

National Identity and Modernity 1870–1945

Latin America, Southern Europe,
East Central Europe

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LATIN AMERICA, SOUTHERN EUROPE,
EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

EDITED BY

VIKTÓRIA SEMSEY

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FOREWORD

In 2017 the Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary organized an international conference entitled National Identity and Modernity 1870–1945 in Latin America – Southern Europe – East Central Europe.

The theme of the conference encompassed certain countries of the fringe zones of history during the late modern period in the mentioned three regions. The formation of these national identities was shaped in unique and complex ways by a delayed economic development (as compared to the developed countries), and by the ethnic and regional diversity rooted in these countries' national history. The political and economic pressures both internal and external influenced and marked the ways of modernization in all three regions between 1870 and 1945. A partial analysis of this complex era and a comparison of the experiences shared within the different regions were the main focus of our conference.

Some of our authors did not take part in the conference. Their studies, however, have significantly contributed to having a more comprehensive and proportionate account and understanding of the aforementioned three regions: María Elisa Alonso (University of Lorraine, France); Sebastián Hernández Toledo (Chile, a PhD student in Mexico); Francisco Quiroz (San Marcos University, Lima, Peru); and Izaskun Álvarez Cuartero, (University of Salamanca, Spain).

It is our sad duty to pay tribute to Eszter Tarjányi, a former lecturer at Pázmány Péter Catholic University, who passed away unexpectedly at a young age, shortly after the conference. She is no longer with us, but we are very grateful for her work.

The co-editors of the book are my patient and dedicated colleagues, José Antonio Sánchez Román (Complutense University of Madrid), Petra Balaton and Csaba Horváth (Károli Gáspár University, Faculty of Humanities). I would also like to thank Vivien Rapali and Dóra Dobos, (both PhD students at Károli Gáspár University, Faculty of Humanities, the School of Postgraduate History Studies) for correcting the footnotes. Anett Pataki, an outstanding former student was an invaluable help in the one-year-long organisational tasks, I am

very grateful for her support. Many thanks to Hedvig Bubnó, Csaba Dupcsik and Béla Makkai (Károli Gáspár University, Faculty of Humanities) for their professional and practical advice. Mariann Nagy (Károli Gáspár University, Faculty of Humanities, Institute of Historical Sciences), Ágnes Judit Szilágyi (Elte), Marcel Nagy (independent researcher), Domingo Lilón (University of Pécs), Lázár Balogh (conductor and music professor) and Gábor Egry (Institute for Political History) helped me peer review each study.

Finally, I would like to say thank you to Maximiliano Gregorio-Cernadas for supporting me in organising the conference and publishing this book, and in the same way the Hungarian LATIMO Foundation. I am grateful to Hernán Otero, who – like me – never gave up, made all possible efforts and came to Budapest to give a highly interesting plenary lecture on the Argentinian immigration's impact on the formation of the nation. The plenary lectures of Eugen Stancu (*Lucian Boia: Demythologization of the Romanian historical discourse after 1989*), Javier Moreno Luzón (*Nationalism and nation-building in Spain 1875–1939*), Csaba Dubcsik (*The national idea as an integration ideology – Hungarian dilemmas from the last third of 18th century to 1918*), Tamás Bubnó (*Nationality: Greek Catholic, Father János Boksay – Joann Bodsaj (1874–1940), Subcarpathian composer*) and Ion Bogdan Lefter (*Politics and culture in modern Romania: A country united, its success story, and its political ups and downs (1866–1945)*) were just as interesting and innovative.

For years, I was intrigued by the idea of organising this conference. However, as time passed, I spotted this topic emerging in the titles of several other conferences. And when I heard someone say that the topic was no longer relevant, I still did not give up, because I was certain that it will stand the test of time and it will reveal something new, since it brings forward and compares three specific marginal regions. That is how this scientific workshop, our conference “National Identity and Modernity 1870–1945, Latin America, Southern Europe and East Central Europe” came into being and its results are now offered in a printed form.

Budapest, 23 April 2018

Viktória Semsey

ARCHERS, HUMANISTS AND STORKS: THREADING ARGENTINE IDENTITY ISSUES

(SPEECH AT THE CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MODERNITY
1870-1945, KÁROLI GÁSPÁR UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST, 6TH OF APRIL, 2017)



MAXIMILIANO GREGORIO-CERNADAS

ABSTRACT

Intrinsically complex, identity is one of the most defining issues of our time. Among many possible approaches here is chosen a poetical-philosophical perspective. The Borges poem "To the first poet of Hungary" threads Argentine and Hungarian identity experiences and concerns, trespassing in time and space, linking local and universal aspects of the question, in a circular procedure between the construction processes of historical identities and actual deconstruction endeavors. Since, due to their history of vast migrations, both Argentina and Hungary are constitutively conceived under the sign of diversity, developing mixed identities and identity uncertainties, they could have a substantial role in contributing globally to this theme. Argentina constitutes a unique experience of cultural pluralism and has also created successful intercultural dialogue platforms. This paper proposes the creation of a platform to articulate interdisciplinary academic and society dialogues between both countries around identity issues which define tensions on the world stage between local identities and global demands in order to provide tools for intercultural dialogues, and hence contribute to world peace and understanding.

The identity question runs through human existence, right in its widest middle, from its most prosaic and sociological aspects to its most ethereal and philosophical ones. That means that we are dealing with one of the most

comprehensive and complex issues of the human being, which is clearly reflected in the prolific senses to which the term refers as a typical polysemic concept.

On the other hand, already from its cradle, the concept “identity”, which etymologically descends from the Latin word *identitas*, and this from *idem*, which means “the same”, anticipates the prejudice of the single explanation. In other words, the concept “identity” seems to take sides in the ontological discussion, even before any discussion about its sense is begun.

But in my opinion that doesn't inevitably mean that we are forced to choose between one comprehensive perspective or many singular ones in order to cope with such complexity. On the contrary, the methodological basis of my thesis is that the intricate nature of the topic deserves exploring with a diagonal approach. I will hence propose here that a poetical perspective could get over either the hard glare of sociology or the abstractions of philosophy as well, with which identity is usually associated.

Art as an alternative way of reflection, postulated brilliantly by minds of the scale of Aldous Huxley, is perfectly suited to light up some special quests of the *Geistwissenschaften*, as the Germans prettily called them, such as the concept identity requires. As Saint-John Perse once stated at his Nobel Prize ceremony, poetic intuition as a tool of knowledge is like a pack of hounds hunting for truth on the border of science. One of the most famous 20th century hunters in this hazy frontier was the Argentine poet Jorge Luis Borges, superbly gifted to follow the trail of big game spiritual issues like human identity.

But he did not restrain his vision to a mere all-inclusive, cold and impersonal approach. On the contrary, he was passionately involved in the entangled question of Argentine identity, around which he wrote unsurpassed pages during the first half of the 20th century. In this regard, Borges was from the 1920s on, a genuine mirror of the Argentine society's identity concerns. This could be the matter of a whole international conference on its own, but I would dare to sum it up in this way. Between the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, millions of people escaping from deep dramas like wars, famines and persecution, in which they had lost their past and their identities, search desperately in Argentina for a way to be others. While the Argentine state provided them with a “national” way of being Argentinian, Borges built, not without zigzagging first, a rather universal way of being Argentinian, with which none of the immigrant identities could feel uncomfortable.

Amidst this radiant construction, Borges did something that may look humble in the context of his complete work, but is gigantic for our local purpose. He conceived one poem which threads three interesting elements for those of us living in Budapest: Argentine and Hungarian identity concerns,

pierced by his universal vision. This issue is not worthless. Indeed, Argentina and Hungary have traditionally had to deal with tensions between global and local forces in constant restlessness.

In this unique piece that links poetry and philosophy, localism and universalism, Argentine and Hungarian identity concerns as well, Borges tries an impossible identification with a remote but admired “first poet of Hungary”. In a part of this unbeatable poem – perhaps the most beautiful poetic text dedicated by a foreigner to Hungarian literature –, we can read in the splendid translation made by my friend Szabolcs Szekeres, and I quote:

*The nights and the seas keep us apart,
the changes brought by the centuries,
the climates, the empires and the bloods,
but indecipherably we are united
by the mysterious love of words,
that habit of sounds and symbols.*

*(Las noches y los mares nos apartan,
las modificaciones seculares,
los climas, los imperios y las sangres,
pero nos une indesciframente
el misterioso amor de las palabras,
este hábito de sonos y de símbolos.)*

The daring means chosen by Borges in this poem to span the big temporal and special ellipse which separates both poets was through the well-known Archer of Elea Aporia, the most classical philosophic paradox ever, between the unique being and the multiple existence:

*Like the archer of Elea
a lonely man in an empty afternoon
endlessly spouts this impossible
nostalgia that seeks a shadow.
(Análogo al arquero del eleata
un hombre solo en una tarde hueca
deja correr sin fin esta imposible
nostalgia, cuya meta es una sombra.)*

The image of a flying arrow was an ancient symbol for reconciling the possibilities of being one and many at the same time, resolving in that way the inaugural debate of western philosophy between Heraclitus and Parmenides.

But the screw could be turned again with this poem, because when Borges talked about “the first poet of Hungary”, we still don’t know his identity. There are many theories about it, whether it refers to Pannonius, Balassi or Petőfi, but any of them is conclusive enough. Even his wife, Maria Kodama, told me some months ago, when she visited us for her first time in Budapest, that she has no idea about it, but following her husband’s mischievous mind, she concluded that most probably Borges was talking about a generic Hungarian poet and that he did not give a precise identity on purpose.

For many academics, the mysterious “first poet of Hungary” was Pannonius, in which case, the screw could be turned once again, since this medieval humanist is an icon of Central European identity discussions: Hungarians, Croatians, Bosnians and Slavonians claim him as well.

His own name alludes to an ancient region, named Pannonia by the Romans, which encompassed diverse territories and cultures that today cover seven countries: Hungary, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Austria. The evidence is that the famous humanist Pannonius was born in Slavonia, from a Croatian father and a Bosnian mother, was bishop in Hungary, ruled as governor in Slavonia and died in Croatia. That means that we are dealing with a man with a multiple identity. It is then no surprise that Borges would have chosen him for this poem. Wouldn’t it be a magnificent allegory that in this poem, by exploiting the rich identity of Pannonius and the poetic identity of Borges, one arrow flies threading together the common identity concerns about the complex ways of being Argentine and Hungarian?

This poem, apparently archaic and bilateral since it refers to ancient and medieval as Argentine and Hungarian subjects and figures, alludes to a very contemporary and universal issue which consists of how to reconcile the inevitable tension that people suffer nowadays, torn apart between the forces of local identity and the overwhelming global influences. Who could avoid this dilemma without risking being locked up in an anachronistic life or opening themselves so far as to live a tasteless life?

The dilemma between being a forgotten arrow inside a quiver or flying like the arrow of Elea’s Archer, which acquires a new identity in each moment of its flight, is not an exclusively contemporary experience. The already mentioned Pannonius wouldn’t have been who he was if he had not lived his humanist education in the north of Italy. But it must be recognized that our present tends to open up to everyone these kinds of identity adventure. The increasing forced migrations and free travels which characterize our time have set out increasingly extreme challenges to the identity question.

At the same time a peculiar phenomenon is growing, which is the expanding edges of identity self-construction: increasingly people have more possibilities of traveling physically or mentally, to search for other identities and to decide freely to be someone different to who they were.

Argentina, traditionally a country opened to massive migrations, has been and continues to be some kind of giant laboratory of identities. Argentinians, almost snobs in these questions, tend to experiment with different identities. In this sense, Argentina, more than just a “melting pot”, is a sort of a test tube over a Bunsen burner. It could be said that being Argentinian is, in some ways, like being under constant boiling. Neither could Borges have written his famous stories among the suburbs of Buenos Aires and the universe, nor would Tomás Abraham be here today to discuss this subject, if both had grown up elsewhere.

The key of the contemporary problem around identity is the geometrical growth of opportunities to choose and combine freely different elements to enrich our identities. More people are more capable of deciding new identities in matters of genre, nationality, physical features or religion, which used to be traditionally a conclusive way of identification. This means that identity is today much more an election than a destiny.

The problem is that this “identity frenzy” may produce fears and tensions. For example, the worldwide allegations directed at the great Argentine-Israeli-Palestinian-Spanish musician Daniel Barenboim about his “multiple identity” are frequently seen with no sympathy and arouse strong controversy.

Opening ourselves to thinking about identity means at the same time thinking about how to open our own identity, a dialogue about how to allow ourselves to change, a key attitude to adapt to surrounding changes and new situations. That includes, naturally, the analysis of the founding period of nationality in countries like Argentina, which means the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, which is crucial to understanding how to deal with contemporary identity problems. In other words, the understanding of identity construction processes is necessary in any deconstruction endeavor.

Countries like Argentina and Hungary, which have been constitutively conceived under the sign of diversity, possess a natural tendency and responsibility in contributing globally to this theme, which should not be taken for granted. I mean that the many jokes about Argentine and Hungarian identity uncertainties must be rather appreciated as assets than seen as debits.

Moreover, since the 19th century’s bilateral migrations, Argentina and Hungary have been developing a special sort of mixed identity, which I like to compare with what the great Hungarian poet Mihály Tompa said about the storks which fly each season between north and south, and I quote: “thank your destiny that gave you two homelands”. For me that is an unbeatable symbol of the many Argentine-Hungarians that come and go restless between the two countries.

For that reason, I am proposing to create a platform of dialogue between Argentina and Hungary around a question which is inherent to both countries,

links them both, and moreover, projects them onto the world stage, urged by tensions between local identities and global demands, to provide answers and arguments for intercultural dialogues, and hence contribute to world peace and understanding.

As soon as I arrived in Budapest, I presented my proposal to the Archbishop of Budapest, Cardinal Erdő, telling him about the successful experience of the Interreligious Dialogue Institute (Instituto de Diálogo Interreligioso, IDI, if you want to google it), created in Buenos Aires at the beginning of the 1990s under the patronage of the then Archbishop of Buenos Aires, and now Pope Francis. This Institution was created under natural conditions, since the Argentine society, as Dr. Hernán Otero brilliantly explained yesterday, has created a unique experience of cultural pluralism. That dialogue forum among Catholic, Jewish and Muslims leaders has been so successful that it has been projected to an international scale in America.

Cardinal Erdő, not only a priest but also a distinguished scholar, wisely suggested that I propose that platform of dialogue about identity and pluralism on an academic level, asking for the partnership of the Catholic, the Reformed Church and the Jewish universities from both countries, which I found an extraordinary idea. The aim of the proposal is to articulate interdisciplinary academic dialogues, but open to multiple society sectors in order to incorporate perspectives and approaches not merely academic. After that conversation, I began bringing together the Pázmány University and the Argentine Catholic University, which are now close to signing an agreement including this matter among others.

I hope I have awoken your curiosity in this proposal. Thank you very much.

HISTORY AND SOCIAL SCIENCES



I. LATIN AMERICA

MODERNIZATION, MIGRATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE ARGENTINE CASE, 1870–1945



HERNÁN OTERO

ABSTRACT

Nation building in Argentina is intimately related with European mass migration. Following this premise, this paper presents the most important characteristics of the social and economic modernization of the country with an emphasis on the contribution of mass migration. This general context allows a discussion of the theories that have tried to understand the integration process (Cultural Pluralism and the Melting Pot), founded in three classical indicators: endogamy, residence patterns and immigrant associations. Finally, it analyzes the main factors of the emergence of new identities: State policies, especially in education, social mobility and political participation.

Keywords: *immigration, integration, identity, nation building, Argentina*

INTRODUCTION

We will present an overview of the integration of European immigrants into the Argentine society between 1870 and 1945, that is, since the beginning of the mass migration process until the mid-20th century. Such a wide subject demands a previous explanation. We will use a social history approach, in the classical sense; consequently, we will stress more the groups, behaviors and actors than the cultural aspects. This decision does not imply any a priori assumptions about the superiority of one approach over the other. Then, we will prioritize a structural and statistical point of view in order to measure, in a better way, the totality of the involved phenomena.

The exposition will be organized in three parts. First, there is a presentation of the most important characteristics of the social and economic modernization of the Argentine Republic, with an emphasis on the contribution of mass migration. Second, there is a discussion of the migratory integration process, founded in three classical indicators: endogamy, residence patterns and immigrant associations. This analysis will allow us to ponder the academic schools (Cultural Pluralism and the Melting Pot) that have tried to make the formation of a new Argentina understandable. Finally, we will present the main factors that explain the migratory integration process and the emergence of new identities: State policies, social mobility and political participation. The first and second parts will be more factual, but that it is necessary to contextualize and understand the last one.

MODERNIZATION AND IMMIGRATION

Between 1870 and 1950, Argentina had a steady economic growth based on the openness to the world economy, the exportation of commodities (wheat and beef, basically), and foreign investments, especially but not only British, for the construction of railways, slaughterhouses and ports, and for public services infrastructure and state loans. This process benefited, on the one hand, from the incorporation of millions of acres of productive land after the so called “Conquista del Desierto” (the Dessert Conquest), in 1879, that ended up with native people controlling the land; and on the other hand, from the state building process begun in 1880, which starts a period of a certain political stability.

A few figures give us a clear image of the speed of this process: between 1870 and 1913 the gross domestic product grew by an average annual rate of 3.8%, double that of European countries. In only fifty years, between 1880 and 1930, 20,000 kms of railroads were built. In the same period, 148 million acres of land were made cultivable. Agricultural expansion led to industrial development in the largest cities. By 1928 Argentina was the sixth worldwide economy. This prominent and expansive process wasn't constant, hence Argentina underwent recurrent economic crises, such as 1873 and 1890, but especially 1929–1930, that, as in other parts of the world, was a watershed in the history of the country.

One central element of this historical period was the massive arrival of Europeans due to the extraordinary availability of emigrants produced by demographic transitions in the old continent. Between 1857 and 1960, 7,600,000 overseas immigrants arrived in Argentina. The proportion of people who returned to their countries (58% during 1870–1915, 44% between 1857 and 1960) was higher than in the case of the United States. Immigration,

particularly during the period 1880–1930, was a kind of big bang because of its enormous effects on Argentine history until the middle of the 20th century. Among many others, we can point out the following ones.¹

First, immigration accelerated the population growth that increased from 1,897,000 inhabitants in 1869 to 4,123,800 in 1895, 8,162,000 in 1914 and 15,893,800 in 1947. These figures show an average annual rate superior to 3% between 1869 and 1914 and 2% between that date and 1947. In other words, the population duplicated every 24 years from the middle of the 19th century until the decade of 1920.

Second, although the number of immigrants to the United States was far higher than in Argentina, the proportional weight of immigrants in the latter was the highest in the world during this period. Thus, the proportion of foreigners in the total Argentine population went from 12.1% in 1869 to 29.9% in 1914, to fall to 15.3% in 1947. This contribution is even more important if we consider its indirect impact: the children of immigrants born in the country, Argentine people according to native law based on *ius solis* or land right. The European migratory flux became less important after the economic crisis of 1930. A new flux arrived during the second post war period. In effect, between 1945 and 1959 Argentina received 899,977 immigrants (basically Italians and Spaniards, but also 22,500 Germans) which in general (70.8%) remained in the country.² In contrast with European migration, emigration from Latin American countries was clearly smaller but continuous (between 2 and 3 % of the total immigrants between 1869 and 2001).

Third, the main mechanisms of travel and initial settlement were migratory chains and primary social networks, composed by members of the same family or village. Interpersonal knowledge favored the spreading of trustworthy information, the loans of money for the tickets and other kinds of material support. For that reason, and in spite of many important colonization enterprises, migration to Rio de la Plata was largely spontaneous, especially after the economic crisis of 1890.

¹ On the immigration to Argentina see José Moya: *Cousins and Strangers. Spanish Immigrants in Buenos Aires, 1850–1930*, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, California, 1998; María Bjerg: *Entre Sofie y Tovelille. Una historia de los inmigrantes daneses en la Argentina (1848–930)*, Buenos Aires, Biblos, 2001; Alejandro Fernández: *Un 'mercado étnico' en el Plata. Emigración y exportaciones españolas a la Argentina, 1880–1935*, Madrid, CSIC, 2004; Fernando Devoto: *Historia de la inmigración italiana en la Argentina*, Buenos Aires, Cámara de Comercio Italiana de la República Argentina, 2006; Marcelino Irianni: *Historia de los vascos en la Argentina*. Buenos Aires, Biblos, 2010; Hernán Otero: *Historia de los franceses de la Argentina*, Buenos Aires, Biblos, 2012; and, especially, Fernando Devoto: *Historia de la inmigración en Argentina*, Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 2003.

² María Inés Barbero y María Cristina Cacopardo: La inmigración europea a la Argentina en la segunda posguerra: viejos mitos y nuevas condiciones, *Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos*, No. 19, 1991, 291–322.

Fourth, immigration was responsible for fast urbanization. The urban population increased from 28% in 1869, to 37% in 1895, 53% in 1914 and 57% in 1930. This process was the consequence of urban settlements of immigrants, in spite of the objectives of the intellectual elites, the rural origin of the majority of immigrants and the large availability of lands which, in general, remained under control of native landholders. For the same reason, immigrants were incorporated in secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, and were a master key of industrialization in the largest cities (mainly Buenos Aires and then Córdoba and Rosario).

Fifth, the settlement of immigrants in the country was unequal. Their presence was quite significant in the city (49% in 1914) and province of Buenos Aires (34%), the richest and largest of the country. Other provinces of the so called "Pampa Gringa" such as Santa Fe and Córdoba, had an important contribution. Provinces protected by import duties, such as Mendoza (wine) or Tucumán (sugar) also received a significant flux, but in a smaller proportion. In other parts of the country, their presence was not important from a quantitative point of view. In short, European migration stressed, in a deep way, the territorial imbalance of the country: the richer regions increased their population proportion from less than 60% in 1869 to more than 80% in 1930.³ As Gino Germani pointed out, the result of this process could be defined as the "dual Argentina".⁴

Sixth, in a clear contrast with the United States, Argentina received basically the so-called "new migration", coming from the South and East of Europe. Italians and Spanish, in that order, were 79% of the migratory flux between 1874 and 1914, followed by the smaller group of the French, (226,874 immigrants). After the Great War, a period with negative migratory balance due to a drastic reduction of entries and a rise of returns, immigrants from Central Europe, Syria and Lebanon, increased their presence without modifying the Latin preponderance.

Seventh, from a religious point of view, immigration was basically Catholic. The Jewish population, scarce in 1890, increased by colonization enterprises in the provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe and Entre Ríos, but especially after the pogroms in Russia and during the Holocaust. It has been calculated that more than 200,000 Jews emigrated to Argentina from 1880 until the creation of the State of Israel in 1948.⁵ Jewish migration was composed of Russians and Polish and, in a much smaller proportion, by Germans and people from

³ Eduardo Míguez: *Población y sociedad*, in Míguez: *América Latina en la Historia contemporánea. Argentina. La Apertura al mundo. 1880–1930*, Madrid, Fundación Mapfre–Taurus, 2011.

⁴ Gino Germani: *Política y sociedad en una época de transición. De la sociedad tradicional a la sociedad de masas*, Buenos Aires, Paidós, 1962.

⁵ Haim Avni: *Argentina y la historia de la inmigración judía (1810–1950)*, Buenos Aires, Editoria Universitaria Magnes, Universidad Hebrea de Jerusalén, AMIA, 1983.

Central Europe. The fourth national census of 1947 counted 249,330 Jews and 310,633 Protestants, that is 1.6% and 2% of the Argentine population, respectively. At the same time, Catholics made up 93.6%. While these figures lump together immigrants of the first generation and their Argentine descendants, they are a good estimation of the weight of the most important religions at the end of our period.

Eighth, mass migration was produced by exceptional demographic and economic conditions in the old continent but also, in the Argentine case, by a particularly broad and generous migratory policy. That was the consequence of two confluent processes. On the one hand, the ideas of intellectuals such as Alberdi and Sarmiento, who considered that European immigration (especially the northern one) was essential to increase the population and leave behind the negative Spanish legacy.⁶ On the other hand, there was a legal system with large guarantees for immigrants. This system was based on three underpinnings: the National Constitution of 1853–1860, the Citizenship Law of 1869 and the Immigration and Colonization Law of 1876 (the so-called Avellaneda Law). These policies suffered changes in practice (for example, the increase of requirements and administrative obstacles) during moments of social conflict from 1900 until the first post war, a period that started a policy of “closed doors”. The increase in xenophobia and nationalism in culture and politics during the 1920s and especially the 1930s produced a rejection of groups considered less assimilable, in particular Jews and political refugees, such as Spanish Republicans. Despite these negative processes, neither the legal system nor the pro-migratory consensus were put into doubt because their advantages were obvious for a large set of actors (landholders, industrialists, etc.). As clear evidence of this consensus, Argentina had never established a quota system, unlike the United States in 1924 or Brazil in 1934.⁷ After the second post war period, Peronism went back to an “open door” policy, like the liberal one of the 19th century.⁸

MIGRATORY INTEGRATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY: A CENTRIFUGAL AND PLURALIST SOCIETY

The impact of mass migration, briefly exposed, compels us to analyze now the central issue of national identity, a kind of obsession in psychoanalytic coffee

⁶ Tulio Halperin Donghi: *¿Para qué la inmigración? Ideología y política inmigratoria y aceleración del proceso modernizador: el caso argentino (1810–1914)*, in Halperin Donghi: *El espejo de la historia*. Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 1976, 189–238.

⁷ See the contribution of Elda González Martínez in this volume.

⁸ Biernat, Carolina: *¿Buenos o útiles? La política inmigratoria del peronismo*, Buenos Aires, Biblos, 2007.

talks of ordinary people and intellectual debates, although we must recognize that the traditional myth according to which “Argentiniens descend from ships” has been losing its force. The historical distance from the period of mass migration, the economic and political crises of the 20th century, and the revival of indigenous identity, among many other aspects, have produced the emergence of a more Latin American point of view.

There are, at least, two ways to study migratory integration and its main result: national identity. First, there is a more discursive or philosophical approach, that analyses the reflections of intellectuals, politicians, writers, and so on about identity (or its lack) and economic and social features (positive or negative) of the mass migration period as a whole. This approach has focused on the cultural aspects (the levels of xenophobia and prejudice, the conflicts, for example) using qualitative sources (such as the press, literature, etc.). Second, there is a more sociological or statistical approach, using quantitative sources (such as censuses, surveys, etc.). The distinction between both approaches is in some way artificial but useful for our purposes

Briefly, there are two academic schools of migratory integration in Argentina. On the one hand, there is the Melting Pot Theory (or *Crisol de Razas* in the Argentine version, another icon of national identity), proposed by the Italian sociologist immigrated to Argentina, Gino Germani, one of the fathers of Modernization Theory. According to Germani, Argentina underwent a fast process of “fusion” (not assimilation like in the United States) between natives and foreigners, produced by two factors: the stopping of immigration in the 1930s and the demographic “weakness” of the host society, that is, the scarce proportion of the native population in relationship with the migratory “avalanche”. On the other hand, there is the theory of Cultural Pluralism, proposed by North American authors such as Mark Szuchman and Samuel Baily and the Argentinian Fernando Devoto.⁹ According to this interpretation, migratory integration in Argentina would have been slower and more complex than Germani suggests. The followers of this school use internal sources of ethnic institutions and case studies, deeper but also more biased (the middle classes are overrepresented in these societies). The debate between both schools has been rich and powerful and it has produced many important results in essential indicators such as marriage integration, spatial segregation and ethnic associations.¹⁰

⁹ Mark Szuchman: *Mobility and Integration in Urban Argentina. Córdoba in the Liberal Era*, Austin, The University of Texas Press, 1980; Samuel Baily: *Immigrants in the Lands of Promise. Italians in Buenos Aires and New York City, 1870–1914*, Cornell University Press, 1999.

¹⁰ An eclectic review of the debate in Devoto and Otero: *Veinte años después. Una lectura sobre el Crisol de Razas, el Pluralismo Cultural y la Historia Nacional en la historiografía argentina, Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos*, 2003, 50, 181–227.

Endogamy (the practice of marrying within a specific ethnic group) is a key indicator because it explains many aspects of the family process, especially the socialization of the second generation of immigrants. Besides, exogamic marriages with natives were associated with lower probabilities of return to their country.

Exogamy was the rule during the early phases of immigration, before 1850. In contrast, the mass migration period shows a more complex panorama. Nevertheless, there are some clear patterns. First, the sex imbalance of the migratory flux (men were more numerous, as usual in the 19th century) produced a high level of endogamy in European women. In contrast, European men were more exogamous with native women. In other words, the Argentine Melting Pot happened without native men. The influence of the imbalanced sex ratio was increased by patriarchal power and the lack of freedom of women to choose their partners out of their family, regional and ethnic circle.

Second, Spaniards and Italians (in that order) were the most endogamous groups, while the French were the most open to mixed marriages. Third, exogamy was higher in the small and intermediate cities than in the largest ones due to the more imbalanced sex ratio (a surplus of men), less or no spatial segregation and, last but not least, higher social uniformity in terms of salaries and consumption. The opposite happened, naturally, in the big cities. Endogamy was also important in the second and the third generation of immigrants, at least in the largest cities, as the census of Buenos Aires in 1936 shows.¹¹

Fourth, minority groups from a quantitative point of view, such as the Germans or Danish, or religious groups, such as the Jews and Protestants, were much more endogamous than majority ones. The cultural distance in terms of language and religion, two variables clearly associated, from the host society and from Catholic groups, also explains why levels of endogamy were long-lasting.

Finally, the endogamy of the first generation of immigrants decreased in all majority groups. This process, clearly associated with the evolution of the migratory flux, was still in evidence in the 1920s.

Concerning the second indicator, the residence patterns of immigrants, the index shows a certain level of segregation in the largest cities such as Buenos Aires, but with two important caveats. On the one hand, these levels were similar to the internal and Latin American immigrants. On the other hand, the international comparison shows that Buenos Aires was one of the least

¹¹ Susana Torrado: La transición de la nupcialidad. Dinámica del mercado matrimonial, in Torrado, Susana (comp.): *Población y bienestar en la Argentina del primero al segundo Centenario. Una historia social del siglo XX*, Buenos Aires, Editorial EDHASA, Vol. 1, 399–438.

segregated cities in the world.¹² In fact, the average level of ethnic segregation around 1910 was half or a third that of cities in the United States. Although there were significant concentrations of immigrants in Buenos Aires, as a result of primary social networks, there were no ghettos in the sense defined by the Chicago School of Sociology. The enormous weight of Europeans in the population of the city (51% in 1914) should have made immigrant quarters less necessary.

Another illustration in the same direction is given by the *conventillos* (tenements). As is suggested by the 1887 Buenos Aires census, the typical tenement was multiethnic with a large majority of foreigners (especially men) and a significant portion of Argentinians (mainly women). Clearly segregated along social lines but without a strong evidence of ethnic segregation, the *conventillos* encouraged a kind of “melting pot” at the bottom of the social pyramid. This fact is important if we consider that a quarter of Buenos Aires’ population lived in tenements at the end of the 19th century.

Similarly to endogamy, spatial segregation decreased clearly in majority groups between 1887 and 1914 and was higher in groups defined by religious beliefs. Obviously, a statistical approach has important limits because the ethnic quarter (such as the Italian neighborhood of La Boca or the Jewish quarter of *Once*) is also defined by a symbolic dimension that includes the presence of ethnic icons like associations, celebrations, and especially perceptions of other groups and the host society.¹³

The third crucial dimension regards the volunteer associations of immigrants, a classic indicator of structural and informal assimilation. This matter has been studied following two perspectives: the endogenous model (case studies based on lists of members and minutes books) and the exogenous model (statistical analysis of memberships). This second model, based on censuses and surveys, allows us to incorporate the concept of the ethnic nucleus, defined as the proportion of members of associations of a given migratory community.¹⁴

As is well known, communities had a complex and dynamic set of permanent institutions (associations, schools and journals), but there were also periodic activities: celebrations (such as the 12 October in the Spanish community, a national holiday in Argentina since 1917), religious and secular parties, tributes to national heroes (such as Garibaldi and Mazzini in the Italian case), parades and street meetings.

¹² Moya, *Cousins and strangers*, 181. See also Otero and Adela Pellegrino, *Sharing the City: Residence Patterns and Immigrant Integration in Buenos Aires and Montevideo*, in Baily and Míguez (eds.): *Mass Migration to Modern Latin America*, Wilmington, Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003, 81–112.

¹³ Devoto: The origins of an Italian neighbourhood in Buenos Aires in the mid-nineteenth century, *The Journal of European Economic History*, Vol. 18, 1989, 37–63.

¹⁴ Otero: *Historia de los franceses*, 252–263.

Associations included societies for the protection of immigrants; charity societies; cultural and recreational societies, especially for the elites (such as the Spanish Club or the Italian Circle); regional societies, more abundant in Italian and Spanish cases during the first half of the 20th century; societies of veterans, created after the Great War; and mutual aid societies. These last ones included basically adult men and carried out many functions: aid, medical care, retirements, burials, and so on. We must add also hospitals, orphanages and old people's homes. Associations developed also ethnic and patriotic functions in a complex relationship with chambers of commerce, big enterprises and the diplomatic authorities of the motherland.

Ethnic nuclei evolution describes a parable that reaches its maximum level of pluralism between the 1880s and the Great War. These nuclei were most powerful and lasting in mutual aid societies rather than in ethnic schools. In the latter case, religious schools such as those of Protestants and Jews but also of Catholics (for example, Italian Salesian schools) were more lasting than secular ones. The community press had a similar but faster evolution: by 1914 foreign journals, very important in the 1880s, were scarce and limited to Buenos Aires only.

The decline of associations had three steps. First, conflicts were produced by the economic, political, and military mobilization of the Great War not only between the communities from countries at war (British, French, Austro-Hungarians, Germans, and Italians after 1915, etc.) but also neutral ones, such as the big Spanish case. Studies show that British (4,852) and French (5,800) combatants represented a very high percentage when compared to the number of enlisted Italians (32,430). Although the Italian contingent was approximately 6 times larger than the French and the British, the Italian community in Argentina was in fact 11 times bigger than the French, and over 33 times bigger than the British. While the figures for British and Italian combatants do not discriminate between first- and second-generation immigrants (like France, both countries based their citizenship on right of blood), all data indicates that Anglo-Argentines' participation was far higher than the almost insignificant numbers of second-generation French and Italian immigrants.¹⁵ Even if there are no systematic studies, mobilization of Germans and Austro-Hungarians was seemingly not very significant, since most of them would not have been able to avoid the British naval blockade.

¹⁵ Emilio Franzina: *La guerra lontana: il primo conflitto mondiale e gli italiani d'Argentina*, *Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos*, 44, 2000, 57–84; Caroline Douki: *Les émigrés face à la mobilisation militaire de l'Italie, 14–18 Aujourd'hui*, 5, 2002, 159–180; Otero: *La guerra en la sangre. Los franco-argentinos ante la Primera Guerra Mundial*, Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana, 2009; María Inés Tato: *El llamado de la patria. Británicos e italianos residentes en la Argentina frente a la Primera Guerra Mundial*, *Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos*, 71, 2011, 273–292.

In the short-term, war produced a revival of winning countries' communities. The creation of military associations of veterans, the emergence of new *lieux de mémoire* and the ethnic mobilization in the streets (added to massive mobilization of Argentinians, for and against government neutrality) are clear proof of this process. On the other hand, the military mobilization of immigrants and their children (Europeans by the *jus sanguinis* or birth right) produced a deep confrontation between ethnic leaders and between them and the diplomatic authorities of the motherland. Moreover, it accelerated the distancing from their communities of people who rejected fighting in the war, particularly Argentinians and children of Europeans, but also many immigrants of the first generation. The Great War implies in summary an ethnic revival and a zenith for the communities (especially in the French and British cases). Consequences were worse for the losing countries' communities, such as the Germans, that also suffered the effects of the United Kingdom and the United States black lists against their enterprises in Argentina.

The second step of decline started with the crisis of 1930, which accelerated the deficit of ethnic institutions (reduction of members and payment of dues, competition of trade unions and Catholic and private associations, etc.) and produced the merging or closure of many associations.

Finally, the confrontation between fascists and antifascists in the 1930s and 1940s (very clear among Spaniards, Italians, Germans and French), fostered by motherland policies of "nationalization" of emigrants, produced a new conflict line. This fact was not really new because political confrontations had always been critical for the internal life of communities (for example, the fights between liberals and Catholics in the Italian case or between monarchists and republicans in the Spanish one).

FROM PLURALISM TO MELTING POT: CENTRIPETAL TENDENCIES

Although every migratory flux had a different evolution, their integration in the host society happened in the same period. As we will see now, this simultaneity stresses the importance of three domestic factors: state policies, social transformations and political participation.

A key aspect of migratory integration, usually not considered by the Cultural Pluralism approach, was the state integration policies, in particular in education and health. In the first case, we should emphasize the development of the Argentine public system of education since the First Argentine Pedagogic Congress (1882) and the Primary Education Law in 1884 (Law 1420). In harmony with the secular and positivist mentality of the so-called Generation of the 1880s, the law established public, mandatory, free and secular education. The law also defined a republican integration model,

clearly inspired by the French experience (laws of both countries are in fact contemporary), according to which school should be a mechanism of national unification. The Prussian model was also significant: according to Liliana Bertoni, the emergence of a patriotic liturgy in the 1880s in primary schools portrays the essentialist idea of Argentine nationality.¹⁶

Criticism against ethnic education began in 1881 with Domingo Sarmiento's articles about Italian schools and increased during the whole decade. The main argument was that the schools of Italian associations had become a mechanism of Italian identity, eventually useful for the colonial ambitions of the Italian state.

The Primary Education Law was completed by centralized organs such as the National Education Council in 1880, the massive foundation of public schools and other significant laws that imposed the mandatory use of Spanish language in primary schools (the project of Nicolás Avellaneda in 1896) and the presence of Argentine teachers in ethnic schools (1917). According to immigrant leaders and foreign diplomats, it was impossible to compete with public education. Besides, students of ethnic schools belonged to the high social classes of each community, while the middle and poor classes sent their children to free Argentine schools.

These policies had clear effects on immigrant children. By 1904, for example, public schools monopolized 95% of the educational offer in Buenos Aires. The situation was quite similar in the rest of the country. This explains why the proportion of illiterates (14-year-olds and above) was reduced from 64.6% and 78.1% in 1869 to 12.1% and 15.2% in 1947, for males and females respectively.

Finally, the patriotic liturgy became deeper and more intense after the arrival of José María Ramos Mejía in the National Education Council in 1908. The growing influence of nationalism was characterized by a valorization of the Spanish legacy, powerfully denied by the liberal elites during the second half of the 19th century.

In the illustrative terms of Eugene Weber's book, "Peasants into French", the education system opened the way to pass from Europeans into Argentinians and from peasants into city dwellers.¹⁷

A similar function was accomplished by the mandatory military service in 1901 (law 4.031 or the Richieri Law), which had a central role in the nationalization of immigrant children born after 1885. Even more, despite their elitist features, during the 1920s and 1930s a significant proportion

¹⁶ Lilia Ana Bertoni: *Patriotas, cosmopolitas y nacionalistas. La construcción de la nacionalidad argentina a fines del siglo XIX*, Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2001.

¹⁷ Eugen Weber: *Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914*, Stanford University Press, 1976.

(53%) of colonels and generals were immigrant children.¹⁸ This process was obviously deeper and faster in other state institutions, from public administration to universities, and private ones, like religious establishments (from the 1920s in the Protestant establishments and the 1930s and 1940s in Jewish ones)¹⁹.

As we have seen, the competition of the public health system was crucial for ethnic mutual aid societies from the 1930s, due to the economic crisis (reduction of members and payment of dues) of the latter. In the same way, the nationalization of railroad and port companies in the 1940s was a decisive strike against material support for many communities, particularly the British and French.

The second main factor for migratory integration was the huge transformation of the social structure produced by modernization and mass migration. Rapid urbanization, changes in the agrarian sector and industrialization allowed the formation of a middle class, whose proportion in the labor force increased from 10.6% in 1869 to 25.2% in 1895. By 1914, they had reached 30.4% of the total labor force, a classic threshold to define a country as a middle class society. The middle class was more important in cities and in the population from European origins. The access of immigrants into the upper class was more typical of groups who arrived before mass migration (English, Irish, French, etc.) when the possibilities of social mobility (the ownership of land, for example) were greater.

Social mobility allowed the rise of immigrants and their children to liberal professions, state jobs and non-manual work. The evolution of economic conditions allowed also new and better cultural consumption and the emergence of a middle class ethos about the value of work, children's education, savings, house ownership, and so on. This ethos early distinguished Argentina in the Latin American context and resisted the negative effects of the economic crisis of the last quarter of the 20th century.

Obviously, this optimistic image should be nuanced. Industrialization and harsh living and working conditions produced a high level of social conflict (for example, after the crises of 1890 and 1930, or during and after the Great War) and a dynamic and strong labor movement. Trade unions had an important presence of European leaders and members, many of them with experience of Anarchism, Socialism or syndicalism. In 1947, for example, 20% of the working class were first generation immigrants.

Becoming part of the labor movement did not prevent the continuity of ethnic identities because there was sometimes a common ground between

¹⁸ Hernán Cornut: La influencia de la inmigración en el Ejército Argentino durante la década de 1920, *Épocas*, Universidad del Salvador, 4, December, 2011, 101-129.

¹⁹ Susana Bianchi: *Historia de las religiones en la Argentina. Las minorías religiosas*, Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 2004, 84.

both kinds of associations. However, worker leaderships were very critical of the patriotism and bourgeois reformism of ethnic leaders. The tension between ethnic and class identities (or between national and class conscience using the expression of Guy Bourd )20 was in fact very important and ended with the victory of the latter.

The S enz Pe a Law of 1912, which established a universal, secret and mandatory vote for 18-year-old men (the women’s vote was passed in 1947) had a similar effect because it allowed the massive incorporation of immigrant children into political parties such as the Radical Civic Union of Hip lito Yrigoyen, chosen president in 1916, or the Socialist Party. Moreover, according to Ema Cibotti, this political opening was decisive to the fall of the ethnic press, the main way of political participation of immigrant communities until then.21 Significantly, both political parties and labor movements had universal programs and discourses, without particular emphasis on ethnic considerations.

Olivier Compagnon has recently stressed that the Great War (the “suicide of barbarians” according to the contemporary expression of Jos  Ingenieros) was crucial to the emergence and strengthening of Latin American nationalism.22 The rise of political nationalism, pro-Hispanic and Catholic (or even fascist and anti-Semitic in their extreme versions), first with the military coup of General Urriburu in 1930 and then with the military coup of 1943, precursor of Peronism, contributed to a cultural atmosphere more favorable to identification with an Argentine nationality than with the motherland. The enormous distance that separated a continent in flames from a country with positive forecasts during the first half of the 20th century reinforced those feelings.

CONCLUSIONS

We may conclude by stressing a few but significant points. First, the integration process in Argentina had clear and significant levels of Cultural Pluralism during the mass migration period, between 1870 and the Great War. However, the country has been characterized in the middle and long term by one of the fastest Melting Pot processes of the American continent,

20 Guy Bourd : *Buenos Aires. Urbanizaci n e inmigraci n*, Buenos Aires, Editorial Huemul, 1977, 215–227.

21 Ema Cibotti: Del habitante al ciudadano: la condici n del inmigrante, in Mirta Zaida Lobato: *Nueva historia argentina. El progreso, la modernizaci n y sus l mites, 1880–1916*, Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana, 2000, Tomo V, 365–408.

22 Olivier Compagnon: *Am rica Latina y la Gran Guerra. El adi s a Europa (Argentina y Brasil, 1914–1939)*, Barcelona, Cr tica, 2014.

including the United States. As we have seen, immigrant children, the main observation point for considering the issue, show clear signs of identification with the host society from the 1920s onwards.

Second, if integration is both a process and a result, the Cultural Pluralism theory gives us a good explanation of the first, while the Melting Pot reflects the second. A vertiginous social mobility, stressed by Gino Germani in his classical work, and state policies, an actor not usually considered by Cultural Pluralism, were the key factors of the process. The influence of the French model (with the state acting as an integration machine through the education system) and the higher level of uniformity of migratory flux were other explanatory differences with the United States.

Third, the indicators we use (endogamy, residence patterns and ethnic nuclei) show more lasting levels of Pluralism in bigger cities (such as Cordoba, Rosario and Buenos Aires) than in the smaller and intermediate ones, and in groups with different religions, a clear sign of the complexity of the process.

Fourth, from a more historical point of view, two moments should be stressed by their impact on the integration process: the Great War, a revival but also a swan song for European communities, and the economic crisis of 1930 that dramatically reduced the migratory flux. The arrival of Peronism in 1946 was a watershed in Argentine history. During the second half of the 20th century, the ethnic aspects of European migration, without having completely disappeared, became a subject of the past.

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THE MODERN PERU: WESTERN, INDIGENOUS OR MESTIZO? SELF-PERCEPTION OF PERU THROUGH ITS HISTORIOGRAPHY



FRANCISCO QUIROZ CHUECA

ABSTRACT

Peruvian conservative historiography seeks to present Peru as a Western country located in the Andes. However, disputes among historians have raised the question of how Western the country really is in view of the complex reality of its ethnic and cultural composition, as well as its inclusion in the modern age of the twentieth century. Throughout the nineteenth century an image of the country as part of the Western and Christian world was built due to the results of independence during the decade of 1820 and the guano export boom, but the War with Chile (1879–1883) showed the weaknesses of the economic, social and political development of the country. After the conflict, however, it was sought once again to restore the lost historical image which started the debate with ideas of a western country and others that emphasized the indigenous majority basis of the Peruvian nation. Toward 1930 a tendency arose to consider Peru as a Mestizo country although guided by White social sectors. The historiographical debate is rich in proposals to the extent that the exposed positions are being discussed even in present-day Peru.

Keywords: *Peruvian historiography, Peruvian nationalism, Peru state formation, Bartolomé Herrera, Rubén Vargas Ugarte*

In this essay I contend that historiography developed in Peru in the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries reflects the specificities of the formation of the ideas of a Peruvian identity as the product of the vicissitudes of the idea of the Peruvian nation managed in the context of the formation of the Peruvian republic after the long colonial period. The argument,

however, is that the creation of an autonomous state and a modern nation has peculiarities in Peru affecting the conception of the Peruvian national identity and, therefore, the particular components that determine the content of the idea of a Peruvian nation and the historical discourse that this nation projected as support of its own existence and mission.

One of the most important variables is precisely the colonial legacy that creates ethno-cultural, regional, economic, and social differences. For centuries the country cultivated internal distinctions that are reflected both in the regulations and social practices, and even in the image of its common history.

The idea of the nation and the orientation of the historiography mirror the difficulties intellectuals in the capital city, Lima, faced when trying to conceive a restricted nation presented as inclusive of ethno-cultural sectors and regions of the country. More than a common history, a nation such as the one forged in independent Peru seeks to impose its versions of the past as common to all inhabitants of the country.

In a megadiverse country such as Peru, the result is the reproduction of the prejudiced and ethnocentric tendencies of the hegemonic culture. Therefore, the colonial fact and the need to sustain a nominally egalitarian political and social regime end up shaping the content of Peruvian historiography and the idea of the nation in modern Peru.

THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY PERUVIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

The permanent struggle between historical guidelines has been one of the central features of Peruvian historiography since its dawn in the sixteenth century (or even from before).

Colonialism and the transition toward an independent Republic affected the conceptions of Peruvian history. By independence in 1820–1826, the two historical paradigms created in previous centuries were still in force, which reflected the discrepancies Lima and provincial intellectuals held about the country and its historical destiny: a) the Incan, encomendero, and Andean model created in the seventeenth century by the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, and b) the Western, White, and Creole Lima model created by Pedro Peralta Barnuevo in the eighteenth century.¹

These models of interpretation of Peruvian history remained in force, but with some alterations as in the eighteenth century the version of the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega gave rise to a utopian revival of the Inca Empire and, on the

¹ Francisco Quiroz Chueca: *De la patria a la nación. Historiografía peruana desde Garcilaso hasta la era del guano*, Lima, Asamblea Nacional de Rectores, 2012.

other hand, Peralta's paradigm was modified by Peruvian Creole intellectuals in their periodical *Mercurio Peruano* (1791–1795) as part of their process of self-identification after a great rebellion that shook the colonial regime in 1780. Indeed, Creole intellectuals generated an idea of themselves as the true representatives of the Peruvian nation as part of the Spanish Empire and with more affinities to the Creoles of other parts of Hispanic America and even to peninsular Spaniards than with their fellow Indians, Mestizo, and castes.²

It was the Jesuit Juan Pablo Viscardo Guzmán who first formulated a coherent version of the Peruvian history that sustained political separation from Spain and his arguments would be central in the emergence of the new interpretative models of Peruvian history after independence. His *Carta a los españoles americanos* (London, 1799, in French) contains a short "history" of Peru pointing toward independence. His narrative recounts the events from the conquest to the late eighteenth century, showing in a continuous line the Spanish role in the New World which he understands as extremely negative.³ His enlightened and pactist vision allowed him to see that Spain had failed to comply with the "colonial pact" with the Creoles as heirs of the conquerors who had reached maturity and should have been emancipated from their "mother" (the Bourbon dynasty) due to her tyrannical attitudes in taking away the privileges Creole elites held at least from the seventeenth century.⁴

The political break with Spain generated debates around the cultural paradigms that the new country should have in order to create the foundations of the Peruvian nation. In particular, the hesitation to enter Western modernity generated controversies between Catholics and Hispanists and, on the other hand, supporters of Western progress linked to the Protestant traditions of northern and central Europe when evaluating the Spanish legacy in the formation of Peruvian nationality. While England and France represented progress, Spain was seen as an unsuccessful country wedded to outdated traditions.

There was a long period of searching for what it meant to be Peruvian in different areas of culture and knowledge. This was a complicated task in a multicultural country such as Peru because it implied a high degree of intellectual violence in the effort to impose a version of history that set aside this multiple local legacy and, rather, privileged the Western as the

² In fact, the prevalent historical vision in the *Mercurio Peruano* was the imperial version penned by the Catalan oidor of the Royal audiencia of Lima Ambrosio Cerdán de Landa y Simón Pontero (1793).

³ On Viscardo's philosophical conceptions see María Luisa Rivara de Tuesta: *Filosofía e historia de las ideas en el Perú*, Lima, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2000, Tome II, 64–65; and David Brading: *The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the Liberal State 1492–1867*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, 535–540.

⁴ Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzmán: *Obra completa*, Lima, Ediciones del Congreso del Perú, 1998, Tome I, 211, and Tome II, 382.

true, the correct, and the one and only tradition. In fact, inclusion meant to homogenize by imposing through education the version of the culture of the dominant Creole groups on non-Western compatriots who were neither Christians nor Spanish-speakers.⁵ Thus, to become Peruvian, the peoples of the Andes and the Amazon, as well as the descendants of African slaves and castes had to assume the hegemonic culture of the Creole elites.

As the Peruvian independent Republic was consolidated the dominant Creole elites found that it was not convenient to completely deny the Spanish legacy of the country. In these circumstances and on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of political independence, the fact that the pro-Spanish and Catholic historical discourse of the ultraconservative priest Bartolomé Herrera (1846) emerged can be better understood. The Lima-centrist historical interpretation of Peralta Barnuevo was modified to make room for a Spanish Peru without Spain: thanks to the development of the Creole consciousness, Peruvian Creole elites had reached maturity as if to separate themselves from their mother country in order to start a new autonomous life.

Bartolomé Herrera used Viscardo's ideas to support his Hispanic and Catholic position without mentioning the origin. Just as for Viscardo, the great concern of Herrera and the historians of his time was not the past, but the present and the future. The former greatness of Peru was not questioned as it was the historical foundation of the new republican regime in a country with a complex ethnic-cultural composition, one which had recently emerged from a long colonial regime in circumstances that left serious doubts about the relevance of the separation and of the conviction with which the elite groups had acted.

Herrera accepted independence as inevitable and, to explain it, he used an argument that appears in Viscardo's *Letter*: the maturity of the Peruvian nation within the Spanish nation, although Viscardo was more interested in the Hispanic American nation and Herrera had in mind religious elements in the formation of a new, Peruvian independent nation.

Three centuries the motherland led us in her arms. She assured us with Catholicism, the unity of the faith that was missing, together with the order and public rest in Europe; she taught us her customs, her laws, her science, her blood, and her life; she formed us as a nation. But a nation is a group of means ordered by Providence, so that they meet their sights with intelligence and will. It was necessary, therefore, that the Peruvian nation fulfilled its destiny.⁶

⁵ Mónica Quijada: *Homogeneidad y nación, con un estudio de caso: Argentina, siglos XIX y XX*, Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2000.

⁶ Herrera links the nation with the racial, the cultural and the religious so that the Peruvian nation fits easily into the Hispanic American nation. He states that the nation is "a group of men who form a separate race, who by their language, their religion and their habits,

With Herrera, history becomes providential again. Like many other previous authors, Herrera saw in the Inca Empire a moment of preparation of the Andes to receive the Gospel (*preparatio evangelica*) and it was the Spaniards who fulfilled the task imposed by God: “Peru already needed baptism: Spain extended its vigorous arms to receive in them peoples to be offered to the Church” and thus created “the new Peru, the *Spanish* and *Christian* Peru.”⁷

The last sentence summarizes Herrera’s conception of the country’s historical trajectory. Peru is a Spanish and Christian country located in South America.

This quote has been manipulated by conservative and nationalist historians that want to see Bartolomé Herrera as their standard-bearer in the promotion of a nominally integrated Peruvian nation guided by Creoles. In reality, a *new* country made up of Spaniards and Indians does not imply an equal merger. Herrera deeply rejected the idea of considering Indians as equals, because for him intelligence was the gift that makes the difference between those who belong to a society with all rights and those who simply do not. According to Herrera, Indians lacked understanding and, therefore, they could not be citizens.

Thus, Herrera changed the terms of the discussion: independence was a process of maturation that leads to the *emancipation* of a colony that can now live without the tutelage of a metropolis. Moreover, in an argument that would also be developed later by conservative historians,⁸ Herrera denied the colonial character of the Spanish dominion stating that the Spanish overseas territories were kingdoms of the Spanish commonwealth rather than colonies and thus

we were a part of the great nation that ruled the kingdom of Spain and the Indies. It was therefore necessary that we were not patriotic for not loving that nation that was our homeland, or that government that was our government.⁹

In this way, Herrera opened the door to revaluing the Spanish image of Peru and the Peruvian nation at a time when the influence of northern and central European and Protestant modernity was increasing at the expense of the Hispanic legacy and Catholicism with which the Peruvian dominant social sectors had identified for three centuries. This vision, politically conservative, continued its course in Peruvian historiography (especially, in Lima historical

have more similarity and more links with each other than with the rest of the human race”. Bartolomé Herrera, *Escritos y discursos*, Lima, Biblioteca de la República, 1929–1934, Tome I, 77; Tome II, 106–107.

⁷ Herrera, *Ibid*, Tome I, 74–76 (Emphasis in the original).

⁸ For instance, see Fausto Alvarado Dodero, *Virreinato o colonia. Historia conceptual. España-Perú. Siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII*, Lima, Fondo Editorial del Congreso del Perú, 2013.

⁹ Herrera, *Ibid*, Tome I, 92.

thought), which increasingly had in the Spanish tradition a central theme of their interests. It is true that the historical view of Herrera would have to wait for the next century to reach acceptance and to be developed by Peruvian Hispanist historians, but already in the nineteenth century the colonial history was vindicated after suffering the inclemencies of ideological battles during the separatist war (1820–1826). Historians such as Manuel de Odriozola, Manuel de Mendiburu, Manuel Atanasio Fuentes, Sebastián Lorente, José Toribio Polo and writers such as Ricardo Palma, would have the colonial period as a very important and positive part of Peruvian history.¹⁰

NATIONALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

The flourishing of nationalist historiography in Europe had echoes in Peru. Indeed, in the second half of the nineteenth century, two versions emerge that can be considered as nationalist and linked to the construction of the nation-state. Sebastián Lorente and Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán gave – each one on their side – an overview of the history of Peru in structured narratives. Both aimed to present the historical trajectory of the country to show its current achievements as a civilized country in the context of nineteenth-century Western modernity. But their proposals differed substantially from each other.

Sebastián Lorente was actually the author of a new paradigm in Peruvian historiography, an integrating vision of the history of the country. In his essays of 1866 and 1879, Lorente made a vindicating history, harmonizing different versions to have a patriotic and nationalist narrative, a history that was neither Cusco-centrist nor Lima-centrist in the strict sense. However, Lorente worked out a conciliatory version of local and Creole traditions that included the Spanish legacy as an important part of the Peruvian national identity.

However, his more important contributions were related to the role Indians should play in the new nation. Lorente vindicated the legacy of native peoples of the Andes using the then new studies by Mariano de Rivero and the Swiss Johann Jakob von Tschudi on the pre-Inca and Inca periods to consider them as constitutive stages of the Peruvian nationality. In 1841 Rivero published his *Antigüedades peruanas* and ten years later Tschudi reissued it in Vienna with his own contributions. As a matter of fact, Lorente's position was inclusive but not egalitarian. Lorente found in ancient history the links that he felt could help in the task of "civilizing" the native population so that they could

¹⁰ See Joseph Dager: *Historiografía y nación en el Perú del siglo XIX*, Lima, Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2009; and Francisco Quiroz, *Romanticismo y nacionalismo en la historiografía peruana del siglo XIX*, *Sílex*, 7, 1, 2017, 15–43.

become part of Peruvian civilization in the context of the Western modern world. This binding element is what he called the “Inca theocratic socialism” and consisted of the despotism of the Inca rulers that made everything work properly in their empire. The construction of a nation-State according to Lorente should consider the ascendancy of indigenous leaders to ensure the solidarity and social harmony that should be applied in contemporary Peru for the creation of a modern society.¹¹

On his side, Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán stated that the independence of 1820–1826 was the founding milestone of modern Peru. Considering the pre-Hispanic and the colonial periods as not fundamental historical moments, Paz Soldán traced the lines of development of Peru based on its incorporation into the contemporary Western world after independence. Paz Soldán was clear in identifying Peru with the Creole culture that created a modern state during the guano export boom (1840–1880). Moreover, Paz Soldán identified the nation with the state.¹² Lima high society (and subsequent historians) considered Paz Soldán’s version of Peruvian national history to be the most appropriate to understand the country as a nation.

The great difficulty of nineteenth-century Peru in generating an inclusive and egalitarian idea of its nation consisted in the intention of the hegemonic social and political sectors to impose a Western model on a non-Western society such as the nineteenth-century Peruvian society. The republic in the guano export boom period presented itself as a modern and civilized country in Western terms. In this project, Indians, Amazonians, and Afro-Peruvians had no place. In a time when the country was seen as rich and modern, historians showed the Indians as a hindrance on the road to progress.

Sebastián Lorente did include native cultures in the history of the country, but his intention was only to establish that Indians were capable of adapting to the requirements of a modern and Western civilization through education and through their social subjection as it was supposed to have happened in Inca times. Finally, the accepted version was that of Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán, who showed that the real country was the one created by independence thanks to the effort of the Creole elites from 1820 on. According to hegemonic nineteenth-century historiography, the Peruvian identity had a Western image in a country that was geographically and culturally diverse.

¹¹ Sebastián Lorente: *Historia de la civilización peruana*, Lima, Imprenta Liberal, 1879, 5; Sebastián Lorente: *Escritos fundacionales de historia peruana*, Lima, Fondo Editorial de la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 2005, 55–56.

¹² Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán: *Historia del Perú independiente*, Lima, Imprenta de El Nacional; Le Havre, Imprenta de Alfonso Lemale, 1868–1870. 2 tomos.

THE CONSERVATIVE AND NATIONALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

The establishment of the basis of a vision of Peruvian history that would become the “official” version of the country after the debacle of the War with Chile (1879–1883) corresponds to the Jesuit Rubén Vargas Ugarte. The war had devastated the country materially but also culturally. The previous export boom was replaced by a sharp and prolonged economic crisis accompanied by a bitter confirmation: the national self-esteem had been gouged by the defeat to a country that the dominant social sectors of Lima (and Peru in general) always considered as inferior.

The country had to be rebuilt both materially and culturally. Historiography was called to meet the demands of this last aspect but the task had to be deferred due to the civil strife in which strongmen or caudillos dispute the political power believing themselves to be the saviors of the country that, in fact, they anarchized. Toward 1895 the civil war ended, inaugurating a period of a new primary-export economic boom and political stability at the expense of a huge reduction of citizenship by excluding the indigenous and rural majorities of the country from the political, social, and cultural system.

This new oligarchic republic was controlled by old wealthy sectors (landowners and bankers) and new ones dedicated to mining, petroleum, agricultural exports, finance, and modern industry. Their exclusionary politics and social manners gave way to what is called the “aristocratic Republic” in Peruvian history (1895–1919).

In this context, the dominant oligarchy sought to highlight positive aspects of Peruvian republican history in order to eliminate the negative image that national history had acquired after the war.¹³ The awkward task was to focus on the few moments when the country lived in social order rather than in the chaos attributed to the democratic norms rejected by a disillusioned oligarchy of the republican political system.

Actually, the disappointment with the republican regime is common throughout Latin America at the turn of the century. New social actors were breaking into the political, social and cultural scene by questioning the hegemonic role of the oligarchy in these fields. Mesocratic, provincial,

¹³ A radical anti-oligarchic leader, Manuel González Prada launched a very sharp dart at the oligarchy in his famous speech at the Politeama theatre in Lima, collected in his book of essays *Páginas libres* (1888), shortly after the war was over. In the presence of the President of the Republic of the time, González Prada pointed directly to the situation of backwardness and exploitation in which the oligarchy kept the majority of the population of the country as the actual cause of the defeat in the war. González Prada concluded his speech with a lapidary expression for the pre-war governments: “the history of former governments of Peru fits in three words: imbecility in action”. Manuel González Prada, *Ensayos 1885–1916*, Lima, Universidad Ricardo Palma, Editorial Universitaria, 2009, 53–55, 57.

trade-unionist, indigenist tendencies constituted a difficult challenge to counteract by a traditional oligarchy incapable of proposing creative and effective alternatives to maintain its predominance.

Under these conditions, two projects emerged seeking to overcome the intellectual gap, namely those of Francisco García Calderón and José de la Riva Agüero y Osma. One supported the need to implement strong measures in order to control the overflowing situation; the other presented miscegenation as his central idea. Both of them appealed to history in their proposals.

Francisco García Calderón was an intellectual from the Peruvian oligarchy but also one of its greatest critics. Alongside other Latin American intellectuals disabused of the republican trajectory, García Calderón was committed to an authoritarian alternative remembering Simón Bolívar, Porfirio Díaz in Mexico and Ramón Castilla in Peru as great men because they knew how to impose themselves and avoid the social inconveniences of representation and democracy. In that sense, he was a supporter of the “democratic Caesarism.”

In his essays *El Perú contemporáneo* (1907) and, especially, in *Las democracias latinas de América* (1912) published in French but with wide circulation among Peruvian and Latin American intellectuals, he developed ideas about the historical mission that the Latin American *intelligenza* and political elites had to carry out through authoritarian regimes and even by collaborating with dictators.¹⁴ It is understood that the elite in mind was White, Western and Christian.

On his side, aristocratic historian José de la Riva Agüero y Osma rejected plebiscitary caudillos who replaced democratic representation and, as a partisan of the monarchy, he preferred a strong regime capable of controlling the emerging economic, social, and cultural sectors. For this, he found the perfect formula in an interpretation of Peruvian history that highlighted the conformation of a Mestizo or mixed people nation starting with the European conquest in the sixteenth century. He used widely the ideas of Bartolomé Herrera about a new country created by the conquest, but his conclusion was that the country was new because it was neither indigenous nor Spanish. Curiously enough, the great paradigm of this new country would be the Mestizo writer Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, author of a decentralized version of Peruvian history, contrary to the one Lima elites had held for centuries. As a result of a historiographical controversy about the originality of the

¹⁴ Francisco García Calderón: *Las democracias latinas de América. La creación de un continente*, Caracas, Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1976.

work of the Mestizo author (1908–1912), José de la Riva Agüero discovered in Garcilaso the iconic image of the Mestizo that must epitomized the Peruvian national identity.¹⁵

In 1921, the first centenary of the independence of Peru was celebrated and, as expected, the country was wondering about the practical results of the separatist movement of 1820–1826. In particular, the fundamental changes in the political, social, economic and cultural aspects were of interest, while the governor of that time, Augusto B. Leguía, pretended to be carrying out a republican refoundation that he called the “Patria Nueva” more oriented to North American interests in contrast to the previous British preferences of the traditional oligarchy. A large historiography would seek to rethink the separatist war but only a few authors would link this fact with its effects on the Peruvian nation and national identity throughout the century.

Interestingly, among those who raised reflections on the first hundred years of independent life in the country was a Peruvian entrepreneur. Pedro Dávalos y Lissón published a set of commentaries of his own and others in four volumes entitled *La primera centuria* with an eloquent subtitle: “Geographical, political and economic causes that have stopped the moral and material progress of Peru in the first century of its independent life.” The pessimistic tone shows the disenchantment of the power groups in terms of the regime that led to the national disaster (war with Chile, 1879–1883) and the “liquidation of moral and material values” of the country, concluding that “the democratic theories were unrealizable in Peru.”¹⁶

After a hundred years of a representative and supposedly democratic republic, the oligarchic regime contrasted sharply with the situation that the country should have. This situation was posed by new commentators and analysts who did not belong to the oligarchy and even some of them actually opposed it. This was important because practically up to that time the oligarchy had almost had a monopoly of political, social and historical opinion. The indigenism and, above all, the critical thinking of José Carlos Mariátegui appeared as an alternative to the mainstream thought.

Peruvian conservatism did not take long to respond. Víctor Andrés Belaunde responded directly and immediately to Mariátegui in his essay *Meditaciones peruanas*. Belaunde’s option was clearly authoritarian. For him, the trajectory of the country showed that only in times of rulers like Ramón Castilla or Nicolás de Piérola had it been able to maintain order in a country

¹⁵ José de la Riva Agüero: Estudios de historia peruana. La emancipación y la república, in *Obras completas de José de la Riva-Agüero*, Lima, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Instituto Riva Agüero, 1971, Tome VII.

¹⁶ Pedro Dávalos – Pedro Lissón: *La primera centuria. Causas geográficas, políticas y económicas que han detenido el progreso moral y material del Perú en el primer siglo de su vida independiente*, Lima, Librería e Imprenta Gil, 1919–1926, Tome IV, 89–90.

that was becoming increasingly difficult to control. Indeed, Belaunde openly placed himself on the side of the doctrine of the “sovereignty of intelligence” of Bartolomé Herrera as the answer to the dilemma of the validity of democracy in the country. Here, Belaunde affirmed that practice and science had demonstrated “the lies of the revolution” and “had dispelled many of the illusions of exaggerated democracy because of the absurdity of political egalitarianism in a people, like ours, of such a complicated structure.” The solution was the formation of an intellectual oligarchy of men of position, talent, and virtue to guide an ethnically mixed people.¹⁷ That is, “real” Peru was a racially White country.

Father Vargas Ugarte was the creator of the new conservative version of the Peruvian history. To begin with, echoing the demands of Bartolomé Herrera, the focus of the interests of historiography had to be Peru from the time of the European conquest. Vargas Ugarte stated that the historical course of Peru should begin “with the study of the Conquest, enjoyable and interesting and with which, logically, the real Peru begins, born of the fusion of two races, the conqueror and the conquered.”¹⁸

In effect, the extensive and fruitful work of Vargas Ugarte began with the European conquest and covered all the time of the Spanish rule, Independence and the Republic. Vargas Ugarte provided a significant account of the history of the formation of the Peruvian nation as a Mestizo one led to its civilizing ends by a White, Western, and Christian elite. This version of Peruvian national history became “official” since it worked for the political, social and cultural interests of the Peruvian oligarchy.

Thus, the idea that crosses the conservative and nationalist Peruvian historiography is linked in this way to the postulates of Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzmán about the maturity of the American Creole, going through modifications made by the priest Bartolomé Herrera in mid-nineteenth century in the sense that independence had to be understood as a natural process of emancipation. Already in the twentieth century, it was highlighted that the country was Mestizo and led by a White, Western and Christian elite (mostly from the capital city, Lima) and this would be the main idea that prevailed in Peruvian historiography until the advent of a historiography with different social protagonists and authors since the decade of 1960.

¹⁷ Víctor Andrés Belaunde: *Meditaciones peruanas*, in *Obras completas. Primera serie El Proyecto Nacional*, Lima, Comisión Nacional del Centenario de Víctor Andrés Belaunde, 1987, Tome II, 100–101, 128.

¹⁸ Rubén Vargas Ugarte: *Manual de estudios peruanistas*, Lima, Librería Studium, 1951, 19–20, 27.

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“EL MODELO DE INDUSTRIALIZACIÓN POR
SUSTITUCIÓN DE IMPORTACIONES”, MOTOR DE LA
MODERNIZACIÓN POLÍTICO-SOCIAL EN AMÉRICA
LATINA Y DEL SURGIMIENTO DE UNA IDENTIDAD
NACIONAL

MARÍA ELISA ALONSO

ABSTRACT

This article casts light on the fact that the economic changes which were implemented in Latin America from the 1930s in order to emerge from the crisis invigorated the political sphere, generating at the same time a modernisation process both politically and socially all over the continent. In this transformation, the irruption of the urban proletariat was a determining factor, which altered the system of socio-political relations forever. These measures boosted a process of socio-political modernity focused on a nationalism that reached all areas of life in the countries. The important thing is to show that this nationalism shifted away from the European cultural tradition and allowed Latin America to discover its own identity which revalued what is Latin American.

Keywords: *Latin America, modernization, industrialization, nationalism.*

RESUMEN

El siguiente artículo es una reflexión sobre los cambios económicos que se implementaron en América Latina para salir de la crisis, a partir de los años '30. Estas transformaciones económicas incentivadas por los propios Estados, influyeron de manera determinante en el ámbito político de la región y generaron un proceso de modernización sociopolítica en todo el continente. Dicha modernización impulsó a su vez entre otros aspectos, un nacionalismo

que se extendió a todas las esferas de los países implicados. Este nacionalismo se alejó de la tradición cultural europea y permitió a América Latina profundizar en su propia identidad, revalorizando lo latinoamericano.

Palabras clave: América Latina, modernización, industrialización, nacionalismo

INTRODUCCIÓN

El gran período de modernización¹ en la región latinoamericana se produjo a raíz del *Crash* de Wall Street y la ulterior recesión económica mundial que concluyó a lo largo de los años 30 o 40, según los países. En América Latina, el impacto de esta depresión global también se hizo sentir en lo político y social, lo que obligó a adoptar una serie de cambios de gran amplitud y estrechamente interrelacionados, en las esferas tanto política como económica. Esta crisis económica germinada en EEUU supuso un punto de inflexión decisivo para el proceso de modernización de América Latina que tuvo que plantearse por primera vez, un futuro alejado del eurocentrismo.

En esta reflexión se trata de poner de manifiesto que las transformaciones económicas que se implementaron para salir de la crisis en la que estaban inmersos los países de la región, dinamizaron a su vez la esfera política, generando en paralelo un proceso modernizador de lo político y de lo social en todo el continente. En esta transformación fue determinante la irrupción del elemento urbano, que alteró el sistema de relaciones sociopolíticas para siempre.

El principal objetivo es poner en evidencia que las medidas económicas adoptadas en la región a partir de los años 30 impulsaron irremediablemente un proceso de modernidad sociopolítica, centrada en un nacionalismo que alcanzó todas las esferas de la vida de los países. Lo importante es mostrar que este nacionalismo se alejó de la tradición cultural europea y permitió que América Latina descubriera una identidad propia, nacional, alejándose progresivamente del ideal europeo de modernidad, que conllevaba un menosprecio de todo lo latinoamericano².

Es evidente que a partir de los años 30 la mayoría de los países latinoamericanos se lanzaron a la búsqueda de la particularidad aglutinadora que

¹ El proceso de modernización en América Latina está marcado por transformaciones políticas, culturales, sociales y económicas. Aquí se hace esencialmente referencia a las transformaciones económicas (derivadas de la política de industrialización por sustitución de importaciones), por su carácter impulsor del resto de cambios que sufrió el conjunto de la región.

² F. Cardoso – E. Falleto: *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina: Ensayo de interpretación sociológica*, Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI, 1971.

permitiera el surgimiento de una identidad territorial. Esta particularidad se convirtió en el ejevehiculador de reformas sociales y políticas, a la vez que legitimaba las transformaciones económicas que abrieron la vía a la modernidad de la región.

En la reflexión posterior se trata de demostrar la interrelación de todos estos aspectos, mostrando cómo una crisis sistémica se convierte en el detonante imprevisto para uno de los mayores procesos de modernización y transformación del siglo XX.

Más concretamente, para acotar el análisis este trabajo se va a centrar en aquellos países que impulsaron un desarrollo basado en la industrialización y una economía interior, poniendo en evidencia la fuerte relación entre modernización económica, industrialización e identidad nacional. Aunque en ocasiones se aluda a ellos como ejemplos, no se tendrán en cuenta aquellos países que optaron por impulsar un desarrollo hacia fuera, sustentado en las exportaciones.

REPLANTEAMIENTO DEL MODELO ECONÓMICO: EL NACIONALISMO

La crisis de 1929 en EEUU que se prolongó durante toda la década de los 30, dando lugar al período conocido como la Gran Depresión, se extendió a todo el mundo y tuvo especial repercusión en América Latina. De hecho, fue el detonante del proceso de modernización tanto económico como político-social que vivió la región en el siglo XX.

Hasta los años 30, las economías de los países latinoamericanos se basaban en un modelo agro-exportador, dependiente y sustentado principalmente en el sector primario. A partir de la segunda mitad del siglo XIX, los países latinoamericanos integran el comercio mundial adoptando el rol de proveedores de materias primas, así como minerales y productos agrícolas, reminiscencia de su pasado como economías coloniales (es el caso de Bolivia, uno de los mayores exportadores de plata y estaño, Brasil especializado en la exportación de café que constituía uno de los pilares de su economía y Argentina que vendía carne y trigo a Gran Bretaña). Los países latinoamericanos exportaban materias primas principalmente a EEUU y Europa, y a su vez importaban bienes de consumo y materias elaboradas de estos mismos países. Es decir, exportaban materias primas que luego importaban una vez transformadas. En este contexto, América Latina era una región sin industria que transformara sus abundantes materias primas ni infraestructuras para desarrollar su propia economía interna.

A pesar de esta dependencia, las economías latinoamericanas supieron aprovecharse de la coyuntura internacional que obligaba a las economías europeas (Gran Bretaña principalmente), primero en pleno proceso de

desarrollo industrial y después en plena recomposición de su tejido industrial tras la Primera Guerra Mundial, a solicitar continuamente materias primas de estas economías periféricas. Los beneficios que estas economías obtuvieron se debían a una estructuración internacional del trabajo, en la que América Latina se especializó en la producción de las materias primas más demandadas por las principales economías internacionales. Se trataba de un pacto “neocolonial”³ entre dos *sectores* exportadores, entre las elites dirigentes de los países europeos y EEUU, por un lado, y las elites de los países latinoamericanos por otro.

