

Chapter 10

Accusing Hans Globke, 1960–1963

Agency and the Iron Curtain

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In July 1963, the Supreme Court of East Germany convicted West German state secretary Hans Globke to life imprisonment for complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity during the Nazi rule in Germany.¹ The verdict was returned in absentia in East Berlin. This public event was the end point of a longer history of various Cold War efforts aimed at compromising “Adenauer’s chief aide” by means of the historical record.

Hans Globke, born 1898 in Düsseldorf, who worked from 1929 in the Prussian, then Reich Ministry of Interior, wrote in 1936 together with State Secretary Wilhelm Stuckart the first commentary on the anti-Jewish Nuremberg Laws (“Reichsbürgergesetz” and “Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre,” 1935).² Due to the need for

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2 On the main charges against Globke and his controversial reactions to them, see John P. Teschke, *Hitler’s Legacy: West Germany Confronts the Aftermath of the Third Reich* (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), 173–220. On Globke’s

expertise in the new postwar public administration, positive testimonies, and luck in the “denazification” process, Globke gradually returned to public service during the second half of the 1940s. From 1953 until his retirement in 1963, he served as federal secretary of state and chief of staff in the West German Chancellery.

Globke belonged to the West German political elite that propaganda by the German Democratic Republic (GDR) continuously referred to in the Adenauer era. In 1956, the Committee of German Unity (ADE) published the first brochure dedicated to Globke.³ Also in West Germany, Globke was a controversial figure. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) had been critical of Globke and his successful political career from the beginning. His past was no secret. Adolf Arndt, the Social Democrat expert on legal affairs, referred to Globke’s commentary on the Nuremberg Laws already in a parliamentary debate on July 12, 1950.

The international controversy around Hans Globke between 1960, when the anti-Globke press campaign intensified, and 1963, when the Globke case culminated in the East Berlin trial, was a complex public affair. The capture of Adolf Eichmann in May 1960 by the Mossad markedly influenced the Communist campaign that now aimed to implicate or at least discredit Globke by the criminal procedure in Jerusalem. Another turning point of the Globke affair dates to early 1963 when the final decision was made to organize a separate trial in East Berlin to incriminate Globke. The conditions and possibilities of agency aiming to influence the Globke affair varied widely during this period. By agency, we mean the resources of action for individuals in a given field of power, dominated by state Cold War tensions. During the Eichmann affair, particularly the procedure at the court of first instance (1960–61), individual agency was more influential. We will discuss the activity of two persons who were mobilized across the Cold War’s borders in this constitutive phase of the Globke affair: Hungarian journalist Jenő Lévai and West German student activist Reinhard (Maria) Strecker.

biography see the polemics in Jürgen Bevers, *Der Mann hinter Adenauer: Hans Globkes Aufstieg vom NS-Juristen zur Grauen Eminenz der Bonner Republik* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2009), and Erik Lommatzsch’s more balanced *Hans Globke (1898–1973): Beamter im Dritten Reich und Staatssekretär Adenauers* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2009). On Globke’s early postwar career, see Daniel E. Rogers, “Restoring a German Career, 1945–1950: The Ambiguity of Being Hans Globke,” *German Studies Review* 31, no. 2 (May 2008): 303–24.

3 *Rassenschande-Rassenschänder: Hans Globke* (East Berlin: s.n., 1956).

This chapter is about the role of individuals in compiling evidence, bringing information to the public’s attention, and pushing the prosecutions forward. We will pay special attention to actor–state relations—that is, to the question of how and to what extent these two individuals were autonomous or politically controlled actors in the international affair under examination, and what sort of resources they used to achieve their goals.

First, we will focus on documentation efforts of these two actors, both of whom published an influential book underscoring Globke’s responsibility in 1961. Second, by analyzing the publications’ content and Globke’s representation by Lévai and Strecker, we will approach their books’ public perceptions, including Globke’s reaction. Third, by comparing the two trials in Jerusalem and East Berlin with respect to accusations against Globke, we take note of Lévai’s and Strecker’s absence in the respective courtrooms. We primarily utilize Stasi files on the Globke campaign and trial, material from the Hungarian Foreign Office and the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (in the National Archives of Hungary), and also press and TV publications. It is thus a dominant state perspective on the events that we juxtapose with, and thus confront, both actors’ actual social activities.

That said, one last remark: this chapter is not about the mobilization of two victims. Lévai’s and Strecker’s interests and motives were certainly intertwined and multifaceted: Strecker’s extraordinary activism derived from interdependent private and political impulses. He came from a family of liberal jurists; some of his relatives had been concerned by the anti-Jewish Nuremberg Laws. Besides, for Strecker, as for many others, the continuance of (at least formerly) convinced Nazis in the judiciary was understood as a threat to West German democratization; so were “unpolitical” civil servants such as Hans Globke, as well. Lévai, who personally lived through the violence of racial persecution in 1944–45, had never assumed publicly the victim position, which probably would have destroyed his authenticity as an expert.

Publicizing Historical Documents: Jenő Lévai

Jenő Lévai’s book *Eichmann in Hungary: Documents*—produced simultaneously in German, English, and French⁴—was commissioned by the Hungarian authorities and put into circulation in the spring of 1961. The

4 *Eichmann in Ungarn: Dokumente* (Budapest: Pannonia, 1961); *Eichmann in Hungary: Documents* (Budapest: Pannonia, 1961); *Eichmann en Hongrie:*

book was the outcome of Hungarian–East German cooperation that aimed to exploit the political and ideological possibilities inherent in the case. Given that Hungary was deeply affected by the activity of Eichmann and that the “Hungarian chapter” was consequently envisaged as a key moment of the future trial, the attitude of the Hungarian Communist government was far from indifferent. Hungarian motives were characterized by the ambivalence between the need to see Eichmann punished, on the one hand, and not publicly acknowledging support for Israel, on the other. Since the idea of asking for Eichmann’s extradition was eventually dropped,⁵ and the official participation of the Hungarian Chief Prosecutor’s Office in the Eichmann trial seemed more than unlikely,⁶ the basic Hungarian strategy of influencing the whole affair was to control the production of evidence based on historical documentation.

The Hungarian Foreign Ministry note of June 6, 1960, entitled “Recommended Measures Related to the Eichmann Affair” recommended contact be established with “the journalist Lévai, who has great knowledge in this area,” in order to collect a “plentiful amount of factual material” on the activities of Eichmann and his peers in Hungary.⁷ On June 9, 1960, Ferenc

Documents (Budapest: Pannonia, 1961). If not mentioned otherwise, the English edition is used in the following.

- 5 Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party Politburo decision, October 11, 1960, Hungarian National Archive [Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára, Budapest; hereafter MNL OL], M-KS 288 f. 5 204. See also András Kovács, ed., *Communism’s Jewish Question: Jewish Issues in Communist Archives* (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter/Oldenbourg, 2017), 84–95.
- 6 The Hungarian strategy was driven by the motive to prevent Israel from black-mailing the FRG with the Eichmann case and thus exploiting it politically as a “purely Israeli matter.” Members of the Politburo considered the participation of the Hungarian prosecution in the Eichmann trial risky because of the possible Israeli refusal. Thus, they opted for the request for observer status. See minutes of the Politburo meeting on June 28, 1960, MNL OL, M-KS 288 f. 5 189.
- 7 Note “Measures recommended in relation to the Eichmann affair,” MNL OL, XIX-J-1-j-NSZK-30/c-004579-1/1960, doboz (d.) 8. According to the decision of the Politburo on June 28, 1960, measures of massive data collection and documentation on Eichmann’s and his accomplices’ role in Hungary were taken: MNL OL, M-KS 288 f. 5 189. As a result, division II/5 (for Prevention of Interior reaction) in the Hungarian Interior Ministry gathered archival sources and conducted testimonies with witnesses and perpetrators. See the

Esztergályos, deputy department head in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, met with Jenő Lévai to discuss the details of possible cooperation. At the meeting, Lévai informed Esztergályos he would be willing to work with the ministry if he received the necessary assistance in the Eichmann affair. He also signaled that there were countless other unexploited areas, such as the proof of the Nazi past of State Secretary Globke, for which he already had significant basic material. In his report, Esztergályos stated that “the Foreign Ministry could make excellent use of Lévai also apart from the Eichmann affair,” and recommended Lévai’s screening by the Interior Ministry so that a decision could be made about collaborating with him. If there were no obstacles to this, he wrote, “we should, using the financial resources of the press department, make Lévai independent . . . get him to process the material available on the basis of pre-determined topics agreed with him.”⁸

Lévai came up with the idea of incriminating Globke as an ideological attack on West Germany at approximately the same time Albert Norden, the first ADE secretary, also made an attack. The ADE, a GDR government department established in 1954, was responsible for all questions concerning the preparation of a peace treaty and German unification. Yet, following the imminent failure of Socialist Unity Party of Germany (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*, or SED) policies concerning the two German states, the ADE had concentrated on publicizing the personal continuity of the functionary elite between the Third Reich and the FRG.⁹ After the success of the previous campaign against West German minister Theodor Oberländer’s past, Norden had proposed that the GDR’s campaigning against compromised West German politicians be systemized. The decision to focus on Globke was owing both to Globke’s past and to his contemporary political activities.¹⁰ As Lévai had been involved in the political

four volumes of documents at the Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára (Historical Archives of the State Security Services, Budapest; hereafter ÁBTL), A-643/1-5.

- 8 “Conversation with journalist Jenő Lévai,” MNL OL, XIX-J-1-j-NSZK-30/c-004579-1/1960, d. 8.
- 9 On the ADE see Heike Amos, *Die Westpolitik der SED 1948/49–1961* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1999), 258–67.
- 10 Theodor Oberländer, federal minister of displaced persons, refugees, and war victims, had resigned from his post in the first days of May 1960. On the campaign and trial against Oberländer, see Philipp-Christian Wachs, *Der Fall Theodor Oberländer (1905–1998): Ein Lehrstück deutscher Geschichte* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2000), 191–308. On Norden’s choice for

attacks against Oberländer, we may assume he was already in direct contact with the ADE or had a contact person in the GDR press in Budapest. Lévai had already pointed at Globke in May 1960 in the last article of his Oberländer series¹¹—before his meeting with Esztergályos. Lévai referred in it to Globke's responsibility in the matter of marking passports of Jewish Reich citizens with a "J," which he based on Carl Ludwig's book on the Swiss refugee policy between 1933 and 1955.¹² This argument was then taken up by the ADE and became the symbolic charge against Globke.

