of key transit trade roads and could influence the traffic of strategic resources such as slaves from various regions and luxury furs from Northern Eurasia. This is why numerous merchants from the *outside world* regularly used long established routes to enter deep into the steppes, where as a rule they were welcome even in the midst of military conflicts (Golden 1991: 97–99; see also Golden 1987–1991: 65–66; Noonan 1992: 323–324). Yet, despite the existence of such routes, it was the crossing points on the fringes of the two worlds – the steppe and the sown – that had the largest commercial potential and there a large scale exchange of all the goods and resources delivered through both of them could be conducted.¹⁰ It was precisely in the ‘no-man’s land’ – on the sea coast or in the oases surrounded by steppes – where commercial centers arose, on whose markets the nomads and the sedentarists met. Such towns and cities did not belong entirely to neither world and could prosper precisely due to their role as a commercial and cultural contact zone. Among their inhabitants were members of traditionally settled peoples as well as former or even still practicing nomads.¹¹ This duality was also manifested politically – steppe chiefs and sedentary rulers often clashed for dominance over such urban centers.

For the Cuman-Qïpchaqs the access to the cities of these marginal zones could be even more important than their relations with the territories of the *outside world* itself. Their significance for the nomads is particularly pronounced as these intermediary markets offered them an alternative access to the goods of this world – an access which was not that vulnerable to the unpredictable twists of politics and warfare. On the contrary, on these markets the desired goods could be acquired peacefully and they could offer an alternative in times of conflicts with the neighboring sedentary polities. Furthermore, the location of the intermediary settlements on the edge of steppe and sown was quite often accompanied by a fluid political status, which was not always closely tied to a centralized sedentary state. Thus, for the Cuman-Qïpchaqs – who in principle were not interested in lasting conquests of sedentary territories in the *outside world* – sometimes

⁹ Indeed, such visits are documented in the sources only sporadically and were usually due to the search for asylum or military support for a risky political undertaking. Among the asylum seekers was the future husband of the Georgian Queen Tamar (1184–1213) Yury Andreevich, who ran to the Cumans some time in the period 1175–1185, and perhaps the future Bulgarian Tzar Ivan Asen II (1218–1241) at the first stage of his flight from Bulgaria c. 1208; *Kartlis tskhovreba* 2013: 258–259; *Kartlis tskhovreba* 2014: 243; Georgius Acropolita 1971: 156, 157–158; Theodorus Scutariota 1971: 266–267. Among those who sought military support were Pseudo-Diogenes (in the 1090s), Ivan Berladnik (s.a. 1159 in the *Hypatian Chronicle*), as well as the leaders of the successful anti-Byzantine uprising in Bulgaria, Peter and Asen (1186); Anna Comnena 2001: 285; *PSRL*, vol. I: 226–227; *PSRL*, vol. II: 217, 497; Nicetas Choniates (1983a): 28, 29; Nicetas Choniates (1983b): 95.

¹⁰ As illustrated by the accounts of Ibn al-Athîr and Rubruck for Sudaq (*SMIZO* 1884, vol. I: 26; Ibn al-Athîr 2008: 223; Rubruc 1929: 166; *The Mission* 1990: 62–64; see also the description of the gifts, which according to Ibn Bibi were offered by the inhabitants of this city to a Saljuq army around the third decade of the 13th c. (İbn-i Bîbî 1956: 329; Ibn Bibi 2011: 302; İbn Bibi 2014: 340).

¹¹ Such is the impression that leaves the short report of the Andalusian traveler al-Gharnâfi for the town of Saqsin on the Lower Volga; Ibn Fadlân 2012: 63–64. In this regard the variety of written and archaeological evidence could be pointed, according to which part of the inhabitants of the Crimean cities were also of nomadic descent, see for example Konovalova 2009: 103, 123. Makarova 2003: 73; Ajbabin 2003: 79; Aibabin 2005: 299, 313, 319. In the 11th c. al-Kâshgharî considered a number of settlements in Central Asia as Oghuz cities; al-Kâshrî 1982–1985, Part I: 329, 333, 352, 353, 362; see also Golden 1992: 210.



it became possible to impose their will over some of the settlements in the marginal areas and through them to influence the exchange of resources with the sedentary societies. This perspective was of such importance for the Cuman-Qïpchaq chiefs, that in the 12th or early 13th c. the political vacuum literally pulled them into the sedentary zone of Crimea. Through most of the following decades until the appearance of the Mongols the Cuman-Qïpchaqs exercised loose control over a large part of this zone with its key commercial entrepôt – the city of Sudaq. Apparently, this urban center was ruled by its own elite, but various accounts report that before the arrival of the Mongols Sudaq was a dependency of the Cumans, who collected tribute from the inhabitants of the Crimean littoral, traded with the arriving merchants and even took up arms against an invading Saljuq force in order to protect the strategic port (Golev 2018b: 23–107).

Thus, the settlements of the Crimean coast and Sudaq in particular played the role of strategic contact zone in the ‘no-man’s land’ for the Cuman-Qïpchaq tribes of the European parts of Dasht-i Qïpchâq, and they were even able to impose their control on this zone in the last decades of their domination in Western Eurasia. The question arises of whether there were intermediary settlements with similar importance in the steppes of Central Asia, which could offer to the eastern Cuman-Qïpchaq groupings the comfort that their fellow nomads enjoyed in the west? There hardly can be any doubt that the most suitable candidates for such a role would be the cities along the course of the Syr Darya, and Jand and Sighnaq in particular.¹² According to Peter Golden the Central Asian Qïpchaqs used these settlements ‘as their urban centres’ (Golden 2009: 11), Mehmet Fuad Köprülü considers that one of the Cuman-Qïpchaq khans has dominated in the region of Sighnaq and Jand,¹³ while Serzhan Akhinzhanov even assumes that a separate ‘Sighnaq’ grouping of the Qïpchaqs existed.¹⁴ The present paper seeks to answer the following questions: What was the extent of the Qïpchaq orientation towards these cities? What was their actual significance for the nomads? Was there a Qïpchaq presence in Jand and Sighnaq and if so, what was its nature? In what way did the different geopolitical situation in Central Asia influence the processes that took place in the marginal zones between the steppe and the *outside world*?

Since the evidence for the history of the Cuman-Qïpchaqs is usually recorded in the sources in the context of their contacts with the neighboring sedentary civilizations, the research is based on chronicles and documents for the activities of the Khwārazmshāhs Anushteginids from the end of the 11th to the first decades of the 13th c., written mainly in Persian language. Most of the narrative sources have been created after the end of the Cuman domination in Dasht-i Qïpchâq (around the mid-13th c.) and only few contemporary documents from the Khwārazmshāhs chancellery survived until present days. Thus, the modern researcher is forced to face once again the scarcity of information and the fragmentary nature of the source base that plagues the history of the medieval Eurasian nomads. A peculiar feature of the sources in this particular instance is the existence of more detailed and numerous accounts regarding Jand, whereas Sighnaq often

¹² The geographical features of Central Asia, where the oases of agricultural life are dispersed among vast steppes and deserts makes the border between steppe and sown much more fluid as compared to Eastern Europe and defining mediatory settlements in this region is harder. But, as pointed out by Anatoly Khazanov (1992: 72): ‘Except for the Syr-Daria river, Semirechye, and the northern regions of Khwarazm, which served as a principal contact zone between the nomadic and sedentary worlds, the main cultivated territories in Central Asia were situated southwards, between the Amu Daria and Syr-Dariya rivers, and beyond the limits of the regular migratory routes of the Dasht-i-Qïpchaq nomads.’ See also Bajpakov 1986: 7–12.

¹³ Fuad Köprülü 1943: 232, 235, 239, 240; see also Timokhin and Tishin 2018: 95.

¹⁴ Akhinzhanov 1995: 211–212; see also Akhinzhanov 1979: 67–68. According to Jürgen Paul (2015b: 145) Sighnaq ‘was known as the Qïpchaq centre along the right bank of the Syr’.



remains outside the sight of the medieval authors. This fact makes any conclusion regarding the latter city much more uncertain. Other cities are located along the Syr Darya river, such as Yangikent and Sawran, but there is no evidence whatsoever regarding the relations between their inhabitants and the Cuman-Qipchaqs, and thus by necessity they remain outside the scope of the present paper.

JAND, SĪGHNAQ AND THE NOMADIC WORLD IN THE TIMES OF THE FIRST ANUSHTEGINIDS


The Central Asian nomads came into contact with the sedentary civilizations along the course of the Syr Daria long before the appearance of the Cuman-Qipchaqs in the region. This fact comes as no wonder having in mind Khazanov's (1992: 73–74) rightful observation that 'the oases, being the centres of agricultural production and craftsmanship, at all times attracted the nomads like magnet'. At the end of the 10th c. the anonymous author of *Ḥudūd al-Ālam* reports that the *Malik* of the Oghuz spent the winter in the settlement of Dih-i Naw. It was mentioned in the source together with Jand and perhaps was identical with the later Yangikent in the river delta.¹⁵ The Oghuz were the immediate predecessors of the Cuman-Qipchaqs in the Central Asian and East-European steppes and it was not by chance that their ruler wintered along the lower course of Syr Darya. The seasonal migrations of the Eurasian stockbreeders were defined by the climate and the specifics of the pasturelands and it was precisely due to these factors that the banks of the river were among the most attractive nomadic winter quarters in the entire Central Asia. It was also for these reasons that the inhabitants of Khwārazm choose the early winter for their annual attacks against the Oghuz which aimed at driving them away from the Khwārazmian borders (Golden 1992: 211). Due to the same seasonal cycles in the following centuries the Cuman-Qipchaqs, who pushed away the Oghuz, continued to appear regularly in the region in winter time. Apropos, according to *Ḥudūd al-Ālam* Sighnaq was a center for production of bows,¹⁶ which doubtlessly was related to the surrounding nomads. In the 11th c. Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī referred to this settlement as 'a city of the Oγuz' (al-Kāšrārī 1982–1985, Part I: 352), and his statement once again should be interpreted as a manifestation of the same proximity, although we are not informed how close these Oghuz were to the nomadic lifestyle.

As regards Jand, its relation with the same Turkic nomadic world is displayed in the course of events that took place at the turn of the 10th c. At that time Saljuq b. Duqaq – a prominent fugitive from the interior of the Eurasian Steppe – settled with his Oghuz followers in the region of Jand. According to the later historiography (which however reflects the Saljuqid sponsored tradition) under his leadership the newcomers took the side of the Muslims in the ongoing warfare with their pagan Turkic relatives and undertook continual raids against the latter. Ibn al-Athīr's (2002: 31) statement that only after the arrival of Saljuq the region of Jand 'passed fully to the Muslims' suggests the extent to which the city was related to the surrounding nomads. Indeed, no matter what the real role of Saljuq was in these events, the whole episode was a typical nomadic affair

¹⁵ As can be concluded on the basis of the overlapping meanings of the Persian Dih-i Naw (New Village) and the Turkic Yangikent (New City); Golden 1992: 209.

¹⁶ *Ḥudūd al-Ālam* 1340/1962: § 25, p. 118; *The Regions of the World* 1970: § 25, pp. 119, 358. Minorsky even accepts that the toponym itself is of Turkic origin.





Map 1. (Part of Map 17: 'The early 13th century: the Ghurids, Khorezmshahs, Qara-Khitays, and Küchlük', Bregel 2003: 35, reproduced with permission of the estate of Yuri Bregel)

with various groupings supporting opposite sides in the prolonged conflict. Furthermore, after the death of Saljuq his descendants lost the city to another warlord – Shāh-Malik.¹⁷

In the 1040s – soon after the triumphal success of the Saljuqids in the battle of Dandānaqān that marked the beginning of their vast conquests – Chaghri Beg (1040–1060), one of the two founders of the new empire, undertook a campaign against a rebellious ruler of Khwārazm. After he captured the province Chaghri Beg met with an anonymous Qipchaq *amir* who embraced Islam and the two Turkic leaders entered into a matrimonial union.¹⁸ This evidence indicates that around the mid-11th c. the Qipchaqs were already an important factor in the history of Khwārazm and most probably large parts of the steppes along the Syr Daria were under their control. Such a conclusion is supported by Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī, who, writing in the 1070s, states that a frontier city of the Qipchaqs called Kenček Sengir was situated in the vicinity of Ṭarāz,¹⁹ much further eastward.

¹⁷ See the critical analysis of the hypotheses for his origin in Peacock 2010: 24–25.

¹⁸ Ḥusaynī 2014: 25; see also Ahmed b. Mahmud 2011: 61. For the dating of the events, see Golden 1992: 277; Golden 2005: 267–268.

¹⁹ Al-Kāshrī 1982–1985, Part I: 357; the transcription follows Golden (1992: 278), who pointed to this account.



About two decades after the expedition of Chaghri Beg, his son Alp Arslan (1063–1072) undertook an ambitious campaign in the region of the Aral Sea in the winter of 1065–1066. It is indicative that the Sultan chose the cold season for the realization of his plans. In addition to the fact that in that season the deserts surrounding Khwārazm are passable,²⁰ this timing was perhaps also influenced by his intention to deliver a blow to the nomads who were then in the region. Alp Arslan set towards Khwārazm and undertook operations against the nomadic tribes from the steppes between the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea, some of whom apparently were Qipchaqs.²¹ After that he directed his army eastward and visited the lands along the Syr Darya, reaching as far as Sawran. Crossing the river delta, the Sultan was met with generous gifts by an anonymous ‘Khan of Jand’, whose dominions according to the extant sources were left under his authority.²² The title of the nameless ruler indicates relation with the Turkic nomadic world of the Central Asian steppes, but unfortunately the sources do not mention anything regarding his ethnic or dynastic affiliations. It is not impossible that the Khan under question was of Qipchaq descent. Yet, some evidence from the next century that will be discussed later indicates that he might have been a member of some of the Qarakhanid branches, thus suggesting that he could have been a local ruler of the Muslim inhabitants of the city. Keeping in mind the large timespan between the described events and the evidence from the 12th c. such a hypothesis should also remain a mere conjecture. Therefore, this episode does not permit any certain conclusion regarding the relations between the Cuman-Qipchaqs and the urban population in the basin of the Syr Daria.

Other events pertaining to the reign of the first member of the Anushteginid dynasty in Khwārazm – Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad I (1097–1127/28) associate indirectly the Turkic inhabitants of the Central Asian Steppes with the ruler of Jand and demonstrate that the nomads were indeed able to influence the fate of the Khwārazmian oasis. Ibn al-Athīr reports that ‘a certain Turkish ruler’ decided to take advantage of Quṭb al-Dīn’s temporary absence and invaded his dominions. The situation escalated further when Tughril-Tegin, the son of the previous Khwārazmshāh Ikinji b. Qochqar, fled from the court of Sultan Sanjar (1118–1157) ‘and joined the Turks’ in Khwārazm. The scale of the crisis is indicated by the fact that on his way back to his dominions Quṭb al-Dīn sent a request for help to Sanjar in Nīshāpūr and the latter personally set out with his troops towards the hot spot. In the meantime, Quṭb al-Dīn himself approached Khwārazm before the arrival of his overlord and this compelled the Turkic attackers to withdraw in Manqīshlaq, while Tughril-Tegin sought refuge with the ‘Khan of Jand’ (Ibn al-Athīr 2002: 293).

Ibn al-Athīr’s laconic description of the events does not permit precise identification of the Turkic invaders. Their withdrawal to the area of Manqīshlaq suggests a possible relation either with the Qipchaqs or with the Oghuz. Yet, keeping in mind that the events took place in the end of 11th c. or the first decades of the 12th c. when the Qipchaq domination in the Aral and Caspian steppes was already firmly established, it seems probable that the attackers were members

²⁰ According to Bayhaqī, who wrote in the 11th c., the Khwārazmshāh Hārūn b. Altūntāsh commented after his meeting with the ruler of Jand Shāh-Malik that the latter was able to come in Khwārazm only during the winter, when the desert is covered with snow; Bayhaqī 1393/2014, vol. III: 1116–1117; Beyhaqī 2011, vol. II: 391–392; Beyhaqī 2011, vol. III: 395. n. 113; Bejkhaki 1969: 827. This statement could be too deterministic, but there is no doubt that winter was the most suitable season for campaigning in the region.

²¹ As could be concluded for example from the account of Ibn al-Jawzī (Ibnū’l Cevzī 2011: 149–150).

²² Ibn al-Athīr 2002: 157; Ḥusaynī 2014: 32; see also the later version in Ahmed b. Mahmud 2011: 80. Mīrkhwānd (1339/1960: 275) gives a much more detailed but also much later version of these events; see also the somewhat abbreviated Russian translation: *MITT* 1939: 467.



of their tribal community. The fact that Tughril-Tegin sought asylum with the ‘Khan of Jand’ is also of considerable importance. Apropos, the latter is mentioned yet again without any further details. Since the incursion took place around four decades after the campaign of Alp Arslan it is quite probable that the khans in the two episodes were two different persons. Be it as it may, the fragmentary source base allows the conclusion that in the city there was a local ruler or perhaps a local dynasty. In the latter instance the ‘Khan of Jand’ seems to have played an independent role in the events and apparently was sympathetic to Tughril-Tegin. Some authors consider the latter to be the instigator of the incursion (Bartold 1900: 346; Kafesoğlu 2000: 42) and suggest relation with his father’s origin from the Qun tribe (Kafesoğlu 2000: 42), but these hypotheses remain nothing more than conjecture.

The importance of Jand as a stronghold that allowed the projection of nomadic influence in Khwārazm was actually a double-edged sword. The city could have been used by the energetic Anushteginids with the same success as a bridgehead for pressure within the steppes. This feature once again highlights the role of the key city as an intermediary outpost in the marginal area, whose masters could be both the steppe chiefs and the Khwārazmian rulers, depending on the circumstances. Never before or after the age of prosperity, achieved by the Anushteginids (second half of the 12th c. – first quarter of the 13th c.) was Khwārazm able to rise as the center of a mighty empire (Bartold 1968: 116) and there is no doubt that this precedent was at least partially due to the attraction of the surrounding nomads in the Khwārazmian political sphere. The latter process was clearly manifested in the reign of the dynasty’s second ruler ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Atsīz (1127/1128–1156), who in many aspects laid the foundations of the future empire. As has been pointed out by Jürgen Paul, there are two key directions for the Khwārazmian expansion: one of them at the northeast and east towards the lower course of the Syr Daria, the other at the southwest towards the Manqīshlaq peninsula and the regions south of it. Atsīz was active in both directions and apparently the establishment of control over the nomads inhabiting these areas was among his motives (Paul 2013: 88). The Qipchaq influence is present in both regions, being especially strong along the Syr Darya.