En este contexto, Estados Unidos se convirtió desde 1914 (apertura del Canal de Panamá) hasta 1929 en el principal interlocutor comercial con América Latina, reforzando su papel hegemónico con fuertes inversiones económicas que le convirtieron en la principal fuente del capital extranjero de la región (principalmente en Centroamérica, México y el Caribe). La falta de una estructura institucional y esta situación de dependencia económico-financiera debilitaba las economías de estos países, cada vez más endeudadas. Estas circunstancias determinaron que la recesión económica mundial tuviera efectos especialmente desestabilizadores en la región⁴.

Para salir de la recesión, los dos principales interlocutores económicos de la región, EEUU y Gran Bretaña, implementaron un sistema proteccionista con fuertes aranceles a la importación. En EEUU bajo el auspicio del Presidente Franklin Delano Roosevelt, se tradujo en el *New Deal*, y en Gran Bretaña, el mercado se redujo a los miembros de la *Commonwealth*, dejando fuera a los países latinoamericanos que perdieron a sus dos principales socios económicos. El hecho de que las principales economías, sumidas en la crisis disminuyeran la demanda de importaciones (sobre todo de aquellas materias primas que no eran indispensables), motivó que América Latina tuviera que enfrentarse a la pérdida de mercado para sus productos. Estas circunstancias desencadenaron que las economías latinoamericanas, cuya balanza comercial estaba basada en los intercambios internacionales, quebraran, evidenciando así la debilidad de sus economías “periféricas”.

Para evitar esta crisis, los países latinoamericanos no podían seguir el ejemplo de las principales economías mundiales, ya que carecían de la infraestructura industrial y de una red de comunicaciones interna que permitieran un proteccionismo económico para impulsar los sectores de la economía nacional y disminuir las importaciones.

³ A. Rouquié: *Amérique Latine*, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1987.

⁴ Ver el análisis de Bulmer-Thomas (V. Bulmer-Thomas: *La Historia económica de América Latina desde la Independencia*, México D.F., Fondo de cultura económica, 2010). En este libro, el autor plantea otros aspectos que influyen en el desarrollo económico de la región a finales del siglo XIX y plantea nuevos argumentos que explican el modelo exportador que se impuso en América Latina.

En este contexto internacional, los países latinoamericanos tuvieron que replantearse su modelo económico y adoptar medidas para promover la independencia económica con respecto a terceros.

Frente a esta situación, algunos países tomaron conciencia de la necesidad de impulsar la demanda interna y promovieron la industrialización de sus economías para hacerlas más autónomas. En este proceso de aprendizaje, algunos países (entre los que se encontraban las repúblicas más grandes) incentivaron lo que se conoce como la “Industrialización por sustitución de importaciones” (ISI). Concretamente, los países que intentaron la industrialización por sustitución fueron Perú, Paraguay, Bolivia, México, Colombia, Brasil, Uruguay, Chile y Argentina.

No obstante, hay que señalar que el proceso de industrialización no fue un proceso homogéneo, ni se produjo al mismo ritmo en todos los países ni en el interior de los mismos. De hecho, no todos los países que implementaron en los años 30 estas medidas industrializadoras tuvieron éxito, como es el caso de Perú, Paraguay y Bolivia.

Sin embargo, es en los años 50 y 60, cuando los países latinoamericanos optaron por dos modelos económicos diferentes⁵.

Por un lado, los seis países (denominados por Bulmer-Thomas LA6) que implementaron el proceso de industrialización con más o menos éxito, profundizaron en él e impulsaron un modelo de desarrollo hacia dentro, con disposiciones proteccionistas más racionales y menos improvisadas que en los años 30, que tuvieron implicaciones incluso en los ámbitos político y social.

A su vez por otro lado, la mayoría de los países (LA14) optaron por reforzar, estimular e incluso diversificar las exportaciones existentes, desarrollando una economía hacia el exterior sin renunciar completamente al proceso de industrialización nacional. Entre los países que siguieron este modelo de desarrollo hacia afuera, están aquellos que intentaron sin éxito, medidas industrializadoras en los años 30 (Perú, Paraguay y Bolivia).

De este modo, en este trabajo cuando se analiza el modelo industrializador y sus consecuencias político-sociales, se hace referencia principalmente a aquellos países que se adaptaron al nuevo contexto internacional, industrializándose e innovando el papel del Estado y las instituciones políticas, es decir, aquellos que adoptaron en los años 50 y 60 el modelo de desarrollo hacia dentro.

¿Qué supuso el “modelo de industrialización por sustitución de importaciones” para la modernización de la región? Entre los aspectos más significativos de la modernización económica, que como se verá posteriormente también tuvo repercusiones en el ámbito social y político, se produce un crecimiento económico debido a las grandes inversiones para modernizar la red

⁵ Para mayor información consultar Bulmer-Thomas, V. Op.cit.

industrial, los medios de comunicación, las infraestructuras y el transporte. Además, se pasa de una sociedad eminentemente agrícola a una sociedad mayoritariamente industrial con el consecuente afianzamiento de una estructura de clases, se acelera el proceso de urbanización (que se inicia en la mayoría de los países y se consolida en otros, como Argentina y Chile), se aplican y desarrollan innovaciones tecnológicas tanto a la agricultura como a la industria, se crean grandes empresas y fábricas que transforman las materias primas, surge una nueva elite económica vinculada al capital empresarial (clase media principalmente urbana), etc.

Se produjo una toma de conciencia de la necesidad de proteger las economías nacionales, dando lugar al surgimiento de un nacionalismo económico, vinculado al proteccionismo y a economías cerradas. Se inicia así un período en el que los países de la región que adoptan un modelo de desarrollo hacia dentro, evolucionan hacia una modernidad económica, política y social, que dura desde 1930 a 1960 aproximadamente.

En este contexto y forzadas por la situación, estas economías implementaron un nacionalismo económico, caracterizado por una industrialización acelerada y sobre todo un desarrollo hacia el interior.

Aprovechando en un primer momento el tejido comercial del que disponían, mejoraron las infraestructuras existentes adaptadas al mercado exportador y adecuándolas al nuevo mercado interno. A la vez, aplicaron innovaciones tecnológicas a la escasa industria existente, tanto a la exigua industria artesanal como a aquella que estaba vinculada con el proceso de obtención de las materias primas que exportaban. Estas transformaciones constituyeron la base de los primeros pasos hacia una revolución industrial y un mercado interno, a los que se consagraron los 30 años posteriores. Es el inicio de uno de los hitos más importantes del siglo XX en la región. Este nuevo modelo supuso una modernización en todos los ámbitos, al dejar atrás una economía periférica, dependiente del sector de la exportación. Se adopta un nuevo sistema innovador, motor de una serie de profundas transformaciones que sobrepasan el sector económico, con la aparición de nuevos actores políticos alejados del modelo conservador del siglo XIX y una nueva sociedad más dinámica, que reclama una mayor participación en la vida pública e instigadora de nuevas demandas sociales y laborales.

Esta primera etapa se hace con capital eminentemente nacional, auspiciado por incentivos estatales e impulsado por la imposibilidad de adquirir bienes manufacturados que importaban de las economías centrales, antes del estallido de la crisis. Todo ello aceleró el proceso de industrialización ante la necesidad de producir lo que no pueden importar. El éxito de este proceso modernizador, imprescindible y necesariamente rápido, se debe principalmente al nuevo papel adoptado por los Estados, que salvan la vulnerabilidad

del nuevo sistema, actuando como reguladores e impulsando un nacionalismo económico, con la implementación de medidas proteccionistas y un desarrollo de las economías internas.

Como se acaba de señalar, un aspecto que no se puede obviar es el papel determinante del Estado, que se convierte en el principal agente regulador de la economía. El proceso se basa en un Estado centralista e intervencionista, que se convierte en agente aduanero, protector del mercado interno y garante del control de las fronteras como delimitación geográfica nacional. El Estado central toma todas las decisiones políticas e importantes, organizando todos los aspectos de la esfera pública de estos países.

IMPLICACIONES POLÍTICO-SOCIALES DEL PROCESO DE TRANSFORMACIÓN ECONÓMICA: LA IDENTIDAD NACIONAL

La recesión económica mundial que se extendió a América Latina en los primeros años de la década de los 30, modificó no sólo el sistema económico, sino que a posteriori también transformó el orden político y social de la región. Podemos afirmar que en 1930 dio inicio una nueva época que debilitó los sistemas políticos latinoamericanos, que se habían constituido siguiendo el modelo constitucional estadounidense, y que por su juventud todavía no habían conseguido la estabilidad y legitimidad que los mantuvieran al abrigo de los efectos de los vaivenes internacionales.

En este contexto, la presión de los grupos de interés y la influencia de nuevas ideologías, impulsarán cambios decisivos en la realidad político-social de la región (el nacionalismo revolucionario y el socialismo-comunista principalmente)⁶. A partir de este momento, el Estado se convertirá en el principal actor político-económico, que se impondrá por encima de las elites

⁶ En torno a los años 30, dos nociones que ya habían aparecido con anterioridad en el continente se unen en torno al nacionalismo revolucionario, el nacionalismo y el antiimperialismo. Este discurso político que ya apareció en la revolución mexicana, se convierte en una noción central del aprismo peruano de finales de los años 20 y de los regímenes populistas posteriores (principalmente del peronismo), entre otros. El nacionalismo revolucionario defendió un Estado fuerte que gestionase los recursos naturales del país, la inversión pública, a la vez que preconizaba una serie de políticas integradoras que se basaban la cultura y la educación para todos. Todo ello en torno a un proyecto de unidad nacional anti oligárquico y antiimperialista. J.C. Mariátegui: *Mariátegui Total*, (Edición Conmemorativa del Centenario de José Carlos Mariátegui) Lima, Amauta, 1994.

Otra noción ideológica que también dejó su impronta en América Latina y que se enfrentó al nacionalismo revolucionario, fue el socialismo-comunismo, que en un principio no se perciben como concepciones distintas (como ocurre en Europa). Este socialismo-comunismo latinoamericano se caracteriza principalmente por una dinámica de lucha de clases que se traduce por una lucha contra el imperialismo (Partido Comunista Salvadoreño fundado en 1930, el Partido Comunista Cubano y el Partido Comunista Mexicano de principios de los años 40, por ejemplo).

conservadoras que habían gobernado el continente desde el siglo XIX. Si hasta entonces la economía se mantenía separada de las instituciones políticas, la nueva coyuntura político-económica también modificó este aspecto. El Estado se convierte en agente económico de primer orden y pasa a ser el regulador y protector de la economía del país, impulsando el ya mencionado nacionalismo económico y a su vez, el nacionalismo político⁷.

Como consecuencia, el Estado también adopta un papel fundamental en el ámbito político porque se convierte en el principal motor de este camino hacia la modernidad y en soporte de una nueva forma de hacer política. Es en este contexto en el que se fraguan por un lado los populismos latinoamericanos, caracterizados por una ideología basada en el concepto de identidad, tanto de clase, como nacional e incluso con el propio partido, y por otro lado, los diversos movimientos de izquierda que jalonaron la región⁸.

Hasta los años 30 en América Latina, la concepción de identidad (cultural y nacional) y de modernidad que se tenía, aspiraba a imitar los modelos europeos, idealizándolos. Para ello se adoptaron medidas que impulsaban la europeización de la región para acabar con la dicotomía “civilización–barbarie” (Europa–América Latina), entre las que destacan las políticas que incentivaban la emigración europea para “blanquear” la sociedad latinoamericana (y eliminar el mestizaje) o imponer la educación en la tradición europea. En este contexto, el peso de Europa seguía siendo determinante en todas las esferas de la vida política, económica y cultural⁹.

La aparición de nuevas capas sociales con voluntad de participar en la vida pública y distanciadas de las elites conservadoras heredadas de la tradición europea, impulsó al Estado a intervenir para incluirlas, teniendo que reconocer y aceptar las diferencias culturales. Aparece así una voluntad de buscar una identidad diferencial respecto a los centros de modernidad que constituían los países europeos y Estados Unidos. Una identidad que recupera el mestizaje como un modelo de identidad cultural y no como hasta el momento, un estigma que evidenciaba la impuraza de América Latina. El mestizaje deja de tener connotaciones negativas para convertirse precisamente en el elemento diferenciador de las nuevas identidades nacionales.

Véase también, A. Quijano: Colonialidad del poder, eurocentrismo y América Latina, in E. Lander (comp.): *La colonialidad del saber. Eurocentrismo y ciencias sociales. Perspectivas latinoamericanas*. Buenos Aires, Clacso, 2005; F. Safford: Política, ideología y sociedad, in L. L. Bethell (ed.): *Historia de América Latina*, Barcelona, Cambridge University Press, 1992; T. Halperin Donghi: *Historia Contemporánea de América Latina*, Madrid, Alianza, 1990.

⁷ G. Couffignal: *La nouvelle Amérique Latine*, Paris, Sciences Po Les Presses, 2013.

⁸ M. Machnnon – M. Petrone: *Populismo y neopopulismo en América Latina, el problema de la Cenicenta*, Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1998.

⁹ A Quijano: Raza, Etnia, Nación, Cuestiones Abiertas, in R. Forgues: *Jose Carlos Mariátegui y Europa, el otro descubrimiento*, Lima, Ed. Amauta, 1992.

Esta concepción del mestizaje como elemento identitario tuvo especial relevancia en países como México donde el indigenismo se concibió como elemento integrador o Brasil¹⁰ (a finales del siglo XIX habían empezado a recuperar el mestizaje como un valor positivo e integrador, sentando las bases del indigenismo moderno). Pero como todos los procesos transformadores en América Latina, éste tampoco se produjo en todos los países, ni evolucionó por igual en aquellos países que se apropiaron de esta noción. Así, por ejemplo, en México la política indigenista se fue orientando hacia la aculturación¹¹ y la asimilación más que hacia la integración y en Ecuador durante el gobierno del populista José María Velasco se menospreció este mestizaje y todo lo referente a los pueblos originarios del país. En palabras del propio Presidente “el indio del campo no hace males. Alimenta al país con su trabajo. En cambio el indio de las ciudades es sumamente peligroso. Ha leído libros”¹² queda reflejado el rechazo a aceptar dentro de la elite a los “indios”, rehusando otorgarles un reconocimiento público que sobrepase el papel de simple mano de obra¹³.

Sin embargo, cabe señalar, como afirma Martin Hopenhayn¹⁴, que la necesidad histórica forzó estas dinámicas modernizadoras. La coyuntura de este período impuso la necesidad de incentivar una transformación social y política, para que el propio proceso de industrialización tuviera éxito. En estas circunstancias, la capacidad integradora del modelo industrial de sustitución de importaciones fue decisiva y se auspició gracias al papel preponderante del Estado. Este Estado, que hizo del centralismo su bandera, estimuló un proceso de modernidad racional sistémica, sustentado en una burocratización de las elites y un ensalzamiento de la identidad nacional. En este contexto, los diferentes Estados-nación se atribuyen una identidad basada en la mezcla como elemento aglutinador, posibilitada por profundas transformaciones de la sociedad, como el proyecto efectivo de revolución industrial, la urbanización y sobre todo la racionalización del aparato del Estado¹⁵.

Durante este período, marcado por la confianza en las transformaciones sociales previstas, el Estado busca profundizar en un proyecto nacional,

¹⁰ Aunque en el caso de Brasil, la reivindicación de lo mestizo se produce más en los medios artísticos y culturales que político.

¹¹ B. G. Aguirre: *Formas de gobierno indígena*, México, Instituto Nacional Indigenista, 1981; A. Caso: *La comunidad indígena*, México, SEP-Diana, 1980.

¹² J. M. Velasco Ibarra: *Conciencia o barbarie*, Quito, Editorial Moderna, 1937, 39–133.

¹³ R. L. Segato: *La nación y sus otros: raza, etnicidad y diversidad religiosa en tiempos de Políticas de la Identidad*, Buenos Aires, Prometeo, 2007; N. García Canclini: *Culturas híbridas. Estrategias para entrar y salir de la modernidad*. México, Grijalbo, 1989; F. Fanon: *Piel negra. Máscaras blancas*. Madrid, Akal, 2009.

¹⁴ M. Hopenhayn: *Ni apocalípticos ni integrados. Aventuras de la modernidad en América Latina*, Santiago de Chile, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1994.

¹⁵ R. Ortiz: América Latina. De la modernidad incompleta a la modernidad-mundo in Nueva Sociedad, 166, 2000, 44–61.

aplicando nociones desarrollistas e impulsando la cultura popular como base de la identidad nacional aglutinadora. Las fronteras estatales se afianzan como referente de la identidad y por ende, de la nación. En este sentido, el Estado construye y consolida identidades ya existentes vinculadas a la territorialidad, con fines aglutinadores. Los Estados buscan una modernidad unificadora para incentivar el sentido de pertenencia a las repúblicas, construyendo una identidad que toma como referencia las necesidades de los propios Estados-nación. Este proceso que se había iniciado a finales del siglo XIX con la construcción de los Estados-nación y con el objetivo de dar legitimidad a las estructuras organizativas (políticas y administrativas), se profundiza con este proceso de modernización industrial, para legitimar el papel preponderante del Estado y de sus instituciones.

Sin embargo, cabe señalar que de forma general, este carácter inclusivo excluye las identidades no hegemónicas, como los pueblos originarios o los sectores agrícolas, alejados del proyecto industrializador. Además, tampoco el proceso fue homogéneo en toda la región, ya que hubo países que presentaban desigualdades importantes, principalmente los países de América Central, como Nicaragua y Costa Rica.

En cuanto a los nuevos estilos de hacer política que surgen en este período, en este trabajo no vamos a entrar en el debate sobre los populismos¹⁶ que proliferaron en América Latina hasta los años 70, sino que vamos a analizar estas tendencias políticas, por las repercusiones que tuvieron en la creación de una identidad nacional y las transformaciones socioeconómicas.

Los movimientos populistas surgieron en este período porque su naturaleza y su forma de hacer política respondían a las necesidades del nuevo proceso, convirtiéndose en el instrumento perfecto para poner en práctica el impulso modernizador. Estos movimientos no aglutinan a sus seguidores en torno a una ideología bien definida, sino que su estilo de hacer política se basaba en un discurso retórico, nacionalista y de clase, que se utiliza para denunciar las desigualdades sociales. En este punto es necesario aludir a la definición que Alain Touraine hizo del populismo, porque refleja a la perfección los aspectos que se están exponiendo en este texto. En palabras de Touraine, el populismo es una reacción nacionalista, a una modernización dirigida desde el exterior. Su principal objetivo es acabar con las rupturas impuestas por la acumulación capitalista o socialista, compensando la modernización inducida por un crecimiento del control colectivo de los cambios económicos y técnicos. En resumen, mantener o recrear una identidad colectiva gracias a transformaciones económicas¹⁷.

¹⁶ Para más información, consultar J. Álvarez – R. González (eds.): *El populismo en España y América Latina*, Madrid, Editorial Catriel, 1994; C. Malamud: *Populismos latinoamericanos. Los tópicos de ayer, de hoy y de siempre*, Oviedo, Ediciones Nobel, 2010.

¹⁷ A. Tourain: *La parole et le sang*, Paris, O. Jacob, 1988.

Los populismos tuvieron su momento de mayor esplendor durante el período de modernización económica que estamos analizando en este texto, porque representaban la idea de progreso que defendía el Estado y se convirtieron en el canal de expresión de los nuevos sectores sociales urbanos e industriales¹⁸. Y tuvieron especial relevancia durante la década de los 40, en plena expansión industrial que favorece el surgimiento de clases sociales urbanas y organizadas, que van a ser decisivas en el encumbramiento de estos partidos y sus dirigentes al gobierno¹⁹.

Estos movimientos, cuya vocación es integrar a las masas, son movimientos urbanos germinados en una sociedad neointindustrial, que hacen de la identidad nacional y de clase sus principales elementos aglutinadores y que una vez llegan al poder tienen dificultades para implementar su programa reformador. Los gobiernos populistas que se instalaron en América Latina entre los años 1935 y 1955, se centraron en establecer relaciones clientelares con la sociedad urbana, en ocasiones marginando al mundo rural que no formaba parte del proyecto modernizador (como es el caso del peronismo en Argentina). El eje central de sus medidas giraba en torno al desarrollo industrial local y a la idea de una economía independiente y nacional, cuyo coste disparó la inflación y quebró los Estados, endeudándolos²⁰.

La mayoría de estos populismos respondían a una nueva realidad en la que los conflictos sociales y el surgimiento de nuevos actores políticos, así como el proceso de urbanización e industrialización, hacía imposible continuar con la práctica política conservadora que había existido hasta el momento. En este contexto, se forman nuevas dicotomías de poder centradas en el nuevo sector industrial. En estas relaciones duales se oponían la burguesía local a los sectores urbanos, que estaban fuertemente sindicalizados y que impulsaron transformaciones sociales que contribuyeron a la modernización de la región.

En lo que respecta a las transformaciones sociales, hasta el desarrollo industrial la población de los países que adoptaron un desarrollo hacia dentro, era eminentemente rural. Para responder a las necesidades de una economía moderna, la industrialización acelerada de la región y sobre todo, la

¹⁸ En la década de los 90 también surgieron movimientos neopopulistas, si bien lo hicieron en otro contexto y como reacción a la ingerencia del FMI en la región. Entre los líderes de estos nuevos populismos, destacan: Abdalá Bucaram Ortiz en Ecuador (1996–1997), Alberto Fujimori en Perú (1990–2000), Carlos Ménem en Argentina (1989–1999), Fernando Collor en Brasil (1990–1992), Hugo Chávez en Venezuela (1999–2013)

¹⁹ Los Presidentes populistas que gobernaron la región durante el período que se está trabajando son: Lázaro Cárdenas en México (1934–1940), Getulio Vargas en Brasil (1930–1945 y 1950–1954), Víctor Paz Estenssoro en Bolivia (1952–1956), José María Velasco en Ecuador (1935–1956) y Juan Domingo Perón en Argentina (1946–1955).

²⁰ Para más información sobre el populismo económico, consultar Dornbusch – Edwards que identifican cuatro fases en las que ponen en evidencia las principales medidas implementadas por los gobiernos populistas y las causas de su fracaso. R. Dornbusch – S. Edwards: *The macroeconomics of populismo en Latin America*, 1991.

introducción del elemento urbano en la ecuación social, modifican esta estructura. De esta forma, el desarrollo de este nuevo modelo económico permite el surgimiento de nuevos sectores sociales, como la incipiente clase media urbana por un lado, que evoluciona en torno a las pequeñas y medianas industrias heredadas del sector artesanal, incentivada a su vez por la llegada de emigrantes europeos y la población rural nacional, y por otro, una nueva capa social asalariada gestada en la necesidad de mano de obra (principalmente en el caso de Argentina).

De este modo, aparecen nuevos actores públicos, impulsados por los movimientos políticos de corte proletario y centrados principalmente en el movimiento sindical. Con la aparición de los primeros movimientos de masas, en países como México, Brasil y Argentina surgen las primeras reclamaciones de derechos y la demanda de la intervención del Estado para garantizar las nuevas transformaciones sociales solicitadas. Así por ejemplo, en el caso de Brasil, la Constitución de 1934 incluye por primera vez, un capítulo dedicado al "orden económico y social", en el que se establecía expresamente la intervención del Estado en materia económica y social²¹ o la promulgación del Código del Trabajo en 1941, en el que se reconoce la jornada laboral de ocho horas y se regula el trabajo infantil y femenino, entre otros aspectos.

CONCLUSIONES

La dificultad de tratar la noción de la identidad nacional en América Latina ha obligado a generalizar ciertas cuestiones, obviando las particularidades y la evolución de los distintos países en el tumultuoso siglo XX. Por esta razón y para acotar el análisis, el trabajo se ha centrado principalmente en los países que adoptaron la industrialización nacional como proceso de desarrollo y motor transformador, analizando las consecuencias de la modernización industrial en las transformaciones sociales.

Teniendo en cuenta lo expuesto en este trabajo, ¿Cuáles son las principales repercusiones de la modernidad política que vivieron los seis países que impulsaron el desarrollo interior a partir de los años 30? La consecuencia de mayor alcance fue el progresivo aumento de la presencia del Estado y por ende, el desarrollo de la organización burocrática y administrativa (necesaria para implementar las políticas públicas adoptadas) y el incremento y afianzamiento del marco legal ("imperio de la ley"). Asimismo, se reconocieron nuevos derechos civiles y políticos orientados a defender e incluir a todas las

²¹ Los puntos más destacados recogidos en este capítulo son: nacionalización de la explotación de las riquezas mineras, participación en la implementación de industrias estratégicas para el desarrollo del país y reconocimiento del Estado como garante regulador del mercado de trabajo y de los derechos sociales.

esferas del nuevo tejido social, posibilitando la movilidad social en el nuevo sistema socioeconómico y el surgimiento de nuevos sujetos políticos y con ellos nuevas formas de hacer política.

Como queda patente en el texto, es la voluntad de abandonar el papel de abastecedores de materias primas y acabar con la dependencia económica, lo que impulsa el proceso hacia la modernidad de América Latina.

Como se ha podido observar en el texto, la identidad nacional se construye en torno al Estado²², cuya voluntad es homogeneizar procesos culturales y políticos. Los discursos aglutinadores, como el de los populismos que han jalonado América Latina durante todo el siglo XX, han buscado la creación de una identidad nacional, haciendo del Estado el referente identitario de una sociedad en plena transformación. El Estado-nación, se convierte en el valedor de una nueva identidad inclusiva, que ha de englobar a las nuevas capas sociales, cada vez más interesadas en acabar con el sistema conservador heredado de la relación metrópolis-colonia, dando respuesta a su vez a la evolución modernizadora de todo el sistema.

Si bien finalmente este sistema fracasó en los años 70 con la aparición de regímenes dictatoriales y guerras civiles en prácticamente toda la región, no se puede obviar que supuso un revulsivo e impulsó un proceso modernizador que cambió el concepto de identidad de forma definitiva. A partir de ese momento, América Latina tomó conciencia de sus particularidades y de la necesidad de definir una identidad propia, alejada de la tradición europea. Se trata de optar por una perspectiva no-eurocéntrica de la modernidad y de la identidad, adecuándola a la realidad latinoamericana²³.

Y esta es precisamente la gran revolución de este período, el afianzamiento de una identidad nacional propia, particular, producto de la historia de América Latina. Siendo esta toma de conciencia de la especificidad de la región y de los países que la integran, el eje conductor de las posteriores revoluciones políticas y sociales. El reconocimiento del valor del mestizaje como definitivo de la cultura brasileña o la institucionalización del indigenismo en México, entre otras, son un ejemplo de las múltiples consecuencias de este período. América Latina aprovechó la necesidad de replantear su papel en la economía mundial, para buscar y crear un imaginario cultural alejado del eurocentrismo que había heredado de las relaciones coloniales²⁴.

²² Muchos son los autores que han destacado los aspectos negativos de este proceso de construcción de la modernidad en América Latina, y han criticado el papel del Estado nacional, como J. F. Lyotard: *La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir*, Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1979.

²³ E. Deves: *El pensamiento latinoamericano en el siglo XX. Entre la modernización y la identidad*, Buenos Aires, Biblos, 2000.

²⁴ E. Lander: *La colonialidad del saber: eurocentrismo y ciencias sociales, perspectivas latinoamericanas*, Buenos Aires, Clacso, 2003.

Más allá del fracaso pragmático de este período, principalmente en lo económico, que se saldó con un fin de siglo convulso (dictaduras y guerras civiles en los años 70 y 80, la ingerencia del FMI en los años 80 y la implementación de un neoliberalismo a ultranza en la región, la crisis de la deuda externa, el surgimiento de los neopopulismos en los años 90, etc.), hay que reconocer la importancia de este período de 30 años por lo que ha supuesto para la cultura y la identidad latinoamericana²⁵.

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²⁵ Couffignal: *Op.Cit.*

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II. SOUTHERN EUROPE

NATIONALISM AND NATION-BUILDING IN SPAIN (1875–1939)



JAVIER MORENO LUZÓN

ABSTRACT

In the last decades, historiography on nationalism in Modern Spain has been drastically transformed. A melancholic view of the nation-building process, focused on its deficiencies and failures, has been replaced by more accurate, balanced and complex arguments, and the Spanish case has been put into a broad European context. Two competing versions of Spanish nationalism were at stake during this crucial period (1875–1939): the liberal-democratic one and the Catholic and conservative one. This conflict grew through different political regimes during the interwar European crisis – a constitutional monarchy, a military dictatorship and a democratic republic – and led to a Civil War in 1936–39, won by National-Catholic forces. Meanwhile, alternative nationalist movements developed in Catalonia and the Basque Country, provoking diverse responses from the Spanish state. The principal one consisted of a huge effort on nation-building policies. As in other European countries, the authoritarian right was based in strongly nationalist discourses and practices. The repressive actions against Catalan and Basque nationalisms did not work, but, by the Civil War years, most of the population was ‘nationalized’, in one way or another.

Keywords: Spain, nationalism, nation-building, liberalism, dictatorship, Civil War.

This paper will focus, in general terms, on nationalism and national construction in Spain in the crucial period that ran from 1875 to 1939. That is, between the establishment of a constitutional monarchy that temporarily

ended the political instability habitual for most of the 19th century, at one end, and the civil war that was the culmination of a new era of instability and political conflict in the 1920s and 1930s at the other. In this period we can see that Spain was experiencing many political and cultural problems similar to those seen in other parts of the world, in Europe and the Americas, so that it is especially useful to integrate the Spanish case into a global, comparative vision of these processes. In addition, Spain's nationalist movements were influenced by what was happening in other countries, such as, for example, Hungary. As Anne-Marie Thiesse has pointed out, there is nothing more international than the formation of national identities.¹ I shall highlight the principal features of a state nationalism, Spanish nationalism, and of its rivals in the sub-state nationalisms of Catalonia and the Basque Country, as well as, in addition, the multiple projects and efforts that arose to 'nationalize' ordinary citizens, stimulate national feeling and create alternative national imaginaries, and the clashes that occurred between different nationalist discourses and practices.

The historiography on nationalisms in Spain has experienced an upward curve, from a low level of interest to one much greater. Up to the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, Spanish nationalism was given scarcely any attention by historians. The Catalan and Basque nationalist movements, in contrast, had attracted a great many studies. This was an academic reflection of the dominant climate in the transition from the Franco dictatorship to the current democracy. Spanish nationalism was associated with the dictatorship, while the nationalist movements around Spain's periphery formed part of the opposition to Franco; hence, when the dictator died in 1975 there was a real feeling of a fresh spring for these peoples, who celebrated their national identities in opposition to a Spanish one, reasserted their own myths and symbols and sought to find their origins in history. They even went so far as to place the existence of Spain as a nation in doubt.

After democracy had been consolidated, historians began to give attention to Spanish nationalism. At this time a highly influential thesis became widespread on the dynamic between nationalisms in contemporary Spain: the so-called thesis of 'weak nationalization'. According to its proponents, the inefficacy of the State and the lack of interest in this area shown by the ruling elites, opposed as they were to democratic participation by the people, had created a vacuum in the 'nationalization' and development of national identity among ordinary citizens which, in the transition from the 19th to the 20th centuries, was exploited by Catalan and Basque nationalists to develop their own political

¹ Anne-Marie Thiesse: "Les identités nationales, un paradigme transnational", in Alain Dieckhoff – Christophe Jaffrelot (dirs.): *Repenser le nationalisme: Théories et pratiques*, Paris, Sciences Po, 2006, 193–226.

movements.² In reality this thesis formed part of the dominant narrative within Spanish historiography at the time, what Santos Juliá has called the paradigm of failure: this narrative asserted that the Spanish case was exceptional, because it stood apart from the European norm in all the great processes of modernity, such as industrialization or the passage from liberalism to democracy.³ On this point in particular, this narrative of failure focussed on the process of Spanish national identity construction, which had failed by comparison with those of other countries considered to be successful, above all France. Overall, these ideas advanced the spread of a melancholy view of history, which noted failings more than achievements and the specific facts of each situation.

In the last fifteen years this panorama has changed substantially. The integration of Spanish historians into international networks for the study of nationalism and national identities has facilitated comparisons with other national examples, above all in Europe, and undermined the idea of Spanish exceptionalism. At the same time, the French case has been demythologized, and the existence of a supposedly general norm, from which Spain stood apart, has been discarded. A great many different discourses and expressions of Spanish nationalism have been analysed, which emerged very strongly from the 19th century onwards. It has been possible to demonstrate the enormous complexity of the mechanisms of nationalization, from the top down but also from the bottom up, originating not only in the state but also in civil society, and at all times open-ended and in constant evolution. The importance has also been underlined of regionalisms as forms of Spanish nationalism, and not just as embryos of the alternative nationalisms of Catalonia, the Basques or even Galicia. And in conclusion, the idea of failure has been disproved, or at least relativized, and Spain has been identified as one of the countries that, in contrast to many others in Europe, did manage to construct and sustain a nation-state in the contemporary era. A nation-state that was disputed and problematic, with deficiencies and aspects that lagged behind other countries, but one that lasted. That is to say, the old melancholy has disappeared.⁴

This aside, in the modern historiography of Spanish nationalism up to the present day, modernist approaches have also come to predominate over the ‘primordialist’ or ‘perennialist’ ones. That is, the majority of historians look upon national construction as a modern phenomenon, and only a few argue that the Spanish nation has existed ever since the Middle Ages or the

² Fernando Molina – Miguel Cabo Villaverde: *An Inconvenient Nation: Nation-Building and National Identity in Modern Spain. The Historiographical Debate*, in Maarten Van Ginderachter – Marnix Beyen (eds.): *Nationhood from Below: Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 47–72.

³ Santos Juliá: *Anomalía, dolor y fracaso de España*, *Claves de Razón Práctica*, Vol. 66, 1996, 10–21.

⁴ Javier Moreno Luzón – Xosé M. Núñez Seixas (eds.): *Metaphors of Spain: Representations of Spanish National Identity in the 20th century*, New York–Oxford, Berghahn, 2017.

15th century. Catalan historiography, in contrast, has been dominated by perennialism. In this context the period from 1875 to 1939 becomes crucial for the development of nationalisms and national construction in Spain. In this period Spain was initially under a constitutional monarchy, up to 1923, then under a Spanish-nationalist military dictatorship, between 1923 and 1930, then under a democratic republic, from 1931, and then finally went through the Civil War, from 1936 to 1939.

As José Álvarez-Junco has argued, two distinct versions of Spanish nationalism emerged in the course of the nineteenth century, which were consolidated in the 1870s. The mutual confrontation between them marked Spanish history from then onwards.⁵ On the one hand, there was a civic and patriotic vision in the French revolutionary style, advocated by liberal democratic sectors. The nucleus of this idea was the concept of the people, commonly confused with that of the nation, a people that was virtuous in the face of wicked elites. This vision's historic myths spoke of this people's love of liberty; demonstrated against tyrants, as in the sixteenth-century rebellions against the Habsburg monarchs, and against foreign invaders, from ancient times to the conflict known in Spain as the 'War of Independence' against the armies of Napoleon. The first Spanish Constitution, issued in 1812, and the liberal Generals who had defended it against absolutism completed this account. This nationalism acquired its own special symbols, such as the song the *Himno de Riego* or Riego Hymn, dedicated to one of these officers and the Spanish equivalent of the *Marseillaise*, which would become the national anthem of the republic founded in 1931.

On the other hand, there was a nationalism that was conservative, religiously-based and Catholic, more cultural than civic, and which identified the nation with the Church and considered that no one could be Spanish who was not a Catholic. It was in parallel with other nationalisms such as those of Poland, Ireland or Croatia. Its mythologized narratives emphasized the Christian reconquest of the national territory from the Muslims in the Middle Ages, the Catholic Counter-Reformation against Protestantism and the Evangelization of the Americas. These formulas were expanded upon in the final decades of the nineteenth century, aided by the protection given under the monarchy to the religious orders dedicated to education.

With regard to Spanish national construction, a number of important elements stand out in the last quarter of the 19th century. A number of generally-accepted and virtually undisputed symbols had become consolidated, such as the red and yellow national flag, which was deployed in very diverse contexts, from the theatre to social protests. Greater difficulties

⁵ José Álvarez-Junco: *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2011.

arose with an official national anthem: in opposition to the revolutionary anthem already mentioned the *Marcha Real* or 'Royal March' was imposed, a military march like the *Marcia Reale* in unified Italy. It had no words, and so it was difficult for the population to connect with it emotionally. It was the music of the king and of religion, since it was played during Masses and other solemn events, and had to be heard standing and in silence, a good representation of Spanish monarchist conservatism. Equally, popular nationalism was expressed in mass demonstrations and by other similar means on the occasion of various colonial crises. Spain did not take part in any foreign wars with other European powers, which affected its national construction, since there can be no doubting the influence such wars had in the consolidation of national identities in Europe and the Americas. However, the Spanish army did undertake campaigns in the Caribbean, the Pacific and North Africa, which encouraged a street-level patriotism that was viewed negatively and even repressed by the authorities.

At the same time a body of national imagery was created and disseminated around the first nationalistic patriotic commemorations, in the same manner as one saw in other European countries during the same decades, and international instruments were made use of to help create national pride and sentiment, such as the Universal Exhibition in Barcelona in 1888. Regionalisms, which were increasingly cultivated in this period, also customarily served to reinforce Spanish identity at a local level, as was similarly the case in the contemporary France of the *petites patries* or the Germany of the *Heimat*. Simultaneously, however, other instruments that were at the disposal of the state for the advancement of 'nationalization' and national identification exhibited serious deficiencies. The army was based upon a class-based system of recruitment, through which the sons of the upper classes could free themselves from the obligation of military service by paying a sum of money. Public education similarly suffered from an accumulation of major failings, with levels of illiteracy close to 60 per cent in 1900. Only in the last decade of the previous century had policies begin to be formulated that aimed at turning schools into incubators of patriots, as in France or Italy.

It was also at the end of the 19th century that a phenomenon arose of crucial importance for the evolution of the national question in contemporary Spain: the emergence of alternative nationalist movements in regions such as the Basque Country and Catalonia. We may ask why these nationalisms appeared, in which case we need to add to the insufficiencies of Spanish nationalization other factors, such as the rapid industrialization of these regions, the richest in the country, their rejection of the intensification of the measures intended to reinforce Spanish national identification, and the fragility of the Spanish state as demonstrated by its defeat in colonial war at the hands of the United States in 1898, which led to the loss of the remaining traces of the Spanish

Empire. As tends to be the case with the modernist school of analysis, we must attribute a leading role in these movements to local elites who were seeking to emancipate themselves from Spanish centralist control.

This was an era of cultural nationalism across Europe, and these sub-state movements adopted features of the German model, such as the emphasis on language. Both Basques and Catalans developed nostalgic discourses of a golden age in which their peoples were free, a subsequent fall into decadence provoked by Spanish oppression and the necessity of recovering their lost greatness. Both movements were based on powerful links with civil society, through cultural and recreational associations. Both likewise created their own national symbols, adapting pre-existing heraldry and songs in the Catalan case or, in the Basque example, creating completely new ones.⁶

Nevertheless, there were important differences between the Basque and Catalan nationalists. The Basques insisted on the importance of religion – as did Spanish Catholic nationalism – and race, understood as family lineage and measured by the number of Basque surnames each person could trace in their family history. In effect, Basque nationalism was a reaction against the arrival of Castilian immigrants to work in the region's industries, and xenophobic in character, and only in the second place did it defend the Basque language, *Euskera*. The Catalans, in contrast, placed their emphasis on history – in memories of the grievances Castile had caused them centuries ago, which gave rise to Catalan National Day, in memory of a defeat in the 18th century – and above all on language: the Catalan language and the literature written in it, revived in a cultural renaissance that had preceded the nationalist movement, and which became their principal symbol of identity. In this case, regionalism developed into nationalism.

In addition there was one notable significant difference in the political sphere between Basque and Catalan nationalisms: the Basque movement was from the beginning separatist, seeking independence, and wished to know nothing of Spain, while Catalan nationalism was compatible with some form of political autonomy within the Spanish state, and the Catalan nationalists even had projects for Spain as a whole. Spain could become a confederal and multinational state, in their view, in which Catalonia would see its special characteristics recognized. Their model was the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the same period, in which Catalonia could take the role of Hungary, united with Castile in a state that shared some common functions, and above all the crown as a symbol. For, if the Emperor of Austria was also King of Hungary, the King of Spain was at the same time Count of Barcelona. While Basque nationalism was above all Catholic and highly conservative, within

⁶ Javier Moreno Luzón – Xosé M. Núñez Seixas: *Los colores de la patria: Símbolos nacionales en la España contemporánea*, Madrid, Tecnos, 2017.

Catalan nationalism, albeit that it was initially dominated by sectors from the right, a republican, federalist left emerged. Moreover, though it might seem hard to believe today, until a few years ago proponents of complete independence were a minority within Catalan nationalism.

An event of vital importance in the development of nationalisms in Spain was the defeat of 1898, which unleashed a real crisis of national identity and became known simply as *el Desastre*, the Disaster. While other empires were growing, Spain lost its own. From that point on, the Catalan nationalists won major electoral successes, like the Czechs in the Austrian Empire, and succeeded in negotiating with central governments to obtain practical benefits. Thus, in 1914 the *Mancomunitat*, the first joint regional institution covering all the four Catalan provinces, was created, dedicated to cultural and social fields, and which employed the Catalan language and set about building the nation. Within the Spanish ruling elite there were some figures who were particularly sensitive to the need to integrate Catalanism.

At the same time, however, Spanish nationalism was also reinforced to an extraordinary degree during these years, with a proliferation of projects intended to revive the country after the 'Disaster'. This 'regenerationism' also incorporated a strong cultural element, since it placed the Castilian or Spanish language at the centre of national identity, the only one that could be permitted in public administration and in schools. Like other nationalisms, such as Catalanism, it sought to find the national genius or *volksgeist* in language. Spain also had its national writer, like Dante in Italy, Schiller in Germany or Camões in Portugal: Miguel de Cervantes, author of *Don Quijote de la Mancha*, considered the finest book in the Castilian language and one of the greatest in universal literature. The three-hundredth anniversary of the publication of *Don Quijote* in 1905 served to consecrate its status as the 'national bible'. *Don Quijote* was the symbol of Spain, and representative of its national values (nobility, idealism and love of justice). The conversion of the Castilian language into a fundamental element of Spanish identity was a symptom of another characteristic of Spanish nationalism: the manner in which it confused Spain as a whole with just one of its regions, Castile, the central plateau of the country, along with its particular history, landscapes and culture, in opposition to other regions with diverse and different cultures.

In the same period, successive governments launched a variety of initiatives to encourage and broaden the 'nationalization' of Spaniards and deepen patriotic feeling. Initiatives such as the promotion of all kinds of nationalistic commemorations – a kind of 'centenary mania' – which, in addition to *Don Quijote*, included the centenary of the 'War of Independence' against Napoleon. This was the great national epic, interpreted as a unanimous uprising of the Spanish people against the French invader, through which each city and each region could venerate its own heroes from the conflict.

In addition one saw the rise of what was known as *Hispanoamericanismo*, 'Hispanic-Americanism', the search in the Spanish-speaking countries of the Americas for a substitute empire to replace the one that had been lost, an idea that exalted the role of Spain as the supposed head of a multinational cultural community, *Hispanoamérica* or *la raza*, 'the race'. This was a movement driven by civil society, and which secured the declaration of 12 October, the anniversary of the Discovery of America by Christopher Columbus in 1492, as Spain's national day, a holiday that has survived under all the different political regimes up to the present day.

With regard to education, the majority of the political and intellectual elites interpreted the 'Disaster' at the hands of the United States in the same way that the French had interpreted their defeat by Prussia in 1871: as the triumph of a more developed country, economically and scientifically, over a backward one. Consequently, one saw a notable new impetus in concern for education and in favour of public education, the better preparation of teachers and an opening to international trends in science. This was an effort in which the leading role was initially taken by the liberal left, in the face of the reticence of Catholics, but which was subsequently taken up and shared by a range of political tendencies, both under the military dictatorship of the 1920s and during the democratic republic of the 1930s. By 1930, illiteracy had fallen to thirty per cent. Whether under one version of Spanish nationalism or the other, schools were required to produce conscious and patriotic citizens, who identified with national symbols like the flag.⁷

Also, in the same manner as in other European states of the time, from Great Britain to Italy, the Spanish monarchy promoted its own fusion with the national identity, by means of royal tours and great ceremonial events such as the coronation and later the wedding of King Alfonso XIII. This was not a case of the construction of a dynastic patriotism on the Austrian model, but of the emergence of a Spanish nationalist monarch, very active in political life, in the style of Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany.

Lastly, one other feature that stood out in the years following the 'Disaster' was the growing presence of the army in the definition and extension of the national identity. Emulating European models, such as the French but above all that of Germany, the military took upon themselves the need to intervene in political life in order to combat the sub-state nationalisms, which they considered separatist, and to create patriots by educating the soldiers who undertook military service, which was made compulsory in 1912, and promoting the militarization of children and young people through 'children's

⁷ Javier Moreno Luzón – Xosé M. Núñez Seixas: *Los colores de la patria*.

battalions' and organizations like the boy scouts. They also encouraged a fresh colonial war in Morocco, which brought with it renewed nationalistic campaigns but also new disasters, which made it unpopular.

The First World War represented an important leap forward in the development of nationalisms, in Spain as in the whole of Europe. The victory of the Allies led to the dissolution of great multinational empires like Austria-Hungary and the application of the principle of national self-determination. Although Spain had remained neutral in the war, it suffered its impact very intensely. It did not fragment, nor did it experience a process of separation in the post-war period comparable to the bloody conflict in Ireland. However, for the Basque and Catalan nationalists the war did represent an opportunity to demand at least a statute of autonomy – and in the case of the Basques, the recovery of their old *fueros* or traditional laws – within the Spanish state. These campaigns failed due to the intensification of social conflicts. However, in the face of both these social conflicts and the sub-state nationalist agitation, and as was the case in a great many European countries in the interwar period, from Poland to Portugal, Spain also witnessed a growth in authoritarian tendencies. Political intervention by the army, supported by the Church and above all the King, led eventually to the first military dictatorship in twentieth-century Spain, that of General Primo de Rivera, from 1923 to 1930.⁸

The Primo dictatorship proposed to culminate Spanish national identity construction by means of two complementary policies. First, there was the persecution of any manifestation of non-Spanish nationalism, which centred on persecuting Catalan national identity, the most vigorous of the sub-state identities. Not only Catalan nationalist parties but also Catalan symbols and the language were prohibited, which, far from doing away with them, made Catalan sentiment stronger and more resistant. This was what Alejandro Quiroga has called 'negative nationalization'. Secondly, but with equal vigour, there was a multiplication of Spanish nationalist initiatives in schools, in the army, or in continual demonstrations of support for the dictator and the King, as in, for example, the celebrations of victory in the war in Morocco.⁹ There were also major international exhibitions which showed off the greatness of Spain and its links with the Americas, in Barcelona and Seville in 1929.

This dictatorship adopted as its official doctrine a Catholic Spanish nationalism that was counter-revolutionary, anti-democratic and centralist. It could not be described as fascist but had a great influence on the subsequent dictatorship of General Franco. One can find certain parallels with the

⁸ Javier Moreno Luzón: *Modernizing the Nation: Spain during the Reign of Alfonso XIII, 1902–1931*, Brighton, Sussex Academic Press, 2012.

⁹ Alejandro Quiroga: *Making Spaniards: Primo de Rivera and the Nationalization of the Masses, 1923–30*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

regime of Admiral Horthy in Hungary, although in Spain the Constitution was suspended, only one official party was permitted and no parliamentary elections were held. Inevitably, the dictatorship led to national symbols such as the red and yellow flag, which up to then had been shared by the majority of Spaniards, becoming identified with an authoritarian monarchy, and so rejected by democratic forces.

The fall of this dictatorship also signified the fall of the monarchy, and the proclamation in 1931 of a democratic republic. On the one hand this promoted the other variant of Spanish nationalism, civic and democratic, in its schools and national holidays, with its own symbols such as the old liberal hymn the *Himno de Riego* as a new national anthem, and a new national flag of three colours (in the French revolutionary style) incorporating the purple that was associated with Castile and so with the Castilian revolt against the Habsburgs in the 1520s.¹⁰ At the same time it brought a new opportunity for Catalan and Basque nationalists. The Catalan republicans succeeded in getting the Madrid parliament to approve a Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia, under which the Catalan government would take responsibility for education, economic affairs and public order. However, the Basque nationalists, more conservative and opposed to the secular republic, did not achieve their autonomy until the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936, in exchange for supporting the republicans against the military officers who had rebelled against constitutional legality.

In the Civil War one could see demonstrated the depth of nationalization that had been achieved up to that point. For, as Xosé M. Núñez Seixas has underlined, both sides employed mobilizing propaganda that conceived the conflict as a war of independence against foreign invaders. The republicans saw themselves as heirs to the people in arms of 1808, risen up this time against fascism, since Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy both supported the army that had rebelled against the Republic. While the insurgents headed by General Franco considered themselves the heirs to imperial and Catholic Spain struggling against the enemies of religion, and above all international Communism, since the Soviet Union was the principal external source of support for the Republic. As we all know, Franco's side, which called itself the 'national' side, won, and with this victory fierce repression was unleashed against leftists and Catalan and Basque nationalists, and the conservative, Catholic and militarist version of Spanish nationalism imposed from above.¹¹

¹⁰ Sandie Holguín: *Creating Spaniards: Culture and National Identity in Republican Spain*, Madison, Wisconsin University Press, 2002.

¹¹ Xosé M. Núñez Seixas: Nations in Arms against the Invader: On nationalist discourses during the Spanish Civil War, in Chris Ealham – Michael Richards (eds.): *The Splintering of Spain: Cultural History and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 45–67.

From all we have said up to this point we can draw certain conclusions. Spain was not isolated, but instead was influenced by a variety of international trends, and above all European models, in its national identity construction during the 19th century, in the intensification of these processes at the beginning of the 20th century and in the many conflicts that developed in the interwar period. It is, then, not an exceptional case in the European context but one more among a very varied body of national examples. By the 1930s, the majority of the Spanish population were ‘nationalized’ in terms of identification with the nation, although internal divisions, as demonstrated by the range of potential alternative national symbols, were profound: between Spanish nationalists of different tendencies (such as civic republican liberalism and Catholic nationalism), and between state nationalists and sub-state nationalists, especially in Catalonia and the Basque Country. To quote the subsequent words of Juan J. Linz, one could say that Spain was “a state for all Spaniards, a nation-state for a large part of the population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities”.¹²

The Spanish case demonstrates that in studying processes of national identity construction one has to take into account, alongside the actions of the state, the actions of civil society. Equally, too, it shows us the way in which nationalization can follow an oscillating path, and sometimes turn back on itself, and the way that nationalization does not necessarily mean homogeneity, but can signify something more complex, within which different national and regional identities co-exist.

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¹² Juan J. Linz: Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalisms against the State: the Case of Spain, in S.N. Eisenstadt – Stein Rokkan (eds.): *Building States and Nations. Analyses by Region*, Beverly, Sage, 1973, 31–116, quoted from 99.

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STATE BUILDING AND NATIONAL IDENTITY. CENTRE-PERIPHERY RELATIONS IN SPAIN (1876–1945)

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JULIO PONCE ALBERCA

ABSTRACT

The 19th-century state-building process is well known, and the role played in the process by the development of national identities is likewise recognised. Many cases reflect the existence of some kind of national identity predating statehood, mainly based on language, traditions and customs originating in years of life in common. Yet there is no doubting the key role of the state in forging the cohesion of national communities. The successful effects of such action can be verified in states in which a sense of national pride was instilled in most of the population (Britain and its empire). Yet similar feelings were present in other countries despite less-than-satisfactory state-building processes. In this paper we aim to analyse the case of Spain to verify whether the state-building process (and its local administration) fostered the emergence of national identities at the regional level.

Keywords: *state-building, nation, identity, Spain, 19th and 20th century history*

INTRODUCTION

There can be little doubt that the concept of ‘nation’ is hugely important to a number of social sciences, as shown by even a cursory glance at the vast literature concerning nation building, national sentiment, purported identities resulting from membership in a given community (or ‘nation’) or the proliferation of nationalist movements. Historical studies have been particularly fertile in this area, among other reasons because any nationalism worth its salt rests on an *ad hoc* interpretation of a community’s past to justify its present and future ambitions. Spain is no exception to this trend. A search of the Spanish ISBN database yields hundreds of titles including

the terms 'Spain' and 'nation'. Titles in this vein have experienced significant growth since the 1980s, as the division of the country into Autonomous Regions spread to the whole of its territory. At the same time, recent decades have witnessed the development and growth of regional studies – linked to the establishment of the State of the Autonomies – giving rise to veritable 'national histories' in the case of peripheral nationalist movements (Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia, etc)¹.

Both the existence of a nation identified with the borders of a state and the presence of national sentiment at the local or regional level (i.e., a sub-state level) tend to be grounded in real or imaginary cultural and historical elements configuring a common identity developed through time and space. Language, customs, common historical experience, tradition and historical rights are some of the salient elements in the construction of national sentiment reflected in a 'collective psychology'. However, the concept of 'nation' implies a purported unity – in other words, it takes it for granted that *all* members of a community share the same sense of identity regarding a given territory. Though seen as indisputable in the nationalist worldview, this is no more than an unwarranted assumption. The existence of non-nationalist groups in societies considered to have nationalist majorities is well documented, as Juan Pablo Fusi has shown². Especially in an increasingly globalised world in which growing mobility intensifies shared identities, this remains true despite the assumption that a nation involves *total* community identification, no exceptions made.

Yet nationalism represents more than an ideal and idealized construction of a community³. As an ideology, its end goal is statehood. Despite its emphasis on culture (language, tradition, history), a nation amounts to little without the existence of a corresponding state, that is, a sovereign political structure (self-government) and an institutional framework for the management and distribution of resources (administration). It is thus little wonder that nations have sought to become nation-states, organizing their territory, passing laws, creating citizens and forging systems for internal and external defense (police and military forces). All this, of course, is made possible through taxation to

¹ This can be verified using the data base of books published in Spain: http://www.mcu.es/web/ISBN/tituloSimpleFilter.do?cache=init&prev_layout=busquedaisbn&layout=busquedaisbn&language=es.

² Juan Pablo Fusi: *Identidades proscritas. El no nacionalismo en las sociedades nacionalistas*, Barcelona, Seix Barral, 2006.

³ A good summary of the development of nationalist historiography since the late nineteenth century can be found in: Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzón: *Evolución y rasgos de las historiografías de los nacionalismos en España*, in C. Rina Simón (ed.): *Procesos de nacionalización e identidades en la Península Ibérica*, Cáceres, Universidad de Extremadura, 2017, 50–57.

allow the state to devote the necessary resources to each area. In other words, a state of its own is what grants power to a community, and particularly to its elites.

Given the importance of the state, what we intend to explore in this paper is its role in shaping national identity. Even if we concede the existence of nations predating statehood (an issue we shall not explore here), what we seek to examine is whether national identities evolve as a result of state action. This is not to imply, obviously, that states are the sole agent generating such identities. We hope only to show how the state can influence their emergence or consolidation. Our hypothesis, then, is that an effective and efficient state, capable of providing citizens with goods and services, *tends* to increase feelings of identification with the community it serves and administers. In the case of Spain, the hypothesis can be reformulated in reverse, that is, that the ineffectiveness and lack of efficiency of a deficient centralized state (resulting from a problematic nineteenth-century state-building process) fostered a Spanish national identity which was both weak and laden with peripheral exceptions. States, to be sure, are not the sole creators of national identity; what we intend is to examine whether the state – in this case, the Spanish one – plays a significant role in generating identities.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE STATE IN SPAIN

During the Spanish transition to democracy, peripheral nationalist movements (in Catalonia and the Basque Country) reclaimed centre-stage after decades of dictatorship. In their view, Spain was no more than a state exercising sovereignty over a conglomerate of nations which, in practice, reflected regional divisions along the borders created by the 1833 partitioning of the country into provinces. From this perspective, Spain was not itself a nation, but merely a superimposed political and administrative structure. Starting in 1977, this position was laid out in the speeches in *Cortes* of Basque and Catalan nationalist leaders, implicitly suggesting that Spaniards as a group lacked national identity, as Spain was no more than a state. It likewise followed that there was nothing good to be said regarding a state that oppressed, taxed and *occupied* these territories (particularly the Basque Country) while offering nothing in return. References to the Spanish state were akin to a list of grievances, fueling feelings of victimhood at the hands of 'the other'⁴.

⁴ José Antonio Rubio Caballero: La visión de España a través del discurso nacionalista durante la transición, *Norba. Revista de Historia*, Vol. 19, 2006, 231–258.

This view entailed certain contradictions, as the deficiencies of the Spanish state were not in fact especially intense in regions as advanced and industrialized as Catalonia and the Basque Country. Rather, the administration faced large problems throughout the entire country, and especially at the local level. In the seventies, local councils not only remained unrepresentative bodies, but were also nowhere near being able to satisfy citizens' need for public services⁵. Nor had the administrative reforms of the fifties and sixties led to any significant degree of satisfaction⁶. Nowadays, we are better able to examine precisely how Spanish citizens view the administration thanks to the Spanish Agency for the Evaluation of Public Policies (*Agencia Estatal de Evaluación y Calidad*), the Centre for Sociological Research (*Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas*) or think-tanks such as the Elcano Royal Institute⁷. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the period we hope to examine. This requires us to turn to two key written sources, namely the press and books published on the topic. A combination of the two provides an insight into Spaniards' perceptions regarding the functioning of state institutions.

The vicissitudes of the nineteenth-century Spanish state-building process are well known, and they left a serious imprint on the following century⁸. Not only was the resulting administrative structure weak – additionally, the lack of political stability hindered any consolidation of the political regime until at least the Cánovas Restoration of 1876. To be sure, the state had a healthy number of civil servants and was to some extent comparable to its European counterparts⁹, but it was no less evident that its action was uneven in its effectiveness and intensity, its presence more tenuous in certain areas of the country's complex geography.

⁵ Antonio Martínez Marín: *La representatividad municipal española: historia legislativa y régimen vigente*, Murcia, Universidad, 1989.

⁶ Luis Fernando Crespo Montes: *Las reformas de la administración española, 1957–1967*, Madrid, CEPC, 2000.

⁷ Regarding the Elcano Royal Institute:

http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/demografia+y+poblacion/ari50-2016-gonzalez-enriquez-declive-identidad-nacional-espanola, See also: Eloísa Del Pino Matute (ed.): *La Administración Pública a juicio de los ciudadanos: Satisfacción con los servicios, valoración del gasto, confianza en los empleados públicos y actitudes hacia la e-administración*, Madrid, Agencia Estatal de Evaluación de las Políticas Públicas y la Calidad de los Servicios, 2011, 11; Eloísa Del Pino: *Los ciudadanos y el estado. Las actitudes de los españoles hacia las administraciones y las políticas públicas*, Madrid, INAP, 2004; Antonio Embid Irujo: *El ciudadano y la Administración*, Madrid, MAP, 1996.

⁸ José Álvarez Junco: *Mater Dolorosa. La idea de España en el siglo XIX*, Madrid, Taurus, 2001; Sobre los procesos de nacionalización en España, in Javier Moreno Luzón (ed.): *Construir España. Nacionalismo español y procesos de nacionalización*, Madrid, CEPC, 2007.

⁹ Manuel Santirso: *Progreso y Libertad. España en la Europa liberal (1830–1870)*, Barcelona, Ariel, 2007.

The difficulties inherent in building a liberal state in a country that had lost a vast empire in the nineteenth century and hardly retained any international weight were not minor. Grappling with that past was not the best ingredient for the forging of a solid national identity – and nor were the country's present or its uncertain future¹⁰. The century had started with a terrible war against the French (War of Independence, 1808–1814) and it ended with the loss of the last remaining colonies – Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines – to the United States. Violence was commonplace and the liberal state created a militarized security force, the *Guardia Civil* (1844). A centralized structure, modeled on the French template, subjected local institutions to central control along a clear hierarchy, at the bottom of which were local councils (*ayuntamientos*), followed by provincial councils (*diputaciones*) presided over by civil governors (delegates of the central government in each province). This province-based structure essentially remained unaltered after 1833, except for the division of the Canary Islands into two provinces in 1927, which brought their total number up from 49 to 50.

The politization of the administration and the absence of professional criteria in the recruitment of public servants were other salient traits of the Spanish state. Personal trust was the route to selection and promotion in any sector, and supporters of a political boss or faction could expect favours and privileges while strict application of rule of law was reserved for adversaries. In such a world, it is little wonder that the most distinguished public servants – including those in the military – sought to make their prerogatives ironclad. Identification with a corps was much more intense than any sense of belonging to a state marked by constant legislative transformations, sudden political shifts and even frequent regime change. A case in point was the institution of seniority-based promotion for Artillery Corps officers, guaranteeing promotions based on length of service rather than a merit-based system which could easily pave the way for outright favouritism¹¹. Another instance of this was the civil governors' 1901–1902 campaign in support, among other causes, of the professional promotion of those who had held public office throughout their career (in particular, those who had been civil governors)¹².

Ortega y Gasset aptly characterized the situation of a state in which every body of public servants fought above all to defend their group interest with little concern for those of other bodies or for the nation's general interest.

¹⁰ Regarding the relationship between the past and the construction of national identity, see: Carolyn P. Boyd: *Historia Patria: Politics, History, and National Identity in Spain, 1875–1975*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997.

¹¹ New officers in the Academy of Artillery had to sign collective commitment to this minority-based promotion system (*escala cerrada*): Antonio Cerdón: *Trayectoria. Recuerdos de un artillero*, Sevilla, Espuela de Plata, 2008 [1971], 125.

¹² Juan Madariaga y Suárez (conde de Torre Vélez): *Nuevo régimen local: (campana de los ex gobernadores en 1901–1902)*, Madrid, Asilo de Huérfanos del S.C. de Jesús, 1902.

In his eyes, Spain lacked more than direction – its insides were actually those of an invertebrate organism¹³. In its most extreme manifestation, this corporatism led to the establishment of the so-called *Juntas de Defensa* (created in 1916 and legalized the following year) by mainland officers, wary of the quick merit-based promotions being earned by officers in Morocco, in defense of their living standards¹⁴.

This was the grim situation of the state in a country which had lost its empire in the nineteenth century and could only fitfully stage a recolonization campaign in Northern Morocco. The open outbreak of hostilities against the Riffian Berbers in 1909 was not settled until 1925, after the Alhucemas landing. In the meantime, Restoration politics and politicians (1876–1923) proved incapable of transforming Spain into a modern nation. The obstacles were too many – institutional corruption, the deliberate rotation in power of the two dynastic parties (Liberal and Conservative), frequent military defeats in the seemingly never ending war in Morocco, the constant interference of the king in the political arena, and so on. Viable solutions were few and far between, establishment parties showing little ability to design appropriate policies amidst opposition from a Left openly espousing a Republican ideal and a Right increasingly looking to the army and a possible military coup as a praetorianist solution to the crisis¹⁵.

It is worth asking just how Spaniards felt about the situation and what the attitude of civil society was regarding the state. Any attempt to answer such questions must first note that Spanish society was in no way characterized by generalized or sustained mobilization against the functioning of the state. There were, to be sure, protests and demonstrations, and these were in fact frequent at certain specific times, but overall the system managed to stay in place for years. Further, the relationship between society and the state in Spain was not very different from that which could be observed in surrounding countries (e.g., Italy or Portugal). Finally, many Spaniards took part in the Restoration system, in its electoral manipulation and systemic irregularities – indeed, the same people who railed against corruption often remained eloquently silent when they were on the receiving end of political favours.

The weakness of Spanish civil society as a national unit is more readily understood in light of the above. While it is true that both Republicanism

¹³ There are numerous editions of Ortega's books. *Invertebrate Spain* was first published in Spanish in 1922. We quote here the first edition published in the US: José Ortega y Gasset: *Invertebrate Spain*, New York, Norton, 1937.

¹⁴ Ana Isabel Alonso Ibáñez: *Las Juntas de Defensa militares (1917–1922)*, Madrid, Ministerio de Defensa, 2004.

¹⁵ For a general review of the period, see: Javier Moreno Luzón: Political Clientelism, Elites, and Caciquismo in Restoration Spain (1875–1923), *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 37, 2007, 417–441.

and trade unions grew stronger, outside of these spheres civil society did not coalesce into social actors capable of creating their own national space, independent of the state and public authorities. We share Paloma Radcliff's assessment that twentieth-century Spain shows more elements of a civil society at the local level than at the national one¹⁶. In this arena, three political cultures experienced a considerable development: Republicanism, trade unions and consumer activism (with a growing female presence towards the end of the Restoration period). Even so, these locally-based civil society movements did not lead to true democratization of the country – indeed, the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923–1930) attests to this. The Second Republic also failed to normalize relations between the state and civil society within a democratic framework. The establishment of a new democratizing regime failed due to the persistence of a still relatively weak and deficient state, incapable of adequately channeling the expectations of a society which, though now more mobilized, still lacked a democratic political culture.

THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE STATE UNDER VARIOUS POLITICAL REGIMES

Since 1876 Spain has gone through five different regimes, three constitutions (1876, 1931 and 1978), a constitutional draft (1929), a civil war, two dictatorships – Primo de Rivera's and General Franco's – and the current democratic regime. Yet, interestingly enough, the general structure of the state has undergone no radical changes, with the exception of making allowance for autonomous regions during the Second Republic and in the *Estado de las autonomías* after the 1978 Constitution. In any event, there were few changes before 1978 in terms of administrative culture, civil service mentality or local administrative structure – local councils remained subjected to a strict hierarchy, under the authority of civil governors and following orders stemming from the central government.

From 1876 until at least the 1960s, the state's effectiveness as a provider of goods and services was modest at best, with the exception of Primo de Rivera's dictatorship and its public works policy, based on public credit and debt. To be sure, a key cause of such ineffectiveness lay in the limited resources available to the state in an underdeveloped country. Yet there were other contributing factors, including corruption, irregularities in the functioning of the administration and a perverse inversion in values in which public

¹⁶ Pamela Radcliff: *El estado y la sociedad civil en la España del siglo XX*, Paper presented in the Seminar organized by the Ortega y Gasset Institute, 23 January 2003. See: 23 de enero de 2003: "El Estado y la sociedad civil en la España del siglo XX", por Pamela Radcliff. Comentarista: José Álvarez Junco.

powers were not expected to serve citizens and civil servants were there not to serve the state, but rather to serve themselves from its platter. Signs of this state of affairs abound (particularly as of the crisis of 1898), though we shall only concern ourselves here with a small number of testimonies.

José María Bayton, a civil servant for the Ministry of the Treasury, published a book outlining the deficiencies of the state's fiscal model: not only was legislation on the matter flawed, but it was also abusive "to the obvious detriment of the Treasury, tax-payers and civil servants"¹⁷. One year later, he wrote:

In the higher spheres of the administration; at the summit of the eternal bureaucracy; in the inaccessible regions where luxury flaunts its disdainful provocations and the sadness and vexations of misery are not felt, privileges accumulate and utilitarian rewards are granted by the laws of the state, always harsh towards those dispossessed by fortune and battered by the rigors of human justice, which in application of social convenience is neither just nor humane¹⁸.

The arbitrary nature of a state at the service of the few and their friends was a widely perceived. Schoolteacher Juan Fernández Carrero bitterly decried the failure of the Provincial Council of Álava to pay him what he was owed and the inaction of the central government, which only exercised its authority against the weak¹⁹. The Catholic church was not much more satisfied: the bishop of Jaca, from his rather personal perspective, denounced the purported injustice of the Spanish state towards the clergy, notaries, the armed forces, the press, and others.²⁰ In general, two trends are salient: (1) criticism almost always originated in the opposition party (especially Liberals) or in outsiders to the establishment (Republicans, Socialists, Traditionalists, Catholics, etc.), and (2) the blame was typically placed on politics and politicians, exempting society from responsibility. The most common form of critical analysis rested on a presumed duality between corrupt politicians and the noble long-suffering people; while the former managed the state to their own benefit, the latter remained its servants, be it as civil servants or as mere tax-payers. This view was so ingrained that many clamoured for the disappearance of politicians

¹⁷ José María Bayton: *Errores de la Administración pública*, Madrid, Tip. De F. Nozal, 1898, 207. The book was dedicated to the Traditionalist ex-member of Cortes Damián Isern y Mascó, author of another work of interest to our topic: *Del desastre nacional y sus causas*, Madrid, Imprenta Viuda M. Minuesa de los Ríos, 1899.

¹⁸ José María Bayton: *Apuntes económico-burocráticos*, Madrid, Imprenta de F. Nozal, 1897, 83.

¹⁹ Juan Fernández Carrero: *Don Quijote y Sancho Panza en Vitoria*, Vitoria, Imprenta de los Hijos de Iturbe, 1905, 14.

²⁰ Antolín López Peláez: *Injusticias del Estado español. Labor parlamentaria de un año por el Obispo de Jaca*, Barcelona, Gustavo Gili, 1909.

while civil servants, seen as neutral and upright, should be responsible for everything. There were even proponents of a new, civil-servant-based regime (*funcionarismo*), defined as follows:

That in which, from the prime minister down to the last clerk, everybody is a member of the nation rather than a party, and in which they all cease to have privileges as politicians and become technicians; public servants and nothing other than public servants, irremovable but responsible – truly responsible – for all their actions; not legislating as they do now, by and for themselves in a more or less obvious manner, but rather allowing the people to legislate, through their representatives in congress, without the leadership or intervention of any oligarchs²¹.

Ultimately, the dream of a government made up of technicians implied a call for the disappearance of political parties and the establishment of 'representative' bodies devoid of 'oligarchs'. Not a far cry from Joaquín Costa's 'iron surgeon' or the remedies proposed by Ricardo Macías Picavea²². Political parties were using the administration to their own benefit, patronage characterized the state at the local level, professionalism was not a selection criterion as friendship remained the norm for selecting trusted personnel, and irregularities remained the norm within the system rather than exceptions. Another case in point: in 1908, the Maura government put the reconstruction of the Navy's fleet out to tender, awarding the contract to a company (the Spanish Society for Naval Construction – *Sociedad Española de Construcción Naval*, SECN) which was actually controlled by two British companies, John Brown Co and Vickers-Armstrong. The irregularities involved in the process were denounced by Juan Macías del Real, Lieutenant Colonel of the Navy's judicial corps. The outcome was an honour tribunal expelling Juan Macías from the Navy within 48 hours, together with the dismissal of other high-ranking officers who had voiced their disapproval of the way the contract had been awarded. For years, Vickers-Armstrong remained in control of SECN, managed by Tomás Zubiría Ybarra, a businessman and politician with close

²¹ José Cascales Muñoz: *El problema político al inaugurarse el siglo XX. El regimen parlamentario y el funcionarismo*, Madrid, Librería General Victoriano Suárez, 1902, 3.

²² Joaquín Costa: *Oligarquía y caciquismo como la forma de gobierno actual en España: urgencia y modo de cambiarla*, Madrid, Imprenta de los Hijos de M.G. Hernández, 1902; Ricardo Macías Picavea: *El problema nacional: hechos, causas, remedios*, Madrid, Librería General Victoriano Suárez, 1899.

ties to king Alfonso XIII. Despite the swiftness of the Lieutenant Colonel's dismissal, years later the fleet was still far from being rebuilt, according to senator and Vice-Admiral Víctor Concas y Palau²³.

Given such hatred of 'politicians', it is little wonder that the military started to be seen as a group of truly honest men who could save the country. An anonymous author wrote a book in defence of General Weyler's Cuban campaign, denouncing irregularities in the Defence budget:

In these budgets, changing figures were assigned, decreasing yearly, for the purchase of war material and fortification works, and most of the time they were not used for the purposes they had been assigned for... [so that] only a fraction of what is assigned in official government budgets to such ends has actually been devoted to them²⁴.

While this was happening with the Defence budget, the island of Cuba was being denied the autonomy it clamoured for. In the absence of any reforms and under a fiercely centralized model, the longing for independence grew, as Sabas Catá had warned in 1895²⁵. And the same deficiencies of the state that had fostered such feelings in the colonies fueled the desire for autonomy of areas of Spain with regional peculiarities (Catalonia and the Basque Country). A good example of this was Valentí Almirall's work *El Catalanismo*, extolling the differential character of the Catalan people, their language and their culture. But underneath all this lay a deeply ingrained dissatisfaction with a state that offered no adequate response to Catalonia's interests. Almirall felt little to no identification with the Spanish state, against which he drew up a list of grievances and complaints in the following vein:

The administration, government and judiciary are in the same situation as our language and laws. While it is true that we are allowed provincial and local councils,

²³ David Rubio Márquez: La denuncia de prevaricación como forma de desgastar a un gobierno: el caso Juan Macías del Real, *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma. Serie V. Historia Contemporánea*, 2014, 474–434; Fernando de Bordejé y Morencos: *Vicisitudes de una política naval: antecedentes: desarrollo de la Armada entre 1898 y 1936*, Madrid, San Martín, 1978; Javier Álvarez Laita: Implicaciones industriales del Plan de Escuadra Maura-Ferrándiz, AA.VV.: *Plan Ferrándiz: Poder Naval Poder Marítimo. Cuadernos monográficos del Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval*, Madrid, Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval, 2008, 65–86; Clive Trebilcock: Legends of the British Armament Industry 1890–1914: A Revision, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 5, 1970, 3–19. This author points out how bribery was used in Spain by Vickers–Armstrong to gain advantages for the company (mainly page 16); Víctor María Concas y Palau: *El proyecto de escuadra al Senado*, Madrid, La Mañana, 1914.

²⁴ *Apuntes en defensa del honor del ejército*, Madrid, Est. Tipográfico de Ricardo Fe, 1898, 16–17.

²⁵ Sabas B. Catá: *Verdades amargas. Exposición de los males que afligen a Cuba, causas que lo determinan y remedios que se aconsejan para su salvación*, Habana, Imprenta La Constancia, 1895.

these are well enclosed inside an iron circle which only allows them to move in the direction desired by the oligarchs of Castilian politics. The fundamental or organizing principle is supposedly general for the entire nation, but in actual fact it is no more than an expression of a part of it which has imposed itself on the rest, and answers always to its political and judicial state. Whether established by a so-called Conservative oligarchy or by a so-called Liberal one, the organizing principle is always authoritarianism²⁶.

Ultimately, underneath cultural differences and identity-based arguments lay a lack of satisfaction with the state and its day-to-day functioning. This was something that could hardly be solved overnight by merely replacing a regime with a different one, as the two regime changes that took place in the twenties and thirties would prove. On 13 September 1923, General Primo de Rivera established a six-year-long dictatorship (1923–1930), which portrayed itself as an opportunity to regenerate the country and put an end to patronage and corruption but failed to create a truly ‘new’ – or for that matter effective – state²⁷. On 14 April 1931, a Republic that would remain in place until the end of the Civil War in 1939 was established; its goal, among others, was to definitively modernize the nation. Yet its reforms did not manage to transform the state, which basically remained the same in terms of efficiency, regardless of any autonomy granted to certain regions (Catalonia, in fact) within the framework of the Republic’s *integral state*. Both the dictatorship and the Republic failed to eliminate corruption and irregularities from the state’s administrative apparatus²⁸.