Authors of the Foreign Ministry note were correct in their assessment of Lévai's great knowledge on Nazi rule in Hungary. A journalist by profession, Lévai turned to historical matters in the early 1930s when, relying on his own experiences, he began publishing on the siege of Przemyśl and the prisoner of war camps in Siberia during the First World War. After having been qualified as Jewish and persecuted during the Second World War, Lévai had worked as part of Hungary's official preparations to the Paris Peace Treaties, signed in 1947.¹³ This allowed him to access official wartime documentation and proceedings of war crimes trials and to conduct research missions abroad, primarily at embassies of the neutral countries.¹⁴ In 1948, his synthesis on the history of the Holocaust in Hungary was published in several languages, including English.¹⁵ Lévai continued his work even following the Communist takeover in Hungary and his partial involvement in the internal

Globke, see Annette Weinke, *Die Verfolgung von NS-Tätern im geteilten Deutschland: Vergangenheitsbewältigungen 1949–1969 oder: Eine erech-deutsche Beziehungsgeschichte im Kalten Krieg* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002), 152–53.

11 Jenő Lévai, "Göbbelstől tanult propaganda-fogások a nyugat-német kormányban," *Új Élet*, May 1, 1960, 3.

12 *Die Flüchtlingspolitik der Schweiz seit 1933 bis 1955: Bericht an den Bundesrat zuhanden der eidgenössischen Räte* (Bern: Bundeskanzlei, 1957).

13 Regina Fritz, "Die Pariser Friedensverhandlungen 1946 mit Ungarn: Die Konfrontation mit der Ermordung der ungarischen Juden im aussenpolitischen Kontext," in *Als der Holocaust noch keinen Namen hatte: Zur frühen Aufarbeitung des NS-Massenmordes an den Juden*, ed. Regina Fritz, Éva Kovács, and Béla Rásky (Vienna: New Academic Press, 2016), 437–54.

14 On Lévai's historical documentation work, see Máté Zombory, "A nemzeti tragédia narratívái: Lévai Jenő, az írás és a történelem (1932–1948)," *Múltunk—Politikatörténeti Folyóirat* 63, no. 2 (2018): 197–236.

15 Eugene Lévai, *Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry* (Zurich: Central European Times Publishing, 1948).

purges at the state security services.¹⁶ From the mid-1950s, he had studied the published International Military Tribunal (IMT) material and conducted research in Switzerland. As early as 1957, he cooperated with the state prosecutor's office in Hessen in the "Hungarian crime complex"—for example, in the case against Hermann Krumei, Eichmann's deputy in occupied Hungary.¹⁷ Lévai also forwarded material on the Oberländer case to the Central Office in Ludwigsburg.¹⁸ In all probability, Lévai was in contact with Hungarian state security.¹⁹

Lévai's knowledge of the topic, his network, and the considerable amount of archive material he kept in his apartment were of inestimable value to the authorities; and for Lévai, the support from the party-state was indispensable to carry out his research work abroad. The Hungarian state's involvement in the Cold War struggles unfolded around the Eichmann affair, and

16 In the 1953 anti-Zionist proceedings, one accusation against the former members of the Jewish Council in Budapest was that they had concealed their own responsibility in committing antipopular crimes ("crimes against the people," a legal category of the people's jurisdiction in Hungary introduced in 1945) against Jews by commissioning Lévai to write a book on the Budapest ghetto, which appeared in 1947 as *The Authentic History of the Miraculous Survival of the Pest Ghetto*. Though his name was on a custody proposal list dated March 1, 1953, Lévai himself was not arrested. See ÁBTTL V-101890/6/A.

17 Hessian State Archives [Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Wiesbaden], *Bestand* 461, No. 33538.

18 See his series of articles in the periodical of the Hungarian Jewish Community *Új Élet* starting on December 15, 1959. Lévai forwarded the second piece to the Central Office of the Land Judicial Authorities for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes (or simply Central Office) in Ludwigsburg. Its director at the time, Erwin Schüle, asked permission from the Ministry of Justice in Baden-Württemberg to enter into contact with Lévai. See Generalakten der Zentrale Stelle [General Records of the Central Office in Ludwigsburg], GA 9-12/1.

19 There is no proof of Lévai being employed and registered as an informant at ÁBTTL, nor of his collaboration with the Stasi at the Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Stasi Records Archive, Berlin; hereafter BstU). However, there is evidence that Lévai at least occasionally provided information to the Hungarian state security service, and on the basis of indirect evidence we assume that he regularly did so under the cover name "Lantos." See "Note on my visit to Israel's Embassy to Budapest on April 22, 1963," ÁBTTL, O-12233, 305–6.

its dependence on Lévai provided him a certain ambit of autonomous action. Despite various mechanisms of state control, it seems that Lévai could and did act on his own behalf. When in June 1960 Bureau 06 of the Israeli political police contacted him with a request for archival material, identified on the basis of his *Black Book*, Lévai brought the correspondence to the attention of Esztergályos, and they agreed that he would leave the request unanswered.²⁰ The deputy head of the department in the Foreign Ministry assured his superiors in a note that "Lévai is aware that in this question all individuation may be awkward for him personally."²¹ However, on May 1, 1961, Lévai stated to the paper of the Hungarian Jewish Community, *Új Élet* (New life), that he had "sent hundreds of records and documents to the investigating authorities" in Israel on the basis of their request.²² As a multipositioned actor, Lévai spoke a different language in the paper of the Jewish community than in the national daily of the party, also in relation to the political and scholarly audiences in Hungary and abroad.

According to the agreement of June 11, 1960, between the Foreign Ministry and Lévai, the latter would initially work on one volume on the Eichmann affair, then expose the accomplices in a following volume "with special attention given to those persons currently in office, such as for instance

20 On July 31, 1960, Lévai informed deputy head of Bureau 06, Ephraim Hofstädter, by mail that he was "collecting material against Eichmann and that there are in his possession some 300 such documents," and that "in order to obtain these documents, we [Bureau 06] would have to approach officially the Hungarian Authorities concerned." Hofstädter to the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 19, 1960, MNL OL, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-30/c-005022/6-1960, d. 11.

21 Note "Approach by Israeli Police," July 11, 1960, MNL OL, XIX-J-1-j-NSZK-30/c-004579-5/1960, d. 8.

22 "Eichmann Magyarországon: Lévai Jenő nyilatkozik új könyvéről," *Új Élet*, May 1, 1961. We do not know whether this claim of Lévai was actually true or whether he wished to exaggerate his importance or to reassure the Hungarian Jewish community. In any case, both versions show his autonomy in relation to the party-state. Head of Police Bureau 06, Maj. Gen. Avraham Zellinger in his summary report of February 14, 1961, "provided a list of foreign experts who either helped personally with the investigation or whose books were extremely useful. They include Reitlinger, Robinson, Jeno Levai [sic], and Kempner." Hanna Yablonka, *The State of Israel vs. Adolf Eichmann* (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 75.

Globke, Adenauer's state secretary."²³ Though this second book was never finished, Lévai worked hard on providing evidence on Globke's complicity in Eichmann's crimes. The allegations of his revelatory article on Globke were published in the Basel organ *Jüdische Rundschau Maccabi* (Maccabi Jewish review) only a few days after the official agreement.²⁴ Hungarian readers learned from the Party daily *Népszabadság* (People's freedom) that Lévai had (allegedly) proved with documents that Globke was the (co)author of almost all the Nuremberg Laws and implementing decrees, and that he had published the papers signed by Globke.²⁵

While working on his Eichmann documentation book, Lévai primarily relied on editions of the IMT proceedings. Among "innumerable volumes published in different languages," he highlights Reitlinger's *Final Solution*, which "was of the greatest help."²⁶ Among other important sources, he mentions the material of trials before Hungarian, Polish, and Czech courts, and the *Bulletin of the Main Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation* (*Główna Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu*). Lévai expressed his gratitude to the Wiener Library in London and the Yad Vashem for providing him documents and publications.

In the spring of 1961, Lévai traveled twice to Berlin, where, with the cooperation of the Hungarian Embassy, he collected material and nurtured his relationship with *Berliner Zeitung* and German Democratic Broadcasting. During his first trip to Berlin, on March 24, 1961, he gave a sworn testimony to GDR lawyer Friedrich Karl Kaul, testifying that according to the former Hungarian Interior Ministry state secretary Aurél Kern, Globke had twice been in Budapest during the war.²⁷ This affidavit seemed to prove that Globke had been responsible for anti-Jewish legislation also after the

23 Note "Discussions held in relation to the Eichmann affair," MNL OL, XIX-J-1-j-NSZK-30/c-004579-2/1960, d. 8.

24 "Als der Massenmörder Eichmann in Budapest residierte . . .," *Jüdische Rundschau Maccabi*, June 17, 1960, and in particular "Eichmann und die Nürnberger Gesetze . . .," *Jüdische Rundschau Maccabi*, September 2, 1960, and "Globke und Eichmann," *Jüdische Rundschau Maccabi*, September 9, 1960.

25 Jenő Lévai, "Viszonzás Globke államtitkárnak," *Népszabadság*, December 25, 1960.

26 See the "List of Sources Consulted" in Lévai, *Eichmann in Hungary*, 290–91. Lévai asserts that he was in contact with Reitlinger and even complemented and corrected the latter's work.

27 "Eidesstattliche Erklärung Jenő Lévai," Yad Vashem Archives, O.51/75.

decision for the Final Solution had been taken,²⁸ a charge that Globke had always rejected.

Most of Lévai's time in Berlin was taken up with matters at the East German television and radio offices. He took part in the making of the documentary film *Aktion J*,²⁹ meant for an international public and first broadcast in the spring of 1961, which targeted and condemned Globke. The filmmakers have him to thank for the film's being a "big hit." Lévai asked Max Merten³⁰ for a meeting and obtained one in Merten's flat in West Berlin. There he managed to make a tape-recording of the interview.³¹ Lévai handed over the recording to the East German TV authorities, who understandably were extremely grateful. East German radio and television reporters both interviewed Lévai. The radio office contracted him for five talks, expressing

28 This seems dubious. Aurél Kern, the alleged witness, had died in May 1959 in Switzerland. See remark on the letter from Aurél Kern to A. Gut[t]mann (United Restitution Organization, Cologne), January 28, 1959, in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv [Foundation for the Archives of the GDR's Parties and Mass Organizations at the Federal Archive, Berlin-Lichterfelde; hereafter SAPMO], DP 3/971. In his letter to the United Restitution Organization, Kern mentions only Globke's superior, Wilhelm Frick. According to Lévai, he had met Kern in 1957 in Lucerne (Switzerland), yet he did not include this vital information on Globke in his own Eichmann book (1961). The reasons why Lévai withheld the information are unknown.