In order to impose his control over the latter region Atsīz first needed to capture the strategically located Jand. It is not by chance that Jūzjānī, who wrote in mid-13th c., saw a direct relation between the Khwārazmshāh’s actions in this direction and the steppe dwellers claiming that ‘on several occasions he was separated from Khwārazm, sometimes out of necessity, sometimes of his own free will, [and] he led armies towards Jand, Turkistān and Qifchāq’ (Jūzjānī/Ḥabībī 1343/1964, vol. I: 299; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. I: 236–237). Atsīz undertook campaigns against Jand and Manqīshlaq only several years after he ascended the throne. This is revealed by the statement of his overlord Sanjar, who in 1132 AD emphasized in a letter to the vizier of the Caliph al-Mustarshid (1118–1135) that the campaigns of the Khwārazmshāh and the capture of Jand and Manqīshlaq are undertaken for the glory of Islam and its expansion (Bunijatov 1986: 10). Once he had set his foot in Jand, the ambitious ruler used it as a bridgehead for an operation against the nomads in the interior of the steppe. In a document dated to the summer of the next 1133 AD it is reported that ‘several months ago [...] the Khwārazmshāh with a large army had entered the depths of Turkistān from a frontier which is famous and well-known and is called Jand’. Enduring perils Atsīz ‘encountered a *malik* and chief who was considered greater among the infidels’, managed to defeat him and massacred many of his people. Afterwards the Khwārazmshāh returned unharmed to his dominions with ‘booty, captives and wealth without measure’ (Bartold 1898: 37; see also Bartold 1900: 346). Apparently, this was a successful raid against the nomadic



encampments beyond the Syr Daria and the prominent infidel *malik* most probably was one of the numerous Cuman-Qïpchaq chiefs. The incursion must have been undertaken in the winter or early spring of 1133 AD.²³ It should be pointed out that the Rus' princes usually chose this time of the year to attack the nomads that encamped close to their lands²⁴ and this parallel was hardly a coincidence. Thus, the control over Jand widened the opportunities for active Khwārazmian politics in the steppes, but it turned out that keeping the strategic city was by no means an easy job.

The perspectives for influence over the nomadic tribes opened for the ambitious Anushteginid by the success of the Khwārazmian expansion in the two main directions did not evade the attention of his Saljuq overlord. In 1138 AD, about six years after Atsiz had captured Jand and Manqishlaq, Sanjar who initially boasted of the success of his vassal, marched against him. It is noteworthy that this campaign began in the autumn and the Saljuq ruler did not come back to his capital until February 1139 AD. The Sultan evidently feared that the growing influence of Atsiz in the steppes could increase too much the number of troops at his disposal through recruitment of additional nomadic contingents. This is why Sanjar led his troops against Khwārazm and defeated its ruler near the fortress of Hazārasp. Atsiz was forced to flee and one of his sons was captured and executed (Juvaynī 1334/1916: 5; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 280; Ibn al-Athīr 2005: 348; Bartold 1898: 45; Bartold 1900: 347–348; Paul 2013: 89–91). It seems that the Sultan's apprehension regarding the presence of steppe nomads among the Khwārazmian troops was not unfounded. According to the *fath-nāma*²⁵, which Sanjar's chancellery circulated on the occasion of the victory, Atsiz's losses amounted to 'nearly ten thousand men Turks, some [of them] from the infidels,²⁶ who were among the auxiliaries and allies of the governor who had gone astray [i.e. the Khwārazmshāh]' (Bartold 1898: 45).²⁷ In all likelihood these pagan Turks were members of the Cuman-Qïpchaq tribal community (Paul 2015b: 145), but whatever their actual ethnic origins were, there is no doubt that they had come in the Khwārazmian armies from the Central Asian steppes. The quoted passage hints that the partnership between the nomads and the Khwārazmian court was long lasting. The presence of significant steppe contingents in Atsiz's army is also suggested by Juvaynī's statement that the Khwārazmshāh had little confidence in his troops and this is why he resorted to flight (Juvaynī 1334/1916: 5; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 280).²⁸ Paul (2013: 91–92) also pointed out that some of the triumphal ceremonies after the Sultan's victory were seemingly aimed at the nomadic followers of Atsiz who had been attracted after the battle.

²³ See the arguments of Paul, who thinks that the campaign probably took place in the winter of 1132–1133 AD; Paul 2013: 93. n. 54.

²⁴ See for example the events described s.a. 1109, 1110, 1111 [1112], 1169, 1170; *PSRL*, vol. I: 283–284, 289; *PSRL*, vol. II: 260, 264–268, 532, 538–540.

²⁵ I.e. *victory proclamation*, see Bunijatov 1986: 10.

²⁶ In this regard see Paul's thoughts: Paul 2015b: 145.

²⁷ See also Paul's comment (2013: 92. n. 50) regarding the reading of *mudīr/mudbir*, which however has no significant importance for the present topic.

²⁸ This evidence is also supported by Ibn al-Athīr's report (2005: 348) that the Khwārazmians were not strong enough to face the Sultan and did not hold their ground turning to flight, which led to many casualties. Furthermore, in Sanjar's *fath-nāma* it is stated that before an hour since the beginning of the battle had passed Atsiz was pushed from the center of his troops and took to flight (Bartold 1898: 45). The rapid retreat before the Saljuq army and the great number of casualties caused by it can also be interpreted as an indication for mass presence of steppe nomads among the Khwārazmian troops. The *Hypathian Chronicle* gives a description of a similar battle between opposing Rurikids, during which the Cuman allies of one of the sides did not wait the attack of the enemy, but immediately took to flight 'whithout even shooting an arrow', and the ensuing defeat brought many casualties; *PSRL*, vol. II: 488.



Sanjar ceded the province to his nephew Suleymān Shāh and returned to his capital Marv in Khurāsān. He announced his victory to the Muslim world in the usual manner of the age – through the circulation of the aforementioned *fath-nāma* (Bartold 1898: 44–47). This document contains a number of accusations against Atsīz among which the statement that he had shed the blood of the ‘Muslims and *Ghāzīs*’ in Jand and Manqīshlaq, whose inhabitants were frontier guards of the Islamic territories (Bartold 1898: 44–45; Bartold 1900: 347; Kafesoğlu 2000: 47; Bunijatov 1986: 10; Paul 2013: 92–93). Beyond the Muslim rhetoric of the Sultan one can clearly recognize his apprehension, caused by the violation of the geopolitical balance by his vassal. Paul (2013: 93) is fully right when he points out among the reasons for the conflict Atsīz’s growing influence over the nomad tribes in the outskirts of Khwārazm (see also Bunijatov 1986: 10; Kafesoğlu 2000: 47). In addition, the threat from which the frontier *Ghāzīs* defended the Land of Islam (i.e. the nomads of the Central Asian steppes) most likely should once again be identified with the Cuman-Qīpchaqs, at least in the case of Jand. If one accepts the quoted passage of the highly ideologized *fath-nāma* at face value, then the relations between the citizens of Jand and the neighboring nomads were hostile or at least included that aspect too. This would not be surprising given the fact that the Qīpchaqs were notorious for their raids against the surrounding sedentary societies. If Jūzjānī is to be believed, the Qīpchaqs and other northern peoples threatened even Khwārazm itself during the reign of Atsīz’s father Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad (Jūzjānī/Ḥabībī 1343/1964, vol. I: 298; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. I: 234).²⁹

Atsīz came back to Khwārazm soon after Sanjar withdrew and with the support of the local population managed to drive away the latter’s protégé (Ibn al-Athīr 2005: 348; Juvaynī 1334/1916: 5; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 280). In the next years the conflict between the two rulers continued with a varying degree of intensity. Eventually in 538 AH (1143–1144) the Saljuq Sultan once again undertook a campaign against his unruly vassal and besieged his capital Gurgānj. But Atsīz managed to avert the catastrophe by entering into negotiations with Sanjar, and the Sultan once again returned to Khurāsān (Juvaynī 1334/1916: 7–8; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 281–282; Ibn al-Athīr 2005: 370; Bartold 1900: 350; Kafesoğlu 2000: 57; Bunijatov 1986: 17–18; Paul 2013: 101–105).³⁰ Yet, the Khwārazmian position along the lower course of the Syr Daria was apparently shaken by the clashes with his mighty overlord and Atsīz lost the control over Jand. Probably this happened in the context of some of Sanjar’s campaigns. In any case, in the autumn of 1145 AD the Khwārazmshāh was forced to attack the city once again and his undertaking was successful. Details for this campaign are preserved in another *fath-nāma*, this time circulated by the triumphant Atsīz. In this document the ruler emphasized the importance of the border region of Jand, which is called a ‘great frontier of Islam’. The Khwārazmshāh also pointed out that the Almighty had already allowed him to ‘liberate’ the region once, but matters of grave importance ‘from other quarters’ demanded his attention. A ‘group of miserable malefactors’ took advantage

²⁹ Later, in a letter to the Caliph al-Muqtafi (1136–1160) Atsīz pointed out that his father had fought for many years with the unbelievers so that the people in Khwārazm and Khurāsān could sleep quietly, and that he himself followed this example (Paul 2013: 100). Most probably in this case the infidels under question were again the Central Asian Cuman-Qīpchaqs.

³⁰ Both Juvaynī and Ibn al-Athīr date the campaign to 538 AH, but Paul points evidence that dates the events to the previous year.



of this situation and interfered in the frontier region, usurping the power in it.³¹ When the Anush-teginid came back the city was ruled by a ‘negligent ignorant, disobedient rebel who had called himself Khan and had conquered the province of Jand’. When the Khwārazmian troops appeared in front of the gates of the city the latter was forced to flee and pursuers were sent on his heels. Atsīz emphasizes that ‘all the amirs, commanders, leaders, and admired and noteworthy people’ hastened in submission to him and thus the entire province was taken by him without shedding blood. In the document Atsīz indicates his intention to grant the power in the region to ‘a credible and trustworthy Khan’ among his own notables. In conclusion he orders his subjects ‘to consider Khwārazm and Jand as a single state’.³²

Once again, we face the typical for this type of sources ornate style and political propaganda,³³ which hinder the precise reconstruction of events. Yet, it is noteworthy that this *fath-nāma* once again mentions a Khan who ruled in Jand, even though he is described as an impostor, due to obvious political reasons. The evidence for the existence of a ruler with that title in this particular source is of special importance, since unlike the narrative texts that have been written later on, these are included in an official contemporary document. Apparently, it was the existing tradition that prompted the Khwārazmshāh to call his own representative in Jand Khan³⁴ – a detail that will be commented below. In addition, the document leads to the conclusion that Atsīz sought to conquer not only the city itself, but also its hinterland. Among the motives for this undertaking the Khwārazmshāh’s desire to transform the lower course of the Syr Daria river in a reliable base for pressure against the steppe dwellers could be pointed out. As a matter of fact, the *fath-nāma* leaves the impression that the social structure of the population in Jand was typical for an Islamic city. Most probably this impression reflects the reality of the mid-12th c., having in mind Yāqūt’s statement that Jand was the birthplace of the famous poet Yaqūb b. Shīrīn al-Jandī, who studied in Khwārazm and was Khwārazmian envoy to Bukhārā and Samarqand in 1153.³⁵

The second conquest of Jand was followed by a somewhat unclear period of Atsīz’s reign. According to Juvaynī in Jumādā al-Ākhira 542 AH (October–November 1147 AD) Sanjar undertook his third campaign against the Khwārazmshāh. After he managed to capture the key fortress of Hazārasp the Sultan once again reached the walls of Gurgānj and this forced Atsīz to enter into negotiations with his persistent overlord once more. According to the agreement that was reached, the Khwārazmshāh expressed symbolically his submission to Sanjar and he returned to Khurāsān yet again (Juvaynī 1334/1916: 8–10; Juvaynī 1958, vol. I: 282–284).³⁶ The analogies with Atsīz’s symbolical submission to the Sultan during his second campaign, described

³¹ Paul (2013: 106) considers ‘probably best to assume that some Qıpchaq groups’ brought to end the Khwārazmian power in Jand in the context of the Qarakhitay expansion or by taking advantage of the conflict between Atsīz and Sanjar.

³² See the text of the document in: Vaṭvāt, 1338/1960: 71–73; Bartold 1898: 41–42; see also the Russian translation of Bunijatov, which is based on another edition: Bunijatov 1986: 18–20.

³³ Paul 2013: 83. For the *Inshā’* collections like the one into which Atsīz’s *fath-nāma* has been preserved see in general: Paul 1998/2011: 455–457.

³⁴ The title of Khan as a designation of the representative that Atsīz planned to install in Jand is present only in one of the text editions, available to me: Vaṭvāt 1338/1960: 73. In Bartold’s earlier edition (1898: 42) as well as in Bunijatov’s translation (1986: 20) this word is missing. Perhaps due to this reason such an important detail has evaded the attention of the modern scholars so far.

³⁵ See Bosworth 2008/2012. Yaqūb al-Jandī was also a prominent member of the Khwārazmian administration (Vaṭvāt 1338/1960: 257–259).

³⁶ Apropos, Juvaynī states that during the symbolical ceremony Atsīz did not pay the necessary respect to the Sultan which irritated him but despite that the military activities were not renewed.



in other sources, as well as the fact that Juvaynī is the only source for the third military operation, made Paul (2013: 81–129) to express doubts whether the latter really took place. Yet, the scholar admits there is a certain possibility that the third campaign indeed took place, but points out that the narrative of the Persian chronicler was rhetorically stylized and there is no way to establish what part of it reflects real facts. Indeed, it is not impossible that interpolated elements (maybe entangled with earlier events) have been included in Juvaynī's description, which could have still been based on a real third campaign of Sanjar in Khwārazm. Such a conjecture is supported by the realistic timing in which the events took place according to the chronicler – the late autumn of 1147. As already mentioned, the cold part of the year was the most suitable time for military operations against Khwārazm. If the campaign really took place, perhaps the increased authority of Atsīz in the steppe after the restoration of his power in Jand was among Sanjar's motives. If this was indeed the case, the Sultan apparently did not reach his goals, since Juvaynī reports that after his withdrawal the Khwārazmshāh 'several times undertook *ghazā* against the infidels and was victorious' (Juvaynī 1334/1916: 10; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 284; see also Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan 2010: 3).³⁷ This evidence of the Persian chronicler, even though it does not contain particular details, seems plausible, as it finds parallel in Atsīz's aggressive politics against the steppe nomads. The 'infidels' once again should be identified with the Cuman-Qipchaqs with a great deal of probability.

It is again in Juvaynī's *Tārīkh-i Jahān-Gushāy* that we find the only reference for a third campaign of the Khwārazmshāh against Jand. According to the chronicler during Atsīz's campaigns against the infidels the *vālī* of Jand was certain 'Kamāl al-Dīn, the son of Arslan Khan Maḥmūd' and there was 'absolute agreement' between the latter and the Khwārazmshāh (Juvaynī 1334/1916: 10; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 284). On the basis of Juvaynī's laconic evidence a number of scholars accept that Kamāl al-Dīn was a member of the Qarakhanid dynasty³⁸ and this hypothesis could serve as a potential starting point in the attempts for identification of the khans of Jand, mentioned above. Be it as it may, the chronicler reports that when Atsīz 'had conquered most of that region'³⁹ he set out in Muḥarram 547 AH [April–May 1152 AD] towards Sighnaq and other ter-

³⁷ Atsīz's arrogant behavior during the symbolic submission ceremony could also be an indication that the campaign did not result in a decisive turn of the Khwārazmshāh's politics, but as already mentioned, there is no certainty whether this part of Juvaynī's narrative is not a mere rhetoric element.

³⁸ Bartold 1900: 351; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 284. n. 23; Kafesoğlu 2000: 60; Bosworth 1968: 145; Paul 2013: 106. Bosworth was the only one who tried to identify the particular genealogy of Kamāl al-Dīn, accepting that he was a son of the Samarqand ruler Maḥmūd (1132–1141), a vassal of Sanjar who lost his throne as a result of the triumphal Qara Khitai victory in the battle of the Qatvān Steppe. But Maḥmūd did not hold the title of Arslan Khan, which actually belonged to his father Muḥammad b. Sulaymān, who ruled in Samarqand in the period 1102–1130; Kochnev 2006: 216–219, 247. Therefore, Kamāl al-Dīn apparently was a son of the latter and brother of Maḥmūd. Kochnev seemingly arrived at the same conclusion, without giving argumentation, as in the genealogical table of one of the Qarakhanid branches he conjecturally depicts Kamāl al-Dīn as son of Muḥammad; Kochnev 2006: 272. The confusion may have arisen due to a writing error in Juvaynī's text where instead of Muḥammad (محمد) may have been written Maḥmūd (محمود). In fact, this is not the only time in which Juvaynī was not accurate as regards the Qarakhanids. Slightly below in his narrative he referred to Maḥmūd as Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad Bughra Khan, despite the fact that Muḥammad did not hold this title and was called either Arslan Khan or Tafgach/Tamgach Khan; Juvaynī 1334/1916: 12; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 286; Kochnev 2006: 219, 247. It must be pointed out that the editor of Rashīd al-Dīn Vaṭvāṭ's letters, Q. Tūysirkānī offered another genealogy and titulature for Kamāl al-Dīn without taking into consideration his affiliation with the 'the Khans of Turkestan' i.e. the Qarakhanids; Vaṭvāṭ 1338/1960: 233–235. In the present paper the hypothesis that Kamāl al-Dīn was a son of Muḥammad b. Sulaymān is accepted.

³⁹ Apparently, the lands of the infidels that were target of the aforementioned campaigns of the Khwārazmshāh are referred.



ritories [beyond] intending to proceed thither together with Kamāl al-Dīn' (Juvaynī 1334/1916: 10; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 284). Despite the aforementioned 'absolute agreement', when the ruler of Khwārazm reached the region of Jand Kamāl al-Dīn became fearful and fled with his army towards Syr Darya (Juvaynī 1334/1916: 10; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 284).⁴⁰ Atsīz sent his notables after him with guarantees, but as soon as the fugitive joined him the Khwārazmshāh put him in chains in which he spent the rest of his life (Juvaynī 1334/1916: 11; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 284; see also Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan 2010: 3).⁴¹ At his place as a ruler of the strategic city Atsīz appointed one of his sons and future successor Il-Arslan (1156–1172).⁴²

The description of this episode undoubtedly contains certain elements that resemble the previous capture of Jand, documented in the *fath-nāma* of Atsīz from 1145. In this case too the local ruler (who is explicitly referred to as a son of a khan) fled from the city when the Khwārazmshāh approached and the settlement was captured without fighting. In the account of Juvaynī as well Atsīz's men were sent after the fugitive and he was replaced by a trusted person – in fact, according to the chronicler he was one of the Khwārazmshāh's sons. This is why some scholars tend to assume that both sources actually describe the same event.⁴³ However, another interpretation seems more probable. It is based on the intention of Atsīz, expressed in the *fath-nāma* of 1145, to appoint as his representative in Jand a person with the title of khan. The Khwārazmshāh was planning to choose one of his own notables (Vaṭvāt 1338/1960: 73), but apparently considered it important that this person should hold the title of khan. From Juvaynī's text we know that Kamāl al-Dīn was of khan ancestry and that he was close with Atsīz's famous court poet Rashīd al-Dīn Vaṭvāt. The latter dedicated poems to the ruler of Jand and after the events of 1152 even fell into disgrace for a time due to their friendship (Juvaynī 1334/1916: 11; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 284–285; Paul 2013: 106, n. 112). Therefore, Kamāl al-Dīn was a well-known figure at the Khwārazmian court. On the basis of Juvaynī's account it can be concluded that by 1152 the local ruler of Jand had been in the Khwārazmian political orbit for a certain period of time. It seems that this scion of the large Qarakhanid dynasty was at the court of Atsīz before his campaign of 1145. Kamāl al-Dīn might have appeared there as a result of the Qara Khitai victory at Qatvān which cost the throne of one of his brothers – Maḥmūd, and led to a lasting reconfiguration of the political map of the region.⁴⁴ It is noteworthy that the sources have not documented any reaction to the brutal deposition of Kamāl al-Dīn, neither from Maḥmūd, who was Sanjar's relative and had been nominated for his successor,⁴⁵ nor on the part of another of his brothers, Ibrāhīm (1141–1156), who was enthroned in Samarqand as a Qara Khitai vassal.⁴⁶ This would suggest that before Kamāl al-Dīn's appearance in Jand he was a minor political player who was acting in his own advantage,

⁴⁰ Apparently in the text the word *rūdbār* has the meaning of 'big river', i.e. Syr Darya, and is not a toponym, as suggested by Boyle.