CONCLUSION

The main conclusion to be drawn from the above is that there appears to be a relationship between degrees of national identification and levels of satisfaction with the functioning of the state. This was particularly apparent in the Spain of the Restoration and in the period of crisis it experienced after 1898. Irregularities, interferences between the aims of politics and the administration, the absence of well designed public policies and a peculiar

²⁶ Valentí Almirall: *El catalanismo*, Barcelona, Librería Española, 1902, 152.

²⁷ Alejandro Quiroga Fernández de Soto: *Haciendo españoles. La nacionalización de las masas en la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera (1923–1930)*, Madrid, CEPC, 2008.

²⁸ Joaquín del Moral: *Inmoralidad política (“enchufismo” y acumulación de cargos)*, Madrid, Imprenta de Galo Sáez, 1931. Regarding proposals for the reform of the state among Socialists, Luis Araquistáin pointed out the need to radically reorganize the state; see: David Guerra Sesma: *El PSOE, entre el jacobinismo y el federalismo durante la Restauración y la Segunda República*, *Historia del Presente*, Vol. 29, 2017, 19–20.

administrative culture persisted inside the Spanish state regardless of changes in regime. And to the extent that the problem remained unsolved, the issue of national identity did too.

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A TIME OF WARS AND COMMON TOTALITARIAN
PROJECTS: THE LINKS BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND
FRANCOIST SPAIN, THROUGH THE ANALYSIS OF A
TRADITIONAL SPANISH CITY (VITORIA, 1936–1944)



GUILLERMO MARÍN

ABSTRACT

Between 1936 and 1944, and in a European context of significant political violence and ideological effervescence, Nazi Germany was very present in everyday life in Spain. This presence was military, both during the Spanish Civil War and in later years. It was also a propaganda presence, through which it tried to foster a feeling of sympathy towards Germany, as opposed to the “great enemies of Spain”, such as Bolshevism. One of the most interesting variants of this propaganda was the attempt to create a new sense of identity which, respecting local and national peculiarities, projected, between the years 1940 and 1942, the idea of a totalitarian Europe, which would be led by Germany, and in which “friendly” countries such as Spain would have to work hard to fit in.

This paper notes the importance and intensity of this propaganda work, and explores the effectiveness, in the social code, that these activities had in the daily life of a small Spanish city: Vitoria. Likewise, it is an initial approach to a subject very little explored by historiography, the scope of which can hopefully be expanded in the future, with new approaches both from the Spanish orbit and at a European / international level.

Keywords: *local history, francoism, Nazism, fascism, propaganda*

INTRODUCTION

As for the general political environment, I will only note the great influence that the course of the current war exerts on it, to the extent that it has improved due to recent favourable events for the Axis.[...] The influence of the international situation on the atmosphere is palpable.

Alfonso Sanz Gómez. Provincial chief of the Falange in Vitoria (Álava).
February, 1941¹

This paper approaches the impact that, in a traditional Spanish city like Vitoria, the presence of Nazi Germany had between 1936 and 1944. One of the fundamental goals of this work is to gauge the degree of effectiveness of the different pro-German initiatives which, during this period, were promoted both by local authorities and by Germany itself, through its solid contacts with the Francoist front during the Spanish Civil war and with the Franco regime afterwards.

In other words, we have tried to measure the success of the pro-German propaganda in its project to create a completely new sense of identity for the population of this city of about 40,000 inhabitants at the height of 1936², based on affinity towards Germany, through a „micro” study that made this work accessible: the case of the city of Vitoria.

For this purpose, we have analysed several different sources. The most important source has been the local press, which describes in detail during the chronology proposed a whole series of initiatives designed to build and promote this „new way of understanding the world” that was sought to be implemented: tributes and parades, German products, a clearly pro-German narrative of the Second World War (especially until 1943), and so on.

We have combined this source with an analysis of others with the aim of trying to model an approach that could balance the logical subjectivity of the local press in a context of totalitarian / authoritarian dictatorship. And in this sense, sources such as abundant photography from the period, official sources intended for state-internal use, or oral sources, have also been very important and useful.

¹ Translated from the original “En cuanto al ambiente político, únicamente consignaré la gran influencia que en él ejerce el rumbo de la actual guerra, por lo que aquel ha mejorado al producirse los últimos acontecimientos favorables para el Eje [...]. Se deduce la influencia que en el ambiente deja sentir la situación internacional”, Alfonso Sanz Gómez: Jefe Provincial de Falange en Álava. Febrero de 1941: *Archivo General de la Administración*, Madrid, Alcalá de Henares, sign. 51/20545.

² Antonio Rivera: *La ciudad levítica. Continuidad y cambio en una ciudad del interior (Vitoria, 1876–1936)*, Vitoria, County Council of Álava, 1992.

Just as with Fascism in Italy during its early years, Nazism was supported and internalised by some of the German intellectual elites of the time. These elites saw in the initial projection of their political, social and artistic ideas, suggestive elements, due to the fact that they were transgressive and revolutionary. Later, however, this way of conceiving the world incorporated increasingly more abominable and dismal elements.

In Spain, after the military coup of July 1936, the uprising against the 2nd Republic sought international references that gave meaning to the transgression that had been perpetrated. It was from then on, and until the beginning of the decline of the Nazi-fascist powers during World War II, when Francoist propaganda used Germany and Italy as central references, and granted them the status of *avant-garde* movements. And this despite the fact that these *avant-garde* movements embodied ideals that were antagonistic to other values that Francoism held dear, and which had notable political support in Vitoria, as was the case of Carlism³.

The analysis of Alava's press and of the speeches made by local authorities in those years has allowed us to outline the main characteristic features of this conception of Germany and of Italy that Francoism wanted to convey. An attempt was made, in a schematic way, to try to convince the population that the Franco regime did not walk alone, but had as a shining beacon two powers that were the *leaders of the civilized world*, that is, Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.

The symbolism of these countries heavily influenced local celebrations. Meanwhile, the press emphasised the great events related to these countries – from Hitler and Mussolini's birthdays to the commemorations of their political successes – and even for the German case, it created exclusive sections designed to exalt their political, territorial, artistic and technological achievements.

Soon, during the transition between the end of the Civil War and the outbreak of World War II, this praise of Germany expressed by local newspapers was toned down, lost part of its military component and acquired a different guise: that of a Francoist state which, after having won its war, maintained Germany as its reference and as a vanguard, encouraged the consumption of German products among the population, and forecast a victory of the Axis in the Second Great War, outlining the position that Spain would occupy in a post-war Europe governed by Germany.

The propaganda machine, discursive and iconographic, nevertheless had a relative influence on Vitoria's inhabitants. This was so with regard to Germany and Italy, but also with regard to popular adherence to Franco's regime. The

³ Virginia López de Maturana: *La reinención de una ciudad. Poder y política simbólica en Vitoria durante el franquismo (1936–1975)*, Bilbao, Basque Country University Press, 2014.

reports of the provincial Falange chiefs drafted from 1939 onwards, designed to analyse the political and social situation of the city, show a complex panorama, marked by adhesions to the new regime under construction and its international references, but also of significant misgivings and disaffections.

PART ONE: THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR (1936–1939)

At the gates of the Spanish war: The coup d'état in Vitoria and the mobilisation of troops

The Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939 was one of the most important events in the history of Spain and the Basque Country in the twentieth century. The triumph of the insurgents in the war brought an end to the democratic regime of the Second Republic (1931–1936)⁴.

News of the uprising of the rebel army (18-VII-1936) arrived soon in Vitoria, where the press – both the traditionalists (*Pensamiento Alavés*) and the liberals (*La Libertad*) – wanted to reflect, at first, the total calm that prevailed in the country despite the news from Africa. However, events happened quickly and, after several days of forced silence, the press echoed the new situation. Thus, while *Pensamiento Alavés* already identified with the insurgents, *La Libertad* tried to maintain an ambiguous position, indicating, without much enthusiasm, the changes produced in the local institutions⁵.

The new times brought with them the establishment of new ways of manifesting adhesion to the rebel side. It was a series of symbols that would be used to unite the whole of society around the representatives of the incipient regime. Perhaps one of the most colourful elements that shaped this new symbolism was the Roman salute⁶. Together with this, the New Francoist state mobilised society around another series of symbols alien to Spanish cultural tradition, such as the German *swastika* or the Italian *fascio littorio*. All these elements were present in the main tributes that the regime celebrated to commemorate both this support, and the advances of Franco's troops over their republican enemies⁷.

⁴ Javier Ugarte Tellería: *La nueva Covadonga insurgente. Orígenes sociales y culturales de la sublevación de 1936 en Navarra y País Vasco*, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 1998, 411–431.

⁵ *Pensamiento Alavés*, July 20, 1936; *La Libertad*, July 22, 1936.

⁶ Zira Box: *España, año cero: la construcción simbólica del franquismo*, Madrid, Alianza, 2010.

⁷ Ferrán Gallego: *El evangelio fascista. La formación de la cultura política del franquismo (1930–1950)*, Barcelona, Crítica, 2014.

After the coup d'état and the beginning of the war in July of 1936, troops began to be mobilised. Thus, from that moment on massive events to bid farewell to the soldiers who were marching to the battle front were commonplace.

Even during the first rallies, traces of Nazi or fascist influence were not visible, except for the use of the Roman salute which, although it seemed to have already been internalised as an element of the new times, was still not the official salute of the new regime. This can be seen, for example, in the expressions of support for the military mobilisation that took place in August 1936. At these rallies, traditional hymns, the bicolour flag and various religious symbols were the ingredients that, at first, united the population around the new authorities. There are no traces of symbols of the Falange⁸ or of the Nazi-fascist regimes in these first organised demonstrations in support of the soldiers who were heading to the front.

However, this aesthetic gradually changed, with the regime adopting all the symbolic paraphernalia of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. This was evidenced, for example, in the tribute that commemorated the anniversary of the battle of Villarreal in November 1937. This had taken place in the months of November and December of 1936, in an attempt to demonstrate the military superiority of the Francoists over republicans and Basque nationalists⁹.

The first anniversary of this battle gathered representatives of the troops who had fought there, including soldiers from North Africa, in the capital of Alava. The parade to pay tribute to the IV Brigade of Navarre and its leader, Camilo Alonso Vega, also included the presence of Germans and Italians. These, who by this time of the war walked through the city centre mingling with the local population, attended the parade as privileged observers.

⁸ On Falange, the only legal party for the Francoist regime, there is an extensive bibliography. There is a good synthesis in: Sheelag Elwood: *Historia de la Falange Española*, Barcelona, Crítica, 2001.

⁹ *Pensamiento Alavés*, November 2, 1937.



Vitoria, 30 November 1937. Source: Archivo Municipal de Vitoria-Gasteiz

Parades to friendly nations, and strangers in the city

The recognition of Franco's government by Nazi Germany and fascist Italy led the local authorities to pay tribute to those who were considered by the New State as *Twinned Nations* (From the original *Naciones Hermanas*). Despite their great conspicuousness, we must take into account that these tributes were exceptional events in Vitoria. However, the press hugely publicised them.

Especially relevant was the homage organised on November 25, 1936 in the capital of Alava¹⁰. On this day of exaltation of the Nazi-fascist powers, the authorities, after haranguing the population from the balcony of the Town Hall in the Plaza de España square, moved to their podium in the Plaza del Arca square, where they witnessed the parade. The act was closed with a fraternisation lunch in *Frontón Vitoria*, in which the *swastikas* decorated this space traditionally used by Basque people to socialise, creating a very curious setting¹¹. Next to them, the representatives of Germany and Italy, who found the main streets of the city decked out with the flags of the *Friendly Nations*.

¹⁰ *Pensamiento Alavés*, November 25, 1936.

¹¹ On the *frontón* as a sporting and social space, and on the *eskupilota* (the sport that is played in the *frontón*) as a sport and as identity symbol that can characterise the Basque people, Olatz González Abrisketa: *Pelota vasca: un ritual, una estética*, Bilbao, Muelle de Urbitarte, 2005.

The population quickly adapted to the new fascist aesthetics by making the Roman salute and standing firm while listening to the national anthems of Italy and Germany.



Vitoria 25 November 1936. Source: Archivo Municipal de Vitoria-Gasteiz

Two months after the start of the war, the German military began to arrive in Vitoria. These, together with a good number of troops from the Protectorate of Morocco, and Italian troops, aroused excitement and curiosity among the population of an inland city that was traditional, and little accustomed to this variety¹².

The Germans arrived in Vitoria in two well-defined waves. A first wave, very early, could be described as informal and with a very short duration. Thus, on 26 of September of 1936 a squadron of Heinkel airplanes arrived at the Salburua aerodrome, on the outskirts of Vitoria. The intention of this visit was, apparently, to create an atmosphere of calm and safety among the population, in the face of the possibility of a republican aerial attack. In practice, it was a three-day visit during which the German commanders enjoyed the local amenities (accommodated in the luxurious Hotel Fronton, and abundantly entertained), while flying around the city exhibiting their skills to the wonder of the locals.

In this context the plane crash of German pilot Ekkehard Hefter happened. The pilot was carrying out acrobatic manoeuvres at a very low altitude, and came across an obstacle that caused him to crash into the Plaza de España square, located in the city centre. The misfortune ended with the plane in flames and with the deaths of the pilot, a milkman and a blacksmith who were in the square. The local press silenced the event because the German presence in the city could not be publicly acknowledged, although it was visible and palpable for the population. Some photographs of the accident and the burial that took place the following day, as well as the memory passed down by oral sources and some works by local historians, are a reminder of what happened¹³.

The second phase in the arrival of foreign military personnel to the city took place during the spring of 1937, with the *rebel troops* preparing for the offensive of Biscay. German soldiers of varying ranks arrived, along with Italians who had headed north after being defeated by the Republican side in the battle of Guadalajara¹⁴. The large number of troops that arrived forced a greater logistical deployment. The Hotel Fronton was reserved for the Condor Legion and high-ranking officials. Meanwhile, soldiers – Germans or Italians – of lesser rank were taken to private houses at the behest of local authorities, or quartered in school yards (as in the case of one of the biggest schools of Vitoria at that time, *Marianistas*). The German presence in the city, and its participation in the war, was barely mentioned in the local press or the

¹² Pedro Morales Moya: *Vitoria, si mal no recuerdo*, Vitoria–Gasteiz, Espéculo, 1998.

¹³ Óscar Bruña Royo: Vitoria, septiembre de 1936, *Hefter fue el primero*, *Historia Militar*, September 2000, 259–266.

¹⁴ Francisco Sevillano Calero: Guadalajara: ecos de una batalla en la propaganda, *Desperta Ferro*, No. 16, 2016, 43–46.

official documents related to the municipal policy. There was a tendency to omit information, or to grossly falsify it, as was done with the bombing of Gernika¹⁵.

Besides Germans and Italians, there was also another exotic element during this period in the city: soldiers from North Africa. The first arrived in December 1936 during the battle of Villarreal, and many of them were quartered in the vicinity of the *plaza de toros* (bullring). Their presence in the city lasted until the end of the Bizkaia campaign, in the summer of 1937¹⁶.

Interviews with witnesses of that period – who were children or very young at the time – have highlighted the deep impression that those „German gentlemen – so tall, elegant and handsome” made and the reactions that all these foreign developments caused in the city. They are remembered as quiet, orderly and friendly, in contrast to the Italians, more scandalous and fun-loving.

With regard to the North African troops, the perception of them varied: from the image of *good maghrebis* portrayed by the uprising, and which is reflected in some opinion articles in the press, to the suspicion that was raised among part of the local population.

PART TWO: THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1939–1944/45)

The Second World War through the local press

The start of the Second World War was the result of a complex chain of economic, political and ideological factors, many of which were a legacy of the way in which the end of the First World War was managed. In the 20s and 30s of the twentieth century, several totalitarian regimes emerged in Europe in a context in which not a few politicians and intellectuals thought that democracy was a political model in crisis, and which needed new alternatives: something cutting edge, a breakthrough¹⁷.

In practice, this global conflict pitched two major blocs against each other: the Axis powers, which included Germany, Italy, and the Japanese; and the Allies, with the UK, USA and the USSR as the main powers. Its outcome marked the end of Fascist-style totalitarianism in Europe, and the emergence of a new bipolar political context: the Cold War, in which the USA and the USSR pushed for more than 40 years to extend their ideological influence in the world.

¹⁵ Walter L. Bernecker: Gernika y Alemania: debates historiográficos, *Historia Contemporánea*, No. 35, 2007, 507–527.

¹⁶ On the participation of Maghrebis in the Spanish Civil War, Rosa Madariaga: *Los moros que trajo Franco: la intervención de tropas coloniales en la Guerra Civil española*, Barcelona, Martínez Roca, 2002.

¹⁷ Francisco Cobo – Claudio Hernández – Miguel Ángel del Arco (eds.): *Fascismo y Modernismo. Política y cultura en la Europa de entreguerras (1918–1945)*, Granada, Comares, 2016.

In a small, quiet and traditional town like Vitoria in the early 1940s, many of its inhabitants followed the developments of this second *big war* through the local press. This study is a very interesting way to gauge the capacity for transformation that Franco's regime had as the war was advancing and as the winners and losers were being outlined.

In the press studied between 1939 and 1944, the population was convinced that the Axis powers (and especially Germany) were the world's vanguard, the model to follow. German „conquests” in Europe, such as the number of enemy ships sunk or the success of their attacks in France, England or the USSR, were enthusiastically reported. Figures such as Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini were extolled, and through small sections with photographs an image of friendly German soldiers was portrayed, fraternising with the locals wherever they went, as opposed to the red hordes that burned and destroyed everything in their wake. Meanwhile, far more distant powers, like Japan, were presented as the future rulers of the Pacific Ocean¹⁸.

From 1943 onwards, this openly pro-German vision (which contrasted, let us not forget, with the official status of the Franco regime during World War II – neutral from 1939 to 1940, non-belligerent from 1940 to 1943) was tempered by the first great defeats suffered by the Axis. This progressive change of perspective started with the first major Nazi setback during the war: the story of the German defeat in Stalingrad in February 1943. The press, as if trying to conceal the defeat, gave very little space to this news, and continued to present the Germans as heroes¹⁹.

The existence of the Blue Division²⁰, which fought on the eastern front supporting Germany and against a great shared enemy communism – was a decisive factor for the press to maintain this pro-German vision on the oriental front. On the western front, however, little attention was paid to Germany, and the manner in which the war was described changed radically, focusing on other great narratives of the war in Europe, such as the American advances in Italy, or the Normandy landings. In contrast to the pro-German approach until 1943, that year the press started to emphasise the military might of the „Yankees”, the neutrality of Spain, and the need to end the war and conquer peace.

Meanwhile, regarding the Pacific front, the pro-American about-turn was also progressive, and is especially representative in the narrative of the process of the reconquering of the Philippines by the Americans from the occupying Japanese, represented as a „reconquest of the Hispanic lands for Western civilisation and for Christianity”²¹.

¹⁸ *Pensamiento Alavés*, January 23, 1942, 8; April 15, 1942, 1; December 27, 1943, 1.

¹⁹ *Pensamiento Alavés*, April 6, 1943, 4; May 31, 1943.

²⁰ Xose Manoel Núñez Seixas: *Camarada Invierno. Experiencias y memoria de la División Azul (1941–45)*, Crítica, Barcelona, 2016.

²¹ *Pensamiento Alavés*, November 23, 1944, 3.

This image that the press gave of the future of the war contrasts with the sensibilities of the inhabitants of Vitoria, which were much more complex and heterogeneous. We know from reports that the Provincial Head of the Movement drafted on the political and social situation in the city that, from the beginning of the war, the Allies stirred sympathy among a significant number of inhabitants of the city, who saw in an Allied success a possible end to the Francoism of the early 40's, clearly pro-German and fascist. However, the regime's ability to reformulate itself and its image abroad and to fit into the new post-war context, with the Axis defeated, failed to fulfil these aspirations.

Pro-German propaganda: distinctive elements

With the pro-German vision that Francoism wanted to spread through the press during much of World War II, another very interesting phenomenon took place: that of intense propaganda between 1940 and 1943, related to German products and to the technical prowess of this country.

The fundamental core of this propaganda policy was the idea that National Socialist Germany represented the reference, the technological vanguard at a European level and the "beacon" that Spain should follow to be a strong nation in the New Europe that would arise after the victory of the Axis powers in the War²².

The propaganda guidelines, accompanied by capital to facilitate its diffusion in Spain, arrived from Germany to this country's embassy in Madrid. From there they passed it on to the Spanish Ministry of Government, which through its press service leaked messages to national newspapers. Part of the significant success of German propaganda, which explains how it reached not only national newspapers, but also other more local ones such as *Pensamiento Alavés*, was thanks to the figure of the person in charge of propaganda in the German embassy in Madrid, Josef Hans Lazar. Lazar was an influential personality in Madrid's political and diplomatic circles in the 1930s and early 1940s²³.

This German propaganda was, along the lines of what can be observed in local publications, of variable intensity and topics. Between 1940 and 1943, for example, it was customary for the Alava press to report on a small number of German products, many of which were impossible to find in shops in a small city of less than 40.000 inhabitants like Vitoria, and in a context of famine and post-war poverty. This did not, however, prevent the description

²² Xose Manoel Núñez Seixas: Falangismo, nacionalsocialismo y el mito de Hitler en España (1931–1945), *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, Vol. 169, 2015, 13–43.

²³ Wayne H. Bowen: *Spaniards and Nazi Germany: Collaboration in the New Order*, Columbia–London, University of Missouri Press, 2000.

of the unsurpassed goodness and quality of German products which, as was written, would arrive in abundance in Spain once the war ended.

Besides these, other reports of considerable graphic strength highlighted the great technical advances of the avant-garde German industry, underlining both its advances in those early years of the 1940s and its pioneering tradition in earlier times (“An idea, an accomplishment”, from the original “Una idea, una realización”²⁴).

And there were other reports, in a military context, such as the one before the battle of Stalingrad, in which German troops seemed unstoppable in Europe, emphasizing the contributions that Spain could make to the project of a continental Europe (from which both the Soviet Union and The British Isles were excluded) under a totalitarian rule governed by Germany.

The apogee of this pro-German propaganda policy was, in the local press studied, between the end of 1940 and the beginning of 1943, its decline coinciding with the first great defeats of the Axis in World War II, which forced Francoism to reformulate its approach, going from a discourse that was openly favourable to Germany during the war, to an abandonment of this position through 1943, with insistent references to its neutrality.



Composition of pro-German propaganda announcements extracted from the Journal Pensamiento Alavés, 1941-1942. Made by Xabier Sagasta Lacalle for the exposition Europa en llamas. Ecos de la Alemania nazi en Vitoria (1939-1945). Curators: Guillermo Marín, Virginia López de Maturana, Xabier Sagasta Lacalle. November 2016-January 2017, Vitoria-Gasteiz.

²⁴ *Pensamiento Alavés*, January 28, 1942, 2; March 23, 1942, 3; April 21, 1942, 3, etc.

The Blue Division in Vitoria

The Spanish Division of Volunteers, popularly known as the Blue Division, was an expeditionary body of Spanish fighters who supported the Wehrmacht (German Army) on the Russian front between 1941 and 1943 as a consequence of the invasion of the USSR by the Third Reich on June 22, 1941. This unit of volunteers, whose members swore loyalty to Hitler, was led by General Agustín Muñoz Grandes, a veteran of the Moroccan war and one of the rebel military commanders who participated in the July 18 coup of 1936.

The call for the mobilisation of the volunteers began immediately in Vitoria. The first recruitment effort was announced in the local press (*Pensamiento Alavés*) on June 26, 1941. The provincial chief of the Falange (Alfonso Sanz) encouraged the recruitment of future Alava divisions „for this war against communism”²⁵. The first trains of volunteers destined for Russia left from the capital of Alava on July 15 and 16, 1941, being sent off with honours by all the local authorities, and to the sound of the main Francoist anthems: *Himno Nacional*, *Oriamendi* and *Cara al Sol*.

From that moment onwards, there were constant demonstrations of support for the Blue Division in Vitoria. For example, during the Christmas holidays, the Female Section of the Falange was in charge of giving the mothers of volunteers a gift that usually consisted of an assortment of sweets and liquors and a cash reward²⁶.

The most significant tribute took place in Vitoria on June 17, 1942, when the first relief of combatants took place. The event consisted of the celebration of a campaign mass in the Plaza de España square, after which different authorities addressed the expeditionaries, led by Lieutenant Colonel Mariano Gómez-Zamalloa and Captain Lang, a member of the German army who accompanied the Spanish volunteers. Then a parade took place on Dato Street, after which the volunteers were invited to eat in the barracks. After finishing, the officers met with the authorities at the Hotel Fronton²⁷.

²⁵ *Pensamiento Alavés*, June 26, 1941, 1.

²⁶ *Pensamiento Alavés*, January 9, 1942.

²⁷ *Pensamiento Alavés*, June 17, 1942, 1.



Vitoria, 17 June 1942. Source: Archivo Municipal de Vitoria-Gasteiz

CONCLUSIONS

The period between 1936 and 1944 was a period of political violence and ideological effervescence, both in Spain, with a civil war, and later in Europe and the world, with the Second World War.

Although officially Germany did not participate in the civil war, and although the Franco regime was officially neutral/non-belligerent in the second great war, mutual support between the two countries was evident. This support was based on ideological affinities and the belief that political violence was a legitimate tool for the construction of a project presented as revolutionary, renovating... totalitarian.

The presence of foreign powers, and more specifically of Nazi Germany in Spain, had a variety of manifestations and was constant between the end of 1936 and 1944. For the case analysed in this paper, that of a „small inland city” like Vitoria, this was a „physical” presence, represented by soldiers in the city, and also by senior Luftwaffe commanders. It was also a „symbolic” presence, by honouring the „friendly nations” (Germany, Italy, Portugal) in a context, that of late 1936, in which a war had just begun in Spain, and one of the sides needed legitimacy and international support.

With the advent of the Franco regime in Spain and the beginning of the Second World War, the German presence in Vitoria changed its propaganda priorities. Until the end of 1942 Germany seemed unstoppable in Europe, and its propaganda service concerned itself with building, in its „friendly countries”, a feeling of identity with a European and totalitarian focus. Germany would be the country to lead that „Great Continental Europe”, thanks to its leadership and its technical, technological and military might, thanks to its status of „vanguard”. This project, evident from the great propaganda effort carried out in local publications like *Pensamiento Alavés*, lost intensity from mid-1943, after the first great German defeats in the war.

Other elements, such as their shared aversion to Bolshevism, led to the creation of other ties, such as the Blue Division, and supported the maintenance of solid relations also from 1943, despite the fact that Francoist Spain began to look, from 1944 onwards, towards another power renowned for its opposition to the USSR: the USA.

There is no doubt that Germany tried to become a reference in Spain, and that in many instances, especially between 1936 and 1942/43, Spain was interested in having Germany as a reference.

On the basis of this evidence, it was necessary to gauge, beyond the propaganda, the degree of effectiveness of this intense pro-German activity. Reports by local political authorities have helped us to play down the impact of this propaganda on social and identity codes, especially during the development of the Second World War. In a city like Vitoria, small but very complex and varied in terms of identities and ideologies, we know that the sentiment was not unanimously pro-German during the war. On the contrary, and as the reports show, Basque nationalism and the political left, present in the city despite being persecuted by the Franco regime, showed their sympathies to the allies clandestinely, and hoped that a defeat of Germany would return democracy to Spain, ridding it of Franco. However, Franco’s skilful strategy, redefining Spain’s place in the world depending on the progress of the war, negated this possibility.

This paper is a first approximation to a phenomenon, that of the existence of a solid and convinced German project which, through military support and strong propaganda, sought to influence a new sense of identity in Spain, based on the projection of an idea of Europe governed by Germany and in which Spain, and Spaniards, had to make an effort to fit in.

Through our approach, focused on a small city that is complex yet eminently conservative and with strong identity traits, the effectiveness of this attempt is played down. However, at the same time, it opens up a path for research that is as rich as it is little explored: that of the variables of the scope, the impact and the different contextual determinants that, beyond the narrow geographic limits of our “micro” study, this German propaganda effort had not only in Spain, but also in Europe and perhaps even beyond.

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La Libertad: July 22, 1936.

III. EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

LUCIAN BOIA: DEMYTHOLOGIZATION OF THE ROMANIAN HISTORICAL DISCOURSE AFTER 1989



EUGEN STANCU

ABSTRACT

In the 1990s the demythologizing scholarly efforts of Lucian Boia directed towards the Romanian historiography steered a rather fierce debate about the way the national historical discourse was constructed in the 18th and the 19th centuries and the manner in which it was understood in the present. In this article I concentrate on the intellectual origins of this demythologizing endeavour undertaken by Boia and I explore his main arguments concerning his analysis of the Romanian historical discourse.

Keywords: *Lucian Boia, historical mythology, demythologizing turn, post-communist historiography*

After the fall of the communist regime in 1989, Romania embarked upon a 'new' process of modernization meant to lead towards political democracy, a market economy and finally European integration. Although the actions of the Romanian political leaders were not always consistent with these aims, there was, however, a direction towards the future to be followed. The same could not be said about the way the past was historically reconstructed. The last decades of the communist regime in Romania, that is, the national-communist period with its protocronist phase¹ have influenced the shape of historical studies. After a period (the 1950s and the 1960s), in which the

¹ Katherine Verdery: *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaușescu's Romania*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991.

achievement of a communist utopia was considered possible with the help of science and technology, starting from the 1970s (the 1971 July Theses and the Program of the Romanian Communist Party from 1974 are the crucial official political documents in this respect), the past became the main ideological preoccupation of Ceaușescu's regime. The idealized Romanian historical past was seen as that perfect *illo tempore*² that had to be remembered, praised and taken as a model for the present and future. History and national values turned out to be the main discursive concern of the Romanian Communist Party. The utopian communist future was replaced with the story of the Romanian past that unfortunately was not fulfilled due to various enemies that over time had threatened the organic development of the Romanian nation. Yet, in the late 1970s and the 1980s, the Romanian communist regime and especially its leader, Nicolae Ceaușescu, aimed to recreate and especially continue that development.

A revision of the state of affairs of historical studies was an intellectual priority after 1989, yet it did not happen straight away. Many professional historians that were active during communism still had important positions in Romanian academia and were convinced that their writings, or in the best case, the reshaped history they started to produce after 1989 was the 'real one'. It was, nevertheless, a change. However, this formula was a heterogeneous one, a hybridization between the 'old-style nationalist historiography' with legacies from the interwar and communist period and inspiration from the new theoretical and methodological directions in historical writing developed mainly in Western scholarship.

The possibility that historians had to debate the problems of their profession was almost nonexistent in the 1990s and this situation was due, according to Alexandru Zub, to the lack of institutions that could create the necessary context.³ Within this framework, there were, nevertheless, personal initiatives that steered the Romanian post-communist historical debate, such as the *Centre for the History of the Imaginary* set up at the University of Bucharest by Professor Lucian Boia. The conferences that were organized and the volumes published by the *Centre* in its first years opened a new research agenda on critically scrutinizing Romanian historical mythologies, which was, however, not embraced by many historians. Then, Boia's seminal book, *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*⁴, a controversial one at that time, initiated what

² Mircea Eliade: *The Myth of the Eternal Return: Or, Cosmos and History*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1991.

³ Sorin Antohi – Alexandru Zub: *Oglinzi retrovizoare. Istorie, memorie și morală în România*, Iași, Polirom, 2002, 172.

⁴ The first edition of the book *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească* [History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness] was published in 1997. In this study I make reference to the third edition published in 2011. There are no differences from the first edition, except that the forewords to the 2nd and 3rd editions respectively were added.

was considered a 'demythologizing-turn' in Romanian historiography. In this paper I shall explain the intellectual origins of this effort by concentrating on the intellectual career of Lucian Boia. I shall then analyze the nature of Boia's de-mythologizing endeavour towards Romanian history and finally discuss the implications it brought concerning the problem of objectivity in history.

Judging by his academic research agenda and scholarly achievements, Boia was a prodigious historian even during the communist period. After graduating from the University of Bucharest, Faculty of History in 1967 as valedictorian, he was hired as faculty member being interested at that time (the end of the 1960s) in contemporary universal history and French history during the Second French Empire of Napoleon III. However, after the mandatory military stage, he was transferred, without being asked, from the department of Universal history to that of Romanian history at the Faculty of History. Thus, he was forced to abandon his scholarly plans related to universal history and find a Romanian subject.

The visit in Romania, as part of the socialist countries collaboration scheme, of a gifted and well-known Czechoslovak historian, Josef Macůrek, and the appointment of Boia as his research assistant created the context for Boia to join the research project put forward by Macůrek for the study of the relationships between Romanians, Czechs and Slovaks within the Habsburg empire. In 1968 Boia benefited from a research visit (in fact a three month research scholarship offered by the Czechoslovak institute directed by Macůrek) in Prague, where he could study in the archives. However, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the wake of the Prague Spring stopped the project and Macůrek was removed from the direction of the *Socialist Countries History Institute*. But Boia rescued the lost research agenda in a book he wrote alone, shortly after he returned to Romania.⁵ At the same time, inspired by this research experience, Boia became interested in the national Romanian movement from Transylvania. As he remembers, "I got closer to Romanian history through Czechoslovakia because I was not interested in Romanian historical issues before."⁶ Out of his PhD (he conducted research both in Romanian and Hungarian archives), at the beginning of the 1970s, he published a monograph about Eugen Brote, a key figure in the Transylvanian memorandist movement.⁷

These elements of Boia's intellectual career are hardly known today, being shaded by his books on historiography, the history of the imaginary, historical mythologies and recently Romanian intellectual history. What Boia published

⁵ Lucian Boia: *Relationships between Romanians, Czechs and Slovaks*, București, Editura Academiei, 1977.

⁶ Lucian Boia: *Istoriile mele; Eugen Stancu în dialog cu Lucian Boia*, București, Humanitas, 2012, 39.

⁷ Lucian Boia: *Eugen Brote (1850–1912)*, București, Litera, 1974.

in the 1970s could not announce at all his intellectual development. Yet, his further professional openness to various historical themes, his intellectual curiosity, and the interdisciplinary methodological approach he embraced were fostered by some unexpected episodes of his biography, such as the previously mentioned connection with Josef Macůrek. Furthermore, during a second visit to Prague at the end of the 1970s occasioned by the publication of the book *Relationships between Romanians, Czechs and Slovaks*, he met Helga Abret, a German literary scholar established in France, with whom he started a fruitful intellectual collaboration, whose results were rather unexpected for a historian. In 1984, Boia and Helga Abret published *Das Jahrhundert der Marsianer*.⁸ Boia refers to this book as an extraordinary historical experiment in which he wrote about scenarios produced on Earth referring to the planet Mars. It was for him the discovery of the imaginary because as he puts it, “on the planet Mars there were projected all sorts of fantasies, dreams, ideologies or utopias.”⁹ It was not only an atypical research topic for a professional historian, but this book also presupposed the investigation of sources which usually were neglected by historians, ranging from popular literature to drawings.

At the same time, at the Faculty of history in Bucharest, Boia started to teach the general historiography course which became available after the titular professor was appointed cultural counsellor at the Romanian Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany.¹⁰ Boia once more abandoned his research plans, related with the history of the Transylvanian national movement, and specialised himself in historiography.¹¹ Moreover, his interest in the new field, his desire to complete a dictionary of great historians as well as his wish to travel in the West for professional purposes led to him coming up with the initiative to form *The International Commission on Historiography*, which was established at the 15th International Congress of Historical Sciences, held in Bucharest in 1980. Along with Boia, the groundwork for setting up this commission was done by Charles-Olivier Carbonell and Georg G. Iggers, well-known scholars in the study of historiography and historical theory.

Also related to his interest in historiography was Boia’s interest in the 1980s for the French *Annales School* in which he developed an expertise and published numerous articles in the magazine *Contemporanul* and in the scholarly journal *Analele Universității București* to a point that erroneously he was often considered a historian who followed the methodology of this

⁸ Lucian Boia – Helga Abret: *Das Jahrhundert der Marsianer*, München, Heyne Verlag, 1984.

⁹ *Istoriile mele*, 89.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 52. For contextual information related to Boia I used *Istoriile mele; Eugen Stancu in dialog cu Lucian Boia*.

¹¹ In the second half of the 1970s he published on this new scholarly interest, Lucian Boia: *Evoluția istoriografiei române*, București, Editura universității, 1976. and Lucian Boia: *Mari istorici ai lumii*, București, Editura universității, 1978.

French historical direction. This was simply a misconception. As he put it clearly, "I have another approach in relation to these French historians. They are very much concerned with structures, masses or mentalities. I am interested more in ideas. I have a relativistic perspective in terms of history while the historians from *Annales* were sure they made a scientific history."¹² At the same time, Lucian Boia continued his research and projects on the history of the imaginary and published in France his first books¹³, participated in conferences, and was integrated in the French network of the Centres for the study of the imaginary.

I made this contextualization referring to the intellectual evolution of Boia and his development as a historian in order to point out the intellectual origins of the demythologizing enterprise undertaken in the 1990s after the fall of communism. Within this context, in 1993 Boia set up in Bucharest *The Centre for the History of the Imaginary*. Its objective was to stimulate and organize research in the fields of the collective imagination and of the history of ideas and representations. It laid special emphasis on political and historical "mythologies", on the problems of group and national identities, and on public images of the other.¹⁴

It should be mentioned that in this period Boia also elaborated his theoretical book on the Imaginary in which he attempted to reconcile the rather diverging visions on this problematic concept put forward by Gilbert Durand and Jacques Le Goff respectively. The book was published only in 1998.¹⁵ Nevertheless, an important question that should be asked is how it was that in the 1990s Boia started to study and especially deconstruct the Romanian historical mythologies. Apparently, it was not related with Boia's earlier preoccupations, but neither was it at all an opportunistic, fashionable research focus but rather a natural intellectual evolution stemming from his preoccupations and curiosity. As he puts it "at some point I became immersed in the imaginary. In the 1980s, on the one hand, I was preoccupied with historiography and on the other hand, I was researching Martians and the ends of the world. The fusion had not yet happened, but it was inevitable that at some point it would occur".¹⁶

The first volumes that were published as products of the *Centre for the History of the Imaginary* and under the coordination of Boia were based on communications presented in conferences and were mostly done by students. The general theme was the understanding, analysis and deconstruction of

¹² *Istoriile mele*, 69.

¹³ Lucian Boia: *L'exploration imaginaire de l'espace*, Paris, La Découverte, 1987; Lucian Boia : *La fin du monde. Une histoire sans fin*, Paris, La Découverte, 1989.

¹⁴ Lucian Boia – Anca Oroveanu – Simona Corlan-Ioan: *Insula Despre izolare și limite în spațiul imaginar*, București, Colegiul Noua Europă, 1999.

¹⁵ Lucian Boia : *Pour une histoire de l'imaginaire*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1998.

¹⁶ *Istoriile mele*, 118–119.

various Romanian historical mythological figures. The theoretical and methodological base for these studies was, besides Boia's book on the imaginary, the books on historical and political mythologies written by other scholars such as André Reszler and Raoul Girardet.¹⁷ The first two volumes were published in 1995 at the Bucharest University Press.

Mituri istorice românești was the first book.¹⁸ It discussed a whole range of historical figures from the Romanian historical pantheon such as Mihai Viteazul, Mircea cel Bătrân, Ioan Vodă, Tudor Vlasimirescu, King Calo I, Antonescu and King Mihai. From the very beginning it was stated that the book did not aim to downgrade the role of the Romanian historical figure but rather to understand how a mythologized vision was produced within the historical discourse. These analyses were not well received especially by those who considered the national historical heroes as untouchable figures that should be unconditionally praised by historians.

Moreover, the second volume, *Miturile comunismului Românesc*, was considered even more problematic. It was clearly stated in the foreword that the essence of the communist mythology resided in a doublespeak, which up to a point has succeeded in hiding the crimes of the system. The elements of the mythological communist discourse such as liberty, equality, the affirmation of human personality, social justice, agreement between states and peace have succeeded in concealing the reality and moreover protecting the memory of the communist system. As Boia maintains the "intellectual dismantling of communism is even more difficult than its material annihilation."¹⁹

Although it was a scholarly work, there were many that considered it a personal attack so that when it came to publishing the second volume the book was delayed without a specified reason. Luckily the change of the Romanian internal political configuration after the elections in 1996 gave a green light to the book.

It should be, nevertheless, stated that these first books of the *Centre for the History of the Imaginary* published by the Bucharest University Press had a low circulation. Yet, they had a great impact and fuelled the debate on the way history was written, reconstructed and the national heroes were epitomised. It was more than a debate in the sense that many times there were only attacks directed towards Boia, considered an anti-patriot and a conspirator who should not publish works that would diminish the status of Romanian historical figures and impede and stain the Romanian national identity.

¹⁷ André Reszler: *Mythes politiques modernes*, Paris, PUF, 1981; Raoul Girardet: *Mythes et mythologies politiques*, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1986.

¹⁸ Lucian Boia (ed.): *Mituri istorice românești*, București, Editura Universității București, 1995.

¹⁹ Lucian Boia (ed.): *Miturile comunismului românesc*, București, Editura Universității București, 1995, 15.

However, these books were only the beginning of Boia's demythologizing intellectual effort towards Romanian history. He remembers that these personal attacks did not determine him to renounce his work and he started to write *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*.

In this book published in 1997,²⁰ Boia sought to investigate the main myths that were characteristic of Romanian historiography and the Romanian historical conscience in the last two centuries. For him exploring the relationship between history and the imaginary was particularly relevant in the period of the 90s when, as he put it, Romanian historiography was in the "phase of necessary critical revision."²¹ Boia's purpose was not to demolish Romanian historical mythology but rather to understand how it appeared and the functions it performed in the past and still performs in the present. As he explains, the amplification and promotion of these mythological constructions in the historical discourse of the present carry an authoritarian and xenophobic message and prevent the achievements of the very goals of the present that were at that time "the modernization and democratization of Romanian society and the integration of the country into the European Structure."²²

The main mythological constructions identified by Boia, that shaped the 19th and 20th century Romanian historical discourse correspond with the themes imposed on historians in the new Party Program approved after the 11th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in 1974.²³ In the 1970s the ideological rationale of the emerging national-communism, which characterised the last part of Ceaușescu's regime, was different from the period in which these mythological constructions appeared in Romanian historiography, namely in the 19th century when Romanian historical consciousness had been under the strong influence of the national ideology.

The identification and deconstruction of several mythological themes is the core of Boia's message in *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*. However, as I shall show later on, the book also implied important thoughts about the epistemological nature of historical studies. All through the stages of Romanian historiography (in his analysis of the 19th century to present), as Boia put it, historians sought to reveal and reconstruct the glorious past in opposition to the present decay. In order to do this, as I mentioned before, several mythological constructions were shaped.

²⁰ In this study I make reference to the third edition of the book, published in 2011. It is identical with the first edition except that it contains the extended foreword to the second edition and that to the third edition.

²¹ Lucian Boia: *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*, București, Humanitas, 2011, 57.

²² *Ibid.*, 58.

²³ *Programul Partidului Comunist Român de făurire a societății multilateral dezvoltate și înaintarea României spre communism*, București, Editura Politică, 1975.

The myth of origins, whether Romanians are actually Dacians, Romans or Daco-Romans, is an unanswered question that over time was given various solutions according to the ideological priorities of that respective present. For instance, in the 18th and 19th centuries, the Roman origin of the Romanian people was a priority, especially for the Transylvanian intellectuals, but in the second half of the 19th century the idea of the Daco-Roman origin became prevalent. Then, the stress of the Dacian roots of the Romanian people reflected the debate between those sustaining the European occidental values and those supporting the autochthonous ones. The Romanian national communist regime during Ceaușescu clearly favoured the Dacians. The “scientific” debate between those sustaining the Dacian or the Roman origins of the Romanian people was always supported with historical facts which were interpreted according to the ideological commandments at stake.

The denial of the Romanian continuity in Transylvania, especially by Hungarian historiography, politically informed another central Romanian historical myth, that of continuity, which as compensation identifies the Romanian national space with that of Dacia from antiquity. Boia discusses the various interpretative historiography scenarios from the 19th century to that proposed by the Romanian Communist Party Program in 1974.

Continuity is related with another crucial historical Romanian myth, that of unity. Romanian unity in its actual territory was anticipated by Dacian unity, and was allegedly achieved in the 17th century by Mihai Viteazul (Michael the Brave). In fact, as Boia demonstrates, the idea of the first Romanian national union realized by Mihai Viteazul was put forward by 19th century historians who sought to find arguments for their national political program that was finally achieved after the First World War.

The continuous fight for independence is another important myth of Romanian historiography according to Boia. In all these mythological categories he explores various interpretations of the national history pointing out that historical reconstruction could not be detached from the “present time” in which the story is produced. In *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*, Boia also speaks about the instrumentalization (in fact this could also be considered a multiplication of the historical interpretations) of some historical figures after 1989. Marshal Antonescu, King Mihai, Avram Iancu or the leaders of the interwar Romanian political parties are such cases.

The book *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească* was better received than the volumes previously published by the *Centre for the History of the Imaginary*. It should be mentioned, nevertheless, that Boia’s scholarly contribution from the 1990s related to the deconstruction of Romanian historical mythology

was labelled a somehow inappropriate demythologizing-turn.²⁴ His attempt at critically assessing the way Romanian history was written in the 19th and 20th centuries is essential but did not generate a turn in the way history was written in post-communist Romania.²⁵ Rather it was the other way around. Historians did not enjoy Boia's demythologizing historical work. As Cristina and Dragoș Petrescu put it in the book *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*, Boia criticized "both the national communist historical master narrative and the 'national' tradition of historical writing to which many Romanian historians wanted to return after 1989."²⁶

This observation explains why historians were not among those to positively assess Boia's book. There were literary scholars, cultural journalists and other intellectuals who thought Boia's demythologizing attempt was an excellent piece of scholarship while still many others attacked the author as being an anti-patriot producing a message that in fact served the enemies of the Romanian national state. For instance, a rumour that circulated at that time and which was reproduced in the excellent analysis of post-communist Romanian historiography made by Cristina and Dragoș Petrescu was that the book *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească* was sponsored by George Soros, the Hungarian born American billionaire. It was a detail that fuelled those maintaining that the book concealed a Hungarian revisionist agenda.

However, this information was just a constitutive element of a conspiracy scenario. George Soros did not sponsor the publication of Boia's book simply because it did not need any sponsoring. *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească* was a great publishing success; it was one of the Romanian post-1989 bestsellers. In the foreword to the second impression, Boia mentions that in two years only, the book had four successive editions with 9000 copies each.²⁷

However, the negative assessments have been almost proportional with the success of the book. Interestingly enough the most comprehensive critique came from Ioan-Aurel Pop, a historian from Cluj-Napoca University who in 2002 published an almost 400-page book in which he critically analysed

²⁴ Cristina Petrescu – Dragoș Petrescu: Mastering vs. Coming to Terms with the Past. A Critical Analysis of Post-Communist Romanian Historiography, in S. Antohi – B. Trencsényi – P. Apor (eds.): *Narratives Unbound: Historical Studies in Post-Communist Eastern Europe*, Budapest, Central European University Press, 2007.

²⁵ I made this note about the use of the term "turn" in reference to the proportions and influence of the so-called "linguistic turn". See Elizabeth A. Clark: *History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn*, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2004.

²⁶ Petrescu – Petrescu: Mastering vs. Coming, 324.

²⁷ Boia, *Istorie și mit*, 15.

Istorie și mit în conștiința românească almost page by page. He generally considers that the essence of Boia's book is in fact an attack on the Romania national identity, a fact that in many countries would be punishable by law.²⁸

This controversy related to the problem of nation and the harm provoked by deconstruction of several historical national mythical figures is secondary, since there was another more important issue at stake in the book. Between Boia and his critics in fact stands an epistemological problem, namely that of historical objectivity. A historian like Ioan-Aurel Pop strongly believes in the capacity of the historian to reach the truth after a scientific investigation. He criticized Boia because instead of using the proper methodology a historian should employ, he rather, as Pop put it, used means from the "domain of literary art".²⁹

It should be said that Boia's revisionist historical agenda was directed also against the problem of historical objectivity as it was understood by most Romanian historians in the 1990s. He was convinced there is not a clear line between fact and fiction and, therefore, history cannot be objectively written. His view resembles more that of Hayden White, who maintains that writing history does not mean objectively discovering the truth from the past,³⁰ than the methodological assumptions of the historical discipline put forward in the 19th century by historians such as Leopold von Ranke, who thought that based on documents from the archives they could reconstruct history 'as it really was.'

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²⁸ Ioan-Aurel Pop: *Istoria, adevărul și miturile*, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 2002, 299.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 300.

³⁰ Hayden White: *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.

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THE NATIONAL IDEA AS AN INTEGRATION IDEOLOGY.
HUNGARIAN DILEMMAS FROM THE LAST THIRD OF
18TH CENTURY TO 1918



CSABA DUPCSIK

ABSTRACT

In the author's view, the national idea has been an integration ideology which has emerged in most European countries in the last third of the 18th century. However, this process has never included in practice a creation of something absolutely new, but the new type of nationalisms have been built from older ideas, identities, affiliations, or social phenomena. One ideal typical version proceeded from the medieval frame of states ("French-type nationalism"), another ideal typical version proceeded from the ethnicity ("German-type or Polish-type nationalism"). "The Hungarians" (implying the groups which are relevant to the discourse and the policy-making) faced a dilemma in this field. Using the personification of the previous sentence, "they" could not decide between these above-mentioned nation-versions, so "they" tried to follow inconsistent strategies.

Keywords: *nationalism, theories of nationalism, integration, modernization ideology, concepts of Hungarian nation*

Instead of a systematic theoretical frame and complete typology of the notions of the nation, I will try to differentiate three dimensions of nationalism-theories (table 1). Along the first dimension, which could be named the "social ontology" of the nation, we could create a scale on the one side of it of the so-called *essentialist approaches*, and on the other side a scale of the *constructivist approaches*. The essentialist approaches suppose that there are "objective" factors, or at least well definable and stable social factors, which determine the characters, the borders, or the political consequences of the

York, Verso, 2006; Rogers Brubaker: *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe*, Cambridge – New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996; Thomas Hylland Eriksen: *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*, Third edition, London, Pluto Press, 2010; Eric Hobsbawm: *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Realities*, Cambridge – New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

*** A relevant, although a little one-sided, analysis is readable in Pierre Bourdieu: *Language and Symbolic Power*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992, 220–251.

**** In the “disused versions” “biological” features and “race” were often referred to.

The position of my approach along these dimensions, somehow, is a “middle-of-the-road” one.

- 1.) So I regard myself as *constructivist* but I have to emphasize that the social actors’ ability to construct the social reality is
 - typically limited
 - extremely variable by the eras, the social and political positions of the actors, the structures, etc.
 - and the consequences of these kinds of activity are very often unpredictable by the actors themselves.
- 2.) My point of view is “*modernist*” (that is, it supposes that “the nation” has emerged in the process of modernization), but I have to emphasize that very often the idea of the nation and the practice, the policies, the institutions which refer to the nation have *premodern antecedents* (for example, in the case of Catalan, Irish, Polish, and Hungarian nationalism).
- 3.) Hungarian nationalism before 1918 had endeavored to combine the basic types, namely state nationalism and linguistic/ethnic nationalism.

Instead of further theoretical argumentation, I would like to present an illustrative story. In October 1848, after the outbreak of the second revolution in Vienna, Ferenc Pulszky, an under-secretary of the Hungarian government which emerged in the March revolution, tried to return to Hungary. Because of the military closing the border, Pulszky passed on foot from the last railway station. He happened to meet a soldier, and he spoke to him in Slovak. It is not clear why Pulszky thought that Slovak would be the soldier’s native language, but it worked: the soldier did not arrest him but pointed him towards the border river.

“On the riverbank... I entered the ferrymen’s hut. They lay on the floor, so I gave one of them a kick. He jumped.

–Yes, respected sir? (ténsúr) – He recognized because of the kicking that he was dealing with a gentlemen.”¹ Although he had to support the gentlemanly

¹ In the original: “a rúgáson megismerte, hogy urakkal van dolga”.

authority with some bribery, in the event, the ferrymen transferred Pulszky onto the Hungarian side. Here, in a village inn near Pozsony (Bratislava, now the capital of Slovakia) a group of *tót*² peasants were chatting:

...The peasants were talking politics, what would be the best: if Jellasich³ or Kossuth⁴ won. The younger peasants preferred Jellasich's victory because he was a *tót* as well,⁵ but an older, and, as it turns out, prestigious peasant... sipped his pálinka, and he said:

–Idiots! If Jellasich wins, he will bring back the [feudal duties]... We are Hungarians even if we speak Slovak.⁶

“*This emboldened me*”, says Pulszky, so he addressed the elder peasant, and hired him to transfer him to Pozsony.⁷

Ferenc Pulszky (1814–1897) was born in the northern part of this period's Hungary (today the northern part of Slovakia) in a well-to-do landholder noble family whose members traditionally played a political role. In their county the peasants were Slovaks, the majority of the urban population were Germans, and the noblemen were bilingual or trilingual but in most cases, they had Hungarian (*Magyar*) identity, even if in some noblemen's households non-Hungarian language(s) dominated or were used.

Pulszky's story sheds light on some relevant points of my lecture. One century before Pulszky's era in Hungary the fact that about 40% of the population and the great majority of the nobility was ethnic Hungarian had no political significance in itself. The Hungarian nation at that time was a political, and not a cultural, ethnic community of people, and the modern legally egalitarian citizenship did not exist either. This idea of the *natio Hungarica*⁸ had embraced all members of the Estates of the realm in the Hungarian Kingdom before 1848, but especially the noblemen,⁹ independently of their native language. When in the last third of the 18th century modern

² In this context *tót* (which nowadays is not regarded as a correct name) was equal to Slovak.

³ Joseph Jelačić, Croatian leader, who was the man of the Croatian nationalists and the Imperials at the same time.

⁴ Lajos Kossuth, liberal and nationalist politician, the Hungarian leader during the revolution and war of independence in 1848–49.

⁵ In this context, *tót* (which nowadays is not regarded as a correct name) was equal to Slav(ic).

⁶ “*Marháék! ha Jellasich győz, visszahozzák a robotot, s a kilencedet és tizedet, mi magyarok vagyunk, ha tótul is beszélünk.*”

⁷ Ferenc Pulszky: *Életem és korom*, I–II., Vol. 1, Budapest, Szépirodalmi, 1958, 439–440.

⁸ Until the 1840s, Latin was the official language in Hungary. The “Estate Nation”, that is, “*the nation in the view of the Hungarian estate nationalism*” seems to be a clumsy term, but it is hard to translate the Hungarian “*rendi nemzet*” or “*rendi nacionalizmus*”.

⁹ In the particular Hungarian context “the Estates” could be regarded as a synonym for the nobility. The Hungarian “Third Estate” was politically extremely weak; the clergy as Estate was equal with the Catholic hierarchy, meanwhile about a third of the population belonged to other churches.

Hungarian nationalism has emerged, the inventors of this idea could exploit not only the “ordinary” international (mostly French or German) patterns of nationalist discourse, but these above-mentioned traditions of Hungarian proto-nationalism, that is, the *Hungarian estate nationalism*.

Perhaps the difference between the estate nationalism and present-day nationalisms can best be highlighted by the example of premodern Transylvania (*Erdély*). Here there were three estate nations:

- “the Hungarians” (that is, the community of the noblemen),
- “the Saxons” (the traditional name of the local Germans, living in autonomy)
- “the *Székelys* (Szeklers)” whose language was Hungarian too, but they had a particular legal status, and they lived in autonomous territorial units just as the Saxons did.

The most populous ethnic group in Transylvania, namely the Romanians had no estate *nation*, and the first claim of Romanian nationalism was to gain the status of the fourth Transylvanian *nation*. After this endeavor’s failure in 1791, and with the inspiration of the changing international discourse, the Romanian intellectuals turned to the *ethnic nationalism of all Romanians*.

This was one of the two paradigmatic ways to make a nation around the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. Ethnic nationalism emerged typically where there was not an own state, as in the Polish or the Irish case, or where the ethnic group lived in several countries as in the German or Italian case.¹⁰ The other way resulted in a type of *state nationalism*, which was, with some simplification, the generalization of the privileged groups’ status to the citizens of the state, (at least, in theory) independently of ethnicity. That was the case, for example, with France¹¹ or the United States.¹² At this conference I have to formulate very cautiously because there are many experts on these topics, but probably most of the nationalisms in Latin-America could be classified as state nationalisms.

Perhaps the lecturer is biased, but he regards the Hungarian Kingdom as a special case. The country had a relatively stable state frame and borders in the Middle Ages from about 1000. From 1526 to 1848, Hungary was a part of the Habsburg’s “*composite monarchy*”,¹³ but the country was neither

¹⁰ Romanian nationalism seems to be the product of a combined situation – although I am not an expert on this terrain.

¹¹ According to Hobsbawm, this was true at least at the beginning, but at the end of the 19th century French nationalism began to be “ethnicized”.

¹² African Americans until the 1860s and Native Americans until the 1920s were not regarded as citizens of the United States. The women were regarded as citizens by their father or husband – although there were a lot of “anomalies”.


¹³ Mark Cornwall: *The Habsburg Monarchy*, in T. Baycroft – M. Hewitson (eds.): *What is a Nation? Europe 1789–1914*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, 171–191.

melted into the Empire as in the case of the Czech Kingdom, nor was it an independent state bound to the other territories of the Habsburg's countries by a personal union (as some Hungarian intellectuals often tried to believe). "The Hungarian nation" had some autonomy at local and national level as well (which was inside and outside of the Habsburg Empire). The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 modernized and emphasized this particular status; even the Habsburg Empire was renamed the Austro-Hungarian (Dual) Monarchy (until 1918).


Before 1848 the social and political foundation of this "autonomy" consisted of the estate institutions overwhelmingly run by the nobility, while the estate nationalism served as the ideological foundation.

As a thought experiment, let's try to imagine that the opinion leaders of the country in the 19th century tried to reform the Hungarian estate nationalism into a "pure" modern type of nationalism (figure 1 and 2). As some assembly of the elite and the middle strata could declare, "*we, the people of the Hungarian Kingdom, in Order to form a more perfect state and modernized society...*"

1. Figure. Thought experiment: the reinterpretation of Hungarian estate nationalism as ethnic Hungarian nationalism in the 19th century



2. Figure. Thought experiment: the reinterpretation of Hungarian estate nationalism as state nationalism in the 19th century



This "*extended-to-the-people*" nationalism would seem to be a very promising "*multifunctional ideology*":

- 1.) It could be a modernizing ideology. The most enlightened noblemen and intellectuals often thought that the insistence on the feudal system could easily lead

to a social explosion (as in France in 1789), and/or could easily lead to vanishing from the map as a political entity (as it happened with Poland in the 18th century, the history of which was often referred to in contemporary Hungary.)

2.) It could be an integration ideology which could convince the privileged people that (in the long run) their basic interest is to abandon their privileges. However, and at the same time, this ideology could convince the non-privileged people that their basic interest is to accept the situation in which the (former) privileged keep under their control the making of a new social system without privileges – because they are all members of the same nation.

3.) It could be a suitable ideology of national independence and an ideology to legitimate the dependence state under the Habsburgs at the same time.

It is a very good symbol of the complex ideological construction that 18 years after the defeat of the “*lawful revolution*”¹⁴ of 1848–49 and the execution of the first Hungarian Prime Minister (Lajos Batthyány), the second Hungarian Prime Minister (Gyula Andrassy Senior) was the key actor in the coronation of the same Habsburg ruler (Franz Joseph). Moreover, even though after 1849 the jury of Franz Joseph had sentenced Andrassy to death, later, as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Monarchy, he became the deputy of the ruler in his absence.

But something arrested the unproblematic realization of this kind of ideological system change: the majority of the Hungarian population was not ethnic Hungarian. However, even in France in 1789 only 12–13% of the population spoke “correct” French, and 50% did not speak it at all,¹⁵ or in the newborn Italian Kingdom, only 2.5% of the population spoke Italian in everyday situations. However, these are poor analogies because in these countries the language-variants could be labeled as dialects (*patois*), but Hungarian is not an Indo-European language like all the other languages of the country. Perhaps Switzerland¹⁶ would be a better analogy, where there is a single political nation consisting of equal ethnic groups. The Hungarian opinion leaders tried to treat the challenge in a way which seemed to be analogous to them.

¹⁴ István Deák: *The lawful revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians 1848–1849*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1979.

¹⁵ Eugen Weber: *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914*, Stanford University Press, 1976.


¹⁶ Julie Hartley-Moore: The Song of Gryon: Political Ritual, Local Identity, and the Consolidation of Nationalism in Multiethnic Switzerland, *Journal of American Folklore* 120, 2007, 204–229, 476.

This endeavor resulted in the concept of the political nation: “According to the principle of the constitution, all citizens of Hungary constitute a political nation, the indivisible solid Hungarian nation, and all citizens of any nationality [ethnicity] are equal members of it...” (1868/XIV. Act)¹⁷

However, the Swiss Nation is *not* named after the dominant ethnic group, and this was never just a linguistic issue. In practice in Hungary before 1918, ethnic Hungarians dominated the elite, dominated the administration from the state to the local level, dominated the intellectual/clerical occupations, and they were overrepresented in the non-professional middle class, in the urban population, and in the working class.

What is more, the political nation even in theory was not “ethnic-free”¹⁸ – its ideology had a definite ethnic Hungarian content (figure 3). It was more than a symbol that the language of the state was the Hungarian one. In any other level of the society, there was a meticulously regulated *human* right to use any other languages (however, after a time the law was often broken), but any issue implying a *collective right* (for example, to establish new territory units on ethnic grounds) was treated as taboo.

Figure 3. The political nation in Hungary as “container” of a Hungarian ethnic nation



The above-outlined ideology and policy left in theory three possible ways of identity construction and life-strategy for the members of the non-Hungarian ethnic groups:

¹⁷ “Magyarország összes honpolgárai az alkotmány alapelvei szerint is politikai tekintetben egy nemzetet képeznek, az oszthatatlan egységes magyar nemzetet, melynek a hon minden polgára, bármely nemzetiséghez tartozzék is, egyenjogú tagja...” (1868/XLIV. tc).

¹⁸ There is not enough space and perhaps it would be unproductive to give a detailed analysis of the Hungarian text here: Lajos Kossuth: *Magyar szózatok*, Hamburg, Voigt H. G., 1847. <http://mek.oszk.hu/13600/13620/13620.pdf>, accessed 15 March 2017.

- 1.) Double identity: identification with the non-Hungarian ethnic group and the Hungarian political nation at the same time.
- 2.) The second “strategy” was the “*Magyarizing*”, that is, linguistic assimilation.
- 3.) “Ideological separatism”: to develop and to present one’s own non-Hungarian national¹⁹ identity.

The way of double identity (1) was not clear in a psychological sense: in contemporary Hungarian discourse there was a common topic that to be non-Hungarian implied a cultural and social “interiority” compared to Hungarianness (or at least it empirically correlated with the “interiority”). This thesis was regarded as a truism in Hungarian discourse from subtle political philosophical tracts through journalism to newspaper cartoons.²⁰ One of the typical themes of these cartoons was that non-Hungarians are “childish” or “children” – whereas “the Hungarian” or Hungary as a nation is “the adult” or “the parent”.

In the terrain of language assimilation (2) there was a paradox: the more educated non-Hungarians had a higher chance and higher possibility to assimilate, and, at the same time, they had a higher chance to resist the assimilation policy, to become non-Hungarian nationalists. Two very interesting sources could explain some of the reasons for this.

One of these sources is an important speech of István Bethlen²¹ in the parliament in 1913. Among other things, he drew attention to the dangerous tendency that “*there are 6525 Romanian men with high-school graduation... so the general staff has been organized...*” In comparison, Bethlen regarded it as “normal” that there were only “*1561 such kind of Slovak men...*”²² The future key figure of the interwar Hungarian political system did not mention that at the time of his speech there were 251,000 men older than 24 years who had graduated from high school.²³ While 14.1% of the whole population was Romanian, Bethlen regarded it as a “danger” that 2.6% of the graduated men were Romanian (and he regarded it as “normal” that 9.4% of the whole population, but just 0.62% of the graduated men were Slovaks).

There have been strong historical stereotypes (paradoxically: both positive and negative stereotypes) that the political left-wing was more “empathic” with nationality issues. I will demonstrate this by an early sociological

¹⁹ The “*national*” here means not “*nationwide*”, as in the English in general, but “*in relation with the nation as a political community*”.

²⁰ Ágnes Tamás: *Nemzetiségek görbe tükörben: 19. századi sztereotípiák Magyarországon*, Pozsony, Kalligram, 2014.

²¹ Member of parliament, later Prime Minister of Hungary, 1921–31.

²² István Bethlen: *Válogatott politikai írások és beszédek*, Budapest, Osiris, 2000, 64.

²³ Ignác Romsics: *Magyarország története a XX. században*, Budapest, Osiris, 1999, 40.

report,²⁴ which, of course, cannot substitute a complete counter-argument but it can give a good illustration of this thesis. This paper reported a research study of 806 students²⁵ in Budapest implemented by the members of the Galilei Circle (an association of radical socialist students and young intellectuals). The author of the paper regarded it as normal that the ethnic Hungarians were overrepresented amongst the students (87.2%, while the proportion of Hungarians in the society was about 50%). The author of the paper did not notice that about half of the non-Hungarian students were Germans, so the non-Hungarian and non-German nationalities were even more underrepresented among the students, but he was worried about the “great number” of ethnic students among scholarship holders. However, just 20 non-Hungarian students received a stipendium in the sample (6 of them were German students).²⁶

The overwhelming majority of the other nationalities were peasants, whose chance for assimilation in a non-Hungarian language environment was almost zero. In the beginning of the 20th century, the education policy tried to facilitate assimilation through the elementary school system. Meanwhile, the typical elementary school in the village had 80–150 children of six years in one classroom, with one teacher (who was often the single ethnic Hungarian). At a time when there were no modern media, the efficiency of this educational policy was nominal. However, this policy was “efficient” in hurting the sentiments of the peasants, who formerly perhaps were not as sensitive to the nationality/ethnicity dilemmas as their intellectuals.

The treatment of “ideological separatism” (3) in Hungarian public discourse was ambivalent: typically any kind of manifestation of non-Hungarian identity policy²⁷ was the topic of moral panic, but at the same time, the opinion leaders tried to underrate the significance of the political consequences. Non-Hungarian nationalism was regarded as a product of the clumsy endeavor of a few demagogues, who were financed by the “Pan-Slavic” and imperialist Russian government (“*the traveling ruble*”, as contemporary Hungarian journalism liked to refer to it).

From the point of view of Hungarian public opinion, the Hungarian fight against the Habsburgs was a legitimate and lawful endeavour, but it was a case of “*that’s another matter*” when it came to the struggle of non-Hungarian movements against the Hungarian government in the late 19th and the early 20th century. They were considered illegitimate and (at least potentially)

²⁴ Béla Bosnyák: A budapesti diáknymor, in Gy. Litván – L. Szücs (eds.): *A szociológia első magyar műhelye. A Huszadik Század köre*, Vol. 2, Budapest, Gondolat, 1973, 189–224. [Original: *Huszadik Század*, 1912, 2, 222–244.]

²⁵ This counts as a sizeable sample at that time.

²⁶ Bosnyák: A budapesti diáknymor, 217.

²⁷ For the “identity policy” see Manuel Castells: *The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture. Volume II. The Power of Identity*, Malden–Oxford, Wiley–Blackwell, 2009.

illegal, but for the leaders and intellectuals of these movements the matter was absolutely the same, and this attitude was not a symptom of a “strategic incomprehension”. From the point of view of the non-Hungarian nationalists in Hungary before 1918, they were fighting for the same aims as the Hungarian nationalist movements in the 19th century.

The above mentioned Gyula Andrásy had a son, who had become a politician, too, and later he was the last Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In a Czech cartoon in the early 20th century a villainous-looking Gyula Andrásy Junior threatens to hang the likable “Slovak”, who asks back: *“Is it the same gallows which was built for your father?”* That was a topic in other Czech cartoons as well: an appealing “Slovak” in characteristic folk costume in prison, where there are symbols of the Hungarian revolution and freedom fight of 1848–49. In Hungary these kind of cartoons were banned, while in the Czech Kingdom, in the other part of the Dual Monarchy, it was possible to propagate the idea that there was a single “Czechoslovak people” who required their own state, of course under the Habsburg reign (but independently from Hungary).

Of course, Hungarian moral panic about non-Hungarian nationalisms in the country had the effect of a self-fulfilling prophecy too, but even with perfect hindsight it seems to be a dilemma to accommodate the different nationalist discourses. What was deemed too little for the non-Hungarian ethnic movements was felt to be too much for the Hungarian political public opinion. Moreover, the non-Hungarian nationalist movements proved to be often incompatible even after 1918, in their “post-Hungarian” period too. For example, in Czechoslovakia according to the 1930 census, 50.5% of the population was Czech,²⁸ and even in the interwar period, there were Slovak nationalist politicians imprisoned. The situation of Czechs in the provinces, where Ruthenes lived, reminded one contemporary British expert of the British situation in colonial India.²⁹ Up to 1993 Czechoslovakia was broken up twice, and there was an ethnic cleansing of 3 million Germans and Hungarians.

Before the summary, I would like to follow the opening story. After the 1849 defeat Pulszky emigrated, and in the next one and half decades, he lived, for example, in Turin (Torino), which was the capital of the Kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont). For the Hungarian political migrants, Piedmont was a very relevant country, mostly in the period of the 1859 war against the

²⁸ Ignác Romsics: *Nemzet, nemzetiség és állam Kelet-Közép- és Délkelet-Európában a 19. és 20. században*, Budapest, Napvilág, 1998, 206–207.

²⁹ Carlile Aylmer Macartney: *Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1937, 226.

Habsburg Empire. The French Emperor, Napoleon III, supported Piedmont in this war, but his support had its price: the French annexation of Savoy and Nice. “Of course”, if “the people” want it too.

“There has happened in Nice the plebiscite [referendum]” – Pulszky wrote in his memoirs.

...The Russians agitated for France, the English guests for Italy... the local habitants bother with neither France, nor Italy, but they tried to exploit the Russians and the Englishmen...

However, what they didn't like was that after the plebiscite³⁰ there were French clerks with a lot of decorators... who changed all the Italian signs to French ones, without asking the consent of the shopkeepers and tradesmen. The Frenchmen understand better their civilizing role than we [the underlining is mine – DCs].³¹

How could Pulszky, a freedom fighter exiled by an Empire, sympathize with another Empire, not with the freedom fighter Guiseppe Garibaldi, who had been born in Nice and who protested against its annexation by the French Empire? Well, it is interesting that in 1861 Pulszky's wife (a daughter of a Viennese banker) gave birth to their fourth child. His given name was Garibaldi...

It weakens the value of the point, but for the sake of completeness: Pulszky accepted the Compromise of 1867, he came home, and he became one of the most influential leaders of Hungarian cultural policy in the next quarter century. He wrote his memoirs, from which the previous quotation is taken, circa 1880. Just like the complexity of the Hungarian national idea, it is not a simple story.

CONCLUSION

The most important thesis of my lecture is that a notable modernization in the political discourse of Hungary developed at the end of the 18th century and the first half of 19th century and the new concept of the nation played an important role in this process. Let's mention just one aspect of this success:

“Alone among the revolutions of 1848, the Hungarian one did not fall or ever look like falling by internal weakness and conflict, but by overpowering military conquest. It is, of course, true that its chances of avoiding such conquest after the breakdown of all the rest were zero.”³²

³⁰ In fact, it happened before the referendum; Pulszky has failed (DCs).

³¹ “A franciák jobban értik civilizátori szerepüket, mint mi” (Pulszky: *Életem és korom*, 250.)

³² Eric Hobsbawm: *The Age of Capital, 1848–1875*, London, Abacus, 1976, 32–33.

In the lecture I have not spoken about the ethnic conflicts, the political tension, or the social base of the ethnic movements. Although there was an ethnic civil war with Romanian, Serb, and Croatian insurgents in 1848–49, the relevant parts of the Romanian, Serb, Croatian, German and Slovak population supported the Hungarian government. At the same time, some ethnic Hungarians supported the Habsburgs during the freedom fight; what is more, despite the national mythology, the great majority of Hungarians accepted (if without enthusiasm) absolutist rule after the defeat.

The representatives of the Hungarian nationalist idea tried “to clear” the lines in the next period until 1918. This ideological endeavor was successful in a sense, but it had non-intended consequences as well: it was not suitable for the integration of the non-Hungarians. The Hungarian elite and middle class regarded it as a good sign that the manifestation of open political tension was so rare among the ethnic minorities. In retrospect, it seems to be much more relevant that the Hungarians in the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century lost the “categorization” war. That is, before the First World War both ethnic Hungarians and non-Hungarians regarded the Hungarian Kingdom as the “(ethnic) Hungarians’ state” – even though about half of the population were non-Hungarians. In the moment of the breakdown at the end of the First World War, it proved to be a critical factor.

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NATIONALISM, MODERNIZATION AND SOCIETY IN CROATIAN LONG CENTURY

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HRVOJE VOLNER

ABSTRACT

The processes of the formation of Croatian national ideology and various types of nationalism that emerged from it came to be mainly a reaction to the fact that modernization was a comprehensive event, and therefore propulsive forces in society worked for or against this unpredictable machine. Cultural nationalism was the reaction of the local nobility, and in the Croatian case they exploited their municipal privilege when they had legitimate remains of the class liberties embodied in medieval parliament as the foundation of their historical right, but were not so eager to extend these rights to the people themselves. Demographic growth, with low purchasing power of agriculture workers and low output in production as the result of absence of investments, made Croatia excellent in the exporting of its people, creating a large diaspora. Industrialization through a modernization process from 1873 until 1939 made a solid productive basis for developing a second phase of industrialization. Uneven technological progress and monopolistic competition made pockets of the workforce capable for its further development. But all was destroyed during the Second World War, a war that had elements of genocide, civil war and international conflict. Demographic losses were most severe in the structure of the dynamic parts of the production force.