29 Both the English and German versions of *Aktion J* are stored in the Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv [German Broadcasting Archive, Potsdam-Babelsberg; hereafter DRAB], main collection (*Hauptbestand*) "DFF/DDR-Fernsehen," items 305187, 055845.

30 Max Merten (1911–71), representative of *Wehrmachtbefehlshaber* Thessaloniki-Ägäis/North Greece in Thessaloniki during the war, had been detained in 1957, accused of war crimes, and convicted in Athens in 1959. Soon released from prison, he had for the first time accused Globke of being involved in the deportation of the Thessaloniki Jews to extermination camps in occupied Poland (a crime that he had been accused of only one year earlier) in June 1960 in the presence of Hessen state attorney general Fritz Bauer. In September 1960, Merten made these accusations public. On the Merten affair see Susanne Sophia Spiliotis, "Der Fall Merten, Athen 1959: Ein Kriegsverbrecherprozess im Spannungsfeld von Wiedergutmachungs- und Wirtschaftspolitik" (master's thesis, University of Munich, 1991).

31 Report by István Rostás, ambassador extraordinary, "Visit to Berlin by Jenő Lévai," April 10, 1961, MNL OL, XIX-j-1-j-Izrael-30/c-0081/15-1961.

an interest in involving him in the roundtable conferences on the Eichmann trial; the TV office invited him to hold a press conference on his new book and the film, and also invited him to the film premiere on April 20–21, 1961.

This enthusiasm was significantly dampened by the fact that on April 9, *Berliner Zeitung* and *Népszabadság* carried articles by Lévai in which he gave a detailed account of his visit to Merten, thus stealing the thunder of the film.³² There was minor international awkwardness with the East Germans complaining that Lévai had caused political damage with his articles, because he had weakened the effect of the film, and withdrawing his invitation to the premiere. Hungarian foreign minister Endre Sík himself challenged the editors of *Népszabadság*, the Party paper, who in turn responded that Lévai had reserved the right to publish the story in the press, and in any case, making things public in advance strengthened rather than weakened public interest in the film's appearance on TV.³³ However, any reference to Lévai's participation in the filmmaking is missing from *Aktion J*.

Getting Access to East European Archives: Reinhard Strecker

Globke's past was also discussed in the West, in particular within German liberal-leftist circles. The initiative of Reinhard Strecker to contribute to this debate derived from this atmosphere, fostered by documents provided by GDR, Czechoslovak, and Polish state institutions that Strecker published in the autumn of 1961.³⁴ Yet, Strecker's attempt to gain access to the Eastern bloc archives posed additional problems for him. In the Cold War atmosphere, any contact with Communist (in particular GDR) state authorities

32 Entitled "Zwei Mordkumpane: Globke und Eichmann" and "A koronatanú megszólal."

33 MNL OL, XIX-j-1-j-Izrael-30/c-0081/31-1961, containing: Endre Sík's letters to Dezső Nemes, head of the editorial committee of *Népszabadság*, April 20 and May 26, 1961; Péter Rényi's memorandum regarding Jenő Lévai's article, April 22, 1961; Dezső Nemes's letter to Endre Sík regarding Lévai's article, April 24, 1961.

34 *Dr. Hans Globke: Aktenauszüge, Dokumente*, ed. Reinhard-M. Strecker (Hamburg: Rütten & Loening, 1961).

seemed dubious or discredited political causes in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

The East–West contact that allowed Strecker to access Eastern bloc original documents had been established in a different context. Since 1957, the ADE had regularly published brochures with indictments and verdicts against Nazi-era public prosecutors and judges (so-called blood judges) who were still in office.³⁵ Strecker launched an initiative to popularize this unpopular topic in West Germany together with a group of enthusiasts of the Socialist German Student Union (SDS). Strecker tried to corroborate the GDR's accusations against these “blood judges” without success in the FRG and Czechoslovakia, where he was denied access to court records. Only then did he turn to the GDR, specifically to the ADE. Here, his request was more successful. Yet, in the beginning, the ADE acted hesitantly toward Strecker.³⁶ The Stasi perceived Strecker as a dedicated, nondogmatic idealist—which made him a rather difficult partner.³⁷ Strecker had been politically active in various student organizations that were critical of the East German state.³⁸ There were further reasons for mistrust: Strecker himself claimed to have been in contact with Western intelligence in 1950–51 and, furthermore, to have been employed in anti-communist actions in East Berlin.³⁹ Nevertheless, for the ADE the advantages outweighed the risks. Its publicist activity was aimed, in particular, at the West German

35 This term was coined by Albert Norden and refers to judges (and prosecutors) who were responsible for death sentences in Nazi Germany, in particular at the Sondergerichte. On the “blood judge” campaign see Marc von Miquel, *Ahnden oder amnestieren? Westdeutsche Justiz und Vergangenheitspolitik in den sechziger Jahren* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2004), 23–81.

36 Stephan Alexander Glienke, *Die Ausstellung “Ungesühnte Nazijustiz” (1959–1962): Zur Geschichte der Aufarbeitung nationalsozialistischer Justizverbrechen* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2008), 69; Miquel, *Ahnden oder amnestieren*, 51.

37 On the question of Strecker's independence, the Stasi and Wiener Library concurred in their assessment. See Note to Wiener Library, May 4, 1960, Wiener Library (London), 3000/9/1/1348; and copy of the Stasi report, March 23, 1962, BstU, MfS-Allg. P. 8098/77, 7–9 (here, 8).

38 Besides the SDS, Strecker was engaged in the DIS (German-Israeli Study Group) and the Protestant Student Union, where he supported students who had fled the GDR. Bevers, *Der Mann hinter Adenauer*, 176.

39 See report of GM [secret collaborator] “Jutta” to GDR state security, April 14, 1959, BstU, MfS-HA X/AKG Nr. 5877, 1. Strecker was not shy with this

public. Its brochures on the “blood judges” had caused a stir abroad, but not so much in West Germany.⁴⁰ Strecker was an authentic mediator with precious contacts with the progressive bourgeois and even anti-communist people in the West.

Strecker went to the ADE archives in East Berlin for the first time at the end of 1958, then visited regularly to consult original documents and make copies. In February 1960, he also gained access to archives in Czechoslovakia, then in Poland with the help of antifascist resistance fighter organizations.⁴¹ This enabled Strecker to distance himself from the GDR and to reduce his dependence on the ADE. Furthermore, Polish and Czechoslovakian authorities and archives had proved to be much more cooperative in the course of his visits to the East.

During his research in these Eastern bloc archives, Strecker had also collected material on Globke as a by-product. Most of the material in Strecker's later Globke publication originated from the GDR, but it is quite possible that the documents had been made available to Strecker by the Czechoslovakia and/or Poland: during the Eichmann trial, the Eastern bloc states had exchanged their material extensively.⁴² Thus, we do not know whether the ADE consciously distributed documents incriminating Globke to Strecker at this early stage.

Strecker presented this material to the Wiener Library (among other institutions) during his visit to England in the spring of 1960, as they were of interest for historical research.⁴³ The documents were, subsequently, also transferred to Yad Vashem.⁴⁴ This circulation did not present any problem as the documents remained in a small, nonpublic sphere. Discussing Globke's past publicly was a different matter. Strecker considered publishing a book

biographical detail; see also the report “Strecker,” February 25, 1960, *ibid.*, 10–11.

40 Glienke, *Die Ausstellung*, 69.

41 *Ibid.*, 69–71.

42 See, e.g., Memo of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 10, 1960, SAPMO, MfAA, A 2944.

43 Telegram from Strecker to the Wiener Library, October 12, 1960, and a letter from Wiener Library to Strecker, October 14, 1960, Wiener Library 3000/9/1/1348. Strecker was invited to present his findings on the personnel continuity of Reich-to-Federal judiciary at the House of Commons. Glienke, *Die Ausstellung*, 135–59, 245–48.

44 Wiener Library to Strecker, January 16, 1961, Wiener Library 3000/9/1/1348.

on Globke by the spring of 1961 at the latest.⁴⁵ According to Strecker, Karl Ludwig Leonhardt, literary editor at Rütten und Loening publishing house, convinced him to publish the Globke book.⁴⁶

We may interpret the book as a general reaction to Eastern bloc propaganda against Globke. Albert Norden, the GDR's chief propagandist, as well as the SED press organ, *Neues Deutschland*, had declared Globke "Himmler's right hand" who was responsible for the deportation of Jews from all over occupied Europe and for other crimes, as well as a fascist and anti-Semite even before Hitler's rise to power.⁴⁷ Since the direct effect of GDR propaganda was rather limited due to a predominantly anti-communist West German public,⁴⁸ such blunt treatment was an obstacle to West Germany's critical confrontation with the Nazi past that Strecker longed for. According to Strecker, it was against the "clean" pen-pushers (*Schreibtischtäter*) where "leverage must be applied."⁴⁹ In the foreword to his book, Strecker summarized his motivation as follows: the public in the free part of Germany "has a right to its own judgment."⁵⁰

Unlike Lévai, who could count on a supportive state attitude in his home country, Strecker faced risks publishing allegations about Globke in the tense atmosphere. Since November 1960, the GDR-led campaign against Globke

45 In a letter to the Wiener Library of March 5, 1961, he remarked that he would "perhaps" publish a book before the West German parliamentary elections in September: Wiener Library 3000/9/1/1348.

46 *Die Schärfe der Konkretion: Reinhard Strecker, 1968 und der Nationalsozialismus in der bundesdeutschen Historiografie*, ed. Gottfried Oy and Christoph Schneider (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2013), 61. This edition existed in the FRG (Hamburg) and the GDR. Leonhardt was an advocate of West German confrontation with the past; he tried in vain to publish Rolf Hochhuth's play "The Deputy" at his publishing house. See Mark Edward Ruff, *The Battle for the Catholic Past in Germany, 1945–1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 165–67.

47 See, e.g., the speech of Albert Norden at the press conference of July 28, 1960, BstU, MfS-ZAIG Nr. 10589 (2/2), 344–55; and "Wo Globke auftauchte—Judenvernichtung," *Neues Deutschland*, August 2, 1960.

48 On the idea of anticommunism as an immunization strategy, see "Geistige Gefahr" und "Immunisierung der Gesellschaft": *Antikommunismus und politische Kultur in der frühen Bundesrepublik*, ed. Stefan Creuzberger and Dierk Hoffmann (Munich/Boston: De Gruyter/Oldenbourg, 2014).