⁴¹ Bartold (1900: 352) brings attention towards the fact that contrary to the established practice the campaign against Jand took place in the hot season.

⁴² Juvaynī 1334/1916: 12; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 285; see also Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan 2010: 3. According to Juvaynī this happened 'when Jand was purged of rebels' which is somewhat puzzling, given the fact that in the passage there is no evidence for hostile attitude of Kamāl al-Dīn and his subjects towards the Khwārazmshāh. This vague sentence might be an indication for some unrest in the city, caused by the capture of the *vālī*.

⁴³ Bartold 1900: 351–352; Paul 2013: 106, 123–124; see also the authors referred to by Paul. Other scholars, however, assume that there were two separate events: Kafesoğlu 2000: 60–61; Bunijatov 1986: 18–20, 22–23.

⁴⁴ For the battle and its aftermath, see Biran 2005: 41–47.

⁴⁵ Juvaynī 1334/1916: 12; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 286; Bosworth 1968: 157.

⁴⁶ Kochnev 2006: 223.



and thus became an instrument in Atsīz's hands. Probably the Khwārazmshāh decided to install him as his vassal in Jand at the place of the anonymous Khan who fled in 1145 (a hostile member of the same dynasty?)⁴⁷ in order to take advantage of his protégé's legitimate ancestry and to impose indirect Khwārazmian rule in the region, avoiding thus additional turmoil.

The version that Kamāl al-Dīn was Atsīz's vassal⁴⁸ is supported by the fact that Juvaynī refers to him as *vālī* – a title, translated by Boyle as ruler, but meaning almost invariably 'governor of a province' (Steingass 1892).⁴⁹ Vassal relations could explain the statement of the chronicler that between Kamāl al-Dīn and Atsīz there was 'absolute agreement', as well as the intention of the Khwārazmshāh to march towards Sighnaq, used as a pretext for his appearance in Jand. If one sets on a campaign from Khwārazm Sighnaq lies far beyond Jand and it would be very strange if Atsīz had undertaken such a distant and risky operation if he did not have at least some form of control over the latter city, which lies on his way. In fact, Juvaynī states that the Khwārazmshāh had already conquered most of the region when he decided to set towards Sighnaq together with Kamāl al-Dīn, and this intention aroused the latter's suspicions only when the Khwārazmian troops entered the region of Jand. Once again, we witness a typical behavior of a vassal, who had been called upon to support the campaign of his overlord. Yet, the vassal status seems to have been loose enough since Kamāl al-Dīn was able to command his own troops, to leave the city without permission and to trust the promises of the Khwārazmian notables. It seems that the episode described by Juvaynī reflects the moment in which Atsīz decided to get rid of the local ruler (representative of a local dynasty?) for good and to put the strategic city under the direct rule of his own house, sending there Il-Arslan.⁵⁰ It is noteworthy that neither him, nor the Khwārazmian princes that controlled the city in the following decades bear the title Khan of Jand.

It is indicative that according to Juvaynī the annexation was undertaken in the context of successful campaigns against the pagan nomads in the region. Furthermore, Atsīz's intention to conduct a campaign in the area of Sighnaq served as a formal pretext for his appearance in the environs of Jand. This is the first mention of the city in the context of the Khwārazmian expansion and it seems that in the mid-12th c. the intention for military operation in that region sounded realistic enough to serve as a cover for the annexation of Jand. It cannot be established whether there were earlier campaigns in that direction, but the account of Juvaynī leaves the impression that by the moment of the capture of Jand Sighnaq remained beyond Khwārazmian control. Another campaign against the steppe infidels, organized soon after the deposition of Kamāl al-Dīn⁵¹ indicates that the Khwārazmshāh followed a consistent steppe policy and his operations against the nomads were something more than a pretext for the annexation of Jand.

Undoubtedly Atsīz decided to impose the direct rule of his house in Jand in order to prevent a new slipping of the strategic city from the control of the Anushteginids. The appointment of a son of the ruler as governor of the city is indicative for the importance the region had for the elite of

⁴⁷ Indeed, it is possible that the town was captured by another Qarakhanid during the reconfiguration, caused by the Qara Khitai expansion, perhaps with the support of the Qipchaqs in the region.

⁴⁸ And not Qara Khitai vassal, as assumed by Bunijatov (1986: 22) and Paul (2013: 106, but cf. n. 112).

⁴⁹ Indeed, if Kamāl al-Dīn ruled in Jand in his own name one would expect that Juvaynī will refer to him as *malik* or *khan*.

⁵⁰ Apropos, the vague passage in which Juvaynī reports that Vaṭvāṭ fell out of favor due to his friendship with Kamāl al-Dīn might be a hint that the latter was not completely sincere towards his overlord; Juvaynī 1334/1916: 11; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 284–285. But firm conclusion on this matter remains elusive.

⁵¹ Juvaynī 1334/1916: 12; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 286.



Khwārazm. In fact, no evidence from mid-12th c. for other Khwārazmian city ruled by a prince of the dynasty has been preserved to the present day. Therefore, Paul's conclusion that Jand is second in importance for the Anushteginids after their capital, is absolutely relevant.⁵² The city kept its significance during the next generations of the dynasty and in the following decades princes from the royal house resided in it. Even though these were not always the official heirs to the throne, on a couple of occasions the members of the dynasty that were ruling Jand were able to take the supreme power in Khwārazm, which gives an additional hint for the importance of the city.

The first Anushteginid who resided in Jand and managed to mount the throne in Khwārazm was Il-Arslan. When Atsīz died in July 1156 the prince was in the camp of the Khwārazmian army in Khurāsān. Il-Arslan took advantage of this situation in order to ensure the support of the troops, to purge the rival members of the dynasty and the Khwārazmian elite, and to take the supreme power.⁵³ A letter of the aforementioned court poet, Rashīd al-Dīn Vaṭvāṭ, indicates that the nomadic neighbors of Khwārazm did not confine themselves to passive endurance of the Khwārazmian attacks. In his letter Vaṭvāṭ emphasizes among the reasons that prevented the Khwārazmian troops to render support to Sanjar (who had just managed to save himself from Oghuz captivity) the fact that 'in the winter this frontier is fearful from the blows of the infidels (may God abandon them!), especially now when the lord, the late *malik* (may he rest in peace!) had passed in the proximity of the Almighty God, and the infidels became more confident due to his death, and also that much fighting for the fate is necessary to keep Jand and Mangqīshlaq'.⁵⁴ Vaṭvāṭ points out that by the moment of writing the army had still not returned from a campaign against Sāq and slightly below states that the Khwārazmian troops will appear 'as soon as the winter passes away and the vanguard of spring becomes evident, and secures the frontier of Khwārazm against the calamities of the infidels (may God abandon them!); but not before the troops take some rest and meet their families (Vaṭvāṭ, 1338/1960: 128).

Naturally, the court poet is trying to excuse the absence of his lord in Khurāsān using all kinds of arguments and there is a possibility that he has overstated the problems caused by the nomads. Yet, despite the possible exaggeration Vaṭvāṭ's letter undoubtedly referred to real political circumstances from the mid-12th c. On the basis of this source it can be concluded that in spite of Atsīz's aggressive steppe policy the nomads were still able to conduct regular incursions not only against the remote Khwārazmian outposts, but against Khwārazm itself. The statement that after Atsīz's death the infidels became more confident rings true when it is compared with the way the Cuman-Qīpchaqs reacted to the death of other prominent royal neighbors of Dasht-i Qipchāq. For instance, when they learned of the demise of the Great Prince of Kiev Vladimir Monomach (1113–1125), one of the most active organizers of the Rus' steppe campaigns against the Cuman-Qīpchaq camps, the nomads immediately attacked the Rus' lands (*PSRL*, vol. I: 295–296; *PSRL*, vol. II: 289–290). In fact, if Mangqīshlaq and Jand were indeed threatened by the steppe dwellers, then their reaction to the death of Atsīz had considerable dimensions. As regards the barely mentioned campaign against Sāq, Paul was not able to identify the settlement but points to the simi-

⁵² Paul 2015b: 144–145; See also Kafesoğlu's similar observation, Kafesoğlu 2000: 91–92.

⁵³ Kafesoğlu 2000: 73. See also Bunijatov (1986: 32), who follows the narrative of Kafesoğlu without referring to it.

⁵⁴ Vaṭvāṭ, 1338/1960: 128. Jürgen Paul (2013: 108) brings attention towards this fragment of Vaṭvāṭ's correspondence. Kafesoğlu (2000: 73), and Bunijatov (1986: 32) after him, apparently used this source, but assumes that Jand and Mangqīshlaq had been captured by the infidels. In fact, the text of the letter does not say explicitly that these dominions were lost, as also shown by the interpretation of Paul, and this vague evidence of Vaṭvāṭ does not reveal the real dimensions of the crisis along the steppe frontier.



larity of its name with Sighnaq. The German scholar remarks that the latter city was the target of Khwārazmian campaigns against the Qipchaq groupings in the region, but admits that there is no evidence for such an operation at that time (Paul 2013: 108. n. 120). Indeed, additional information is not available, but the Khwārazmian activities with regards to Sighnaq are documented only fragmentary, so the possibility that Vatvāt referred to a campaign against this city remains open.

Apparently, the pagan nomads continued to threaten the frontiers of Khwārazm in the following years, since according to Kafesoğlu during the reign of Il-Arslan in the letters to Baghdad Khwārazm is constantly referred to as *Dār al-Jihād*.⁵⁵ Naturally, to emphasize one's contribution to the fighting with the infidels in the correspondence with the caliph was a common political approach that was often adopted by the Muslim rulers, especially on the periphery of the Islamic world. But perhaps in this case too the rhetoric was based on real events at least to a certain extent.

Yet, the direct conflict was far from being the only sphere of interaction between Il-Arslan and his steppe neighbors. Jūzjānī reports that he 'concluded an alliance with the Khan of the Qifchāq and guarded the frontiers of his dominions to the best of his abilities' (Jūzjānī/Ḥabībī 1343/1964, vol. I: 300; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. I: 239). Leaving the vague evidence for pagan Turks in Atsüz's army aside, this is the first Anushteginid for whom it is explicitly stated that he established relations with the Qipchaq chiefs. Most probably these contacts began when Il-Arslan was his father's representative in Jand. Be it as it may, the next generations of the dynasty developed the policy of alliance with the tribes of Dasht-i Qipchāq bringing it to an unprecedented scale.

THE CUMAN-QĪPCHAQS AND THE CITIES ALONG SYR DARYA IN THE ZENITH OF THE KHWĀRAZMIAN EMPIRE


When Il-Arslan passed away in 1172 one of his sons named 'Alā' al-Dīn Tekesh was in Jand ruling the region on behalf of his father. The younger son of the deceased – Maḥmūd Sulṭān-Shāh, who was the official heir to the throne, proclaimed himself Khwārazmshāh and Tekesh was summoned to the capital. The latter, however, refused to submit and to acknowledge the new ruler. These events marked the beginning of an internecine strife between the two brothers which lasted for more than two decades. Tekesh used Qara Khitai help to push out his brother from Khwārazm and to take the throne. Later on he managed to repel the counterattacks of his brother, who was in turn supported by the Qara Khitai at a certain point. But Sulṭān-Shāh was able to use their forces in Khurāsān, where he carved out a new domain for himself and constantly challenged the legitimacy of his brother from there.⁵⁶

Tekesh himself apparently played some role in the diplomatic relations of his father with the Qipchaq tribes beyond Syr Darya, since his wife was the famous Terken Khatun – daughter of

⁵⁵ Kafesoğlu 2000: 60. n. 119. Kafesoğlu also pointed to evidence according to which *ghazā'* was conducted from Khwārazm both in the winter and in the summer.

⁵⁶ Bartold 1900: 361–371; Kafesoğlu 2000: 84–91; Bunijatov 1986: 38–45; Biran 2005: 55–63; Paul 2015a: 597–622. As pointed out by Paul (2015a: 603), Tekesh himself mentions that he has ruled the region of Jand before he rose to the throne in his edict for the appointment of his son Malik-Shāh as a governor in the city, Baghdādī 1384/2005–2006: 14–15.





Map 2 (part of Map 17: 'The early 13th century: the Ghurids, Khorezmshahs, Qara-Khitays, and Küchlik', Bregel 2003: 35, reproduced with permission of the estate of Yuri Bregel)

a prominent chief from this tribal community.⁵⁷ Their marriage perhaps took place during the reign of Il-Arslan. If Tekesh indeed took part in his father's contacts with the Qipchaqs this should hardly be surprising given his position as governor of Jand. Among the main obligations of the latter was the control over the contact zone with the nomad tribes of the Central-Asian steppes. Having in mind the marriage connections of Tekesh and his governorship in Jand it is surprising that the sources do not mention explicitly any Qipchaq support for his aspirations to the throne after his father's demise in 1172. Furthermore, in order to materialize his ambitions, the pretender

⁵⁷ She is known in the sources only with her Islamic name. All important Muslim chroniclers report that Tekesh's wife comes from a tribe related to the Qipchaqs, but contradict each other which is that tribe; an-Nasavi 1996: 65, 82; *Sirat-i Djalaluddin* 1986: 38, 62. Juvayni 1334/1916: 109, 198; Juvaini 1958, vol. II: 378, 465; Jüzjani/Ĥabibi 1343/1964, vol. I: 300, 306, 313; Jüzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. I: 240, 254, 279; Rashid al-Din/Rüşhan-Müsavı 1373/1994, vol. I: 505–506; Rashid al-Din/Karimi 1338/1959, vol. I: 366; Rashiduddin/Thackston 1998–1999, Part II: 250; Rashid-ad-Din/Smirnova 1952: 209–210; Rashid al-Din/Rüşhan 2010: 33; Mirkhwänd 1339/1960: 407.



sought the support of another steppe power – the Empire of the Qara Khitai. Does this mean that the Qipchaqs did not interfere because they wanted to preserve their relations with Khwārazm no matter which prince takes the throne? Or, on the contrary, realizing the importance of the conflict they supported their in-law but remained outside the scope of the sources? Regrettably these questions will remain unanswered. Be it as it may, during Tekesh's reign the relations with the Qipchaqs inherited from his father were further strengthened and their contingents started to play an increasingly important role in the Khwārazmian expansion.⁵⁸

Several letters sent by Tekesh to other Muslim rulers in the beginning of the 1180s throw some light upon this process. The letters were preserved in the collection of documents of the senior Khwārazmian administrative official al-Baghdādī. The documents reveal that in two subsequent winters the in-laws of the Khwārazmshāh – Alp Qara Uran and his son Qiran – appeared with their troops in the environs of Jand in order to join the Khwārazmian contingents in the area, and to march together against the territories of the Qara Khitai in the region of Ṭarāz.⁵⁹ Apparently Tekesh's father-in-law was precisely Qiran.⁶⁰ Evidence is available for no more than two years, but perhaps it reflects the existence of a longer-lasting practice of conducting seasonal military campaigns. Apropos, despite Tekesh's efforts to represent the events in his correspondence with other Islamic rulers in the context of the holy war against the infidel Qara Khitai, some phrases indicate that the Qipchaq allies were also pagans.⁶¹ It is also noteworthy that the steppe partners appeared systematically near Jand in order to offer their services to their royal in-law, which corresponds to the intermediary position of the city on the border of the steppe and sown. The fact that the Qipchaqs arrived in the region in two consecutive years is also fully in line with the seasonal migratory cycle of the Eurasian nomads. In fact, the rhythmical nature of their appearance raises the question to what extent Tekesh was able to decline the offer for seasonal campaigning and what would have been the alternative for the large nomadic forces that were already at the borders of his dominions? In other words, was Tekesh the initiator of the allied military activity or was he just trying to direct it to his own political advantage? Unfortunately, these questions will also remain unanswered.

From the correspondence of the Khwārazmshāh it becomes evident that by that time the Khwārazmian power spread over a number of settlements along the course of the Syr Darya, and a member of the dynasty, Nāṣir al-Dīn Malik-Shāh b. Tekesh, ruled in the *'eyalet* and region

⁵⁸ Paul (2015a: 617, 619) even points at the access to 'the great human resources of the steppe and his Qipchaq allies' as one of the reasons which enabled Tekesh finally to prevail over his energetic brother Sulṭān-Shāh and allowed him to capture Nishapur, thus paving the way for further Khwārazmian expansion in Khurāsān and Western Iran.

⁵⁹ Baghdādī 1384/2005-2006: 158, 174–175. In another letter, written in November 1182 to the Atabeg of Ādharbāijān Jhān Pahlvān (1185–1186) – i.e. about a month after the second evidence for the appearance of Alp Qara Uran in the environs of Jand – Tekesh boasted that he continues to enjoy the support of numerous Qipchaq troops from the remotest parts of Turkistān; Baghdādī 1384/2005-2006: 180; see also Bartold 1900: 366. In this part Jand is not explicitly mentioned, but it is noteworthy that the steppe allies appear in the cold season and the fact that they are coming from the distant parts of Turkistān hints that they too have passed through Jand or some other city in the Syr Darya basin.

⁶⁰ Tekesh himself emphasized his relation with him in one of the letters; Baghdādī 1384/2005-2006: 174. In this regard Paul (2015b: 147) points among the contradicting sources for the origin of Terken Khatun one of Jūzjānī's versions, in which it is stated that her father was called Aqran/Iqran: Jūzjānī/Ḥabībī 1343/1964, vol. I: 300; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. I: 240.

⁶¹ Paul 2015b: 147; Kafesoğlu 2000: 94. n. 76; see also Bartold 1900: 365; Biran 2005: 61.



of Jand'.⁶² According to a letter from 1182 Malik-Shāh took command over 'the troops [*khadam u ḥashm*] of Jand and the army [*sipāh*] of Barchinliqkent, Rabatat, Sighnaq and the furthestmost lands that are in submission in this direction' (Baghdādī 1384/2005–2006: 158–159) for a joint attack in alliance with the Qipchaq relatives against the Qara Khitai.⁶³ In another letter, written a few months later, it is reported that Malik-Shāh received an order to 'gather under his banners all of the troops [*ḥashm*] of Jand, Esas, Barchinliqkent, Shahrkent, Rabatat and all the other provinces that are under [the power] of the *firmān* and the protection of the *amān* of our majesty, and to meet with Alp Qara Uran'⁶⁴ in order to conduct a joint attack against the Qara Khitai. Perhaps the partner relations established with the steppe in-laws have facilitated the spread of Anushteginid power over the aforementioned settlements along the Syr Darya. Yet, the possibility that the pressure of the nomads pushed the inhabitants of these cities in the Khwārazmian sphere of influence should not be ruled out either.