Keywords: *nationalism, modernization, industrialization, diaspora, Croatia*

NATIONALISM, NATION AND MODERNIZATION

The fight for the preservation of Croatian nationality as part of the Illyrian nation (later accepted as the Croatian nation) caused the ethnically defined nationalism, contrary to the rest of the national body who were not Illyrians

(for example, Germans, Hungarians and others). Modernization and dynamic social strata as bearers of the new occurred here in discontinuity with the fundamental processes in the creation of infrastructure for a future national state: language, cultural institutions, national ideology and so on. The examples from Croatian history can be used to compare the types of nationalism (Western European and Central European); they indicate the possibility of different directions in the development of the national state. The book "The Croatian nation and nationalism in the 19th and 20th centuries" by the historian Nikša Stančić, which is a valuable source for the study of the above mentioned phenomenon, indicates the reasons due to which ethno-nationalism became the option of endangered political elites of Central and Southeast Europe, especially Croatia, at one time during the implementation of the modernization processes. For the sole purpose of presentation, it is important to underline the fact of the ambiguity of the concept of nationalism, which in relation to the politically defined concept of a nation in a civil and (or) ethnic sense, includes, in itself, energies that can easily change their polarity from patriotism to racial, religious and ethnic chauvinism. Therefore, the conclusion that Stančić proposes is that there is a difference between the Western and Central European concept of nation and nationalism "in political operationalization, that is, a different function of a 'civil' ('political') and 'ethnic' component in each of these types, whereby that ratio and function changed over time."¹ Thus, these nationalisms and nations had their own distinct history. Consequently, one should distinguish between the appearance of the nation in the form of nationalism, from the term nationalism as an identity according to which the individual and the collective is determined, and doing so, not forget the purpose of a struggle to overcome the past.²

A civil nation defined by sovereignty results from the fractures caused by great social breakages due to the processes of modernization. Scientific and technical changes destroy the feudal fences between classes and change the nature of corporate ownership, which is, according to the modernized Roman law (as opposed to majoratic rights) perceived as private ownership. And thereby civilians have the monopoly on the use of power – of a state risen in the modern age as a separate phenomenon. In a pre-modern stage, that same state will standardize a national culture that the modern Western European nations, according to the ideal type, inherit from the predecessor, only now

¹ Nikša Stančić: *Hrvatska nacija i nacionalizam u 19. i 20. stoljeću*, Zagreb, Barabat, 2002, 8.

² Stančić: *Hrvatska nacija i nacionalizam*, 3–8; *Leksikon temeljnih pojmova politike*, Zagreb, Školska knjiga, 1990, 82.; Lino Veljak: *Metafizički temelji politikâ identiteta, Identitet i kultura*, Zagreb, Institut za društvena istraživanja, 2014, 65. Compare Panikos Panayi: *Ethnic Minorities in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany Jews, Gypsies, Poles, Turks and Others*, Essex, Pearson Education 2000, 213–215; Anthony D. Smith: *Nationalism and modernism*, Zagreb, Politička misao, 2003, 16, 36.

with modern contents. That process gives patriotism a blessed position: man is in a state of nature free, with the ability to contemplate, he is his own master, his work creates a property that is his, and when teamed up by a social contract, citizens create their own state and/or society, to preserve private property which is sacred. Without modernization, but also a modern State, the reasons of political ethnicity are not rational, and patriotism has a clear characteristic of favoritism of a kind – a fight for survival through ethnicity.³

On the one hand, we can argue that the main purpose of the emancipation of a class in a modern society is liberation according to the processes of modernization. That modernization is but an inner content of nationalism. Contrary to this, we have an occurrence of national movements generated as a response by the provincial elite towards “other people’s” national integration impulses. Such phenomena were not present in Western Europe because “the carriers of the old system would lose their social base and disappeared in the new system.”⁴ It was about the areas where alongside the traditional, politically powerful nobles, a layer of wealthy traders would appear as a bourgeois aristocracy who buy noble titles and thus identify themselves with the old system. The process of national integration takes place here, but without social stratification inherent in a modern civil society. We can talk about the gentle modernization processes that affect the competitiveness of serf production. If it came to social emancipation in terms of liberal principles, then it was to a limited extent and under control, in the interest of the aristocracy and the new nobility. In fact, it was on the periphery where an indigenous resistance towards the weak modernization and national integration impulses of the Habsburg Monarchy could arise undisturbed. As the bearers of resistance towards modernization were the representatives of the old system, they did not articulate their parole through the ideas of equality, solidarity and freedom, but they insisted on the conservative institutions – class constitutionalism. “The focus of the new identity has not been put on ... individual citizens and the political community of citizens ... the nation was understood as a collective superior to the individual.”⁵ These provincial elites have done what the ancien régime did in the pre-revolutionary epoch. They established the institutions necessary for a cultural standardization. Thus, the Croatian national revival sought standardization and the introduction of a national language as the official language. Due to the lack of real modernization of integration factors, no one had to learn that tool of public thought if they did not want to. Thus the language of political institutions in the Banate of

³ Compare Stančić: *Hrvatska nacija i nacionalizam*, 11–18, 21–23. On the difference between Roman and Germanic law see Ivan Prić: *Država i društvo*, Beograd, Mala edicija ideja, 1976, 74 i d.; Hannah Arendt: *The Human Condition*, Zagreb, August Cesarec, 1990, 92.

⁴ Stančić: *Hrvatska nacija i nacionalizam*, 25.

⁵ Stančić: *Hrvatska nacija i nacionalizam*, 29.

Croatia and Slavonia was Croatian (from 1861), but the language of trade as the most important economic activity (including during the interwar period) was German and Hungarian.⁶

The language of modernization is a language of technology and science. It is about the need to accept the reality that contradicts the illusion of immediate consciousness. It is about education in terms of mass technical education in order to plan the implementation of new technologies in the production process, but also the ability of the workforce to adopt new knowledge. Science is the product of the action of rational categories, which extend to the technologies of creating knowledge (the microscope, the telescope, scientific procedures and so on), and has its birthplace in the human mind. How other than through learning could we understand that things that get our attention arise from the possibility of our conceptual cognition, that the image we have about the world is never final. Hence the weakness of the untrained mind towards ideological abuse; it is a gnoseological constant and it needs to be absorbed.⁷

A nation (a mental concept about which we have no rational knowledge, as well as of God) hypostatizes into a being by itself, which identifies its subjects that differentiate themselves and those who are like them from those who do not belong to the collective that is defined by a nation. A nation is a metaphysical foundation of absolute identity; according to some thinkers it usually works in a way that the always particulate entity is put in place of the greatest generality. In doing so, of course, one should take into account the fact that metaphysics does not deal with beings and entities as such, but it deals with concepts. Absolutization of concepts derives from the principles of abstraction, the exclusion of the important from the unimportant. This can help establish a hierarchy of concepts, but also a hierarchy of beings to which these terms refer. While science considers these forms of classification inappropriate in modern forms of research, they play an important role in the sphere of social reality.⁸ In the social everyday life, they “acquire real life that would be reflected in its perverted forms as real power.”⁹ It is about “almost exclusively ethnic-national and religious (only sometimes racial, and often cultural) dimensions of individual and group identity. Basically,

⁶ Eric J. Hobsbawm: *Nacije i nacionalizam*, Zagreb, Novi liber, 1993, 47; Stančić: *Hrvatska nacija i nacionalizam*, 25–29.

⁷ On the relationship between technology and the workforce see Nicolas Snowden: What really caused the Great Recession? Rhyme and repetition in a theme from 1930s, *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 39, 2015, 1250–1252. <http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/> accessed 19 October, 2016; Helmuth Plessner: *Zakašnjela nacija (O političkoj zavodljivosti građanskog duha)*, Zagreb, Naprijed, 1997, 125–138.

⁸ Veljak: *Metafizički temelji političke identiteta*, 59–62.

⁹ Veljak: *Metafizički temelji političke identiteta*, 63.

the ethnic-national and religious dimensions are in homology (and in the corresponding homologous series, they often get that dimension of identity that produces the idea – i.e. the value – of racial purity).¹⁰

The phenomenon of converting the energy of nationalism from patriotism to chauvinistic racial, religious or ethnic content has to be separated from modernization as an essential precondition for the construction of the modern nation. We can, as in the case of the former Second and Third Reich, have the emergence of a powerful industrial force that perceives the surrounding world through an ideological visor of social Darwinism. Modernization is, in this case, the cause and factor of great social change, but it also creates an opinion that the fact of the survival of the strongest is the only truth of a natural human being, and that force is the only law. Plessner notices the problem in the weakening of the religious traditions of antiquity and Christianity in modern man, which causes him to neglect support in generalizing natural morality. Since the emergence of the German nation took place without strong links with the enlightened tradition of rationality and humanism, but through the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio*, there remains a reality of a crude and false image of the superiority of modernization as a racial superiority. We can say that in this area the idea of the modern state is not spontaneous, that civil society was the project of enlightened absolute monarchs. While in the 18th century it was believed that the British Parliament could do everything except turn a man into a woman and vice versa, in Germany the authority of the emperor was replaced by the authority of a leader. Appellation becomes one of the means of the authoritarian state, and it has the task of providing well-being and culture instead of being the traditional tool in the fight of certain entities of a civil society. Can we, in this day and age, claim that the old European nations, created in the age of Enlightenment, kept any active links with the essential components of this historical period – the Humanity (and what would that mean)? And has the modernization outgrown humans and society?¹¹

THE ISSUE OF THE MODERNIZATION OF CROATIAN SOCIETY, CONTINUITY AND CUTS

The provincial government of the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia from the time of Ban Ivan Mažuranić tried to regulate the land according to European models, by forming the institutions necessary to transform the country towards the contours of modernism (state administration,

¹⁰ Veljak: *Metafizički temelji političke identiteta*, 64.

¹¹ Plessner: *Zakašnjela nacija*, 60–75, 119, 123; Franz Neumann: *Demokratska i autoritativna država*, Zagreb, Naprijed, 1974, 34–36.

organization of necessary secondary schools, such as the agricultural and forestry school in Križevci, and later the appropriate faculties as well, and the organization of the Forest service in the Provincial Government in Zagreb and others). These countries (namely Croatia and Slavonia, later also Vojna Krajina) set free the workforce from centuries-old ties of feud, but imposed a tax on the vast masses of peasants that would force them to sell land and also cause a separation of cooperative property, emigration to overseas countries, as well as the conversion to the proletariat. This time, in the interwar period, is remembered by the fact that the Banate of Croatia was “only exploiting the workforce, and therefore there is a million Croats overseas,” or “during the Austro–Hungarian we exported manpower instead of goods. Nowadays, we should not do that (April 1930 A/N), even if we could. Nowadays, we should export goods.”¹² In the period between 1880 and 1921, the population employed in the field of agriculture decreased slightly from 83% to 75.3%, and the main cause for that was the high birthrate and emigration of the excess population from the arable land to the cities of Croatia and Slavonia that slowly grew, but also emigration abroad.¹³

In his valuable paper “The agrarian crisis in Croatia from 1873 to 1895” Rudolf Bičanić explains the causes of the structural crisis in Croatia, and by doing so he also reveals the real consequences of the penetration of foreign capital and the intentions of the holder of modernization in political and economic terms. He claims that the direction of economic development in the 19th century went towards the total abolition of feudalism and towards the development and strengthening of civil society and capitalism as the basic economic system. He points out that economists, while analyzing the causes of economic decline, often forget that peasants and young-capitalist countries can ascribe their decline to a huge burden of the tax pressure of the state apparatus, which is reflected in the indirect exploitation of peasants. A farmer, since he was not able to arrange the sale of his products (through cooperatives) represents a damaged party when having to sell to a middleman. For example, during the agrarian crisis, when the price of wheat fell by 50% on the world market, that fall was over two-thirds in the export country. The autarkic peasant economy provided everything necessary for an individual household, except tax money and luxury goods, which gradually penetrated society (e.g., sugar and petroleum), and village consumption was minimal for the entire period until the end of World War II. The domestic elite at

¹² Državni arhiv u Osijeku (u nastavku DAOS) 223, box 121, Zapisnik plenarne sjednice 6.4.1930. Govor ministra Demetrovića

¹³ Rudolf Bičanić: *Agrarna kriza u Hrvatskoj 1873–1895*, Zagreb, 1937, 12; Ivo Goldstein: *Hrvatska 1918–2008*, Zagreb, EPH–LIBER, 2008, 79–80; Mira Kolar-Dimitrijević: *Kratak osvrt na povijest šuma Hrvatske i Slavonije od 1850. godine do Prvog svjetskog rata*, *Ekonomika i ekohistorija*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Zagreb, 2008, 74–82.

the end of the 19th century saw modernization as the progress of trade and industry, which were considered to be the cause of wealth. These were mainly members of the old feudal stock, the clergy, the nobility and bourgeoisie, with a lesser degree of intelligence, and industrialists. This was a group “which was renewed for a certain period of years with every parliamentary election, but it was actually guaranteed in advance especially for this purpose, in a tailored electoral order. Peasantry and workers would rarely get to speak when it came to those elections.”¹⁴ Clearly trying to enhance the unfavorable social structure of the country, the growth of tax revenues reached a whole 100% in the first era of agrarian crisis.¹⁵ “The impact of the crisis can be best judged by the declining state revenues of salt. Salt was considered to be one of the primary human needs, and therefore the most elastic expenditure. Despite that, its consumption fell in the first phase of the crisis by almost 20%, even though the population increased ... for the same amount of salt, two and three times more wheat had to be given.”¹⁶

In the best case scenario it was about cohabitation, a collaboration of the new rich and the old elite, if not about the domination of the old aristocracy in the application of modernization achievements. Before the abolition of feudalism, the Habsburg Monarchy had already begun the process of the transformation of feudal landowners into capitalist entrepreneurs. Compared to the centers of modernization, feudalism based on the serf economy dominated for a very long time in Croatia. The latifundia of foreign nobility in Slavonia did well; they overcame the crisis caused by the abolition of feudal relations by taking advantage of that by leasing and also selling forests. According to the statistics from 1895, only 8.48% of properties in Croatia and Slavonia exceeded the size of 11 ha, and only 0.28% of properties covered more than 57 ha of land (with 27.68% of arable land in total). The share of small rural holdings up to 5 ha of total arable land accounted for about 44.3%, but in 1946, the ratio rose to 76.8%.¹⁷

According to the model of internal colonization stated by Michael Hechter, the periphery became the object of exploitation by the industrially developed core. Investments conditioned the economic development of the periphery, making it dependent on the foreign market. Export from the periphery had always been in the form of raw materials (agricultural, forest or mineral), at best of semi-finished products. Modernization, in this case, led to “cultural

¹⁴ Bičanić: *Agrarna kriza u Hrvatskoj*, 17. (quotes Vinko Krišković: *Dokle smo došli*, Zagreb 1925, 31.)

¹⁵ Bičanić: *Agrarna kriza u Hrvatskoj 1873–1895*, 4, 7–11.

¹⁶ Bičanić: *Agrarna kriza u Hrvatskoj 1873–1895*, 11–12.

¹⁷ Iván T. Berend – György Ránki: *The European Periphery and Industrialization 1780–1914*, Zagreb, Naprijed, 1996, 50; Mirjana Gross: *O položaju plemstva u strukturi elite sjeverne Hrvatske potkraj 19. i na početku 20. stoljeća*, Historijski zbornik, No. 31–32, Zagreb, 1978, 123–139.

division of labor” or “colonial development produces a cultural division of labor: a system of stratification in which the objective cultural differences come in front of the class benchmarks. Occupations of higher status are kept for those from metropolitan culture; members of the local culture are ranked at the bottom of the stratification system”.¹⁸

The example of the early industrialization of Slavonia in the period from 1873 confirms the thesis of internal colonization. The exploitation is dominated by one type of raw material, in this case wood (initially red oak, but with the improvements of the transport equipment and saturation of the market, sessile oak, beech, and others were used as well). The dependence of the nobility on the financial centers of the Monarchy caused their political orientation, which was manifested in the preservation of the minimum autonomy under the auspices of the crown of St. Stephen. The circle of the elite in the area of the periphery expanded with the arrival of new people, the industrialists. A question about the type of property involved in the exploitation of the Slavonian forests (whether domestic or foreign-owned) already came up at the turn of the century. The always liberally optimistic report by the Trade Chamber of Commerce in Osijek responded saying that a domestic property was in question, because most newcomers remained living in the area of the chamber and paid taxes where their factory plant was located as well. This was a half-truth, since newcomers paid taxes and in other parts of the Monarchy, even more, depending on the capacity of the products they sold. The Gutmann family from Nagykanizsa has to be pointed out as the messengers of modernization, since they would become one of the largest forest landowners and industrialists in Croatia. This family’s profit was not invested nor, to a significant extent, consumed in the country of occurrence, but in Budapest and Vienna (except for the exceptions of Edmund and Alfred Gutmann).¹⁹

In 1937, when Bićanić spoke of foreign capital invested in 1873 in Croatia, he called it a colonial-capitalist sector. This refers to the part of the national economy, which dealt with the exploitation of forests, mines and the like. It was characterized by a large concentration of capital, which could not be found in a poorly developed and young-capitalist country. In such countries, this type of capital, according to Bićanić, showed the same phenomena as found in the exploitation of colonies. He stated the following examples: the destruction of the wealth of nations, without a plan and without care for the future, drawing material goods from the earth without leaving the equivalent in it. The country remains without profit, while labor becomes exhausted and falls on

¹⁸ Smith: *Nationalism and modernism*, 60.

¹⁹ Gross: *O položaju plemstva u strukturi*, 126–130; Hrvoje Volner: *Drvena industrija Slavonije s posebnim osvrtom na obitelj Gutmann do kraja 1918. godine*, *Historijski zbornik*, LXV, 2, 2012, 464–473; Kerencsényi (ed.): *A nagykanizsai Gutmann-család felemelkedése a nagyburzsoázíába*, *Zalai Gyűjtemény 12*, Zalaegerszeg, 1979, 147–149.

the community, which, in practice, breeds corruption as a social system. The agrarian crisis would, until 1895, change the poorly productive relations in production in the countryside. Fallow land, as well as the rotational system of farming would abate. While in Western Europe, the crisis caused a reduction of wheat fields, and a transition to intensive livestock farming our country increased wheat farming, especially wheat, maize, potatoes and forage plants. Some of the land began to be better cultivated; until the crisis seven to eight owners used the same plow in some districts. The custom of winter plowing in some Slavonian districts did not exist not even until the mid-20th century.²⁰

CUTS IN THE MODERNIZATION PROCESSES

If the agrarian crisis represented a failure in the structure of the traditional peasant economy, the political changes caused by the end of the First World War would represent a cut in the modernization continuity. However, the crisis destroyed the poor, and the survivors represented the transition of quantity into quality. Many rural households in Croatia and Slavonia met the decline of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy almost without debt, mostly due to inflation. Yet the demographic growth and shortage of arable land caused a new scramble for arable land. Agrarian reform created a break in the process of improving agricultural production, and this cut led to the first discontinuity.²¹

The peasant economy became, in 1918, a general state policy; the criteria for the distribution of land to the individual producer did not result from the superiority of one's production, but from ethnic-national-religious reasons. Arable land was divided by nationality (war merit) with the aim of creating loyal voters, and even for purposes of national security. All of those had nothing to do with the quality of the farming. A scattered, technically unequipped peasant property, with a labor force that generally had no knowledge of the agrarian economy, could not help feed the surplus population. The locals bought land from impoverished or nationally undesirable nobility, while at the same time settlers from Serbia received land from the state based on the nationalization of estates in Croatia. In such conditions, the agrarian reform, as a significant social measure of agrarian societies, produced a national intolerance. If we also add that the price of wheat fell after 1925 from 4.17

²⁰ Bičanić: *Agrarna kriza u Hrvatskoj*, 30–32; Zvonimir Kulundžić: *Politika i korupcija u Kraljevskoj Jugoslaviji*, Zagreb, 1968, 51 i d.

²¹ Zdenka Šimončić-Bobetko: *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Hrvatskoj 1918–1941*, Zagreb, AGM, 1997, 25–30; John R. Lampe – Marvin R. Jackson: *Balkan Economic History 1550–1950, From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982, 331–333.

dinars to 0.60 dinars per kilogram in 1930, and that 60% of national income of Yugoslavia came from agricultural production, then it becomes clear that inequality had to be the cause of the destruction of the nation. In addition to everything else, we should mention a ten-year tax inequality between the newly acquired regions and the former Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, which was justified by the war damage, but also as a reward to Serbia for winning the war, and the newly added areas were treated as colonies.²²

The expropriation of forest estates especially affected the disposal of private property that became unsafe. Industrial companies for the exploitation of forest and wood processing (largely owned by foreign capital) tried to ensure the stability of their business, but this was only possible by providing concessions, which were charged by bribing the responsible people in the government. Although the interwar Yugoslavia publically wrote that it was the foreign capitalists (mainly Hungarian Jews) who had corrupted the country, it was the rulers who were setting up the framework of market competition. This certainly contributed to a slowdown in the modernization of the economic system of the country, where the industry was concentrated on drawing a maximum profit from raw materials and poorly qualified labor. The corruption, which in the interwar Yugoslavia was encouraged by the government, caused a significant delay in the modernization processes.²³

The next cut was created by World War II, which caused the deletion of entire ethnic communities that were holders of modernization in certain areas. According to what has so far been researched, it is clear that the quisling government, supported by German invaders, expropriated the Serbs, Jews, Romas. Was this modernization by murder? Kept in Croatian archives are the documents that bring the decisions on nationalization of non-Aryan property. There were cases, such as the one of Viktor Gutmann, when the Ustasha officials kept some individuals in management positions if they could not replace them with someone more eligible. This is evidenced by letters of a circular character which sought the removal of Serbs, Jews and Masons from certain activities, but only if they were not necessary. In practice, all of this meant the loss of mostly professional manpower in trade, industry, transport, and the public sector, but also in the opposite direction, after the war, a loss

²² Mijo Mirković: *Ekonomska struktura Jugoslavije*, Zagreb, Nakladni zavod Hrvatske, 1950, 10, 13, 23–33; Ivan Lajić – Mario Bara: *Ratovi, kolonizacija i nacionalna struktura Slavonije u dvadesetom stoljeću*, Zagreb, Institut za migracije i narodnosti, 2009, 66–68, 70; Boris Kršev: *Finansijska politika Jugoslavije 1918–1941*; Novi Sad, Prometej, 2007, 64–74, 124, 125–128.

²³ Compare the papers of Zdenka Šimončić-Bobetko: *Izvlaštenje veleposjedničkih šuma u Hrvatskoj 1919–1941. godine*, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 25, 1993, 232–233; and *Osnovne karakteristike industrijskog razvoja na području Hrvatske u međuratnom razdoblju*, *Acta Historico-Economica Iugoslaviae*, 1, Zagreb, 1974, 61–62; and also Smiljana Đurović: *Državna intervencija u industriji Jugoslavije 1918–1941*, Beograd, Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1986, 39, 42–50.

of well-educated agricultural workers – the Germans. All of this supports the idea of modernization as a mechanism carried out by individuals. Viktor Gutmann was killed by the communist authorities for cooperation with the occupier, and his brother Ernest was killed by the Ustasha authorities because he was no longer needed.²⁴

While the aforementioned agrarian reform favored the suitable according to similar ethnicity, the agrarian reform after World War II was based on the idea that the land owner can only be a person who handles that same land. State have prescribed agrarian maximum, person who had more land would lost its property without possibility of compensation. The aim of the reform was not to improve the agricultural production, but to provide a social help to poor farmers. Agrarian reform took away the land from those who knew how to make money from it, and gave it to those who did not. Inputting the confiscated land in the Land Fund, 1,500,000 hectares of land were shared, of which 51% of the total or 80% of arable land was given to farmers. Forest estates, as well as all industrial enterprises, fell under state ownership.²⁵

The policy of the communist rulers on villages targeted the so-called big farmer, who was marked as a potential enemy of the people, and who was then imposed with a progressive tax in the form of the repurchase of agricultural products. The task was to make agricultural production complementary to industry and other sectors of the national economy and to bring the arable land owned by farmers into full operation and application of all known agrotechnical measures. Rural properties larger than 10 ha represented a problem since they were used to speculate with the price of wheat and other grains, but they exploited only 60–65% of their capacity. The new policy towards the village failed, but it started the transition of the peasant masses to the city center, where large investment cycles began as a part of a five-year plan (from 1947). The resistance of peasants towards the new measures in agriculture was marked as Bourgeois nationalism by the communist government. The administrative centralism was also marked as a type of nationalism. It evolved in all aspects of government, from central to state and local. It evolved in the relations between the ministries and the bodies responsible for the implementation of the five-year plan at the federal and state level to the companies and state economic institutions. It was the residue of the capitalist worldview which was characterized as economic particularism, because it

²⁴ Ivo Goldstein: *Hrvatska 1918–2008*, 256, 267; Milan Salajić: *Old Belišće*, Belišće 2012, 107–115; Hrvoje Volner: Nacionalne ideologije i oslobodilačke revolucije, *Zbornik radova Kultura, Identitet, Društvo–Europski realitet*, Osijek–Zagreb, 2014, 784; DAOS fond 6 Poglavarstvo grada Osijeka, box 5188.

²⁵ *Enciklopedija Leksikografskog zavoda*, Zagreb, 1959, bibliografska jedinica "Jugoslavija", 19–27. Marijan Maticka: *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija 1945–1948*, Zagreb, Školska knjiga, 1990, 47–48; Marijan Maticka: Uvjeti i okolnosti za provođenje agrarne reforme i kolonizacije u Hrvatskoj, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 27, 1978, 5–12.

was impossible to understand that the people's ownership has primarily a social character, not a capitalist one. That generated a tendency of destroying the competition of the local economy, at different levels of government, in order to centralize the means of production. The creators of the five-year plan called that process a conditional nationalism because there was no reaction that would give these phenomena a bourgeois-nationalist direction.²⁶

CONCLUSION

In the first phase of modernization, we can follow a consolidation of landowners and liberated peasants, who, in different ways, adapted to the new situation, especially freedom, but also a state intervention that, through various taxes, forced farmers to turn goods into money. Demographic growth and insufficient resources for investment as well as exclusivity in the process of implementation of agrarian reform after the First World War was the cause of hostility between nations. Distribution had nothing to do with the quality of tillage, and the primary sector of the national economy became a category of social welfare. The colonial-capitalist sector of the national economy was included in the system of corruption, and therefore this sector of the economy became unpliant for the development of maximum capacity. The attempt to change the social structure of the population after the Second World War gave more significant results. The number of employees in agriculture, as well as demographic growth were reduced. From the the mid-60s of the last century the economic emigration to the countries of Western Europe grew. The planned economy connected the sectors of production in a national economy using the logic of education, opening workplaces, and providing social and health care. Modernization without the pluralism of political life formed society via propaganda, which led to a long-term decline of civil society, general widespread corruption, and the strengthening of ethno-nationalism as a traditional system of identification of subjects.

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²⁶ Katarina Spehnjak: Seljački otpor politici obveznog otkupa u Hrvatskoj 1949. godine, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, 27, 1995, 209–210; Boris Kidrič: *O nekim principijelnim pitanjima naše privrede*, Sabrana dela V, Beograd, 1948, 8–14; John R. Lampe – Marvin R. Jackson: *Balkan Economic History 1550–1950*, 442.

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THE GERMAN LANGUAGE PRESS IN TEMESWARER BANAT AND THE HABSBURG'S IDEOLOGIES

VICTOR NEUMANN

ABSTRACT

Under Vienna's coordination, the Diocese of the Roman Catholic Church from Temeswarer Banat (Temesvári Bánság/Banatul Timișoarei) was reestablished, the Swabs, an important German population, were colonized, and basic administrative and economic institutions were founded. The Catholics coordinated the religious life of the region, representing the main bridge to the Austrian Empire. As soon as German became the official language of Temeswar (nowadays Timișoara) and its neighboring area, but also a language of communicating and popularizing information, the press became an instrument of work. Both during the 18th century and the 19th, it was in tune with the conqueror's ideology, with the direction of Vienna's imperial authority. The two German language publications, Temeswarer Nachrichten and Temeswarer Zeitung, are among the best examples of the magnitude of Austrian reforms in Banat during the 18th and 19th centuries, and also their role in promoting and establishing European modernity within the East-Central regions of the continent.

Keywords: *Temesvár/Timisoara, Temeswarer Press, multiethnicity, intercultural profile of Temesvár, Confessional diversity, Catholic's coordination, German as official language, Austrian reforms in Banat*

THE FIRST REGIONAL NEWSPAPER: TEMESWARER NACHRICHTEN (THE INFORMATION OF TEMESWAR)

Following the recommendations of Empress Maria Theresia and Joseph II's proposals from 1768 regarding the founding of a German language printing press, along with a Serbian and a Romanian one, Mathäus Joseph Heimerl

established the first institution of this kind in Banat, publishing the regional newspaper entitled *Temeswarer Nachrichten* (The Information of Temeswar). As a result of count Clary und Altringen's – the president of the Temeswar city administration and the governor of Banat – benevolence, the newspaper was first issued on the 18th of April, 1771. The model was borrowed from papers printed in Vienna, Bratislava and Pest. Thirteen issues of *Temeswarer Nachrichten* were kept at the *Vienna Imperial Court Archive*.¹ By the published news, but also by the content of some articles, the newspaper created a nice intellectual climate.

Its first issue popularized information from the Viennese court,² *Temeswarer Nachrichten* reproducing passages from the *Diarium*³ issue number 26/23rd of March regarding Empress Maria Theresia's enterprises, her audiences, the imperial orders regarding the official course of currency, its circulation, and the mourning gatherings organized at the death of political personalities or members of the imperial family. Along with such news, Editor Mathäus Joseph Heimerl advertised the new orders of Banat's governor, Count Clary und Altringen, which referred to the regional economy and trade and which enforced state control upon the exchange of goods and transportation. It was the centralist model, of French origin, assimilated by the imperial administration.

In the third issue of the newspaper, published on the 2nd of May, 1771, Mathäus Joseph Heimerl published an article in which, after inserting some news regarding the Austrian-Prussian relations, he expressed his perspectives upon the political status of Romanian states, the unification tendencies of the Tsarist Russian naval army, and Poland's precarious political and economic situation. Here are the journalist's notes: "It seems that the Russians hope to keep Moldavia and Wallachia under their domination. They seek to comprise <the cameral works> (Camerälwesen) within a good constitution (gute Verfassung) and in this regard field-marshal Ruminatsev summoned baron Gartenberg from Warsaw". "A fleet from Azov will act on the sea to try the unification of Russia's maritime power in the archipelago. Beside all these, they still talk about peace". "At the same time, Poland suffers mostly. And if the war will continue, the country will be deprived of people and cattle"⁴.

¹ See Österreichischen Staatsarchiv. *Finanz und Hofkammerarchiv, Wien, 1, Banater Akten, Rote Nr. 73, Fasz. 1 (1770–1778)*, fol. 652–684 – *Altteste Zeitung des Banat*. See also Dr. Joseph Wüst: *Die Anfänge des Buchdruckes und des Pressewesens im Banat*, Wien, 1954, 47; Franz Liebhard: *Banater Mosaik. Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte*, Bukarest, Kriterion, 1976, 208.

² *Temeswarer Nachrichten*, 18th April, 1771, 652–653.

³ *Diarium*: one of the best known Austrian publications of the time.

⁴ *Temeswarer Nachrichten*, 2nd May, 1771, 657.

THE CULTURAL-EDUCATIONAL COMPONENT OF THE PUBLICATION

During the last decades of the 18th century, Banat was not only a region in which the craft and trades prospered, but one in which society was concerned with education, with intellectual emancipation. Close contacts had been established with Central and South-East Europe, due to the involvement of some of Temeswarer's intellectuals. Supported by the imperial administration, schools were founded and schoolbooks were published. In a report given to Maria Theresia in 1779, attorney Daniel Lazarini of Caransebeş (commissioned to research the possibilities for improving the educational process in the Romanian school network in Banat) stressed the necessity that the authorities should ensure an appropriate number of manuals in the Romanian language.⁵ Concerning Mathäus Joseph Heimerl's efforts, he published and sold schoolbooks and children's books: *A spelling book, an ABC and multiplication table, a magazine full of lessons for children for multiplication tables*,⁶ *a magazine full of lessons for children for the correct training of mind and heart, a magazine full of lessons for young people, especially young women, a handbook for young people poor people*⁷ and so on. The manuals were the reprinted versions of those edited in Vienna and destined to be used in normal schools.

A lot of literature and history books were popularized through *Temeswarer Nachrichten*: Diderot, *Theatre*; Fieldler, *Ode at Gellert's Death*; Friedrich Hagedorn, *Complete Works*; Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock, *Writings* (including the poems *Mesiade, Solomon and Adam's Death*); Ossian, *Poems*; Samuel von Pufendorf, *Introduction to the History of Europe's Most Known Empires and States*; Ludwig Muratori, *The Happy Christians of Paraguay*; eight different titles of Caraccioli's works; and Friedrich Lauterbach's chronicle upon the lives of Polish princes and kings.⁸ Mathäus Joseph Heimerl understood the importance of the works written by literary celebrities and historians of his time, and this is the reason he propagated them. His printed editions could not satisfy the demand, could not please the population's cultural aspirations. A sizeable import of books printed in Vienna, Paris and Berlin was needed. Diderot's dramatic work was known in Temeswar in the years 1770–1780 and among teachers, doctors, public servants, traders and officers there were people with a strong cultural baggage, some struggling to find the meaning of the Scottish poet Ossian's verses. Gottfried von Brettschneider, one of

⁵ Josef Wüst: *Die Anfänge*; Liebhard: *Banater Mosaik*.

⁶ *Anhang zu den Temeswarer Nachrichten* (*Temeswarer Nachrichten* supplement), 25th April, 655.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 18th April, 653.; *Lehrreiches Magazin für Kindern, zur richtigen Bildung ihres Verstandes und ihres Herzens, Lehrreiches Magazin für Junge Leute, besonders junge Frauenzimmer, Magazin zur Unterweisung für junge Leute, arme Leute usw.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, 2nd May 1771, 658; see also *ibid.*, 13th June, 1771, 673–674.

the scholars of the time, affirmed that Temeswar was a true cultural space in which Goethe's and Wieland's adepts were confronting each other.⁹ The activity of other intellectuals showed the existence of an environment that cultivated humanist creations: Wolfgang von Kempelen, councilor of the administration; Clemens von Rossi, first canonical and vicar of the Roman-Catholic cathedral, former priest of the Italians colonized at Orțișoara; Johann Jakob Ehrler, superior bureaucrat of the imperial administration of Temeswarer's Banat.

*TEMESWARER BANAT'S HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY FROM AN
ENLIGHTENMENT PERSPECTIVE*

Temeswarer Nachrichten's newspaper stood out by publishing a well-documented study upon the History of Banat. The imperial authorities of Vienna constantly took an interest in regional history, so the paper was trying to answer their curiosity. In the supplement of the second issue from the 25th of April, 1771, Mathäus Joseph Heimerl announced that he would print a "historical description of Temeswarer's Banat" (*Historische Beschreibung des Banats Temeswar*). The study addressed the readers from Temeswar and its neighboring area and also the foreign subscribers (auswärtige Pränumeranten).¹⁰ Starting with the third issue, the mentioned work was published, with no signature. The information was attentively selected, the author insisting upon the significant facts. The study is a geographical description of the Banat region, followed by a short historical overview from antiquity to the 18th century. Next, there is a presentation of the demographic movement in the region and the economic and social situation. The text aimed to popularize the unknown realities of one of the provinces of the Habsburg Empire. Most of the descriptions were based on the knowledge of the period, the interpretation being tributary to the times.

In its introduction, the borders of Dacia from the time of Decebal's kingdom are indicated, comprising the land between the Danube, the Tisza, the Carpathian Mountains, the Nistru and the Prut. Temeswarer's Banat was considered a part of old Dacia. The same paragraph also states that Dacia was conquered by Emperor Ulpus Traianus and transformed into a Roman province, while Sarmisegetusa, the old capital, became a Roman colony.¹¹ As proof of these affirmations, the texts of two Roman inscriptions discovered during the

⁹ Liebhard: *Banater*, 223.

¹⁰ The editorial staff wished to offer as much information as possible about a province less known to the European world. According to *Anhang zu den Temeswarer Nachrichten*, 25th April, 1771, 655.

¹¹ According to *Anhang zu den Temeswarer Nachrichten*, 2nd May, 1771, 658.

first half of the 18th century and preserved at Caransebeș administrative office, were reproduced.¹² Regarding the indigenous population, the study mentions its military force and the desire to keep its autonomy and continuity on the same territory.

This perspective indicates the overlapping of ancient and modern views and is particular to Enlightenment and Romantic historical literature. The proof of origins, of the continuity of living and of the language peculiarities of a specific community coincides with the debut of the national idea. In the case of the Germans, this idea – in the absence of statehood, of administration and of a judicial system – facilitated the formulation and the promoting of the identity idea based on history and ethno culture.¹³ Influenced by the new orientation of his time, the author is interested in the identity aspect in an ethno-national sense within a space in which, at that time (the 1770s and 1780s), communities did not define themselves as such. They had been shaped by religion and the church, the confessional nation being their main identity reference in the 18th century. The article we discuss must be placed in the context of the intellectual and political life of the late 18th century.

The narration of the facts, as results from the article included in *Temeswarer Nachrichten*, shows that the author takes an interest in defining the moral and spiritual profile of the Romanian and Serbian population of the region. The author affirms that Banatian Romanians represent the largest part of the population and they call themselves Romanians, being considered the followers of the colonists placed in the region by Emperor Ulpus Traianus. He also observes that the Romanian language has profound roots in Latin and the Roman origins of the Romanians can be demonstrated by their clothing, traditions and food.¹⁴ Talking about the relations between cultural-linguistic communities,¹⁵ he underlines that all the people of Banat – among whom, along with Romanians, there were Germans, Serbians, Hungarians, Bulgarians and Jews – can live together in their best conditions. The mentioned communities

¹² It's possible that the inscription came from the Roman center of Tibiscum (Jupa, near Caransebeș), the five fragments of the inscription being kept today by the Banatian Museum of Timișoara. See also I. I. Russu – M. Dušanić – N. Gudea – V. Wollmann: *Inscripțiile Daciei Romane* (The Inscriptions of Roman Dacia), Vol. 1, Bucharest, Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1977, 182–185, 149–151. The author of the study published in *Temeswarer Nachrichten* has the virtue of doing, even with a few errors, the first translation, including it in the scientific network.

¹³ See Victor Neumann: Volk (People) and Sprache (Language) in Herder's thought. The speculative theory of ethno nation, in V. Neumann: *Neam, Popor sau Națiune? Despre identitățile politice europene* (Group, People or Nation? About European Political Identities), București, Curtea Veche, 2005, 47–84.

¹⁴ See *Temeswarer Nachrichten*, 9th May, 1771, 660.

¹⁵ At that date, there were no ethno-national communities, but only linguistic and cultural communities. See the concepts that define the collective and political identity in modern Europe at Neumann, see Neumann: *Neam, Popor sau Națiune? (Group, People or Nation? About European Political Identities)*

often live in mixed neighborhoods, working together, while keeping their own language and religion.¹⁶ Regarding Romanians and Serbians, who shared the same Orthodox religion, it was mentioned that they “are slim, strong and handsome by nature”. While the food of the Romanian population was some sort of polenta, prepared in the same manner as bread, from “Turkish wheat” (corn), home-made bread was the food of the Serbians. Both communities were eating raw, air dried bacon, their preferred alcoholic drink being “răchia” (a boiled liquid of plums and cherry plums). The desire to coexist in a civilized manner with the neighbors – writes the author of the article – is owing to the education of the village old sages. Thus, the Habsburg experiment was not new for Banat’s population. The promotion of a healthy cohabitation had been a constant of the local culture, while the discipline and education promoted by the imperials interfered with one of the locals’ traditional character traits.

For a better knowledge of the regional past, the collaborator of Heimerl’s newspaper noted, in an approximately chronological order, the following succession of domination of Middle Age Banat: Hungarian, Turkish and Habsburg.¹⁷ In the same context, he showed, based on the official documents of the empire, that Banat became (after the Habsburg conquest) a new acquired possession, occupied after the war, and thus any private right issued before 1716 could not be acknowledged or taken into consideration. The region was placed under the direct authority of the Viennese central institutions (The Aulic Chamber, the so-called Neo-Aquistic Commission and the Aulic War Council). It was a domain of the Crown and Chamber, being entrusted to an administration (*Landesadministration*) led by a military governor.¹⁸ The observations match the subsequent historical studies and indicate the reason for which 18th century Banat was a different region than Transylvania. On one hand, the Ottoman domination interrupted the continuity of the religious

¹⁶ It’s very important to mention the fact that Banat’s rural population were open to borrowing and mixing foreign values. The peasants of Romanian-German, Serbian-German, Romanian-Serbian, and German-Hungarian villages used two or more languages, the communication and proximity of the communities laying the grounds for mixed families. In parallel, in the cities of Banat, the social emancipation that took place in the 19th century led to the assimilation of a similar set of values and civic rules, and not to the underlining of linguistic and religious differences. The promotion of *Kultur* ideology took place starting with the forty-eighter period, but later managed to win over, even if only partially, the intellectual environments capable of political decisions. In the end, the ethno-nationalist identity theory – one contrary to the interests of the empire – was often counteracted by assimilationist policies, relatively easy to implement within a society having a mosaic identity like Banat had until the Second World War.

¹⁷ *Temeswarer Nachrichten*, 9th May, 1771, 660.

¹⁸ Ibidem. Vezi și J. J. Ehrler: *Banatul de la origini până în prezent* (Banat from Origins to Present Day) – 1774, Costin Feneșan edition, Facla Publishing House, 1982. The manuscript of Ehrler’s book is found at *Egyetemi Könyvtár Budapest* (Budapest University Library), *Kézirattár* (manuscript cabinet), G 189 – and was translated in Romanian and edited by historian Costin Feneșan.

institutions, of guilds and socio-political and economic relations patronized by the nobility. On the other hand, under the same Ottoman domination, the local elites weakened and the local structures were neglected. In turn, cohabitation with the Turkish population left marks in the local habitat. The conquest of Banat by the Habsburgs did not meet social and political opposition, like in Transylvania. The region was not obliged to take into account the legislation of the local institutions preexistent to its integration among the Austrian territories. Being an area where most of the administrative and political structures had been destroyed or abandoned by the Ottomans, Banat became the place of a real experiment for the House of Habsburg.

The article *Historische Beschreibung des Banats Temeswar* (A Historical description of Temeswarer's Banat) from *Temeswarer Nachrichten* is written by J. J. Ehler. He provides information worthy of being taken into consideration from a historiographic perspective. These preoccupations precede those of the Italian historian Francesco Grisellini, who, two years later, in 1773, introduced his ample synthesis upon Banat's past, publishing in *Giornale d'Italia* a concise narration of the economic and social-demographic issues of the region from the date of the Habsburg conquest until 1773.¹⁹ This is one of the reasons I became interested in finding out who was the anonymous author who collaborated with the publication. The use of a pseudonym would have given me the chance to more quickly identify him. The first questions, searches and assumptions were made in 1953, when Joseph Wüst signaled the existence of the periodical among the documents regarding Banat in the Viennese Archives. In the 1980s, Franz Liebhardt²⁰ resumed the discussion upon the article. Studying the paper I understood that it is not insignificant to identify the name of the first chronicler with historical inclinations from Banat. The result of the research made by historian Costin Feneșan met my attempts. He discovered the manuscript of J. J. Ehler's work *Banat from the Origins until the Present Day – 1774*, at the Eötvös Loránd Budapest University Library. Comparing the text from *Temeswarer Nachrichten* with the one published by Costin Feneșan, it is clear that the author is one and the same, Johann Jakob Ehrler.²¹

¹⁹ Alexander Krischan: Franz Grisellini – erster Historiograph des Banats, in *Deutsche Forschungen in Ungarn*, Budapest–München, 1980, 127–186. See Francesco Grisellini: *Versuch einer politischen und natürlichen Geschichte des Temeswarer Banats...*, Wien, 1780. The Romanian edition was published under the title *Încercare de istorie politică și naturală a Banatului Timișoarei* (An Attempt of Political and Natural History of Timișoara's Banat), *Foreword*, translation and notes by Costin Feneșan, Facla Publishing House, Timișoara, 1984.

²⁰ Liebhardt: *Banater*, 212.

²¹ See, in parallel, *Temeswarer Nachrichten*, issues III and IV and the work *Banatul de la origini până în prezent – 1774* (Banat from the Origins until the Present Day – 1774).

Who was Johann Jakob Ehrler and what was the explanation of his concerns for the past of the region? A superior functionary of the Banatian administration during Empress Maria Theresia's reign, he gained experience as an employee of the regional administration who had to gather information and offer clear solutions for the administrative reforms advocated by the Habsburg House. He was appointed for this role by Count Clary und Altringen, the regional governor. The fact that he published in *Temeswarer Nachrichten* a fragment of his work without mentioning his name is explained, probably, by the precautions he took in front of his colleagues or in front of the Viennese authorities. They could have blamed him for publishing the obligations set contractually with the Viennese administration.

What is interesting is that J. J. Ehrler's writing distinguishes itself from similar work by the diversity of the roots he appeals to, based on his own discoveries during his travels to Banat. Compared to the article from *Temeswarer Nachrichten*, his work from 1774 included details about the material and spiritual life of the inhabitants of the region. The reconstruction of home economics, the population's means of living, functionaries' incomes and obligations, human curiosity, useful data regarding the land, people and cattle of Banat are just a few examples of his important monograph. Its role was to fill in the gaps regarding Banat's geography and history. What is clear is that J. J. Ehrler's article stimulated the intellectual curiosity of his contemporaries, the first and most important result being the travel diary and interpretations of the Venetian historian Francesco Grisellini.

THE NEWSPAPER AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULARIZATION

The newspaper includes many other pieces of information from the medical, economic and administrative fields which, by their content, present the intellectual preoccupations of the population, especially those concerning emancipation by acquiring the reflexes of modern civilization. For example, in annex III from the 2nd of May (*Anhang zu den Temeswarer Nachrichten*) a book of medicine, entitled *Dispensatorium*, is described, including recipes for healing certain illnesses and an enumeration of the medicines entered into circulation. The editor underlines the usefulness of the book for any citizen, also stating that the sum of 3 Florins and 6 Kreuzers is more than acceptable for everyone who wants to buy the book. In the same issue of the newspaper, special interest is shown to an essential book of medicine, Platner's *Surgery*.²² For the farmers, there is news about animal breeding,

²² Johann Zacharia Platner: *Gründliche Einleitung in die Chirurgie oder kurze Anweisung alle Krankheiten, so denen ChirurGIS vorkommen, theils mit innerlichen und äusserlichen Medikamenten, theils durch Operationen zu curiren*, 2 Theile, in einem Band, Leipzig 1748.

the cultivation of cereals and industrial plants. Works published recently in Vienna are popularized, dealing with tobacco cultivation, the techniques of cultivating land depending on the landform, the price of animal and vegetable products, and sheep breeding. The new educational programs drafted by the Viennese imperial chancellery are also published for the peasants. This kind of information implies the alphabetization, a process started in Banat in the mid-18th century, when within church or secular schools, students learned German, Romanian, Serbian and Hungarian.

A special attention was given to administrative issues. As Temeswar at that time (and later) appealed to people of different cultural-linguistic, religious and professional categories who travelled between Constantinople and Vienna, Hamburg and Trieste, Thessaloniki and Buda, Belgrade and Moscow, Ragusa (Dubrovnik) and Lemberg, Pressburg (Bratislava) and Arad, it was natural for the imperials to think and put in motion an exact evidence of population (the aspect should be valid no matter the period or the political regime). Mathäus Joseph Heimerl informed the public upon the regulations that functioned in this sense. By the order of the police commander, his printing house published tables of evidence that the citizens were obliged to buy for the sum of 4 Kreuzers and fill with the following information: the first name and the name of house owners, of tenants, of employees, and the age, religion, place of birth and occupation.²³ In this context, too, similar to those before the year 1771, it is about the measures taken by the imperial administration, measures having a restrictive character that took into consideration the possibilities of the individual solicitor to build a house, to pay the annual compulsory taxes to the administration, to be employed in a profession or to do commercial services useful for the local community. The term "restrictive" refers to the fact that a part of the inhabitants (like the Jews or the Macedo-Romanians) placed within the city were considered to be merely tolerated. A single exception was represented by the military and functionaries of *Banater Landesadministration*. In Timișoara, the German colonists received land for building houses beyond the walls of the city, in the Elizabethan quarters. In the same manner, the Serbian, Romanian and Jewish communities lived in the Fabrik, Josephine and Mehala neighborhoods.²⁴

The aspirations of certain people of these groups to enter the city had been preceded by long evaluations. For some of the new inhabitants admitted inside the city, the so-called *Toleranztax* was applied. If we discount the historical conditioning of the mentioned linguistic and religious communities (privileges, but mostly their absence), we will observe that the evidence and control system was designed firstly for protection. The argument was the

²³ *Temeswarer Nachrichten*, 13th June, 1771.

²⁴ Tivadar Orthmayer – Jenő Szentkláray: *Történelmi adattár*, Temesvár–Budapest, 1871. See National Romanian Archives, Timișoara Branch, Fund Timișoara City Hall, file no. 2/1740.

fear caused by the plague that had descended upon Temeswar during 1738 and 1740 which determined the imperial officials to enforce the necessary measures in order to prevent a new tragedy. *Temeswarer Nachrichten* offered the necessary guidance to prevent the plague, popularizing scientific papers on the subject.

Instead of conclusions we can state that the 18th century newspaper contributed to the creation of a modern cultural climate within the region. It proves the existence of a local intellectual elite, but also the desire to inform and form different social segments, including the future bourgeoisie, which started to manifest itself during the 19th century. *Temeswarer Nachrichten* shows the meaning of community meetings and suggests how the creation of a multiple cultural code had been possible. Today's concerns regarding the Banatian intercultural phenomenon or those referring to intercultural education find strong support in the studies regarding the multi-lingual press. There are numerous similar examples to that offered by *Temeswarer Nachrichten*, and they belong to the publications printed in all regional languages – German, Hungarian, Romanian and Serbian.

The newspapers edited in the second half of the 18th century promoted the imperial idea of intellectual and social emancipation. The institutional mechanism on which the cultural life from the Crown territories builds up is subordinated to the good-will of the Viennese administration, the informing and the emancipation of the population happening by the emperor's will and reforms. The centralism, on one hand, and the censorship, on the other, indicate two of the major coercions met by the adepts of the Enlightenment ideal within the regions and cities of Central Europe. The progress made for the formation of the intellectual class suggested by the publication of *Temeswarer Nachrichten* is enlisted within the limitations imposed by the Habsburg House and must be understood in that specific state and political context. The descriptions contained in *Temeswarer Nachrichten* serve as documents of the time; they provide useful information on European history and geography. This debut of the press in Temeswar – we are talking about the year 1771 – is an unmistakable testimony of its contribution to the first modernity of the region.

TEMESWARER ZEITUNG AND THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN CIVISM

When we discuss the history of Central and East-European countries, the retrieval of history depends on the understanding of regional social and political physiognomies, of the analysis of confessional, linguistic and cultural diversities, as they were manifested on the scale of the former

Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The decoding of dominant cultural models in the period before the First World War shows the existence of some cosmopolitan societies whose origin and traits were outlined in the Enlightenment age.

Starting with 1718, Temeswar became a strategic city for the Habsburg Empire, and later, during the 19th century, an important economic and commercial city within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Both in the first and the second stage, Temeswar defined itself as a multi-confessional, multi-linguistic, civic, bourgeois and cosmopolitan centre; a cross-border city, promoting the model of modern European burg. By the influence of Viennese administration, but also due to the locals' pursuits and ingenuity, Temeswar had gained a distinct personality. Its advantages were the following: its geographical position, at the basin of Cerna-Timiş-Bega rivers, under the influence of the Mediterranean climate and facilitating the meeting of different cultures; its numerous colonists, German, Hungarian, Slovakian, Czech, and Croatian, originating from all corners of the Empire and Europe; its Jewish population, allowed inside the city after the payment of a tolerance tax, who asserted themselves as good craftsman and traders, but also doctors, teachers, artists, and journalists; the Romanian-Orthodox, Slavic-Orthodox and Turkish-Muslim neighborhoods; the spiritual and cultural patronage of the Roman-Catholic church. Therefore, the city defined itself as a society situated between many languages, cultures and religious confessions, without identifying wholly with one or another. Contrary to the fact that the 19th century identified itself as one of nationalities, Temeswar was hard to define by the notion of nationality, or by the preponderance of one or another ethno-cultural group. Similar to Cernowitz, Temeswar was a social, cultural, economic and political experiment.

THE CONTINUITY OF THE MULTI- AND INTERCULTURAL TRADITIONS

Temeswarer Zeitung was the newspaper that resumed and developed the multi- and intercultural tradition started in the previous century. It contributed to the social pedagogy, to the cultivation of diversities and to the promotion of a lifestyle in unison with the inhabitants of Temeswar and Banat. Even if during the last decades of the 19th century, the intention of the governments from Budapest to Magyarize the population from the east of the Monarchy was obvious, the German press stayed alive. Firstly, it demonstrated the survival of multi-linguism and of Banat's cultural landmarks built in the previous century by the Viennese administration. The concern of Temeswar's inhabitants was directed to social emancipation, professional training and economic competition. The use of Hungarian as the official language did

not cause any problems for the people of Temeswar and Banat. Civism was a reference of first importance, which explains the absence of ethno-national confrontations.

Beyond any politics, the liberalism promoted by *Temeswarer Zeitung* was a human postulate. It implied tolerance and understanding for individual aspirations. The development of commerce, finances and transport made civism strong in Temeswar and its neighboring area, being a true philosophy of life. The concern for civism was similar to the interest in modernity and Europeanism. It was expressed in most Central European cities, symbolizing the urban behavioral culture. Civism was the messenger and defender of liberalism. The well-known Hungarian politician, Franz Deák, asserted himself as the adept of emancipation of different socio-cultural and religious segments that populated the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Among others, this attitude led to the acknowledgement and large integration of Jews from Transleithania (from the east of the Monarchy) within the socio-economic life, and also within the public institutions. Most Jews joined the civic movement, the promotion of multi-lingual culture, defining their identity by a trans-national culture, consonant with the political direction of the imperial House. The Jews represented the modern version of aristocracy. Publications of the time hired them for their fight for individual and civic rights.²⁵

Alexander Krischan – one of the historical researchers of *Temeswarer Zeitung* – affirms that the Jewish journalists from Austro-Hungary contributed to the development of the German language press.²⁶ On one hand, they played the role of intermediary of the Austrian cultural legacy, and on the other, they promoted the bilingualism of German and Hungarian, the two official languages of the monarchy. Thus, they contributed to the preservation of the Central European ambivalent cultural code. Their significant involvement in the press was accelerated by their knowledge of German culture, many of them having studied at the universities of Vienna and Prague.²⁷ Temeswar profited from this manner of manifestation of Jewish intellectuals, their fecund activity being visible not only in the economy, but also in science, technology, education and the press.²⁸

²⁵ Victor Neumann: Les Juifs de Banat entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Roumanie au debut du XXe siècle, in C. Iancu: *Permanences et ruptures dans l'histoire des Juifs de Roumanie (XIXe–XXe siècles)*, Université Paul Valéry – Montpellier III, 2004, 127–139. See, at large, the process of Jewish emancipation and the involvement in the urban life, in Victor Neumann's work, *Evreii Banatului. O mărturie a multi- și interculturalității Europei Este-Centrale* (The Jews of Banat. A Testimony of East-Central Europe Multi- and Interculturality), 2nd edition, Timișoara, Brumar Publishing House, 2016, 85–121, 121–163.

²⁶ Dr. Alexander Krischan: *Die "Temeswarer Zeitung" als Banater Geschichtsquelle (1852–1949)*, Munich, Verlag des Südostdeutschen Kulturwerks, 1969, 32.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ According to Victor Neumann: *The End of a History. Jews of Banat from the Beginning to Nowadays*, Bucharest University Press, 2006, 93–125.

During the last decade of the nineteenth century, when Budapest was making visible efforts to promote literacy among the lower segments of the population, Hungarian policy was not aimed at suppressing the multi- and intercultural profile of Timișoara. The number of German publications proves this fact. Regarding *Temeswarer Zeitung*, it experienced a glory period. Managed for two decades by Armin Barát, “*Temeswarer Zeitung*” was transformed from a provincial newspaper to one of imperial standards. Armin Barát employed many young journalists from all over Banat and also regions of the Monarchy, being concerned with their training and acknowledging their performance. Together with colleagues from Arad, Győr and Szeged, he founded the *East Monarchy Journalists Association*. Some of the journalists trained by Armin Barát continued their careers at Vienna and Budapest. His language knowledge overlapped with the local culture. He wrote in three languages: German, Hungarian and French. He translated literary works from German to Hungarian and from Hungarian into German. He had a decisive role in founding the Arany János Society, in organizing numerous cultural and humanitarian activities, and he also contributed to the manifestation of civism in Temeswar.²⁹

THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN CIVISM

How can one explain the success of the German publication managed by Barát in a city having a Hungarian administration? As I already mentioned, the identity of the dualist monarchy was not built on the idea of a unique language and culture. At the first stage of the double monarchy, the idea of nation was not similar to the idea of *Volkische/Völkische Nation*. The German language speakers, but also the Romanians, Serbians, and Slovaks from the Eastern part of Austro-Hungary belonged to the same state entity. A notion used at the time to define them was nationality. Budapest's politics ensured the school training of the mentioned languages. In the same manner, the practice of different religious cults and the functioning of cultural associations and foundations belonging to the nationalities was ensured. Along with the acknowledgement of this type of plurality, the nationalities had the right to send representatives to parliament. As the idea of *Völkischekultur*

²⁹ According to Alexander Krischan: *Die "Temeswarer Zeitung"*, chapter Ära Barat – Übernahme des “Südungarischen Lloyd” (1887–1912), 41–48.

(ethno-linguistic culture) overlapped with that of a nation, the controversies on identity themes and theories amplified, becoming radical around and during the First World War.³⁰

The German language press from the second half of the 19th century did not oppose the Hungarian state. As director of *Temeswarere Zeitung*, Armin Barát was an appreciated personality within the Hungarian cultural and political environments. The situation was similar to that of the *Preßburger Zeitung*, the German language newspaper from Pozsony / Preßburg / Bratislava. The will of the majority for a peaceful cohabitation was obvious; the local concern was for preserving a spiritual environment without ethno-nationalist directions. Even if some articles had been written for the benefit of Hungarian propaganda, Armin Barát and *Temeswarer Zeitung* promoted ideas directed to all of Temeswar's citizens equally, without favoring specific origins, mother tongues or religious traditions. It opposed any idea of segregation. In the years 1890–1900, *Temeswarer Zeitung* was a German language newspaper that corresponded to Central Europe's multicultural profile, supported by Emperor Franz Josef.³¹ Filtered by the grid of collective egoisms, the mentioned ideal was minimized or neglected by the ethno-nationalist directions.

Beyond these realities, visible in many regions of the Monarchy, *Temeswarer Zeitung* was a modern newspaper, concerned with the education of the population in the spirit of a Central European city. Here is the liberal idea that inspired the newspaper's direction: "We respect and love the German nation, but we don't belong to it..."³² These words imply more than the acknowledgement of a state identity; it was, at the same time, the idea of *Mitteleuropa*, having a multiple cultural code, impossible to resume to a *Kulturnation* or a *Volkgeist*, as the most popular of the ideologists were thinking.³³ Excepting the concessions necessary for its survival, Temeswar was leading its own multilinguistic and multicultural policy destined to ensure the status of open city.

³⁰ Victor Neumann: Relațiile româno-maghiare într-un moment de răscruce, in L. Salat – S. Enache (eds.): *Relațiile româno-maghiare și modelul de reconcilere franco-german, The Romanian-Hungarian Relations and the French-German Model of Reconciliation*, The Center of Resources for Ethno-Cultural Diversity, Cluj, Pro-Europe League, 2004, 301–325.

³¹ Alexander Krischan: *Die "Temeswarer Zeitung"*, 45. Some historians interpreted such a manifestation just as a sign of loyalty towards the Hungarian state, without taking into consideration the plural identity of Central European cities, the cultural physiognomy of the local. Thus, the generalizing and simplified formulations, manifested in ethno-nationalist and racist ideologies during 1900 and 1914.

³² Wir achten und lieben die deutsche Nation, doch wir gehören ihr nicht an..., *Temeswarer Zeitung*, No. 47, 1901, 1.

³³ Promoted by the intellectual environments of Wilhelm I's Reich and picked up by a part of the intellectual groups within Central and South-East Europe, the *Volkgeist* ideology opposed the civism of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy's great cities. Gradually, this would contaminate the Hungarian elites, too. In this context, their message became a restrictive one.

Armin Barát wrote about the water supply and the sewage of the Bega River, about building railroads and ordering the city streets. He gave special attention to the theatre movement, the activity of scientific associations, art and literature, and pedagogy. According to *Temeswarer Zeitung*, the popularity of the theatre was growing between the 1890s and 1900s, and this was beneficial to the entire society. The annual general assembly of the association for supporting the theatre mentioned the fact that the number of theatre goers had risen by 50% in those years, a part of Temeswar's citizens clearly being interested by the Hungarian language and culture.³⁴ Regarding the native language, Hungarian speakers increased by 4.9% in the 1890–1900 decade. *Temeswarer Zeitung* mentions that the number of German speaking people diminished by 1.7% and the Romanian and Serbian speaking people diminished by 1.4%.³⁵ For the year 1890, the statistics regarding the inhabitants of the city showed the following: 55.91% Germans, 26.72% Hungarian, 3.87% Serbians and 9.6% Romanians.³⁶

In statistics, the Germans and Hungarians were Roman-Catholics. A part of the Romanians were Greek-Catholic, while the majority was Orthodox, similarly to the Serbians. There were many cases of Jews who declared themselves either German or Hungarian. There were statistics where they appeared as Hungarians of Mosaic religion or Germans of Mosaic religion. Other statistics simply mentioned them as Jews.³⁷ What have been always

³⁴ Author Das Temesvarer Theaterwesen, *Temeswarer Zeitung*, No. 75, 1896, 1–2.

³⁵ Josef Geml: Kulturelle Verhältnisse Temesvars, *Temeswarer Zeitung*, No. 35, 1900, 6–7.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, In the year 1900, the data are different: 51% Germans; 32% Hungarians; 11% Romanians. Viktor Orendi-Hommenau, *Gestern und Heute*, Temeswar, Eigenverlag. 1929, 6; see also Armin Barát, *Die königliche Freistadt Temeswar*, Druck von Heinrich Uhrmann, 1902, 139. The city had a surface of 36 km², in the year 1890 the population density being 1,206 inhabitants/km², while in the year 1900, 1,473 inhabitants/km². The native language spoken by the civil and military inhabitants of the city in the year 1900 indicated that 55.9% of Timișoara's total population spoke German, 26.7% Hungarian, 9.1% Romanian, and 3.9% Serbian. Hungarian was also spoken by the other 15,135 inhabitants whose mother tongue was not Hungarian. According to the statistics of the time, only 16,625 from Timișoara's inhabitants could not speak Hungarian. At Banat's scale, the demographic situation was the following: Timiș County had a total population of 400,910 inhabitants, among whom were 120,683 Germans, 160,585 Romanians, 57,821 Serbians, 47,518 Hungarians, 2,612 Slovaks, and so on. Torontal County had 594,343 inhabitants: 158,312 Germans, 191,036 Serbians, 125,04 Hungarians, 86,168 Romanians, and 15,899 Slovaks. Caraș-Severin County had 466,147 inhabitants: 336,147 Romanians, 55,883 Germans, 33,787 Hungarians, 14,674 Serbians, and 2,908 Slovaks. The number of Swabians was best represented in Torontal and Timiș, where they formed the relative majority of the number of inhabitants; Swabians were less represented in Caraș-Severin, where Romanians represented three quarters of the population.

³⁷ See Victor Neumann: *Istoria evreilor din Banat ...* (The History of banatian Jews...), Bucuresti, Editura Atlas, 1999, 109. according to George Barany: Magyar Jew or Jewish Magyar (To the Question of the Jewish Assimilation in Hungary), *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 8, 1974, 1–144; cf. Hildrun Glass: *Zerbrochene nachbarschaft. Das deutsch-jüdische Verhältnis in Rumänien (1918–1938)*, München, Oldenbourg Verlag, 1996, 36.

omitted in this misleading proportion were the mutual exchange of values, mixed families and the sense of modern urban life in which the living norms became the main reference, and not the ethnicity or religion. The situation was similar in many Central European cities.

THE SCHOOL AND REGIONAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE AGE OF THE NEW NOBILITY: TEMESWARER ZEITUNG'S VIEW

The law of Magyarization of the elementary (1879) and middle education (1883), along with the law of changing the names of cities and villages (1898), were part of an assimilationist policy that could not change the cosmopolitan identity of Temeswar. Against the pressures of the Hungarian authorities, many local peculiarities had been preserved. For example, the German language continued to be used by the administration in the majority of the German villages from Banat; the bi-linguism and multi-linguism being present in the different social environments of the city and region.³⁸

In the year 1897, *Temeswarer Zeitung* underlined the importance of founding associations for promoting and spreading the language and culture, motivating it by the existence of illiteracy among a segment of the population within the counties of Banat.³⁹ The central and local administrations were concerned with training the population for their integration to industry. The expression of civic sentiment was the result of an ample process of emancipation in schools. In the year 1896, according to *Temeswarer Zeitung*, there were 33 education institutions in Timișoara, among which were four public, eight communal, eleven Roman-Catholic, three Romanian Greek-Orthodox, three Serbian Greek-Orthodox and four private schools. Moreover, there were nineteen elementary schools, three craft schools, an inferior commercial school, a vocational school, two civil schools (Bürgerschule), one for boys and one for girls, a commercial medium school, and two normal schools for teachers. The number of teachers and educators was 144.⁴⁰ The elementary and medium education institutions recorded a continuous growth. After Kolozsvár (nowadays Cluj) and Nagyvárad (nowadays Oradea), Temeswar of the year 1896 had the most educational institutions: 58⁴¹. The concern for the training of the population was extremely important and in tune with the policies promoted by the administration of the Dual Monarchy.

³⁸ Not the number was essential, especially in the cities of the old monarchy, but the accepted cultural code – this is the reason why any statistic could be deceiving. The individuals viewed themselves as members of one or another community according to their own interests, ideologies or intellectual level.

³⁹ Prof. F. R.: Südungarischer Kulturverein, *Temeswarer Zeitung*, No. 49, 1897, 1.

⁴⁰ Anton Gokler: Zur Geschichte der Volksschulen, *Temeswarer Zeitung*, No. 33, 1896, 1–2.

⁴¹ Josef Geml: Kulturelle Verhältnisse Temesvars, *Temeswarer Zeitung*, No. 35, 1900, 6–7.

In February 1899, the school inspector Karl Sebeřtka visited a number of communal schools, emphasizing the activity of repetition schools (Wiederholungsschulen) for girls between 12 and 15 years old who graduated from popular school. These schools were destined for those who did not want to attend a superior education institution. In the downtown (Innenstadt) quarters of Temeswar there was a class with 73 girls, while in Fabric there was one with 94 girls. The students attended classes on Wednesday between the ages of 14 and 17. The inspection noted that there were 5,182 students who were attending the classes of at least one school, and 4,817 attended day schools. In the downtown quarters there were 549, in Fabric there were 1,836, in Josephine there were 1,818, and in Elizabethan there were 616. The paper also notes that the schools from the quarters of Josephine and Fabric had been renovated.⁴²

Along with the administration, the private institutions and the bourgeoisie of Temeswar made plans for economic expansion, so the training of technicians had to be doubled as well as that of businessmen. In an issue from the year 1897, *Temeswarer Zeitung* observed the need for trained traders who could speak the languages of Oriental Europe and who could adapt to the expansion in the Balkan Peninsula. Their role was to multiply the connections with neighboring states and to develop the export of goods from Temeswar and Banat. This is the reason why a commercial high school and an academy of commerce were established, in order to develop the trade with the the Orient.⁴³

In the 1890s and 1900s, the characteristics of the city were being imprinted by a solid bourgeoisie. It bore the mark of the new nobility of Budapest and Vienna, or even the emblems of the counts enforced by the social policies of the two imperial capitals.⁴⁴ This was less visible in the cities of Transylvania, where the new nobility – often represented by Jews – was not accepted by the communities of Saxons and Romanians, being only present among Hungarians.⁴⁵ *Temeswarer Zeitung* notes that the population of Temeswar

⁴² Temeswarer Volksschulwesen, *Temeswarer Zeitung*, No. 59, 1899, 1–2.

⁴³ Eine orientalische Akademie in Temeswar, *Temeswarer Zeitung*, No. 66, 1897, 4.

⁴⁴ Victor Neumann: From the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the Romanian State: On the Jewish Question in a Disputed Territory, in V. Neumann (ed.): *The End of a History. Jews of Banat from the Beginning to Nowadays*, Bucharest, Bucharest University Press, 2006, 93–125. For similar urban cultural models in Central Europe, see also Angelo Ara: Juden und Jüdisches Bürgertum im Triest der Jahrhundertwende, in A. Corbea-Hoişie – J. LeRider (eds.): *Metropole und Provinzen in Altösterreich (1880–1918)*, Wien, Polirom-Böhlau, 1996, 264–274.

⁴⁵ Zoltán Szász: Maghiari, români, saşi. Transilvania 1867–1918 (Hungarians, Romanians and Saxones. Transylvania 1867–1918), in Nándor Bárdi (ed.): *Transilvania văzută în publicistica istorică maghiară* (Transylvania Seen in the Hungarian Historical Press), Miercurea-Ciuc, Pro Print Publishing House, 1999, 253.

was inclined to obey the political rules, when they were not absurd. Generally, the inter-human relations and the respect given to the city prevented the population from seeking extreme ideologies.⁴⁶

THE EUROPEAN IMAGE OF THE CITY

The development of all types of associations had been a convincing sign that the society was interested in the technical, scientific, cultural and sporting areas, without being attracted to ephemeral political ideas. An instinct for emancipation and openness allowed for the existence of 1,469 cultural institutions in Temeswar in the year 1891. The liberal professions of lawyers and doctors were very sought after and appreciated. For example, in the year 1900, there were 60 lawyers and 41 medical doctors. Most of them were graduates from the Universities of Budapest, Vienna and Graz. The number of scientific, cultural and sporting associations was 41, with 4,183 members; in the city there were also 31 humanitarian associations, having 6,806 members, small associations of craftsmen and agricultural associations with 5,286 members, cultural foundations with a budget of a quarter million guildens, and institutions that promoted the theatrical arts. *The History and Archeology Museum Association* was founded in the year 1885 by merging two other associations, having 172 members, among who were five honorary members and 67 founding members.⁴⁷ An exceptional role in the mentioned association was played by Zsigmond Ormos, a first rank personality of the city, prefect of Temes County. He laid the foundations of the Temeswar and Banat Museum with his historical, archaeological, local and universal art collections.

An example of an association reflecting important political and civic matters was the *South Hungarian Association of Natural Sciences*, led by Professor Franz Rieß. At its 25 year anniversary, *Temeswarer Zeitung* mentioned its virtues. The association was founded on 25th of March, 1874, from an idea of the public high school. Among its founders there were some notorious figures of the time: Julius Szalkay, Ludwig Buko, Michael Kriesch,

⁴⁶ Ethno-nationalism was present within the region, especially among very poor social segments, which benefited later and too little from emancipation and modernization. A type of ethno-nationalism was manifested by certain Banatian intellectuals, who had entered recently into contact with the urban environment. See in this sense, Victor Neumann: *Federalism and Nationalism in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy*; Aurel C. Popovici's *Theory in East European Politics and Societies*, 16, 2002, 864–898; Victor Neumann: *Ecoul pogromului de la Iași in presa din Banat*, in G. Voicu (ed.): *Pogromul de la Iași 28–30 iunie 1941*, and *Prologul Holocaustului din România*, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2006, 205–213.

⁴⁷ Josef Geml: *Kulturelle Verhältnisse Temesvars*, *Temeswarer Zeitung*, No. 35, 1900, 6–7.

and Eduard Themak. The association's activity included meteorological observations, observations regarding plant development, the analysis of drinking water from Temeswar and artesian water from Union Square, the Temes County land analysis, the exploration of unknown caves from the Banat region, mineralogy studies, the cataloging of birds of prey within the region, ethnographic studies, especially regarding the Swabian and Bulgarian population from the region, and geographical studies upon the Banat mountains. The association owned a natural sciences museum and a library containing 1,506 specialized books, among which were 643 medicine books, 170 physics books, 152 chemistry books, 140 natural sciences books, and 85 mathematics books. It also published a magazine, *The South Hungarian Association of Natural Sciences*, which registered 248 members, including 93 medics, 41 pharmacists, 27 professors and teachers, 18 lawyers and judges, 17 functionaries, and 16 producers and traders.⁴⁸

During the years 1860–1900, the interests of the society headed towards the introduction of technical experiments that could be accomplished relatively easy in Temeswar. The town and county dignitaries were responsive to renewal and invited prestigious Western societies to put into practice the experiments of local technicians and scientists. As innovations on a regional or European scale, Timișoara promoted electrical street lighting, an urban telephone network, and electric trams.⁴⁹ The small industry and the craftsmen only satisfied the local needs. The agriculture had technical and production problems in all the Banatian villages. There was a crisis of capital, and the general situation was not encouraging. A way out from this situation was the specialized industrial education, offering the chance of urbanization for a segment of the peasantry, as well as the possibility of industrial development.⁵⁰ There were fields of small craftsmen that disappeared or declined at the end of the 19th century. The craftsmen corporation of Temeswar and Pancevo tried to function by creating craftsmen production cooperatives, but could not succeed because of the great competition.

The economic renewals triggered important social transformations. With the occasion of celebrating a millennium of the founding of the Hungarian kingdom, Temeswar organized a great international fair. Among the participants there were workshops and small enterprises from Temeswar and the whole Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. These included Anton Petrof's piano manufactory, displaying all classes of pianos, with Viennese and English

⁴⁸ Die 25 jährige Tätigkeit der "Südungarischen Naturwissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft 1874 bis 1899" in *Temeswarer Zeitung*, No. 68, 1899, 2–3.

⁴⁹ Zoltán Szász: Manchester-ul ungar. Dezvoltarea Timișoarei moderne (The Hungarian Manchester. The Development of Modern Timișoara), in Nándor Bárdi (ed.): *Transilvania văzută în publicistica istorică maghiară* (Transylvania Seen by the Hungarian Historical Press), Miercurea-Ciuc, Pro Print Publishing House, 1999, 244–245.

⁵⁰ Das Kleingewerbe Südungarns, *Temeswarer Zeitung*, No. 20, 1899, 6.

mechanics, small factories of wood processing and furniture production, Armin Krauß's upholstery workshop, Kolarits's workshop of the textile industry, Ulrich Hinterfeer's glove factory, Ignaz Spizer's hat workshop; Johann Tedeschi & Co's machinery factory, and Stefan Farkas & Michael Ludwig's hardware workshop. For Temeswar, this marked an unprecedented development. Events such as this, and also the involvement of the citizens, are very well depicted by *Temeswarer Zeitung*.⁵¹ The same newspaper mentioned, at the end of the 19th century, the processes of city transformation and the integration of peripheral neighborhoods. The example of the Mehala neighborhood is suggestive for showing how the number of inhabitants had risen in Temeswar, the city becoming the fifth largest of the Eastern region of the Monarchy.