49 Strecker to Wiener Library, March 5, 1961, Wiener Library 3000/9/1/1348.

50 Strecker, *Dr. Hans Globke*, 5.

was in full swing. Most Western actors shied away from the politically sensitive issue. When Strecker presented to the Wiener Library more documents on Globke in December 1960, its representative said it was "not particularly interested . . . at present."⁵¹ The situation became even more tense in 1961 in the wake of the Eichmann trial and the erection of the Berlin Wall. According to the West German news journal *Der Spiegel*, Hessen state attorney general Fritz Bauer had opened preliminary investigations against Globke in January–February 1961.⁵² If the Globke case had been a predominantly political question before, it was now transformed into a question of criminal responsibility in West Germany, as well. While some West German politicians and press called for Globke's dismissal due to his compromised past, the reaction from the conservative political establishment seemed inevitable, following discussion of Globke's character publicly.⁵³ Yet, Strecker seemed to disregard the apparent conflicting political interests,⁵⁴ not to mention his personal exposure.⁵⁵

East–West power relations had provided an opportunity for action for both Lévai and Strecker. The latter's book could not have been realized without GDR state-party approval and access to Communist state archives.

51 Wiener Library to Strecker, January 3, 1961, Wiener Library 3000/9/1/1348. It is unclear whether Strecker had received this material only recently or if he had only now found time to forward it. Unfortunately, Strecker's letter to the Wiener Library, December 13, 1960 (mentioned in Wiener Library to Strecker of January 3, 1961), is not preserved in this folder.

52 "Globke: Ein unbedeutender Mann," *Der Spiegel*, February 15, 1961. It remains unclear what Bauer actually did, and what status the investigations had.

53 Adenauer, who generally backed Globke, gave another reassuring TV interview on April 10, 1961, one day before the Eichmann trial. In May 1961, Adenauer noted during a speech in parliament that Globke's commentary had saved the lives of many Jews. This assertion aroused protest in the West German Jewish community. See *Frankfurter Rundschau*, June 9, 1961.

54 This explanation is given in the literature on Strecker's behavior in the "blood judges" issue. Glienke, *Die Ausstellung*, 166.

55 He had regularly been discredited by the West German conservative press as a GDR agent; the Social Democrats had also been suspicious of him. See Glienke, *Die Ausstellung*, 45–50, 75–89; and Miquel, *Ahnden oder amnestieren*, 52–53. His motivation had only recently been cleared by a prominent political figure, Christian-Democrat Max Güde. Glienke, *Die Ausstellung*, 56–61; Miquel, *Ahnden oder amnestieren*, 54–55.

Furthermore, the financial aspect of their documentation efforts should not be neglected: according to Strecker, he could make copies for free in the Eastern bloc archives.⁵⁶ Lévai's travel expenses for his archival trips to Europe were, upon his personal request, reimbursed by the Hungarian state; he also received remuneration for his book. Lévai could also use the state infrastructure and his contacts within the government. Lévai had an impressive reach: he published articles in GDR, Swiss, and Israeli press outlets as well as English-language scholarly journals. Strecker, for his part, had less time and concentrated on the German public. These emphases were primarily due to the occupational status each enjoyed: Lévai was a full-time historian, Strecker a part-time activist. Both had been engaged in issues of politics of the past before the Globke affair. While Strecker concentrated on the "blood judges," Lévai's sphere of interest was much broader as he, beyond the historiography of the Holocaust, took part in Communist propaganda campaigns against the FRG.

The Budapest–East Berlin Production of *Eichmann in Hungary*

The fact that the material for *Eichmann in Hungary* was compiled by the East German Foreign Office, then checked by the members of the ADE,⁵⁷ left a significant mark on Lévai's book. According to the contents list enclosed with the agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Lévai, the work to be entitled *Indictment against SS Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann* aimed to discuss Eichmann's entire activity at the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* IV B4 in nine chapters.⁵⁸ The initial plan underwent some modifications while Lévai was working on it. More important, however, were the changes resulting from the editing process. One important change was that the scope of the book was narrowed to Eichmann's role in the 1944 Hungarian

56 Confidential note to Dr. Wiener, May 4, 1960, Wiener Library 3000/9/1/1348.

57 Helmer (GDR Foreign Ministry) to Vesper (ambassador in Budapest), January 17, 1961. SAPMO, MFAA A13.740.

58 Note "Discussions held in relation to the Eichmann affair," MNL OL, XIX-J-1-j-NSZK-30/c-004579-2/1960, d. 8.

operation, and a second was that the final version puts more emphasis on the supposedly compromising Nazi–Zionist negotiations during the war.⁵⁹

It is noteworthy that the final work exposed the role of Hans Globke in crimes attributed to Eichmann. The state secretary is presented as having contributed decisively to the destruction of the Jews in Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. "The murder of over six million Jews answers the criterion of genocide. Owing to his extensive contribution to these laws, which led to the murder of over six million Jews, Globke is also guilty of genocide." These accusations are strengthened by a reference to a 1947 UN resolution.⁶⁰ The first two and a half chapters in Lévai's book, apparently added to the manuscript in Berlin, deal with the state secretary's responsibility in the so-called Nuremberg statutes, in the implementation of racial laws in the annexed territories (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Memel), in resettlement actions, and in the "J" passport action. Globke is portrayed as the one preparing the extermination process: "The 'legal ground' [of the Final Solution] had already been established in the Nuremberg laws and decrees elaborated by Globke and company. So Globke had designated his victims."⁶¹ Additionally, his alleged direct and personal contact with Eichmann is emphasized: "If we take one by one the steps taken by Eichmann in different states, Globke's figure will be discernible and so will the important participation of his helpers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."⁶²

The editors in East Berlin added certain German documents into the manuscript, and left out minor parts in order to shape the emphasis of the book. For example, by not including the document that proved the initiative of the Hungarian Ministry of Internal Affairs in the registration of the Jews, the final version softens Hungarian responsibility, as did the added chapter subtitle, "Hungary to Follow the German Pattern." Lévai's comparison according to which deportations from the Hungarian countryside happened to be the most horrific of all as well as the phrase "In no other European

59 The manuscript is located in two parts, chapters 1–2 and 3–5, at two different locations of the Hungarian State Archives, which is probably the outcome of the editing process. As eventually only the Hungarian parts were of interest, those were probably taken out from the collection of the studies written for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and preserved elsewhere. See the first half at MNL OL, XXXII-10, 13, tétel; the second half at MNL OL, XIX-J-1-j-30/c 1945–1964 Izrael, dd. 12, 13.

60 Lévai, *Eichmann in Hungary*, 274.

61 Ibid., 29.

62 Ibid., 31.

state did Eichmann receive any help from the power forces as much as in Hungary" were also cut, thus putting more weight on the role of occupying Germany.⁶³ Points of emphasis were also modified using techniques of translation. The most striking fact in this regard was that the Hungarian *gyűjtőtábor* was translated "concentration camp," whereas the *Black Book* used the term "assembly center" (in some cases *internáló tábor* [internment camp] was also translated as "concentration camp").⁶⁴ In all likelihood, these modifications served to sharpen the argument against West Germany.

The anti-Globke aspect of Lévai's book was by no means entirely due to the editing process in East Berlin. The manuscript, apparently finished in September 1960,⁶⁵ begins the first chapter with the anti-Jewish aspect of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) program and the Nuremberg racial laws and decrees, "many among them written by, on the part of the Ministry of Interior, [by] state secretary dr. Wilhelm Stuckart and his deputy dr. Hans Globke." Globke's role in the "J action" is mentioned here as well.⁶⁶ Lévai's manuscript of *Eichmann in Hungary* contains an epilogue, in which West German generals, policemen, businessmen, scientists, doctors, lawyers, and judges with a Nazi past who held positions of responsibility at the time or earlier are listed.⁶⁷ Globke's alleged role in Nazi racial

63 See the third chapter of the original manuscript, "Eichmann Budapest," MNL OL, XIX-J-1-j-30/c 1945–1964 Izrael, d. 12, 155.

64 See Tim Cole, *Holocaust City: The Making of a Jewish Ghetto* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 77–78.

65 So Lévai dated the Author's Preface, s.n., MNL OL, XXXII-10, 13, tétel.

66 Ibid., s.n.

67 See the fifth chapter of the original manuscript, "Zárszó," MNL OL, XIX-J-1-j-30/c 1945–1964 Izrael, d. 13, 128–55. So far we have not found evidence about the source of this list. On the one hand, this is very similar to those used and circulated by the ADE, such as the list of the "blood judges." It is thus a possibility that Lévai received this list from East Berlin. As a matter of fact, he indicates ADE pamphlet *Über die verbrecherische Vergangenheit des Dr. Hans Globke* (1960) as a source (most probably he refers to the publication *Globke und die Ausrottung der Juden: Über die verbrecherische Vergangenheit des Staatssekretärs im Amt des Bundeskanzlers Adenauer*). On the other hand, there are several signs proving that the list was compiled by Lévai himself (maybe under the control of the Hungarian state and party authorities). Most importantly, the list reflects Hungarian interests, naming, for example, Ernst Lemmer, Kurt Becher, members of Eichmann's special unit in Hungary, or Karl Werkmeister (West German ambassador to Stockholm), whom he

persecution is also detailed: on the suggestion of an unknown Hungarian reviewer of the manuscript, a facsimile of his pledge of obedience to Hitler is even included.⁶⁸ Globke is portrayed in the manuscript as a "former devout member of the Nazi Party" who was Eichmann's accomplice in several crimes. Lévai quoted Globke that "the racial thinking of National Socialism implie[d] the rejection of the liberal principle concerning the equality of all humankind."⁶⁹ However, the comparison of the manuscript and the published book clearly show the differences in the judgement of Globke's role between the author and the producers. The book's most serious charges against Globke (genocide and direct collaboration with Eichmann) are not to be found in Lévai's manuscript. Although Lévai refers to Globke in the second chapter as the one whose orders Merten followed in Greece, the story of preventing the rescue of the Thessaloniki Jews, which was detailed in the published book, is missing.⁷⁰

Eventually, Lévai took up the additional and more serious accusations against the state secretary. In the Hungarian press, Lévai presented Globke, the contemporary West German éminence grise, as Eichmann's right-hand man who was active across all German-occupied Europe,⁷¹ as an active implementer of the racial laws.⁷² In the Swiss-Jewish weekly journal *Jüdische Rundschau Maccabi* in the summer of 1960, Lévai first referred to Globke

personally exposed as Eichmann's former accomplice in Budapest. In sum, the weight of Hungarian interests in the list suggests Lévai's authorship. Lévai probably took up the 1957–59 GDR-led "blood judges" campaign as a model.