It becomes clear from another letter of the Khwārazmshāh in al-Baghdādī's collection that the conflict with the Qara Khitai in the region of Syr Darya was not limited only to the activities of the members of the dynasty and their steppe relatives. Tekesh informed the Shirvānshāh Akhsitān I (c. 1161 – c. 1196), that 'the *Malik* of Sighnaq' 'with all of his troops [*khadam u ḥashm*]' has risen against the infidel Qara Khitai and has accepted Khwārazmian supremacy (Baghdādī 1384/2005–2006: 189–190; Kafesoğlu 2000: 95; Bunijatov 1986: 51). This document mentions for the first time in the age of the Cuman-Qipchaq domination over Dasht-i Qipchāq the existence of a separate ruler in the Central-Asian city – 'the *Malik* of Sighnaq'. Apparently, the letters in al-Baghdādī's collection mark the moment when the settlement and its environs came under Khwārazmian supremacy.⁶⁵ What role the surrounding Cuman-Qipchaqs played in this process cannot be established. Later events demonstrate that Sighnaq either periodically slipped out of Anushteginid control – similarly to Jand – or that this control was simply very loose. In fact, we cannot be sure even whether the city came under Khwārazmian dominance for the first time in the 1180s. Be it as it may, the proximity of the turbulent nomads did not benefit the stability of the Khwārazmian power in the region.

It is evident from the documents in al-Baghdādī's collection that Jand, Sighnaq and a number of other settlements in the Syr Darya basin provided separate contingents for the Khwārazmian army. They were listed separately from Alp Qara Uran's Qipchaq warriors and were under the command of Malik-Shāh. Thus, even if there were Cuman-Qipchaqs among these troops and the townspeople did have their own contacts with their steppe neighbors, politically the inhabitants of the aforementioned settlements under Khwārazmian rule remained outside the control of the mighty nomadic chiefs.⁶⁶ Such a conclusion is supported by another letter in the same collection, which reports that among Tekesh's troops that besieged Sarakhs in 1182 – the latter being a dominion of his brother Sulṭān-Shāh in Khurāsān – there were contingents from

⁶² Baghdādī 1384/2005–2006: 158–159. From the evidence of Ibn al-Athīr it becomes clear that by the time of his death in 1197 Malik-Shāh was the official heir to the Khwārazmian throne (Ibn al-Athīr 2008: 32). Apparently, the prince held the same position at the time of his arrival at Jand since in his edict for the appointment of Malik-Shāh as a governor in Jand Tekesh refers to him as 'a son, who is the dearest of [my] sons', Baghdādī 1384/2005–2006: 15.

⁶³ According to Akhinzhanov (1995: 215) Sighnaq served as a basis for this campaign.

⁶⁴ Baghdādī 1384/2005–2006: 175. For the settlements mentioned in the various letters, see Bartold 1900: 179–181; Bajpakov 1986: 28; some of them are also pointed on the maps in Bregel 2003, see for example p. 33 map 16.

⁶⁵ It is possible that before that Sighnaq had been in the Qara Khitai sphere of influence.

⁶⁶ At least this is the impression left by the letters of Tekesh, whose style is not characterized by modesty.



Barchīnliqkent, Shahrkent⁶⁷, Ribāṭāt, Mangqishlaq, and Jand (Baghdādī 1384/2005–2006: 155; Paul 2015b: 147; Bunijatov 1986: 48). Therefore, by the 1180s, these settlements and the surrounding areas were integrated in the state of the Anushteginids to the extent that they provided troops not only for the Khwārazmian campaigns in the basin of Syr Darya, but also for the operations in the distant Khurāsān.

Apparently in this period Jand became something like an ‘appanage’,⁶⁸ in which a prince of the Anushteginid dynasty was sent in order to rule the strategic city and from there to control the rest of the settlements under Khwārazmian domination in the basin of Syr Darya. Perhaps such were the plans as early as the times of Atsīz, when the latter decided to remove the local Khans of Jand.⁶⁹ Apparently in the 1180s at least some of the cities along the river were still governed by their own rulers (such as the *Malik* of Sīghnaq) who were subordinated to the Anushteginid residing in Jand. But princes from the family of the Khwārazmshāh were also appointed in other cities in the region, as is demonstrated by a document in al-Baghdādī’s collection commented by Kafesoğlu. It is an edict of Tekesh, who appoints another of his sons, Tāj al-Dīn ‘Alī-Shāh, as *vālī* in Barchīnliqkent, bringing this way the city under the direct rule of his dynasty.⁷⁰ Unfortunately the edict has no date and the chronological span between the appointment and the joint campaigns with the Qīpchaqs cannot be established. Be it as it may, it can be assumed that the instances with Sīghnaq (ruled by its own *Malik*) and with Barchīnliqkent (governed directly by a member of the Khwārazmian royal house) represent the two patterns that were followed in the integration of the rest of the cities in the region in the growing Anushteginid state. From the letters in al-Baghdādī’s collection it can be concluded that the prince who resided in Jand commanded the contingents from the rest of the settlements along the course of the Syr Darya during campaigns in the steppe and perhaps in operations on other military theaters as well. A certain level of autonomy in this appanage, due partially to its geographical features, is evidenced by the fact that in 1172 Tekesh was able to disobey his brother’s orders and to seek his own rights to the throne, and Sulṭān-Shāh could not prevent it. Indeed, the sands of the Qizil Qum desert separate the settlements along the Syr Darya from Khwārazm and make the position of the local governor both autonomous and vital for keeping Khwārazmian power on the river banks.

⁶⁷ Which according to Bartold (1900: 179) is identical with Yangikent.

⁶⁸ Naturally, the usage in the present paper of terms, connected with the European Middle Ages, such as ‘appanage’ and ‘vassal’ is absolutely provisional, and has no intention to draw any parallel between Western feudalism and the socio-political order of the eastern Islamic world.

⁶⁹ Paul (2015a: 603–604. n. 15) points out that in his edict for the appointment of Malik-Shāh as governor in Jand ‘Tekeš tried to construe a tradition: Atsīz had appointed his son and successor Il Arslan as governor there, and therefore he himself sent his most beloved son Malikshāh to Ğand’. According to the German scholar in this way Tekesh, who also had ruled the city before he rose to the throne, tried to emphasize his own legitimacy in the context of the conflict with Sulṭān-Shāh. See also the passage in the edict: Baghdādī 1384/2005–2006: 15. But no matter what Tekesh’s political motives for this claim were, the fact that in the second half of 12th c. three successive generations of Khwārazmshāhs had sent their sons to serve as governors in Jand points if not to the existence of a tradition, at least to the following of an established practice.

⁷⁰ Kafesoğlu 2000: 92–93; Baghdādī 1384/2005–2006: 38–43; see also Bunijatov 1986: 45–46. According to the edict, Ribāṭ-Tughānīn, another settlement located close to Barchīnliqkent, is also placed under the jurisdiction of ‘Alī-Shāh. As pointed out by Bartold (1900: 181), this settlement is identical with Ribāṭāt which has been mentioned several times above. It is also recommended in the document that spies should be sent to the most distant lands in that direction, which entirely corresponds with the position of the cities in the basin of Syr Darya as Khwārazmian outposts and demonstrates the vigilance of the Anushteginids in this region.



The establishment of allied relations with the Cuman-Qipchaq tribes and the successful Khwārazmian expansion along the Syr Daria did not guarantee that the coexistence with the nomads would be a plain sailing. It is hardly by chance that in the beginning of the 1180s Tekesh planned to conduct a campaign in Khurāsān with ‘great armies’ from the remotest lands of Islam and the frontiers of the land of Khifjāq precisely in the end of the winter.⁷¹ Indeed, the early spring is the season in which the Khwārazmshāh usually sets out with his troops towards this region.⁷² But there can hardly be any doubt that besides the geographical features of Khurāsān his choice was also influenced by the necessity to keep his troops during the winter on ‘the frontiers of the land of Khifjāq’, since in this season the nomadic military activity was at its apex. Even at the height of the Khwārazmian expansion in southwest and Central Asia, when Tekesh’s armies conducted campaigns in Western Iran and Khurāsān, the activities of the steppe chiefs on the Syr Darya still demanded the attention of the Khwārazmshāh.

After the winter of 1194–1195 passed Tekesh personally led a campaign towards ‘Sighnaq and its surroundings’ with ‘the intention to wage *ghazā* against Qadīr Buqu Khan’.⁷³ The Khwārazmshāh was accompanied by one of his sons and future successor Muḥammad II (1200–1220). After the Khwārazmian army crossed the Qizil Qum dessert and reached Jand Qadīr Buqu Khan started to withdraw. Tekesh chased him ignoring the fact that among his own troops there were numerous warriors from the Qipchaq tribe Uran,⁷⁴ some of which were serving in his own retinue. These tribesmen entered into contact with Qadīr Buqu Khan and promised him that if he faced the Khwārazmshāh they would desert him during the battle. According to Juvaynī, the Khan listened to them and turned to face his pursuers in an open battle on 18 May 1195. The Uran indeed appeared behind the center of the Khwārazmian army and plundered its baggage causing Tekesh’s severe defeat. Many of his soldiers died in the battle and even more found their bitter end in the desert sands. According to Juvaynī, the Khwārazmshāh himself needed 18 days to reach Khwārazm.⁷⁵ Regrettably, the Persian chronicler does not report in what way his Qipchaq

⁷¹ This passage is from another letter in al-Baghdādī’s collection and apparently concerns the contingents provided for the Khwārazmian army by the settlements in the region of Syr Darya, which were mentioned several times in the other documents (Baghdādī 1384/2005–2006: 148). Some scholars offer different interpretations of the passage, cf. for example the contradicting interpretations of Paul and Kafesoğlu (Kafesoğlu 2000: 93; Paul 2015b: 147). Bartold (1900: 181) dates the letter to January 1182 whereas Kafesoğlu (2000: 93. n. 69) prefers January 1181 referring to the historical context.

⁷² As can be seen in another letter of Tekesh (Baghdādī 1384/2005–2006: 175–176).

⁷³ Juvaynī 1334/1916: 34; Juvaynī 1958, vol. I: 304–305; see also Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan 2010: 13. For the various forms and the meaning of this chief’s name see Juvaynī 1334/1916: 34. n. 2; Juvaynī 1958, vol. I: 305. n. 67.

⁷⁴ For this group, see Golden 1995–1997: 117–118; Fuad Köprülü 1943: 227–243. Juvaynī does not comment on why Tekesh trusted the Uran, but on another place in his *Tārīkh-i Jahān-Gushāy* he reported that they belong to the tribe of his wife Terken Khatun: Juvaynī 1334/1916: 109, 198; Juvaynī 1958, vol. II: 378, 465; see also Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan–Mūsavi 1373/1994, vol. I: 505–506; Rashīd al-Dīn/Karīmī 1338/1959, vol. I: 366; Rashīduddīn/Thackston 1998–1999, Part II: 250; Rashīd-ad-Dīn/Smirnova 1952: 209–210; Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan 2010: 33; Mīrkhwānd 1339/1960: 407. Such a statement is entirely in accordance with the information in al-Baghdādī’s collection that Tekesh’s steppe in-law was called (actually titled) Alp Qara Uran and can explain why the Khwārazmshāh trusted the Uran during his steppe campaign. The question for the relations between the Uran and Qadīr Buqu Khan should remain open since no evidence for the latter’s tribal affiliation has been preserved and the attempts for his identification as one of the Uran chiefs remain speculative: Bartold 1900: 368–369; Fuad Köprülü 1943: 235; Akhinzhanov 1995: 217–218; see also Kafesoğlu’s objections: Kafesoğlu 2000: 130. n. 19. Likewise, speculative is the statement that Qadīr Buqu Khan had dominated over the region of Sighnaq and Jand, see the literature in n. 12.

⁷⁵ Juvaynī 1334/1916: 34–35; Juvaynī 1958, vol. I: 304–305; see also Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan 2010: 13; Mīrkhwānd 1339/1960: 375–376.



enemies took advantage of their victory and whether it caused some alteration in the political map of the Syr Darya region. But having in mind Kafesoğlu's observation (2000: 129) that Tekesh was not able to answer immediately, due to the importance of the events in Iraq (i.e. 'Irāq-i 'Ajam), the outcome of the battle perhaps strengthened the Qipchaq influence in the area of Sighnaq in the following years.

The documents in al-Baghdādī's collection reveal that in the previous decade the city was in the Khwārazmian sphere of influence and was ruled by its own *malik*. The *malik* himself is not defined as a Qipchaq which suggests that even if he was ethnically related to the Cuman-Qipchaq community he was rather viewed as a political and cultural representative of the townspeople from the riverbanks of Syr Darya. On the other hand, the presence of Qadīr Buqu in the area of Sighnaq hints at some connections between the city and the steppe dwellers. Apparently the Khan was the leader of a steppe grouping whose winter passages were in the surroundings of Sighnaq. Apropos, Tekesh's actions in general follow the classical seasonal pattern of the sedentary campaigns against the Cuman-Qipchaqs. As already mentioned, the Rus' chronicles documented a number of similar incursions into the steppes in the winter or the early spring, and Atsīz's campaign in 1133 apparently followed the same pattern.⁷⁶ It seems that the intention of the latter to assault the same nomadic winter pasturages in the environs of Sighnaq, which must have been Tekesh's goal in 1195, served as a pretext for the appearance of the Khwārazmian troops at the gates of Jand that ended up with the deposition of Kamāl al-Dīn almost fifty years earlier. It is very interesting what prompted Tekesh to undertake such steppe campaign after his return from the remote 'Irāq-i 'Ajam, when he was at the height of his military and political might. Due to the lack of additional evidence the entire episode should be interpreted as an illustration of the key importance of the relation with the Cuman-Qipchaq chiefs from the region of Syr Darya even in a moment of successful Khwārazmian expansion in other directions.

It seems that Tekesh was planning his retaliation for the early spring of 1197, since according to Juvainī when he received the news for the death of his successor Malik-Shāh the heartbroken ruler abandoned his plans for *ghazā'* (Juvaynī 1334/1916: 39; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 309). Most probably the infidels against which this *ghazā'* was planned were the Cuman-Qipchaq tribes from the region of the Syr Darya that had shaken the positions of the Anushteginids in the area with their recent victory.⁷⁷ But no matter the extent of the steppe threat, the problem soon solved itself.⁷⁸ Shortly after the account of the death of Malik-Shāh Juvaynī reports that a conflict arose between Qadīr Buqu and his nephew Alp Direk.⁷⁹ The latter appeared in Jand and sent envoys to Tekesh

⁷⁶ The fact that the decisive battle took place as late as 18 May perhaps should be explained with the time necessary for the previous maneuvers (the retreat of the steppe forces and the following chase), and maybe with the specific climatic features of this particular year. At any rate, the climate and the seasonal migrations of the Eurasian nomads should not be viewed as absolutely deterministic factors for their behavior.

⁷⁷ Yet the possibility that the campaign was directed against other prominent Central Asian infidels – the Qara Khitai, cannot be completely ruled out.

⁷⁸ In Kafesoğlu's (2000: 129) words.

⁷⁹ Juvaynī 1334/1916: 40; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 309. There is an insignificant variation in the form of Qadīr Buqu's name in the referred passage as compared to the form in the description of the events in 1195. Furthermore, the title Khan is used only in one of the manuscripts. Yet, it can hardly be any doubt that both fragments of Juvaynī's narrative describe the same person. As regards Alp Direk, Bartold, and Fuad Köprülü after him identify this chief speculatively with Alp Qara Uran, mentioned in the letters from al-Baghdādī's collection, see n. 102. Akhinzhanov (1995: 219–222), in no less speculative way, identifies Alp Direk with Inalchuq, who carried out the slaughter in Otrar (1218).



informing him that if provided with Khwārazmian support, he will get rid of his uncle and will submit the latter's dominions to the Khwārazmshāh. Tekesh decided to take advantage of the situation and apparently organized a large-scale campaign, since he conducted diplomatic preparation, mobilized troops from various provinces and called his son Muḥammad from Khurāsān. They set out together from Khwārazm in Rabī' al-Awwal 594 (January–February 1198) on yet another winter campaign against the steppe nomads. In the meantime, Qadīr Buqu did not waste time and made an incursion reaching as far as Jand, in order to attack his rebellious nephew. His appearance there coincided with the arrival of the Khwārazmian vanguard, commanded by Muḥammad, who put Qadīr Buqu to flight. After chasing him, Muḥammad managed to capture the steppe chief together with his notables and troops and brought them before his father. In Rabī' al-Ākhir of the same year (February–March) Qadīr Buqu was sent enchained in Khwārazm and thus the campaign was concluded at the end of the winter.⁸⁰

But Tekesh was disappointed in his hopes to establish control over his nomadic neighbors, since in the very same year the remains of Qadīr Buqu's people gathered around his nephew and continued to challenge the Khwārazmian power in the basin of Syr Darya. The Khwārazmshāh was forced to free Qadīr Buqu from captivity and to send him against Alp Direk at the head of a large army' while he himself set out towards Khurāsān and 'Irāq-i 'Ajam. It is noteworthy that this time the Qīpchaqs apparently threatened the Khwārazmian borders in the warmer part of the year since according to Juvainī Qadīr Buqu was released before the arrival of Tekesh in Khurāsān on 2 Dhū al-Ḥijjah 594 (5 Oktober 1198).⁸¹ Soon news arrived of Qadīr Buqu's success against his nephew, which by that time was beneficial for the Khwārazmian politics.⁸²

This episode reveals a very unusual phenomenon – an intervention of a foreign sedentary power in the internal affairs of the Cuman-Qīpchaqs, mirroring their own favorite practice to take part in the internal strife of their settled neighbors. Juvaynī's short and fragmentary evidence suggest the existence of an important tribal grouping whose seasonal migratory roads lay close to the Khwārazmian borders. Apparently, this grouping was more politicized and centralized than the Cuman-Qīpchaq groupings from the Eastern European Steppes. Perhaps this difference is caused by the existence of a strong settled neighbor who, similarly to the Rus', was able to exercise systematic pressure in the steppe, but who was much more homogenous politically as compared to the decentralized Rus' principalities. Was this tribal grouping identical with the one that Tekesh's wife originated from, and which provided him with military potential for his enterprises? The sources do not give an explicit answer to this question, but this seems to be the most logical assumption regarding Terken Khatun's tribal background. In any case, the intervention in the nomadic affairs was a risky business with unpredictable results. Similar to the marriage connections and the regular campaigns in the steppe, such activities did not provide a lasting solution to the problem with the instability that the Cuman-Qīpchaqs generated in the frontier regions. Therefore, in order to deal with the consequences of this unavoidable cohabitation the Khwārazmshāhs had to employ additional measures.