INSTEAD OF CONCLUSIONS

What do all these phenomena prove? *Temeswarer Zeitung* shows that, between 1890 and 1900 Temeswar was an urban center with a lot of initiative, with new institutions, with a society eager to learn and become modernized in large measure, multilinguistic and multi-confessional, adapted to capitalist policy. *Temeswarer Zeitung* confirms Jenő Lendvai's conclusions, the secretary of Temeswarer Chamber of Commerce and Industry. According to him, the city was connected to Europe's economy by the production of goods in demand on the German, English, French, Russian and Balkan markets.⁵² The news inserted in *Temeswarer Zeitung* about civic and scientific associations, about the bourgeoisie and its program in the years of the 1890s and 1900s, and about education and culture addressed to the population show how the social component was the most important link in the political-administrative construction and the city's economic development. The rapid integration of the inhabitants into industrial activities, the transportation facilitated by the trains that linked Vienna to Bucharest, London and Constantinople, and Western to South-Eastern Europe, the regularization of the Bega canal and others, had been possible due to a well-trained and progress-oriented professional elite, but also to a cooperative society, opened to communication and competition. Temeswar's and Banat's civism asserted itself as the process of emancipation developed.

Although it was often considered a German city, the 19th century Temeswar mostly identified with Vienna's cosmopolitan direction in the period of the Austrian Enlightenment. It had refused the idea of German identity in its

⁵¹ *Temeswarer Zeitung*, Vol. 61, No. 31, 9th February, 1912, 1.

⁵² Szász, Manchester-ul, 247.

Volksgeist meaning, and the Hungarian one in its *a Magyar nép* sense. In the same way, later on in the interwar period, it opposed the Romanian national-organic idea. Temeswar's shift of status from a city subordinated to Vienna to one subordinated to Budapest and later, to Bucharest, could not alter its freedom of conscience. For a long period, Temeswar had assumed a social culture in which the main values were cohabitation, communication, understanding and reciprocity; all of them stimulated competition, creation and innovation.

In the last decades of the 19th century, *Temeswarer Zeitung* highlighted the plural culture, the confessional diversity, and the dominant social features of Banatian people. Despite the fact that it shifted from one language to another, from one administrative status to another, from one political system to another, Temeswar and Banat had preserved the cross-border urban and regional peculiarities. The performance of the city in the 1900s, when the population was speaking German, Hungarian, Romanian, Serbian and Bulgarian, has preserved its echo in time. This explains the fact that the city has displayed a strong intellectual resistance to any kind of constraints, communitarian and nationalist tendencies. During the interwar years, when the region was part of the Romanian state, the city asserted its civic belief above all else. The same happened during the Second World War, when the people of Temeswar/Timișoara and Banat protected the local Jews from the anti-Semite legislation, from the threats of deportation and extermination. During the communist period, Temeswar/Timișoara promoted cultural and artistic values, by means of its reformist ideas, and in 1956 and 1989 by the mass revolts against the totalitarian regime.

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SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RECRUITMENT OF HUNGARIAN SOLDIERS IN THE ARMY OF MAXIMILIAN HAPSBURG THE EMPEROR OF MEXICO

—◀▶—
ISTVÁN BOBAY

ABSTRACT

In this essay the author deals with certain aspects of the recruitment of the volunteer army of Maximilian Hapsburg. Summarizing the political picture of Mexico in the second half of the nineteenth century, Bobay draws attention to questions concerning the motivation of the Hungarian soldiers joining this volunteer force. Three areas related to their motivation are identified: personal, social and economic. Beyond questions concerning the personal aspect, the national identity is elaborated on. Listing the life-stories of Hungarian soldiers, István Bobay clarifies that the failure of the Hungarian War of Independence and the following neo-absolutistic political situation might have played a role in their joining the overseas volunteer army.

Keywords: *Maximilian Hapsburg the Emperor of Mexico, recruitment of Austrian Volunteer Army, economic crisis of 1863 in Hungary, War of Independence in Hungary in 1848–1489, national identity, Béla Varjassy.*

SHORT SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN MEXICO

There is no need for a detailed history of the Second Mexican Empire but I would like to introduce it quite briefly. In 1857–1861 there was the War of Reform in Mexico, which came to an end with the victory of the republican political side. During this time the situation was full of crisis in Mexico and Napoleon III took the chance of gaining influence over the country.

The French intervention against Mexico began in December of 1861 with the help of Great-Britain and Spain. The latter two armies withdrew from Mexico shortly after the intervention leaving the French alone. Although the French army was defeated on May 5th, 1862, thanks to reinforcements, finally the French Army alone occupied the capital and a significant part of the country. The Second Mexican Empire was proclaimed in 1863 helped by Napoleon III and Maximilian Habsburg was invited to sit on the Mexican throne in the same year by a Mexican delegation. The young ruler with his wife and tiny entourage arrived in Mexico in the May of 1864 and he ruled as the emperor of Mexico till 1867, when he was executed by the republican army. During this whole period a very bloody civil war was taking place in Mexico between the forces of royalist and the republican political sides – the latter led by Benito Juárez. The fall of the Second Mexican Empire was due to two turns in world politics. Firstly the American Civil War had been settled and the Monroe doctrine was being executed again in foreign affairs. Thus, the government of the USA was able to put pressure on the French emperor to withdraw his forces from Mexico. The other event that caused the fall of the Second Mexican Empire was a European issue. In 1866 Prussia defeated the Habsburg army at Königsgrätz, raising Napoleon III's fear of a Prussian attack. Therefore, he broke the treaty of Miramar and started to withdraw his forces from Latin-America. The last groups of French soldiers left Mexico as early as 1867. This event had a negative effect on the moral of the Mexikanische Österreichisches Freiwilligenkorps as well. This force was dismissed and transported back to Europe at the beginning of 1867. Maximilian Habsburg with a small number of his Mexican supporters and approximately 1,000 volunteer soldiers who were still loyal to their emperor were in a rather difficult situation. The number of republicans supported by American weapons and volunteers dramatically increased. The imperial forces could control just four major cities in the given year. These were Veracruz, Puebla, Mexico City and Querétaro. The significant part of the army of the Habsburg Emperor was rallied north of Mexico City in Santiago de Queretaro, where a decisive battle would have been intended against the enemy forces coming from the north. However, the imperial forces were encircled and were starved for several months. Later the Emperor and his two generals were executed near Queretaro on June 19th, 1867.¹

In accordance with the treaty of Miramar, Franz Joseph's younger brother had a chance to recruit a small army from the Hapsburg Empire as well. It is very important that this was a volunteer army and it was not obligatory

¹ About the French intervention in Mexico (1861–1867), see: Jack Autrey Dabbs: *The French Army in Mexico 1861–1867: a study in military government*, The Hague, Mouton, 1963; Gyula Horváth: III. Napóleon és Habsburg Miksa kalandjai Mexikóban, *Mediterrán Világ*, 3, 2008, 20–28.

to join. The volunteers were mercenary and were not motivated by political ideas. The original name of this army was Mexikanische Österreichisches Freiwilligenkorps or it was sometimes referred to as the Österreichisches-Belgisches Freikorps because the Belgian ruler sent more than 1,000 soldiers from Belgium. This military group's recruiting started in the spring of 1864 and the volunteers were transported from the port of Trieste to Mexico from November in the same year. The whole number of this army was around 7,100 people. This army served in Mexico till the end of 1866 or the middle of 1867 under the French headquarters of the commander. According to Lajos Tardy, 1,046 people joined the army of Maximilian Habsburg from the Carpathian basin but in the light of my new research this number could have been higher.²

SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MOTIVATION FOR JOINING THE ARMY

An important question represents the motivation of the soldiers: what kind of military duty and how much payment were promised to them.

Regarding the Mexican volunteer army, two contemporary placards can be found in the archives of the Museum of Military History in Budapest. On the one from 1864 the following conditions can be read in connection with the payment and the opportunities after the duty. The placard elaborates on the payment of each branch of the army (infantry, cavalry, and engineering) and

² About the Hungarian soldiers in Austrian Volunteer Army see István Bobay: Egy kalandos sorsú magyar huszár, Jajczay József életrajza: Különös tekintettel a Hawaii-szigeteken végzett kapitányi és kiképzői tevékenységére és az egyéb 19. századi hawaii-magyar történelmi kapcsolatok kérdéséről, *Századok*, 3, 2014, 747–777; István Bobay: Az Österreichische Freiwilligenkorps Habsburg Miksa mexikói császársága idején, in J. Fülöp – M. Mészáros – D. Tóth (eds.): *„A szél fúj, ahová akar”*: Bölcsészettudományi dolgozatok, Budapest, Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem – L'Harmattan Kiadó, 2016, 201–214; István Bobay: Tallózás a „mexikói kaland” emlékei között: Hadtörténelmi Intézet és Múzeum (I. rész), *A Hadtörténelmi Múzeum Értesítője*, 19, 2018, 279–313; Katalin Jancsó: Magyarok Habsburg Miksa, Mexikó császárnak a szolgálatában: Külföldi csapatok Mexikóban a II. császárság idején, *Tiszatáj*, 65, 2011, 72–79; Miklós Mihály Nagy: Mexikó magyar katonautazója: Pawlowszki Ede, *A Földrajz Tanítása: Módszertani Folyóirat*, 5, 1999, 11–17; Miklós Mihály Nagy: Újkori magyar katonautazók, *Magyar Tudomány*, 8, 1999, 936–944; Miklós Mihály Nagy: Háy János utódai: A magyar katonai utazási irodalom, *Kortárs*, 12, 2004, 91–104; Miklós Mihály Nagy: Miksa császár magyar katonája, *Új Honvédségi Szemle*, 9, 2000, 94–102; Lajos Tardy: Az 1864–67. évi mexikói „önkéntes hadtest” magyarországi résztvevői, *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 103, 1990, 145–171; Péter Torbágyi: *Magyarok Latin-Amerikában*, Budapest, A Magyar Nyelv és Kultúra Nemzetközi Társasága, 2004; Balázs Venkovits: „A császárságnak buknia kellett”. Habsburg Miksa és a magyarországi Mexikó-kép alakulása, *Aetas*, 29, 2014, 28–46.

on the terms of the duty which was set at six years. After this six-year-period the soldiers could be provided with transport back to the homeland or they could be given estates in Mexico.³

There is no specific description of the tenor of the duty. Up until now nothing can be found in the archives that could make clear either the aspects of the Mexican duty and its circumstances or how the soldiers were informed about it. Thus, it is questionable how detailed was the knowledge of the soldiers concerning this opportunity.

During that time, a Hungarian military immigrant called Károly László⁴ was living in Tabasco State in Mexico. According to his unpublished diary, which can give a clearer picture of the situation of the volunteers, he met five Hungarian soldiers whose names were mentioned by him and who voiced their complaints about the duty. According to their account, they were recruited just to keep public order with the highest soldiers' payment. They also believed that the emperor had been elected by the majority of the Mexican nation.⁵ However, this was untrue and contrary to what was promised them, they had to serve in exhausting guerrilla warfare and in unhealthy weather for low money. It was known that if they had wanted to they could have stayed in Mexico after their six-year-long duty and the government guaranteed some estate to them as well.⁶

THE PERSONAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CAUSES OF JOINING AS A VOLUNTEER SOLDIER

The following paragraphs explore the reasons that the volunteer soldiers joined the emperor's army. The central question was why a high number of volunteer soldiers chose to join the army of Hapsburg Maximilian. Three areas can be identified: personal, social and economic.

There are more than thirty numbered letters, notes, memoirs and other documents – in the contemporary press, the public collections, and the inheritance of Lajos Tardy and in the hands of other private collectors

³ Hadtörténeti Múzeum [Military Museum in Budapest] Plakát- és aprónyomtatványtár, [Military Museum in Budapest, Collection of placard and printed papers], 73.162.1/Nbt.; About the placards in abundance see Bobay: Tallózás a "mexikói kaland" emlékei között: Hadtörténeti Intézet és Múzeum (I. rész), *A Hadtörténeti Múzeum Értesítője*, 19, 2018, 279–313.

⁴ See about his life story: Gábor Bona: *Hadnagyok és főhadnagyok az 1848/49. évi szabadságharcban*, Vol II. Budapest, Heraldika, 1998, 361.

⁵ Országos Széchenyi Könyvtár Kézirattára [Manuscript Collection of National Széchenyi Library] Oct. Hung. 720/9. László Károly kézirat naplója [Notes of Károly László], 198.

⁶ Tardy, Az 1864–67. évi mexikói "önkéntes hadtest", 148.

– which were written by Hungarian volunteers who served in Mexico.⁷ Some of them mentioned personal reasons such as getting rich⁸ and the possibility of forming a career.⁹ According to a military certificate issued in 1869, Gyula Gyulay Gaál¹⁰ – who had to leave military duty early in 1860 due to a family issue and had been living in the house of his parents – “realized the humble feeling and aimlessness of his unemployment” and that is why he joined the Austrian Volunteer Army and went to Mexico.¹¹ Conclusions can be drawn from the life stories of the soldiers as well. Joseph Jajczay, who was an officer in the Hapsburg Army, was committed to prison by military tribunal in 1860 for five years, so probably he left his motherland having expectations of a new life.¹²

Moreover, a military history book which was written before the Second World War¹³ and two genealogy works mentioned the love of adventure of

⁷ Among these, the memories of Ede Pawlowsky and Ede Szenger have been published in full during the 19th century. See about Ede Pawlowski: *Miksa császár szerencsétlen expedíciójának leírása: kiváló tekintettel Queretar 70 napig tartó ostromára*, Budapest, Rudnyánszky A. könyvnyomdájából, 1882; Ede Szenger: *Mexiko felvidéke élet- és kórtani tekintetben*, Budapest, Magyar Orvosi Könyvkiadó Társulat, 1877. Moreover, the notes of Albin Lenkey and Gyula Lukáts have also been published. See: László T. Ágoston: *Lenkey huszárok*, Budapest, Aposztróf, 2009, 117–122; Roland Perényi: *Egy önkéntes naplója Miksa császár mexikói kalandjáról* (forrásközlés). http://socialhistories.blog.hu/2008/11/29/egy_onkentenes_naplója_miksa_csaszar_mexikói_kalandjarol (Last check: 17th February, 2018.)

⁸ One of the Hungarian volunteers called István Burián mentioned in his notes, published in 1868, that some soldiers indulged in daydreams about “golden hills” in Mexico during the journey. István Burián: *Egy mexikói önkéntes naplótöredéke, Jász-Kunság*, Vol. 1, No. 10, 8th March, 1868, 78.

Another soldier called Fogas joined the Austrian Volunteer Army in the hope of riches and rank. Somogyi Károly Városi és Megyei Könyvtár (Szeged), Vasváry-gyűjtemény, [Vasváry Collection in Szeged] +HAB1:68v-69v, Miksa császár (Maximilian), újságrészlet, Himler Márton, *Maximilian magyarjai*.

⁹ After the fall of the Second Mexican Empire, some volunteers stayed in Mexico and they began a new life there. Among these was Pál Sarlay, who had written some letters from there which were published in a Hungarian newspaper *Vasárnapi Újság*. In these he gave information about his fellow-soldiers who stayed in Mexico and he wrote in detail about one comrade called József Beyer, who was the main veterinary surgeon of the Army of Maximilian Hapsburg. Sarlay wrote that Beyer left his motherland because before 1864 he had no career chances in Hungary.

Pál Sarlay: *Eredeti levél Mexikóból, Vasárnapi Újság*, Vol. 14, No. 47, 24th November, 1867, 579; *Vasárnapi Újság*, Vol. 14, No. 48, 1st December, 1867, 590–591; *Vasárnapi Újság*, Vol. 15, No. 52, 27th December, 1868, 638–639.

¹⁰ See about his life story: Bobay: Tallózás a “mexikói kaland”..., 306.

¹¹ *Hadtörténeti Levéltár* [Military Archives in Budapest] [later see: HL], *Personalia Gyűjtemény*, 38/D; VII.27; 113/87;10/88, Gyulai Gaál Gyula huszár ezredes (1840–1923) iratai 1860–1897; a Bizonyítvány [military certificate] 30. January 1869.

¹² Bobay: *Egy kalandos*, 752.

¹³ J. Pilch – I. Berkó – J. Gyalókey – Á. Markó (eds.): *A magyar katona vitézségének ezer éve*, Vol. 2, Budapest, Franklin Társulat, 1933, 478.

characters like Albin Lenkey¹⁴ and Gedeon Bibo.¹⁵ Family affairs cannot be overlooked either. A case in point is Joseph Pulitzer, who was born in the city of Makó in Hungary in 1847. He followed his uncle, Vilmos Berger, who was a hussar in the Mexican volunteer army.¹⁶ Another family affair can be brought up as well. According to János Domonkos another volunteer called Lajos Herberth joined the Austrian Volunteer Army for the reason of a bad marriage.¹⁷

This point about recruiting also touches upon social groups such as vagrants. According to an article that was published in 1873, the recruiting was ridiculous and just vagabonds joined the Army of Maximilian Hapsburg.¹⁸ On one hand, in all probability some vagrants did set sail for Mexico, but on the other hand, this declaration needs to be overhauled. Then again there was a tight screening for officers by means of military documents.¹⁹ There are some sources indicating that other convicts tried to join this army as well.²⁰

In the early 1860s there was a rather serious economic crisis in the territory of historical Hungary. It started with a financial crisis in 1860 and it was worsened by a huge drought and penury in the summer of 1863.²¹ On one hand, this event had a negative effect on the building of the railway network²²

¹⁴ HL, Personalia Gyűjtemény [Archives of Institute of Military History, Collection of Personalia], 99/B VII. 137/a. Családfák táblázata. 3. sz. Lenkei és zádorfalvi Lenkey Károly [1838 körül] leszármazottainak családfája.

¹⁵ Zoltán Vargha: *A Bibó család története*, Különlenyomat. A "Magyar Családtörténet Szemle" 1943. évfolyamának II., III. és IV. számaiból. 21 [reprints of No. II., III. and IV of Családtörténeti Szemle without publisher and date] 21.

¹⁶ That is why the young Joseph Pulitzer also applied to be a volunteer but he was refused in consequence of health problems. He had bad eyes. But after this event he travelled to France and he tried to join the French Foreign Legion as well but the young man was refused again. Than Joseph Pulitzer went to Hamburg and sailed for the USA. Probably during this time his first target was Mexico but finally he settled in New-York and he joined the Union Army. András Csillag: *Joseph Pulitzer és az amerikai sajtó*, Budapest, Osiris, 2000, 28.

¹⁷ János Domonkos was a friend of Lajos Herberth. He wrote a short life story of Lajos Herbert after his death in 1896. *Békés*, Vol. 15, 28, No. 50, 6th December, 1896, 1–2.

¹⁸ *Vasárnapi Újság*, Vol. 20, No. 21, 25th May, 1873, 247.

¹⁹ According to some reports of the General Commando (headquarters) in Buda, a Hungarian soldier called József Török wanted to join the Austrian Volunteer Army as an officer, but the military headquarters closely examined his background and his request was turned down. HL, General Commando [Collection of Headquarters of Imperial Royal Hapsburg Army in Buda], 1864. 1 oszt/105 (3016 d.). Szendrő járászolgabírójának levele az egri cs. kir. Hadkiegészítő Parancsnokságnak

²⁰ Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok Megyei Levéltára [The National Archives of Hungary: Archives of Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok County] [later see: MNL – JNSZL] IV. 252. Jászkun Kerület Nemesi Közgyűlési iratai. Jászkun Kerület Kisgyűlési jegyzőkönyve III./1394.

²¹ Krisztina Boa: "[A]z ínség olly rém alakban gyakorlá hatását": Válságreflexiók 1863–1864-ről, *Korall*, 14, 2013, 28–42.

²² About the statistics of built railways in that period see: Ferenc Horváth: A magyarországi vasúti pályák építése (1827–1875), in Kovács László (ed): *Magyar vasúttörténet*, Vol I., Budapest, publisher Bodor Gyuláné, 1995, 119.

and river regulations as well,²³ which guaranteed work to the masses during this time. On the other hand, in the summer of 1863 the harvest was withered and livestock died out almost everywhere in the country. Due to this there was a great famine and great economic depression at the beginning of 1864 when the recruiting began.²⁴ The several thousand volunteers is a small group in contrast to the whole society, although in itself this number might seem significant. Considering the statistical facts, there seems to be a clear connection between the economic crisis and the number of volunteers.²⁵ Up to the present no sources have been found which were written by volunteers and in which this economic cause was confirmed. However, there is a short story published in 1888 in *Pesti Hírlap* not long after the Mexican Adventure. In this work one of the characters became ruined because his harvests failed and his livestock were dying. According to the story, right after that happened to him he went to Mexico as a soldier.²⁶

THE DESIRE TO GET AWAY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY AS A CAUSE OF JOINING THE ARMY

Between 1849 and 1867 there were a handful of political situations in Hungary during the time known as the period of absolutism. After the failure of the War of Independence in Hungary in 1848–1849, Hapsburg absolutism exerted a very firm control over the country. The secret police were very powerful and all civil persons and soldiers were watched by them.²⁷ Moreover, it is important to emphasize that the figure of Archduke Maximilian Hapsburg was more popular in Hungary than his older brother, who had struck down the Hungarian War of Independence between 1848 and 1849.²⁸

²³ Zsigmond Károly: A magyar vízi munkálatok rövid története különös tekintettel a vizek szabályozására, in Ihrig Dénes (ed.): *A magyar vízszabályozás története*, Budapest, Országos Vízügyi Hivatal, 1973, 116.

²⁴ Concerning the huge drought and penury in the summer of 1863 see Antal Réthly: *Időjárési események és elemi csapások Magyarországon 1801–1900-ig*. Vol. I., Budapest, OMSZ, 1998; Boa: "[A]z ínség olly rém alakban", Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára [The National Archives], D 216. Abszolútizmuskori Levéltár, M. Kir. helytartótanács, Ínség mutató/A–K 258.

²⁵ The statistics on the job opportunities of the 1,046 volunteers from Hungary are as follows: 49.9% were without qualifications (in general, they were farmers, landowners, cottars and unskilled workers), 15.58% were workers in the food industry, catering trade and skin process industry, and 34.5% had other job opportunities. The job opportunities items were published in Tardy: *Az 1864–67. évi mexikói*.

²⁶ Árpád Abonyi: *Rossz vér*, *Fővárosi Lapok*, Vol. 25, No. 348, 18th December, 1888, 2560.

²⁷ In 2015 a book was published about the working of the Hapsburg secret police in Hungary between 1849 and 1867, which was written by Ágnes Deák. See: Ágnes Deák: *"Zsandáros és policzajos idők": Államrendőrség Magyarországon, 1849–1867*, Budapest, Osiris, 2015.

²⁸ Tardy: *Az 1864–67. évi mexikói*, 146–147.

A military book which has been quoted already in this work mentioned that the dissatisfaction opposed to this absolutism was one of the reasons for joining,²⁹ but until now no sources have been found that were written by a volunteer and explicitly mention the political causes.

An author called Péter Búsbach³⁰ – who was a captain of Hungarian Honvéd Army in 1848–1849 and a parliamentarian in the Hungarian Parliament after the Compromise of 1867 – published his memoirs in 1906. This book expatiates on the 1860's of Hungary as well. In one section the writer dwells at length on how Hungarian society actively followed with attention the European political events during that time because they were waiting for the recommencement of the freedom fight against the Habsburgs. Moreover, everybody had no doubt about the work of the Hungarian political emigrants abroad and the activity of illegal movements in Hungary, such as the organization of Nedeczky. But Búsbach particularly draws the reader's attention to the fact that, in his estimate, the contemporary youth in Hungary had a bad time in their native land and wished to get away from there. If an opportunity arose many of them left Hungary and went abroad, "some to Berlin, others to Italy, and there were even people who went to Mexico as well – into the adventurous country of Maximilian Habsburg".³¹

Béla Varjassy was a member of this mentioned generation and his story described below from 1861 serves as an example of how the social standing of the Hungarian youth was during that time. He had been serving during his military career as a lieutenant in the Habsburg Army before 1864. He served as an officer in the Mexican Volunteer Army in 1864–1867. After that he took part in the French–Prussian war in 1871 as a French officer and in the same year he attended the crushing of the Paris Commune. From 1871 till 1886 Varjassy was an officer in the French Army in Indochina and during his whole military career he took part in 45 battles. Finally, he returned back home with his family and he died as a detective of the Police of Budapest. He published several volumes of memoirs from time to time in some periodicals.³² One of them was published in 1887 with the title "my one month vacation in 1861".³³

²⁹ Pilch – Berkó – Gyalóky – Markó: *A magyar katona*, 478.

³⁰ Pető (Péter), Búsbach 1827–1905. About his life story see: Gábor Bona: *Századosok az 1848/49. évi szabadságharcban*, Vol. 1, Heraldika, Budapest, 2008, 223.

³¹ Péter Búsbach: *Egy viharos emberöltő II.*, Budapest, Benkő Gyula Bizománya, 1906, 271.

³² When Varjassy moved back home his story was published in *Pesti Hírlap* and *Budapesti Hírlap*. After his death, his short life story was published in some contemporary newspapers. About his life story see: Endre Bajomi Lázár: *Tramontana: Magyar önkéntesek Franciaországban*, Budapest, Zrínyi Katonai, 1984, 31; *Békés*, Vol. 2, No. 32, 7th August, 1870, 4; *Fővárosi Lapok*, Vol. 23, No. 183, 4th July, 1886, 1331; *Pesti Hírlap*, Vol. 31, No. 135, 9th June 1909, 11; *Budapesti Hírlap*, Vol. 29, No. 135, 9th June, 1909, 9–10.

³³ Béla Varjassy: *Egy havi szabadságom: 1861-ben*, *Budapesti Hírlap*, Vol. 7, No. 42, 12th February, 1887, 1.

In this reminiscence Varjassy described a vacation when he went through a great ordeal. This story draws a picture of a young Hungarian officer who was attached to the Imperial Royal Hapsburg Army. We become acquainted with the inner conflict of the Varjassy of that time. According to his reminiscence, Varjassy was a hussar officer in the Habsburg Army and he was garrisoned in Northern Italy during this time. In 1861 he had a long furlough and for this time he went back home to the city of Arad because he was invited to the wedding of one of his brothers. He arrived back home on the day when the famous politician László Teleki died, who had been a very important politician during the reform era and in the War of Independence, and after the failure of those events he had left Hungary. Teleki had been very active in the movement of Hungarian immigrants since 1849. At the end of 1860 he travelled to Dresden under an assumed name but he was captured and taken to Vienna by the Austrian secret police. Teleki was pardoned by Franz Joseph and he returned to Pest. After a long period there was an election again in Hungary in March of 1861 and Teleki suddenly became the leader of the most radical political party against the Hapsburg government. However, he committed suicide under suspicious circumstances in Pest on May 7th, 1861. Hungarian society became furious on hearing the news and nobody believed it was really suicide.³⁴

When Varjassy arrived home, the citizens of Arad were very active politically because of the death of Teleki and that is why the military commander of the city summoned Varjassy and also advised him to keep aloof from the radicals. He wrote that the wedding was like a funeral banquet and everybody was just talking about Teleki. The next day the commander summoned him again and he was taken to the military prison for two days. Then the young officer was invited to the theatre by his family. But there was an enormous debate between Varjassy and his father. Namely, Varjassy's father prohibited his son from wearing the imperial military uniform to the theatre. According to the reminiscence, the soul of the young officer was tried by this debate. But he did not comply with his father's order, which is why he had to sit separately. During the next night he went to the theatre again. He wore his uniform partly because a young girl invited him and he also loaned his saber and his hussar's short fur-lined coat to the actors for the performance because the play was about hussars. The following day Varjassy was taken to the prison again for 48 hours. Some days later he bought a ticket for a concerto. Still later he was wandering the city when he met the commander, who also gave him a ticket to the event.³⁵

³⁴ See about Neo-absolutism: András Gergely (ed.): *Magyarország története a 19. században*, Budapest, Osiris, 2005.

³⁵ Varjassy: *Egy havi szabadságom*, 1–2.

The concert hall in Fehér Kereszt Hotel³⁶ was full and he saw that both his family and the commander with his soldiers were there as well. Varjassy was sitting next to a colonel. When the concert was finished the hall became silent and everybody saw him. At that moment the audience stood up and they started singing a Hungarian national song called the Szózat. The young officer wanted to stand up as well but the other soldiers pulled him down into the chair. All of the soldiers were sitting and they did not even take off their hats. Upon that one of the elder brothers of Varjassy pulled him up and told him "*Stand up! You are Hungarian*". Varjassy finally listened to his heart and stood up and sang the national song along with the mass of people. Then Varjassy left the concert hall without salutation from his fellow-soldiers and the audience cheered him. On this account the next morning he was challenged to a duel by a colonel.³⁷

After the duel Varjassy left Arad and travelled to Pest in the hope of a peaceful vacation. But the trials continued there as well. An informer reported him because he was singing while wearing military uniform in a pub with a drunken group of people. That is why the next morning he took off his soldier's uniform and he bought civil clothes which were made in Hungarian style. Arriving back at the hotel, he found a summons from the military headquarters of Pest. He decided to leave and he travelled to Vienna by train. But in the end some soldiers were waiting for him in the railway station of Vienna and he was escorted to the headquarters. There the young officer was interrogated by a general of the Imperial Royal Hapsburg Army, who was very rude and who was on bad terms with Hungarians. At the end Varjassy was taken again to a military prison in Wien for a while.³⁸

It is not possible to draw any definite conclusion on the strength of just one source, but it seems that numerous Hungarian soldiers had to face similar difficulties. This story presents a young officer who could not find his place in the society of the Hapsburg Empire and it shows that there was a gap between his two identities. On one hand, Hungarian society and soldiers' families created a patriot identity against the Hapsburg government and on the other hand, the military forces followed a powerful imperialist political line. It is clear that a lot of soldiers did not feel comfortable in this situation and the duty in Mexico offered a way out.

Moreover, we think that the Hungarians who served in the Hussar Regiment of the Austrian Volunteer Army could live in one way or another with their national identity in Mexico as far as it was possible. The question arises of

³⁶ The Fehér Kereszt Hotel was the first modern hotel in Arad. It was built in 1840–41 and it was planned by a Viennese architect called Franz Maler. <http://www.muemlekem.hu/hatareset/Feher-Kereszt-szalloda-Arad-1799> (Last check: 17 of February on 2018.)

³⁷ Varjassy: Egy havi szabadságom, 2.

³⁸ Varjassy: Egy havi szabadságom, 2–3.

how they were able to do this in a multiethnic force in Latin-America. The answer to this question is that the language of command of the Mexikanische Österreichisches Freiwilligenkoprs was German – as in the Royal Hapsburg Army – except for the hussar regiment, because they were given commands in Hungarian,³⁹ which was a very special situation. The fact that Hungarian was used as the language of command may have motivated a lot of Hungarians to join. They could feel their national identity again without reprisals in Mexico. An anonymous Hungarian volunteer declared that the Mexicans separated them from the “Austrians”. Thus the Mexicans used the Hungarian ethnicity to tag them.⁴⁰ It is necessary to compare this information with other foreign documents, such as those of the Mexicans, Austrians, and French, but this statement seems to be true.

It is also worth noting that when the hussars did a march-past in front of Marshal Bazaine and the headquarters of the volunteer army, they were singing Hungarian military songs such as the marches of Rákóczi and Hunyadi.⁴¹ They shouted out “Long live the Hungarian hussars”.⁴²

In connection with this, it is to be further noted that research shows that many of the Hungarian soldiers who served in the War of Independence in Hungary in 1848–1849 also joined the Army of Maximilian Hapsburg fifteen years later. According to the documents and treatments, all of them were recruited compulsorily to the Imperial Royal Hapsburg Army after the failure of the Hungarian War of Independence. The orders were not light and many of them chose to escape their service in the Imperial Army.⁴³

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³⁹ Tardy: Az 1864–67. évi mexikói, 147.

⁴⁰ (anonymous) Magyar huszárok Mexikóban, *Ered. Levelezés, Magyar Világ*, Vol. 2, No. 62, 16th March, 1866, 2.

⁴¹ Both Hunyadi and Rákóczi were very important and famous persons in the history of Hungary, who symbolized fighting and freedom as well.

⁴² István Burián: Egy mexikói önkéntes naplótöredéke, *Jász-Kunság*, Vol. 1, No. 41, 11th October, 1868, 332.

⁴³ Parallel to this research, the author is working on an essay about the connection between the soldiers of the Hungarian Honvéd Army in 1848–1849 and the Army of Maximilian Hapsburg, and the officers and soldiers who served in both of them.

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THE REPUBLIC: THE SPANISH CASE IN THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IN HUNGARY, 1867–1873

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VIKTÓRIA SEMSEY

ABSTRACT

This study reviews a short period of Hungarian political modernization according to sources from the era. Primarily it steers the attention to the press and its republican supportive statements in the short years after 1867. It focuses especially on the Spanish events between 1867 and 1873 and supports the political modernization associated with republican ideals with their Hungarian appearance. It emphasizes the dethronement of Isabella II, the parliamentary speeches of Emilio Castelar translated to Hungarian and the letter of Lajos Kossuth to José María Orense as Spanish examples which provoked interest in Hungarian political life after the Settlement of 1867.

Keywords: Settlement of 1867, republic, democratic circles in Hungary, Lajos Kossuth, Emilio Castelar, José María Orense

The settlement of 1867 between Hungary and Austria inspired those Hungarian political forces who protested due to the lack of total state sovereignty and restricted citizen's rights. Between 1867 and 1873, out of the protesters, many referred to the proclamation of the French Republic, the conception of the short-lived First Spanish Republic and the thriving economy and political stability of the United States to point out the positive attributes of the republican state of government. Therefore we can see there was a "tail-wind" or comparative value of all those opinions from the Hungarian representatives, publicists and common men who belonged to the *left wing* or the forming "*democratic circles*" and supported the republic.

The "Compromise was appraised or complained about as the victory of the Hungarian political elite throughout not only the Empire, but Europe as

well...” – said László Csorba.¹ Still, the governing compromise-party between 1867 and 1918, during the time of dualism, –except for two occasions – were never supported by the majority; only 40% of the Hungarian population supported it.²

The base of the so-called Deák-Party (the supporters of the Compromise) was made of landowners, aristocrats and the upper-class. This party was in power until 1875. The opposition was the “center-left”, which accepted the confines of the monarchy, but missed the guarantees of autonomy. Consistently, the separation supporters were called “left-wingers” and also we can find the republic supporters among them. Many of their members fought in the War of Independence of 1848–49, after which they were forced to emigrate, but most of them returned later on. There are opinions in the specialized literature that there were no demands for a republic in the inland political movements.³ Our study tries to give a more detailed view on this left-wing picture (according to Hungarian contemporary reflections) with Spanish historical events between 1868 and 1873.

In the years between 1868 and 1873, when Spain was trying to create not only a republic, but a federative republic, in the dualist Austria-Hungary we can see the start of an intensive economic development of the constitutional monarchy in a specific – so called “common-cases” – political structure, in the personal-union constitutional monarchy. Neither part of the dualist monarchy could achieve a republic in the 19th century due to distinct reasons. Our study tries to give more details of how particular international events affected the republic supporters with the help of Hungarian political-publicist literature and certain speeches from the parliament of that period.⁴

The historical conditions after the Compromise were not favorable for the creation of a republic in Hungary, but international examples, including Spain, may have inspired the slow modernization of Hungarian political life.

The most important steps, territorial integrity and basic civil and human rights were achieved in Hungary in 1848/49, and their broadening and the modernization of the country had been in progress since then. Although a significant number of politicians and common men rejected the political system of 1867 from the beginning, many of them supported the idea of a

¹ László Csorba: A dualizmus rendszerének kiépülése és a konszolidált időszak (1867–1890), in A. Gergely (ed.): *19. századi magyar történelem, 1790–1918*, Budapest, Korona, 1998, 383.

² *Ibid.*, 383.

³ Ferenc Pölöskei (ed.): *A köztársasági eszme és mozgalom története Magyarországon*, Budapest, ELTE BTK, 1990, 18.

Ferenc Pölöskei in his book (*Ferenc Pölöskei: A köztársasági eszme története Magyarországon*, Budapest, Cégér, 1994, 56–60) explains that out of the left-wingers József Madarász was the most radical. He only accepted the personal-union. He demanded general, equal, and secret suffrage.

⁴ The parliamentary diaries from 1869 and 1872 were reviewed digitally, available: (https://library.hungaricana.hu/hu/collection/orszaggyulesi_dokumentumok/)

republic giving them more rights. From 1868 to 1873 there were certain politicians, village and city dwellers that started democratic circles to widen democratic rights; some took part in those actively and others wrote articles. Lajos Kossuth welcomed the Spanish dethroning revolution of 1868 openly in his letter from Italy, where he had emigrated to, because it opened up the possibility for a republic. The Spanish example flashed the idea of a federative republic in 1873 as a solution to the autonomy demands of Spanish regions.

Were the politicians and the press-news concerned with the Spanish events in Hungary? Could the events there have affected the Hungarian political life of the era? The modernization in Hungary was not revolutionary and radical (except for the overriding importance of 1848–49), but restrained between 1830 and 1873. As an introduction to our topic, we will briefly review the history of republican ideals in Hungary in the 19th century.

The so-called “*parliamentary-youth*” of 1832–36 were the first ones to change the work of the reform-parliament with their radical beliefs. Their numbers estimated around 1200. They supported the political legacy of the French Revolution, which was democratic and republic-like reforms.

In the thirties, political analyses already appeared in the Hungarian press, which compared the republican form of government, the American republican presidential system and the function of a constitutional monarch.⁵ In the most prestigious literary paper of their form era (1825–48), the “*Athenaeum*”, a Hungarian writer analyzed the difference between the American presidential system and the “European constitutional monarchial prince”(monarch – V.S.) system. (May 10th, 1838, No. 37). He referred to the works of Alexis de Tocqueville about American democracy and highlighted the role of the executive power when he argued for the transformation of the monarchy into a republic.

After the dethronement of the Habsburg dynasty on April 14th, 1849, the idea of a republic arose – but obviously under pressure. (Lajos Kossuth was elected as a governing-president.) The lack of total state governmental sovereignty in Hungary was ever present in the 19th century. The defeat of the Hungarian War of Independence against the Habsburgs in 1849 was followed by absolutism. Not long after the Compromise between Austria and Hungary and the creation of a “*common-cases*” dualist monarchial system in June, 1867, a revolution started in Spain (September, 1868) ending with the dethronement of Isabella II of Bourbon and the proclamation of the First Republic in 1873. Probably all these events were exemplary for those Hungarian politicians who rejected the idea of dualism as a political form

⁵ György Kókay – Géza Buzinkay – Gábor Murányi: *A magyar sajtó története*, Budapest, Sajtóház, 2001, 66.

limiting complete national independence. In parliamentary speeches and in the press of the era there were regular examples of news and articles about the Spanish events.

After the Compromise, political parties appeared in Hungary which were unlike the mass parties of today and were more like clubs, made up of representatives with the same ideals.⁶ Parties were formed based on public law, so they were specified by their standing with the dualist form of state. The decisive questions were the case of the state-rights. Those who did not accept the Compromise were called center-lefts.

In these times a small group of radicals appeared, the left-wingers, who officially became a party in 1868, called the 1848 Party. Their demands included total economic independence, secret suffrage, free education and the total equality of nationalities. They mostly consisted of ex- small and medium landowners, nobles and intellectuals, but also peasants and craftsmen from the countryside.⁷

The movement of the democratic circles of the left-wingers started in 1867 and become popular with the peasantry quickly. The Democratic Circle in Pest was formed in 1867 and their numbers increased rapidly in other cities and villages throughout the country.

In the years before the Compromise, politicians and their parties created a huge amount of press. Often editorial offices were lead by parliamentary representatives. The *Pesti Napló* ("Diary of Pest") of the era was a high quality, well-known daily paper, which accepted the Compromise as naturally as possible. It was edited by the liberal intellectuals of Pest. In 1868 from September to October, articles appeared in it regularly about Spain. According to the "*Pesti Napló*" of October 3rd, a "lewd government" had been abolished with the dethronement of Isabella II on September 18th, 1868, whose government was a disaster which had led to the impoverishment and illiteracy of the population. The readers were informed about the different parties in Spain too: the progressivists, the unionists (those who supported the federative union of Portugal and Spain), the republicans (lead by José María Orense, to whom Kossuth wrote his letter in 1868) and the Carlists (conservatives).

On October 12th, 1868 – one month after the dethronement in September – "*Pesti Napló*" published a long article called "Riego-march" (with the signature of A.N.): "The Spanish revolution went along to the sound of the Riego hymn." The song represented the "*Spanish Marseillaise*" of the country's history in the 19th century. On October 13th in Madrid "more and more protests appear for a republic". In the article of October 14th we can

⁶ László Katus: *A modern Magyarország születése – Magyarország története 1711–1914*, Pécs, Pécsi Történelemtudományért Kulturális Egyesület, 2012, 352.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 354.

read about two important demands of the Madridians: “Abajo los Borbones!” (Down with the Bourbons!) and “Abajo Roma!” (Down with Rome!), as the Madridians also wanted religious freedom.

In the Hungarian press of 1868, people could read about the judgment of the Spanish dynasty and the ideas of a federative republic which emerged in the political struggles of 1868/73. Certain representatives in the Hungarian parliament – even if not obviously mentioning Spain – referred to the republican ideal in their speeches. Béla Máriássy (1824–1897)⁸ said the following in the House of Representatives on January 28th, 1871: “... the restrictions in civil rights have a retroactive effect on the country and creates bitterness in the population.” ... “...there are no real movements in the country, only desires.” ... “...there are republicans in the country. Yes, there are, but their dreams are unachievable, as there is no republican spirit in the country, and we royalists are in an immense majority.”⁹ To Máriássy’s speech, Representative István Patay¹⁰ reacted as follows: “...there are men with republican ideals and men with republican desires. Yes there are, and I belong to those men and I solemnly and proudly say this.”

Sándor Mednyánszky on the 263rd countrywide meeting on January 16th, 1871, said the following about the Franco-Prussian War: “... the French nation shook off its oppressor, the emperor, and his methods while being illuminated by two great and sacred ideals: the saving of the homeland and the republic.”

Pál Szontagh on May 5th, 1872, included the latter ideal in his speech in the House of Representatives: “those who can’t see the virtues of a republic are blind.” (Records of the House of Representatives vol. 12 May 5th, 1872. digitalized version.)

The “*Religio*” (the Catholic ecclesiastical and literary journal) commented on the revolution of Madrid from September, discussing religious freedom on November 7th, 1868, in Pest in its 38th number titled “*Ecclesiastical Reports*”. The Hungarian journal draws attention to the arguments about religious freedom and the dismissal of the Syllabus through the Spanish events and concludes that a federative republic could be a “good example” for Hungary. “Give freedom to...the church, and we will not care a thing about the structure of government.” – says the Hungarian journalist.

⁸ Béla Máriássy (1824–1897) was a nobleman landowner, publicist, parliamentary representative, with legal qualifications. He took part in public affairs from 1843. He travelled in England and France in 1844. He was a militiaman in 1848 and a representative in parliament from 1861 joining the resolution party. He was accused of taking part in the Almásy movement in 1864. He was also the editor of the left-winger paper “*A Jövő*” (“The Future”) in 1862–63.

⁹ Diary of the Hungarian Parliamentary House of Representatives 273. National Session, January 28, 1871.

¹⁰ István Patay (1808–1878) came from a landowning family and fought against Jellačić in 1848 as an army officer. After 1849 he went into hiding, then emigrated. He came home after 1867 and was elected as a parliamentary representative.

The anti-Compromise supporter "*Magyar Újság*" ("*Hungarian Journal*") of the 19th century was one of the most important left-wing journals of the time. László Böszörményi¹¹ started to edit it, and, among others, he sounded the ideals of Lajos Kossuth. The journal quickly became popular mostly because of the open letters of Kossuth, which was shown in the large number of copies it sold (around 50 thousand a year).¹²

Lajos Kossuth, who lived as an emigrant from 1849, settled down in Turin (Torino), Italy in 1865. He sent his friendly, political analytical letter, which was drafted on December 6th, 1868, from here to José María Orense¹³, who was one of the founders of the Spanish Republican Party. His letter contained ideas of continent wide importance: the victory of the Spanish Revolution of 1868, the disposal of the monarchy and the proclamation of the Republic. Kossuth might have met him in Paris in 1867 or in Brussels or Geneva in 1866. The left-wing press of the era referred to¹⁴ this letter and its ideas. At the end of the many pages of the letter, Kossuth wrote to Orense the following: "I, as you know it... A republican with heart and hand..." Also in another part of the letter the Hungarian politician wrote this:¹⁵ "We met in exile and turned out to be friends... and the memory of our ephemeral relationship is so sweet and alive that I need to send my regards on the occasion of the revival of your noble home..."

The Hungarian politician regarded the dismissal of the monarchy as the greatest achievement of the Spanish Revolution of September, 1868. He briefly reviews the Spanish history of the past centuries and according to progression and democracy concludes that the Spanish nation acted with the "logic of maturity" and the events were characterized by order and modesty. "...Such nobly proven logic of maturity demands a republic. The future belongs to democracy" Kossuth goes on. Democracy is based on national

¹¹ László Böszörményi (1824–1869) took part in the War of Independence in 1848–49, and he was elected as a parliamentary representative in 1865, becoming one of the leaders of the left-wing party. In 1867–1868 he was the editor of *Magyar Újság*. He opposed the conciliation and was sentenced to prison for one year after publishing one of the letters of Kossuth, where he fell ill and died.

¹² Kókay – Buzinkay – Murányi: *A magyar sajtó*, 132.

¹³ José María Orense (1803–1880) was a marquis, republican politician and parliamentary representative. He had been forced into emigration regularly due to the political roles he took upon himself

¹⁴ In the paper called: "*Nép Szava*" on January 3rd, 1869, they refer to a letter of Lajos Kossuth: "Lajos Kossuth, our compatriot, wrote a letter to the leaders of the Spanish Republican Party, in which he prompts them to do whatever it takes to form Spain into a Republic." In the following number, on January 10th on page 15 we can read about an article which again refers to the publishing of the letter from Torino by Kossuth on December 6th: "In Spain, the advice of Lajos Kossuth, Garibaldi, Mazzini and Victor Hugo – Republic instead of Monarchy – was heard."

¹⁵ Ferencz Kossuth (ed.): *The writings of Lajos Kossuth, VII. Történelmi tanulmányok*, Budapest, Athenaeum R. Társulat, 1900, 426–438.

sovereignty. National government and monarchy exclude each other, thus the ideal form of government would be democracy rather than a republic. The days of monarchies are numbered concludes Kossuth. There is no question of nationality in Spain and no outside threat, even if a Bourbon queen was dethroned in 1868. It would not be logical to look for another “*tutor*” (meaning a king – V.S.), as a new king would only bring more internal strife. Spain will only be united by a republic.

The Hungarian politician continues to argue with those who fail to support the republic: it is not true that the monarchies of the future will be any different than those of the past, just because the democratic constitution frames them with safeguards. According to Kossuth, constitutional monarchy tries to accommodate two mutually excluding ideals: “*monocracy*” and “*democracy*”.

He finally concludes his letter by saying that a republic is an adequate form of government for the era and adds that “not solely the Spanish, but also the European question is the one hanging by the vote of the Spanish nation. In our times, no nation can separate itself from the world.”

In 1867–68, left-wingers in Hungary consequently rejected the Compromise; they formed a countrywide mesh of democratic circles and tried to mobilize an anti-Compromise public opinion movement. In this fight the Spanish dethroning revolution of 1868 then the “*liberal-democratic*” constitution accepted in 1869 and the short-lived first republic proved to be a great argument. The republican supportive movement had its own press, journals with the titles of “*Magyar Újság*” (“*Hungarian Press*”) and “*Nép Zászlója*” (“*Flag of the Nation*”), and also “*Arany Trombita*” (“*Golden Trumpet*”), “*Nép Szava*” (“*Voice of the People*”), “*Ellenőr*” (“*Inspector*”), and “*Gyors-Posta*” (“*Quick-Post*”). Not only analytical articles were published, but the open letters of Kossuth, too. The “*democratic circles*” were first attempted to be abolished by the government with a decree on March 3rd, 1868.¹⁶

Imre Áldor¹⁷ conceived the following anti-Compromise ideas in the journal “*Flag of the Nation*” on July 4th, 1868: Hungary is Samson, “who brought down his prison, but in the process buried himself in the rubble...” “...the unconcealable fact is that the nation is sick and ails from the hundreds of wounds inflicted by the recent past.” The same journal also writes in July of 1868 about Kecskemét (a Hungarian agricultural town) that eight mass-circles were formed, meaning “*democratic circles*”, which are “packed with men” reading and arguing about recent events. However, when the summer

¹⁶ Domokos Kosáry – Béla Németh G. (eds.): *A magyar sajtó története*, Vol. 2/2., 1867–1892, Budapest, Akadémiai, 1985, 35.

¹⁷ Imre Áldor (1838–1928) was a school teacher, writer from the 1860s and journalist. He was the editor of the “*Nép Zászlója*” (between 1868–1870 and 1873–76), and also of the “*Gyors Posta*” (January 2nd, 1871–September 22nd, 1872) and its side-paper the “*Nemzeti Kortés*”/“*National Cortes*” (1872).

came, and the time for agricultural work, their attendance decreased. The number of members in a circle was around 174. On July 18th, 1868 (number 29), in an article titled “*What happens in our country*”, the journal wrote that Pest county had rejected the secretary’s decree banning the democratic circles: “The democratic ideal was ripened by this age... it can only be the main spring of our social life.” According to the “*Nép Zászlója*”, “happiness can be found in a republic” (October 3rd, 1868, No. 40); “We trust in the Spanish nation, that they are not distressed by the scaffold, ...let this be their rallying-cry: Freedom, Equality, Fraternity – in one word, the Republic” (November 14th 1868, No. 46).

In connection with the left-wing literature of the era we can find slightly more diverse opinions: Ágnes Deák writes the following in her book titled *Citizen transformation and neo-absolutism 1849–1867*: “The left-wingers make up the Third power, being in a huge minority, who rejects the idea of any kind of common cases organization.” After July, 1867, “Left-wing forces started an intensive political agitation, the organization of democratic-circles started.”¹⁸ According to László Csorba, next to the Compromise supportive Deák-Party, the Decree-Party (in other words, the “*center-left*”) was the most important alongside the independence supporters, making up the so-called left-wing division lead by Dániel Irányi, Ernő Simonyi and Ignác Helfy, all of whom came home from emigration after 1849. They had to take into account the peasantry, small landowners and the middle-class and got most of their support from the larger farming cities of the *Alföld* (a Hungarian geographic unity with characteristics favouring agriculture). Kossuth considered this group to be the closest to him.¹⁹ Naturally, not all of the left-wingers were republic supporters. They mostly confessed to liberal, democratic and national endeavors. In the democratic circles they gave voice to the political tension and the social status of the peasantry. One outstanding example is the peasant movement of János Asztalos.²⁰

In the 14th number of the journal “*Arany Trombita*” (subtitled: “*A Political, Industrial and Agricultural weekly-paper. For the mass audience.*”), on April 17th, 1869, we can also find news about events in Spain: in Spain after

¹⁸ Ágnes Deák: *Polgári átalakulás és neoabszolutizmus, 1849–1867*, Budapest, Kossuth, 2009, 100.

¹⁹ Csorba: *A dualizmus rendszere*, 383–384.

²⁰ János Asztalos (1822–1898) was a lawyer and politician who organized the democratic circles in the town of Kecskemét. On 23rd of February, 1868, he led the protests in Kiskunfélegyháza (which included democratic demands).

the revolution of September, 1868, it had still not been decided whether a monarchy or a republic should be the form of government. Republican supporters had entrusted Emilio Castelar²¹ to govern.

In the left-wing press of the times the richest and most significant article would be the one from Arany Trombita, published separately in 1869 in four pages titled "*Emil Castelar's speech for the Republic*". In this article Hungarian readers were informed about the speech of the Spanish politician which he gave in Cortes. In the long speech one part of a sentence was highlighted in heavy type by the editor, possibly due to the demands of the writer: "the confederation of different races in Europe". According to Castelar the only tool to defend Latins against the "military-autocratic politics of the German race" is the Confederation and the Republic.

One of the first ideas of Castelar was that monarchy means social injustice and political reaction to him. In contrast, republic means social justice and political freedom. When Castelar answers the question proposed by himself, "What is democracy?", the first things he mentions are popular representation and the right to govern. Following these are human and civil rights, the general right to vote, freedom of conscience, freedom of religion and freedom of education. In contrast, monarchy places the supreme power in the hands of one family. Hungarian readers could also learn about the opinion of others in the Spanish parliament (for example, Sir Rodriguez), according to whom "the world is a large federation, the people of Europe are en route to European state fusion..."; can we find a bigger "*course-ideology*" in history, regarding the up-keep of nations? Castelar confesses that he would like that "with the revolution of September my home will be the first state that founds a European state confederation" and adds that the time of the "*holy-affair*" of humanity was from 1787 to 1792, referring to the formation of the United States and the Revolution of France.

Emilio Castelar's speech in support of the republic was most likely of interest to some politicians of Hungary at that time. This is suggested by the fact that it was published separately in smaller format too, translated by Emil Szilágyi, in 1869 in Pest, Emil Castelar: "*His speech for the Republic*" (Athenaeum Printers, pages 1–30). In his introduction Emil Szilágyi, the translator of the text, mainly emphasizes denominational equality and freedom of conscience quoting the Spanish politician: "The present speech made a great deal of noise in the learned world; every nation hurried to translate it to its own

²¹ Emilio Castelar (1832–1899) was a journalist and politician, and one of the presidents of the First Spanish Republic of 1873, who settled the regionalist endeavors. He was also-called "possibilist republican" (in other words a "moderantist", who later accepted the restoration of the Spanish monarchy in 1875 according to logic.) He was not a supporter of revolution. Although Castelar remained a committed supporter of the republican system as a perfect governmental system, he accepted the – changing – dialectics of history with this too. In: Raymond Carr: *España 1808–1975*, Barcelona, Ariel, 1985, 348–349.

language and spread it... In Germany around 600 copies are in circulation." The Hungarian writer-translator also adds that "the ideals elaborated in the speech are not as widespread around here..."

Also published by the Athenaeum Association in 1875, in the translation of György Szathmáry (1845–1898), journalist and parliamentary representative, were the six parliamentary speeches of the Spanish politician, published with the title "*Emil Castelar's Speeches*". All of the speeches were delivered in 1869 in the Cortes when the arguments took place about the "*liberal-democratic*" constitution accepted in June.

Emilio Castelar's parliamentary speeches dealt with just the questions the left-wingers of the era were interested in: freedom of religion (Castelar's speech on April 12th, 1869); freedom of conscience (May 5th, 1869); inalienable human rights (heard in a session on June 25th, 1869); a speech against the Bourbons; a speech against slavery; and a speech about the Internationale. Regarding the Spanish Revolution of 1868, Castelar states that: "The revolution of September included two revolutions. One of them resembled the one of 1830, the other the one in 1848 of France, one represented by the conservative and the other by the radical party."²²

"*Magyar Újság*" released an article on the front page just two days after the proclamation of the Spanish Republic on February 11th, 1873, titled "*A returned crown*", referring to the resignation of the Spanish King, Amadeo de Saboya. It was stressed that it was not a dethronement, but a special case, in which "a king gave back the crown of his own free will". A few days after (February 15th), also on the front page in the "*Politikai Szemle*" ("*Political review*") it was written that "if Spain becomes a Republic, other Latin nations will follow it."

In the "*Igazmondó*" ("*Truth-teller*") left-wing journal²³ on February 16th, 1873 it was highlighted that: "And so the Republic has been proclaimed in Spain," King Amadeo resigned. On February 23rd the journal commented on his resignation: "...such a king is worthy of the honor of every citizen. So beautiful is his resignation that we report it in all of its spread." The "beautiful" in truth had an elated meaning, since the king alluded to the fact that, because he could not further the improvement of Spain's fate and prevent a state of civil war, he thought it would be better to return the crown. Ignác Helfy,

²² Emilio Castelar: *Castelar Emil beszédei* (Emilio Castelar's speeches), Budapest, Athenaeum Társulat, 1875, 125.

²³ On January 8th, 1871, "*Igazmondó*" in its article titled "*What should be our foreign policy?*" quotes Mór Jókai, according to whom "Our goals, flags, ideals are the same. Liberal ideals, protection of the people's interest, constitutional government, national cultural improvements." On February 13th, 1871, "*Igazmondó*" judged the Hungarian voting system apropos of republican values. In its 14th number, in the article titled "*Caste multiplication*" it criticized the "virilist" electoral system, which violates the Equality of Rights in Hungary, and "*creates a wealth-based aristocracy*"!

parliamentary representative and consistent rejector of the Compromise, called in the 99th national session on February 26th, 1873, for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to recognize the Spanish Republic as a legitimate state. The news of Amadeo Saboya's resignation and the proclamation of the Republic on the same day on February 11th reached the Hungarian political public opinion relatively quickly.

Helpy, in his aforementioned interpellation, said the following: "What is happening in Spain is unique in the history of nations... The Spanish nation... has accepted it not with insolent demonstrations, but with calm, grateful recognition and...for the laid down crown they offered the crown of civilian merit for the king." ..."The Spanish assembly chose the republican form." Helpy asked the Hungarian prime minister for the acknowledgement of Spain's new governmental form, since the USA had already acknowledged it and for him the most important political message was that every nation should have its decisions at its own disposal.²⁴

On February 15th, 1873, "*Magyar Újság*" introduced the Spanish events on its front page, in a full column article: "The Spanish Republic is pronounced. The first nation to acknowledge it is the United States. The French Republic pages welcome it!" On February 20th, 1873, also on the front page, "*Politikai Szemle*" began its report with the following sentence: "The declaration of the Spanish Republic produced great movements in the political world. However, this faded in a short time and now only the journals try to guess whether the Republic will stay alive or not." The writer finishes his train of thought thus: "after a small republican shock the weather calmed in the political world."

This "*calm weather*" lasted a long while in Hungary with the Compromise born in 1867. It is a controversial question up to the present time that even though a republic as a modern form of government could not be a realistic alternative in the Hungary of the era, how effective a dualist form of rule was for the future of the country.²⁵

In the discussed period – between 1867 and 1873 – there were two important parliamentary elections in Hungary, which – from the perspective of our

²⁴ *House of Representatives Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 99, 26th of February, 1873, 102–103. https://library.hungaricana.hu/en/view/OGYK_KN-1872_05/?pg=107&layout=s&query=spanyol%20k%C3%B6z%C3%A1rsas%C3%A1g

²⁵ We can see significant differences in the judgment of the political modernization of the dualist monarchy after the compromise. For example, according to László Csorba: "*The compulsion for the upkeep of the compromise...in truth excluded the consistent continuation of the liberal reform politics.*" (Csorba: *A dualizmus rendszere*, 386). On the same topic, see also: Katus: *A modern Magyarország születése – Magyarország története 1711–1914*, Pécs, Pécsi Történelemtudományért Kulturális Egyesület, 2012; Péter Hanák: *1867 – Európai térben és időben*, Budapest, História Könyvtár, 2001; András Cieger (ed.): *A kiegyezés*, Budapest, Osiris, 2004; Gábor Gyáni: *Nép, nemzet, zsidó*, Pozsony, Kalligram, 2013. Also from earlier: István Bibó, László Németh, Iván Zoltán Dénes, András Kovács, András Gerő, Ignác Romsics, Éva Somogyi and the work of others.

chosen subject – simultaneously framed the Spanish political modernizing events of the 19th century. The two elections were in 1869 and 1872. In 1869, the Compromise supporting Deák-Party got 59% of the mandates. The strengthened left-wingers (or the Party of 48) got 52 mandates and the left-center got 112 mandates.²⁶

The electoral campaigns of 1872 were characterized by grave abuses. The government tried to influence the results with tools of abuse. The “cortes”²⁷ electoral methods of the county elections of the feudal world appeared: food and drink distribution and vote purchases were used to stave off the voters of the opposition. Due to the electoral abuses the government had to step down. Also the new decree of 1874 tightened the rights of suffrage; the proportion of voters changed from 6.7% to 5.9 on the side of the anti-liberal open voting system.

CONCLUSION

It is indisputable that following the settlement of 1867 not only economic improvements started in Hungary (even though there was a brief pause due to the European agricultural crisis of 1873), but a political modernization too.²⁸ In legislation they concentrated on the creation of a modern civil state apparatus, a justice system, civil rights and property-rights firstly. Then again political modernization is still debated in the specialized literature up to this day, and according to some: “...society improvements were tilted back definitively with the process of casteation due to 1867.”²⁹

If we are examining the phenomena of political modernization taking place in the second part of the 19th century, we can say that the period between 1867 and 1873 can altogether be considered as a brief “*interlude*” from the viewpoint of what support the republican system had. In the mentioned years

²⁶ Katus: *A modern Magyarország*, 356–357.

²⁷ The “*cortes*”, the name of the Spanish parliament, was tied to aggressive electoral methods and abuses by Zsigmond Kemény in his pamphlet published in 1843 titled “*Kortessedés és ellenszeret!*” (*Cortentry and its remedies*). In the Hungarian political language the word “*cortes*” seems to have become naturalized in the 19th century in connection with elections and electoral techniques (e.g., *cortes-campaign*, *cortes-techniques*, *cortentry*, *cortes-speech* etc.)

²⁸ For political modernization, see – among others – the research of András Cieger (András Cieger: *Kormány a mérlegen a múlt században. A kormány helye és szerepe a dualizmus politikai rendszerében 1867–1875*, *Századvég*, 4, 1999, 79–107). Cieger raises attention to the fact that the Settlement of 1867 was a step back to the April Acts of 1848 as the rights of the monarch grew in many areas.

²⁹ András Kovács: *Két kiegyezés*, in: A. Czieger (ed.): *A kiegyezés*, Budapest, Osiris, 2004, 348. The reason to use the word “*caste*” is to suggest that the Hungarian society was going to be inflexible/immobile.

many referred to the Spanish events and the press dedicated emphasized attention to them: thus the dethronement following the revolution of 1868, the debates of 1869 about the liberal-democratic constitution of Spain and the first Republic of Spain in 1873 became the motivating examples.

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CHANGES IN NATIONAL SELF-IMAGE AND THE IMAGE OF NEIGHBOURHOOD OF EXPATRIATE HUNGARIANS IN THE ROMANIAN OLD KINGDOM¹

—◀▶—
BÉLA MAKKAI

ABSTRACT

At the end of the 19th century, – due to the economic crisis and inappropriate social policy – hundreds of thousands were forced to leave the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The vast majority of Székely-Hungarians aimed at starting a new life in neighbouring Romania, rather than overseas.

This lecture is based on a thorough analysis of the settler foreigners, with special attention to their relationship with the rejected old home and their welcoming new country. The economic recession and the changes in law concerning market protection began at the turn of the century. Due to this, the policy of migration in Romania was not shaped by economic pragmatism any longer, but rather by traditional xenophobia. As an aftermath of this, migrants were to suffer discrimination. The conscious policy of Romania concerning migration aimed at taking an advantage of the situation: migrants had lost their citizenship by their settling down in Romania. In the meantime, the Hungarian government launched a campaign in 1901, aiming at maintaining national identity and resettling back those who had left earlier. During the Balkan Wars, the Hungarian government and the press succeeded in convincing the vast majority of Hungarians who had left that their real home was Hungary and that it was important, even if they were living somewhere else, that they should go back home. However, an overt campaign organized by Bucharest had already been launched for Transylvania, and they attacked

¹ The notion of “Regát” (in Hungarian) or Regat in Romanian is used in both languages as the name of the two Romanian principalities, which were united in 1859–1861. This term is also applied in order to make a chronological differentiation from the notion of Greater Romania that was established during the Paris Peace Conference and according to the terms of the Paris Peace Treaties (1919–1920).

their ally in 1916. Despite all of this, the Hungarian press of Romania did not depart from their mediator purpose: they aimed at proponing the reconciliation and alliance of the two neighbouring countries in the long-run. This reconciliation was fueled by the fact that both countries were in the "Slavic and German-ring" and therefore both parties had started to become more and more interdependent.

Keywords: *Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Old Romanian Kingdom, Hungarian-Romanian relations, migration, assimilation, Hungarian diasporas in Romania, Romanian irredentism, Hungarian press in Romania*

After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, two generations of the Hungarian political elite had seen the reincarnation of the Empire of the Árpád dynasty in the 50 million Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy and being guided by great power illusions they were ever more inclined to ignore the aspirations of other nationalities, who represented half of the population of their country. Although this attitude was not accompanied by economic discrimination, because of the population boom, it became apparent at the end of the century and due to the severe livelihood crisis in the unproductive peripheral areas, a high percentage of the ethnic groups were forced to leave the country. The intensive consumption of the growing economic goods by the hereditary aristocracy and the largely foreign-born economic elite further aggravated the already complex national troubles.² However, the losers of this cynical "social policy" were not only the other nationalities. About a third of the emigrants of the south-eastern part of the country's workforce were Hungarians.³ Due to the pressures of the empire (and the phanariot rulers), the society of Wallachia and Moldova was becoming xenophobic⁴

² Especially by knowing the fact that during the 50 years of the existence of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, the Hungarian proportion of the domestic GDP had tripled. László Katus: *A modern Magyarország születése. Magyarország története 1711–1944*, Pécs, Kronosz–Pécsi Történettudományért Kulturális Egyesület, 2012, 472.

³ The proportion of Romanians was almost 60%, and of the Saxons approximately 10%. The report of Gyula Vargha, director of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office to Kálmán Széll prime minister. Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára [National Archives of Hungary] K 26 Ministerial documents, subsection number 548. nr. 1937./1901 item XXXI, radix 811. Hereinafter: National Archives of Hungary, MNL OL K 26 ME, subsection nr. 548. nr. 1937/1901, item XXXI, radix 811.

⁴ Fear was caused for example by the alleged propensity for domination of the Germans, who were ready to quit Russia. I am quoting the Romanian article: *Bukaresti Magyar Közlöny*, 6 October, 1860. The editor of the Hungarian newspaper had a more optimistic view about the situation: "we are affirming benevolently that we are not afraid about the degeneration of Romania, because our experience here is that no single nation has a major melting power. Here, German, Greek, Hebrew, Serbian, Roma and all others speak the language of the homeland..." *Bukaresti Magyar Közlöny*, 20 October, 1860.

and newcomers were received controversially. For example, a cross had to be placed instead of the usual star on the tower of the Reformed Church built in the 1820s in Bucharest. Nevertheless, this phenomenon can also be interpreted as an exaggerated manifestation of gratitude to the princely patrons.⁵

In any case, the loyal attitude was not only promulgated by the Protestant presbytery, but also the editors of the first Hungarian weekly magazine were working with this programmatic formula.⁶ The political emigration of 1848/49 also greatly valued the hospitality of the two Romanian principalities, and it did a lot in order to alleviate the pigeonholed oppressor image and the rejection⁷ of Hungarians by their neighbours, which stereotype was also strengthened because of the civil war episodes of the War of Independence. The French press was a support in this direction as it was an important information source for Romanian news and there were articles on a regular basis about the heroism of Hungarian volunteers fighting on the side of Garibaldi. Thus, the Romanian papers could not accuse the Hungarian partner pages of partiality.⁸ Moreover, the Romanian poet Bolliac Cezar encouraged the youth to follow the example of the Hungarian Legion.⁹ Others, however, saw this as a threat to the Romanians. According to a paper in Bucharest, “these Hungarians always want to conquer us, also this paper of theirs is nothing else but a political intrigue by which they want to incriminate us.” The answer of the Hungarian editor was that his mission was to conquer only the hearts of the Romanians.¹⁰ He tried to communicate with and approach the Romanians by the evocation of common struggles against the Turks by starting an article series (under the

⁵ Suțu Alexandru and Ghika Grigore had also contributed to the costs of the construction. Along with this, the unusual altar and biblical-themed oil paintings inside the Reformed Church are also indicators of the coercive reasons. Károly Auner: *A romániai magyar telepek történelmi vázlatja*, [A historical outline of Hungarian settlements of Romania], Temesvár, 1908, 69.

⁶ Although editor Ferenc Koós was not denying the frictions in the past, he was also stressing the commonality of interests of the two nations by saying thank you for the hospitality of Romanians. *Bukaresti Magyar Közlöny*, 1 September, 1860.

⁷ A part of the press of Bucharest was spreading the idea that the Hungarians had already lost the appreciation of the West in 1848. The source of the quotation is the paper of the *Bukaresti Magyar Közlöny* issued on 24 November, 1860. However, in contrast to the regrettable attack of the corps of volunteers of Major Hatvani in Abrudbánya, which action interrupted the peace negotiations, there was the massacre of the Hungarian civilian population of Zalatna and Nagyenyed. See Róbert Hermann: *Az abrudbányai tragédia 1849. Hatvani Imre szabadságszereplője és a magyar-román megbékélés megírója 1849-ben*, Budapest, Heraldika, 1999.

⁸ Also the paper named *Roman* (issued on 10 October, 1860) quoted the case of a Hungarian courier who slaughtered four Neapolitan Bo(urbon) mercenaries and put two others to flight, as he himself received several wounds. *Bukaresti Magyar Közlöny*, 20 October, 1860.

⁹ *Bukaresti Magyar Közlöny*, 3 November, 1860.

¹⁰ *Bukaresti Magyar Közlöny*, 25 August, 1860.

title of Romanian brothers) with the aim of discussing controversial issues.¹¹ The contemporary issue of the *Național* noted by the characterization of the soul of the Hungarian people that the Hungarians are heated by sacred fire, “which would be an honour for any other nation as well”. However, according to the newspaper their “infernal plans” (namely, national oppression)¹² are guiding them to such actions which “have not been committed by the wildest barbarians in the most barbaric centuries.”¹³ The physician Józsa Oroszhegyi denied this. He pointed out that the Hungarian landlords had exploited not only the Romanians over the centuries, but also the millions of Hungarian serfs. However, in 1848 they were able to give up voluntarily their privileges and to ensure full equality of rights for all the inhabitants of the country.¹⁴

The first constitution (1866) of the two Romanian principalities united in 1859/1861 also did not treat the immigrants according to unison standards. Whilst Romanian native speakers could gain citizenship immediately, the aliens had to wait for decades.¹⁵

Along with this, the host country was not initially hostile to immigrants (who were of considerable benefit from an economic perspective). Some people made a bright career, such as doctors, engineers and artists,¹⁶ and also the Szekler maids who were coming here in masses to work were appreciated in the Romanian labour market because of their good reputation of being clean, hard-working and reliable.¹⁷ The fact that their integration was not easy can be concluded by reading the *Bukuresti Híradó* (1876–1885). This newspaper (as also those that were founded later) was launched with a dual mission as it was the public voice of Hungarian immigrants and it sought to solve conflicts between the two nations. There was a Romanian version of it (*Gazetta de Bucuresti*) as well, which was published for a few years. The new publication

¹¹ But the newspaper had a subsection with the title of *Hungarian-Romanian relations* as well.

¹² Hungarian data concerning assimilation issues contradict this claim. Accordingly, between 1850 and 1900 there were 309 Hungarian, 42 German and 11 Serbian municipalities which were Romanianised. Whilst from Romanian villages only 42 were forced to be Hungarian, 13 to be German and 6 to be Serbian, and ultimately a number of 4 to be other nationalities. Endre Középpajtai Barna: *Románia nemzetiségi politikája és az oláhajkú magyar polgárok*, Kolozsvár, EMKE, 1908, 136–137.

¹³ *Național*, 1860, publication number 70. Source: *Bukaresti Magyar Közlöny*, 22 September, 1860.

¹⁴ *Bukaresti Magyar Közlöny*, 17 November, 1860.

¹⁵ The Basic Law excluded a priori the Jews and Muslims from the right to gain estate. Endre Barna: *Románia nemzetiségi*, 81–82.

¹⁶ For example, Mihály Dávid, the designer of the University of Bucharest, lithographer József Pernet, painter Károly Szathmáry-Papp, court photographer Ferenc Mándy, dr. Lajos Fialla, the deputy president of the Romanian Red Cross and so on.

¹⁷ As economist Lóránt Hegedüs wrote: the Szekler maid is something like “a consumer product, like tea or coffee, which importation fluctuates according to demand.” Lóránt Hegedüs: *A székelyek kivándorlása Romániába* (The emigration of the Szeklers to Romania.) Budapest, Franklin, 1902, 23.

declared war on misconceptions, the atmosphere of “suspiciousness” and “hostilities”,¹⁸ and the editor, Lajos Vándory, reciprocally refused accusations concerning the national oppression of Transylvanian Romanians. And in the same way, he rejected the thesis of persecution of Hungarians [Csangos] in Romania.¹⁹

However, the roots of certain national conflicts were sometimes in international relations as at the time of the so-called “great Eastern crisis” between 1875 and 1878. The Hungarian newspaper praised the initially careful politics of Romania²⁰ in the Russian-Turkish conflict as the country was under Russian protectorate at the beginning of the century. And by making references to the Russian military intervention of 1849 in Hungary and to the crushing of the Polish uprising in 1863, the article emphasized the vulnerability of the Romanians and it stressed their common fate with Hungarians.²¹ But after all, Romania intervened on the Russian side in the fighting and after the victory of Plevna, the country unilaterally declared its independence (1877).²² Right after the victory and a couple of months later, it was not advisable for Hungarians living in Bucharest to speak in their own language (because of the Turkish friendly policy of Budapest).²³ After receiving life-threatening messages, Vándory had to temporarily flee from the country.²⁴ Later he was denounced because of incitement to nationalism and for high treason as well.²⁵ The editor refused the accusation of high treason by referring²⁶ to his distinction that was awarded by Charles I. According to Vándory, this accusation could be addressed to those Romanian journalists in Transylvania who wanted to shape Romanian-speaking Hungarian citizens to become faithful adepts of a foreign country; while Hungarians

¹⁸ For example, that the Romanians were only waiting for a chance to extend their political boundaries to the Tisza river; or that the Hungarians were aiming on the basis of former vassal rights to recover Wallachia, respectively the Szörényi Bánság. *Bukaresti Híradó*, 1 October, 1876.

¹⁹ *Bukaresti Híradó*, 1 October, 1876.

²⁰ *Bukaresti Híradó*, 20 February/4 March, 1877.

²¹ *Bukaresti Híradó*, 3, 15 April, 1877, and *Bukaresti Híradó = Gazetta de Bucuresci*, 18 January, 1880.

²² This would also be confirmed by the great power Congress of Berlin in 1878 with the recognition of the possession of the northern part of Dobrogea. However, Romania had to give up the southern part of Bessarabia in favor of its Russian ally and it committed itself to accord citizenship to approximately 261,000 Jews and Muslims. Endre Barna: *Románia nemzetiségi*, 81–82.

²³ Gábor Németh, preceptor and journalist, summed up these months as follows: “even in those difficult times we hardly dared to speak Hungarian in the street.” *Bukaresti Magyar Közlöny*, 11 November, 1884.

²⁴ *Bukaresti Híradó*, 9 August, 1885.

²⁵ *Bukaresti Híradó*, 28 June, 1885.