68 Lévai, *Eichmann in Hungary*, 274.

69 Lévai did not indicate the source of this quotation. Also, Strecker quoted this passage from the preface of the Globke/Stuckart commentary of the Nuremberg Laws (1936); see *Dr. Hans Globke*, 100. According to Globke, his superior Stuckart had written the introduction; see Lommatzsch, *Hans Globke*, 73. There is no indication in the commentary itself as to who wrote the introduction; see "Einführung," in *Wilhelm Stuckart and Hans Globke, Reichsbürgergesetz, Gesetz zum Schutz des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Rasse, Gesetz zum Schutz der Erbgesundheit des deutschen Volkes* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1936), 1–30.

70 Ibid., s.n.

71 "Viszonválasz Globke államtitkárnak," *Népszabadság*, December 25, 1960; "Milliók gyilkosa V: Auschwitz és a 'végső megoldás,'" *Ország-Világ*, February 8, 1961.

72 See, e.g., "Milliók gyilkosa VIII: Eichmann Magyarországon," *Ország-Világ*, March 1, 1961.

briefly, in a highly polemical way ("who had helped prepare very carefully the extermination of the Jews");⁷³ later, he reprinted some of the ADE's accusations.⁷⁴

Lévai extended his accusations against Globke to the Hungarian complex only in the spring of 1961. He first disseminated the idea of Globke's double visit to Budapest in a Hungarian weekly on March 1, 1961—that is, before his testimony to Kaul.⁷⁵ According to this article, Globke told the Hungarian government in March 1944 to "copy the Jewish code that I made with Sanyo Mach in September 1939 in Bratislava."⁷⁶ With his affidavit for Kaul, Lévai confirmed as a hearsay witness that Globke had been present at the place of the crime: according to Kern (Lévai's source), on Globke's first trip, in 1942, he allegedly complained about the sabotage of the Hungarian anti-Jewish laws' execution and demanded the implementation of the Nuremberg racial laws in the country; on the second trip, in March 1944, Globke allegedly dismissed Kern from his post—a reference to the state secretary's alleged role in the actual implementation of the Nuremberg Laws in Hungary is missing.⁷⁷ Also in Lévai's later scholarly articles on the destruction of Hungarian Jewry, Globke was absent.⁷⁸

73 Jenő Lévai, "Als der Massenmörder Eichmann in Budapest residierte . . .," *Jüdische Rundschau Maccabi*, June 17, 1960.

74 For example, the accusations concerning Globke's role in Norway and Denmark had been addressed first by the GDR press (*Berliner Zeitung*, *Neues Deutschland*, *Neue Zeit*) on July 29, 1960, in coverage of the ADE press conference the previous day. See Jenő Lévai, "Eichmann und die Nürnberger Gesetze," *Jüdische Rundschau Maccabi*, September 2, 1960; and "Globke und Eichmann," *Jüdische Rundschau Maccabi*, September 9, 1960.

75 Lévai, "Milliók gyilkosa VIII."

76 Quoted in Lévai, "Milliók gyilkosa VIII." This can be treated as a stylistic device. Lévai also reported Eichmann's first words after his return to Budapest in October 1944, as if he had been present: "Jetzt geht die Sache hurtig weiter!" [Now things will move right along!], *Jüdische Rundschau Maccabi*, June 17, 1960.

77 "Eidesstattliche Erklärung Jenő Lévai," Yad Vashem Archives, O.51/75.

78 See, e.g., Jenő Lévai, "The Deportations from Hungary, 1944: Did Horthy Order a Stop?," *Wiener Library Bulletin* 17, no. 1 (January 1963): 12–13; Jenő Lévai, "The Hungarian Deportations in the Light of the Eichmann Trial," in *Yad Vashem Studies on the European Jewish Catastrophe and Resistance* no. V, ed. Nathan Eck and Arieh Leon Kubovy (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1963), 69–103.

Attempts at a Nonpartisan Presentation in *Dr. Hans Globke*

Strecker's book on Globke compiles 288 documents, arranged in chronological order: photos, newspaper articles, photocopies and copies of documents derived from the Reich Ministry of Internal Affairs, some signed by Globke, with a few short texts by the compiler himself.

By contrast with Lévai's text, the ADE could not control the editing process. Strecker had prominently placed in the opening credits his criticism that both the United States and the Soviet Union had kept their archives closed.⁷⁹ Due to the lack of sources, we do not know whether the GDR had tried to influence Strecker indirectly. Furthermore, we do not know the extent to which Strecker referred to any document's interpretation as provided to him by authorities in Poland or Czechoslovakia, as he certainly was not a trained professional historian.

Strecker's tone differs from that found in ADE brochures and most other Eastern bloc propagandistic materials on Globke despite the fact that Strecker did not reach his ideal—factual, prosaic, without polemics—in every particular.⁸⁰ Yet, his supposedly balanced approach to Globke went unnoticed in the charged atmosphere of the Cold War and GDR–FRG conflict. Globke's lawyer described the book as "tendentious."⁸¹ Strecker sometimes resorted to irony, and his book could be read as a subtle, propagandistic anti-Globke pamphlet adapted to a Western mindset. This aspect is compounded by Strecker's reserved editorship.⁸²

On the one hand, Strecker did not draw a direct connection between Eichmann and Globke as Lévai's book had done. He interpreted Globke's attendance at meetings and his trips abroad not as proof of his complicity in Nazi crimes, but merely of his knowledge of those.⁸³ Furthermore, Strecker did not interpret Globke's involvement in the issue of changes of Jewish names in 1932 as sufficient indication that Globke had been a Nazi

79 Strecker, *Dr. Hans Globke*, 2.

80 Cf. Strecker to Wiener Library, March 5, 1961, Wiener Library 3000/9/1/1348.

81 Complaint, Kugelmeier to Land Court Bonn, September 29, 1961, SAPMO, DP 3/971, 32 pp. (here, 21).

82 According to Strecker, it was the new publisher's literary editor who told him to shorten his commentary as "documents spoke for themselves." See Oy and Schneider, *Die Schärfe der Konkretion*, 65.

83 Strecker, *Dr. Hans Globke*, 8.

before the Nazi takeover.⁸⁴ In contrast to both Lévai and the ADE, Strecker also incorporated exonerations. He had quoted one of the most important testimonies of good character for Globke alongside Adolf Arndt's philippic and other unfavorable evaluations.⁸⁵ On the other hand, Globke's assumed connections to the anti-Hitler resistance group of July 20, 1944, were critically considered.⁸⁶ Strecker did not say whether he understood Globke as a Nazi or a "non-Nazi." He acknowledged possible "honorable motives" for Globke's service in the Nazi ministry. To him, the juridical question of criminal responsibility was of no importance, but the moral and political question was: should persons be allowed to serve in prominent political positions in a democracy if they had caused nameless suffering (*namloses Leid mitverfasst haben*) by their formal cooperation (Strecker used the Catholic theological term *cooperatio formalis*) with the Nazi regime?⁸⁷ Strecker gave his view—an implicitly negative assessment.⁸⁸ The discussion about the political consequences of Germany's Nazi past was more important to Strecker than the historical clarification of the concrete case or Globke's punishment.⁸⁹

84 Ibid., 18–24, 46–64. As an official in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, Globke dealt with regulations concerning name changes by German Jews who had either converted to Christianity or were afraid of the rising anti-Semitic atmosphere in Germany and, thus, tried to get rid of their Jewish-sounding family or first names.

85 See quote of Cardinal Graf Preysing in Strecker, *Dr. Hans Globke*, 8–9.

86 Ibid., 276–79. For an evaluation of Globke's resistance contacts, see Lommatzsch, *Hans Globke*, 86–93.

87 See "Dr. Hans Globkes Flucht nach vorn . . .," television program *Telestudio West*, DFF, December 14, 1961, DRAB, Hauptbestand, 063228, min. 10–11.

88 Strecker invoked a broadcast address by Theodor Heuss, West Germany's first president, on the first page of his publication; see *Dr. Hans Globke*, 1. To Strecker, persons that "couldn't even excuse their participation in these things [the Third Reich] with their Nazi obstinacy" were a worse political threat. See Strecker to the Wiener Library, March 5, 1961, Wiener Library 3000/9/1/1348.

89 This restriction to the moral sphere may also have been a realistic insight and minimal claim; see Glienke, *Die Ausstellung*, 74–75. On Strecker's general civic approach to the Nazi past, cf. Michael Kohlstruck, "Reinhard Strecker—'Darf man seinen Kindern wieder ein Leben in Deutschland zumuten?,'" in *Engagierte Demokraten: Vergangenheitspolitik in kritischer Absicht*, ed. Claudia Fröhlich and Michael Kohlstruck (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1999), 185–200 (here, 193–94).

Yet, the historical reconstruction of Globke's past was an essential part of the discussion. Strecker's book, *Dr. Hans Globke*, was primarily based on documents that had already been published by the ADE. However, there was one document that Strecker published for the first time: Jenő Lévai's affidavit (mentioned above).⁹⁰ We do not know through which channels Strecker received this testimony, although he probably received it either from Kaul who had conducted the sworn questioning (information that Strecker did not include in his publication) or from a member of the ADE in Berlin. The possibility exists that it was Lévai himself that gave the affidavit to Strecker in April 1961 when Strecker took part in the inauguration of the National Memorial Sachsenhausen.⁹¹ According to indirect evidence, we suspect that Strecker had been invited to this event exactly for this purpose: in order to transmit this information to the West.⁹² Since Lévai was at that time also in the GDR,⁹³ it is possible that he, too, was present in person at the inauguration ceremony.

Strecker seems to have been reticent with regard to the value of Lévai's testimony claiming Globke's direct contribution to the deportation of Hungarian Jews. Strecker remarked that Lévai's claim that Globke had been in Budapest in March 1944 was unlikely.⁹⁴ A (hypothetical) personal encounter could help explain why Strecker had nevertheless included Lévai's

90 Strecker, *Dr. Hans Globke*, 270.

91 On Strecker's presence during the inauguration on April 23, 1961, see Stasi report, March 23, 1962, BStU, MfS-Allg. P. 8098/77, 7.

92 This hypothesis is based on an analogous example of Stasi strategy. One year later, in December 1962, "Nazi-hunter" Tuwiah Friedman, head of the Institute of Documentation for the Investigation of Nazi War Crimes (Haifa), was invited to a meeting in Warsaw to receive GDR material on Globke. See Halle (Agitation Department) to Mielke, October 15, 1962, BStU, MfS, HA-IX Nr. 22631, 366–67.