⁸⁰ Juvaynī 1334/1916: 40–41; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 309–310; see also Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan 2010: 14–15; Mirkhwānd 1339/1960: 378–379.

⁸¹ Juvaynī 1334/1916: 41; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 310. see also Rashīd al-Dīn/ Rūshan 2010: 15; Mirkhwānd 1339/1960: 379.

⁸² Juvaynī 1334/1916: 43. n. 2; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 311; see also Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan 2010: 15; Mirkhwānd 1339/1960: 380; Bartold 1900: 368.



The two instances from the chronicle of Juvaynī examined above give another confirmation to the key, but also at the same time double-edged role of Jand, which is described both as a starting point for the operations against the nomads from the Syr Darya area, but also as a contact zone where the nomads themselves strove to interact with the rulers of the Khwārazmian Empire. In fact, even during the reign of the mighty Tekesh the Cuman-Qīpchaqs were able to reach the city during their incursions. Sighnaq on the other hand seems to have been much more peripheral, which corresponds to the significantly lesser amount of source information and suggests even stronger nomadic influence upon its fate.

Other evidence from the reign of Tekesh further complement the picture of a constant nomadic threat in the region of Jand. Kafesoğlu brings attention to the content of the already mentioned edict for the appointment of Malik-Shāh as a governor in the city, preserved in al-Baghdādī's collection. In this document it is stated that the dwellers of Jand inhabited the frontier with the infidels and are worthy guardians of 'the Kingdom of Islam'. In addition, full observation of the rights of the *ghāzīs* and *mujāhids* is provided, and it is ordered that these territories should be kept full of 'chosen and experienced warriors' in order to maintain a constant readiness for the repulsion of sudden assaults.⁸³ Any doubts that the edict may contain clichés without particular historical value disappear when this evidence is compared with a passage from Juvaynī's chronicle. The historian reports that c. 1199 Khwārazmian troops managed to capture a rebel notable, who was not sentenced to death by Tekesh because of his brother's merits. Instead, the Khwārazmshāh ordered that the culprit should be held enchained in prison for one year and 'after that to spend the rest of his life in one of the frontiers with Dār al-Ḥarb, near Jand.' (Juvaynī 1334/1916: 43; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 311). Therefore, even in the end of the rule of one of the mightiest Anūshtegīnids, when the Khwārazmian Empire already claimed the leading position in the Eastern Islamic lands and a senior place in its ruler's harem was occupied by the daughter of a prominent Qīpchaq chief,⁸⁴ the steppe frontier with the infidel Qīpchaqs remained a wild and dangerous place where criminals were banished.

The great commercial importance of Jand is also marked in the aforementioned edict of Tekesh and it is provided that the trade routes should be maintained secure, the life and property of the merchants should be guarded, etc. The instruction that the infidels should not be allowed to disturb the traders is of particular interest, suggesting that on certain occasions the caravans traversing this region had been assaulted by the steppe nomads.⁸⁵ Kafesoğlu (2000: 92) remarks that such an interest towards the commercial activities is not attested in the official documents for other settlements and undoubtedly this is an indication for Jand's economic importance. This aspect is almost never mentioned in the preserved sources from the age, but this seems to be due to the fact that most of them – such as Juvaynī's chronicle and the letters of the Khwārazmshāh Tekesh – have been focused mainly upon the political events. Nevertheless, the very intermediate

⁸³ Kafesoğlu 2000: 91–92; see the entire document in: Baghdādī 1384/2005–2006: 12–29.

⁸⁴ Terken Khatun's position in the court of Tekesh is illustrated by an anecdote related by Jūzjāni: Jūzjāni/Ḥabibi 1343/1964, vol. I: 300–301; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. I: 241.

⁸⁵ Kafesoğlu 2000: 92. Such occasions in the European parts of Dasht-i Qipchāq are documented by the Rus' sources approximately in the same chronological period – around the turn of the 1160s: PSRL, vol. II: 526, 527–528, 538–541; see also Golev 2018b: 71–73 and the literature referred to there. Peter Golden and Thomas Noonan regarded these episodes of Cuman-Qīpchaq hostility towards the merchants that crossed the Eastern European steppes rather as an exception, and not as a lasting practice; Golden 1991: 97–99; see also Golden 1987–1991: 65–66; Noonan 1992: 323–324.



position of Jand between the steppe and the sedentary world combined with the existence of a dynamic waterway like the Syr Darya determined the key role of the commercial activities in the life of this town. Of course, the Khwārazmshāhs were not unaware of the dividends that control over such a marketplace could bring for the state treasure and this must have been one of the motives behind their persistent expansion in this region. Yet, it seems that in Khwārazm priority was given to the geopolitical perspectives that the control over Jand opened towards the steppes and especially to the possibilities for pressure upon the winter pastures of the Cuman-Qïpchaq tribes. Perhaps this is the reason why there is such a scarcity of sources regarding the economic importance of the city.

The successful expansion of the Khwārazmian state during the reign of Tekesh led to the appointment of Malik-Shāh as governor in Khurāsān in 1187, and after Sulṭān-Shāh died in 1193 Muḥammad was also transferred into this region.⁸⁶ In 1194 another son of Tekesh – Yūnus Khan, was appointed as governor of Ray.⁸⁷ Several years later Isfahan was given to Erbüz Khan, a grandson of the Khwārazmshāh (Juvaynī 1334/1916: 39; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 308). Not long before Tekesh's death in 1200 'Alī-Shāh, who used to be a *vālī* of Barchīnliqkent, was also transferred to the west where in his turn he received Isfahan as a residence (Juvaynī 1334/1916: 45; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 313; Ibn al-Athīr 2008: 51). Obviously, the growing ambitions of the Anushteginids made them concentrate the larger part of their attention and energy in the west and the sources do not mention anymore the presence of members of the royal dynasty in the cities along the Syr Darya.

Muḥammad seems to have been something like an expert in the campaigns against the nomads, since he was called upon by his father to take part in the operation against Qadīr Buqu Khan in 1195. This happened despite the fact that at the time the official heir to the throne Malik-Shāh (who had also gained experience in the steppe military operations during the 1180s) was still alive. Such an impression is strengthened by the fact that it was Muḥammad that led the vanguard of the imperial troops during the Khwārazmian intervention in the Qïpchaq internal strife in 1198 when his brother was not alive anymore. Possibly this 'expertise' was related to the Qïpchaq origins of his mother Terken Khatun.⁸⁸ Perhaps the prince's participation in the aforementioned campaigns of Tekesh lies at the root of Jūzjānī's vague evidence that Muḥammad accomplished successfully each undertaking 'in the direction of Jand and Turkistān' on which he was sent by his father (Jūzjānī/Ḥabībī 1343/1964, vol. I: 306; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. I: 254). The inaccurate statement of the same chronicler that by the time of Tekesh's death the prince was in the region of 'Jand and Turkistān' seems to be another reflection of his activities in the steppes.⁸⁹

Thus, although the Anushteginids continued to conduct campaigns against the nomads in the basin of Syr Darya, apparently by the end of Tekesh's reign they abandoned their long-lasting practice to appoint members of the royal house as direct governors in the cities of the region. Perhaps the vast dimensions of the Empire at the turn of the 12th century and its breathtaking ex-

⁸⁶ Juvaynī 1334/1916: 25, 30, 34, 35–36, 39, 40; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 297, 301–302, 304, 305, 308–309. Jūzjānī/Ḥabībī 1343/1964, vol. I: 304, 306; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. I: 250–251, 254; Ibn al-Athīr 2008: 14, 32.

⁸⁷ Juvaynī 1334/1916: 33–34; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 304; see also Jūzjānī/Ḥabībī 1343/1964, vol. I: 304; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. I: 249–250.

⁸⁸ There is no certain evidence whether Malik-Shāh was also born of Terken Khatun, but judging from Ibn al-Athīr's statement that there was 'an inveterate enmity' between the two brothers (Ibn al-Athīr 2008: 32), he probably had a different mother.

⁸⁹ Jūzjānī/Ḥabībī 1343/1964, vol. I: 306; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. I: 254–255. n. 4. Contrary to Jūzjānī's statement, at the time of his father's death Muḥammad was actually occupied with a military operation against the Ismā'īlis in Quhistān; Juvaynī 1334/1916: 46–47; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 314–315; Ibn al-Athīr 2008: 47–48, 51.



pansion in the following two decades led to a change in the priorities of the Khwārazmian court. Indeed, on the eve of the Mongol invasion the sons of Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad II received vast ‘appanages’ in various parts of the Empire which were located far from the frontier settlements in the basin of Syr Darya.⁹⁰ In addition, the sources unambiguously highlight the leading role that the Qipchaq relatives of Muḥammad’s mother Terken Khatun started to play in the Empire during his reign.⁹¹ But if the members of the Khwārazmian elite had hoped that rising the steppe relatives to prominent positions will bring to an end the nomadic incursions in the strategic zone along the Syr Darya, they were dissatisfied. Like his father Tekesh, Muḥammad II was forced to lead personally campaigns against the nomads even at the height of his political might and Jand once again played a key role in these events.

According to Juvaynī Muḥammad was forced to postpone the rift with the Qara Khitay since he was preparing a campaign against the Qipchaqs and he could not risk a Qara Khitay offensive while he was away from his dominions. It was only after his successful return from the ‘ghazā’ against the Qipchaqs’ that he started to plan how to take Transoxiana from the Gürkhan (Juvaynī 1334/1916: 89–90; Juvaini 1958, vol. II: 357–358). In another place of his *Tārīkh-i Jahān-Gushāy* the chronicler reports that while the Khwārazmshāh was in Transoxiana trying to capture this region from the Qara Khitay ‘a crowd of the remnants of Qadīr Khan’s followers’ took advantage of his absence in order ‘to breathe the breath of rebellion’ in the region of Jand. This forced Muḥammad to set towards Jand soon after his return in Khwārazm in order to deal with the restless nomads. After he ‘had extirpated this crowd of robbers’ the Khwārazmshāh had to set on another campaign – this time from Jand towards Samarqand where he had to repel the counter offensive of the Qara Khitay (Juvaynī 1334/1916: 82; Juvaini 1958, vol. II: 349–350).

These passages are part of the Persian chronicler’s contradictory narrative for the last years of the Qara Khitay Empire and it cannot be established with certainty whether they reflect two different conflicts with the Qipchaq tribes or the same campaign was described in two separate accounts.⁹² The events perhaps took place at the end of the first decade of the 13th century.⁹³ Leaving aside the problem of the particular number of campaigns, the information of Juvaynī demonstrates that despite his ambitions for expansion in one of the richest regions of the Eastern Islamic world, Muḥammad could not afford to neglect the operations against the turbulent inhabitants of Dasht-i Qipchāq. The campaign described in the chronicler’s first version was apparently directed towards the steppes outside of the Anūshtegīnids’ immediate control since Juvaynī states that Muḥammad had to be absent from his dominions (Juvaynī 1334/1916: 89; Juvaini 1958, vol. II: 357). In the second version the region of Jand is mentioned as the target of the nomadic incursions and the following Khwārazmian counterattack (Juvaynī 1334/1916: 82; Juvaini 1958, vol. II:

⁹⁰ See for example an-Nasavi 1996: 64–66; *Sīrat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 37–40; Juvaynī 1334/1916: 86, 131, 133–134, 201, 208–209; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 354; vol. II: 401, 403, 468, 474; Jūzjānī/Ḥabībī 1343/1964, vol. I: 309, 314, 315; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. I: 267, 281–282, 285; Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan 2010: 36, 37.

⁹¹ See for example Juvaynī 1334/1916: 109, 198; Juvaini 1958, vol. II: 378, 465; an-Nasavi 1996: 68, 74–75, 77, 82, 213; *Sīrat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 42, 52, 55–56, 62; Mīrkhwānd 1339/1960: 407; Abul’-Gāzī 1906: 34–35.

⁹² For the problematic nature of Juvaynī’s evidence for these events, see Bartold 1900: 381–388; Biran 2005: 71. Kafesoğlu (2000: 182–183) apparently represents both passages as a description of a single event, without commenting on the contradictions in the source.

⁹³ Bartold (1900: 382, 388) supposes that the first of the two campaigns took place in the spring of 1209, and offers no particular chronology for the second; Biran (2005: 74), after Bartold, assumes that the events in the first version happened around 606 AH/1209–1210 AD, and does not mention at all the Qipchaq campaign of the second version.



349–350). Therefore, even when the Khwārazmian Empire was at its zenith the region of the Syr Darya remained vulnerable to nomadic aggression of such a scale that it demanded the presence of the Khwārazmshāh himself.

Jand is also mentioned in the contradictory accounts of Muḥammad's first clash with the Mongols, which predated the Khwārazmian campaign of Genghis Khan (1219–1221) and probably took place some time in the second half of the 1210s. Among the various sources⁹⁴ of interest for the present subject are the accounts of Juvaynī and Jūzjānī. The two authors are unanimous that the conflict with the Mongol troops occurred during a steppe campaign of Muḥammad, but they contradict each other regarding the adversaries against which the operation was initially aimed. According to Juvaynī, the Khwārazmshāh's original objective was to neutralize the remnants of the Merkits, whom the Mongol pressure forced to withdraw westward, towards the habitat of the Qangli.⁹⁵ The newcomers were apparently considered a threat to the Khwārazmian influence in the steppes. The Persian author states that Muḥammad set towards Jand aiming at the fugitives, but after receiving information on the approach of the Mongols he came back to gather additional forces, and passing once again through Jand he crossed beyond the Syr Darya.⁹⁶ According to Jūzjānī, Muḥammad entered Turkistān chasing Qadīr Khan the Tatar and the conflict with the Mongols took place only after the Khwārazmshāh defeated this chief (Jūzjānī/Ḥabībī 1343/1964, vol. I: 309–310; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. I: 267–269). In another place of his *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāsirī* the same author reports that the campaign was aimed at looting the tribes of 'Qadīr Khan of Turkistān'.⁹⁷ These sources support the assumption that the Qipchaq tribes in Central Asia were somehow related also to this campaign of Muḥammad. Indeed, such a 'steppe relation' would come as no wonder having in mind the fragmentary source material for the Khwārazmian steppe policy. The preserved accounts demonstrate that the Khwārazmshāhs had to lead campaigns in the steppes periodically, interrupting the rest of their undertakings in order to keep the Khwārazmian influence among the Qipchaq tribes, and to provide at least temporary relief

⁹⁴ Review of the main sources for the first battle between the Khwārazmshāh and the Mongols see in: Bartold 1900: 397–400; Buell 1992: 9–16.

⁹⁵ In the *Secret History* it is reported that the Merkit refugees headed towards 'the country of the Qanglin and the Kimčā'ut' and according to *Yuanshi* 元史 and Rashīd al-Dīn they fled to the Qipchaqs, *The Secret History of the Mongols* 2006, vol. I: § 198, p. 126; Khrapachevsky 2013: 46, 73; Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan–Mūsavī 1373/1994, vol. I: 95; Rashīd al-Dīn/Karīmī 1338/1959, vol. I: 72–73; Rashīduddīn/Thackston 1998–1999, Part I: 53; Rashīd-ad-Dīn/Khetagurov 1952: 115–116.

⁹⁶ Juvaynī 1334/1916: 101–102; Juvaini 1958, vol. II: 370; see also Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan–Mūsavī 1373/1994, vol. I: 475; Rashīd al-Dīn/Karīmī 1338/1959, vol. I: 344–345; Rashīduddīn/Thackston 1998–1999, Part I: 235; Rashīd-ad-Dīn/Smirnova 1952: 189; Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan 2010: 32.

⁹⁷ Jūzjānī/Ḥabībī 1343/1964, vol. II: 149; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. II: 1096–1097. There is a discrepancy between the two versions regarding the name and the tribal affiliation of Qadīr Khan's father. The patronyms seem to have been preserved in a distorted form, but the tribal affiliations are of great interest. In the first version the father of the Khan is defined as a Tatar and in the second as a member of the Yemek grouping. But there can hardly be any doubt that it is the same Qadīr Khan, who belonged to the tribal elite of the Cuman-Qipchaq tribes. In fact, according to one of Jūzjānī's versions for the origin of Terken Khatun, she was the daughter of Qadīr Khan the Qipchaq; Jūzjānī/Ḥabībī 1343/1964, vol. I: 306, 313; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. I: 254; see also Jūzjānī/Ḥabībī 1343/1964, vol. I: 313; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. I: 279. Unfortunately, it cannot be established with certainty whether there was some relation between 'the Qipchaq' and 'the Tatar/Yemek' Qadīr Khan. But if al-Nasāvī's version for the origin of Terken Khatun from the Yemek grouping is taken into consideration, it seems not impossible that Muḥammad fought the tribe of his father-in-law (an-Nasāvī 1996: 65, 82; *Sirat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 38, 62).



from the pressure upon their steppe border.⁹⁸ The mentioning of Jand as a starting point of this operation of Muḥammad also corresponds with the strategic role of the city as an outpost for operations against the steppe nomads.

Naturally, warfare was not the only remedy against the troubles caused by these restless neighbors and as early as the times of Il-Arslan (if not earlier) the Anushteginids began entering into alliances with the chiefs of the steppe groupings. Muḥammad himself was a product of precisely such a marital alliance and his father Tekesh managed to use this marriage in order to channel the Qipchaq energy to the advantage of the Khwārazmian policy. During the reign of Muḥammad the integration of the Cuman-Qipchaqs reached its height and apparently this ruler used an interesting combination of measures, aimed at providing peace for his dominions in the basin of Sur Darya. On the one hand, following the actions of his great grandfather Atsiz in the case of Jand, he deposed the local rulers in some of the cities under Khwārazmian domination. Such, for instance, was the fate of the Qarakhanid *malik* of Otrar, who apparently tried to maintain a balance between Khwārazm and the Qara Khitai, but eventually in 1210 he was banished to Nasā, where he was later executed.⁹⁹ The *malik* of Sighnaq was perhaps also deprived of his dominions, but unlike the case of Otrar the concrete circumstances surrounding this process have not been described in the sources. In any event, 'two sons of the ruler (*ṣāhib*) of Sighnaq, which is in the Country of the Turks' were in the capital of the Anushteginids during the Mongol invasion. They were executed there together with a number of other captured rulers and notables on the orders of Terken Khatun, when she decided to leave Khwārazm.¹⁰⁰

The fact that Muḥammad tightened his rule over the cities along the Syr Darya is not surprising per se, but his choice of personnel for the vacated positions of governors seems rather unexpected. The Khwārazmshāh appointed in a number of settlements in the region members of the Qipchaq tribal elites, who thus became representatives of the Khwārazmian military-administrative apparatus. In this respect the case of Otrar is particularly indicative, where on the eve of the Mongol invasion the governor was Muḥammad's close relative on his mother side, notorious for the provocation of the Otrar incident.¹⁰¹ Abū al-Ghāzī narrates: "The son of the younger brother of Turken's father – Inalchuq – had come to the Sultan, embraced Islam and the Sultan gave him the Turkistān region, where he was ruler. "From this day onwards – the Sultan told him – nobody should call you Inalchuq, but they should call you Gair Khan" (Abul'-Gazi 1906: 34). Giving the title of khan to the steppe relative is an indication for his assignment to the Khwārazmian military-administrative nomenclature (Bunijatov 1986: 90–91). Other Cuman-Qipchaq chiefs

⁹⁸ On the other end of the vast Dasht-i Qipchāq the Rus' princes periodically undertook campaigns in the interior of the steppes too in order to relieve the Cuman pressure, to rise their own prestige, and, naturally, to acquire rich booty, see in general Golev 2013: 211–244.