²⁶ The medal of the crown of Charles I was awarded to Vándory in 1881. *Bukaresti Híradó*, 5 July, 1885.

of the Regat could hardly be accused by the same token.²⁷ The opinion of the honorary president of the Hungarian Association of Bucharest concerning the promotion of hostile resentment was similar to that of Vándory: “certain intellectuals are filling the columns of newspapers with negative messages about us. According to them, we are the uncultivated and intolerant barbarians of Europe.”²⁸

Nevertheless, there was another shadow on the distorted image of Hungarians. Due to the deteriorating price and wage conditions during the war many of them were now “Hungarians in starvation” and according to Vándory, they were not worthy of the hospitality of Romania.²⁹ The precarious livelihood conditions were mainly characteristic of the vulnerable maids the majority of who were involved in prostitution.³⁰ However, the engineer Sándor Veress pointed out that the “hateful ridicule” by which the host nation judged the cavalry of the “Hungaras” was not fair and the same was true for the slogan of “Attila’s degenerate descendants” by which watchwords, authors were aiming to characterise a whole nation.³¹ Conversely, certain Hungarian organizations³² that were led by uneducated and aspiring leaders, who often quarrelled with each other,³³ deserved more criticism and mischievousness. These issues mostly resulting from religious conflicts sometimes ended in the Romanian courts.³⁴ In order to better protect the reputation of Hungarians, the proposal of Vándory was to limit the irresponsible emigration flow and the forced deportation back home of those who were rubbing along in the foreign country.³⁵ However, the self-respecting Sekler bashfully tried to hide his material and moral slipping.³⁶

²⁷ The answer of Vándory to the accusations of the Románul. *Bukaresti Híradó*, 5 July, 1885.

²⁸ *Bukaresti Híradó*, 13/25 February, 1877.

²⁹ *Bukaresti Híradó*, 22 May/3 June, 1877.

³⁰ According to Veress, there were hardly any girls with pretty faces among the young maids because of the poverty and increased demand. *Bukaresti Híradó*, 3/15 April, 1877.

³¹ *Bukaresti Híradó*, 3/15 April, 1877.

³² The Romanian (Bucharest) and German media were picking up certain topics about the details of the discords among Hungarian leaders, for example, the newspaper *Epoca*, 14 October, 1899. Source: *Bukaresti Közlöny*, 17/29 October, 1899.

³³ According to Zoltán Poliány, “... public associations were not created by public need or interest, but because of personal vanity, greed or religious reasons. The memoir of Poliány of 14 April, 1904. National Archives of Hungary MNL OL K 26 ME subsection nr. 604. nr. 636./1904 item XVIII, radix 636, 6.

³⁴ “Here reigns perpetual friction (...) and pain, this hatred is based on religious intolerance (...) here in Bucharest ...” *Bukaresti Híradó*, 30 January/11 February, 1877. The protestant deacon and president of the association was regretting that the Hungarian Society of Bucharest had no cases with the authorities during its 42 years of existence. Therefore, it was necessary to clarify the new and shameful situation in front of the Romanian public. *Bukaresti Közlöny*, 17/29 October, 1899.

³⁵ *Bukaresti Híradó*, 1/13 May, 1877.

³⁶ Endre Barabás: A székeky kivándorlás és a Romániában élő magyarok helyzete, [The emigration of the Seklers and the situation of Hungarians living in Romania], *Economic Review*, 25, Vol. 25, January, 1901, 427.

Anyhow how could she or he present himself with his big shame in front of those who remained at home? The well-known disadvantages of this pride were not only pointed out sometimes by the Romanians, but with “pedagogical” intentions also by the Hungarian editors in Bucharest.³⁷ Nonetheless, at certain exceptional moments, the Hungarian diaspora was able to achieve the stage of objective disposition by addressing its real problems.³⁸ The engineer Sándor Veress, who believed in the way of moral renewal, recommended the harder method to his compatriots: “If I give all my energy in order to be a more conscientious doctor, a more accurate engineer, a more diligent teacher, to become a more tireless and reliable merchant than the others (...) than the non-Hungarian neighbours”, then it serves me as an individual the most and the esteem of the nation which I represent.³⁹

Therefore, the rise and decline in moral matters marked the Hungarian diaspora of Romania at the same time. Over a few decades, this diaspora founded professional charitable and cultural societies in several Romanian cities.⁴⁰ The human capital, which was mainly composed of seasonal workers, was quickly changing in the meantime. After the Hungarian-Romanian war of customs duties of the 1880/90s,⁴¹ hundreds of Szekler and Saxon craftsmen settled from the south-eastern part of the country to Romania, which was an effort to maintain their former consumer market. The young Romanian

³⁷ Also József Feleký criticized the individualism of Szeklers and the dissensions of the Hungarian associations in Bucharest: “Unfortunately, solidarity, mutual support, care for each other and the subordination of personal interests to the public interest were never the virtue of Hungarians ...” *Bukaresti Magyar Hírlap*, 17 July, 1918.

³⁸ The writing with the title *Hungarian diseases* can also be regarded as a successful self-portrait and it is designed with much courageous sincerity in which the author criticizes the proudness and headstrongness of the self-appointed leaders of the Hungarian associations. At the same time, he also addresses the dangers of flattery and the issue of irresponsible credulity tied to the readiness to sacrifice the public interest: „... if they are telling to us some honey-glazed words in order to fall into a narcotizing deadly dream by giving us spiced pie, inebriating wine, – well in that case, we are ready to do all possible things, but how is this otherwise? – Do not hurt the Hungarians!” *Romániai Hírlap*, 29 March, 1908.

³⁹ *Bukaresti Híradó*, 13/25 February, 1877.

⁴⁰ The first Hungarian organization in Bucharest was a Protestant congregation and it was founded in 1815 on 14 May. Churches, schools, chapels and rectories were built in Pitești and Ploiești. A school and rectory was constructed in the Moldavian Szászút, especially in Brăila and Galați the education could be started in the mother tongue of the children. László Bányai: A bukaresti magyar egyházzól, *Az Ige*, Vol. 3, No. 20, 1992, 7. According to Nicolae Iorga, the modern “Hungarian” Catholic history of Ploiești began in 1829, and that of Turnu Severin (Szörénytornya in Hungarian) started in 1836. Auner: *A romániai magyar telepek történelmi vázlata*, 72.

⁴¹ The Hungarian media of the Regat addressed the issues in a respectful tone, but the nationalist press in Hungary discussed the events in a quite supercilious manner. Romania took countermeasures due to the pressure and conflict generated by the Hungarian landlords. The Hungarian press wrote about Romania that it was “ungrateful” and there were also other derogatory words such as “A pygmy among the European states showed its fist to the Austria-Hungarian Monarchy.” *Pesti Hírlap*, 15 May, 1886.

state welcomed the skilled foreign workforce, first of all in the professions where there was a shortage, and in this way many of the newcomer craftsmen became headman.⁴² Moreover, in the midst of their financial gains, they were also promoting the good reputation of the receiving new homeland. (A good example was the carriage manufacturers in the World Exhibition in Paris in 1878.)⁴³ Nevertheless, the effects of the economic crisis were already prevalent at the turn of the century and therefore it resulted in a rapid deterioration of the living conditions. During these years the immigrant craftsmen assured their professional followers, who were also competitors with each other. The economic policy of the government supplemented all this with market protection regulations.⁴⁴ The hard living conditions coerced masses on the margins of society.⁴⁵ The critical situation was aggravated by the inflexibility of Hungarian legislation. Since after an absence of ten years the expatriates lost their Hungarian citizenship and men who were liable to do military duty could expect severe punishment – as lawbreakers – at home. Thus, the consciously accepted dual identity⁴⁶ had been replaced with the purposelessness of belonging to nowhere and these Hungarians soon became despised “bozgars” (which means homeless in Romania). Due to the living historical stereotypes and the one-sidedness of the media, Romanian society saw the immigrant Hungarians – by a significant proportional error – as the oppressors of their Transylvanian brothers.⁴⁷ Thus, it was a big satisfaction

⁴² In the 1880s a great number of Hungarians worked in the armaments factory and engineering works of Bucharest as well as in the docks of port cities. There were entire Hungarian departments in the Mandrea shoe factories and even the headmen were Hungarians. Barabás: *A székely kivándorlás*, 436–437. In the light of these facts, a newspaper in Budapest was formulating presumptuously by stating that the hardworking Szeklers “were making the Romanian workers completely worthless.” *Pesti Hírlap*, 30 October, 1902.

⁴³ Carriage manufacturer Ferenc Sántha won the grand prize. However, the situation changed radically at the turn of the century. Thus, the Romanian authorities did not allow the Hungarian carriage manufacturers to present their products on the international market of France and the Romanian transportation and industrial trade show in 1895. Barabás: *A székely kivándorlás*, 430.

⁴⁴ Please see the laws concerning the industry (industrial act) of 1887, the regulations on this subject from 1894, and in particular the amendment to the law of 1912. Foreign workers were among the first dismissals in industrial plants and their proportion was tied to strict regulations. Barabás: *A székely kivándorlás*, 434.

⁴⁵ A leány kereskedés elleni mozgalom. [The movement against girl trading] *Bukaresti Magyar Újság*, 10 August, 1902; Mozgalom a hungarák érdekében. [Movement for the “Hungara”-s.], *Bukaresti Magyar Újság*, 1 May, 1908.

⁴⁶ The opinion of János Bálint, the editor of the *Bukaresti Magyar Újság*, was the following: “... the purpose of our paper was to teach all Hungarians living here to really love two home countries at once. To tell what is our duty to the homeland that provided us with civil rights and to our second home where we are gaining our existence.” *Bukaresti Magyar Újság*, 26 January, 1902.

⁴⁷ The Greek-Catholic and Orthodox Romanian Church enjoyed cultural autonomy. The number of Romanians in Hungary was less than half that of Romania’s population, and yet they had several schools. Furthermore, dozens of newspapers, smaller banks and

for them that one of the “leading nations” of the Monarchy was not seen any more as an exploitative ruler but on the contrary, they were seen now as the slaves of the Romanians. The view of the government circles in Budapest was not very different and certain politicians gave their opinions from their comfortable chairs by simply naming their compatriots as “scum”.⁴⁸ They knew nothing about their existential fights, homesickness and convoluted emotional-ideological ties.⁴⁹ Even one of the consular officials barely perceived a little piece of the bigger picture by noting that while the relationship between expatriates and the new homeland could be characterised as one of loyalty⁵⁰ and sometimes almost servility,⁵¹ in turn they kept their distance in their attitude towards the old homeland.⁵² This was partly because they were reading Romanian newspapers and in the light of this, the quitted homeland

cultural organizations were in their possession and by the proportion of more than 20% of Romanian-speaking settlements, they were officially allowed to use their native language for managing issues in public administration. All these affairs were regulated by a separate nationality law (Article XLIV. of 1868). Péter Hanák (chief editor): *Magyarország története 1890–1918.* vol. 2 vols., [The history of Hungary from 1890 to 1918.] Budapest, Akadémiai, 1983, 1007. By contrast, in Bessarabia under Russian rule [today Moldavia], the Romanian majority had neither an autonomous church nor their own schools where they could have used their mother tongue.

⁴⁸ The 16-page proposal from the Ministry of Culture to the Romanian action. Hungarian National Archive, MNL OL K 26 ME subsection nr. 548, nr. 2198/1901, item XXXI, radix 811. Later the expression was also taken over by the draftsmen of the prime minister. Please see: Formulation to Géza Fejérváry Interim Minister of Commerce. 27 November, 1905. Hungarian National Archive, MNL OL K 26 ME subsection nr. 793, nr. 5139/1905, item XV. radix 1215.

⁴⁹ For example, they often made pilgrimages to their old homeland by visiting the historical scenery of the War of Independence of 1848/49, namely to the Nyerges-tető (to name one), which was called the Hungarian Thermopylae. *Romániai Magyar Néplap* 24 1900. June and *Romániai Magyar Néplap*, 1 July, 1900. At the same time, they generously donated when there were natural disasters, for example, for the injured parties of the floods from Szeged in 1879. *Bukaresti Híradó*, 19 July, 1885. The same was true in the case of the mining disaster of Resicabánya (Reșița), although most of the injured from the homeland were of Romanian nationality. *Romániai Hírlap*, 14 January, 1909, *Romániai Hírlap*, 11 February, 1909.

⁵⁰ This pattern was offered by the Hungarian press in Bucharest, for example, in the border dispute of Dobrogea or in the case of the violations concerning the Kuco-vlach minority of Macedonia as they were expressing their loyalty to the reviving country with the criticism of the Bulgarian attitude. *Romániai Magyar Néplap*, 2 September, 1900 and 16 September, 1900.

⁵¹ Also Vándory was mentioning as an example the radical policy of Romanians related to possessions, which aimed to improve the grave social problems. However, he was not able to see that the confiscation of the properties of the mainly Phanariot Greek church had nothing to do with social justice, but rather it could be characterized as a redistribution process that was happening in the spirit of a coherent national policy. *Bukaresti Híradó*, 19 January, 1879.

⁵² Béla Putnik: A magyar kivándorlók Galaczon (Romániában), [Hungarian emigrants in Galați (in Romania)], *Közgazdasági Szemle*, Vol. 25–26, 1901, 827. Such issues as the political oppositionist attitude [those who emigrated were mostly sympathizing with the ideas of 1848 being in contradiction with the dualistic governments], the failures in social care, and the unfriendly attitude of the German and Romanian consular officials towards Hungarian customers had caused together the cool relationship of emigrants with the old homeland.

appeared as weak and repulsive in spite of its great power status. This is how expatriates could see their old homeland.⁵³ The commercial correspondent of the Hungarian government reported from Bucharest in 1901 the following: "...the Romanian press is almost constantly publishing false and manipulated news about Hungary..."⁵⁴ They presented the start of the Hungarian Newspaper of Bucharest in 1902 as the result of the proceedings of agents and perceived its foundation as an abuse of the freedom of the press. The new paper aimed to promote Hungarian culture and foster the reconciliation of the two nations, but the staff members of the *Apărarea Națională* (Institution of National Security) named the editors of the new paper "wolves in sheep's clothing" whose dangerous initial plan was the disturbance of the identity of the Csangos of Moldova (a Catholic minority with mixed Hungarian and Romanian identity issues).⁵⁵ But the Hungarian press was not tactful either in the dispute. *Pesti Hírlap* (The Newspaper of Pest) attacked sharply (under the title "the Romanization of Hungarian schools") not only the Romanian, but also the Hungarian government.⁵⁶ Indeed, it was very difficult to curb the sensation-hungry press on both sides of the border.⁵⁷

⁵³ Zoltán Poliány puts it shortly in his report of 118 pages as he wrote that the Hungarians who grew up with the Romanian press learned to hate their own homeland (20). 14 April, 1904. Hungarian National Archive MNL OL K 26 ME subsection nr. 604, nr. 636/1904, item XVIII, radix 636.

⁵⁴ The report of Rezső Márffy-Mantuano of 22 February, 1901. Hungarian National Archive MNL OL K 26 ME subsection nr. 858 nr. 2274/1902, item XXII, radix 1496. In many cases the Romanian postal service simply refused to deliver the newspapers that were in Hungarian-language to subscribers. Barna, Endre, *România nemzetiségi*, 17–18. But the principle of freedom of the press was even more vulnerable in the Regat. Later Márffy noted the following: "... the Romanian government, or if not them, the excited students are just simply banishing that kind of journalism which they don't like." Even the reporter of the *Pester Lloyd* in Bucharest received such threats. The report of Rezső Márffy-Mantuano of 19 December, 1902. Hungarian National Archive MNL OL K 26 ME subsection nr. 858, nr. 638/1903, item XVIII, radix 405.

⁵⁵ Barna: *România nemzetiségi*, 18. At the same time, Hungary had just renounced its support of the Csangos because the authorities did not want to risk for about 50,000 Hungarian-speaking Romanian citizens the danger that nearly 2.8 million Romanians in Hungary would be segregated...

⁵⁶ *Pesti Hírlap*, 12 March, 1905. Therefore, in order to avoid any further diplomatic conflicts, the Hungarian Prime Minister requested from the leading journalists the following: "they should not address at all the issues of the Hungarians of Romania." The letter of the Prime Minister Kálmán Széll to Agenor Gołuchowski (joint foreign minister), (Fair copy version.) Hungarian National Archive MNL OL K 26 ME subsection nr. 548, nr. 2418/1902, item XXII, radix 672.

⁵⁷ But such reports that were also a pretext for Romanian reprisals were published on a regular basis in the national press. In its transcript of 29 November, 1911, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary was forced to ask the Hungarian head of government to address again the leading journalist in order to omit even the good news related to Romanian affairs in the press, because by any further debates they were involuntarily offering material for accusations concerning the subject matter of "Magyarization" that was quickly spreading in the foreign media as well. Under such conditions, the Hungarian government was thinking

Until the turn of the century, the situation was so bad that the editor of *Pesti Hírlap* (The Newspaper of Pest) stated the following: in the Romanian old-kingdom, only the Jews are detested more than the Hungarians.⁵⁸ His statement is also supported by the hostile manifestations experienced by the rural missionary visits of the protestant deacon Újváry,⁵⁹ and by the basic rules of certain Romanian saving cooperatives, which prohibited (with the consent of the authorities for internal affairs) Jews and Hungarians from becoming members of the association.⁶⁰ There are other examples as well of discriminatory measures: those Hungarian craftsmen who did not use Romanian letters when writing their names on the sign boards of their company had to face severe penalties.⁶¹ The impact of this kind of attitude was summed up on a calm factual basis by the eyewitness in the following way: the Hungarian workers of the paper factory of Bucharest – with the aim to maintain their jobs – were becoming Romanians.⁶² Nevertheless, the assimilation process had its natural facets as well. Expatriates often devoted all their energies to career-building and to acquiring more wealth.⁶³

about the introduction of prior censorship measures of the most active media organ, the Budapesti Hírlap. [The record is struck through with pencil.] Hungarian National Archive MNL OL K 26 ME subsection nr. 1082, nr. 6882/1911, item XX radix 456. Moreover, the Austro-Hungarian Legation felt obliged to distance itself from the claims of the *Bukaresti Hírlap* and their official statement was published in the newspaper named *Epoca*. Hungarian National Archive MNL OL K 26 ME subsection nr. 1082, nr. 7491/1911, item XX, radix 605.

⁵⁸ See: "Romania and the Hungarians", *Pesti Hírlap*, 30 October, 1902. There were even previously indices for these developments: in 1894, members of the Association of Hungarian Songs and Art lovers who were making a (1st of May) picnic in the Teé Park were suddenly attacked by some Romanian students. The members of the association were beaten, their flag was torn to shreds and after that it was burned by the statue of Viteazul Mihai (Romanian historical hero). Moreover, the rampaging young men threw stones at the windows of the Austro-Hungarian embassy. Barabás: *A székely kivándorlás*, 448–449, and the memoir of Zoltán Poliány of 14 April, 1904, 54. Hungarian National Archive MNL OL K 26 ME subsection nr. 604, nr. 636/1904, item XVIII, radix 636.

⁵⁹ In Craiova "the Romanian priests started a boycott from the pulpit against the aliens." For instance, in Câmpulung "They all bitterly lamented about the blatant dislike promulgated by the Romanian side, which was experienced at every step", and this situation stimulated the Hungarian Protestants living here to migrate into other regions. The letter of Újváry to the bishop György Bartók, Sept. 6, 1905. Magyarországi Református Egyház Zsinati Levéltára, Archive of the Protestant Synod in Hungary. RZsL, 2. fond. Külügyi iratok [Foreign documents], box 51 1085/1905.

⁶⁰ See the fund rules of the Saving and Credit Cooperative of Dimbovița. A similar clause was in the statute of the Speranta Bank (paragraph 12). Hungarian National Archive MNL OL K 26 ME subsection nr. 548, nr. 4524/1902, item XXII.

⁶¹ The compulsory transcription of their original names into the Romanian language dealt a blow to the national identities of immigrants. Barabás: *A székely kivándorlás*, 434.

⁶² Barabás: *A székely kivándorlás*, 437.

⁶³ A Hungarian elementary teacher who lived in the Regat wrote about the croissant and pretzel sellers of Hétfalu, who belonged to the Csango community and were growing up in the domestic Romanian countryside, that they talked among themselves in Romanian and in order to get better integrated in the Romanian society, they looked for Romanian husbands for their daughters. József Kertész: *Tíz év a romániai magyar misszióban* [Ten years in the

At the same time, the worsening of the consciousness-degradation of expatriates and their quick assimilation had a sobering effect on the Hungarian government, which in the spring of 1901 launched its "Operation Romania". This was a defensive, but simultaneously an active program that signaled a major turnaround in the Hungarian national policy line, because in order to protect their own "race power" it also considered the option of long-term repatriation of expatriates. Until then, they had been trying to protect them somehow from the effects of spontaneous and planned assimilation.⁶⁴

Simultaneously, Budapest encouraged its employees, especially the journalists, to respect the Romanian laws and customs.⁶⁵ The practical effect of these precautions was observed in the international exhibition which was organized in honour of the twenty-fifth royal jubilee of King Carol. Five Hungarian associations built their pavilion together in the exhibition of 1906, which was an initiative of the editor Zoltán Poliány. The main building of the jubilee was decorated with the photo of the Romanian royal couple, Hungarian and Romanian national flags, various inscriptions and the main slogan was "Be a faithful denizen of your homeland, but ask for God's blessing for the land where you are earning your daily bread." (All this was in sharp contrast with the behaviour of the Romanians of Hungary, who were also

Hungarian mission from Romania], Kolozsvár, Jenő Stiff and Partner, 1913, 18. A journalist also referred to their case as he criticized their countrymen because they were denying their origins to have a better career: "Well it would be so nice if somebody would get to know that they have a ragged Ungur (means Hungarian in Romania) as their ancestor." *Bukaresti Magyar Újság*, 26 January, 1902.

⁶⁴ Until then (thus till the creation of more favorable economic conditions) simultaneously they were supporting them with "church and school" and with scholarships from the kin-state, press material in Hungarian and calendars. As for the scattered diaspora, they offered schools with additional buildings for the accommodation of the pupils etc. See Béla Makkaj: *Magyarok temetője, Ó-Románia. A regáti magyarság a dualizmus kori nemzetpolitikában* [Old Romania, as a Hungarian "cemetery". Hungarians of Regat on the horizon of the Hungarian national politics in the era of dualism], Manuscript; Béla Makkaj: *Végvár vagy hídfő? "Az idegenben élő magyarság nemzeti gondozása" Horvátországban és Bosznia-Hercegovinában (1904–1920)*, [Bridgehead or border castle? "The national care for Hungarians living abroad" in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1904–1920)], Budapest, Lucidus, 2003.

⁶⁵ As the journalist Zoltán Poliány was in a mission in Bucharest, he received the following strict and unequivocal instructions: "You have to avoid all kind of tasteless hyper loyalty, behave responsibly and respect Romania and its institutions..." Pro domo. (Without date.); Hungarian National Archive, MNL OL K 26 ME subsection nr. 858, nr. 2981/1903, item XVIII, radix 405.

participating at the exposition.)⁶⁶ The short visit of the royal couple, who were received with the Romanian anthem had indeed a very good influence on the assessment of the Hungarian expatriates in Romania.⁶⁷

Nevertheless, the tensions which came from national politics reversed the favourable trend. The controversial bill on education that was rejected in 1905 was again submitted to the Hungarian parliament. The purpose of this was the regulation of teachers' wages and the compulsory school education of the state language,⁶⁸ which was only spoken by a small part of the homeland nationalities.⁶⁹ The Lex Apponyi triggered great indignation by the representatives of the two autonomous Romanian Churches on Hungarian territory. The churches maintained their own school system where Romanian was the main language of education. Besides the Romanian parliamentarians of Hungary,⁷⁰ who joined the international protest campaign against the law, even the Romanian state took action.⁷¹ As a response to the disputed law, the Romanian educational authorities intended to increase (to triple) the number of Romanian language lessons for Hungarian citizens in the schools

⁶⁶ The Romanians from the Hungarian parts did not use either the Hungarian flag or the photo of József Ferenc I and not even the name of the country appeared on the banners of the exhibition. While Romanians from Bukovina had the black-and-yellow flags of the Habsburgs, those of Serbia appeared with Serbian flags and with the portrait of King Petar, those from Bessarabia used inscriptions with Cyrillic letters and the portrait of Czar Nicholas the second, and finally the Aromanians and Kuco-vlachs wore Turkish fezzes and sang the Turkish anthem at the exposition. Barna: *Románia nemzetiségi*, 115–128, 140–161.

⁶⁷ *Bukaresti Magyar Újság*, 28 June, 1906 Romániai Magyarok Nagy Képes Naptára [The Big Picture Calendar of the Hungarians of Romania] edited by Poliány received the Grand Prix and the editor of the calendar obtained a golden pen from the Romanian king. The Hungarian associations that presented their products at the exposition won a silver medal and certificate. *Bukaresti Magyar Újság*, 22 November, 1906, Hilda Hencz: *Magyarok román világban. A Kárpátokon kívüli román térségben élő magyarok és a Bukaresti magyar sajtó (1860–1941)* [Hungarians in the Romanian world. Hungarians living outside the Carpathian region and the Hungarian press in Bucharest] = *Maghiarii în universul românesc. Maghiarii din spațiul extracarpatic românesc și presa maghiară bucureșteană (1860–1941)*. Carocom '94 Kft. Bukarest/București, 2009, 40.

⁶⁸ In 1910, a quarter of the citizens belonging to various ethnic groups, thus (22.5 %), and in the case of Romanians only 12.1 % knew the language of the Hungarian state. *Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények, Új sorozat*, Vol. 64, Budapest, M. Kir. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1920, 145, 164.

⁶⁹ The draft law, which was already submitted in 1905 by Albert Berzeviczy, had been withdrawn because of the intensive protests against it.

⁷⁰ In 1907 Alexandru Vaida-Voevod (who later became prime minister of Romania and fought for the autonomy of Transylvania) read out the poem of his younger brother in the Hungarian parliament. *Bukaresti Magyar Újság*, 14 April, 1907. The poem was formulated in the following style: "You are parasitizing this homeland since ten damned centuries as bloodthirsty bugs [...] But everything, everything is in vain as you will perish, lawbreaking Asian scum". Sándor Bíró: *Kisebbségben és többségben: románok és magyarok (1867–1940)* [In Minority and in the Majority: Romanians and Hungarians (1867–1940)], Bern, Európai Protestáns Magyar Szabadegyetem, 1989, 262.

⁷¹ The students of Bucharest held protests against Hungary in support of Vaida-Voevod. *Bukaresti Magyar Újság*, 13 June, 1907.

sustained by means of the Hungarian state⁷² and the textbooks for the general public used there were often prohibited in their original form and reedited.⁷³ The harassment of Hungarian schools is also less understandable because of the fact that the level of public education in Romania was greatly lower than that of the Romanians in Hungary.⁷⁴ Moreover, even the construction of new kindergartens was purposefully implemented in regions with various nationalities (Bulgarian, Turkish, Csango-Hungarian) and it was no secret that this happened with the intention of spreading the Romanian language.⁷⁵ It is also worth mentioning that the Romanian (ecclesiastical) authorities sometimes issued the birth certificates of the Hungarian children (who were already born outside Hungary) incorrectly by mistake, but sometimes also deliberately with incorrect modifications. In this way the Hungarian origin of

⁷² They made mandatory the Romanian festive periods and the bilingual school accounting. While the Hungarian private schools in the Regat were not allowed to take up Hungarian pupils who had lost their citizenship (but did not possess Romanian citizenship either) or could not offer valid certificates. The functioning of the private schools was regulated by a royal decree with the No. 3157 of June 28, 1896, which was also submitted as draft-law in 1905 by Haret Spiru, Minister of Religion and Public Education. However, due to the election defeat of the liberals, this was temporarily removed from the agenda. Barna: *Románia nemzetiségi*, 47–48.

⁷³ Only in 1905 the following books were blacklisted: Károly Boga: *Földrajz* [Geography], István Dr. Török: *Magyarország története* [The history of Hungary], Gyula Sebestyén: *Magyar olvasókönyv* [Hungarian reading book], dr. Gööz – Schön – Trajtlér: *Magyar nemzeti olvasókönyv* [Hungarian national reading book], *Bukaresti Magyar Újság*, 5 October, 1905. An extreme example of prohibition was in the case of a math book as the initiators of the prohibition complained because in the task the distance to be calculated was between two Hungarian cities, respectively Budapest and Pozsony [today named Bratislava]. Barna: *Románia nemzetiségi...*, 61.

⁷⁴ In 1899 only 19.7% of the population over 15 years could read and write in Romania, but if one takes out the percentage of the foreigners from this aggregate (where this ratio was 53%), and the stateless persons (44.4%), then this indicator continues to deteriorate to (17.1 %). Barna: *Románia nemzetiségi...*, 74. Not even half of those who achieved compulsory school age in a year was enrolled or taking part in public education (39.9%). *Ibid.*, 77. However, the Romanians of Hungary were allowed to maintain several thousand religious schools, and even the mother tongue was intensively used in education. In 1880 2756 schools were functioning where the education was in Romanian and there were 394 Romanian-Hungarian bilingual schools in Hungary. These indicators were overstepping the number of schools of the motherland, whose population was twice as populous; it is also a fact that in 1913, this figure had decreased significantly: with 2170 Romanian-language schools. Hanák: *Magyarország története*, 1007.

⁷⁵ 21 kindergartens were set up by ministerial decree (Minister of Culture) with No. 51.817 on 17th September, 1905, from which 4 nurseries were for the Serbs around Bucharest, 7 for the Csangos and a number of 10 for the Turks of the county of Tulcea. Barna: *Románia nemzetiségi*, 56. Even these sheer numbers prove the use of nurseries for the homogenization of the population, because from the total of 168 such institutions, 133 were functioning in regions dominated by ethnic and national minorities. Gyula Kádár: *Tiszta Romániát! Háromszék*, 20 July, 2013.

the child was disguised. Such measures generated a schizophrenic situation in the consciousness of pupils but also challenged the self-esteem of their parents.⁷⁶

Nonetheless, the above mentioned problems were minor compared to the times as the Balkan War broke out in 1912, because the new conflict-ridden situation caused much distress and attitude changes on a larger scale within the multi-ethnic society. The complications grew after the acquisition of South Dobrogea in 1913 as Romania started a major political campaign against the Monarchy, which had strong anti-Hungarian implications as well. Although the country had been a member of the Triple Alliance since 1883, after this success (the acquisition of South Dobrogea), Romania openly struggled for the possession of Erdély (Transylvania).⁷⁷

After the outbreak of the First World War, Romanian propaganda tried to stigmatize the Hungarian people as one of the main causes of the war.⁷⁸ The Hungarian press in turn tried to strengthen the self-esteem of the expatriates by thematising the war and stressing that the heroic courage and humanity of the Hungarian soldier on the fronts was even greatly appreciated by the Serb and the Russian civilian population.⁷⁹ In contrast, professor of history Iorga Nicolae portrayed the warring "Hungarian type" by comprising it in the person of István Tisza, the Prime Minister of Hungary. Iorga gave the warrior

⁷⁶ Modified data did not match anymore with those that figured in the passports that were required in Hungarian schools. Usually the father's first name was used as a surname. Of course, this was in Romanian form. However, the Romanian school inspection demanded the records on this basis and the issuance of the notifications about half year studies also happened according to official basic data. József Degenfeld, chairman of the secular convent attached and sent to Sándor Wekerle (Head of the Hungarian Government) the reports of Anna Kállayné Vadas from March 1 and March 26, 1918. Hungarian National Archive, MNL OL K 26 ME subsection nr. 1210, nr. 1531/1918, item XX, radix 157.

⁷⁷ One of the invocations of the Romanian newspaper named *Universul* was addressing the members of the army to buy maps of Transylvania, because they might need them in the near future ... Quotation: Map of Transylvania. *Romániai Magyar Újság*, 21 February, 1915. Furthermore, according to data published during the Marghiloman-government about the affairs of the previous years, the Romanian government spent a total of 2,350,000 lei (that is, the same amount of Swiss francs) on the campaign for Transylvania. Also the Romanian leaders of Hungary were financed from this financial means. The *Gazeta Bucureștilor* was quoted by the *Bukaresti Magyar Hírlap*, issue of 22 July, 1918. The Hungarian newspaper already stated by New Year's Eve of 1915, that "after the start of the war hatred against the Hungarians rose to the highest level." *Romániai Magyar Újság*, 31 December, 1915. "A few months ago there were a lot of street protests and the people who were gathered just marched through the streets railing against the Hungarians and its allies." *Romániai Magyar Újság*, 2 January, 1916.

⁷⁸ According to the *Adevărul*, "...there is no doubt that the war was provoked by Tisza and Emperor Wilhelm." Quotation of the *Romániai Magyar Újság*, 21 February, 1915. The Hungarian press used a counter expert and quoted Professor Constantin Stere, who was of Bessarabian origin, as he saw the real danger for Romanians not in the Hungarian conduct, but in the Russian imperialist desire. *Romániai Magyar Újság*, 2 January, 1916.

⁷⁹ *Romániai Magyar Újság*, 29 December, 1915.

the well-known heroic traits, but simultaneously loaded its portrait with certain fatal and negative characteristics.⁸⁰ However, the Romanian press concealed any news which could have dispersed this preconceived image about Hungarians.⁸¹

The constructive attitude of the newspapers came from the conciliation creed from which the chief editor was writing before the war in the following way: "We have to (...) take the first step. We understand the local conditions. We just need to enlighten our brothers from their mistakes and let's take action that the sons of the Romanian nation can also get clarification. The current guilt-filled atmosphere will stop in this way..."⁸² Nevertheless, such conciliatory voices fell on deaf ears in the storm of the First World War.

Encouraged by the successes of the Brusilov Offensive in August, 1916, Romania attacked its ally in its back and invaded the unguarded southern part of Transylvania. The Hungarian pastors and teachers were interned,⁸³ and the *Romániai Magyar Újság* stopped its activity. The "untrustworthy" strangers⁸⁴ suffered from the requisitions of the Romanian Army and their

⁸⁰ He was described in this way: "Even God, if he became Hungarian, would not be able to stop that fanatic, blind and deaf human being, who is rushing rapturously on a straight road marked with the blood of his adversaries into the final destruction. ... He wants to win, dominate, command and wants to colonize." He continues: "Tisza is babysitting (IV.) Károly [Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary] and it makes Psst! to Serbia as it would be his serf, Berchtold was sent to walk around and put his people in its place. He provokes the world." *Universul*, 28 December, 1915. *Romániai Magyar Újság*, 31 December, 1915. The Secretary General of the irredentist Cultural League, Iorga, who spoke good Hungarian forgets to mention that Tisza considered about the war that in the case of victory there would be only more ethnic inhabitants in the country, and consequently the war was not in the interest of Hungary.

⁸¹ They did not report about the incident when the staff of a Hungarian steamer saved 16 Romanian shipwrecked soldiers from the Danube at Galați. *Romániai Magyar Újság*, 31 October, 1912. And the initiative of the Senior Fellow (Alpár Rejöd) of the Hungarian Newspaper of Romania found no followers, although he made a film about the bright development and European character of Romania at his own cost. (His work was also introduced to an audience in Budapest). *Magyar ismertetés a román királyságról. Romániai Magyar Újság*, March 28, 1912. és Előadás az Urániában Romániáról. *Romániai Magyar Újság*, May 19, 1912. His co-editor, the historian Géza Szöcs, tried to dispel the mist of ignorance and suspicion with several reasonable articles having the title "Historical truth and national chauvinism." The series of articles had more than 10 consecutive sections and see the fourth serial: *Romániai Magyar Újság*, 30 November, 1911.

⁸² Mit tegyünk? [What should we do?], *Romániai Magyar Újság*, 17 October, 1909.

⁸³ Report of the Presidium of the Convent about 1916 to the Prime Minister, Móric Esterházy, 16 May, 1917. Hungarian National Archive, MNL OL K 26 ME subsection nr. 1185, nr. 2726/1917, item XIX, and the letter of the Presidium of the Convent of 16 May, 1917 to the Universal Convent. Archive of the Protestant Synod in Hungary, RZsL, fond 2. Foreign documents, box 56, 1626/1917.

⁸⁴ The letter of Árpád Márton army chaplain of March 19, 1917 to the Presidium of the Convent. Archive of the Protestant Synod in Hungary, RZsL, fond 2. Foreign documents, box 73, 1251/1917.

institutions were used for military purposes.⁸⁵ The numerous vexations made many persons apply for Romanian citizenship in order to assure their physical safety, and avoid expropriation.⁸⁶ Following the successful Danube counter-offensive of the Central Powers and the take-over of the Romanian capital,⁸⁷ the short-lived *Bukaresti Magyar Hírlap* (Hungarian News of Bucharest) was published and its editor, József Feleky, gave the conciliatory password that “all treason” should be forgotten. However, he tied this to conditions,⁸⁸ and pointed out in a supercilious tone the extremist character of the Transylvanian campaign of the Romanians. The warnings of the Hungarians of the Regat concerning its dangers were in vain. As he wrote, “the swaggering Romania triumphed over common sense and so the disaster has to happen.” Simultaneously, the writer of the article expressed his hope that based on these lessons common interests would shape the relationship between the two peoples in the future.⁸⁹

After the armistice of Padua, the tonality of the newspaper became calmer. This time, the editor urged the historical reconciliation of the two neighbouring nations as they were interdependent in the Slavic sea and mentioned the possibility to create a strong Romanian-Hungarian coalition.⁹⁰

After the victory of the Entente, the self-defence reflexes became dominant. The newspaper confronted its readers with the painful memories of internments, harassments and requisitions caused by war damages, and also

⁸⁵ Which suffered severe damage. The letter of the director of Anna Kállayné Vadas from 8 July, 1917 to the Presidium of the Convent. Archive of the Protestant Synod in Hungary, RZsL, fond 2. Foreign documents, box 73, 2697/1917.

⁸⁶ The report of Ágost Kuczka of 3 July, 1916 about the Catholic school year of 1914/15. Hungarian National Archive, MNL OL K 26 ME subsection nr. 1081, nr. 2559/1915, item XVIII.

⁸⁷ The preliminary peace was signed on 5 March, 1918 in Bufta and the separate peace treaty was only closed on 7 May, 1918 in Bucharest, which also meant a breach of the confidentiality agreement with the Entente. Catherine Durandin: *A román nép története*, [The history of the Romanian people], Budapest, Maecenas, 1998, 212.

⁸⁸ He used the following formulation: “if all the origins of our national movement will not be externally instigated provocation...”. But he went even deeper by recognizing the line of the new frontier in the Carpathian Mountains to the watersheds in the valleys as the main basic condition. *Bukaresti Magyar Hírlap*, 5 May, 1918. The special publication of the newspaper was dedicated to the issue of the signed peace treaty and, according to the editor, the “new era” could only be successful if “this is based on the mutual respect of rights, the integrity of the borders and by keeping good neighborhood relations.” *Bukaresti Magyar Hírlap*, 7 May, 1918.

⁸⁹ *Bukaresti Magyar Hírlap*, 8 September, 1918.

⁹⁰ All this could happen on the basis of the confederative plans of Kossuth. The justifications used in the article are really interesting: “Our countries are side by side, the security issues towards East and Southeast and the commercial life demand that one should put aside the nowhere validated doctrines and ideas as we should give each other an opportunity and a way to a peaceful relationship and friendship, which should be long-lasting and should be developed efficiently.” Hungarian-Romanian fraternization. *Bukaresti Magyar Hírlap*, 6 October, 1918.

with the Romanian hospitality and its promising equal treatment of the nation of majority, but all this proved to be in vain and remained just a myth.⁹¹ In line with this, only two choices were left for the Hungarians of the Regat: In order to retain their own goods gained during several decades, they had to fully integrate in a Romania that hardly tolerated strangers or in the light of the experiences of various harassments they could seek the protection of the motherland.⁹² Therefore, the majority opted to return to the homeland and those who decided to remain were absorbed dramatically and quickly during the monolithic nation-state building process of a multi-ethnic Greater Romania.⁹³

The victorious Entente awarded an even bigger part of the territory of Hungary to Romania from the dismembered Kingdom of Hungary. Unfortunately, in this way the relationship of the two neighbouring nations reached a historical low point.

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⁹¹ *Bukaresti Magyar Hírlap*, 4 August, 1918. The newspaper showed lively interest in the affairs of interned and imprisoned Hungarians. Elsewhere, the newspaper reported about the failures that were threatening the nutritional and medical care of those interned and imprisoned. *Bukaresti Magyar Hírlap*, 1 September, 1918.

⁹² This option was also presented in detail in the Hungarian press. *Települjünk haza!* [Repatriate!] *Bukaresti Magyar Hírlap*, 30 June, 1918.

⁹³ Such developments only underlined the former item of an eminent demographer, who named the Romanian Old-Kingdom “the century-long (and) big graveyard of the Hungarians”. Source: Gusztáv Thirring: *A magyarországi kivándorlás és a külföldi magyarság*, [The Emigration of Hungary and Hungarians abroad], Budapest, 1904, 6. See also Boia Lucian: *Románia elrománosodása*, [The Romanianisation of Romania], Cluj-Napoca [Kolozsvár] Koinónia, 2015.

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HOW COULD THE INTEREST OF THE HUNGARIAN ECONOMY SUCCEED IN THE 1891 AUSTRO- HUNGARIAN-GERMAN TRADE TREATY?

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ÁKOS KÁRBIN

ABSTRACT

My paper focuses on the question of how successful Hungary was in promoting its economic interests in the 1891 trade treaty made with the German Empire. Hungary was mainly an agricultural country, while Austria mostly relied on industrial production. The German and the Austro-Hungarian Empire had already made a trade and customs agreement in 1868. At the beginning their trade relationship was determined by free trade, but later on both of them turned to protective tariffs. How much was the German customs politics changed following Bismarck's resignation? And what trade policy did his successor, Chancellor Caprivi represent? How could the Monarchy harmonise Hungary's interests with Austria's? Was the Hungarian profile tending more to economic nationalism or free trade? According to the new treaty Hungary provided their export products for the German market.

Keywords: *German Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire, trade and customs agreement, Hungary's economic identity, Economic nationalism, Free trade*

THE GERMAN ECONOMY IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY

At the time of the foundation of the German Empire in 1871, Germany was clearly an agricultural country even though in some parts industrial activity was significant. Around 1850 55% of the German population worked in agriculture. By the years of 1861–71 50.9% and in 1890–94 42.6% worked in the same sector. On the other hand, the rate of industrial labourers increased to 27.6% in 1861–1871 and it went up to 34.2% in 1890–1894. Thanks to

the government's support, industry had a kick-start and by the turn of the century the German GDP was mainly backed up by industrial production. As a consequence of the changes in 1900, only 38% of the German population worked in the agricultural sector. In the industrial and mining sector the rate of workers grew to 36.8%.¹ Before World War One, between 1910 and 1913, Germany became a new industrial country as the majority of the population, 37.9%, worked in industry, while only 35.1% did so in agriculture.²

Alongside this a definite demographic growth took place in Germany in the second part of the 19th century. At the time of the foundation in 1871, just over 41 million citizens inhabited the German Empire. Due to intense population growth, this number was 49.4 million right before making the trade treaty, and by 1905 it had reached 60.6 million. With the increase of the population social needs also grew.

The expansion of the transportation infrastructure helped the commercial development. The growth of the railway network reduced transportation times. In addition, with the improvement of the road system international commerce started booming.

HUNGARY IN THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN COMMON MARKET

In the middle of the 19th century Hungary finally left the "old regime" behind; nevertheless, it remained an agricultural country. The customs between Austria and Hungary were partially eliminated on October 1, 1850, which resulted in a customs union.³ This union was not identical with a common market and it did not accelerate the Hungarian economy in the way it was expected. In these terms the Compromise brought about a turn with a customs union between Austria and Hungary (Act no. XVI of 1867). Hungary was based on agriculture, while Austria mainly relied on their industry. Besides the Compromise of 1867, Austria-Hungary also made an economic compromise which was to be renewed after each 10-year period in the future.

How did the Hungarian political leadership adapt to the new economic identity? After the Compromise, Hungary stayed strong in agriculture and livestock breeding. At the dawn of the Dual Monarchy, all industries related to agriculture and animal husbandry were embraced. Thus industry became dominated by agriculture. Naturally, alongside agriculture, traditional

¹ Nachum Gross: *Austria-Hungary in the world economy*, in J. Komlos (ed.): *Economic development in the Habsburg Monarchy in the nineteenth century, Essays, tables*, Boulder, East European Monographs, 1983, 30.

² Gross: *Austria-Hungary*, 30.

³ John Komlos: *Az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia mint közös piac, Ausztria-Magyarország gazdasági fejlődése a tizenkilencedik században*, [The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union], Budapest, Maecenas, 1990, 30.

industrial activities still supported the overall development of infrastructure, such as the construction of the railway network, which was based on the sources and old tradition of the Hungarian economy: mining, iron and the steam engine industry. From this point Hungarian industry started developing in a way which was strongly connected to agriculture – by processing agricultural products, the food industry started blooming, by crop processing, the milling industry followed in line, and to be able to transport raw materials and final products they needed to improve the railway network, too.

The population of Hungary in 1870 was 13,219,350 although there were only 5,011,310 Hungarian nationals. In 1890, of the overall 15,261,800 population, 6,009,351 were Hungarian. In 1900, out of 16,838,255 people 6,854,415 were Hungarian. According to the statistics of 1869, 80% of the total Hungarian population did agricultural work, while 8.6% worked in the industrial sector.⁴ This data had changed to 66.7% for agricultural workers and 16.2% for industrial workers by 1910.

To present the economic standards of Austria and Hungary it is best to take a look at the GDP rates of the time. For this I have used Max-Stephan Schulze's data from 2007. In 1870, 26.7% of Austria's GDP came from the agriculture, while in Hungary it was 48.8%.⁵ The tendency remained the same in 1890 with 26.8% of the GDP in Austria coming from agriculture, and 53.1% in Hungary. While in 1910 the agricultural income proportion in Austria had dropped to 22.7%, the Hungarian proportion still reached 49.9%. Based on these figures in the early twentieth century Hungary was still an agrarian country.⁶

David Good calculated the yearly income of the Austrian and Hungarian industrial production using the 1913 currency rates in gold crowns. Proceeding from this, Austria's annual income was 429.37 million crowns in 1867, 944.15 million in 1890 and 1,642.37 million in 1910.⁷ Meanwhile in Hungary the annual income was 140.59 million crowns in 1867, 274.97 million in 1890 and 513.50 million in 1910.⁸

⁴ Gross: *Austria-Hungary*, 30.

⁵ Max-Stephan Schulze: *Origins of catch-up failure: Comparative productivity growth in the Hapsburg Empire, 1870–1910*, Economic History Working Papers, Department of Economic History, London School of Economics and Political Science, Working Papers, No. 100/07, London, 2007, 39.

⁶ Katus László: *Hungary in the Dual Monarchy 1867–1914*, Atlantic Studies on Society in Change, No. 132, New York, Columbia University Press, 2008, 231.

⁷ David F. Good: *The Economic Rise of the Hapsburg Empire, 1750–1914*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984, 259.

⁸ Good: *The Economic Rise*, 260.

The countries of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had different economic interests that made them set different targets in their commercial politics. Hungary exported most of its agricultural products to Central and Eastern Europe, whereas Austrian industrial products primarily hit the Balkans.⁹

EARLIER TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

In the second half of the 19th century, the European economy featured several characteristic trends within commercial politics. Following up the 1848 revolutions, the idea of free trade came about. As a result England and France signed the free trade agreement known as the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty in 1860, along which free trade principles were put into effect.¹⁰ The treaty included the most-favoured-nation clause at first.¹¹ The bilateral contracts enabled the parties to use duties as an alternative of the general customs tariffs while trading with each other.

The German and Austro-Hungarian foreign trade relations changed over 1866. The two powers became quite alienated. However, it was the same person, Otto von Bismarck, who ignited the conflict and started the conciliation process in the end. This led to a mutual approach between the German Empire and the Monarchy at the end of the 1860s. The result of all this was a tariff and trade agreement signed in 1868.

In the age of the Dual Monarchy, which was also the aftermath of the Compromise, the two empires first signed a trade treaty on 9 March, 1868 in Berlin.¹² This was largely influenced by the spirit of the free trade movement. The treaty was realised with the involvement of the Kingdom of Prussia and the North German Confederation and it was in effect between 1 June,

⁹ Palotás Emil: *Machtpolitik und Wirtschaftsinteressen: Der Balkan und Russland in der österreichisch-ungarischen Aussenpolitik 1878–1895*, Budapest, Akadémiai, 1995, 160–161.

¹⁰ Jacques Rougerie: A második császárság, in Georges Duby (ed.): *Franciaország története II. Az új idők. 1852-től napjainkig* [The Second Empire. in The History of France, Vol. II. The new era. From 1852 till today], Budapest, Osiris, 2007, 96.

¹¹ Most favoured nation agreement: a general principle stated in the clause of trade treaties being synonymous with non-discriminatory trade policy, because it ensures equal rather than exclusive trading privileges between two partners. The MFN status is very desirable between trading partners because it allows each country the greatest access into the other's domestic markets without the hindrances of tariffs or quotas. The state offering this policy also agrees with allocating the same privileges to the other party as it does to a third party. Neither party is obliged to apply MFN though, it is merely an act of courtesy.

¹² Johann von Bazant: *Die Handelspolitik Österreich-Ungarns 1875 bis 1892 in ihrem Verhältnis zum Deutschen Reiche und zu dem westlichen Europa*, Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1894, 10.

1868 and 31 December, 1877. According to previous treaties the tariffs were conventional – for instance grains, wood and all raw materials and food products were duty-free. There was a great discount on exporting cattle.

In the meantime the winds of change had begun blowing in the newly founded German Empire, which induced confrontation with the Russian Empire. From 1875 onwards the German political leadership aimed to make their partnership tighter with the Monarchy. In alignment with Bismarck's plans this was supposed to be more than just a general partnership.¹³ He saw politics and economy as two totally distinct, independent fields.

In the second part of the 19th century, contrary to the ideology of free trade, nation states began introducing protective tariffs to secure their domestic markets against foreign competition. The German Empire was keen to reinforce their economy by industrialisation right from the start. To preserve this tendency it was determined to keep English and French industrial products (light and heavy) out of the market.¹⁴ Thus Germany introduced protective tariffs, and at the same time, took up protectionism as a principle to sign contracts upon.

The Monarchy did not mean to separate from the European commercial political trends so Hungary had to adapt to the Austrian wishes and went into negotiations over an autonomous customs tariff in 1877. This was introduced not long after, in 1878.¹⁵ Hence the contract between Germany and Austria-Hungary, which was to expire by the end of 1877, was extended provisionally and confirmed by Franz Joseph on 27 June, 1878. This was when the German government introduced the autonomous tariff. The agreement was then renewed on 16 December, 1878 to come into effect on 1 January, 1879 and stay so until the end of the year. Now the autonomous tariff affected the so far duty-free grains and crops, similarly to wood. However, it was against Hungary's best interests to cease to keep animal import duty-free. Moreover, animal welfare regulations also took a toll on Hungarian export.¹⁶

Following this the contract was renewed from time to time, such as being temporarily extended again until 30 June, 1880, while on 11 April, 1880 in Berlin they arranged for the provisional contract between the two empires to terminate by 30 June, 1881.

¹³ Konrad Canis: *Bismarcks Außenpolitik 1870–1890: Aufstieg und Gefährdung*, Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2008, 148.

¹⁴ Karl Erich Born: *Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Deutschen Kaiserreichs (1867/71–1914)*, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1985, 119.

¹⁵ Autonomous customs tariff: a type of tariffs which is applicable by one state to the other's goods and products (to which state they do not owe mutual clearance by contract). Each independent state declares their own tariffs on the items according to their economic and commercial interests, which are arranged in a list, that is, the autonomous customs tariff. Mutual tariff suspension takes place only in case stated in a contract.

¹⁶ Láng, Lajos: *A vámpolitika az utolsó száz évben*, [Customs politics in the past hundred years], Budapest, Politzer Zsigmond és fia kiadása, 1904, 279.

The German Empire and the Monarchy signed yet another trade treaty on 23 May, 1881 along the most-favoured-nation treatment. Although this treaty was originally in effect until the end of 1887, its scope was several times extended until 1891.

Before the trade treaty of 1891 export and import rates looked like the following inside the Monarchy in 1889: 13.10% of German imports came from Austria-Hungary, while 10.54% of German exports targeted the Monarchy. According to the German trade statistics, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was in the third place only.¹⁷ On the other hand, 56.10% of the Austro-Hungarian imports came from Germany, whereas 62.6% of the Austro-Hungarian exports targeted Germany.¹⁸ According to the Austro-Hungarian trade statistics, the German Empire was in the first place.

THE TRADE POLICY OF THE “NEUE KURS”

Otto von Bismarck left office on 20 March, 1890. Leo von Caprivi followed him in his position, being commended to the young William II by the “Iron Chancellor” himself. The new Chancellor was the exact opposite of his predecessor being a quiet and humble man. Caprivi, having arrived from the world of the military, had no experience either in diplomatic matters or economic questions.¹⁹ In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Caprivi received a helping hand from state secretary Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein in coping with the farmers protesting against the cutting down on agricultural tariffs in the first place.²⁰ In the Prussian government Hans Hermann von Berlepsch was the head of the trade portfolio and he was also a supporter of Caprivi’s trade politics.²¹

Caprivi focused on Central-European trade relations and aimed to make these tighter – first of all with the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, and secondly with Italy, Switzerland and Belgium. He made his opinion clear about the trade treaty: “An alliance and tariff war with Austria are incompatible ... the object is to consolidate central Europe economically into a trading area for

¹⁷ Hans von Scheel: *Der auswärtige Handel des deutschen Zollgebiets im letzten Jahrzehnt, Verein für Socialpolitik, Schriften, Band 49, Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot Verlag, 1892, 545, 547.*

¹⁸ Konrad Canis: *Die bedrängte Großmacht: Österreich-Ungarn und das europäische Mächtesystem 1866/67–1914, Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2016, 213.*

¹⁹ Lamar Cecil: *The German Diplomatic Service, 1871–1914, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1976, 258.*

²⁰ Gudula Gutmann: *Das Deutsche Reich und Österreich-Ungarn 1890 bis 1894/95: Der Zweibund im Urteil der führenden Persönlichkeiten beider Staaten, Münster, Scriptorium Verlag, 2003, 305.*

²¹ John C. G. Röhl: *Deutschland ohne Bismarck: Die Regierungskrise im 2. Kaiserreich 1890–1900, Tübingen, Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, 1969, 61.*

German industrial exports against the brutal tariff barriers of Russia and of North America.”²² The new chancellor Caprivi wanted to build a strong network among the Central-European countries. The two empires first wanted to reach agreement among themselves and only afterwards with other countries. The Monarchy expected to have their own position supported by Germany in relation with Switzerland and Italy after the negotiations, while Germany was counting on the Monarchy in securing German interests in the Balkan States and France.²³ The actual realisation of proceeding towards the same economic goals resulted in conflict between Berlin and Vienna. Caprivi himself was not familiar with commercial diplomacy and therefore he used the words “customs union” and “trade treaty” as synonyms.

As opposed to Bismarck, Caprivi claimed political and economic issues to be closely intertwined, determining relations among allies.²⁴ In accordance with this, Germany wished to renew their tariff and trade treaty with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the first place. Nevertheless, negotiations regarding duties began between the Austrian and Hungarian governments in Budapest as soon as the April of 1890.²⁵ The representatives of the German light and heavy industry unanimously supported the ambitions of the imperial government. The government invested into influencing Austrian and Hungarian newspapers to favour the trade treaty with Germany. At the same time German heavy industry was lobbying at the German Chamber of Commerce – who were well-aware that they needed a market for their products.

THE FIRST STEPS OF THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT

Gyula Szapáry was a devoted supporter of the Dual Monarchy as well as the Triple Alliance.²⁶ He made a point of this at the time of taking office. The Hungarian prime minister was also concerned about establishing a safe

²² John Alden Nichols: *Germany after Bismarck: The Caprivi era 1890–1894*, Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1958, 140.

²³ Lothar Höbelt: Die Handelspolitik der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie gegenüber dem Deutschen Reich, in Adam Wandruszka – Peter Urbanitsch (eds.): *Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918*, VI/1, Die Habsburgermonarchie im System der internationalen Beziehungen, Wien, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1989, 571.

²⁴ Holger Afllerbach: *Der Dreibund: Europäische Großmacht- und Allianzpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, Wien–Köln–Weimar, Böhlau Verlag, 2002, 380.

²⁵ Rolf Weitowitz: *Deutsche Politik und Handelspolitik unter Reichskanzler Leo von Caprivi 1890–1894*, Düsseldorf, Droste Verlag, 1978, 53.

²⁶ *Graf Julius Szapáry an der Spitze Ungarns. Ein Lebens- und Charakterbild*. Leipzig, Verlag Duncker & Humblot, 1891, 148.

place for Hungarian products on the international market. Upon taking his position at the end of March 1890, he announced his wish to keep Hungary's trade partners and to further increase their number.²⁷

Following the formation of the Szapáry cabinet on 25 March, 1890, at the second ministerial council minister of trade Gábor Baross called the attention of the government to the foreign trade treaties expiring in 1891. He applied for authorisation from the government to be able to get in touch with Gustav Kálnoky, common minister of foreign affairs, and the Austrian government with the purpose of organising common trade negotiations.²⁸ The Hungarian government found it important to listen to the most prominent agricultural and industrial representatives in the country before signing an agreement with foreign states. Baross recommended the setting up of a customs council in a meeting on 12 February, 1890. This same idea was shared at the ministerial council meeting on 11 April 1890.²⁹ At the head of the customs council was the president and their deputy and altogether it was composed of 21 members. The minister of trade was the president and he was to make suggestions for the person of the deputy. The members of the council were appointed by the ministers of trade, finance and agriculture, two of them by each. Furthermore, the minister of agriculture appointed five members from the farmers, while ten members were chosen from the salesmen and tradesmen by the minister of trade. The purpose of the customs council was to discuss questions over duties and customs tariffs which were unanimously chosen to be presented to the council. Although the members could present their own initiatives and suggestions, these could only appear in front of the General Assembly if the minister of trade had approved of them and the others had also agreed to further discussion. For the discussion of certain issues, the council was allowed to set up a special committee and involve experts also. The negotiations of the council were confidential, and the members received no monetary rewards and were bound by a confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement.

²⁷ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes – Berlin (further on PAAA) R 8874. Kaiserlich Deutsches Generalkonsulat für Ungarn. Nr.: 9. Ludwig von Plessen an – Otto von Bismarck. Budapest, den 17. März 1890.

²⁸ Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára [The National Archives of Hungary – further on MNL OL] K 27. Minisztertanácsi jegyzőkönyvek [Minutes of the Council of Ministers – further on MTJK] 1890. március 25., 10.

²⁹ MNL OL K 178. Földművelésügyi Minisztérium. Elnöki osztály. [Ministry of Agriculture. Presidential Department] FM/118/1891. Külkereskedelmi ügyek [Foreign trade matters]

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN DISCUSSIONS BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH GERMANY

On 15 April, 1890 the possible synchronisation of trade politics with the Austrian government was put forward for discussion at the ministry of agriculture.³⁰

I. It was in both Austria and Hungary's best interest to sign the tariff treaties as sales could not be estimated based on autonomous customs tariffs.

II. The Hungarian government expected Caprivi to review the protective tariff based trade politics after Bismarck's resignation. András Bethlen and his ministry were of the opinion that Germany would decrease agricultural tariffs and, in return, it should expect the moderation of the Monarchy's tariffs. The most prominent trade partner of the Monarchy was the German Empire so as long as they did not reach a contract with the Germans no negotiations were to start with other states. In this aspect the Hungarian government had to respect Austria's interests. There were two major points to bear in mind, namely: would the decrease of tariffs endanger their previously gained position, and would the eastern market remain theirs? As far as Austria and Hungary relied on each other when one party gave concessions to the other this was to be compensated evenly.

III. In case a contract had already been made with Germany or other countries, others could only be signed with eastern countries (particularly Romania) if animal welfare regulations were consulted – even if this meant issuing concessions.

IV. In case no agreement was made with Germany, no concessions were to be issued to eastern countries (particularly Serbia).

V. Western-European countries had formally avoided animal imports from Hungary; nonetheless, even stricter regulations should be applied on livestock imports coming from eastern countries.

Baross informed the government about a customs and trade conference to be held on 26 April, 1890 in Budapest. According to the plans the main stress would be on the future contract with the German Empire by which political and economic relations should be synchronised besides maintaining tariff barriers. Therefore, they got in touch with the common foreign minister.

The Austro-Hungarian leadership did not unveil their opinion or intentions regarding the trade treaty. Anton von Monts, the first secretary of the German embassy in Vienna, reported to Berlin that the Monarchy would not negotiate any treaties without coordinating with Germany and so Germany could take advantage of the unclear circumstances. The chargé d'affaires hoped for bigger concessions from the Monarchy, though he knew that the

³⁰ MNL OL K 178. FM/118/1891. Külkereskedelmi ügyek [Foreign trade matters]

Hungarian and the Austrian interests were not in accordance. According to Monts' proposition, Hungary could buy industrial products from Germany for a low price, and Austria could purchase agricultural items from the Balkan states for a similarly reasonable price, as well as being in the position to set up a much stricter agreement over animal welfare issues than any of the parties involved in order to regulate livestock export.³¹ This proposal gained outstanding importance later on and is referred to as Monts' proposition.³²

On 26 April, 1890 there was a conference held in Budapest about the Monarchy's possibilities in making trade relations tighter with Germany.³³ On behalf of Hungary Gábor Baross, while on Austria's side Olivier Bacquehem, the two ministers of trade, took part in the Conference. Although they agreed in having to start negotiations with Germany, Austria hesitated. They first wanted a treaty with Serbia and particularly Romania as Austrian industrial products had been cleared from their market during the tariff war.³⁴ While Hungary was well-aware of their economic identity (for example, they wanted to introduce a new duty tariff for livestock trading), they acknowledged the need to go into negotiations with the Balkan States later on. For the moment though, they were keen to get down to business with the German government.

NEGOTIATIONS STEP FORWARD TO A TREATY

A few days later ambassador Heinrich VII, Prinz Reuss of Köstritz, and minister Kálnoky talked about details. Kálnoky informed the diplomat about the Monarchy welcoming the German customs treaty. Due to the upcoming change of chancellor, exact dates were not available to be appointed just then.³⁵ In the middle of May agricultural minister Bethlen and ambassador Reuss touched base on whether Hungary wanted a trade treaty with Germany – and if so, they stated Hungary should not give further concessions.³⁶ Bethlen promised that he would take care of the Austrian government. On the one hand, he wished for the appeasement of the German agricultural scene. On

³¹ Robert Pahre: *Politics and Trade Cooperation in the Nineteenth Century: The "Agreeable Customs" of 1815–1914*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, 340.

³² Ernst Suter: *Die handelspolitische Kooperation des Deutschen Reiches und der Donaumonarchie 1890–94*, Düsseldorf, Dobler, 1930, 11.

³³ Weitowitz: *Deutsche Politik*, 51.

³⁴ Robert Pahre: Most-favored-nation clauses and clustered negotiations, in B. Koremenos – C. Lipson – D. Snidal (eds.): *The Rational Design of International Institutions*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 119.

³⁵ Bundesarchiv – Berlin Lichterfelde (further on BA) R 901/10057. Handelsvertrag zwischen Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn. Kaiserlich Deutsche Botschaft in Wien. Heinrich VII. Prinz Reuss an – Leo von Caprivi. Wien, den 30. April 1890.

³⁶ PAAA R 8690. Kaiserlich Deutsche Botschaft in Wien. No.: 168. Heinrich VII. Prinz Reuss an – Leo von Caprivi. Wien, den 16. Mai 1890.

the other, it was still necessary for the Monarchy to get a market so that they could start flourishing again. In June Kálnoky thought it unlikely to reach agreement with Germany, as much as the Austro-Hungarian Empire needed a trade treaty with the German Empire. Even if Hungary was open for the trade treaty with Germany in July 1890. Austria first wanted a treaty with Serbia and Romania.

On 17 July, 1890 Monts at the German embassy was reassured by Kálnoky himself that he would ensure the start of the negotiations using his influence.³⁷ On 20 July, 1890 Kálnoky informed Szapáry about having contacted the German embassy and replied to Monts. Kálnoky accepted Monts' proposition that had been consented to back at the treaty negotiations held in Budapest on 26 April (in which they stated that the Monarchy would not negotiate any treaties behind the back of the other state).

At the end of August 1890 the German government took steps to accelerate the customs treaty process. Berlepsch, the Prussian minister of trade, collected the tariff requirements of the factory industrialists' union. Accordingly, Berlepsch met 18 prominent representatives of the industry on 29 August, 1890. The industrialists embraced the opinion of avoiding the pitfalls of the most favoured nation's clause and initiating negotiations with the Monarchy. This led to a conference that took place in Berlin in two sessions, 4–12 and 22–24 September, 1890. In September 1890 the agreement was made by the German government.

In the meantime, the two emperors – Wilhelm II and Franz Joseph – met in the middle of September in 1890 in Rohnstock.³⁸ The two foreign ministers Caprivi and Kálnoky were present too. To the public it could seem as if the states of the Dual Alliance were preparing their common future. We have to bear in mind that the importance of the conference is usually overestimated. As for sorting the relationship, both parties mutually consented to and acted according to Monts' proposition. The politicians agreed on intensifying the preparations of the trade treaty. This was also a reasonable step to take for the Germans as William McKinley's protection tariffs were introduced at the time in the US.³⁹

³⁷ BA R 901/10058. Handelsvertrag zwischen Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn. Kaiserlich Deutsche Botschaft in Wien. Anton von Monts an – Leo von Caprivi. Wien, den 17. Juli 1890.

³⁸ Walther Lotz: Die Handelspolitik des Deutschen Reiches unter Graf Caprivi und Fürst Hohenlohe (1890–1900), *Vereins für Socialpolitik*, Schriften, Band 92, Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1901, 73.

³⁹ Marc-William Palen: *The "Conspiracy" of Free Trade: The Anglo-American Struggle over Empire and Economic Globalisation, 1846–1896*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017, 188.

HUNGARIAN PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS

Minister of trade Baross informed the Hungarian government at the ministerial council on 10 October, 1890 that the German government was ready to sign a trade tariff contract.⁴⁰ Upon this Kálnoky commanded a confidential data collection to start with. Then the previously set up tariff council was called into session again.

As soon as July 1890, the council was set up with the delegation of the Ministry of Trade: István Liphay, minister-counsellor, Count Miklós Fiáth, counsellor of the Ministry of Agriculture, István Andreánszky, minister-counsellor, and Adolf Turóczy, counsellor and head tariff director of the Ministry of Finance.

On behalf of the Ministry of Trade, Béla Lukács, state secretary – who was also deputy-chairman of the council –, Hugó Kilényi and János Mihalovics minister-counsellors, were sent.

The different sectors were represented by Count Aurél Dessewffy, president of the Hungarian Economic Association (OMGE), Soma Mudrony, president of the National Association of Industry, Endre György and István Tisza, members of parliament, and Manfréd Weiss and András Mechwart, industrialists. The council had its first session on 26 October, 1890 and had the negotiations concerning the treaty with Germany on the agenda.

Caprivi and his ally, the Italian Prime Minister, Francesco Crispi, touched base about the customs and trade treaty between 7 and 8 November, 1890 in Milan.⁴¹ The Chancellor embraced and promoted the ambition of Italy involving Portugal in the Triple Alliance. Over the course of the discussion he envisioned the Triple Alliance as a trade league providing a common market for the members and standing up against France.⁴² Crispi went one step further by defying the Austrian leadership. Namely, he made the suggestion to unify the supplemental agreement of the Triple Alliance by including a single set text in the contract, providing identical conditions for each member. Caprivi took his side.

In order to move Hungarian and Austrian interests closer, a common customs negotiation was organised in Vienna which started on 15 November, 1890.⁴³ Baross summarised the most relevant reasons that supported an agreement with the Austrian government as a means to prepare for representing the same ideas in the upcoming triple conference, against Germany.

⁴⁰ MNL OL K 27. MTJK 1890. október 10. 3.

⁴¹ Konrad Canis: *Von Bismarck zur Weltpolitik: Deutsche Außenpolitik 1890 bis 1902*, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1999, 78.

⁴² Walter Rauscher: *Zwischen Berlin und St. Petersburg: Die österreichisch-ungarische Aussenpolitik unter Gustav Graf Kálnoky 1881–1895*, Wien–Köln–Weimar, Böhlau Verlag, 1993, 172.

⁴³ MNL OL K 27. MTJK 1890. november 9. 1. pont

On 1 October, 1890, protection tariffs introduced by a republican senator, William McKinley, came into effect in the US. Baross did not know of any other countries planning a response. Thus the Hungarian government decided to wait until other countries protested against the protection tariff system and only take a step alongside the Dual Monarchy. There was a passage in Monts's proposition that stated the contracts expiring in 1892 could only be renewed with Germany's consent. Baross wished to clarify this with the German government. Inasmuch as they could not find common ground, Hungary were to demand cutting tariffs on wood, grains, flour and livestock and issuing an agreement about animal welfare from Germany. Moreover, the items mentioned above should be charged with special duties. The Hungarian government was not ready to cut the tariffs on leather, iron, animal and vegetable fat, chemicals, or equipment and locomotives. A compromise was offered: if Germany released the tariffs on raw materials and livestock, Hungary would cut tariffs on iron. Hungary was ready for a customs treaty with Serbia and Romania taking into consideration the animal welfare issues, but only after signing one with Germany.

DUTY CONFERENCE IN VIENNA

The Austrian and Hungarian governments held a conference over the custom tariffs on 15–17 November, 1890 in Vienna. The summarised results are the following: Baross reported to the ministers' council that they could not expect concessions from the Austrian government regarding textile and clothing industry tariffs.⁴⁴ As for the tariffs on iron, they delegated the Hungarian government to make a decision on the matter. They expected the Germans to reduce the crops and grains tariffs to three marks. One crucial part of the preparations was the questions regarding livestock. Cutting down on duties was not as much a matter of debate here as reaching an agreement on animal health and welfare. The Hungarian government would have involved Italy in the series of discussions had it not been for Monts' proposition. Austria did not mean to impose sanctions on the French government. Given that the Austrian government had approved of Monts' proposition, there was no way to disregard that. Alongside this, a proposal was put forward to invite the whole German management to Vienna to get the negotiations started.

The dialogue commenced on 2 December, 1890 at the common Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The German delegation was headed by legation counsellor

⁴⁴ MNL OL K 27. MTJK 1890. november 19. 2. pont

Wilhelm von Jordan, who arrived along with the negotiators.⁴⁵ The head of the Austro-Hungarian delegation was László Szőgyény-Marich, First Section Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The first part of the negotiations took place over 2–22 December, 1890. At the very beginning, on 3 December, a heated debate started over the topic of textile finishing trade rates as the Germans wished to return to the 1878 rates.⁴⁶ Austria refused to go along with this and it was a close call that almost led to the negotiations being disrupted. This would have naturally been against all interests so Franz Joseph saved the day and organised a reception for the German delegation to soothe the turmoil.

It was soon obvious how different were the interests of the two states of the Dual Monarchy. This resulted in a very impotent Monarchy opposed to Germany and put double pressure on Szőgyény. The Hungarian agriculturalists forced the Austrian industrialists to release their tariffs which brought about Berlin releasing their own agricultural tariffs. The industry had to be aware of the German rivals in terms of domestic production, and at the same time they demanded that they cut the tariffs on the textile products that were exported to Germany. When Berlin turned to Vienna to cut their industrial tariffs back to the rates of 1881, the question was presented to the Hungarian agricultural field too. The Germans were pressurised by the intense Prussian agricultural lobby as they did not mean to cut tariffs on crops and grains as much as they were forced to. This time a change from five marks to four looked realistic in the opinion of the negotiators of the German delegation. Ambassador Reuss described an overall volatile spirit among the dialogue partners: “they are almost hopeful, almost sceptical, depending on the proposals’ nature arriving in the next couple of days”.⁴⁷ This of course did not please the Hungarians too much.

The second section of the conference started on 12 January and lasted till 26 January, 1891. The next point on the agenda was the question of German customs. The representatives of the Monarchy were eager to gain advantage for the time the Serbian-Romanian treaties were made. The ambitions of the German delegates regarding plant breeding and trading were defied. Even

⁴⁵ Amt von Auswärtigen – Historischer Dienst – Maria von Keipert – Peter Grupp (eds.): *Biographisches Handbuch des deutschen Auswärtigen Dienstes 1871–1945*, Band 2, G–K. Bearb. von Gerhard Keiper – Martin Kröger, Paderborn–München–Wien–Zürich, Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2005, 447–448.

⁴⁶ Finishing trade: exporting woven or knitted cloth to be finished by techniques such as colour printing, dyeing and bleaching abroad, and returning them to the country of origin while crossing borders with certain tariffs.

⁴⁷ BA R 901/10060. Handelsvertrag zwischen Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn. Kaiserlich Deutsche Botschaft in Wien. Heinrich VII. Prinz Reuss an – Leo von Caprivi. Wien, den 13. December 1890.

a smaller argument was ignited after the Austrians showed reluctance over the new railway fares Baross introduced on 1 January. The dialogues did not achieve anything favourable, and many of the tariff issues remained unclear.

The arrangements continued between Berlin and Vienna but solely in the form of correspondence. The German government yielded in March and cut the crop tariffs from five to 3.5 marks, which finally pleased the Monarchy.

By 3 May, 1891 the outlines of the trade treaty were ready and had been paraphrased by the representatives of the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.⁴⁸ On the same day, the negotiations came to an end. Three days later the signing of the extension of the Triple Alliance happened in Vienna too.⁴⁹ Although there were no great concessions, altogether they were favourable for the two states. The Hungarian agriculturalists benefited from the German market, while the German industrialists took advantage of the Monarchy's markets. Germany avoided the engagement with the Balkan States, even if Austria-Hungary wished for it. Germany and Austria-Hungary started making agreements with other European countries – namely, Italy, Switzerland and Belgium.

In the end, Germany, the Monarchy, Italy, Switzerland and Belgium signed a trade treaty on 6 December, 1891. This became a bill that came into effect on 1 February, 1892 and remained active until 31 December, 1903. Austria-Hungary and Germany also signed an Animal Health and Welfare Agreement.

CONCLUSIONS

The following year brought the onset of the German-Austrian-Hungarian treaty. On 1 February, 1892 it came into effect, and as Lajos Thallóczy noted in his personal diary on 9 February he met Monts. The German consul general spoke about the Hungarian conditions with his usual malice, and also mentioned that the lack of industry in Hungary was a shortcoming that he, as an ally, saw as a real "problem".⁵⁰ Gyula Szapáry's cabinet had to acknowledge the importance of the Hungarian economic identity and that of the trade treaty from the aspect of increasing production and national exports. The Monarchy, including Hungary, wished to go on playing an active role in the Central-European economic space; it even planned to raise duties in order to increase its income. The trade and customs agreement brought

⁴⁸ Gutmann: *Das Deutsche Reich*, 305.

⁴⁹ Alfred Francis Pfißram: *Die politischen Geheimverträge Österreich-Ungarns 1879–1914*, Wien, Braumüller, 1920, 224.