93 Lévai traveled to East Berlin on April 19 to take part in the international press conference on the book *Eichmann in Ungarn*. However, due to the Sachsenhausen inauguration ceremony, the event had to be postponed to April 27. See Letter of István Rostás (ambassador extraordinary to Berlin), May 2, 1961, MNL OL, XIX-j-1-j-Izrael-30/c-0081/29-1961.

94 Referring to Globke's request on March 11, 1944, for vacation the following week, published on the previous page, Strecker concluded that "this has to be thus an error in timing at least." Strecker, *Dr. Hans Globke*, 270. Globke was in Slovakia in February 1944, and in Switzerland in March 1944 for health treatment.

affidavit in his book.⁹⁵ Personal contact was a means to develop trust and demonstrate reliability amid the confusing multiplayer dynamics of the Cold War. For example, Strecker referred to Friedrich Karl Kaul as a guarantor when he underlined that he was convinced that the presented documents from the GDR archives were authentic and not forged.⁹⁶ Furthermore, Strecker was suspicious due to the fact that Globke had not yet published a correction or refutation to Lévai's accusations concerning Hungary. Strecker assumed that Lévai's sworn statement had already received "widespread" attention abroad (as he had probably been told in the GDR).⁹⁷ He was unaware that it was actually he himself who first would make this accusation against Globke public in the West.⁹⁸

The political context, without doubt, influenced the conception of their books and, moreover, the target audiences as well. Strecker wrote for an anti-communist and domestic public. His choice to display temperance in his assessments of proof may also be owing to his awareness of the risk of being taken as a propagandist of the GDR. Strecker played the role of mediator and guarantor of documents previously published by the ADE. By contrast,

95 Up to now, we have not found documents proving this personal encounter between Lévai and Strecker. There were reasons for not talking about their connections as it was dangerous for both actors and "their project" had failed. On the insights of such a grounded speculation, see Roger D. Masters, *Fortune Is a River: Leonardo da Vinci and Niccolò Machiavelli's Magnificent Dream to Change the Course of Florentine History* (New York: Free Press, 1998).

96 See interview with Kaul-Strecker, in *Dr. Hans Globkes Flucht nach vorn*, DRAB, Hauptbestand, 063228, min. 15. This had been the West German government's first line of defense with regard to the Frick letter. Yet, the letter was later proved authentic in the East Berlin Globke trial by a Polish expert.

97 Strecker, *Dr. Hans Globke*, 270.

98 According to the complaint by Globke's lawyer Kugelmeier, September 29, 1961 (SAPMO, DP 3/971, 21), Strecker was the first to publicize this accusation. This assertion seems to be correct. Western audiences for the first time could hear Lévai's claim at the press conference related to the book at the Hungarian Embassy in East Berlin, but the West German press apparently did not take up this issue. This assumption is based on a spot check of the biggest newspapers. *Die Welt*, whose correspondent was present, did not report on the press conference (issues of April 28, 29, 30). *Neues Deutschland* did not report about it at all (issues of April 28, 29, 30). *Berliner Zeitung* (April 28, 1961) reported superficially. Only *Neue Zeit* (April 28, 1961) referred to a double visit of Globke in Hungary.

Lévai worked for an international audience, and his book was never translated into Hungarian.

Publications: Audiences and Reception

Lévai's documentary book on Eichmann was a weapon against Globke and West German "neofascism" and was made as part of the Hungarian strategy in the Eichmann affair.⁹⁹ The book was not put onto the market but was distributed directly, via diplomatic channels, mainly through the Hungarian embassies at occasions of international press conferences. The first such event took place on April 27, 1961, at the embassy in East Berlin. The first three questions from the audience, precoordinated with the ADE, were related to Globke's activity in Hungary during Nazi rule. Journalists' questions were answered by the expert Jenő Lévai.¹⁰⁰ To the first question put by the East German news agency ADN, Lévai asserted that Globke had been twice in Hungary and met with prominent German and Hungarian fascists, Eichmann included.¹⁰¹ This was the first time that Lévai made this claim public outside Hungary. The next day, State Secretary Hans Globke himself denied the accusations in a televised interview without mentioning either Lévai's book or the press conference.¹⁰² The FRG eventually banned the distribution of the book, which, according to a Hungarian Communist Party press report, "amounts to documentary proof that Eichmann and Globke collaborated."¹⁰³

Lévai's book also created a stir because Herbert Melzig, mentioned as a suspect due to a translation error, raised an objection verbally at the book's launch, then in writing to the German and Hungarian authorities,

99 See Esztergályos's "Note on the measures to be taken in the Eichmann affair," February 8, 1961, MNL OL, XIX-j-1-j-Izrael-30/c-sz.n. "Eichmann-per," d. 13.

100 Embassy report on the press conference, May 2, 1961, MNL OL, XIX-j-1-j-Izrael-30/c-0081/29-1961.

101 Letter of István Rostás (ambassador extraordinary to Berlin), May 2, 1961, *ibid.*

102 See "Globke und die Juden," *Der Spiegel*, May 10, 1961.

103 "Nyugat-Németországban elkobozták az Eichmann 'Magyarországon' című könyvet," *Népszabadság*, June 7, 1961. On the West German government's official assessment of confiscation, see the complaint by Kugelmeier, September 29, 1961, SAPMO, DP 3/971.

demanding a correction and even the withdrawal of the book from circulation.¹⁰⁴ In the estimation of the embassy, the two affairs (the publication of the Merten interview mentioned earlier and the Melzig controversy) related to Lévai "ought to warn us that in the future, when collaborating with Lévai, we must manage him with far more caution and care."¹⁰⁵

When Strecker published his book on Hans Globke shortly before the West German parliamentary elections in early September 1961,¹⁰⁶ Globke again reacted quickly. He filed for an injunction the same month. His lawyer, Alphons Kugelmeier, listed more than twenty-two misrepresentations or distortions.¹⁰⁷ For example, Kugelmeier assumed that the letter from Wilhelm Frick, Reich minister of internal affairs, to the Führer's deputy Rudolf Hess dated April 25, 1938, was a forgery.¹⁰⁸ In this letter, Frick recommends Globke as an official who is deserving promotion. Besides mentioning his former membership in the conservative Zentrum Party, Frick claims Globke coauthored several Nazi discrimination laws. While Strecker did not comment on this particular document, it had been used by the GDR and others to prove that Globke had been not only the commentator on, but the author of, the Nuremberg Laws.¹⁰⁹

Strecker's suggestion to include a correction was not accepted by Globke's legal representative, and he was summoned to appear in court on December

104 Lévai, *Eichmann in Ungarn*, 222. See Melzig's letters at SAPMO, MfAA A13.740.

105 Letter from István Rostás, ambassador extraordinary, on "Professor Lévai's second journey to Berlin," May 12, 1961, MNL OL, XIX-j-1-j-Izrael-30/c-0081/28-1961.

106 Erika Schwarz, *Juden im Zeugenstand: Die Spur des Hans Globke im Gedächtnis von Überlebenden der Schoa* (Berlin: Hentrich & Hentrich, 2009), 10.

107 SAPMO, DP 3/971.

108 Ibid., 9. Cf. Lommatzsch, *Hans Globke*, 317, 402.

109 Strecker, *Dr. Hans Globke*, 83–84. This is the only document that seems to prove Globke's intellectual authorship of the Nuremberg Laws. It remains the most potent argument for anti-Globke accusations. See the balanced interpretation of this issue in Lommatzsch, *Hans Globke*, 47–48. Globke had not been present at the Nuremberg *Reichsparteitag* in September 1935 where the laws had been discussed and decided. But as Globke admitted in April 1961, he had helped prepare the two initial implementing regulations (*Ausführungsverordnungen*) of the Nuremberg Laws afterward. Cornelia Essner, *Die "Nürnberger Gesetze" oder die Verwaltung des Rassenwahns 1933–1945* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002), 115, 126–50.

13, 1961.¹¹⁰ Strecker was, thus, under strong pressure to prove his accusations.¹¹¹ In this situation, needing to respond quickly, Strecker turned to East Berlin for help. He sought the original documents and, in addition, concurrent supporting material.¹¹² Immediately, a working group was established in the GDR's Attorney General and Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office to support Strecker.¹¹³ Some documents belonged to the ADE,¹¹⁴ and were, thus, easily accessible; however, many were stored in the Stasi archive. The responsible Stasi department, HA XI, received the order to provide the needed material on December 5, 1961. On December 8, Stasi officer Lothar Stolze met Strecker "by chance" at Carlos Foth's office (Foth was the head of the International Communication Department in the GDR Attorney General's Office). This unintended meeting led to the first discussion between Strecker and GDR state security. Together, the two men decided that Strecker would receive the material as certified copies via the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office.¹¹⁵

Both sides profited from this arrangement, but asymmetrically. Strecker needed urgent help; in return, the GDR received precious, otherwise unattainable information—that is, insight into Globke's defense strategy: Strecker handed over the correspondence concerning the suit against publication of his book.¹¹⁶ Thereupon, Strecker was invited to East Berlin to an interview with Kaul on December 12, 1961.¹¹⁷ On December 14, just one day after the hearing in Bonn, and one day before the Jerusalem court handed down its verdict against Eichmann, the interview was broadcast on Deutscher

110 SAPMO, DP 3/971: Dr. Lewalder to Court Bonn, November 7, 1961; Alphons Kugelmeier to Court Bonn, 7 November 1961; court summons Court Bonn to Strecker, October 17, 1961.

111 According to Strecker, the West German intelligence service was also ordered to prevent the publication of Strecker's book, and economic pressure was exerted by the FRG government on the edition house. See Bevers, *Der Mann hinter Adenauer*, 176–77.

112 Strecker's "preliminary remark" (n.d.), BStU, MfS HA IX/11 ZUV Nr. 83 Bd. 5, 2–10; list of needed documents for Strecker, *ibid.*, 11–14.