⁹⁹ Juvaynī 1334/1916: 80–81; Juvaini 1958, vol. II: 347–348; an-Nasavi 1996: 61–63; *Sirat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 33–36; Bartold 1900: 391; Kochnev 2006: 236.

¹⁰⁰ An-Nasavi 1996: 78–79; *Sirat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 57. Perhaps the sons in question were grandsons or great grandsons of the *Malik* of Sighnaq, mentioned in Tekesh's letter from the early 1180s.

¹⁰¹ The sources give various forms of his name and contradict each other as regards the precise degree of his relation with Terken Khatun: (an-Nasavi 1996: 73–75, 305. n. 5, 306. n. 6; *Sirat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 50–52; Jūzjānī/Ḥabībī 1343/1964, vol. I: 311; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. I: 272; Jūzjānī/Ḥabībī 1343/1964, vol. II: 103–104; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. II: 966–968; Juvaynī 1329/1912: 58–62; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 77–81; Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan-Mūsavī 1373/1994, vol. I: 471–475; Rashīd al-Dīn/Karīmī 1338/1959, vol. I: 341–344; Rashiduddin/Thackston 1998–1999, Part I: 233–235; Rashid-ad-Din/Smirnova 1952: 187–189; Rashīd al-Dīn/ Rūshan 2010: 31; see also Ibn al-Athīr 2008: 205; Bar Hebraeus 2003: 357; Bartold 1900: 428–429.



were also appointed as governors of cities in the basin of Syr Darya. Perhaps this was the case with Iletgü *Malik*, who commanded the Qangli garrison of Banākat when the Mongol invaders appeared in 1219.¹⁰² At the same time the defense of Jand and the region was entrusted to another relative of Muḥammad on his mother side – Buchi Pahlavān, having the title of Qutluḡ Khan.¹⁰³ He was also the brother of one of the Sultan's wives.¹⁰⁴ Qutluḡ Khan is called by Juvaynī *Amīr-i Amīrān*, and according to the chronicler he had a large army under his command. Yet, despite this he did not wait for the appearance of the Mongols, but abandoned Jand and fled to Khwārazm.¹⁰⁵

The fact that Jand, Sighnaq and Barchīnliqkent were among the cities that formed the first line of defense against the advancing Mongols is also indicative for the importance of the settlements of the Syr Darya region as a steppe outpost of the Khwārazmian Empire.¹⁰⁶ The troops in Otrar commanded by Inalchuq were called '*Lashkar-i Bīrūnī*'¹⁰⁷ – 'External army', which illustrates the strategic role of this Qīpchaq chief.

It must be pointed out, however, that the practice of appointing Qīpchaq tribal notables on key positions in the empire was not restricted to the basin of the Syr Darya. During the reign of Muḥammad relatives of Terken Khatun were installed as governors in a number of other cities throughout the Khwārazmian Empire. Such was for example the case with Tört Oba, who in 1207 was appointed as *Shihna* of Samarqand,¹⁰⁸ while in the same period Kōzli governed Nīshāpūr.¹⁰⁹ Amin Malik, another member of the same Cuman-Qīpchaq lineage, ruled Harāt for more than

¹⁰² Juvaynī 1329/1912: 70; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 91; Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan–Mūsavī 1373/1994, vol. I: 492; Rashīd al-Dīn/Karīmī 1338/1959, vol. I: 356; Rashīduddīn/Thackston 1998–1999, Part I: 243; Rashīd-ad-Dīn/Smirnova 1952: 201; Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan 2010: 31; Bar Hebraeus 2003: 357. For the dating of the appearance of the Mongol troops in the Khwārazmian Empire, see Bartold 1900: 438.

¹⁰³ According to al-Nasāvī, Buchi Pahlavān received the title of Qutluḡ Khan as a reward, since he had distinguished himself during the first battle between the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad II and the Mongols (an-Nasavī 1996: 49; *Sirat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 18).

¹⁰⁴ In accordance with the practice of the last Anushteginids to marry women from the clan of Terken Khatun; an-Nasavī 1996: 65, 80, 213; *Sirat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 38, 59–60; Jūzjānī/Hābībī 1343/1964, vol. I: 313; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. I: 279).

¹⁰⁵ Juvaynī 1329/1912: 68; vol. II: 131; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 88; vol. II: 401; Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan–Mūsavī 1373/1994, vol. I: 491, 511; Rashīd al-Dīn/Karīmī 1338/1959, vol. I: 355, 370; Rashīduddīn/Thackston 1998–1999, Part II: 242; Rashīd-ad-Dīn/Smirnova 1952: 200, 214; an-Nasavī 1996: 96; *Sirat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 85). It is possible that Qutluḡ Khan was responsible for the defense of a larger part of the Syr Darya region, since according to al-Nasāvī he, together with other commanders and ten thousand horsemen, was placed in Shahrkent (i.e. Yangikent in the river delta, see n. 66), and the defense of Jand was entrusted to another general (an-Nasavī 1996: 76; *Sirat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 54). This hypothesis is supported by Juvaynī's narrative for the capture of Sighnaq, Özkend, Barchīnliqkent and Ashnas. Their conquest is represented as a prelude to the capture of Jand and the chronicler does not mention the presence of any Khwārazmian commander whatsoever in these cities, as well as in Shahrkent, which was taken later on; Juvaynī 1329/1912: 66–70; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 86–91; Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan–Mūsavī 1373/1994, vol. I: 490–492; Rashīd al-Dīn/Karīmī 1338/1959, vol. I: 354–356; Rashīduddīn/Thackston 1998–1999, Part II: 242–243; Rashīd-ad-Dīn/Smirnova 1952: 199–201).

¹⁰⁶ As pointed out by Kafesoğlu (2000: 250).

¹⁰⁷ Juvaynī 1329/1912: 64; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 82; an-Nasavī 1996: 307. n. 5. Troops from the same 'external army' were also located in Bukhārā, and apparently there was another Qīpchaq chief among their commanders, see n. 110.

¹⁰⁸ Juvaynī 1334/1916: 76, 81, 83–84; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 343, 349, 351; Biran 2005: 72–73.

¹⁰⁹ Ibn al-Athīr even calls him 'a leading magnate of the state'; Ibn al-Athīr 2008: 127, 129, 130; for him see also Juvaynī 1334/1916: 69–73; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 336–340; an-Nasavī 1996: 180–181.



a decade, until the Mongol invasion.¹¹⁰ By the time of this onslaught one of the Sultan's maternal uncles was among the commanders in Samarqand,¹¹¹ while another brother of the mighty royal mother, Khumar Tegin, was among the leaders of the garrison in the Anushteginid capital Gurgānj. Due to the absence of the princes of the dynasty from the city and on the grounds of his own relation to the royal house Khumar Tegin was even proclaimed Sultan,¹¹² but in the face of the steady Mongol advance his reign was nothing more than an ephemeral episode of the Khwārazmian Empire's agony.¹¹³ Most probably a number of other military commanders of Muḥammad and his son Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn Mingburnu (1220–1231), whose origins are not specified in the sources, were also of Qipchaq descent.¹¹⁴

There is no doubt that the appearance of many Qipchaq chiefs on key positions in the entire empire reflects the general increase of the Qipchaq influence in the state of the Anushteginids during the last decades of its existence. But the fact that Qipchaq leaders whom Muḥammad was not always able to hold in submission¹¹⁵ received control over strategic segments of the steppe border in the basin of Syr Darya is particularly indicative. Thus, commanders of steppe background, the larger part of whose troops undoubtedly consisted of members of the Cuman-Qipchaq tribal community, received control over some of the settlements which the Khwārazmshāhs once used as bases for their pressure upon the nomads from Dasht-i Qipchāq. Obviously, there was a deal between the Anushteginids and the tribal elites of the neighboring Cuman-Qipchaqs, which aimed at reducing the tension along the steppe border. As part of this deal the Cuman-Qipchaq chiefs were integrated in the high military-administrative strata of the empire and

¹¹⁰ According to Ibn al-Athīr he was 'one of his [Muḥammad II's] leading emirs'. His name and title vary in the different sources: Ibn al-Athīr 2008: 130–131, 229; an-Nasavi 1996: 104, 119–123, 126, 127, 315. n. 6; *Sīrat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 92–93, 106–112, 116, 117; Juvaynī 1334/1916: 135–141, 147, 192–196; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 404–410, 415, 460–463; Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan–Mūsavī 1373/1994, vol. I: 521–526; Rashīd al-Dīn/Karīmī 1338/1959, vol. I: 376; Rashīduddīn/Thackston 1998–1999, Part II: 256; Rashīd-ad-Dīn/Smirnova 1952: 220–223; Jūzjānī/Ḥabībī 1343/1964, vol. I: 316, vol. II: 116–119; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. I: 287, vol. II: 1012–1023; *The Secret History of the Mongols* 2006, vol. I, § 257: 189–191; vol. II: 942–943; *Yuanshi* 2009: 158.

¹¹¹ The various sources contradict each other regarding the name of this relative of the Sultan: an-Nasavi 1996: 76; *Sīrat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 54; Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan–Mūsavī 1373/1994, vol. I: 478; Rashīd al-Dīn/Karīmī 1338/1959, vol. I: 346; Rashīduddīn/Thackston 1998–1999, Part I: 236; Rashīd-ad-Dīn/Smirnova 1952: 191. Apparently, he was executed after the capture of Samarqand by the Mongols, together with many other chiefs and warriors of the Qanglī; Juvaynī 1329/1912: 95; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 121; Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan–Mūsavī 1373/1994, vol. I: 503; Rashīd al-Dīn/Karīmī 1338/1959, vol. I: 364; Rashīduddīn/Thackston 1998–1999, Part II: 249; Rashīd-ad-Dīn/Smirnova 1952: 208. n. 3.

¹¹² Juvaynī 1329/1912: 97–98; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 124; Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan–Mūsavī 1373/1994, vol. I: 513; Rashīd al-Dīn/Karīmī 1338/1959, vol. I: 371–372; Rashīduddīn/Thackston 1998–1999, Part II: 253–254; Rashīd-ad-Dīn/Smirnova 1952: 215; Abul'-Gazi 1906: 34.

¹¹³ For the influence of some of these chiefs in the Khwārazmian Empire see also the comments of Yorulmaz 2006: 160; Yorulmaz 2012: 106.

¹¹⁴ Such seems to have been the case with Kōk Khan, one of the commanders of the 'external army' in Bukhārā during the Mongol invasion; Abul'-Gazi 1906: 34; Juvaynī 1329/1912: 80, 82; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 103, 106; Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan–Mūsavī 1373/1994, vol. I: 498; Rashīd al-Dīn/Karīmī 1338/1959, vol. I: 360; Rashīduddīn/Thackston 1998–1999, Part II: 246; Rashīd-ad-Dīn/Smirnova 1952: 205. This assumption is very likely for commanders, whose warriors were explicitly defined as Qanglī and Turks, such as Barīshmas Khan, Sarsīgh Khan and Ulagh Khan from the garrison of Samarqand; Juvaynī 1329/1912: 95; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 121; Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan–Mūsavī 1373/1994, vol. I: 503; Rashīd al-Dīn/Karīmī 1338/1959, vol. I: 364; Rashīduddīn/Thackston 1998–1999, Part II: 249; Rashīd-ad-Dīn/Smirnova 1952: 208.

¹¹⁵ Particularly indicative in this regard is al-Nasāvī's comment that the Khwārazmshāh was unable to deliver Inal Khan to the Mongols after the Otrar Incident due to his kinship with large part of the troops and the prominent emirs; an-Nasavi 1996: 74–75; *Sīrat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 52.



received control over the cities along the Syr Darya, which once stood at the epicenter of the conflict between the nomads and Khwārazm. Thus, under the banner of the imperial ruling apparatus the steppe in-laws of the Anushteginids obtained much bigger influence in the region than their forefathers were ever able to gain. Apparently, the deal was made with one particular steppe grouping, since the source material examined above demonstrates that almost all imperial notables of Qipchaq descent were considered by the medieval authors to be related to the tribe of Terken Khatun. Their appearance in the empire is eloquently described by Abū al-Ghāzī: 'From the Qangli people, everybody, who was in close kinship with his [Tekesh's] wife, was coming to the Sultan [Muḥammad] for service. They were embracing the Muslim faith and were receiving appointments' (Abul'-Gazi 1906: 34). Eventually such a concentration of power in the members of a single grouping turned out to be particularly dangerous for the Anūshteginids, without even eliminating completely the possibility for a conflict with the steppe relatives. It is hard to esteem what were the relations between the Qipchaq 'governors' and their nomadic counterparts in the Dasht-i Qipchāq, but apparently not everybody was happy, since Muḥammad was forced to lead campaigns in the interior of the steppes until the very arrival of the Mongols in the region.

Such dynamics in the contact zone with the inhabitants of Dasht-i Qipchāq are typical of settled states that have vast steppe frontier and enter into contact with many groupings. Two instances from the second half of the 12th c., documented by the Rus' chronicles, clearly demonstrate the dangerous and unpredictable twists that could be caused by the parallel parleys with more than one Cuman-Qipchaq grouping.¹¹⁶ Apparently, the steppe relatives of Muḥammad were sometimes among the dissatisfied too, which is not unusual for the cohabitation with the restless Cuman-Qipchaq tribes, as demonstrated by other events in the history of the Rus' principalities.¹¹⁷ Even the Qipchaq relatives that received senior offices in various parts of the empire often followed their own interests and betrayed the Anūshteginids. This behavior is a manifestation of the general instability brought by the increase of the Qipchaq influence in the vast empire.¹¹⁸ One can only speculate on what the consequences of the Qipchaq control over strategic steppe outposts and the growing influence of these nomads in general upon the development of the Khwārazmian state would have been, had the Mongol invasion not caused its abrupt collapse.

The sources for the history of the Khwārazmshāhs Anushteginids offer some, albeit limited, information regarding the social history of Jand. Without ceasing to be a focal point of warriors for the faith and merchants¹¹⁹ (two typical categories of visitors and dwellers in the frontier settlements), Jand apparently acquired many of the characteristic features of the classical Islamic cities.

¹¹⁶ *Sub anno* 1169/1172: *PSRL*, vol. I: 357–361; *PSRL*, vol. II: 555–559; and *sub anno* 1193: *PSRL*, vol. II: 675–676.

¹¹⁷ See for instance *sub anno* 1096: *PSRL*, vol. I: 231–232; see also *PSRL*, vol. II: 221–222; and *sub anno* 1185: *PSRL*, vol. II: 644.

¹¹⁸ It is enough to remember the treason of the Uran during the steppe campaign of Tekesh (see above in the text), the plot of members of the same tribe against the life of Muḥammad II (see the sources referred in n. 72), the treason of Tört Oba (see n. 105) as well as the treachery of Kōzli (see n. 106). With regard to the instability of the Qipchaq factor the uncontrollable behavior of Amin Malik should also be mentioned. Although he did not betray Jalāl al-Dīn, his actions caused a rift between the supporters of this ruler paving the way to his defeat in the battle on the bank of Indus in 1221 (see n. 107).

¹¹⁹ Juvaynī states that when the Mongols besieged Jand in 1219 the larger part of its inhabitants 'had never seen war'; Juvaynī 1329/1912: 69; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 89; see also Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan-Mūsavī 1373/1994, vol. I: 491; Rashīd al-Dīn/Karīmī 1338/1959, vol. I: 355; Rashiduddin/Thackston 1998–1999, Part II: 243; Rashid-ad-Din/Smirnova 1952: 200). But this statement should hardly be taken at face value, given the fact that according to the same chronicler only two decades earlier a death sentence was replaced with banishment in the frontier region of Jand.



According to Yāqūt, who visited the town on the eve of the Mongol invasion, its inhabitants belonged to the *Ḥanafī madhab*.¹²⁰ In the reign of Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad II, Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Jandī was *Qāḍī ʿaskar*, and for a while he became a *Qāḍī* of Nishāpūr and its surroundings.¹²¹ Therefore, some members of the highest circles of the '*Ulamā*' in the vast Khwārazmian Empire stemmed from Jand.

One comment of al-Nasāvī, the biographer of Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn, throws additional light upon some processes that were developing in the city. According to this author Ṣadr al-Dīn owed his career to his descent, as his forefathers 'served Sultan Tekesh in the time when he was ruler of Jand, given to him as an *iqṭā'* by his father Il-Arslan' (an-Nasavi 1996: 68; *Sīrat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 42–43). Apparently the Anushteginids who had been sent to govern Jand had found support for their power among members of the local population with whom they entered into close and lasting patronage-client relations. Thus, the importance of the city and the fact that it was a residence of a member of the royal house had formed a specific two-way relationship between the princes and the citizens. On the one hand, the necessity of a reliable steppe outpost in the strategic region demanded the constant presence of the Anushteginids in Jand and the maintenance of a loyal circle of supporters in the city. On the other, the ensuing rise of these princes as Khwārazmshāhs opened bright perspectives for administrative career at imperial level for the 'Jand lobby' that had emerged around them. The existence of such a lobby is attested by al-Nasāvī's statement that during the appointment of Ṣadr al-Dīn as a *Qāḍī* of Nishāpūr, it was not only him who was distinguished, but also more than twenty persons among his brothers, *Nā'ibs* and *Vakīls* (an-Nasavi 1996: 69; *Sīrat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 43). Therefore, a large group of relatives and associates of Ṣadr al-Dīn also held important offices in the imperial administration. This also suggests, inter alia, that in Jand educational institutions existed that would allow at least the initial training of these officials. The influence of the 'Jand lobby' was undoubtedly strengthened further by the fact that most of the Anushteginids that were governors in Jand later mounted the imperial throne.

Another citizen of Jand, named Fakhr al-Dīn 'Alī b. Abū al-Qāsīm al-Jandī rose to the post of Head Vizier during the reign of the last Anushteginid – Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn. His career attracted the attention of the sources, which allows for certain additional conclusions regarding the social structure of the city. According to al-Nasāvī he started his service as a financial official in the '*divān* of Jand' (an-Nasavi 1996: 140; *Sīrat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 134), while vizier in the city was Najīb al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī. The latter had to be represented by his son, since he served with Muḥammad 'in the days when the Sultan was still commander of the troops in Khurāsān' (an-Nasavi 1996: 140; *Sīrat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 134). This episode indicates that by the beginning of the 13th c. the administration in Jand was headed by a vizier,¹²² who in the case of al-Shahrazūrī was a member of the large class of imperial officials of diverse origins and, as indicated by his

¹²⁰ See Bosworth 2008/2012; see also *MITT*: 416.