⁵⁰ Országos Széchényi Könyvtár [National Széchényi Library] Quart. Hung. 2459. 1. 1887–1900. Thallóczy Lajos Napló. [The Diary of Lajos Thallóczy] 396.

growth in Hungarian agricultural and industrial production. The existing sectors carried on producing and new ones joined in. The agreement with the Germans had secured the future of Hungarian agriculture.

After signing the trade treaty, the import rates in the Common Custom Area of the Austro-Hungarian Empire continuously grew. Over time this tendency (of increasing imports) stayed steady. Countries such as Great Britain, the United States of America, Italy and Russia kept injecting products into the Monarchy, while Germany still remained in the first place with the highest proportion of imports.

The exports of the Common Customs Area coming from the Monarchy also grew steadily. The same tendency showed, inasmuch as export items targeting Germany were 4–5 times as many as of the other countries (Great Britain, Italy, Russia and Switzerland).⁵¹

In my paper I cannot introduce all the duty items, so I will point out three that really determined the Hungarian exports. The export of cattle from the Common Customs Area was one of the major points of the trade treaty. The German agricultural sector was not satisfied with this segment because the Hungarian government won over the Germans with great concessions.⁵² The Hungarian government persevered with the livestock-breeding and livestock-keeping trends until it could start exporting livestock to the German Empire again. Egg exports from the Common Custom Area also became a niche for the Hungarian government with its newly purchased refrigerator cars which made eggs into a popular cargo. 80–85% of egg exports targeted Germany. Finally, although the high quality Hungarian crops and grains were exported to several European countries (Great Britain, Switzerland, Italy and France), most of them landed in Germany also.

After signing the trade treaty, Hungarian foreign trade traffic changed along with the trade relations. In this 12-year period (1892–1903) we can observe how Hungarian export rates overtook import rates in several cases. This contributed largely to the increase of economic growth and strength.

Last but not least, we have to mention that more than 80% of German exports were received by Austria-Hungary. Hungary was clearly committed to Germany both in terms of political attitude and economics. Hungarian foreign trade was narrowed down and focused on Germany in the first place. This remained the same until the First World War, and all along between the two World Wars in fact.

⁵¹ Láng: Statisztikai táblázatok és egyéb mellékletek [Statistical tables and other appendices], 26–27.

⁵² Sándor, Gyömrei – Miklós, Vértesy: *Baross Gábor* [Gábor Baross], Budapest, Athenaeum Irodalmi és Nyomdai RT. Nyomása, 1937, 59.

The Hungarian government made the most of the 1891 trade treaty by bringing into prominence and using the true identity of the Hungarian economy.

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THE ROLE OF THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERIPHERIES IN THE AUSTRO-
HUNGARIAN MONARCHY FOCUSING THE POLICY OF
THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE (1897–1914)



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ABSTRACT

The necessity of the economic, cultural and social development of the peripheries was recognized by the Hungarian public at the end of the 19th century due to the mass emigration of the inhabitants seeking employment abroad. Darányi Ignác, Minister of Agriculture (between 1895–1903 and 1906–1910), launched a uniform and comprehensive economic development programme, the so called “folk aid actions” within the framework of the gradually established branch office system. These turned into intermediary level specialized offices serving for the completion of the agricultural organizational tasks in the areas of Subcarpathia, Upper Hungary, Székely Land and Transylvania (1897–1914). Concurrently the goal of the assessment was to introduce the underlying responsibility of the government in raising the underdeveloped, deficient areas mainly to be found in the peripheries, and to find what kind of means and assistance could be offered by the government in advancing the regions.

Keywords: *development of peripheries, Ministry of Agriculture, system of branch offices, regional economic actions, “folk aid actions”, aid and support policy*

After the declaration of 1867, Hungary during the Austro-Hungarian assimilation process underwent huge economic and social development. However, the general upturn did not characterise the whole territory and population of the country evenly. Especially the areas characterised by

the adverse, natural, archaic social and economic structures suffered from lagging behind, which resulted in emigration and seasonal outwork migration as a consequence. The key issue in economic and social modernisation was competitive agriculture which could simultaneously provide a decent living and the development of a healthy farming system as a criterion for the former, and achieving the employment of a large workforce previously engaged in the agricultural sector in factories due to accelerated industrialisation.

As a result of gradual industrial developments by the Ministry of Trade from the end of 1880s, which in turn were followed by agricultural developments in the 1890s, the underdeveloped areas started to become comparable to the other regions in the Central European area. Public intervention in the underdeveloped regions was a regular undertaking, since in Austria the development of the mountainous areas was concluded upon planned agricultural policies which created the dairy industry in the Alpine region.¹

After previous occasional and sparse aid, public intervention in the development of underdeveloped regions started to become official around the turn of the century. The “aid action” taken by the Ministry of Agriculture was shown to be the most efficient with the strongest long-term effects among all public interventions. Ignác Darányi, the Head of the Ministry of Agriculture (1895–1903 and 1906–1910), who while being a liberal was open to certain elements of the agrarian-conservative approach, and his worthy successors (Béla Tallián and Béla Serényi) personally oversaw the granting of preferential aid to the eastern, north-eastern and northern regions in need, taking into account the possible options regarding matters falling within the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture.²

The current study focuses on the state development of the agriculture of the peripheral regions. From the end of the 19th century, the Ministry of Agriculture introduced aid packages and regional industrial programmes to develop these areas. The summary of the theoretical policies and actual practices of the agricultural development programmes covering almost half of the area of the historic Hungary is completed upon sources found in the National Archives of Hungary, as well as statistical summaries and other official documents of the dual era found in the same place. A high level of importance is granted to the summaries about the state actions covering several years. The aim of the study is to pinpoint the responsibility of the

¹ Mariann Nagy : *A magyar mezőgazdaság regionális szerkezete a 20. század elején*, Budapest, Gondolat, 2003, 262.

² Imre Takács : *Magyarország földművelésügyi közigazgatása az Osztrák–Magyar Monarchia korában, 1867–1918*, Budapest, Mezőgazdasági Kiadó, 1989, 81–83.

government in the encouragement of the underdeveloped areas that were mainly situated in the peripheries, and how and by which means it could support these regions to raise them to a certain level.³

ORGANISATION OF THE SYSTEM OF BRANCH OFFICES

The necessity of state intervention had been proven by the stagnation of production and trade that led to the low standard of the traditional lifestyle. The contemporary economic literature painted a sorrowful picture of the one-sided, self-supplying three-year production as a result of the poor geographic elements (unfavourable weather, geographic and soil features) as well as the wrong choice of production, the lack of finances and the insufficient measures of the liberal economic policy (landownership laws, especially the laws regarding forests). Railway lines were built later and not to the planned extent, despite huge investment. This played a significant role in the slow development of the modern economy and the establishment of industrial companies.

In 1897 the Ministry of Agriculture started economic aid-granting to the Ruthenian farming people in Subcarpathia (East Carpathian areas). From 1901 this aid programme was called "mountainous action" so that the attention of political opponents of supporting non-Hungarian groups would be clouded.⁴ The mountainous action has been regarded as a special mixture of contemporary social and national policies based on which the "usage of new conservative social methods which were in the public administration started."⁵

³ Petra Balaton: Állami akciók a lemaradó régiók fejlesztésére a dualizmus korában, s. e. *Bartha Miklós és kora. regionális fejlesztések. Székelyudvarhely, Udvarhelyszék Kulturális Egyesület*, 2013, 69–81.

⁴ József Botlik: *Egestas Subcarpathica. Adalékok az Észak-keleti-Felvidék és Kárpátalja XIX–XX. századi történetéhez*, Budapest, Hatodik Síp Alapítvány, 2000; Kálmán Vigh: Borostyánkői Egan Ede, a hegyvidéki nép jötevője (1851–1901) *Vasi Szemle*, 50, 1, 1996, 86–95., Andrea Gönczi: Egy magyar kísérlet az alpesi gazdálkodás megvalósítására – a hegyvidéki akció, *Acta beregsasiensis*, A II. Rákóczi Ferenc Kárpátaljai Magyar Főiskola évkönyve, IV. Beregszász, 2005.

⁵ Miklós Szabó: *Az újkonzervativizmus és a jobboldali radikalizmus története (1867–1918)*, Budapest, Új Mandátum, 2003, 176–177.

Later public authorities operating under the same principles were created in Székely Land, then from 1908 in the territories of Transylvania and Upper Hungary.⁶ The areas with lower level Hungarian population were drawn into the action led by the Transylvanian offices gradually from 1909.⁷

My source-based research has clearly shown that the scant literature examines and presents “public actions” on their own, as if the State aid granted on a regional basis would only have been a specific response to the very serious local problems which required remedying.

Yet Minister Darányi considered the Mountainous Action as “a starting point for the future activities to be extended to the whole Carpathian mountain range” even in 1899, i.e. the idea of granting economic aids in a broader scale was already born. Except for Transylvania, the governmental actions worked mainly in the mountainous Slovak and Ruthenian areas before the 1910s.⁸ The leaders of the branch offices claimed that “they can be included in the community of Hungarian national development by preparing the prerequisites of economic advancement and the safety of their existence” solely by the direct spread of agriculture.⁹

The branch offices served for the realization of the governmental programme upon the local conditions; besides providing simple financial aid, they contributed to the overall change of view and the dissolution of economic underdevelopment by proposals and recommendations.¹⁰

As well as modernising the agricultural circumstances, the development of production features which complemented the natural environment were also goals. By the mid-1890s, the agrarian socialist demands were spreading around the peripheries, and these economic actions could bring them to a halt.

Governmental actions had lost their purpose of being actions against dearth by the 1910s, and were transformed into intermediary-level specialised offices with a constant scope of duties.¹¹ The National Party of Work led by

⁶ Petra Balaton: *A székely akció története. I/1. Munkaterv és kirendeltségi jelentések*, Budapest, Cartofil, 2004, 39–45.

⁷ 1904: Székely and Csángó areas of Kisküküllő, Torda-Aranyos and Brassó Counties; 1909: Regions inhabited by Magyars in Transylvania (58 settlements of Kolozs, Szilágy and Alsófehér counties); 1908–1911: Some isolated Hungarian ethnic islands: in Nagy-Küküllő County (Héjjasfalva, 1908) and in Beszterce-Naszód County (Zselye, Sófalva, Tacs, Nagysajó, Magyarremegye, 1911).

⁸ Official agricultural report: *Indoklás a Földművelésügyi magy. kir. Ministerium 1913. évi költségvetéséhez*, Budapest, s. p. 1912, 119.

⁹ Archives of Hungary Central Archives (=NAH CA), The Archives of the Ministry of Agriculture, General documents (=K 184) 1916–128–62713. 27911/1914. The operational report of the sub-office in Temesvár.

¹⁰ Takács: *Magyarország földművelésügyi közigazgatása*, 81–83.

¹¹ Official agricultural report: *Indoklás a Földművelésügyi magy. kir. Ministerium 1913. évi költségvetéséhez* Budapest, s. p. 1912, 119.

István Tisza won a majority in the 1910 election and sought to implement policies based on consensus and negotiations with nationalities, derogating from the former political practice of Hungary. The aim of the new, more moderate political direction was to create harmony with the minorities with fair education and culture policies, as well as spreading modernisation and introducing economic development programmes in the mountainous areas populated by minorities, where traditional economic practices were followed.¹²

The subject of the Romanian pact negotiations started in 1910 was the compliance with the liberal Nationalities Law of 1868, concessions on schools, supporting underdeveloped areas economically and, in particular, ensuring constituencies with a Romanian majority. Thanks to Romanian rapprochement, certain mountainous regions, home to Romanians (Szolnok-Doboka and Hunyad Counties in 1912) were incorporated in the Transylvanian action for economic development.

The offices which completed an aid mission after the severe devastation caused by heavy rainfall and floods in 1912–1913, lost this feature and were changed into ordinary medium level administrative authorities. Béla Serényi, Minister of Agriculture (1910–1913), issued an organisational and operational regulation regarding all branch offices on 28th April, 1913. The offices became the direct authorities of the external offices and professional institutes (except for the educational and scientific institutes), the governmental lands, national horse breeding issues, governmental spa baths and recreational areas, forestry and water authorities and the offices which handled governmental properties. The branch offices fulfilled a coordinating role among the ministries and the offices solving the simple tasks that did not require any special professional knowledge. The regulation brought significant changes in the system of the branch offices; the office in Transylvania was divided into Marosvásárhely (Târgu-Mures) (Brassó, Csík, Háromszék, Kisküküllő, Maros-Torda, and Udvarhely Counties) and Kolozsvár (Cluj-Napoca) branch offices (Alsófehér, Hunyad, Kolozs, Krassó-Szörény, Szolnok-Doboka and Torda-Aranyos Counties).¹³ Minister Béla Serényi intended to establish a separate governmental organisation for agricultural administration, and the first action for this was the setting up of branch offices in the areas which suffered major natural disasters on 1st September 1913. In the areas with Romanian majorities in East-Hungarian and Partium regions (Arad, Bihar

¹² Gábor Vermes: *Tisza István*, Budapest, Századvég, 1994, 142–260.

¹³ NAH CA, K 184, 1913–128–87548/112347. Organizational rules for the Branch Offices of the Ministry of Agriculture, issued by the Order of the Minister of Agriculture, on 28 April, 1913, Nr. 4670. praes.

and Szilágy Counties), Nagyvárad (Oradea) was the centre, and in the Banat region with Romanian, German and Serb population (Krassó-Szörény and Temes Counties), Temesvár (Timișoara) was the centre.¹⁴

The majority of both regions belonged to the “innovational border zone” next to the eastern market line of the Great Hungarian Plain, whereas the area expanding from Szatmár County through Bihar to the southern border of Temes County was quite diverse regarding its natural features, settlement system, economy and social setup, as well as its status regarding modernisation. The dynamically developing regional centres (Arad, Temesvár, and Nagyvárad) played an important role in the spread of modernisation as financial, trade and industrial centres.¹⁵ However, the mountainous areas of the counties were regarded as underdeveloped areas with unfavourable geographic features and basic agriculture. In the southern areas, the danger of flooding due to previous unlimited and irresponsible grazing practices resulted in erosion and barrenness.¹⁶ The losses due to flooding played an important role in the process in which the Ministry of Agriculture realised the necessity of the development of the mountainous areas with traditional agricultural practices.

Minister Béla Serényi intended to establish a separate governmental organisation for agricultural administration, the first step for which was the setting up of branch offices in Temesvár and Nagyvárad. The Minister was planning to organise the introduction of branch offices gradually in other parts of the country, then to convert them into district directorates of agriculture. However, the Tisza government formed in June 1913 did not consider expanding the system of branch offices feasible. Imre Ghillány, Minister of Agriculture (1913–1917), did not find it necessary to establish a separate centre of branch offices for the wheat-growing areas of Bánság linked to the economic growth, and heavy industrial areas rich in iron ores in Krassó-Szörény County.

The Board of Ministers therefore agreed on 23 October to delegate Temes County to the Directorate of Livestock in Arad and Krassó-Szörény County to the branch office in Kolozsvár. The centre in Temesvár was closed in agreement with the local authorities on 1 May, 1914. The targeted economic development

¹⁴ NAH CA, K 184, 1913. 1916. Class 128. General issues of the sub offices of the Ministry of Agriculture, 86418. Report of Szilágy County's subprefect on 19 Aug., 1913 (No. 9962.)

¹⁵ Zoltán Gál: A helyi bankok aranykora: bankközpontok a Bánságban a 20. század elején, *Közép-európai Közlemények*, 2, 9, 2010, 117–133, Zoltán Gál – Szilárd Rácz: Városok fejlődése és pénzügyi funkciói a mai Vajdaság területén a dualizmus időszakában, in Zoltán Takács – András Ricz (eds.): *Regionális kaleidoszkóp*, Szabadka, Regionális Tudományi Társaság, 2014, 91–102.

¹⁶ Ferenc Virágh: Adatok a dél-alföldi mezőgazdaság tőkés fejlődéséhez (1880–1810), *Agrártörténeti Szemle*, 23 3–4, 1981, 489–514; Mihály Mózes: *A kiegyezéstől Trianonig*, Regionális Gazdaságtörténeti tanulmányok, /Erdély, Bánát, Tiszántúl/, Debrecen, Cosmos, 1998.

of mountainous areas of the counties continued with less intensity. A new administrative centre was established in the eastern region of Upper Hungary, Eperjes (Prešov) being the administrative centre.¹⁷ István Tisza, the Prime Minister, began to research the status of the nationalities in Upper Hungary, which can be considered as the preliminary steps towards a governmental economic-social action. Although the action was not realised, the Eperjes Branch Office (Gömör-Kishont, Sáros, Szepes and Zemplén Counties) was established counterbalancing the Slovak agricultural movements threatening Hungarian governmental interests.¹⁸

The ministerial branch office system was completed in almost half of the area of the country – the mountainous (Munkács and Eperjes), Transylvanian (Kolozsvár and Marosvásárhely), Upper Hungary (Zsolna, Žilina) and the Nagyvárad Directorates had an increasing budget stabilizing at 3% of the agricultural budget (3 million crowns). Additional centres of branch offices were not established due to the onset of war from 1914 to 1918. After the collapse of historic Hungary, the operations of all ministerial branch offices were discontinued.

OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

The economic development policies of the governmental aid actions changed a lot during their operations, as did their jurisdiction, personnel and budget. The practical experiences of the ministries changed the programmes significantly, supported by the proposals by the villages, counties, county associations, and industrial chambers. Unforeseeable natural disasters such as the adverse weather in 1912 and 1913, which was followed by aid action, and the political events of World War I and then the following military occupation caused major changes.

The activities of the mountainous (Ruthenian) action were continuously increasing from the 20th century, and as well as the triple pillar (land tenancy, the development of animal husbandry and loan associations), strong emphasis was placed on the rural issues of the establishment of handcraft institutes, mountainous dairy farms and the development of the Vilmos Balogh mountainous economic farm.¹⁹ Meanwhile, the Transylvanian development programme was unable to cope with all the issues that it had

¹⁷ NAH CA, Archives of the Prime Minister (= K 27), Cabinetminutes of the meeting on 23rd Oct 1913.

¹⁸ The II/B Department of the Prime Minister's Office followed nationalist movements in Hungary closely from 1911/1912. István Tisza engaged in agreement and pact negotiations with Romanians and Slovaks before the start of the First World War.

¹⁹ *Magyarország földművelésügye 1897–1903*, Budapest, A m. kir. földművelésügyi miniszter kiadványa, 1904, 98–99.

originally planned for (the issues of infrastructure, rafting, industry, mining, child safety, baths, hunting, and fishing), its scope of activities concentrated on the development of agriculture from 1905.

The governmental aid actions commencing from the end of the 19th century developed the underdeveloped areas from the central budget and was based on the same organisation; however, each one was tailored to the demands of the given area. Their goal was to eliminate the economic deficit and to implement changes regarding the aspect of building on social self-aid initiatives.

The operations of the economic actions were exasperated by the conflict between modernisation and experience and tradition. The lack of trust regarding the governmental offices was great especially during the first 3–4 years of the actions. The farmers trust could be gained for the innovations by the friendship of the villages, and written documents. Thus the branch offices realised that the agreement of the local charismatic leaders (vicars and teachers) was crucial; the fulfilment of the actions would be impossible without them.²⁰ The Temesvár Branch Office was the only one where a farmers' association was formulated with members that represented the counties' social organisations, and also to evaluate and support the cooperation with the agricultural associations. On the other hand, a committee worked besides the first leader of the Ruthenian action, Ede Egán, which knew the local issues, and which had regular meetings where the representatives of the ministries were also present, and where all the aspects of the aid actions were discussed.

The aid and support policies of the economic programmes were collective; the communities or the institutes serving the community were favoured. On the one hand, they received low interest loans (2.5–4%) with a 1.5–3 year payment period, or 10–30% price reduction in the case of cash payment. The condition of governmental aid was the compulsory self-contribution (financial, own work/manpower or animal power, land, or building). Personal aid was only given in the case of a catastrophic economic year or a disaster (fire, flood or hail loss).

The fact shows the unified management of public actions that the amounts of costs were determined separately, by tasks (cooperative or water policy), in some cases.²¹

The branch offices wanted to develop animal husbandry into a key sector based on the geographic features of the areas; as a supporting intermediary they helped to define the goals of breeding and contributed to acquiring the appropriate breeding-animals (cattle, horse, swine and sheep). Official breeding policy advocated breed change: the breeding of, alongside the White Hungarian breed of cattle, the triple-purpose (for milk, for meat and

²⁰ Mihály Koós: *A székely actio ismertetés*, Budapest, Pallas, 1905, 10–11, 64–65.

²¹ Official agricultural report: *Indoklás a Földművelésügyi magy. kir. Ministerium 1904. évi költségvetéséhez*, Budapest, s. p. 1903, 95.

as a draught animal), the multi-coloured (red-mottled) landrace with western origin because of good agriculture and an increased demand for milk and meat. The Upper Hungary action had great success in raising sheep. The branch office, in conjunction with trade inspectorates, organised breeding-cattle judging contests, and it considered the satisfactory selection, housing, care and feeding of sires important as well.²²

In Transylvania however, due to the lack of time, the experiment was not completed, and no western breed was integrated due to the constrained necessity of mixing. The change in breeds resulted in a higher rate of animal loss; however, the multi-coloured (red-mottled) landrace with western origin which demanded higher care were often inadequately cared for. In Upper Hungary the aid action had success in sheep breeding. There were changes in breeding cattle both in quality and in quantity and the spread of the multi-coloured (red-mottled) landrace with western origin increased: the rate was more than 90%, while in Subcarpathia it was 70%.

There were greater successes in the area of pastures and pasture animal husbandry. Grassland and pasture management were the basis of the most important farming sector, animal husbandry. Neglected pastures were the result of carelessness and ignorance of the need for economic progress. The Ministry of Agriculture therefore provided large State aids for pasture improvement (amelioration). Pasture improvement and ensuring pasture lands were important tasks of the branch office.²³

Water supply management as an important civilisation advancement regarding animal husbandry, public health and fire safety gained momentum from the beginning of 1910s, especially in terms of the activities of the Transylvanian Branch Office.

Increasing the crop income via technological developments was the main focus for spreading intensive, modern, and sensible farming. As a result of seed distribution the average income increased, production of feed crops became more widespread and several agricultural experiments were completed. Via agricultural machine and equipment distribution, machines that had been unattainable or even unknown so far started to be used, even though not in large quantities. The widespread usage of fertilizers (artificial or natural) was significant in Upper Hungary.²⁴ The branch offices placed a great emphasis on land ownership issues, especially on the popularization and support of re-parcelling of land, and on a smaller scale they helped the purchase of lands or pastures. The land loan activities of the mountainous action were vastly

²² *A hegyvidéki, erdőlyrészi (székelyföldi) és felvidéki miniszteri kirendeltségek*, A m. kir. földművelésügyi ministerium kiadványai 11, Budapest, Pallas, 1912, 96–97.

²³ NAH CA, K 184, 1914–110–86546/1911. Official report about pasture improvement in Upper Hungary.

²⁴ *Mútrágya a Felvidéken*, *Budapesti Hírlap* 29, 139, 1909, 38–39.

superior when compared to the activities of the other branch offices. Minister Darányi rented the mountainous farms of the incumbent Schönborn-Buchheim manor in 1897. The governmental lands were rented by villages or individuals; however, only 16,000 cadastral acres of the 1.5 million available were parcelled among 7,000 smallholders covering 50 villages. The employee management activities of the branch offices were followed by several debates; besides the placement of unskilled labourers to stop the agricultural strikes they recruited skilled workers, too.

The spread of knowledge and information regarding agriculture was an important task on the peripheries. These economic educational presentations concentrated on general legal and public administration knowledge, and social (public health and problems with alcohol abuse) issues; they also talked about household management and parenting with women. Books and booklets in the field of economics utilising the popular tone of several languages particularly promoted farming practises.²⁵ Public libraries, academic (winter) lectures and practical activities (land overviews, study tours) resulted in an increased professional knowledge. The establishment of professional schooling also contributed to the development of specialised knowledge, for example, the school in Alsóverecke in Sub-Catpathia and the primary economics school in Torda, Transylvania, and also in Árvaváralja in Upper Hungary (1912). In the framework of free legal aid, paid solicitors provided legal advice in different land cadastral, registry, tax and other issues.

The Ministry of Agriculture had dedicated considerable energy to promoting credit cooperatives belonging to the National Central Credit Cooperative (Országos Központi Hitelszövetkezet) in particular among the Romanian-speaking population. Besides counterbalancing the activities of financial institutions of the nationalities, it supported the conversion of credits previously taken out, combating exploitation and the bulk procurement and distribution of agricultural crops. Before receiving financial support, the earlier functioning of the cooperatives was assessed and evaluated from a national perspective "with regard to loyalty and patriotism."²⁶

Professional procurement and sales groups were founded as well as the highly operational loan associations. The foundation of consumer cooperatives was the result of the lack of trade competition owing to the poor infrastructure, mainly the initiative of the villages. Animal insurance cooperatives were established to reduce the risks concerning the rearing of high-value animals. They had a contractual relationship with the Hungarian Mutual Animal Insurance Association (Magyar Kölcsönös Állatbiztosító Társaság), which

²⁵ NAH CA, K 596, 1913–119–245. Issue of booklets.

²⁶ NAH CA, K 596, 1913–81–96. Issue of credit cooperatives.

covered damage to livestock that exceeded 5% for a ½% reinsurance rate. In the more highly developed villages the so-called citizen houses or cooperative houses served for the modernisation of the villages and for rural development.

The governmental development of fruit and vegetable production, home-craft industries, dairy farming, poultry farming and bee-keeping served for the expansion of income sources.

The Ministry of Agriculture supported home-craft activities as a form of winter supplementary income from the end of the 19th century. There was a sort of nostalgia in this action by the ministry; however, the home-craft industry was unsuccessful from both the trade and social aspect.²⁷

CONCLUSIONS

What were the governments' intentions in establishing branch offices? Counterbalancing the nationalist movement that jeopardised the Magyar public position, linguistic-cultural Magyarization (Hungarianization) in a reasoned way, or a positive social and economic action to be implemented among the Magyar diaspora and landowners of nationalities?

Among the economic and minorities policies of the Hungarian governments in the era of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, the regional economic actions proved to be the most effective positive measure that was aimed at improving the supply and employment difficulties. The goals of the aid actions were on the one hand to strengthen the Hungarian small, middle and wealthy farmers economically, and on the other hand to promote positive economic measures in the circle of loyal minority (Ruthenian, German, Romanian and Slovak) landowners.

In the 1910s the branch offices in Transylvania, Nagyvárad and Temesvár respectively, aimed at drawing the government's attention to the underdeveloped status of the mountainous regions populated by Romanians, such as the inadequate water supply of the villages and of the Alpine pasture economy, as well as the danger of floods due to deforestation and the mishandling of private resettlements and parcelling in the Southern areas.²⁸

The management of the branch offices were convinced that the economic support of the minorities and their cultural integration would strengthen each other, thus strengthening their loyalty towards Hungary.

The social success of the branch offices was different; there was more success in the more developed plains than in the more closed regions.

²⁷ *Ipariakció a Székelyföldön*. Javaslatok az iparnak a Székelyföldön való fejlesztéséhez, Budapest, Athenaeum, 1905, 123–124.

²⁸ NAH CA, K 596, 1913–119–245. Issue of pasture culture.

The operation of the branch offices depended on the attitude of the people working there: “branch offices were founded in the areas populated mainly by minorities; ideal success could not be gained there; however, a lot of effective measures were taken ... positive results could only be achieved in the areas where the local office employed committed and diligent people.”²⁹ The success of the actions would have needed higher professional knowledge of the officials of the counties.³⁰

The social and geographic effect and success of the branch offices were also different; the farmers that were both wealthier and better trained joined the programmes, while the poorer peasants were left out of the distribution programmes, often due to lack of knowledge and trust. More success was gained in the more developed, open areas than in the underdeveloped, closed regions. There were favoured faster developing areas in each county showing signs of uneven development where the farmers’ associations and cooperatives received higher support.

The offices improved the lives of several families by preferential distribution, as they gained such economic assets that could not have been obtained otherwise. However, they did not achieve changes in the areas of social problems (loans, land registration). Without finding the solution to the problems of land ownership, land registrars, legal and loan status, the branch offices had to face inextricable tasks, and thus they should not be blamed for their lack of solutions. The social regret that accompanied the foundation and operation of the actions turned into impassiveness and disinterest. The development programme of the regions could have been more successful if it had been followed by effective social support and involvement. Moreover, the opportunities were also limited. Beside the liberal economy, the possibilities restricted by finances had to be addressed. The limited investments, the disinterest of leading investors and bankers as well as the disagreement within the leading political circles and the reluctance of the minorities were all encumbrances to the success of the actions. There was very little cooperation among the ministries. They emphasized that “underdevelopment and the failings of decades cannot be rectified within a few days.”³¹

However, the economic programmes did contribute to the spread of developed agriculture, combating disinterest and aversion, as well as the change of viewpoint of the local people.

²⁹ NAH CA, K 184, 1919–128–2233. Order about the organisation of the Ministry of Agriculture’s External Offices.

³⁰ László Szarka: *Szlovák nemzeti fejlődés – magyar nemzetiségi politika 1867–1918. Slovenský národný vyvin – národnostná otázka v Uhorsku 1867–1918*, Pozsony–Bratislava, Kalligram, 1999, 118.

³¹ András Lajos Róth: Dorner Béla, a székely gazdák nevelője, *Székelyföld*, 3, 1999, 10, 60.

On the whole the importance of the governmental actions lies not in their economic and social effect, but in the change of the Hungarian economic policy and national aspect. The liberal state realised that it had to take a stronger role in the development of the economy thus eradicating regional differences and supporting the underdeveloped regions as opposed to the countries which were more developed than Hungary.

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THE STRANGERS WITHIN. NATIONAL IDENTITY,
EVERYDAY ENCOUNTERS AND REGIONALISM IN
TRANSYLVANIA 1918–1944

—◀▶—
GÁBOR EGRY

ABSTRACT

This chapter analyses how everyday ethnicity in interwar Transylvania reinforced Romanian regionalism in the province. Starting from the concept of everyday ethnicity, it introduces the idea of everyday regionalism, which was in that particular area tightly connected to practices otherwise perceived as non-Romanian ones. Due to common socialization and the existence of a common middle-class milieu (a legacy of dualist Hungary), performative acts, such as leisure activities, that were understood as manifestations of Hungarianness enabled the Romanian middle-class to delineate its own community from the Old Kingdom. In doing so it also created a temporary new group, including both Romanians and Hungarians. Within the lower classes similar phenomena existed, but the means to express difference were more vulgar. With the help of a regionalist political discourse, a new form of loyalty and Romanian identity emerged, one based on the idea of authenticity of Transylvanian Romanians, and excluding Old Kingdom Romanians.

Keywords: *nationalism, Romanian regionalism, interwar era, everyday ethnicity*

Political regionalism, Hungarian Transylvanism, its literary and its political variety, or the efforts of the Romanian National Party (later National Peasant Party) to counter the dominance of Bucharest and wriggle out of administrative autonomy for the region annexed to Romania in 1920, are well

known for mainstream historiography.¹ However, most of these works focus on the politics, the discursive aspects of regionalist movements, and even if they reveal everyday differences (as it is mostly done by Irina Livezeanu), they fail to address this aspect of the phenomenon thoroughly. In this chapter, I will attempt to fill this void and reveal not only the everyday aspects of regionalism, but also its relation to the well-known discourses, and how they were interrelated and influenced each other.

My precursor and inspiration was less historiography than contemporary sociology. Rogers Brubaker, Margit Feischmidt, Jon Fox and Liana Grancea conducted research on everyday ethnicity in Cluj/Kolozsvár during the tenure of the right-wing nationalist mayor, Gheorghe Funar, who attempted to turn the city into a living memorial of Romanianness.² However, despite nationalist politics pervading the public sphere and being the most important dividing line within political elites, everyday life remained relatively untouched. Ethnicity, and especially how it was enacted by people had its own logic, rarely influenced by the political battles raging in the City Hall or in the Parliament. Nevertheless, it did not mean everyday indifference to ethnicity; the nation was one of the salient phenomena structuring life in the city, but everyday interactions did not follow the logic of a lasting ethnic conflict between the Romanian majority and the Hungarian minority.

How is it possible, however, to extend the concept of everyday ethnicity to a regionalist idea and movement? Regions are often treated as defined by “hard” factors, like geography, economics, transportation routes and so on. But regions very often have a symbolic dimension, like nations, an imagery that connects inhabitants beyond the confines of their immediate surroundings.³

¹ Béla Pomogáts: *Atranszilvánizmus. Az Erdélyi Helikon ideológiája*, Budapest, Akadémiai, 1983; Zsolt K. Lengyel: *Auf der Suche nach dem Kompromiss. Ursprünge und Gestalten der frühen Transilvanismus*, München, Ungarisches Institut, 1993; Zsolt K. Lengyel: *A kompromisszum keresése*, Csíkszereda, Pro Print, 2007; Gábor Egrý: *Az erdélyiség “színeváltozása”. Kísérlet az Erdélyi Párt ideológiájának és identitáspolitikájának elemzésére, 1940–1944*, Budapest, Napvilág, 2008; Ion Ciuperca: *Opiziția și putere în România anilor 1922–1928*, Iași, 1992; Irina Livezeanu: *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle 1918–1930*, Ithaca – London, Cornell University Press, 2000; Florian Kühner-Wielach: *Siebenbürgen ohne Siebenbürger? Zentralstaatliche Integration und politischer Regionalismus nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, München, De Gruyter, 2014.

² Rogers Brubaker – Margit Feischmidt – Jon Fox – Liana Grancea: *Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006; in Hungarian: Rogers Brubaker – Feischmidt Margit – Jon E. Fox – Liana Grancea: *Nacionalista politika és hétköznapi etnicitás egy erdélyi városban*, Budapest, L'Harmattan, 2011. (In the subsequent text I reference the Hungarian version of the book.)

³ Anssi Paasi: The Institutionalization of Regions: A Theoretical Framework for Understanding the Emergence of Regions and the Constitution of Regional Identity, *Fennia*, 164,1, 1986, 105–146; Miroslav Hroch: Reflections on the Role of History, in Steven G. Ellis – Raingard Esser – Jean-Francois Berdah – Miloš Reznik (eds.): *(Re)constructing Regional Identity, Frontiers, Regions and Identities in Europe*, Pisa, Pisa University Press, 2009, 1–14.

The process of how this symbolism of the region is generated and distributed is not only analogous to the idea of the nation, but often they are intertwined: ethnicity and ethnic encounters are part of the constitutive characteristics of regions.⁴ Therefore, in this chapter I will focus on everyday ethnicity and how its varieties reveal differences *within* the broader national groups for discovering what can be called “everyday Transylvaniam”. I will also evaluate its relationship with regionalist politics, how much they influenced each other and which one was constitutive in the formation of the other.

“EVERYDAY REGIONALISM”: DIFFERENCE, SOCIAL INTERACTIONS AND POLITICS

Ethnicity, as I use the term here drawing upon a definition given by Margit Feischmidt,⁵ is a difference in a social context that is understood as an essentialized character trait of a group and its members. It is neither an apolitical nor a political form of groupness in itself;⁶ it is rather a way of cognition, although its recognition could be politicized. Whether it exists outside the context of the respective interaction or not, it is only visible when it “happens”, when it manifests itself.⁷ Interactions taken as expressions of this ethnicity trigger the phenomenon as far as it forces participants to react and reveal their own understanding of the respective ethnicity in that particular context. This is how agency also becomes discoverable as people could have had more than one option to define or redefine ethnicity.

What does “everyday” stand for in this context? Obviously, it is distinguished from purely political forms of the nation and as such it is also removed from the political sphere. But beyond this basic delineation, “everyday ethnicity” has two interlinked points of reference: the people and the space (or situation). The people who are associated with everyday ethnicity are “ordinary” ones, and as such they cover generally everyone who has or had no significance and national stature. This does not exclude the possibility that significant figures would be associated with everyday ethnicity, especially in moments when their lives became entangled with everyday situations. These are mainly

⁴ See this argument more elaborately in Gábor Egry: *Hova lettek az erdélyiek? Az erdélyi identitás változásai, 1938–1948*, in Zsombor Bódy – Sándor Horváth (eds.): *1944/1945: Társadalom a háborúban: Folytonosság és változás Magyarországon*, Budapest, MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont Történettudományi Intézet, 2015, 271–288.

⁵ Feischmidt Margit: *Megismerés és elismerés: elméletek, módszerek, politikák az etnicitás kutatásában*, in Margit Feischmidt (ed.): *Etnicitás. Különbségteremtő társadalom*, Budapest, Gondolat, 2010, 7–29, 11.

⁶ Jeremy King: *The Nationalization of East Central Europe*, in Nancy M. Wingfield – Maria Bucur (eds.): *Staging the Past. The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe from 1848 to the Present*, West Lafayette, Purdue University Press, 2001, 123.

⁷ Brubaker – Feischmidt – Fox – Grancea: *Nacionalista politika*, 383–384.

recurrent and often banal ones that always have a practical function even if they acquire symbolic meaning, too. Dancing a “csárdás” (a dance associated with Hungarians) at a village feast was a favorite pastime and frequent occurrence, but if it happened at a commemorative event, it gained a symbolic significance, too. It is often the physical space (a school, a church etc.) that shifts the symbolic importance of the otherwise banal act.

Typologies of everyday ethnicity outlined by Brubaker et. al and Jon Fox and Cynthia Miller-Idriss⁸ help to understand better the content and limits of everyday ethnicity. Brubaker et al. list four forms of ethnicity happening in an everyday context: teasing or mocking the other on the ground of his/her ethnicity, silence about ethnic issues or tabooization, conflict over ethnicity or between people with different ethnicities, and choice between national options. Fox and Miller-Idriss offer a different typology which is common with the former in one of its elements, choice between national categories. The other three types are: speaking with and of the nation, consuming the nation and performing the nation. Within these types, people interact with each other and with institutions, often transcending the boundaries of the banal and symbolic. The choice of school with the mother tongue as its language of instruction is part of the everyday as much as the school is an inescapable institution of socialization, and it does it in everyday contact with children and parents. Still, it is symbolic for many national activists, who see in the school the bastion of national existence. On the other hand, performing the nation often happens among less banal circumstances, like exceptional sporting events (soccer games of national teams, Olympics etc.), but as long as ordinary people do it, it belongs to “everyday ethnicity”.

Michael Billig’s theory of “banal nationalism” offers a starting point for the assessment of the relationship between everyday ethnicity and politics.⁹ Banal nationalism is a latent, often unconscious sense of nationhood that pervades life to the extent that it becomes natural, unnoticed for those sharing it. It is not simply part of everyday life, it filters into banal acts, objects, products and deeds, whose national quality only becomes clear if they become related to or entangled with something unusual or with someone from outside the national group. One way to “trigger” their ethnic character is politicization of the spaces they exist within. In the same vein, politics and everyday ethnicity are interrelated inasmuch as politics often makes “ethnicity happen”. However, politics is not necessarily institutionalized politics and the political field. Individuals interacting with others can also politicize everyday situations

⁸ Jon Fox – Cynthia Miller: Idriss. *Everyday Nationhood*, *Ethnicities*, 8, 4, 2008, 536–563.

⁹ Michael Billig: *Banal Nationalism*, Sage, London, 1995.

if they invoke ethnicity in a political way or form. Thus, everyday ethnicity is first of all relational; it is revealed through interactions that make people react to ethnicity.

Everyday ethnicity is a phenomenon connected to the people and contexts that are rarely associated with nationalist politics and the presence of ethnicity in or the ethnic understanding of interactions and institutions in such situations. However, quite often the trigger of ethnicity is a politicized understanding of an event or an interaction in these contexts.¹⁰ This politicization is not the revelation of an already existing, latent national identity, but rather a momentary occurrence that could just as easily disappear as it could remain, analogous to how national mobilization faded (or even was reversed) in the case of Upper Silesia.¹¹ Thus, everyday ethnicity is not something unalterable and stable; its presence or absence in a given context or interaction would not automatically be repeated in an identical situation. It is the participants who finally define ethnicity and not external activists or observers.

But observers are often among those who “interrogate” identity,¹² who make people react to the ethnic interpretation of a given situation and reveal their own ideas about ethnicity: to perform an act of identification.¹³ Everyday ethnicity is, therefore, almost always relational, not only individually, but also in terms of groups that are supposed to be represented by the individuals.

This makes another element crucial: stereotypes. Stereotypes are often simplistic, general characterizations that are still indispensable for making sense of the world, especially of relations between groups and individuals. Ethnic auto- and hetero-stereotypes often express common ideas about the qualities of one’s own group and its outgroups. Stereotypes are, nevertheless, influenced by politics and general discourses of identities,¹⁴ especially in those cases when individuals encounter ethnic others rarely, if they encounter them at all. But even in an environment where interethnic encounters are more frequent, some stereotypes abound or are invoked by observers

¹⁰ Tara Zahra: “Imagined Noncommunities”, *National Indifference as a Concept of Analysis*, *Slavic Review*, 69, 1, 2010, 104–105.

¹¹ James Bjork: “Neither German nor a Pole”. *Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland*, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 2008.

¹² Aleksandr Motyl: The social construction of social construction, implications for theories of nationalism and identity formation, *Nationalities Papers*, 31, 1, 2010, 59–71.

¹³ Rogers Brubaker – Frederick Cooper: Beyond Identity?, *Theory and Society*, 29, 1, 2000, 16–18.

¹⁴ András Vári: Die Palette ethnischer Stereotypen in Ungarn (1790–1848). Überlegungen zu den Thesen in John Breuillys – Eva Schmidt-Hartmann (eds.): *Form en der nationalen Bewußtseins im Lichte zeitgenössischen Nationalismus theorien*, München, Oldenbourg, 1994, 173–196.

recurrently, whatever the actual experiences of people are, revealing how much generalization as a means of essentializing differences is part of these relations.

In interwar Transylvania the typical pairs of alterity¹⁵ were Romanian–Hungarian, German–Romanian, German–Hungarian, Jewish–Romanian, Jewish–Hungarian and Jewish–German. Here, I will only deal with the Romanian–Hungarian from a Romanian perspective, as an illustration of a phenomenon that was otherwise present within the other relations and had a bearing on regionalism. I am aware of the historical importance of all of these relations, especially that of the Jews, for the formation and later development of the nationhood of Romanians, Hungarians and Germans alike,¹⁶ but my goal is more to highlight a general, structural phenomenon than to give an exhaustive analysis of it in a concrete historical setting.

EVERYDAY AND POLITICAL REGIONALISM

If we bind regionalism to the sense of difference arising between members of a supposedly unitary ethnic group, it is important to point out its possible sources. In interwar Transylvania four important aspects stand out that influenced why people made distinctions. The first one, differences of socialization, was more prevalent within the group of Romanians due to the composite nature of the nation state. Roles, norms and habits associated with social status and position, and cultural canons were different in dualist Hungary and in the Old Kingdom (the territory of Romania before 1918) and this was often felt during interactions, too.¹⁷ However, as time passed following the dissolution of Hungary, their different socialization paths set a distance between Hungarians from Hungary and in the successor states.¹⁸ The interactions also revealed an unceasing difference regarding what constituted

¹⁵ Dietmar Müller: *Staatsbürger auf Widerruf. Juden und Muslime als Alteritätspartner im rumänischen und serbischen Nationscode. Ethnonationale Staatsbürgerschaftskonzepte 1878–1941*. Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz Verlag, 2005.

¹⁶ Constantin Iordachi: *Citizenship and National Identity in Romania. A Historical Overview, Regio–Minorities, Politics, Society*, 2002, 3–34; Franz Sz. Horvath: *Zwischen Ablehnung und Anpassung: Politische Strategien der ungarischen Minderheitselite in Rumänien 1931–1940*, München, Verlag Ungarisches Institut, 2007; Hildrun Glass: *Zerbrochene Nachbarschaft. Das deutsch-jüdische Verhältniss in Rumänien 1918–1938*, München, Oldenbourg, 1996.

¹⁷ Livezeanu: *Cultural Politics*, 154–155.

¹⁸ See Gábor Egrý: *Az erdélyiség*, also László Szarka: “Nádi élet”, “eltűnt gondolatok”. Szlovákiai magyar önértelmezések az első bécsi döntés idején, *Fórum Társadalomtudományi Szemle*, 9, 3, 2007, 51–63; Tamás Gusztáv Filep: Felföldi közirók a magyarországi állapotokról, in Nándor Bárdi – Attila Simon (eds.): *Integrációs stratégiák a magyar kisebbségek történetében*, Somorja, Fórum Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 2006, 139–154.

ethnically determined behavior (part of and deriving from the essential national character). Sometimes public/private division gained significance as ethnicity was for a while more tolerated in private than in public settings (or the same act was considered ethnic in public and non-ethnic in private), but different interpretations of where this boundary lies recast events from one category to the other. Finally, traditional norms and values, including loyalties, survived the change of sovereignty and not only among Hungarians. If these deviated from the expectations concerning proper ethnic behavior¹⁹ or ran counter to the uncontested dominance of loyalty to one's own nation, one conclusion was easy to draw: they represented another ethnicity. While these factors affected every social milieu, there were important differences between the middle-class environment and the world of the lower classes. Therefore, in the subsequent sections, I will assess them separately, especially as the nationalizing state posed different expectations towards their members.

Everyday (and political) regionalism within the world of the middle-classes

The most elaborate practices of difference were present within middle-class milieus. This is hardly surprising, given the somewhat vague nature of the group, including noblemen, landowners, managers, members of the liberal professions, private officials with at least secondary education, well-to-do businessman, aspiring smaller entrepreneurs, teachers, priests, public officials, most of the former political and administrative elite and the group of heterogeneous background benefitting from the social transformations during and after WWI. Diversity was reflected in their practices too, and those with or aspiring to a higher social status were eager to signal their aspirations with "appropriate" behavior.

However, different trajectories of socialization (not only political) resulted in different Transylvanian and Old Kingdom customs. While the use of public spaces for public and private purposes alike was common (from enjoying different forms of leisure to participating at festive events), what people did and how they did it was often a suitable way to express very subtle differences. It is also true that these were the most visible aspects of everyday ethnicity and regionalism, not least because they happened in front of the eyes of society.

Public spaces were situated at the boundary of public and private, enabling the expression of both varieties of everyday ethnicity and regionalism. Attending restaurants, coffeehouses, casinos, clubs, festivities and music or

¹⁹ Pieter M. Judson: *Guardians*, Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities".

sports events was a favorite pastime in Transylvania. In most cases elements of high and popular culture were on display in various forms (from specialist productions to individual singing), and being often associated with national culture, it was almost natural to see such practices as expressions of ethnicity. In Transylvania such occurrences clustered around performances of gypsy bands, the playing and singing of the Hungarian national anthem and the reception of more recent, fashionable music, especially operettas.

The gypsy bands were quite common in dualist Hungary and the Old Kingdom, too. However, their repertoire was different, and even though the bands themselves hurried to learn the pieces favored by the Old Kingdom Romanians, what was ordered by and what was played for the audience distinguished people. Songs considered Hungarian and played in a pub or coffeehouse often induced denunciation and arrests. But the involvement of prominent Romanians often made those cases strange.²⁰ Sometimes it was reported that Romanians opted for Hungarian songs out of defiance towards their kin from the Old Kingdom.²¹

Ethnic difference was not the only hurtful aspect of such situations. Social hierarchy was considered in ethnic terms in dualist Transylvania, Hungarians being the elite and middle-class (the rulers), Romanians the peasant folk.²² Therefore, so-called Hungarian practices also signified social position, and deprivation of or exclusion from those meant decline in social terms, too. Probably this was the reason why the prefect of Mureş-Turda (Maros-Torda) wanted to expel a famous gypsy band from the city of Târgu Mureş (Marosvásárhely) after its leader refused to play for him. The band leader explained that he was hired by a military officer for exclusive service that evening, which added insult to injury.²³

Playing, listening to and occasionally singing the Hungarian anthem was a curious and complex affair. Mostly representing a more solemn register, it was also part of worldly leisure activities; gypsy bands often played it during drunken nights, while the gentlemen sang along. Thus, it represented the hybrid nature of public spaces, while signifying middle-class status. However, being the official anthem of a foreign country, its public performance was suspicious, frequently banned, and treated as an expression of Hungarian

²⁰ A group arrested in Făgăraş (Fogaras), for example, turned out to be the local leadership of the Romanian National Party. Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (Central Archives of the Hungarian National Archives – MNL OL) K28 4. cs. 10. t. 1923-T-85, "A romániai magyar kisebbség sérelmei", 1922, December 24–25.

²¹ Arhivele Naționale Sectia Județeană Mureş (ANSJ MS), Fond Prefectura Mureş, inv. 466, dosar 5/1922, f. 6.

²² Nicoleta Hegedűs: *Imagineamagharilor în cultura Românească din Transilvania (1867–1918)*, Teza de doctorat, Cluj-Napoca, Univeristatea Babeş-Bolyai, 2010.

²³ Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale (ANIC) Consilul Dirigent (CD) Sectia Prezidială, dosar 2/1922 75. f.

national sentiment. But the social could overcome the ethnic in this case too, as happened with the director of the state gymnasium in Târgu Secuiesc (Kézdivásárhely). He was enjoying a merry evening with some Romanian and many Hungarian gentlemen from the predominantly Hungarian town. At one point he called for the gypsy band to start playing the Hungarian anthem, and after the band leader refused to do it due to the fear of official retribution, the director slapped his face.²⁴

Not only did these dualist-era customs offer a chance for Romanians to indulge in non-Romanian practices, but due to tastes developed before 1918, more recent products of Hungarian culture were well received in Transylvania. A group of tourists from Bucharest had a firsthand experience of this in Braşov (Brassó, Kronstadt), in the modern building of the Hotel Aro in 1932. The travelers had decided to descend to the city from the nearby mountain resort of Predeal and arrived when the band of the local mountaineer regiment was playing. The scene was mortifying because locals, irrespective of their nationality, celebrated when the band played the song “32-es baka vagyok én” (I’m a private from the 32nd regiment). Although the song refers to a military unit (the court regiment of the Hungarian kings), and therefore it was often banned by the State Security, it was of more recent stock, composed in 1928 as part of an operetta. Nevertheless, a military band playing it among popular enthusiasm was shocking enough to result in a denunciation.²⁵

In all of the above cases, Romanians from the Old Kingdom encountered behavior that they associated with non-Romanian ethnicity – from people who were otherwise “reliable” Romanians. Such subtle differences between Romanians made the definition of Romanianness problematic. The events were not necessarily the result of deliberate exclusion or inclusion; often the dynamics of social hierarchies led to incidents. Nevertheless, people were capable of using such practices deliberately, effectively redrawing the boundaries *within* their own ethnic group. The use of customs associated with another ethnicity also meant a transposition of the ethnic boundary too, setting a new one between Romanians and Romanians and redefining what constituted Romanianness and what was truly non-Romanian.

From the many opportunities to illustrate this development, I have selected two, a festive dinner and a serenade. While neither was an ethnic practice in itself, certain circumstances could make both of them the expression of exclusion from and inclusion into a specific group. Serenades were quite common in dualist Hungary, often given in admiration of public figures by

²⁴ ANSJ MS Direcția Regională Ministeriul Afacerilor Interne Mureş / Autonomia Maghiară (Dir. Reg. MAI MAM), inventar 1235, dosar 2899, 23. f.

²⁵ ANIC Direcția Generală a Poliției (DGP) dosar 56/1921 200. f. The song quickly made an international career; it had been sung by Willy Fritsch in the German movie “Melodie des Herzens” already in 1929.

the local or national society. Politicians, acclaimed artists or scientists were regularly honored by music in public and a gathering of the local notables. The music played could range from classical pieces to “national” ones. Festive dinners had a similar function, the expression of reverence for a public figure, and even though there was great variety, they were often more downscaled and enclosed events, farther from the public.

When the Hungarian Calvinist public of Sighetul Marmăției (Máramarossziget) decided to honor the county prefect with a serenade, on the surface it was only a typical gesture. But in the Romania of 1935, in the context of Maramureș county (Máramaros), it held many subtle layers of meaning. The occasion was the inauguration of a new flag of the Calvinist Singing Association (Dalárda), a traditional custom from the dualist era. But the prefect was a Greek-Catholic, Gavriła Mihali, member of the Bucharest-based National Liberal Party, while the songs performed were Hungarian ones. At a first glance, a typical Romanian official earned this honor of a serenade only due to his official status. However, the Mihalis had a Hungarian noble title, one they were extremely proud of, and Gavriła himself served dualist Hungary as a district chief up to 1918 when his relatives were MPs of the governing liberal parties. Therefore, later, he was often accused of fraternization with Hungarians, to the extent of venerating the Saints of the Árpád-dynasty.²⁶ Thus, for some observers, this serenade was either the continuation of a custom of the old elite or a signal of how the commonalities of the Hungarian nobility triumphed over Romanian ethnicity.

A year later, the Romanian lawyer, businessman and politician, Aurel Socol, a stalwart of the National Peasant Party in Cluj (Kolozsvár), organized a festive dinner for a guest – from Hungary. Socol was a well-known figure in pre-1918 Cluj too, but he came to prominence after 1919, as the local leader of the Romanian National Party. He served as an MP and deputy-mayor, and upon his death the city council bestowed an honorary grave on him. His guest was, however, not one of his acquaintances from before 1918, but rather a young intellectual from Budapest, Miklós Asztalos, a historian and close collaborator of Pál Teleki. Born in Odorheiu Secuiesc (Székelyudvarhely), he graduated from the University of Budapest and became an important figure of émigré organizations. He was the editor of a history of Transylvania, and figured on the list of dangerous irredentists in the files of the State Security.²⁷ When Socol, an opponent of the Bucharest government, invited him, it was

²⁶ Máramarosban magyarul mulatnak. A román alispánt azzal vádolják, hogy boros fejjel a magyar himnuszt énekelte. *Pesti Napló*, 20 October, 1935, 9; A sighetli református dalárda zászlóavatásának ünnepségei. *Máramaros*, 23 June, 1935, 2.

²⁷ See ANIC DGP dosar 122/1922, 46. f.; ANIC DGP dosar 49/1921 vol. I. 224. f.

not simply an expression of recognition for Asztalos' academic prowess; it was a gesture towards Bucharest: Transylvanian Romanians were capable of acting as equals of the much envied (and detested) Hungarian "gentry".

However, the fact that Mihali was a supporter of the Liberals, while Socol was their opponent, and still both could engage with Hungarians on equal terms, highlights the importance of a common pre-1918 middle-class social background, socialization and traditions. The latter's significance was brought to the fore at several other occasions. The Romanians of Caransebeş protested the removal of the statue of Francis Joseph, they expressed a tradition of loyalty to the Monarch originating from their past as borderers in the Habsburg army.²⁸ The burghers of Târgu Mureş, irrespective of their nationality, kept alive another tradition transcending ethnic boundaries: a public procession dedicated to the former mayor of the city, György Bernády, on his name day. Bernády held the post both before 1918 and in the late 1920s.²⁹ His veneration in the late thirties, among the growing nationalist sentiments engulfing the country suggested that local issues and traditions still counted.

Everyday (and political) regionalism among "ordinary" people

The distinction between "ordinary" people and the middle-class in terms of ethnicity is not without risks. Already contemporaries saw the latter as the "national" class, the real driving force behind the nationalizing society. Nationalism studies confirmed its crucial role in the formation of nations,³⁰ but this conjunction of self-perception and scholarly analyses also raises the scepter of appropriating categories of nationalist politics as categories of analyses. Nevertheless, ethnicity within the middle-class and among lower classes was truly different. This was most clearly revealed by the complaints during the 1930 census, the ones the Hungarian party in Romania intended to submit to the League of Nations as proof of systematic and deliberate fraud during census taking.³¹ Finally, the material was judged insufficient, but it still

²⁸ ANIC DGP dosar 8/1919, 240. f.; Irina Marin: *The Formation and Allegiance of the Romanian Military Elite Originating from the Banat Military Border*, PhD thesis, London, UCL, 2009.

²⁹ Fodor, János: *Bernády György életrajza*, PhD dissertation, Cluj-Napoca, Babes-Bolyai University, 2016.

³⁰ Miroslav Hroch: *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985.

³¹ Attila Seres – Gábor Egry: *Magyar levéltári források az 1930. évi román népszámlálás eredményeinek értelmezéséhez*. Kolozsvár, Nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 2011, For the complaint mechanism of the League of Nations see Eiler, Ferenc: A népszövetségi

betrays that most of the problems were reported by middle-class Hungarians active in Hungarian social and political life. Lower class individuals were mostly reluctant to protest or indifferent.³²

But the general stance of “ordinary” people was not simply national indifference. Ethnicity was present within these milieus and people were quite aware of differences, even if they did not invoke ethnicity every time external observers would have done so. Music was, not surprisingly, one of the means to perform differences, especially as the pre-1918 popular culture had an impact on tastes here, too. It was also notable that most radio apparatuses belonged to minority citizens; their ratio among applicants for radio permissions was often double that of their share among the population of the respective administrative units. They often tuned in to Budapest or Berlin, readily sharing this leisure time joy with fellow villagers or neighbours.³³

However, most of the practices highlighting a difference *within* an ethnic group were different from the ones observed among the middle-class. The Romanian popular dance, for example, the hora was one of the customs specific to and associated strongly with Transylvanian Romanians, and one of these was composed and danced as the so-called “Hora unirii”, the hora of unification, to commemorate the events at the end of 1918. One can imagine how astounded the authorities were to learn that relatively soon after the establishment of Greater Romania, Transylvanian peasants used this dance to express their discontent with the general situation, which they blamed exclusively on the Old Kingdom Romanians.³⁴ Dancing was often complemented by short songs that were aimed at slighting the Old Kingdom Romanians, usually playing on the theme of extreme high prices.

Another subtle means of excluding Old Kingdom Romanians was to transpose ethnic stigmata attached to Transylvanian Romanians by non-Romanians. Besides the many degrading adjectives (filthy valah, stinking valah, valah scrounger etc.) the most common of them was the term: mămăligator, polenta eater or glutton. At first sight not as harmful as the others, it was actually a very strong insult. Corn was not part of the diet in Hungary proper, it was rather used to feed pigs, and when it was added to bread, during the first year of World War I, it caused such intense discontent and complaint that the practice was abandoned after the second war harvest.

nemzetközi kisebbségvédelmi rendszer működése az első években, in Nándor Bárdi – Csilla Fedinec – László Szarka (eds.): *Magyar kisebbségek a 20. században*, Budapest, Gondolat, 2009, 60–62.

³² Seres – Egrý: *Magyar levéltári*, 45–47.

³³ ANIC DGP dosar 17/1931, 29–43, 4/1925, 197–198.

³⁴ ANIC DGP 56/1921, 57–59.

But this cereal was very suitable for the Transylvanian climate and popular in the Old Kingdom as food for humans. Thus, the stigma sharply highlighted the social and cultural superiority of Hungarians.

It is therefore not very surprising that sometimes Transylvanian Romanians applied this stigma to Old Kingdom ones. A primary school teacher from Lugoj, for example, burst into the office of the head of the local branch of the State Security in November 1928. It was during the days of the fall of the liberal government and shortly before Iuliu Maniu was installed as the new prime minister. The head of State Security sent reports to Bucharest radiating a sense of urgency because of the insults suffered by Old Kingdom Romanians on the streets of the city in broad daylight, too. The apogee of the disturbances was the drunken schoolteacher entering the room and shouting at the police officer: Polenta eater, go back to your polenta [to the Old Kingdom]!³⁵ With this gesture, the schoolteacher not only excluded the State Security officer from his own group, but weakened – or probably completely erased – its boundaries towards Hungarians, too. Using a stigma that was otherwise a “Hungarian one”, that is, it was commonly applied by ethnic Hungarians to Transylvanian Romanians of any social status, it meant he was implicitly aligning himself with the Hungarians and creating a new, hybrid group of Transylvanians.

While this transposition of stigmas happened mainly due to the lack of their own referential terms (stigmas) for Romanians (they were never really significant others, like Hungarians or Germans were), insults of other kinds were very common in public, the most often reported being in connection with the trains. They were frequently embedded into more general references and comparisons with the past, usually painting dualist Hungary more favorably than Greater Romania. A reason to complain was more than enough, and there were many: the trains were running slow, the tracks in an awful state, houses were requisitioned for the new personnel from the Old Kingdom, money (from Austro-Hungarian Korona to Romanian leu) was exchanged unfavorably, the arbitrary conduct of new public officials, cronyism, nepotism and most of all corruption and graft. At one point the public opinion in the Banat was so negative that local mayors justified their own corruption simply by pointing out what was going on at higher levels of the administration and especially in Bucharest.³⁶

But it was not just the alienating effect of an inefficient, corrupt, arbitrary administration that caused Romanians to drift apart. People from different regions held different loyalties, and some of these were opposed to the one

³⁵ ANIC DGP dos. 56/1921 173. f.

³⁶ Gábor Egry: Crowding Out. Experiences of Difference, Discourses of Identity and Political Mobilization in Interwar Transylvania, *Studia Universitatis Cibiniensis, Series Historica*, IX, 2012, 215.

expected by the state: Romanian nationalism. The violent events in the city of Câmpeni, in the center of the mythical Țară Moților (Mócvidék) in western Transylvania, in the early 1930s revealed some interesting varieties of loyalty of the local Romanians. Adherents of the two dominant parties, the Transylvania-based (Romanian) National Peasant Party and the Bucharest-based National Liberal Party, fought each other in the town. Although it was the home turf of the National Peasantists, following a violent incident in 1932, when the former mayor of the city, Ion Andreica, had to shoot his pistol, a few members of the Peasant Party's paramilitary youth organization, the Voinici, were sentenced to prison. Dissatisfied with the ruling, two of the condemned resorted to the last chance, a clemency petition to the king, Carol II.³⁷

The document reveals a mindset and identification very much at odds with the traditional understanding of Greater Romania as the realization of the uniform will of all Romanians. It resorted to an emotional argument that was supposed to transmit to its reader how devoted they were to the cause of the National Peasant Party. They described themselves as life-long faithful fighters of the party against the thieves and bandits pillaging the country – but the petitioners were too young to mean with this phrase anything else than the National Liberals, often denounced with such phrases. After their signatures they added the phrase “Great-grandchildren of Horea”, leader of a peasant revolt in the mountains in 1784, for a long time understood as the first eruption of anti-Hungarian Romanian national sentiment.

Still, the most telling point was what was absent from the text initially and added later. The petitioners claimed that they received punishment because: “in the past, just as in the present we defend our beloved National Peasant Party.” Someone later added a single word in front of the party's name: king. Combined with an explicit mention of Iuliu Maniu in the original as the focus of their devotion, it shows a radical negligence towards more traditional forms of loyalty, to the king and the country. A marked deviation from the canonical – and state-promoted – version of interwar Romanian nationalism³⁸, it still was not “national indifference”. The way they framed themselves was unmistakably Romanian; both Horea and Maniu, with whom they established an emotional connection, were heroes of the struggle with Hungarians. The description of the event – with references to a mass demonstration of the party at the mythical location of Alba Iulia³⁹ on May 6, 1928 – tapped into the

³⁷ ANIC Ministerul Justiției (MJ) Direcția Judiciară, inventar (inv.). 1117, dosar 102/1932, 3–4, 7–8. f.

³⁸ See Maria Bucur: *Heroes and Victims. Remembering War in Twentieth Century Romania*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2008, 98–142.

³⁹ Gábor Egrý: “An Obscure Object of Desire. The Myth of Alba Iulia and its Social Functions, 1918–1940,” in Claudia Florentina Dobre – Christian-Emilian Ghița (eds.): *In Search of Better Times. Myth and Memory in Eastern and Central Europe*, New York–Budapest, CEU Press, 2017, 11–27.

tradition of national revolution in 1918 against Hungarian rule. Thus, they drew a line separating themselves from the traditional significant others, Hungarians, and did it as Romanians, but they also excluded the Old Kingdom from the national community, to the extent that they renounced loyalty to the ruler and implicitly to the country. Their home and homeland was the NPP, the destined national leader Iuliu Maniu.⁴⁰

(EVERYDAY AND) POLITICAL: REGIONALIST DISCOURSE AND EVERYDAY REGIONALISM

The above examples demonstrate amply the widespread use of certain practices to draw a boundary separating themselves from Old Kingdom Romanians even *within* the supposedly unitary Romanian nation. The most important feature of these cases was – from the perspective of regionalism – how much they coincided with everyday ethnicity, how often elements associated with Hungarian-ness served for the differentiation between Romanians. Therefore, at least during these encounters, the otherwise seemingly clear and stable national boundaries became blurred, Transylvanian Romanians were regrouped with Hungarians (but not as Hungarians) and Old Kingdom Romanians excluded from this new group. It was not necessarily a stable and lasting arrangement, rather situational and contingent, dependent on the presence of Old Kingdom Romanians as a common outgroup or alterity. As soon as the “common enemy” disappeared, the Hungarian-Romanian national boundary was easily reinstated, although with other means and practices than the ones used to exclude Old Kingdom Romanians.

This temporary, often feeble social space was, however, reflected and stabilized in a specific political discourse, that of Romanian regionalism. Since Transylvania joined Greater Romania, political regionalism played an important role among Romanian parties. Transylvanian political figures as individuals or as leading figures of Old Kingdom parties (most notably in General Alexandru Averescu’s People’s Party) and the Transylvania-based Romanian National Party promoted different varieties of a less centralized nation state. After 1926, when the Romanian National Party merged with the Peasant Party from the Old Kingdom, the new National Peasant Party became the main proponent of regionalism. Its chairman, Iuliu Maniu, formed a cabinet in late 1928, and the party was in government until 1931 and again

⁴⁰ Egrý: An Obscure Object.

in 1932–1933. Later, it was seen as the natural alternating party of the still dominant National Liberals, although the king, Carol II, manipulated both parties for his own advantage in his quest for a more authoritarian regime.⁴¹

While the personal composition of the party changed significantly and many prominent figures of the dualist era and the early 1920s left for rival organizations (Vasile Goldiș and his group to the People's Party in the mid-1920s, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, former prime minister, to establish his own, radical nationalist *Frontul Românesc* in 1934), even these “renegades” were eager to establish their own regionalist credentials in their new positions.⁴² Thus, regionalism never ceased to be promoted and its discourse was one of the most important alternatives to the discourse of the centralized nation state.

In this endeavor, regionalists had to delineate their own group both from Old Kingdom Romanians and from Hungarians (at least those from Hungary), too. They needed to find discursively the space that so palpably existed within the middle-class and among “ordinary” people in geographic Transylvania. In this effort, they relied on similar models to those of everyday regionalism. However, contrary to the situational and contingent everyday form of regionalism, its discursive variety had to offer the vision of a more stable regional group, which was simultaneously part of and different from the Romanian nation, as it had to situate Transylvanian Romanians vis-à-vis Hungarians and Germans too, and this required preservation of national boundaries.⁴³

Without a detailed analysis of the regionalist discourses, let it suffice to point out only those important elements that served to delineate Transylvanians from non-Transylvanians, Romanians from non-Romanians, and the various groups these efforts created. Throughout this process the discursive constructs often shifted alterities from one group to another with the application of analogous or identical traits – similar to the practice of transposition of stigmas. Hungarians, traditionally, were not only associated with a feudal oligarchy, but with Asian origins, based on the resilient idea of the Hunnish, and later in the 19th century the Turkic/Turanian origins of Hungarians or at least the nobility,⁴⁴ hinting at their uncivilized and uncultured – violent, harsh, brutish – nature.⁴⁵ However, when it came to finding the right stereotypes for the Old Kingdom elite – holders of western style aristocratic titles, but mainly of boyar and Phanariot

⁴¹ See Livezeanu: *Cultural Politics*, 130–134; Florin Müller: *Metamorfoze ale politicului Românesc*, Cluj-Napoca, Argonaut, 2015.

⁴² See Gábor Egrý: *An Obscure Object*, 19–21.

⁴³ See Gábor Egrý: *Minority Elite, Continuity, and Identity Politics in Northern Transylvania. The Case of the Transylvanian Party*, in Viktor Karády – Zsuzsanna Borbála Török (eds.): *Cultural Dimensions of Elite Formation in Transylvania 1770–1950*, Cluj, EDRC, 2007, 186–215.

⁴⁴ Ildikó Farkas: *A magyar turanizmus török kapcsolatai. Valóság*, 60, 6, 2007, 31–48; Ildikó Farkas: *A turánizmus, Magyar Tudomány*, 157, 7, 1993, 860–868; Balázs Ablonczy: *A turanizmus*, Budapest, Jaffa Kiadó, 2016.

⁴⁵ Nicoleta Hegedűs: *Imaginea maghiarilor*.

origin –, the negative characterization of Byzantinism was quite handy. It explained everything: the nepotism, the inefficiency of the administration or diplomacy, the corruption⁴⁶. But such a characterization could have resulted in very different boundaries. The Balkanism of Greater Romania was, for example, a permanent trope of Hungarian revisionist propaganda and of the complaints about Old Kingdom Romanians among minority Hungarians too, thus, uniting Hungarians with Transylvanian Romanians. However, it was also possible to effectively amalgamate Hungarian feudalism with the Byzantine oligarchy as essentially identical groups – oppressors of Romanian peasants wherever they lived. This was not just an abstract construct; representatives of the National Liberal Party often helped Hungarian aristocrats in Transylvania against Romanian peasants, and these cases gave a good pretext to highlight how the Hungarian and Romanian oligarchy was united even in everyday life.⁴⁷

Very often, however, the argumentation denied the Romanianness of the Old Kingdom elite. This was again easy to do, as most of these families had Greek, Bulgarian, Aromanian, Macedonian or even Polish origins, making them representatives of ethnic strangers within. This way, Transylvanian Romanians were not forced to choose between Hungarians and Old Kingdom Romanians, and both groups being ethnic others, the authenticity of Transylvanian Romanianness was firmly established.⁴⁸

Another important element of discursive delineation, which also tackled the issue of authenticity, was the liberation of Transylvania. Throughout the twenties and early thirties, National Liberal Politicians frequently asserted that the liberation of Romanians arrived with their bayonets. Transylvanian politicians, however, pointed out their own revolution within Hungary which not only preempted any military liberation, but served as a factor of the

⁴⁶ Livezeanu: *Cultural Politics*, 134; Gábor Egry: A Crossroad of Parallels. Regionalism and Nation-Building in Transylvania in the First Half of the Twentieth Century, in Anders E. Blomqvist – Constatin Iordachi – Balázs Trencsényi (eds.): *Hungary and Romania Beyond National Narratives. Comparisons and Entanglements*, Oxford–Frankfurt, Peter Lang, 2013, 239–276; 265–266.

⁴⁷ The daily *Românul* published an article on the situation in the village of Săvârșin (Soborsin), in county Arad in December 1927. The newspaper asserted that the local landowner, Count Hunyady, retained a significant part of his possessions in the village itself after the agrarian reform due to the assistance of the liberals. Even such benefices were returned to him as the market fees, or trade duties. In exchange, he socialized with the liberal grandees of the area. The article concluded that “at innumerable occasions it was proven that the oligarchy is in fact international, like bolshevism. So, our national/liberal oligarchy gave its hand to the Transylvanian Hungarian oligarchy which supports the liberals at the elections, and in exchange the liberals help them to preserve their medieval privileges and to keep the peasants further under the rule of the counts (grofilor). A typical case of such complicity of these two oligarchies for subjugating Romanian peasants is the case of the renegade count Hunyady, from Săvârșin, county Arad. This count, who rejects his definitely Romanian ancestry, lives in our country on his own estate” together with the local Romanian oligarchs. Feudalizmul National-liberal, *Românul*, 25 December 1927, 4.

⁴⁸ Egry: *Crossroad*, 264–269; Egry: *An Obscure Object*, 22–24.

democratization of Greater Romania, contrasted to the limited political system of pre-1914 Romania (and dualist Hungary). Interestingly, the socialization and noble origins of some of the leading Transylvanian Romanian politicians served as an argument in this debate on behalf of Transylvanians claims. (Maniu or Vaida-Voevod, for example, were descendants of Greek Catholic families with a Hungarian noble title.) In one heated parliamentary exchange of words then-prime minister Vaida-Voevod went as far as asserting that he need not be liberated by anyone as he had been a free man his whole life, just as his noble family, which had held its noble title since the 14th century. Curiously, such an argument made Vaida-Voevod a member of a group otherwise detested: the Hungarian feudal oligarchy; and it cast him in a favorable light as regards the Old Kingdom liberals. In a sense, the assertion was based on the common superiority of Transylvanians and underpinned the authenticity (as being more European) of the Transylvanian Romanians.⁴⁹

At one point, even the assumption of the liberation of the Old Kingdom by Transylvanian Romanians appeared: the liberation of the Old Kingdom peasantry by the Transylvanian educated middle-class and the elimination of the remnants of feudalism. This logic created another in-group composed of Transylvanian Romanians and Old Kingdom peasants, this time successfully excluding both Hungarians and Old Kingdom liberals. But while it satisfied the need to delineate Romanians from all non-Romanian groups, including the Old Kingdom elite, it was based on a more ethnicist interpretation of the nation and on growing personality cult around Iuliu Maniu's figure, the strength and social reach of which was illustrated by the clemency petition of the Moți.⁵⁰

CONCLUSIONS

In the end, all of these discursive constructs revolved around one significant issue: authenticity *within* the nation. As a classic means to assert political superiority from the periphery over the center, Transylvanians mobilized many tenets to make it successful. Transylvania was the cradle of Romanians; it preserved the purest of their breed (the Moți), and they had their own, authentic Romanian history, featuring Horea, Cloșca and Avram Iancu. When this was confronted with the alternative discourses, however, their final argument was civilizational superiority – due to the Central European character of the Monarchy that was represented by commonalities with Hungarians. While it did not eliminate the Hungarian outgroup from the system of alterities, it definitely created ambiguities, but also the flexibility

⁴⁹ Livezeanu: *Cultural Politics*, 134.

⁵⁰ Egrý: *An Obscure Object*, 22–25.

to draw and redraw the boundaries according to popular experiences and political expediency, leading to a situationality of the discourse, a quality that was crucial at the level of everyday regionalism as well.

While in this paper I have analysed the Romanians, their efforts were helped by the fact that they were not alone with their endeavor to deal with everyday regionalism – the experience of difference towards co-ethnics, too. Hungarians, even before 1918, set up a regionalist program and the interwar years reinforced the sense of difference towards co-ethnics. First, among those who visited Hungary and did not find there the enthusiasm for minority Hungarians they had expected, and second after 1940, among the Hungarians in Northern Transylvania, who had many reasons to complain over the new administration and its leaders from the “mother country”. The latter, post-1940 discontent found its political expression in the existence of the Transylvanian Party and its regionalist program, which went so far in late 1943 as to demand a separate radio and academy of sciences – typical national aspirations. Its political discourse featured most of what appeared in the Transylvanian Romanian one positioning Transylvanian Hungarians as more authentic, more ethical ones than their kin from Hungary proper.⁵¹

This repositioning had already started during the early thirties and in that period it resulted in symbolically uniting Transylvanian Romanians and Hungarians as pioneers of social progress and national renewal within their respective nations.⁵² However, after 1940, neither of the regionalist forces wanted to preserve this ambiguous and amorphous potentially common group as their main enemy became the traditional ethnic others: Romanians and Hungarians. Without help from their nation states neither one had realistic hopes of preserving or reestablishing its supremacy in Transylvania. The feeble but even in the everyday palpable Transylvania suddenly disappeared; regionalism had lost at least its political arm. But before 1940, the peculiarities of the region created the preconditions of the emergence of a dynamic social phenomenon and its political expression that challenged the traditional understandings of nations and ethnicity at every level of society.