113 Note, November 1961, SAPMO, DP 3/72, 24–29.

114 List of "needed documents for Strecker," BStU, MfS HA IX/11 ZUV Nr. 83 Bd. 5, 11–14.

115 Report HA IX/Stolze, December 9, 1961, BStU, MfS HA IX/11, ZUV Nr. 83, Bd. 5, 15–17.

116 SAPMO, DP 3/971.

117 Stasi report, March 23, 1962, BStU, MfS-Allg. P. 8098/77, 8.

Fernsehfunk (German Television Broadcasting, or DFF).¹¹⁸ Strecker was introduced as the author of a book that had prompted Globke to a “panicky” reaction. Needless to say, this interview also provided an opportunity to highlight the GDR’s contribution. On the question of the origin of documents, Strecker stressed their diversity, but mentioned explicitly the Potsdam Central Archive—East Germany’s principal archives.¹¹⁹

Confronted with the GDR’s attempted co-optation of his autonomy, Strecker defended his agency in the interview by underscoring that the fight against the Nazi jurists was the only thing in common between him and GDR officials, saying to Kaul that it was “the only thing that brings us together time and again.” Kaul, who clearly enjoyed the challenging discussion, answered with ironic incredulity. When Strecker started to explain the reasons for his critical attitude toward the GDR, Kaul interrupted him gently and tabled the frank discussion. According to an internal Stasi report, Strecker had wanted “by all means” to make an on-air statement against the Berlin Wall before the interview started. Several of his friends had been imprisoned while helping East German citizens flee to West Berlin.¹²⁰ Despite the fact that Strecker did not have to read prepared texts on GDR TV,¹²¹ but was allowed to act spontaneously, he could not control his image in the GDR public sphere. Strecker was portrayed as a young, idealistic man of “unlimited objectivity,” who sought for extenuating circumstances, even with regard to somebody such as Globke, “an abettor of murder”¹²²—that is, a well-meaning but hopelessly naive and politically irresponsible person.

In contrast to their political impact, the two books on Globke received thin public or scientific reception: the Wiener Library *Bulletin* announced

118 *Dr. Hans Globkes Flucht nach vorn . . .*, DRAB, Hauptbestand, 063228.

119 In contrast, Strecker stuck to the narrative of staying away from the East German state (after gaining access to Czechoslovak and Polish archives). See Bevers, *Der Mann hinter Adenauer*, 175–76, who cites a contemporary interview with Strecker.

120 According to Strecker, the GDR would “demonstrate its strength” by releasing them from prison. Stasi report, March 23, 1962, BStU, MfS-Allg. P. 8098/77, 8.

121 See, e.g., “Interview mit Opfern des Naziregimes,” newscast *Aktuelle Kamera*, September 14, 1961, DRAB, *Nachrichtenbestand* (newscast collection), 065163.

122 Cf. Off-Commentary in *Dr. Hans Globkes Flucht nach vorn . . .*, DRAB, Hauptbestand, 063228, min. 23.

Strecker’s book in April 1962 with the short annotation “An indictment.”¹²³ Lévai’s Eichmann book did not receive as wide a review as his *Black Book*.¹²⁴ As we have seen, the representation of Globke in the two books differed dramatically (and further, with regard to Lévai’s, it differed among the various publications), even though the authors had substantiated their interpretation with essentially the same sources. We have also recognized certain restrictions by state organs on our actors’ agency, in particular with regard to the framing of each individual’s position. Intersections between Lévai and Strecker are striking: both visited the same places (Yad Vashem, East Berlin), spoke with the same people (Friedrich Karl Kaul), and both are mentioned in the same journals (e.g., the Wiener Library *Bulletin*). Thus, Jewish institutions that dealt with Nazism often constituted meeting points in the East–West conflict.

Lévai and Strecker in Jerusalem

On the recommendation of Esztergályos, the Hungarian party-state “let out” Lévai to attend Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem, to help prevent possible Israeli attacks on socialist countries. He was to provide documents on Nazi–Zionist negotiations in wartime Hungary (the so-called blood-for-goods negotiations) and thus compromise Israel.¹²⁵ The main instrument for this was the publicization of the Kasztner affair.¹²⁶ Lévai was asked to collect material

123 *Wiener Library Bulletin* 16, no. 2 (April 1962): 40.

124 Its French, English, and German versions are mentioned in “Répertoire des ouvrages d’histoire publiés en Hongrie dans le premier semestre de 1961,” *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 9, nos. 1–2 (1963): 299–331. Also, the book served as a source for Randolph Braham, the key historian in the birth and evolution of the field of Hungarian Holocaust studies. In his *The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), *Eichmann in Hungary* is the third most frequently cited of Lévai’s books.

125 Handwritten remark of Esztergályos, June 8, 1961, on the Israeli Embassy’s “Report on the Eichmann trial by the Hungarian Embassy in Israel,” MNL OL, XIX-j-1-j-Izrael-30/c-0081/35-1961.

126 Following the German occupation of Hungary, Rezső Kasztner, representing the Zionists, held talks with Eichmann, and with Kurt Becher in the “blood for goods” deal to save Jewish lives in exchange for war materials. This enabled 1,684 people to be sent to Switzerland on the so-called Kasztner train. After

on the case.¹²⁷ Since Lévai was in indirect contact with Benjamin Halevy, a judge in the Kasztner and Eichmann trials, Hungarian authorities assumed that he could lead them to valuable information.¹²⁸ Given that Lévai had been invited to Jerusalem by Yad Vashem, which offered to foot the bill for one month's stay there, the deal paid off well for the Hungarian leadership. Moreover, from the perspective of the Hungarian state authorities, it was better to put the focus on Lévai rather than on the embassy, because that would enable the latter to maintain the line that the state of Hungary was not interfering in the Eichmann trial, while behind the scenes exploiting Lévai's contacts; and if there were inaccuracies in the material, then a private individual rather than the Hungarian state would be attacked.¹²⁹ Lévai left Budapest in early June 1961.

Although Israel's attorney general Hausner did not manage to summon him as an expert witness on June 20, Lévai's time in Israel was not spent in vain.¹³⁰ He gave public lectures; held conversations with the attorneys in the Eichmann trial; handed over evidence, including records about Globke; gave advice to Yad Vashem officials; and took part in a specialist workshop there on the deportations from Hungary.¹³¹

During the Eichmann trial, the parties involved in the international game around the affair attempted to influence the introduction of documentary evidence proving the role of Globke. In relation to a document that stripped citizenship from German Jews introduced by the public prosecutors, on May

the war, he lived in Israel, and from 1952 on he became the spokesman for the Workers' Party minister for trade and industry. In 1953, the state brought a case for slander against an Israeli of Hungarian origin, who publicly accused Kasztner of collaboration with the Nazis. The verdict of the trial went against Kasztner, and the judge, Benjamin Halevi, stated that the accused had "sold his soul to the devil." Kasztner was shot dead in public on March 3, 1957. In 1958, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and found Kasztner not guilty on every count.

127 Esztergályos's note "Further measures related to the Eichmann trial," MNL OL, XIX-j-1-j-Izrael-30/c-0081/30-1961.

128 Note, March 13, 1961, *ibid.*

129 Note of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry on "Further measures related to the Eichmann trial," May 20, 1961, *ibid.*

130 On Lévai's trip to Jerusalem see also János Dési, *Lévai Jenő és a zsidósors* ([Budapest:] Citoyen, 2017).

131 Embassy summary of the Eichmann trial, June 25, 1961. MNL OL, XIX-j-1-j-Izrael-30/c-0081/39-1961.

22 Eichmann testified that "this was actually the legal basis which made it possible to later deport the Jews from the inner territories of the Reich."¹³² Strecker was not present at the Eichmann trial. He was studying at the time, and he probably could not have afforded to travel to Israel anyway. Yet, even though he was not present in person, his book on Globke was. One copy had found its way into the hands of Adolf Eichmann. The forty-page commentary that Eichmann wrote while awaiting the appeal of his conviction was, however, withheld from the trial chamber for political reasons.¹³³

Globke was close to being implicated in the Eichmann trial at least three times. The first was during Max Merten's testimony, which he made for the defense on May 31, 1961, in West Berlin. Then, on June 21, 1961, in Eichmann's own testimony, Globke was named as the person responsible for the Nazi measures that made it possible to cancel the German citizenship of Jews and confiscate their property, which created a stir internationally.¹³⁴ The third instance occurred on March 22, 1962, during the hearing of the appeal, when Eichmann's defense counsel petitioned a brief to question Globke as an expert witness. On March 28, Attorney General Hausner rejected this motion, saying there was no need for an expert to bear witness to the criminal aspect of the Nuremberg Laws.

Nonengagement in the GDR Trial of Globke

The failure of all the desperate Eastern bloc attempts to incriminate Globke through the court proceedings against Eichmann marks a definitive break in the Globke affair. Most importantly, the actors involved changed considerably. It was partly for strategic reasons that neither Lévai nor Strecker was included in the implementation and performance of the East Berlin trial. During the pretrial phase, it was important to rely upon their contacts and

132 The following is the source of all references to the Eichmann trial: <http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts>.

133 Klaus Wiegrefe, "The Holocaust in the Dock: West Germany's Efforts to Influence the Eichmann Trial," *Spiegel Online*, April 15, 2011, <https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-holocaust-in-the-dock-west-germany-s-efforts-to-influence-the-eichmann-trial-a-756915.html>. On Ben-Gurion's efforts to keep Globke out of sight during the Eichmann case, see Yablonka, *State of Israel vs. Adolf Eichmann*.

134 Homer Bigart, "Eichmann Accuses Top Adenauer Aide," *New York Times*, June 22, 1961.

standing in the West and perhaps to use them as "front actors" covering for the genuine interest groups behind the campaign. A public trial with the desired international repercussions made those interests explicit. Also, the documents collected by these two individual actors were at hand. At the same time, a trial staged officially by the state authorities promised stricter and more efficient ideological and political control of all involved. It is, however, an unanswered question as to why the two were not used, at least symbolically.

The idea to stage a public trial against Globke was considered early on.¹³⁵ However, the decision to initiate the criminal process was only confirmed by the GDR Politburo in the spring of 1963.¹³⁶ The event was publicly framed by Norden and the ADE as the continuation of the Eichmann trial. As the first truly global judicial media event in Jerusalem clearly demonstrated, the staging of a trial could provide the state authorities with not only a previously inconceivable propaganda impact on international politics, but also control over all elements of publicization. This held true for the participants in the procedure, whose selection was carefully made in order to attain the widest possible political and ideological impact.

The participation of Hungary, from where no witnesses were recruited, provides a good example. The Eastern bloc states were contacted via official diplomatic and unofficial secret service lines in the last days of April and beginning of May 1963.¹³⁷ The East German embassy let it be known that it would invite legal and historical scholars from "friendly countries," including four from Hungary.¹³⁸ It also requested that the press deal with the matter

135 According to Klaus Bästlein, Albert Norden came up with the idea at the end of 1961. Klaus Bästlein, *Der Fall Globke: Propaganda und Justiz in Ost und West* (Berlin: Metropol, 2018), 81. See also a note by the Halle (Agitation Department), August 17, 1962, BStU, MfS-HA IX Nr. 22645.