¹²¹ An-Nasavi 1996: 68–69; *Sīrat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 42–44. Ṣadr al-Dīn quickly lost his *Qāḍī* office, since he found himself involved in the conflict between Muḥammad and one of his mother's protégés.

¹²² From another passage of al-Nasāvī it becomes evident that by the time the Mongols appeared on his borders Muḥammad had a separate vizier for 'the Country of the Turks' named al-Ṣafī al-Aqra', whose deputy in Otrar was Badr al-Dīn al-'Amīd (an-Nasavi 1996: 77; *Sīrat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 55). Regrettably, there is no evidence what was the extent of the territory administered by him, but apparently 'the Country of the Turks' included precisely the cities of the Syr Darya region – at least Sīghnaq was certainly within its boundaries (see n. 123). Perhaps the traditional for the Islamic World practice of separation of civil and military power in this case had the additional aim to limit the Qīpchaq influence over the settlements in the basin of Syr Darya and to preserve for the central power at least the control over the administrative apparatus and the tax incomes from the region. But as to Otrar



nisba, was not related to the region but stemmed from Iraqi Kurdistan.¹²³ Apparently a separate *divān* also functioned in Jand, which together with the presence of a vizier, indicates that the city was fully incorporated into the Khwārazmian fiscal and administrative system. It seems that the appointment of an outsider for a vizier in the town was not a result of the Anūshteginids' consistent policy since Fakhr al-Dīn himself also managed to receive that office (an-Nasavi 1996: 140–141; *Sīrat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 134–135).

There is some evidence leading to the assumption that a significant part of the citizens of Jand were Turkic speakers – descendants of settled nomads or Turkicised Central Asian Iranians. This assumption is supported by a phrase in Tekesh's edict for the appointment of Malik-Shāh 'everybody – from near and far, Turks and Tajiks'¹²⁴, as well as by the words of al-Nasāvī, who twice emphasized that Fakhr al-Dīn was eloquent in Turkic (an-Nasavi 1996: 142, 276; *Sīrat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 136, 263) and pointed that he was 'very favorable towards the Turks'¹²⁵. The linguistic proximity undoubtedly facilitated the contacts between the citizens and the Cuman-Qīpchaqs, but the whole line of evidence for the urban Islamic social structure of Jand attests that both groups belonged to two neighboring, yet completely different worlds.

Regrettably, the sources regarding Sīghnaq contain no similar evidence that could shed some light upon the social and ethnic dynamics in the city. In this regard the statement of al-Nasāvī that the city lies 'in the Country of the Turks'¹²⁶ could be useful. But it should be interpreted rather as a political marker, designating the coexistence with the neighboring steppe nomads, and not as an indication for the ethnic and linguistic profile of the population of the city. And yet, having in mind the earlier evidence of Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī, it can be assumed with a reasonable degree of certainty that in Sīghnaq Turkic speakers were a significant part of the inhabitants as well. Apparently, they were also devoted Muslims, since according to Juvaynī the citizens lynched the Muslim negotiator that the Mongols sent to them shouting the *Takbīr*.¹²⁷ Naturally, this deed brought upon them the terrible revenge of the Mongols when they captured the city after storming it for seven days.¹²⁸

itself, the attempt of the central government to seek support among the members of the local elite eventually turned out to be ineffective since Badr al-Dīn al-'Amīd himself lost a large part of his family during the process of the establishment of Khwārazmian power in the city and willingly passed over to the side of the Mongol invaders.

¹²³ See Boyle's comment: Juvaini 1958: 153.

¹²⁴ Baghdādī 1384/2005–2006: 14. It should be pointed out, however, that the phrase 'Turks and Tajiks' alone cannot serve as an indicator for the ethnic composition of the population in Jand since it may have been used rhetorically – in the sense of 'everybody'. In this regard see for example the usage of this expression in some passages of Juvaynī: Juvaynī 1329/1912: 50, 70; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 318, 337.

¹²⁵ An-Nasavi 1996: 276; *Sīrat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 263. The statement of the same author that the vizier was not capable of writing even a single line in Persian without several mistakes (an-Nasavi 1996: 276; *Sīrat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 263) may be another indication that his mother tongue was Turkic, but it may also be explained with insufficient education or with subjectivism on the part of al-Nasāvī.

¹²⁶ An-Nasavi 1996: 79; *Sīrat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986: 57.

¹²⁷ I.e. the expression 'Allāhu akbar'.

¹²⁸ Juvaynī 1329/1912: 67; Juvaini 1958, vol. I: 86–87; see also Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan–Mūsavī 1373/1994, vol. I: 490; Rashīd al-Dīn/Karīmī 1338/1959, vol. I: 354–355; Rashiduddin/Thackston 1998–1999, Part II: 242; Rashid-ad-Din/Smirnova 1952: 199.



CONCLUSION

Several conclusions could be made based on the available sources for the history of Jand and Sighnaq in the period of the Cuman-Qipchaq domination in Dasht-i Qipchāq and the rise of the Anushteginids in Central Asia. In the first place, despite the unquestionable commercial importance of the two cities and their hinterlands for the Khwārazmians, their value remained primarily geopolitical. The two settlements and Jand in particular could serve both as a buffer against the nomadic incursions and as a convenient outpost for pressure against the steppe dwellers.

The larger amount of evidence for Jand leads to the conclusion that it was the main contact point between the Cuman-Qipchaq tribes and the Anūshteginids. Through most of their cohabitation the city was in Khwārazmian hands and was usually governed by a prince from the royal dynasty. Even in the cases when Jand was outside Anushteginid control, before it finally fell under Khwārazmian dominance in the mid-12th c. its inhabitants were apparently ruled by a local dynasty, perhaps a branch of the Qarakhanids. The existence of these local rulers attests that the citizens of Jand were not subjected (at least not directly) to the nomadic chiefs.

The Qipchaqs themselves demonstrated clear interest towards the city and its environs, and their presence in the region is reflected in the sources entirely in the context of military conflicts and political events. For them Jand was the gate towards the dominions of the Anushteginids where their chiefs came to offer their services for yet another joint campaign, to seek political support for their own ambitions in the interior of Dasht-i Qipchāq or to attack their Khwārazmian neighbors. Apart from the large-scale events of that nature, described on the pages of the historical sources, fragmentary evidence from the period attests to the existence of much smaller in scale nomadic incursions, which were perhaps much more frequent. Undoubtedly the Qipchaqs visited Jand and the other cities in the basin of Syr Darya with more peaceful purposes too, such as trade for example, but regrettably the medieval narrative sources do not mark this aspect of their presence in the region. Sedentary merchants perhaps also used these settlements as starting points for their enterprises in the steppe. In any event the routes of the slave traders who visited Dasht-i Qipchāq in order to purchase slaves from the local tribes and subsequently to sell them off in Transoxiana¹²⁹ must have passed precisely through the cities along the Syr Darya.

As regards Sighnaq, it is obvious that winter pasturages on which the Cuman-Qipchaq tribes raised their tents every year were situated in its surroundings. The fact that it was located at a larger distance from Khwārazm and its proximity to the nomadic winter quarters explain the much more limited source material for this town, which was even more exposed to the nomadic influence. The statement of al-Nasāvī that Sighnaq was located ‘in the Country of the Turks’¹³⁰ is not made by chance. As for Akhinzhanov’s hypothesis on the existence of a separate Sighnaq Cuman-Qipchaq grouping, this designation is hardly suitable, since for the nomads who wintered in the surroundings of the city this was only one of their seasonal locations. Furthermore, in terms of politics the settlement apparently remained outside Qipchaq control and could not be regarded as the center of such a tribal entity. In the last decades of the 12th c. and the first years of

¹²⁹ Such was for instance the fate of the future Sultan of Delhi Shams al-Dīn Iltutmīsh (1211–1236). According to Jūzjāni he originated from ‘the tribes of Ölberli’ and was sold off as a child in ‘Turkistān’ whence he was later delivered in Bukhara; Jūzjāni/Ḥabībī 1343/1964, vol. I: 440–441; Juzjani/Raverty 1970, vol. I: 598–600.

¹³⁰ See n. 123.



the 13th c. Sighnaq was ruled by its own *malik* or a dynasty of *maliks* who accepted Khwārazmian suzerainty and are mentioned separately from the Qipchaq allies of the Anūshteginids.

The members of the Cuman-Qipchaq nobility only managed to obtain prominent military and political positions in the cities of the Syr Darya region on the eve of the Mongol invasion. Yet, despite their significant influence in the empire, the Cuman-Qipchaq chiefs ruled these urban centers on behalf of the Anūshteginids. Furthermore, the settlements along the river were under the administrative and fiscal control of the Khwārazmian state apparatus, as demonstrated by the cases of Jand and Otrar. This is why even the peak of Qipchaq presence in the cities of the Syr Darya basin cannot be regarded as a prevalence of the Qipchaq influence over the area. At most, it could be qualified as a synthesis of the sedentary and the nomadic military-political factors in the region, where members of the steppe tribal elite exercised their power under the supremacy of the Anūshteginids.

As regards the contacts between the Cuman-Qipchaqs and the inhabitants of Jand and Sighnaq, it is indicative that Juvaynī comments neither on the feelings of their inhabitants towards the nomadic chiefs in the surroundings of their cities nor on their attitude towards the outcome of the conflicts between the latter and the Anūshteginids. The townsfolk of both settlements is absent as a factor for the contacts with the Qipchaqs in the letters of Tekesh as well. This tendency is in sharp contrast with the way Ibn Bibī described the behavior of the inhabitants of the Crimean port of Sudaq, when a Saljuq fleet appeared near the coast of the peninsula. Whereas Ibn Bibī represents the citizens of Sudaq as initiators of a Qipchaq intervention on their behalf,¹³¹ in Juvaynī's history and the letters of Tekesh Jand and Sighnaq are merely scenes of the described events and their inhabitants were never mentioned in the context of the relations between the Cuman-Qipchaqs and the Khwārazmians.¹³² Naturally, this peculiarity of the sources could be explained by the fact that Juvaynī focuses mainly upon the deeds of the important political figures of the era, and Tekesh aimed at sending particular political messages in his correspondence, rather than depicting a detailed socio-political picture of the region. And yet, if the townsfolk in the two settlements had been in close relation with the Qipchaqs, which similarly to the case of Sudaq had political dimensions, this fact would have left some trace in the sources. This is why the question of whether the Qipchaqs were able to exercise even a loose political supremacy over Jand and Sighnaq during the period of their cohabitation with the Anūshteginids in the region of the Syr Darya has to receive a negative answer. This development in the relations between nomads and citizens was caused not so much by the lack of Qipchaq desire for influence upon the settlements along the Syr Darya, but was rather due to the solid barrier which the Khwārazmian presence in the region put before such ambitions.

This does not mean that the inhabitants of Jand and Sighnaq did not maintain relations with the Cuman-Qipchaq tribes that frequented the surroundings of their cities. Due to the Khwārazmian presence the nomads were simply not able to become a primary political factor and to impose their loose supremacy over the settlements of the Syr Darya region. In Crimea, where the nomad interest was present but the Khwārazmian barrier was absent, in the decades prior to the Mongol

¹³¹ Ibn-i Bibī 1956: 310–312; Ibn Bibī 2011: 287–288; Ibn Bibi 2014: 325–326; Ibn-Bibi 1902: 129–130; Yakubovsky 1927: 55.

¹³² The participation of the *malik* of Sighnaq in a conflict with the Qara Khitay at the beginning of the 1180s, referred to by Tekesh (see above) could be pointed as an exception. But the Qipchaqs are not mentioned at all in the context of these events and it cannot be established what their relations were with the ruler of the city.



invasion the Cuman-Qïpchaqs were able to establish precisely such a supremacy over significant parts of the peninsula's sedentary zone along the seacoast.

The prevalence of the Anushteginids during their cohabitation with the Cuman-Qïpchaqs in the basin of Syr Darya tilted the balance in the relations between nomads and sedentarists in favor of the latter and for a while overshadowed the steppe perspective towards this frontier zone. But the temporal predominance of a sedentary power did not change the fact that Jand and Sighnaq remained a 'no-man's-land' between steppe and sown, and their role as an outpost for assaults against the nomadic camps could easily undergo a complete reverse with the changes in the balance of power in the region. This is precisely what happened when the Mongol *tümens* appeared on the riverbank of the Syr Darya in the course of an invasion, which Peter Golden (2011: 90) defined as 'the greatest incursion of the steppe peoples into settled society'. During these apocalyptical events Jochi, the eldest son of Chingiz Khan, temporarily used Jand as a base for his campaign against Khwārazm itself (Bosworth 2008/2012). A campaign which eventually brought the downfall of the Anūshteginids' capital Gurgānj and heralded the collapse of their ostensibly mighty empire.

REFERENCES

Primary sources

- Abul'-Gazi [Абуль-Гази] 1906. *Родословное древо тюрковъ*. Перев. Г. С. Саблуков, прим. Н. Ф. Катанов [Извѣстия общества археологии, истории и этнографии при Императорскомъ Казанскомъ университетѣ Томъ 22, вып. 5–6]. Казань.
- Ahmed b. Mahmud 2011. *Selçuknâme*. Ed. Erdoğan MERÇİL. İstanbul: Bilge, Kültür, Sanat.
- Anna Comnena 2001. *Annae Comnenae Alexias*. Ed. Diether R. REINSCH and Athanasios КАМВЫЛИС. [Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae Vol. XL/1.] Berlin and New York: De Gruyter.
- Baghdādī 1384/2005–2006. *Al-Tawassul ilā l-tarassul*. Ed. Aḥmad ВАНМАНҮЯЪ. Tehrān: Asāṭir.
- BARTOLD, Vasily [Бартольдъ, Василий] 1898. *Туркестанъ въ эпоху монгольскаго нашествія. Часть первая. Тексты*. С.-Петербургъ: Типографія императорской академіи наукъ.
- Bar Hebraeus 2003. *The Chronography of Gregory Abū'l Faraj the son of Aaron, the Hebrew Physician commonly known as Bar Hebraeus. Vol. I*. Trans. Ernest A. Wallis BUDGE. Piscataway: Gorgias Press.
- Bayhaqī 1393/2014. *Tārīkh-i Bayhaqī. Vol. I–III*. Ed. Khalil КНАҒІВ РАНВАР. Tehrān: Mehtāb.
- Beyhaqī 2011. *The History of Beyhaqī. (The History of Sultan Mas'ud of Ghazna, 1030–1041). Vol. I–III*. Translated with a historical, geographical, linguistic and cultural commentary and notes by Clifford E. BOSWORTH. Fully revised and with further commentary by Mohsen ASHTIANY. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
- Bejkhaki [Бейхаки] 1969. *История Мас'уда, (1030–1041)*. Перев. Альфред К. Арендс. Издание 2-е, дополненное. Москва: Наука, 1969.
- Chronici Hungarici* 1999: *Chronici Hungarici compositio saeculi XIV*. Ed. Alexander ДОМАНОВСЗКУ. In: Emericus SZENTPÉTERY (ed.) *Scriptores rerum Hungaricarum. Vol. I*. Budapest: Nap Kiadó, 217–505.
- Rubruc (1929): *Simica Franciscana. Vol. I. Itinera et Relationes Fratrum Minorum saeculi XIII et XIV*. Ed. P. Anastasius VAN DEN WYNGAERT OFM. Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventuræ, 145–332.
- Georgius Aсropolis 1971. *Historia*. In: Mikhail ВОЙНОВ [Михаил Войнов] (съст.) *Гръцки извори за българската история [Greek sources for the Bulgarian history]. Vol. VIII*. София: БАН, 150–213.



- Hudūd al-‘Ālam* 1340/1962. *Hudūd al-‘Ālam: min al-Mashriq Il al-Maghrib*. Compiled in 982–3 A.D. = 372 A.H. Ed. Manoochehr SOROODEH. Tehran: Tehran University Press.
- Hudūd al-‘Ālam* 1970. *Hudūd al-‘Ālam. ‘The Regions of the World’. A Persian Geography, 372 A. H. – 982 A. D.* Translated and explained by Vladimir MINORSKY. Second Edition, edited by Clifford. E. BOSWORTH. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- The Hungarian Illuminated Chronicle* 1969. *The Hungarian Illuminated Chronicle. Chronica de Gestis Hungarorum*. Latin text of the Chronicle translated by Alick WEST. Essays and notes translated by I. FARKAS, S HORN and E. RÁCZ. Budapest: Corvina Press.
- Husaynī 2014. *The History of the Seljuq State: A Translation with Commentary of the Akhbar Al-Dawla Al-Saljuqiyya*. Trans. Clifford E. BOSWORTH. London: Routledge.
- Ibn al-Athīr 2002. *The Annals of the Saljuq Turks. Selections from al-Kāmil fī'l-Ta'rikh of 'Izz al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr*. Translated and annotated by Donald S. RICHARDS. London and New York: Routledge.
- Ibn al-Athīr 2005. *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athīr for the Crusading Period from al-Kāmil fī'l-ta'rikh*. Part 1. *The Years 491–541/1097–1146: The Coming of the Franks and the Muslim Response*. Trans. Donald S. RICHARDS. [Crusade Texts in Translation 13.] Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate.
- Ibn al-Athīr 2008. *The Chronicle of Ibn al Athīr for the Crusading Period from al-Kāmil fī'l-ta'rikh*. Part 3. *The Years 589–629/1193–1231: The Ayyūbids after Saladin and the Mongol Menace*. Trans. Donald S. RICHARDS. [Crusade Texts in Translation 13.] Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate.
- Ibn-Bībī 1902. *Histoire des Seldjoucides d'Asie Mineur d'après l'abrégé du Seldjouknâme d'Ibn-Bībī texte Persan*. Publié d'après le ms. de Paris par Martijn Th. HOUTSMA. [Recueil de textes relatifs à l'histoire des Seldjoucides Vol. IV.] Leiden: Brill.
- İbn-i Bībī 1956. *El-Evāmīrül-'Alā'yye fī'l-Umūri'l-'Alā'yye*. Vol. I. Tıpkıbasım [Facsimile]. Ed. Adnan S. ERZİ. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi.
- Ibn Bībī 1390/2011. *Tārikh-i Ibn Bībī*. Ed. Zhāle MOTAḤEDDİN. Tehran: Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies.
- İbn Bībī 2014. *El-Evāmīrül-'Alā'yye fī'l-Umūri'l-'Alā'yye. Selçuknâme. Vol. II. Tercüme [Translation]*. Trans. Mürsel ÖZTÜRK. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu.
- Ibn Fadlān 2012. *Ibn Fadlān and the Land of Darkness. Arab Travelers in the Far North*. Translated with an Introduction by Paul LUNDE and Caroline STONE. London: Penguin Classics.
- İbnü'l Cevzî 2011. *Mir'âtü'z-zaman fî târihi'l-âyân'da Selçuklular*. Seçme, Tercüme ve Değerlendirme Ali SEVİM. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu.
- Juvaynī 1912/1329. *Tārikh-i Jahān-Gushāy*. Ed. Muḥammad QAZVİNĪ. Vol. I. Leyden: E. J. Brill–London: Luzac & Co.
- Juvaynī 1916/1334. *Tārikh-i Jahān-Gushāy*. Ed. Muḥammad QAZVİNĪ. Vol. II. Leyden: E. J. Brill; London: Luzac & Co.
- Juvaini 1958. *The History of the World-Conqueror. Vol. I–II*. Trans. John. A. BOYLE. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Jūzjānī/Ḥābībī 1343/1964. JŪZJĀNĪ. *Tabaqāt-i Nāsiri*. Vol. I–II. Ed. 'Abd al-Ḥaiy ḤABĪBĪ. Kābul: Anjuman-e Tārikh-e Afghānestān.
- Juzjani/Raverty 1970. JUZJANI. *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri: A General History of the Muhammadan Dynasties of Asia, including Hindustan; from A.H. 194 (800 A.D.) to A.H. 658 (A.D. 1260) and the Irruption of the Infidel Mughals into Islam. Vol. I-II*. Trans. Henry G. RAVERTY. New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation.
- Kartlis tskhovreba* 2013. *Картлис цховреба. История Грузии*. Роин Метревели и др. (ред.) Тбилиси: Артануджи.