136 Norden proposed the idea during a Politburo session on March 19, 1963. See Michael Lemke, "Instrumentalisierter Antifaschismus und SED-Kampagnenpolitik im deutschen Sonderkonflikt 1960–1968," in *Die geteilte Vergangenheit: Zum Umgang mit Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand in beiden deutschen Staaten*, ed. Jürgen Danyel (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1995), 61–86 (here, 72–73). The Stasi was informed about Ulbricht's approval some days earlier by the ADE. See note by the Halle (Agitation Department) to Mielke, March 13, 1963, BStU, MfS ZAIG Nr. 10598, 25–26.

137 See SAPMO, DP 3/967.

138 The members of the Hungarian delegation were Budapest chief prosecutor Dr. János Götz, judge and council head Dr. Sándor Halász, lawyer Dr. Miklós

in an appropriate manner, and that Hungary prompt intellectuals in capitalist countries to make statements on the matter, demanding that Hungarian MPs intervene.¹³⁹ The composition of the delegations invited to the hearing was carefully determined so as to include legal and historical experts, alongside representatives for the official prosecution and the judiciary. There was a concerted attempt to make the trial interesting for the media by inviting famous public figures as observers. The Jewish Congregation of Greater Berlin invited Endre Sós, chairman of the Hungarian Jews National Association (*Magyar Izraeliták Országos képviselője* [National representation of Hungarian Israelites]), to take part alongside twenty well-known Jewish writers, journalists, lawyers, and community leaders, and the congregation expressed their hope that Sós would write of the hearing in the Hungarian papers.¹⁴⁰

Lévai's name initially came up as a potential expert witness¹⁴¹ but was then dismissed for unknown reasons. According to the plans, the eyewitness testimonies were supposed to dramatize and publicize the history that would unfold during the trial, based on the already collected and prepared incriminating documents.¹⁴² Furthermore, it seems that Lévai's theory of Globke's double visit to Hungary was dropped by the GDR's Attorney General's Office.¹⁴³ It is also telling that Lévai himself did not even mention

Kádár, and historian Dr. László Zsigmond; all were university professors. The chief prosecutor of the GDR also invited the chair of the Chief Prosecutor's Office, József Szalay, as a personal guest. See Memorandum for the Secretariat on the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Central Committee, June 28, 1963, MNL OL, XIX-J-1-j-NDK-30/c-004796-5/1963, d. 28.

139 "Comrade Hienzschi's visit from the GDR embassy," May 24, 1963, MNL OL, XIX-J-1-j-NDK-30/c-004796-5/1963, d. 28.

140 Endre Sós to the State Office for Religious Affairs, June 20, 1963, MNL OL, XIX-A-21-a-K-2-69/1963.

141 Note, "Foreign Experts on the Globke case," April 2, 1963, BStU, MfS-HA IX, Nr. 22631, 3–4.

142 Halle (Agitation Department) to Mielke, March 26, 1963, *ibid.*, 20–22. All in all, 59 witnesses testified in person (plus 1 in written form) from seven countries: 8 from the USSR, 8 from Czechoslovakia, 5 from Poland, 28 from the GDR, 6 from France, 2 from the Netherlands, and 2 from Israel. See BStU, MfS-HA IX Nr. 22628, 236–37.

143 There was no evaluation of Lévai's claim found in the Stasi archive, yet the attorney general did check it, and the indictment against Globke did

the Globke trial in his otherwise very extensive anti-West German journalistic oeuvre.

Emphasis lay on the recruitment of "appropriate" witnesses from the Western Hemisphere. Here, GDR relied on its so-called social organs (e.g., the Friendship Societies) that received short-notice invitations.¹⁴⁴ Initially, GDR authorities had hoped to find support for their campaign against Globke among noncommunist Jewish organizations abroad.¹⁴⁵ During the Eichmann trial, however, these hopes cooled as there had been an anti-Israeli campaign in the GDR press.¹⁴⁶ However, the inclusion of Jewish voices in the trial was an essential strategy to broaden the coverage of the trial.¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, neither Lévai nor Strecker was perceived as Jewish or as a Jewish representative by the GDR.

Strecker's potential value as a citizen of a Western country could not be deployed because he had taken a considerably less active role. Strecker had been invited to the conference of the "International Blood Judge Commission" in Warsaw in December 1962,¹⁴⁸ but he turned down the invitation. He was present during the international press conference on Globke in March 1963 in East Berlin and during the trial in July as an observer.¹⁴⁹ But, like Lévai, Strecker published nothing on the trial.

not include crimes against Hungarian Jews. See note on meeting General Attorney, November 16, 1962, SAPMO, DP 3/72, 25.

144 Halle (Agitation Department), March 26, 1963, BStU, MfS-HA IX, Nr. 22631, 22; Agitation plan, April 2, 1963, *ibid.*, 11–13.

145 Lemke, "Instrumentalisierter Antifaschismus," 71–72.

146 For an analysis of *Neues Deutschland*, see Peter Krause, *Der Eichmann-Prozess in der deutschen Presse* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2002), 238–44.

147 One month before the trial started, the editor of the Yiddish-language newspaper *Folks-Shtime* (Warsaw), Korman, underlined this aspect during a conversation with Hilde Benjamin, GDR minister of justice. See Streit to Norden, June 17, 1963, SAPMO, DP 3/965.

148 See the draft conception of the press conference, November 17, 1962, BStU, MfS HA IX Nr. 22631, 347–50 (here, 349).

149 Attendance list of the "International Press Conference, March 21," 1963, BStU, MfS HA IX, Nr. 22645, 6; Attendance list of journalists, BStU, MfS-HA IX Nr. 22628, 494–96 (here, 494).

Conclusion

International tensions of the Cold War constituted paradoxically both an obstacle and a driving force for individual agents' quest for historical truth. It was the Cold War game that provided both Lévai and Strecker the chance to travel and to find financing, to get access to documents and present them as evidence, and to take part in an international network of actors engaged in the effort to exact retribution for mass atrocities. The constitutive role of Cold War relations in individual agency is clearly visible in the public trajectory of the two actors, Lévai and Strecker, during the Globke affair. Both radically changed their positions during this relatively short period of time. Strecker's general position was critical toward the East German claims, but eventually, because of being attacked by the FRG elite and his own government, he became (most probably unintentionally) a collaborator in the socialist country's anti-Western political efforts. Lévai, who, in contrast to Strecker, initially called for Globke's criminal indictment,¹⁵⁰ was finally absent not only at his trial but also did not participate in the related anti-Globke political attacks. These changes, we argue, cannot be fully explained by their personal motivations, which presumably remained the same with regard to Globke and his "accomplices," but only by taking into account the actor–state relationships constitutive of their agency.

Neither actor was "powerful" in the Weberian sense: while their actions could elicit reactions by Globke in noncommunist publications, they needed the general support of the Communist political elites. Their relative autonomy was based on the fact that both Strecker and Lévai had symbolic capital otherwise unattainable for actors strictly controlled by the state—being Western and having Western contacts in Strecker's case, and knowledge and international network in Lévai's, and access to archival material in both their cases. An important difference is that Strecker had cooperative relationships with foreign states, while Lévai worked with and for Hungary. Their relations to the state may be even closer than usually assumed in historiography. In

150 Cf. *Jüdische Rundschau Maccabi*, September 2, 1961. In mid-April 1961, Lévai said in an English-language interview that he expected a proceeding to begin against Globke "most certainly after the Eichmann trial." "Hungarian Expert Says Eichmann's Trial Must Lead to Globke," *Kanadai Magyar Munkás*, April 13, 1961. On the first day of the Globke trial, the *Neues Deutschland* (July 8, 1963) quoted Lévai, who referred to Globke's peaceful life while Eichmann had been executed.

Communist regimes, collaborating with state security is a manifestation of a close actor–state relationship. While we assume that Lévai was an informant of the Hungarian secret service, Strecker also made contact with the GDR state security once.

Both cases, however, represent an actor–state relation in which the first enjoys relative autonomy for action. This is particularly true for Lévai, who seems to have been very careful not only to nurture his professional acknowledgment in international scholarship but also to steal the show from state-party agents. Their actions differ from pure state-controlled publicity operations insofar as Strecker could distance himself from the mainstream public and state discourse on Globke, and Lévai could decide on the form and timing of his publications.

Our study also reveals how necessary it is to analyze the immediate prehistory of these trials. The Globke trial is not understandable without taking into account the various efforts to incriminate him during the Eichmann affair (and not only then). From the actors' perspective, our comparison has shown the differences of publicization strategies in the two phases of the Globke affair. During the first, the East German and Hungarian states sought to influence a trial in Israel, a state of the opposing ideological bloc. They were dependent on "front actors" and thus were compelled to accept their relative autonomy. By contrast, during the second phase, the East German state could manage the publicization of the trial by carefully selecting the participants. In terms of the state's position, we might identify two types of publicization regimes characterized by two types of nonstate agents: the semiautonomous front actors such as Lévai and Strecker, and the instrumentalized participants of the trial against Globke in East Berlin. This study shows both the temporal component of publicization and its informal, private background.

The legacy of the campaign against Globke looks counterintuitive: while the ADE propaganda had aimed at but did not succeed in controlling the historical interpretation of Globke's past in the 1950s and 1960s, Globke remains the most prominent commentator of the Nuremberg Laws and, to some, the model "desktop perpetrator." On both sides of the Iron Curtain, the Cold War had impeded tolerance of ambiguity concerning Globke: few accepted that Globke's individual responsibility could not, for the most part, be determined unambiguously by the documents—a situation that continues till now.

Chapter II

The Fils et Filles des Déportés Juifs de France and the Lischka Trial in Cologne, 1971–1980

Anne Klein and Birte Klarzyk

During the 1970s, West German society was aroused by the campaigns of a group of French activists led by Serge and Beate Klarsfeld who called former Nazi perpetrators to accountability. With spectacular actions, they exposed the identity of three former SS officers who had taken part in the decision-making and organization of the deportations of Jews from France to the Nazi extermination camps between 1942 and 1944. Because the majority of West Germany's political and juridical elites, as well as society in general, continued to turn a blind eye to Nazi crimes and the presence among them of former Nazi officials, it took nearly a decade of campaigning before these three former SS officers who had served in occupied France—Kurt Lischka, Herbert Hagen, and Ernst Heinrichsohn—were finally taken to court in Cologne in October 1979.¹

¹ From 2001 to 2004, the Cologne Society for Christian–Jewish Cooperation commissioned a scientific research project, focusing on the "judicial proceedings concerning Nazi crimes (injustice) against the Jews in the Cologne region." The Lischka trial was part of this project. A temporary exhibition on the Lischka trial, curated by Anne Klein and realized as a participating student project, was presented in the National Socialism Documentation