- Kartlis tskhovreba 2014. *Kartlis tskhovreba. A history of Georgia*. Eds. Roin Met' reveli, Stephen Jones. Tbilisi: Artanuji.
- KONOVALOVA, Irina G. [Коновалова, Ирина Г.] 2009. *Восточная Европа в сочинениях арабских географов XIII-XIV вв. Текст, перевод, комментарий*. Москва: Восточная Литература, РАН.
- Maḥmūd al-Kāšrārī 1982–1985. *Compendium of the Turkic Dialects. Dīwān Luḡāt at-Turk*. Edited and translated with Introduction and Indices by Robert Dankoff in collaboration with James Kelly. Part I-III [Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures 7]. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Printing Office.
- Michael Attaleiates 1965. *Historia*. In: Mikhail VOINOV [Михаил Войнов], Ivan DUСНЕВ [Иван Дуйчев], Vasilka TĀPKOVA-ZAIMOVA [Василка Тъпкова-Заимова] (ред.) *Гръцки извори за българската история* [Greek sources for the Bulgarian history]. Vol. VI. София: БАН, 159–197.
- МИТТ 1939: Semen L. VOLIN [Семен. Л. Волин], Alexandr A. ROMASKEVICH [Александр. А. Ромаскевич] and Alexandr. Yu. YAKUBOVSKY [Александр Ю. Якубовский] (ред.) *Материалы по истории туркмен и Туркмении*. Том. I. VII–XV вв. *Арабские и персидские источники*. Москва-Ленинград: Издательство Академии Наук СССР.
- Mīrkhwānd 1339/1960. *Tārīkh-i rawḡat al-safā*. Vol. IV. Tehran: Khīyām-Pīrūz.
- The Mission* 1990. *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck. His journey to the court of the Great Khan Mongke 1253–1255*. [Trans. Peter JACKSON.] London: The Hakluyt Society.
- Ap-Nasavi [ан-Насави] 1996. *Сират ас-султан Джалал ад-Дин Манкбурны (Жизнеописание султана Джалал ад-Дина Манкбурны)*. Изд. Перев. Ziya M. BUNIĀTOV [Зия. М. Буниатов]. Москва: Восточная литература РАН.
- Nicetas Choniates 1983a. *Historia*. In: Mikhail VOINOV [Михаил Войнов], Vasilka TĀPKOVA-ZAIMOVA [Василка Тъпкова-Заимова], Lyubomir YONСHEV [Любомир Йончев] (съст.) *Гръцки извори за българската история* [Greek sources for the Bulgarian history]. Vol. XI. София: БАН, 9–93.
- Nicetas Choniates 1983b. *Orationes*. In: Mikhail VOINOV [Михаил Войнов], Vasilka TĀPKOVA-ZAIMOVA [Василка Тъпкова-Заимова], Lyubomir YONСHEV [Любомир Йончев] (съст.) *Гръцки извори за българската история* [Greek sources for the Bulgarian history]. Vol. XI. София: БАН, 94–117.
- PSRL Vol. I: *Полное собрание русских летописей*. Том I. *Лаврентьевская летопись*. Вып. 1: *Повесть временных лет*. Издание второе. Ленинград.
- PSRL Vol. II: *Полное собрание русских летописей*. Том II. *Ипатьевская летопись*. Издание второе. С.-Петербург, 1908.
- Rashīd al-Dīn/Karīmī 1338/1959. *Rashīd al-Dīn: Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*. Vol. I–II. Ed. Bahman KARĪMĪ. Tehran.
- Rashīd al-Dīn/Rūshan–Mūsavī 1373/1994. *Rashīd al-Dīn: Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*. Vol. I–IV. Eds. Muḥammad Rūshan and Muṣṭafā MŪSAVĪ. Tehran: Nashr-e Alborz.
- Rashīd al-Dīn/ Rūshan 2010. *Rashīd al-Dīn. Jāmi' al-tawārīkh: tārikh-i salāṭīn-i Khwārazm*. Ed. Muḥammad Rūshan. Tehran: Mīrāth-e Maktūb.
- Rashiduddin/Thackston 1998–1999. *Jāmi' at-tawārīkh: Rashiduddin Fazlullah's Jami' u't-tawarikh: Compendium of Chronicles. A History of the Mongols. Part I–III*. English Translation & Annotation by Wheeler M. Thackston [Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures 45]. Cambridge, MS: Harvard University.
- Rashid-ad-Din/Khetagurov 1952. *Rashid-ad-Din* [Рашид-ад-Дин]. *Сборник летописей*. Том I, *Книга первая*. Прев. Лев А. Хетагуров. Ред. Александр. А. Семенов. Москва-Ленинград: Издательство Академии Наук СССР.
- Rashid-ad-Din/SMIRNOVA 1952. *Rashid-ad-Din* [Рашид-ад-Дин]. *Сборник летописей*. Том I, *Книга вторая*. Прев. Ольга. И. Смирнова. Москва-Ленинград: Издательство Академии Наук СССР.



- The Secret History of the Mongols* 2006. *The Secret History of the Mongols. A Mongolian Epic Chronicle of the Thirteenth Century. Vol. I-II.* Translated and with a Historical and Philological Commentary by Igor DE RACHEWILTZ. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Sirat-i Djalāluddīn* 1986. *Sirat-i Djalāluddīn.* Persian Translation, made in the 7th Cent. H. from the Arabic Text of Shihabuddin Muhammad Nasawi Zeydari Khurandizī. Ed. Muḏjtabā Mīnuvī. Tehrān: Scientific & Cultural Publications Company.
- Skylitzes-Kedrenos 1965. *Historiarum Compendium.* In: Mikhail VOINOV [Михаил Войнов], Ivan DUJČEV [Иван Дуйчев], Vasilka TĀRKOVA-ZAIMOVA [Василка Тъпкова-Займова] (ред.) *Гръцки извори за българската история* [Greek sources for the Bulgarian history]. Vol. VI. София: БАН, 198–340.
- SMIZO 1884. TIESENHAUSEN, Vladimir G. [Тизенгаузен, В. Г.] *Сборникъ матеріаловъ, относящихся къ исторіи Золотой орды.* Том I (арабски извори). Санкт Петербургъ, 1884.
- Theodorus Scutariota 1971. *Compendium Chronicum.* In: Mikhail VOINOV [Михаил Войнов] (съст.) *Гръцки извори за българската история* [Greek sources for the Bulgarian history]. Vol. VIII. София: БАН, 214–303.
- Vaṭvāt 1338/1960. *Nāmahā-yi Rashīd al-Dīn Vaṭvāt.* Ed. Qasem Tūysirkānī. Tehrān: Chāpkhāne-ye Dāneshgāh.
- Yuanshi 2009. *Золотая Орда в источниках.* Том III. *Китайские и монгольские источники. Собрание сведений, относящихся к истории Золотой Орды (улус Джучи), из китайских и монгольских источников.* Перев. Роман П. Храпачевский. Москва: Наука.

Secondary sources

- AIVABIN, Alexandr I. 2005. 'Cities and Steppe of the Crimea in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries according to the Archaeological Data.' In: Peter SCHREINER and Felicitas SCHMIEDER (eds.) *Il Codice: Cumanico e il suo Mondo.* Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 297–334.
- AIVABIN, Alexandr I. [АЙБАВИН, Александр И.] 2003. 'Степь и Юго-Западный Крым.' In: Татьяна И. МАКАРОВА и СВЕТЛАНА А. Плетнева (ред.) *Крым, Северо-Восточное Причерноморье и Закавказье в эпоху средневековья, IV–XIII века.* Москва: Наука, 74–81.
- AKHINZHANOV, Serzhan M. [АХИНЖАНОВ, Сержан, М.] 1995. *Кыпчаки в истории средневекового Казахстана.* Алматы: Гылым.
- AKHINZHANOV, Serzhan M. [АХИНЖАНОВ, Сержан, М.] 1979. 'Государственное объединение кыпчаков.' In: Сактаган Б. БАИШЕВ и Серикбай Б. БЕЙСЕМБАЕВ (ред.) *История Казахской ССР с древнейших времен до наших дней в пяти томах. Том II.* Сергей Г. АГАДЖАНОВ, Булат Е. КУМЕКОВ, Алькей Х. МАРГУЛАН, Клавдия А. Пищулина (ред.) *Развитие феодальных отношений. Образование казахской народности и казахского ханства.* Алма-Ата: Наука, 50–68.
- BARTOLD, Vasily [БАРТОЛДЪ, Василий] 1900. *Туркестанъ въ эпоху монгольскаго нашествія. Часть вторая, изслѣдованіе.* С.-Петербургъ: Типографія В. Киршбаума.
- BARTOLD, Vasily [БАРТОЛДЪ, Василий] 1968. *Сочинения. Том V. Работы по истории и филологии тюркских и монгольских народов.* Москва: Наука, Главная редакция Восточной литературы.
- BAJRAKOV, Karl M. [БАЙПАКОВ, Карл, М.] 1986. *Средневековая городская культура Южного Казахстана и Семиречия (VI-начало XIII в.).* Алма-Ата: Наука.
- BARFIELD, Thomas. J. 1989. *The Perilous Frontier. Nomadic Empires and China.* Cambridge, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- BIAN, Michal 2005. *The Empire of Qara Khitai in Eurasian History.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- BOSWORTH, Clifford. E. 1968. 'The Political and Dynastic History of the Iranian World (A. D. 1000–1217).' In: John A. BOYLE (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 5. The Seljuq and Mongol Periods.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–202.



- BOSWORTH, Clifford E. 2008/2012. 'Jand.' In: *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, Vol. XIV, Fasc. 5, 533. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/jand-2> (visited on 27 March 2019).
- BREGEL, Yuri 2003. *An Historical Atlas of Central Asia*. Leiden–Boston: Brill.
- BUNIJATOV, Ziya. M. [Бунияттов, Зия. М.] 1986. *Государство хорезмшахов Ануштегинидов, 1097–1231*. Москва: Наука.
- FUAD KÖPRÜLÜ, Mehmet 1943. 'Uran Kabilesi [The Uran tribe].' *Belleten* 7/26: 227–243.
- GOLDEN, Peter B. 1984. 'Cumanica I: The Qipčaq in Georgia.' *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 4: 45–87. [Repr. in: GOLDEN 2003: Article XI.]
- GOLDEN, Peter B. 1991. 'Aspects of the Nomadic Factor in the Economic Development of Kievan Rus?' In: Ihor S. КОРОПЕЦЬКIJ (ed.) *Ukrainian Economic History: Interpretative Essays*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 58–101. [Repr. in: GOLDEN 2003: Article VII.]
- GOLDEN, Peter B. 1987–1991. 'Nomads and Their Sedentary Neighbors in Pre-Činggisid Eurasia.' *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 7: 41–81.
- GOLDEN, Peter B. 1991. 'The Qipčaq of Medieval Eurasia: An Example of Stateless Adaptation in the Steppes.' In: Gary SEAMAN and Daniel MARKS (eds.) *Rulers from the Steppe: State Formation on the Eurasian Periphery*. [Ethnographics Monograph series, Monograph, No. 2] Los Angeles: Ethnographic Press, University of Southern California, 146–150. [Repr. in: GOLDEN 2003: Article IX.]
- GOLDEN, Peter B. 1992. *An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples. Ethnogenesis and State-Formation in Medieval and Early Modern Eurasia and the Middle East*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.
- GOLDEN, Peter B. 1995–1997. 'Cumanica IV: The Cumano-Qipčaq Clans and Tribes.' *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 9: 99–122.
- GOLDEN, Peter B. 1998. *Nomads and Sedentary Societies*. Washington, D. C.: American Historical Association.
- GOLDEN, Peter B. 2003. *Nomads and their Neighbours in the Russian Steppe. Turks, Khazars and Qipchaqs*. Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum.
- GOLDEN, Peter B. 2005. 'The Shaping of the Cuman-Qipčaq and Their World: Origins, Migrations, Political and Cultural Interaction.' In: Peter SCHREINER and Felicitas SCHMIEDER (eds.) *Il Codice: Cumanico e il suo Mondo*. Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 236–265.
- GOLDEN, Peter B. 2009. 'Inner Asia c. 1200.' In: Nicola DI COSMO, Allen J. FRANK and Peter B. GOLDEN (eds.) *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia. The Chinggisid Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 9–25.
- GOLDEN, Peter B. 2011. *Central Asia in World History*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- GOLEV, Konstantin [ГОЛЕВ, КОНСТАНТИН] 2013. *Причини за куманските миграции на Балканите* [Reasons for the Cuman Migrations in the Balkans]. ([unpublished doctoral dissertation], София).
- GOLEV, Konstantin 2018a. 'On the Edge of Another World: Crimea and Balkans as contact zones between the Cuman-Qipčaks and the Outside World.' *Études Balkaniques* 54/1: 89–126.
- GOLEV, Konstantin 2018b. 'The Cuman-Qipčaks and Crimea: the Role of the Peninsula in the Nomads' Relations with the Outside World.' *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 24: 23–107.
- ЈАКУБОВСКИЈ, Alexandr Ju. [Якубовский, А. Ю.] 1927. 'Рассказ Ибн-ал-Биби о походе малоазийских турок на Судак, половцев и русских в начале XIII в.' *Византийский временник* 25: 53–76.
- KAFESOĞLU, İbrahim 2000. *Harezmşahlar Devleti Tarihi (485–618/1092–1221)* [History of the State of the Khwārazmshāhs (485–618/1092–1221)]. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi.
- KHAZANOV, Anatoly M. 1992. 'Nomads and oases in Central Asia.' In: John A. HALL and Ian C. JARVIE (eds.) *Transition to Modernity. Essays on Power, Wealth and Belief*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 69–89.
- KHAZANOV, Anatoly M. 1994. *Nomads and the Outside World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



- КНРАРАСНЕВСКИЙ, Роман Р. [Храпачевский, Роман П.] 2013. *Половцы-куны в Волго-Уральском междуречье. По данным китайских источников*. [Серия «Материалы и исследования». Том II. Исследования по истории кочевников восточноевропейских степей.] Москва: ЦИВОИ.
- КОСЧЕВ, Boris D. [Кочнев, Борис Д.] 2006. *Нумизматическая история Караханидского каганата (991–1209 гг.). Часть I. Источниковедческое исследование*. Москва: София.
- МАКАРОВА, Tatyana I. [Макарова, Татьяна И.] 2003. 'Боспор-Корчев.' In: Татьяна И. МАКАРОВА и Светлана А. ПЛЕТНЕВА (ред.) *Крым, Северо-Восточное Причерноморье и Закавказье в эпоху средневековья, IV-XIII века*. Москва: Наука, 68–73.
- MERTZ, Viktor. K. [МЕРЦ, Виктор К.] 2019. *Краткая история развития материальной культуры Павлодарского Прицртышья*. Павлодар: Павлодарский государственный университет им. С. Торайгырова.
- MURGULIJA, Melita P. [Мургулия, Мелита П.] and Vladimir P. SHUSHARIN [ШУШАРИН, Владимир П.] 1998. *Половцы, Грузия, Русь и Венгрия в XII–XIII веках*. Москва: Российская академия наук, Институт славяноведения и балканистики.
- NOONAN, Thomas S. 1992. 'Rus', Pechenegs, and Polovtsy: Economic Interaction along Steppe Frontier in the Pre-Mongol Era.' *Russian History* 19/1–4: 301–326.
- PAUL, Jürgen 1998/2011. 'Enšā.' *Encyclopædia Iranica*. Vol. VIII, Fasc. 5, 455–457; <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ensa> (last access on 9 April 2019)
- PAUL, Jürgen 2013. 'Sanjar and Atsız: Independence, Lordship, and Literature.' In: Jürgen PAUL (ed.) *Nomad Aristocrats in a World of Empires*. Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 81–129.
- PAUL, Jürgen 2015a. 'Forces and Resources. Remarks on the Failing Regional State of Sulṭānšāh b. II Arslan Ḥwārazmšāh.' In: Jan BEMMANN and Michael SCHMAUDER (eds.) *Complexity of Interaction along the Eurasian Steppe Zone in the First Millennium CE*. Bonn: Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, 597–622.
- PAUL, Jürgen 2015b. 'Who Makes Use of Whom? Some Remarks on the Nomad Policy of the Kwarāzmschāh, 1150–1200.' In: Kurt FRANTZ and Wolfgang HOLZWARTH (eds.) *Nomad Military Power in Iran and Adjacent Areas in the Islamic Period*. Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 137–153.
- РЕАССОК, Andrew C. S. 2010. *Early Seljūq History. A New Interpretation*. London and New York: Routledge.
- РАСОВСКИЙ, Dmitry A. [РАСОВСКИЙ, Дмитрий А.] 1937. 'Половцы, III. Предѣлы "Поля Половецкаго" I–IV.' *Seminarium Condacovianum* 9: 71–85.
- STEINGASS, Francis J. 1892. *A Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary, Including the Arabic Words and Phrases to be Met With in Persian Literature*. London: Routledge & K. Paul. (online version: <https://dsal.uchicago.edu/dictionaries/steingass/>)
- ТИМОКНИН, Dmitry M. [ТИМОХИН, Дмитрий М.] and Vladimir V. TISHIN [ТИШИН, Владимир В.] 2018. 'Происхождение Теркен-Хатун, матери хорезмшаха Ала ад-Дина Мухаммада: к проблеме соотношения этнонимов в восточном Дешт-и Кыпчаке в XII – начале XIII вв. В исторических источниках.' In: *Материалы II-й научной конференции средневековой истории Дешт-и Кыпчака*. Павлодар: ТОО «Научно-исследовательский центр «Дешт-и-Кыпчак» НПФ «ЭКО», 83–102.
- YORULMAZ, Osman 2006. 'Harezmschāh Kanglıları/Kanklıları (Etkileri, Roller ve Akıbetleri) [The Qanglı of the Khwārazmshāhs (Their Influence, Role and Fate)].' *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 162: 151–172.
- YORULMAZ, Osman 2012. *Geçmişten Günümüze Kanglı Türkleri [The Qanglı Turks from Past to Present]*. İstanbul: Ötüken.