⁵¹ See Gábor Egyri: *Az “erdélyiség”*; Zsolt K. Lengyel: *A kompromisszum keresése*; Oláh Sándor: *Gyakorlati gondolkozásmód és megmerevedett etatizmus (1940–1944)*, *Korall*, 18, 4, 2004, 98–112; Sándor Oláh: *Kivizsgálás. rások az állam és a társadalom viszonyáról a Székelyföldön*. Csíkszereda, Pro Print, 2008; Sárándi Tamás: *Levezényelt visszacsatolás. A magyar katonai közigazgatás Észak-Erdélyben, 1940*, Csíkszereda, Pro Print, 2016.

⁵² Gábor Egyri: *Etnicitás, identitás, politika. Magyar kisebbségek nacionalizmus és regionalizmus között Romániában és Csehszlovákiában 1918–1944*, Budapest, Napvilág, 2015, 89–103.

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RE-DRAWN BORDERS – REDRAWN IDENTITIES?
VISIONS ON THE NEW POLISH STATE AND THE
QUESTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE INTER-
WAR POLAND



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ABSTRACT

Changing borders have always had great importance in the mentality of the population. Borders could be the result of decisions coming from outside or a consequence of the struggle of the local population. The Polish case in the inter-war period was an interesting issue as the Republic of Poland was established as a consequence of the First World War and the newly independent state had the chance to focus on the new responsibilities they got after the rebirth of the independent state. The lack of a Polish state, being divided between three great powers in the age of modernization, determined the Polish standpoint towards other nations, too. After a theoretical analysis it is our intention to describe one of the most problematic and important regions, the Polish East, Kresy's position in the Polish identity and the change of this perception within several decades.

Keywords: borders, Polish national identity, political geography

I was in Lithuania and in the Crown [Congress] Poland,
I was in this and that side,
I was here and there;
From the Beskid [Carpathian] Mountains
to the Baltic sea coast,
From Lithuania as far as to Zaporozhia [the Dnieper rapids]
I know the entire Poland.
I know this whole fair tribe, Polish seas, and Polish land,

And the Polish salt;
 And I dream of all this, fantasize,
 And all this is like mine,
 As if I'm Polish king.¹

The Polish identity is based on the historical and cultural heritage of the question of the homeland, the extension of the territory of their state for long decades. Not having an independent state for more than a century, in order to strengthen the ties with the land, the region's poetry served as a very special tool in the 19th and 20th centuries. The poems of Vincenty Pol determined the way of thinking about Poland. His poems *Mohort* and *Pieśń o ziemi naszej* were taught in elementary schools, and the texts of them were printed and hung in the classrooms and both had great importance in the development of the Polish perception regarding the territorial changes and the rebirth of Poland after 1922.² Both of them served as a mental strengthening of the idea of the independence that Poland had lost in 1772 and a verification of the rebirth of the independent status that Poland had gained after the First World War and the Treaty of Riga in 1921.

Territorial attachment and regional identity have always had a great significance in Poland. Thanks to the absence of defined borders, government and institutions of public administration through approximately one and a half centuries, only a common historical tradition, as well as a shared culture, religion and written and spiritual monuments could allow people to experience their sense of belonging. Poets and writers had the chance to increase among their readers emotional ties towards their homeland and to focus on regional or national identity. However, in the Central and Eastern European region in particular, the question of fixed borders or at least the function of borders was not a well-defined issue. In order to understand the problems of the flexible borders in the East it is essential to deal with borders in a wider perspective.

¹ Pol, *Pieśń o naszej ziemi* Biblioteka Uniwersytetu Ludowych, No. 98, Druk Anczyca i spolki, 1919, 35 http://rcin.org.pl/Content/4110/WA51_6929_PANI2286-r1919_Piesn-o-ziemi.pdf accessed 05.04.2017. English version: Serhiy Bilenky: *Romantic Nationalism in Eastern Europe, Russian, Polish and Ukrainian Imaginations*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2012, 19.

² Jacek Kolbuszewski: *Kresy*, Wrocław, Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, 1996, 5–7.

Figure 1. Republic of Poland 1918–1938



Source: <https://universalcuriosity.wordpress.com/2015/02/02/the-innocent-poland/>

The border as a phenomenon got its importance with the birth of the nation state in the 19th century and kept it through several ages. After the First World War, with the collapse and disappearance of the great empires in Central and Eastern Europe, state borders strengthened their separating role. However, the contradictory yet simultaneous functions of walls, borders, and boundaries – to divide and connect, to exclude and include, to shield and constrain – are fundamental to all cultures.³ While mutable borders are a sign of life, closed borders signify ethnic or political division and often literally cause death. As Silberman remarks, even in peacetime borders have often been perceived as dead zones, as peripheral regions separated from the national “core” – its wealth, its power, and the independence of its capital city. When the wall, border, or boundary is closed or remote, these zones usually function as conquered, relatively empty second-class areas.⁴

³ Marc Silberman: *Walls, Borders, Boundaries, Spatial and Cultural Practices in Europe*, New York–Oxford, Bergham Books, 2012, 15–16.

⁴ The Polish Central Industrial Zone is a typical example of this issue. In the interwar period, a Central Industrial Zone was built up in the central region of Poland. As a consequence of the territorial changes based on the agreement in Potsdam in 1945, Poland became pushed towards the West and the Central Industrial Zone remained in the Eastern bordering region of Poland. During the age of Socialism it was subordinated to the necessities of the Soviet

Walls, borders, and boundaries can also be traced far beyond and deeply within the obvious edges of nation-states. They are usually far from being fixed static entities: barrier sites and barrier processes do not solely offer tales of domination and separation.⁵ They are much more than just histories of *surveillance et punier* (control and punish); rather they offer narratives of Foucauldian “anti-discipline” as well as possibilities of identity formation. They are also dynamic spaces of inhabitation that exceed those of the nation-state; they offer possibilities of survival and adaptation and the hope of self-transformation. They may also be understood as activist markers that encourage people to assume “political responsibility for the pursuit of a decent life” extending “beyond the borders” of individual countries.⁶ Henri Lefebvre, the famous French philosopher and sociologist, in his work *The Production of Space* analyzed how modern spaces are the representation of space, the spaces of representation and spatial practice. According to his standpoint, the spaces of representation are “directly lived through in associated images and symbols, and hence [they are] the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’”.⁷

The improvement of national identity in the age of modernization took place in parallel with the development of regional identity. Although the 19th century was the age of the birth of nation states, regarding the position of the nations in Central and Eastern Europe, the monarchies and empires under dynastic order were much more widespread. Thus this determined the fate of the nations living under foreign supremacy; however, at a certain point, it also helped them to strengthen their attempts to achieve autonomous status or later, full independence. By the 19th century, most of the nations living in Central and Eastern Europe faced the problem that Hroch calls “nation building strategy”⁸ that usually began with the realization of national self-consciousness referring to the cultural, linguistic, social and historical attributes of the nation-to-be. That is similar to the phenomenon that appears in Herder’s vision, too, which distinguished nations living within the more-or less defined borders of a nation state and nations that found themselves in the lack of such elements. Accepting the theories of Hechter, who spoke about state building nationalism, peripheral nationalism, irredentist nationalism and unification nationalism⁹, in the Central and Eastern European region at

Union’s market; however, after the collapse of Socialist economic cooperation it became one of the greatest depression zones of Poland and it required tremendous sums to be invested in order to eliminate the cleavages between Eastern Poland and the more developed regions.

⁵ Silberman: *Walls, Borders, Boundaries*, 6.

⁶ *Ibid.* 6.

⁷ Henry Lefebvre: *The Production of Space*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1991, 39.

⁸ Miroslaw Hroch: From National Movement to the Fully Formed Nation, in *The Nation Building Process in Europe*, in G. Balakrishnan (ed.): *Mapping the Nation*, London, Verso, 1996, 79–81.

⁹ Michael Hechter: *Containing Nationalism*, New York, Oxford, 2000, 15–17.

the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, this latter one seemed to be the most widespread approach. However, in order to gain the final target several other elements were also missing which, according to Horch's standpoint, were essential for successful fully-fledged nation building, such as:

1. Development of a national culture based on the local language and its use in education, administration and the economy
2. Civil rights and self-administration
3. Creation of a complete social structure

Although Hroch did not mention it, other additional elements are also necessary for the development of a nation, such as its own interests and values, which should take precedence over all other interests and values, and the problem of independence. As Breully remarks¹⁰, the nation must be as independent as possible, which usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty.

Establishing borders was always a great challenge in the Central and Eastern European region. For many decades, three great powers shared their influential zones over the territories, so it is rather difficult to speak about a common decision based on the interests of the local people. Expressing historical and national claims often led to violent events that usually ended with the brutal intervention of the ruling power warning the insurgents not to oppose the imperial interest by causing instability. As Bialasiewicz's classification describes, decisions about borders are initiated for various reasons: borders can be created from above by the state, which naturally does not necessarily reflect the interests of the local population. Borders can be drawn from outside, too. Usually that happens after the end of a war and in the majority of the examples of past peace treaties, usually only the winners have the chance to express their claims. It is visible from several examples that such decisions seemed to serve only as temporary solutions, and in many cases they served as the roots of further conflicts and lack of cooperation from the hurt partners.¹¹ Borders can also be established from inside as a consequence of national claims; however, that is rather a risky

¹⁰ John Breully: *Nationalism and the State*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1985, 3.

¹¹ From the interwar history of Poland, the conflict between Poland and Lithuania was a very good example of the lack of cooperation. The disputes between Poland and Lithuania arguing over their borders and the territories Poland had managed to gain resulted in the suspension of diplomatic connections between the two states in a period when the threat from both the Soviet Union and Germany in order to extend their influence to this region seemed to be a reality. The consequences of the Treaty of Trianon and the loss of the majority of its territory by Hungary after 1920 also determined the frames of the government's foreign policy. Everything was subordinated to the idea of territorial revision and that was the reason for the mutual suspicion between Hungary and the neighboring successor states.

solution for the ruling partner. Giving autonomous status or even supporting the attempts towards independence can have dual consequences. Getting rid of the insurgent nations and political actors can increase the internal stability of the state and it can serve as an example for the rest of the other nations in their fights for independence. In Central and Eastern Europe, ethnic and political borders did not coincide in the past two centuries and instead of homogeneous structures, multi-ethnic states were in the dominant position.

Another classification of borders focuses on the problem of whether borders are natural or artificial. As in Europe the majority of the borders are a result of international agreement, natural borders appear only in a few cases.¹² Artificial borders were dominant usually as a result of international decisions enforced by the great powers. It was also characteristic of these borders that they usually did not reflect the will of the affected people.

Table 1. The process and the frames of the development of the region

| | | |
|----|-----------------------------------|--|
| 1. | Territorial frames | Creation of borders, identification within the society |
| 2. | Theoretical frames | Territorial symbols, the name of the region |
| 3. | Institutional frames | Institutions, social frames |
| 4. | Institutionalism social frames | Official institutionalism, the birth of nation states |

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From this perspective, the simplest frames are the acceptance of the well-defined territorial sphere. The members of the society can agree with the territorial frames without any obstacle.

The latter issue, the theoretical frames, is a phenomenon that is characteristic in those cases when there is no way to describe the political borders of a given state. This was partly because the national demands and the political decisions are far from each other, or because the previously existing state became divided among other empires, as happened in many cases in Central

¹² Natural borders are usually mountain chains and seas that can divide the different territories from each other. In the historical past, the Carpathian mountains served as natural borders in Central and Eastern Europe. They had the role of defense zones, too. Due to the political events and the decision of the great powers after the First World War, these mountains lost their original defense functions and became divided among the successor states. In nowadays Europe two major natural borders are remarkable: the Alps as the natural border of Italy and the Pyrenees as the natural boundary between France and Spain. Speaking about the Central and Eastern European region, the actual landscape reflects the consequences of several border changes that resulted in a transitional zone between Poland, Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldova and Russia and generated several conflicts, too, which are still recognizable. Frank Davis: *Europe's Natural Borders*, <https://cfrankdavis.wordpress.com/2016/05/23/europes-natural-borders/> accessed on 7th August 2017.

and Eastern Europe, among others in the case of the politically non-existent Poland in the 19th century. The reunification of the II Rzeczpospolita Polska (Republic of Poland) became a reality after the end of the First World War. The transition period between 1918 and 1921 was the proof that national demands and international political decisions were not always in accordance with each other. The new Polish state within the new political borders remained a conflict zone in the interwar period. A significant share of Polish politicians handled the new borders as the greatest reachable extension of Poland while those national groups that were fighting for their independence in accordance with the events of the First World War and the Russian Civil War between 1917 and 1922 felt disappointed as their claims for independence were rejected. The Poles were satisfied with the fact that they gained independence; however, they wanted to extend their territory to the 1772 historical borders, which were not supported by the great powers, by offering the Curzon line as the potential Eastern extension of Poland. After a painful war, the peace treaty in Riga finally guaranteed an extension of the Eastern borders.

The Eastern borders were identified as a historical and symbolic region called Kresy, which obtained a most important meaning for Poles. The importance of the region was based on the general precondition that Kresy stored the roots of Polish identity, the lost historical heritage, the pure tradition of Polish knights and nobility and the territory that meant the Polish past. The name Kresy usually recalls some kind of emotional expression, too. Taking into account the original meaning of Kresy, which is borderland or bordering region, everything was treated as “kresy” where Poles had any disputes regarding the political borders. From this perspective, what Poles understand as “Kresy” was actually that territory that was achieved by Poles after the treaty in Riga in 1921, but which became divided between Russia, later the Soviet Union, and Poland. Kresy, or the Eastern borderland, can be identified as a flat plain located between the European and Asian civilizations which divides Poland from the West and Russia from the East, and as historical events demonstrate, which formed the potential battlefields and marching zones of different armies. Conquerors arrived from the North and from the South; Polish and Lithuanian guards controlled the bordering regions for centuries, which were partly under the supremacy of the Teutonic Order. By the 18th century, the names of the geographic elements still proved the presence of different ethnic groups; however, the Polish language became widespread.¹³ This Eastern periphery became a melting pot of several ethnic groups and religions, which lived among peaceful conditions despite the fact that from time to time different attacks reached the region from different directions. The 19th century, however,

¹³ Anne Applebaum: *Kelet és Nyugat között – Európa határvidékén*, Budapest, Örökség Kulturális Intézet, 2016, 16–17.

stopped the peaceful coexistence of different groups as nationalistic ambitions determined the future of the local population. The First World War complicated this situation even more, as in these confused times different nations wanted to reach a new step in their demands for an independent nation state. The final decision about the borders was created violently by the great powers but before that several fatal events happened in this bordering zone. During the five years of the Russian and Polish War, at least 11 different armies were fighting for the future Ukraine and the last battle in 1920 caused the death of more than 20,000 soldiers.¹⁴ The new borders caused disappointment among both winners and losers and hampered the cooperation among the new states in the next decades. As Churchill remarked, “when the war of giants is over the wars of pygmies will begin”.¹⁵

After 1945 this division disappeared as the entire region remained in the hands of the Soviet Union as a consequence of the 1939 German-Soviet agreement and the Soviet invasion of Poland in September. Thanks to the Potsdam agreement in 1945, after the end of the Second World War in Europe the Eastern regions remained in the hands of the Soviet Union. As a sign of the Polish reaction to these territorial changes, later on *Kresy* meant every territory that was part of Poland but, due to political decisions, had been lost. As Zarycki remarks, “the region was a victim of several recent geopolitical breakthroughs including those in 1914–21, 1939–45 and 2004–7.”¹⁶ Due to the location of Poland, the territory itself belonged to the sphere of interest of both the Russian Empire (later the Soviet Union) and Germany.

Between 1772 and 1795, Poland underwent partition three times and finally, in 1795, the Polish Kingdom disappeared from the political map of Europe. The three empires, the Habsburgs, the Prussians and the Russians treated their Poles in different ways. From among the great powers, the Poles had the most conflicts with the Russians thanks to the pending Polish and Russian historical borders. As Russia gained quite a huge territory from the ever existing Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that was a mixed region both in language and in religion, it caused a lot of conflicts over how to treat the local population that in the 19th century tried to express its own demands and national self-consciousness. Among others, the main reason for the conflict between Poles and Russians stemmed from the different approaches regarding the mental map of these nations: “For both Russians and Poles, Right Bank Ukraine was an integral part of the two conflicting

¹⁴ Ibid. 18.

¹⁵ In Hungarian: Anne Appelbaum: *Kelet és Nyugat között (Európa határvidékén): Örökség Kultúrpolitikai Intézet*, Budapest, 2016, 17. In English: <http://www.quoteauthors.com/winston-churchill-quotes/> accessed on 8th July 2017.

¹⁶ Tomasz Zarycki: *Ideology of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe*, London and New York, Routledge, 2014, 136.

mental geographies that represented the Russian Empire and the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Even after the disappearance of their state from political maps, Poles continued to think in geographical terms of a repartitioned Poland.¹⁷ The Ukrainian lands and the Ukrainian nation were treated in a very special way: “Right Bank Ukraine was just a piece of larger homeland that encompassed three partitioned parts.”¹⁸

As already discussed, the First World War and the hope of the restoration of an independent Poland raised the question regarding borders. Two opposite standpoints were fighting against each other. The first one, the *Realistic standpoint*, became popular among the followers of the ideology of the National Democrats. This vision meant among other things the claim of unification of all Polish territories and building up correct relations with the Russians. According to their view, Poland was the symbol of a nation of Christianity. Although it emphasized Poland as the Saviour of Europe, the church criticized this standpoint. According to the most prominent leader, Roman Dmowski’s vision, Poles were threatened by the surrounding nations and they should remain in one block.¹⁹ His view focused on a homogeneous Polish state with lesser territorial extension.

The other vision, the so-called *Prometheanism*, appeared in Józef Piłsudski’s program. According to this, “Poland’s strength and importance among the constituent parts of the Russian state embolden us to set ourselves the political goal of breaking up the Russian state into its main constituents and emancipating the countries that have been forcibly incorporated into that empire.”²⁰ In his program, he emphasized that the pledge of independence of Poland was strongly connected with the situation of Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus. However, Poland’s aim was to regain the borders of the old Rzeczpospolita: “We regard this not only as the fulfilment of our country’s cultural strivings for independent existence but also as a guarantee of that existence since a Russia divested of her conquests will be sufficiently weakened that she will cease to be a formidable and dangerous neighbour.”²¹ He formulated the federalist project, taking into account that he was dealing with Russian imperialism, which did not consider losing large parts of its territories, Lithuanian and Ukrainian nationalism, the strengthening of Poland’s position and the acceptance of the

¹⁷ Bilenky: *Romantic Nationalism*, 82–83.

¹⁸ Bilenky: *ibid.*

¹⁹ Andrea Schmidt: *Piast vagy Jagello? Lengyelország és Európa*, in Z. Bretter – V. Glied – Z. Vörös (ed.): *Az elkötelezett tanító, tiszteletkötet Csizmadia Sándor 65 születésnapjára*, Pécs, IDResearch/ Publikon, 2012, 119–125.

²⁰ From the Memorandum that was completed as a reaction to the Russian position in the Russian-Japanese war. <http://nowahistoria.interia.pl/drogi-do-wolnosci/news-wojna-rosyjsko-japonska-pilsudskiego-wyprawa-do-japonii,nId,2256066> accessed 09.07.2017.

²¹ <http://nowahistoria.interia.pl/drogi-do-wolnosci/news-wojna-rosyjsko-japonska-pilsudskiego-wyprawa-do-japonii,nId,2256066> accessed 09.07.2017

practical inability to recreate the ethnic boundaries of the former territories of the Republic of Poland.²² Roman Dmowski and his party were supported by the Polish middle class and lower classes and partly by the intelligentsia. The party was anti-Semitic and as its program focused on a homogeneous Polish state, the National Democrats did not just discriminate against Jews, but also Belarusians and Ukrainians. In contrast, Pilsudski's Polish Social Party was willing to grant rights to ethnic minorities, although to varying degrees. National Democrats wanted to expel Jews from Poland and Polishize the Ukrainians and Belarusians through assimilation. In the 1930s there were even more radical views widespread in Poland regarding the homogeneous Polish state. Boleslaw Piasecki and the National Radical Movement even envisioned a Poland with no minorities left: Ukrainians and Belarusians should assimilate. Jews should emigrate and Germans would be the subjects of a population transfer.²³ The interwar Poland, however, was a multi-ethnic state. The four main ethnic minority groups in Poland – Belarusians, Ukrainians, Germans, and Jews – made up roughly 30 per cent of Poland's population and were concentrated predominantly in the East. Based on the statistical data of the 1921 census, Galicia and the parts of the Kresy region were those territories where the percentage of Poles underwent a more or less general decrease and this was explained in certain sections by the fact that the Jews could now declare their nationality.²⁴ As it is visible from the statistical data there was a decrease in the Polish population between 1910 and 1921; however, the share of Roman Catholics increased. As the Polish geographer Romer remarks, this could be a natural consequence of internal migration after the Russian-Polish War and the peace agreement.

Table 2. Changes in Religious and Ethnic Structure of Kresy Based on the Census in 1921

| Province | Poles in % | | Roman Catholics in % | | Hebrews in % | |
|-------------|------------|------|----------------------|------|--------------|------|
| | 1910 | 1921 | 1910 | 1921 | 1910 | 1921 |
| Lemberg | 60.2 | 56.1 | 45.2 | 50.1 | 12.3 | 10.4 |
| Stanisławów | 25.3 | 21.8 | 13.3 | 21.1 | 12.2 | 11.6 |
| Tarnopol | 41.0 | 44.0 | 28.7 | 34.0 | 11.7 | 11.0 |

Edited by the author

Source: http://www.kresy.co.uk/census_demographic.html, Romer, 1921

²² Shannon Williamson: Choosing an Ethnic Group to Target: The Case of the Jewish Minority in Interwar Poland *Germina Veris*, 1, 2014, 32.

²³ *Ibid.* 32.

²⁴ Eugene Romer: The Population of Poland according to the Census of 1921, *Geographical Review*, 13, 1923, 408–412.

Belarusians and Ukrainians were integrated into Poland against their wishes after the First World War.²⁵ Both minorities lived in the Eastern regions, which had belonged previously to Kongress Poland before 1918. In 1918 and 1919 the Poles and the Ukrainians fought against each other in the Polish-Ukrainian War. Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians were fighting for their own separate nation. This helped in the development of their national identity. For a temporary period Ukrainians were able to experience their own statehood but all attempts at a separate Ukrainian state failed. The nationalist Ukrainians founded several organizations that were sometimes quite violent and the members were even willing to kill those Ukrainians who were ready for cooperation with the Poles and Polish officials. Belarusians also established several communities fighting for their independence but their activity was much weaker than in the Ukrainian case.

There were several rebellions between the Poles and the Ukrainians. The reason for these attacks was the fear that the Polish state would force the assimilation of Ukrainians and Belarusians into Polish society by replacing the local language with Polish in schools and by resettling Poles in the Eastern regions, which could lead to the change of the ethnic structure of these territories.

Pilsudski had a more understanding position towards the ethnic minorities living in the territory of Poland. He wanted to show that non-Poles were to be included in the newly independent and free Poland. The situation of the Jews, however, was variable. Anti-Semitism played a large role in Poland and the Jews seemed to be the most hated group. They were treated much worse than the Ukrainian, Belarusian or German minorities.²⁶ The Jews were suspicious in the eyes of the Poles for several reasons. One of them was their special position in the formal Habsburg Monarchy. After the acceptance of the Act on the Emancipation of Jews in 1895²⁷, Jews had the same rights as other ethnic and religious groups. The other reason why Jews seemed to be

²⁵ <http://www.easternct.edu/germinaveris/choosing-an-ethnic-group-to-target-the-case-of-the-jewish-minority-in-interwar-poland/>

²⁶ The German ethnic group had a special position in Poland. As the Western part of independent Poland belonged to the Prussian Kingdom, later to the unified Germany, Poles had to experience the violent and forced Germanisation, the Kulturkampf. The Germans in the interwar period had to experience almost the same although there were several suggestions regarding the German minority. As Williamson mentions, the ultimate goal of the Poles for the German minority in Poland was to send them back to Germany because they did not believe that Germans could assimilate into Polish society. Williamson: *Choosing, Germina*, 13.

²⁷ The process of Jewish emancipation began in the 1840s and went through several stages. The final stage was the Act in 1895 on Emancipation when the Jewish religion was given the same rights as the other historical religions. Actually, this act was a natural consequence of the practice in the late 19th century when more and more mixed (Jewish and Christian) marriages were planned. http://www.holokausztmagyarorszagon.hu/index.php?section=1&type=content&chapter=1_1_3 accessed 09.07. 2017.

suspicious to Polish eyes was their supposed sympathy towards Marxism and Communism and support of Germans. Several pogroms were made against the Jews, and the number of Jewish university students was minimised and any kind of sympathy or support for Jews was discouraged. The National Democrat politicians and supporters were quite active in anti-Semitic activities but Pilsudski and his party were much more tolerant towards them. While Pilsudski and his party enjoyed a wide support from the Jewish population, after his death in 1935, this general tranquil relationship changed at once. Just one year before the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that resulted in the partition of Poland, the Camp of National Unity advocated an economic struggle against Jews.

In addition to these old regional divisions, regional identities became increasingly important for Poles throughout the nineteenth century. As Bilenky remarks, authors even sought to compare and contrast specifically Polish "characters" from different regions. Paradoxically, writers were the advocates of the perception about Polish dominance. Among others the already mentioned Pol and Ignacy Kraszewski expressed their views regarding the extension of Polish dominance. Bilenky remarks that "[s]ome Polish Democrats could emphasize political culture or history as idioms of Polishness in general, but could reluctantly point to Roman Catholicism as a pillar of Polishness to show their difference from "schismatic Russians."²⁸ The question of religious belief, however, highlighted the question of how to treat Catholic ethnic Poles and the Orthodoxian Ruthenians, who, as Bilenky remarks, were considered to be part of a common "Polish nation".²⁹ As he points out, there were no differences among the attitudes of Polish émigré groups on the question of Poland's borders. Their dominant idea was the restoration of Poland according to its 1772 borders, that is, from the Carpathians to the Dvina River and from the Baltic Sea to the lower Dnieper River. Actually, it was the general perception during the First World War that the independent Polish state should insist on this territorial extension. In order to underline this goal, writers and politicians began to emphasize the responsibility for "twenty million" inhabitants.³⁰ This phenomenon later became an almost cabalistic number in Polish nationalist demography, clearly referring to *all* the inhabitants of pre-partitioned Poland and finding its expression both in poetry and in politics among writers of all ideological spectrums.

The permanent structure of the Polish space has remained since the Middle Ages. As Zarycki remarks:

²⁸ Bilenky: *Romantic Nationalism*, 83.

²⁹ Bilenky: *ibid.*

³⁰ This magic number appeared among others in Karl Marx's peach on the future of Poland in 1867. <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867/01/22a.htm>

the historical Polish regions depict the centre-periphery hierarchy in Europe ... in Eastern Poland, many towns had a “private” character, that is, they were not governed by burghers but owned by aristocratic land-owners. The same differentiation that refers to decreasing density from west to east, concerns also all kinds of infrastructure. This important feature of the economic geography of Polish lands is an element of the general logic of the European center-periphery hierarchy.³¹

Furthermore, he remarks that “in such context, the class conflicts were engulfed by the national or center-periphery conflicts defined along issues of national independence.”³²

Analysing the position of the so-called Kresy region, it is worth mentioning Rokkan’s theory regarding the typology of the peripheries.³³ In Polish geopolitical thinking the rise in power of Poland’s Eastern neighbour, and Poles usually have in mind Russia and its other interactions, is treated as a clear threat. This way of thinking may be associated with the construction of modern Polish national identity as well as the adopted Western prejudices against Eastern Europe and a wider East as such.

In the 19th century Polish territories were peripheral areas in relation to the states of all of the occupying powers that determined its locations. The only exception was the Russian-Poland that belonged to the Western bordering region of the Russian Empire, which was located closest to the European core and served as an important transit zone. During the 19th century several uprisings and demonstrations broke out among the Poles from the Russian occupied territories, but they repeatedly ended in failure and were followed by harsh punishments from the Russian administration.³⁴ Russian-Poland was treated in the eyes of the Russian Empire as a buffer zone protecting the Empire from Prussia. In contrast with the position of Russian-Poland (or the Congress Kingdom), the Austrian lands seemed to be the least developed region of the Habsburg Empire.³⁵ Greater Poland under Prussian occupation was also a peripheral region of the Prussian Empire; however, the Prussian modernization also affected the old Polish regions, which benefited from

³¹ Zarycki: *Ideology of Eastness*, 176.

³² Zarycki: *Ideology of Eastness*, 179.

³³ Tomasz Zarycki: Eastern Poland in a center-periphery perspective, in M. Stefanski (ed.): *Strategic issues of the development of the Lublin region*, University of Economic and Innovation in Lublin, Innovatio Press Scientific Publishing House, 95–112.

³⁴ Zarycki: *Ideology of Eastness*, 25–26.

³⁵ “The life of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria was short and sad... and few people mourned its passing.” The largest and most populous crown land of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, occupying a swathe of what is now southeast Poland and far western Ukraine, was also by a large margin its most backward province. <http://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21632438-exploring-myth-galicia-successful-austrian-invention>, accessed 08.07.2017.

the rapid economic growth, but the Russian-Polish lands were in an entirely opposite position.

The word Kresy had symbolic meaning in the age of Socialism. – Amongst émigré intellectuals it expressed that their fight to protect civilization against a despotic and barbaric power, or against Russia, was just. On the other hand, Russian intellectuals were convinced that in the historical past Polish demonstrations were a sign of religious fanaticism and feudal egoism. The image of Kresy which emerges from such debates is almost fully dependent on opinions regarding the heritage of the political system of the First Rzeczpospolita. Attitudes to ideas of both these historical concepts are strongly related to the position of authors in the contemporary intellectual field, structured by the fundamental liberal-conservative cleavage, which is defined by the attitude towards Western domination. For the entire conservative segment of the Polish intellectual field and for a large part of its liberal sector, the ideals of the First Rzeczpospolita remain an important and very positive point of reference for a wide spectrum of debates on the country's modernization.³⁶ According to the more skeptical view, this bordering region, the old periphery of the Rzeczpospolita, had some common elements and linkage to the common tradition of Polish nobility, practically a harsh criticism against the West. This can also appear as nostalgia towards the East as the last bastion of the civilization of the West. Kresy also reflected a mixed region where the Polish, the Belarusian and the Tatar traditions were present with the Lithuanian pagan traditions. It is treated as "a symbol of defending Poland against barbarians from the East but also protecting Europe from Eastern invasion. (From Mongolian hordes to the Bolshevik Red Army)"³⁷ or a Christian defensive wall as Tazbir mentions in his works.³⁸

Kresy nowadays has a controversial meaning. It can serve as a litmus paper of Polish perception towards Europe and the West, but on the other hand, it appears as one of the backbones of Poland's foreign policy doctrine. Accepting the ideology of Kresy a new problem arises: the recognition of the sovereignty of the Baltic states Belarus and Ukraine by Poland is incompatible with the use of the notion of Kresy. The other crucial element is the question of how "Polishness" and Kresy can correspond with each other. If we accept the super priority of the Poles, it is a delicate issue to decide whether that means at the same time the marginalization of other cultures. This still forms a part of the discourse of Polish foreign policy, even though during the interwar period the majority of the historical lands remained beyond the borders of Poland.

³⁶ Zarycki: *Ideology of Eastness*, 120.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 120.

³⁸ Janusz Tazbir has several times referred to Poland as a Christian defense wall since the early 1980s. During the Socialist Poland, this had an additional meaning. In 2004 Tazbir wrote a book under the title *Polska przedmurzem Europy* or "Poland, the defense wall of Europe".

Nevertheless, a similar question appears from time to time: can you be a true Pole if you reject Polish claims towards Kresy? Examining the perception towards this phenomenon, the critical arguments focus on the following: if you accept Kresy you also accept the ideology of Eastness, reject the Western values and support the building of a nationalist counter-narrative of Polish neo-imperial identity.³⁹

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³⁹ Zarycki: *Ideology of Eastness*, 147–148.

THE USE AND THE ABUSE OF THE “NATIONAL TURN” OF THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNIST (1936–1939)

—◀▶—
DÁVID KOVÁCS

ABSTRACT

The so-called popular front policy announced at the 7th Congress of the Comintern in 1935 brought significant changes in the ideology and rhetoric of the communist world movement. One of these changes was that following the turn of 1935, the communist parties such as the Party of Communists in Hungary (KMP) broke with the internationalist tradition, with the so-called “class against class” policy, and started to define themselves as “national parties”, protectors of the national interest and national independence. Also, denial of national history and traditions was no longer supported, as the Hungarian communists started to portray themselves as the heritors of the great traditions of the nation.

My lecture focuses on this ideological and rhetorical turn, examining the practices of how the theoreticians of the KMP tried to propagandize the popular front policy. My aim is to find the answer to when, how and why there came a change in the internationalist ideology that was one of the main features of the movement at its very beginning. The lecture also undertakes to reveal how the Hungarian communist politicians used the national rhetoric for simply tactical purposes. One main characteristic of my approach is that it does not examine the metamorphosis of the Hungarian communist ideology and rhetoric on its own, but it analyzes this phenomenon as an integral part of the Comintern’s politics in the light of changes in Soviet state interests.

Keywords: *communist ideology, nationalism, popular front policy, Party of Communists in Hungary (KMP), national traditions, Comintern, József Révai, György Lukács*

THE “NATIONAL TURN” OF THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNISTS (1936–1939)

I. The background of the popular front policy

The popular front policy owed its existence to Hitler's rise to power; more precisely, to the response that it drew from Soviet policymakers. Following Hitler's accession to power, formerly good German-Soviet relations were corrupted. Although Stalin sought to maintain the former cooperation, it was made impossible by Hitler's openly expressed policy of Eastern expansion and anti-Soviet declarations.¹ All this radically changed Soviet foreign policy orientation. Stalin abandoned his belief that the Soviet Union was being threatened by the coalition of the Versailles victors and its organization, “the counterrevolutionary Holy Alliance of the imperialist states”, that is, the League of Nations, and came to identify Germany as the major menace.²

The Soviets saw the diplomatic means of averting danger in joining the League of Nations and signing the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with France and Czechoslovakia in May 1935.³ The other means was to mobilize European communist parties as the fifth column of the Soviet Union. In line with the

¹ Among Hitler's speeches, particularly worth mentioning is the one he gave at the 1936 party rally in Nuremberg about the acquisition of the mineral resources of the Ural Mountains and the fertile lands of Ukraine: “If we had at our disposal the incalculable wealth and stores of raw material of the Ural Mountains and the unending fertile plains of the Ukraine to be exploited under National Socialist leadership, the German people would swim in plenty.” Quoted in John Lukacs: *The Hitler of History*, New York, Vintage Books, 1998, 145–146.

² Reference to the League of Nations appears in Comintern documents: Programme of the Communist International adopted at its sixth congress (1 September, 1928) in Jane Degras (ed.): *The Communist International. 1919–1943. Documents*, Vol. 2, London, Oxford University Press, 1960, 514–515. In 1930, Stalin gave the following description of France: “present-day bourgeois France...the most aggressive and militarist of all aggressive and militarist countries in the world.” Quoted in Stanley G. Payne: *The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism*, New Haven–London, Yale University Press, 2004, 61. In Comintern materials the Versailles victors were identified as a war threat for the Soviet Union right before Hitler's coming to power: “For the purpose of preparing a counter-revolutionary war against the USSR under the cloak of the peace declarations of the League of Nations and the Second International, there is proceeding the [arming of Japan by the imperialists of Europe and the USA, the] concentration of the Japanese army in Manchuria, the formation and arming of white-guard units in the Far East, and also the organization of an expeditionary army in France...” Extracts from the theses of the twelfth ECCI plenum on the international situation and the tasks of the Comintern sections (September 1932) in Jane Degras (ed.): *The Communist International. 1919–1943. Documents*, Vol. 3, London, Oxford University Press, 1965, 223–224.

³ It should also be added that in addition to conducting public diplomacy, the Soviet leadership never stopped seeking a possible settlement with Germany in the background, as for the Soviet Union the best-case scenario was a total war waged between the “imperialist powers” without her involvement, leaving the capitalist world in a weakened state. These behind-the-scene moves led to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Stalin's endeavors are discussed in: Mikhail Heller – Aleksandr Nekrich: *Utopia in Power. The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present*, New York, Summit Books, 1988, 309–311.

ideology and propaganda reworked by the Kremlin, the communists' new mission was to fight against Fascist Germany and Fascist policy in general, and to protect democratic rights and national independence. For this purpose, communist parties had to seek broad cooperation, a popular front, with social democrats, and with other antifascist and anti-German organizations and parties. The new policy had its test lab in France, and was canonized at the 7th Congress of Comintern, in 1935.

The leading role of the Soviet communist party over other communist parties through the intermediary of the Comintern was not a new development; in fact, it was to be seen as early as the first half of the 1920s. From that time on, according to the opinion of the French historian François Furet, the other communist parties became the tools of Soviet foreign policy. Their function was to protect the "central bastion".⁴ Not only does modern-day commentator Furet come to such conclusions about the role of national parties and the Comintern embracing them, but also many contemporaries did. Trotsky, for example, described this change as the communist parties becoming "frontier guards" of Soviet Russia from being "vanguards of world revolution".⁵

Following the reorientation of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, the Comintern's former concept of enemy, the theoretical dividing line between enemy and friend, and the related rhetoric also changed. According to the Comintern's situation assessment from 1935, the League of Nations is no longer a danger, but a serious impediment to the outbreak of war.⁶ France, which was earlier described as the most aggressive and militant country, now is the best guarantee of the status quo.⁷ It is also stated in the mentioned document that apart from the propaganda for national independence and peace, in case of a German military invasion the communist parties and the working classes must fight together with other parties and other social classes for the independence of their countries.⁸

We can say that with their antifascist, anti-German rhetoric and agitation for peace and independence, the local communist parties tried to transform

⁴ François Furet: *The Passing of an Illusion. The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1999, 211.

⁵ Quoted in Isaac Deutscher: *Stalin. A Political Biography*, New York, Vintage Books, 1960, 392. Trotsky in another of his writings also stated: "At the present time, the Communist International is a completely submissive apparatus in the service of Soviet foreign policy, ready at any time for any zigzag whatever." Leon Trotsky: *The Revolution Betrayed*, Detroit, Labor Publications, 1991, 159–160.

⁶ Extracts from a Resolution of the Seventh Comintern Congress on the Danger of a New World War. Resolutions and Decisions. (20 August, 1935), in Degras (ed.), *The Communist International*, 370.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 373.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 377.

a given nation, a given state into a border guard of the Soviet Union. Effective execution of this mission involved giving up several basic elements of Marxism-Leninism.

II. Changing ideology and rhetoric

Let me start by looking at the elements which were eliminated from the ideology. The first to be discarded was the “class against class” principle, which is not surprising, considering the fact that it had already theoretically excluded any cooperation between the working class and the other social classes in the name of national interests. The new slogans were “popular front”, “democratic front”, “national unity” and “national independence”. In order to expand the border guard they consigned to oblivion the epithet “social fascist” that they had used for social democrats and started to consider them as an integral part of the so-called “united front of the working class”. They also abandoned the idea that fascism is seen as the main trend of development in the capitalist world, a general phenomenon which means that every bourgeois party in every sense, is more or less of a fascist nature. Finally, the civil democracy, which was condemned and regarded as illusionary in the past, became something protectable.⁹

In the 7th Congress of the Comintern, the communists redrew the front lines. Let me start with analyzing how communists “turned into” democrats, or protectors of civil democracy. After the turning point of 1935 it was no longer an increasingly fascist bourgeois world facing the communists and their state, the Soviet Union, but “democratic states and the Soviet Union” confronting fascist states and Germany, in particular. In the light of this new assessment, fascism manifested itself in states, and the Comintern’s theoreticians outlawed earlier perceptions of fascism as a poison running through the veins of the bourgeoisie. On the level of society and national community, differences between “fascist forces” and “democrats”, where the communists now thought that they belonged according to their newly found self-determination, were irreconcilable. There may be no need to highlight the fact that by now the sole criterion for belonging to the “democratic camp” was anti-German sentiment, while to be called “fascist” or at least, to be expelled from the “democratic camp”, it was enough to be anti-Soviet. Naturally, the absurdity of this labeling stems from the logic of playing the role of a Soviet border guard. The new principle of camp formation was announced in the speech by Georgi Dimitrov, the leader of the Comintern, on 13 August, 1935:

⁹ See Furet: *The Passing*, 221–222; Leszek Kolakowski: *Main Currents of Marxism*, Vol. 3, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981, 112.

The situation is quite different in the capitalist countries at present. Now the fascist counterrevolution is attacking bourgeois democracy in an effort to establish the most barbaric regime of exploitation and suppression of the toiling masses. Now the toiling masses in a number of capitalist countries are faced with the necessity of making a definite choice, and of making it today, not between proletarian dictatorship and bourgeois democracy, but between bourgeois democracy and fascism.¹⁰

After the introduction of the popular front policy, local communist parties started to define themselves as the true heritors of democratic ideals, maintainers of emancipation efforts dating from the Enlightenment and the French revolution. In addition, local communist parties also found their historical forefathers in the key figures of the struggles for national independence.¹¹ This was the time in the communist movement when they began to use the national past for political purposes.

History became a tool of the main political message of popular front policy. As Georgi Dimitrov phrased this main message, it is the task of the parties of the proletariat to demonstrate to the masses that they are the "only true fighters of national freedom and independence of the people".¹² Accordingly, the French communists under German threat stepped onto the political stage as faithful defenders of national independence and the French national interest. Their party leader, Maurice Thorez, formerly a devoted supporter of the "class against class" line, extended a hand to the Catholics and to the followers of the conservative Croix-de-Feu.¹³ This example illustrates that the Soviet political interest, as served by the local communists, overrode all theoretical and ideological considerations. Embracing national independence significantly increased the chance of the local communist parties playing the role of border guard.

III. The Hungarian communist popular front policy and "national independence"

The Hungarian communists echoed the Comintern's ideology and so they made a radical, self-defeating turn that the Comintern expected of every section. The transition period had a shaky start, which cost Béla Kun his party

¹⁰ Georgi Dimitroff: *The United Front. The Struggle Against Fascism and War*, San Francisco, Proletarian Publishers, 1975, 111.

¹¹ Martin Mevius: *Agents of Moscow. The Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins of Socialist Patriotism 1941–1953*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, 23.

¹² Georgi Dimitroff: *Working Class Unity – Bulwark Against Fascism*, New York, Workers Library Publishers, 1935, 81.

¹³ Furet: *The Passing*, 539.

leadership. The Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Comintern dissolved the Party of Communists in Hungary in May 1936, and appointed a new party leadership under Zoltán Szántó.¹⁴

From that time on, required propaganda clichés were widely echoed in party materials, articles and publications, with “the greatest danger” and the loss of “national independence” playing a central role in their argumentation. A program article in the July 1937 edition of *Dolgozók Lapja* (The Workers’ Paper) states: “The menace threatening the country is so great that there is no room for procrastination and hesitation. German, Italian and Japanese fascism is throwing a burning torch into the powder keg to set the world on fire. The Hungarian agents of fascism are doing all evil to plunge the people of Hungary into this menacing war.”¹⁵ Another KMP piece of propaganda from 1937 offers a more vivid presentation of “the German menace”: “Hitler’s fascism is seeking to rule over the whole Danube valley. Nazi textbooks identify large parts of Hungary as German territory. Nazi agitators flooding Hungary are speaking before the people of Swabian villages, about their impending liberation by Hitler.”¹⁶

In their party materials the Hungarian communists also declared their aims concerning foreign policy: “The working class is fighting to change the Italian-German-Polish orientated foreign policy, support the actions of the League of Nations against aggressors, and demanding to sign nonaggression pacts with all the neighboring countries, as well as to conduct a policy of friendship with the Soviet Union.”¹⁷

In the communist rhetoric, averting danger calls for cooperation with other political parties and organizations. The cross-party group envisioned by KMP leaders received several designations in the party press. This was called the “popular front”, the “democratic front” and perhaps most often, the “democratic camp”. The need for cooperation made it impossible to maintain the former doctrine that every bourgeois party and social democrats are equally fascist. A so called “letter of comradeship” sent to party members in January 1936 had already stated that opposition parties must not be called fascist and former perceptions of social democrats must be reexamined.¹⁸ The sharpness of the turn is shown by the fact that not long before the political

¹⁴ István Pintér: A Kommunisták Magyarországi Pártja szövetségi politikájának főbb vonásai 1936 és 1945 között, in Henrik Vas (ed.): *A Kommunista Párt szövetségi politikája 1936–1962*, Budapest, Kossuth, 1966, 36.

¹⁵ József Révai: Előre a népfrontért!, *Dolgozók Lapja*, Vol. 1, No. 3, July, 1937, 3.

¹⁶ A körmendi gyűlés in Attila Sipos (ed.): *Népfront Magyarországon. A Kommunista Internacionálé VII. kongresszusa és a magyarországi munkáspártok*, Budapest, Kossuth, 1985, 107.

¹⁷ A Kommunisták Magyarországi Pártja ideiglenes vezetőségének határozata a Kommunista Internacionálé VII. kongresszusa irányvonalának magyarországi alkalmazásáról, in Sipos (ed.): *Népfront*, 58.

¹⁸ Elvtársi levél a KMP és KIMSZ minden tagjához, minden szervezetéhez, in Sipos (ed.): *Népfront*, 44.

turn, György Lukács, one of the most well-known Hungarian communist theoreticians, had declared social democrats to be social fascists in his writings.¹⁹

In Hungarian popular front policy, however, not only democracy was to serve as a basis for the intended partnership but also the buzzwords of patriotic rhetoric. An April 1938 article of *Dolgozók Lapja* called for "national unity, the unity of all Hungarian forces".²⁰ It stated that despite any disagreement in other political issues, it would not destroy unity. The attitude to national history also changed. According to József Révai, who beside Lukács was the other leading theoretician of the Hungarian communists, the example of the 1848 fight for freedom against the Habsburgs must be used as a "weapon" in the fights of the present.²¹ In his historical writings Révai usually labeled the Habsburg dynasty and the Habsburg forces as Germans. Révai loved to create ahistorical analogies between the Nazis and the Habsburgs. He also indicated that communists are the successors of the freedom fighters of the 19th century.²² A few years earlier Révai had stated that the working class has no relation with the fight for freedom, which was led by the Hungarian nobility.²³

It is worth considering how shocking it must have been for some of the devoted communists to see the new party line. Socialist revolution promised collective salvation from the source of all evil, which is exploitation. It had been an inspiring goal for many communists. For them, safeguarding civil democracy and democratic rights which had been deemed formal in the past must have been disappointing. It may have been even more alienating to hear the call for "national unity" to protect the country, which was incompatible with the doctrine of class struggle. In addition, they had to see that their party was urging such groups to join forces that were previously labeled as fascist.

In an attempt to reduce the gap between present and past ideologies, communist theoreticians later tried to make a distinction between "democracy" and "bourgeois democracy". This effort is expressed in the concept of "people's democracy", in use by communists from 1938. Another means of minimizing the ideological discord was for KMP leadership to point out the tactical nature of the change in their materials prepared for internal use. Despite the above mentioned palliative techniques, abandoning the ideals which had

¹⁹ László Sziklai: *Proletárforradalom után. Lukács György marxista fejlődése 1930–1945*, Budapest, Kossuth, 219.

²⁰ István Friss: Igazi nemzeti összefogást!, *Dolgozók Lapja*, Vol. 2, No. 1, April, 1938, 5.

²¹ József Révai: Szabó Ervin és a 48-as magyar forradalom [1936], in J. Révai (ed.): *Válogatott történelmi írások*, Vol. 1, Budapest, Kossuth, 1966, 112.

²² József Révai: Magyar szabadság–világszabadság [1938], in J. Révai (ed.): *Marxizmus, népiesség, magyarság*, Budapest, Szikra, 1948, 167.

²³ József Révai: A 48-as legenda [1932], in Gy. Litván (ed.): *Szabó Ervin történelmi írásai*, Budapest, Gondolat, 1979, 619–620.

shaped the communist world view must have been disastrous for communist party members. Maybe the initial difficulties with the transition sanctioned by the Comintern were related to the unpopularity of the popular front policy.

As already indicated, the popular front policy was designed for France, where it brought considerable success for the communists and for Moscow. While the turn probably led a large number of members to move away from the party, putting a democratic and national mask on the party significantly increased its popularity. Showing commitment to the territorial integrity of France and even becoming the most devoted supporter of national independence eliminated the main cause of their former isolation. The reason for this was that the Comintern's policy before the turn had reduced the influence of communism on French society by agitating against the Treaty of Versailles and for the Alsace people's right of self-determination, even for the separation of Alsace.

Unlike its French counterpart, the Hungarian party that invited the opposition parties to form popular fronts was an almost invisible political party, with an extremely narrow base of support. Moreover, it was outlawed and led from abroad. The parties which the communists invited either did not react or refused the invitation. The newspapers used to convey the political message of the communist party did not reach a broader public. These papers were published abroad and were brought into the country illegally.

Even if the KMP had had access to the appropriate channels, it could not have successfully attracted more supporters, because the party was confronted with public opinion on the question of the national borders, an issue that was considered as fundamental by the general public. The Treaty of Trianon, as part of the Paris Peace Settlement, had redrawn the borders in a way that after the First World War more than three million ethnic Hungarians became citizens of foreign countries. In the interwar period, a general consensus emerged among all the Hungarian parties that the most important national interests were protection of minorities and border revision. Dedicated to preserving the status quo established by the Versailles settlement, the Soviet Union instructed the Hungarian communists to attack border revision policies and encourage political friendship with Czechoslovakia, which was an ally of the Soviet Union. So while in France the Comintern's policy and the underlying Soviet state interests helped pave the way for communists to play the role of the protector of the national interest, in Hungary they made it impossible.

As a conclusion, it can be said that the popular front policy of the Hungarian communists failed due to several reasons. It created confusion and dissent within the party. The national rhetoric designed to win over the broader public was fully discredited, as the foreign policy objectives declared by the communists completely failed to reflect what Hungarian society identified

as being the national interest. The system of lies in the popular front policy ended with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which made the whole ideological construct outdated for some time.

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LITERATURE AND CULTURE



I. LATIN AMERICA

COMPOSITION OF AN IDENTITY. AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS. FIGURATIVE SYNTHESIS OF A JEWISH PERSON: ROMANIA THE NATION; HUNGARY THE LANGUAGE; FRANCE THE CULTURE; ARGENTINA THE HOME



TOMÁS ABRAHAM

Keywords: figurative synthesis of a Jewish person; Romania the Nation; Hungary the language; France the Culture; Argentina the home

It's not easy being Jewish in Argentina, but it was much more difficult being a Jew in Romania and Hungary; not only difficult but impossible. My mother and I were born in Timisoara, my father in Sighisoara. She has Serbian features, my father, a more Germanic appearance. They were bilingual; they spoke Hungarian and German, although I never heard them speak Romanian. According to a family story, the first word I said was "bonat" (vonat), which means "train" in Hungarian. A word, which with an irony of questionable taste, exemplifies what happened to my people in Europe during the Second World War. By one of those miracles of life or fate, my parents, who lived in Timisoara, survived the genocide. The trains that transported the Jews were stationed, so I was told, forty kilometers from the city center.

My father was sent into forced labor, and both my parents had to submit to the segregation imposed by the authorities which restricted their movement and banned them from entering certain areas. They were separated from the rest of their countrymen, but survived.

However, this was not the case for my relatives who remained in Transylvania. They were murdered by the Nazis. The paternal side of the family, the Abrahams, who lived in the towns around Cluj, disappeared without a trace. I have not been able to find out who they were.

My great grandmother on my mother's side was also murdered. I don't even know her name.

My parents taught me Hungarian and not German. My mother did not want me to speak German, due to the events that took place during the war, although she always read in German, and not in Hungarian.

When my parents didn't want me to understand something, they spoke in German. My memory retained a few words that weren't very helpful later on in my job as a philosophy professor: "jaiss", for hot, a warning so that I would drink my soup slowly, "fertig", a signal that we could leave the table, "kistijand", a protocol greeting that my father used with the ladies, "schluz!", to indicate a task was finished... and a few more words.

At twenty-five, my father decided that Stalinism didn't offer him a stimulating future. He had a small factory that manufactured socks, a job taught to him by his widowed mother who had trouble just making ends meet.

My mother came from a bourgeois family. She attended boarding school where she learned basic French and fell in love with my father at fifteen, who in his youth sat at the family table, giving private classes to his fellow classmates and others, like my mother's brother. That's how they met.

My mother's surname is Spitzer, which in German means pencil sharpener, or something sharp.

In 1948, they left Romania, and on October 13th of the same year, they arrived in Buenos Aires. I was one year and ten months old and my parents were in their twenties. My parents didn't talk about Romania. They were not nostalgic. I never heard the word "refugee" or "exiled" at home, we were immigrants, like millions of other Argentinians.

One day, as an adult, I discovered that my birth certificate indicated "protestant". I asked about the reason for this new identity, and my father explained that it was a diplomatic requirement because the quota of Jews that Argentina was willing to accept had been covered.

It was a conversion *ex officio*.

But I am Jewish, I have no doubts. The seal of identity is marked by my paternal surname, Abraham, the founder of monotheism, and is defined by history, because my birth was merely by chance.

The randomness of birth is determined by genetics, because we are the product of an encounter between sperm and egg amongst millions of real missed encounters, but in my case, randomness is also verified by the fact

that had I been born a little sooner – I was born three years after my parent’s marriage, in the midst of war – and had I been born some forty kilometers from my city, I would not be here narrating this minimal biography.

I mentioned at the start that it’s not easy being Jewish in Argentina, but it’s possible. I assume this difficulty is universal except in Israel and Manhattan. My family and I found in my country, Argentina, freedom. That is to say hospitality.

My father didn’t come to America to make a fortune, a common anti-Semitic misconception, but to leave behind war and the postwar period in Romania; in other words, to leave behind oppression and racism.

He started a small sock factory in a western district of Greater Buenos Aires that with time became successful. The products were sold in a region inhabited by Armenians, Syrian-Lebanese Christians and Muslims, Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews and Spaniards from Galicia.

Before arriving in this country, the meat paradise of the world, my father, a thin and tall man, had experienced great hunger. At night, when he returned home, he had already eaten for lunch “puchero”, a dish called “cocido” in Spain and “pôt au feu” in France. In Argentina it’s a stew made with beef, sausage, blood sausage, oxtail, bacon and vegetables.

At dinner time, before sitting at the family table to taste my mother’s goulash or “chirkepaprikash” (chicken paprika) or “töltötkaposta” (sauerkraut filled with pork meat) – dishes that require a slow digestion – he would stop at the railway station in Flores neighborhood to eat a mozzarella pizza, in line with the national tradition deeply rooted in Italian cuisine.

As you can see, I have named a series of national origins in this anecdotic tale, Syrian-Lebanese, Armenians, Galician and Basque – the latter run the dairies where we bought yogurt, cream and milk – Italian, Jews, and I must add the Japanese who washed and ironed clothes in their drycleaners, and the Slovenians who my father employed in his factory.

The Slovenians had left behind a Yugoslavia headed by Tito; many had supported the fascists, and they were even some monarchists amongst them. In any case, all sympathized with the Nazis, employees who worked for a Jew, in a Peronist Argentina who welcomed Jews, some converted, at least on paper, and others not, and Nazis, some camouflaged, others not.

In this pluralistic country, which according to the 1914 census had, in its more populated areas like Buenos Aires and Rosario, more foreigners than natives, I must mention my own family with my Argentinian wife, Catholic, who has a Bavarian Father and Austrian mother and to whom I’ve been married for thirty years. When we met she already had two daughters from her first marriage with a gentleman of English origin. One of her daughters was born in London, the other in Nigeria, but has a German passport because of her mother.

I have a daughter from a previous marriage to a Slavik Jew whose father came from Odessa, who already had a daughter whom I raised, whose father had creole and aboriginal ancestry.

And we are happy.

Having different stories and geographies, is a blessing, at least for now.

A few years ago I invited my parents to Romania; the four of us went, my parents, who had not returned in half a century, my wife and I. We arrived in Budapest where we spent a couple of days. I discovered that I did not understand the Hungarian language spoken by adults, because the little I remembered I had never used in a conversation.

The little Hungarian I spoke was related to my childhood, and considering my strict education, I had learned how to say “thank you,” “good morning” and “sorry”. There is one word that I will definitely never forget: “sämtelen” (szemtelen). It’s difficult to translate but means something like disrespectful, scoundrel, the worst of the worst.

I suggested to my wife, who does speak German but not a word of Hungarian, just to say in any circumstance: “nem ertag magiarul” (nem érték magyarul). I don’t understand Hungarian.

During our visit we tasted good wines, ate goulash with violin music – I wonder if it’s possible to eat goulash without violin music one day? – and we visited the main Jewish synagogue, where a guide told us the story of the temple and in response to a question I made with regard to the fate of the Jews during the war, he told me that many had died of cold and hunger due to food scarcity. A sort of vegetative calamity.

Upon such blasphemy, I asked my parents and my wife to immediately leave the house of God.

I wanted to know who my grandfather had been, my father’s father, about whom my father never spoke. He had died of an illness when my father was very young, and a mysterious maternal mandate silenced even his name.

But my father had a father, and I wanted to know where he had been buried. That’s how we arrived in Romania and Sighisoara.

I visited Timisoara, where I was born. I was moved by the synagogues, impeccable on the outside and under lock. Synagogues without Jews. I attended a Shabbat in the annex of a closed synagogue, where there were no more than ten churchgoers and a Rabbi called Neumann that my father recognized. Everything was poor and desolate.

In Sighisoara, a beautiful city, we found the house where my father grew up, and I decided to look for my grandfather’s grave. There was a Jewish cemetery, a closed synagogue and only one Jew in the city, Erich Raducan, an old man who had survived Auschwitz, who I was finally able to locate.

In the postwar period he had converted to Christianity, probably frightened that the killing would never end, and then recovered his identity. He was in charge of the maintenance of the temple. He opened it for us, my wife and I, while my father remained with my mother at the hotel, not very interested in our quest.

The old man opened the doors that led to the hall, and I cried. I had never seen such a beautiful temple, the enclosed area where my father and grandfather had celebrated the Shabbat, surrounded by the silence of the sacred, clean, with walls painted in pastel tones, that today were repainted white, drawings of palm trees that evoked East Jerusalem, bordeaux velvet cloths covering the altar; only the Jews were missing, all murdered.

The place was prepared for a beautiful ceremony, but the faithful were not there. It was then that I understood that the genocide, and I don't say Holocaust, because it was not a sacrifice but murder, maybe the cruelest that humanity has known, was not only defined by the dead but by erasing memories.

No more rites, chants, clothes, food. The Nazis and their allies wanted to eliminate all traces, all imprints of Jewish life.

There was the temple, empty.

Thanks to the old man we found written in an old notebook with black ink and gothic calligraphy, the name of my grandfather, Lazarus, with the location of his burial place.

With Cora, my wife, we went to the Jewish cemetery in Sighisoara, and we found a chaos of tombs strewn around, covered with moss, so the numbering indicating the location was of little use.

We found a spatula and slowly scraped the stones until we were able to identify my grandfather's. I told my father, who looked at me incredulous; I forced him to follow me, and when he saw the tomb, he looked at me and exclaimed: It's my father! and hugged the stone.

I have said that it's not easy being Jewish in Argentina. On one side is history, because there is a long-standing anti-Semitic tradition, nurtured by a Catholic nationalism that has had different political expressions. The long series of military governments supported sectors sympathetic to Italian Fascism and the Axis during the Second World War.

As in other parts of the planet, anti-Semitism is part of the common sense of idiots, according to the words of the famous writer Imre Kertesz, or, as Marx said, anti-Semitism is the Socialism of fools, because he had not seen today's populism.

The violent anti-Semitism that my country suffered during the twenties in the twentieth century in which there were pogroms, and which again reappeared in the sixties when organizations like Tacuara y Guardia Restauradora Nacionalista persecuted and stigmatized us, an anti-Semitism

that in the eighties became evident with the imprisonment of the journalist Jacobo Timerman during the last military rule, this anti-Semitism in some way traditional, without leaving aside the fact that it was disastrous, was followed by collective crimes and attacks.

Now we are not talking about history, but the present.

The terrorist attacks on the Embassy of Israel, and on AMIA, the Jewish Community Center, in the nineties, are not only important due to the number of deaths and victims, taking into account the injured and the grieving relatives, but by the fact that there are no detainees and we know nothing about these collective crimes.

The recent death of the prosecutor Alberto Nisman, who was denouncing the behind the scenes agreement between the government of President Kirchner and the Republic of Iran, has all the elements to assume it was a murder, and about which we still know nothing.

This reality that I just mentioned is very dangerous, because it shows substantive evidence that there is a local connection, well-articulated and protected by powerful interests, linked or not to foreign powers or organizations.

Notwithstanding these terrorist attacks, my country never stopped welcoming immigrants, a reality accentuated by the great influx of inhabitants from neighboring countries.

And I repeat "my country", because it is the only one I have. I have made the decision to live in it, raise my family and become involved passionately in the problems of my community. That is why I have adopted Spanish as my language of expression, and I teach and write in Spanish.

I was educated in France; I was formed in its universities and acquired the cultural basis for my professional endeavor. In its books and classrooms, I found my first teachers, and in that atmosphere I shared the desire for revolution and the libertarian environment which led to the events of May 1968 in France.

French philosophy is a passion I have, but Argentinian Spanish, is my way of verbalizing.

The French language allowed me to let go of the Hungarian; as I learned a new language, the maternal tongue was erased from my memory, and it was during this process that an old ailment, a chronic stuttering that afflicted me from childhood, started disappearing as I learned French and released the Hungarian. Mysteries of psycholinguistics not revealed, I believe, by the specialists.

I have returned to Europe; today I am here again in Hungary. We know that here as well as in other countries of Europe and on the other side of the Atlantic there is an outcry to raise barriers to stop the migratory wave coming from Central Asia and Africa. The hundreds of thousands of refugees

come from countries at war, people caught in the crossfire, from former colonies abandoned in the chaos or in the fragmentation generated by the artificial drawing of frontiers at the service of imperial interests; they come from cities destroyed by bombings called preventive, oppressed by caliphates led by mercenaries paid by governments competing at a regional level. That is why so many faced with hunger and death, escape.

Europe has a real problem and it's not the immigrants, but its stagnated socioeconomic structure that is unable to include its own people. Technology improves productivity but reduces the work force. Medicine improves the quality and the duration of life, but cannot resolve the fiscal cost of the elderly. The young, with their diplomas, face an uncertain professional future. Globalization attracted millions of new consumers to the global market, but also allowed the inflow of outsourced workers who drastically lowered salaries. A huge financial power surged and created an unjust and exclusionary society.

Furthermore, the fall of the Berlin Wall put an end to a century in which Universalist ideologies evaporated. It happened with Communism, but also with the Welfare State, that is to say social democratic governmentality.

Religious fundamentalism didn't come out of nowhere or appear due to an unrestrainable desire of salvation.

In the seventies, after 1967, when the Six Day War put an end to Arab nationalism, Nasserism, at the same time the modernization cycles of some of the countries of the region generated a migration from rural areas to the city of millions of people.

No one assumed responsibility for this forced urbanization process with its ramifications of misery and degradation. This abandonment was fertile ground for the Islamic discourse.

From 1977 to 1981, Menachem Begin was elected in Israel, Karol Wojtyla in the Vatican, Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran and Ronald Reagan in the USA. In some way they have contributed in great measure to designing today's world.

The end of Stalinism in its different expressions, of the Welfare State, the collapse of the emancipatory ideologies of Marxism as well as of the Enlightenment values that shaped progressivism, the end of the great secular narratives as Lyotard affirmed, will give way to a ruthless capitalism and at the same time a new boom of religious fundamentalism.

Orthodoxies are in fashion, and tribal hatred expressed as ethnic claims and struggles for new sovereignties and territorial and linguistic autonomies shape the international scene.

The slogan is "go back". The return of the names of the monotheistic God, proclaiming its exclusivity, accusing the unfaithful, stigmatizing the person

who mixes with someone outside their circle, an alien, declaring that any person who ignores the ancestral mandate is a traitor; this call to go back to the founding principles is a cry of war.

We blame the age of Enlightenment for having declared the principle of equality and fraternity and thus deceiving minorities. Hannah Arendt, who also criticized certain aspects of the egalitarian illusion, differentiated the concept of Jewishness from Judaism. She notes that before the emancipatory times of the Napoleonic era, Jews were recognizable in their identity. Not only for their traditions but for the functions they carried out in society. They had their place in the diaspora.

With the so called “assimilation” the Jew starts to be sought behind the camouflages that give him new surnames, the conversion to Christianity and his representation in society as a man of universal talent, or as expressed by the philosopher and linguist Jean Claude Milner, the Jewish Exception.

This purported emancipation gave rise to what we have come to know as modern anti-Semitism based on racial theories, degenerative theories, social venom that must be purged.

Milner affirms that between 1815 and 1933, cultural and political conditions occur that explain what happened later. He accuses Europe of having betrayed the Jewish people with the intended equality and of having generated the conditions that led to the crimes against the Jewish people by the Nazis.

Milner proclaims the Jewish self-affirmation against the cosmopolitan trap.

At least Hannah Arendt, on the other hand, chose the freedom road of the American Revolution that guaranteed freedom of speech, the habeas corpus that protects the rights of individuals against the power of government, and the unrestricted right of minorities to express their will.

So, as some say, we should denounce the emancipatory project that is born with the declaration of universal human rights, with its philosophical principles based on the liberalism of the 17th century, in the social contract of the 18th century, and the desire for revolution of the 20th century. What alternatives do they offer?

Going back to the religious sources of monotheism. This is what philosophers do who preached the cultural revolution in the sixties, and after the Gulag, the fight for human rights in Central Europe, after the killings in Cambodia and what happened in Vietnam with the boat people, they leave Maoism, and convert to Orthodox Judaism like Benny Lévy, become followers of Islam like Christian Jambet, or Gnosticism like Guy Lardreau. All were young during the events of

May '68 in France, who, disappointed by the failure of revolutionary ideals, and based on their philosophical education in the best French institutions, justify the return to the word of God.

Others who also left their revolutionary garb will not falter in their warmonger intensity, and choose a democratism of war. They support preventive wars, shelling of the civilian population in spite of the so-called collateral damage that the experts consider inevitable, and they do so because it is their opinion that there is a war between the values of the democratic West and the fundamentalist terrorism of murderous gangs.

Undoubtedly, we live in difficult times, not only because of the global conflicts being waged with unprecedented violence, not only because our mood is altered with up to the minute information about each event on the planet – sensitive globalization also modifies our thinking – but because there are no perfect solutions for the problems exposed.

I believe that an intellectual, whatever his profession, whether journalist, scientist, philosopher, who does not occupy a political post or executive position, should be cautious.

It's easy to condemn, denounce and preach in the name of Common Good without proposing concrete measures. There are quandaries that have a cost difficult to accept. I think it would be frivolous on my part to say that the borders should open without any type of restriction, or to argue that the unrestricted movement of capital should apply to that of people.

Some countries have serious structural problems that can worsen with supposedly humanitarian action and generate acts of violence that everybody would want to avoid.

But what I do believe is necessary is to denounce all forms of racism, to condemn all types of demagogic strategies that use old prejudices to channel collective hatred in search of scapegoats, and we should also denounce the so-called historic revisionism that is not only a cognitive fraud but an immoral act, one that tries to shrug off responsibility for the killings and genocides of our recent past.

If there are those who believe that emancipatory ideals are no longer valid, or that old utopian brotherhoods have been deceitful, and preach a return to religious or ethnic traditions, they have all the right to do so, as long as it doesn't turn into a Medieval Inquisition.

There are no unfaithful to any divine mandate, nor heretics or traitors to a cause, no matter what it is. Religious wars massacred a third of the European population until the Peace of Westphalia. There was a campaign of extermination of the native people of the Americas in the name of God.

If the defense of the West, of its values, is interpreted like a Crusade, or a counter crusade, it will end with a Leviathan, in a totalitarian regime that demands total subjugation in exchange for the so-called Security.

No one has the right to point a finger in the name of the divine will. No one has the right to separate bad Jews from good Jews, or based on categories of affirmation or negation, according to a faithfulness to a history or culture.

There is no truth that can justify death or segregation.

I am Jewish, I was born in Romania, my maternal tongue is Hungarian, my home is in Argentina. There is nothing good or bad in this. What you do defines who you are, not where you come from. A person cannot be judged by his name, his faith, his ideology, nor by his identity or by a system of identities.

We are a wide variety, the unity that identifies us is a continuous variable. To say "I" is a triumph, as long as it's a point of departure and not a point of arrival. We live "from" within, we think from within, we write from within. We don't do it "for" others, nor for ourselves. The word "meaning" that signifies our actions indicates a direction "in and of itself" which is a centrifugal movement that transforms us.

That is why the idea of identity reflects a sameness rearguard, the fear of not belonging, or the fear to be dominated or conquered by foreigners. Recent history has demonstrated what type of events can occur when these fears are manipulated by unscrupulous hierarchs.

BRAZILIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY FROM THE 1930s ONWARD: THE NATIONALIZATION CAMPAIGN AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NATIONAL IDENTITY¹

ELDA GONZÁLEZ MARTÍNEZ

ABSTRACT

This article aims to analyze the restrictions imposed, starting in the 1930s, both on the arrival of immigrants, among them Spaniards, and on the immigrants who were already living in Brazil. In particular, the period between the years 1937 and 1945 significantly marked the way of life of ethnic groups in Brazil. In this period known as the Estado Novo, the New State, the construction of a homogeneous Brazilian national identity was pursued, based on a strongly centralized government.

Keywords: *Brazil, New State, nationalization of foreigners, immigration, Getúlio Vargas*

During most of the 19th century, what were called the southern provinces of Brazil promoted a migratory model based on the development of small properties in border areas or uninhabited areas. By doing this, they intended to achieve two objectives: on one hand, to manage to strengthen the southern frontier (among others), at that time more vulnerable, and, on the other hand, to establish subsistence agriculture, while initiating manufacturing output and polyculture. The spirit of this kind of immigration was maintained, with its ups and downs, with other regions of the country doing the same.

¹ This text was written in the framework of research project HAR2015-63689-R, "Políticas migratorias en el cono sur: un escenario de cambios legislativos que compromete diferentes escalas y actores (1930-1970)", funded by the National RDI Plan of the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness of Spain.

Above all, the idea was to attract white European settlers, at first Germans and Italians and, later, other nationalities, who were installed in agricultural colonies.²

Similarly, and concomitantly with the colonization, a new tendency in immigration affairs began to take shape starting in the mid-19th century, promoted by the owners of the coffee plantations in the central southern part of the country. In a short time, a program to attract immigrants was implemented, a program that consisted of subsidizing the ocean crossing for European farmers who moved to São Paulo to be hired on coffee plantations, together with their families. The government approved, yearly, the amount of the subsidies and put an institution founded in 1886, called the *Sociedade Promotora da Imigração*, and which had immigration agents in Europe, in charge of directing the contingents toward the port of Santos. During the 1880s and 1890s, between 70% and 90% of the foreigners who landed at this port did so with a subsidized ticket.

In both models, the immigrants who made up the contingents were the desired ones: they were, above all, Germans and Italians, in the case of the farming colonies, and Italians and Spaniards, for the coffee plantations. The government, influenced by the eugenics trend, felt that these immigrants could be expected to contribute with their work to the exaltation of Brazil, at the same time as they “whitened” the country. This ideology characterized Brazilian immigration policy, to the point that the legislation passed after the Republic was proclaimed (Decree Number 528 of June 28, 1890) prohibited the entry into the country of natives of Asia³ and of Africa.⁴

And so an open-doors policy was implemented for several decades. Immigrants were welcomed and, as I have indicated, their passage was financed to convince them to choose Brazil as their destination; but in the early 20th century, the authorities began to limit the entry of certain individuals to the country. Above all, healthy people, fit for work, were sought. The legislation that was passed acted to select the immigrants. For example, Decree number 1458 of 1906 prohibited the entry of people with infectious diseases, crazy people, vagabonds, blind people, anyone over the age of 60, and anyone with “an organic vice or a physical defect.” During these years, fear of the social activism that

² For a panorama of colonization in Brazil, consult Elda González Martínez: *De colonos y de asalariados: los inmigrantes españoles en el modelo inmigratorio brasileño*, in Angel Vaca Lorenzo (ed.): *Minorías y migraciones en la historia*, Salamanca, Universidad de Salamanca, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 2003, 255–273.

³ This legislation remained in force until 1907. In 1908, the first 800 Japanese immigrants landed in Brazil. By 1934, Sao Paulo had received around 175,000.

⁴ <http://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/decret/1824-1899/decreto-528-28-junho-1890-506935-publicacaooriginal-1-pe.html>

was appearing, especially among certain groups of foreigners, began to spread,⁵ while voices arose warning of the difficulties that certain groups, among them groups of Asians, could cause. In general, these discourses were no different from those that circulated in other contexts, particularly in the United States.

Soon after, the 1929 economic crisis and a series of factors, such as the triumph of the 1930 revolution, contributed to modify immigration policy, including new provisions regarding the entry of foreigners.

IMMIGRATION DURING THE “*ESTADO NOVO*”

From the very first years of the government of Getúlio Vargas, even before the establishment of the *Estado Novo*,⁶ the control of foreigners was a common, institutionalized practice. One of the measures adopted was the sanction, in 1930, of Decree Number 19,482, restricting the arrival of immigrants. This decree established that the only immigrants who could enter were residents of the country, those requested through the Ministry of Labor for agricultural work, those who had a call letter, and farmers grouped as family. The same decree also included the law of 2/3, which established that the companies had to prove that at least 2/3 of their employees were Brazilian. This was how the government attempted to defend national workers.⁷

A new decree of May 8, 1934, held that, even if – given the sheer size of the country – it was necessary to populate the land and increase agriculture, the influx of unemployed agricultural workers who continually went to the capital to seek work was large. The administration found that one of the causes of unemployment was the massive entry of foreigners who were not always qualified for agricultural work, but who had aptitudes that contributed to increase economic and social disorder. The second article of the decree resolved to prohibit the entry to anyone considered limited or disabled for work, such as those who were disabled or crippled, blind or deaf-and-dumb, the mentally ill, the incurably ill or seriously contagious (suffering leprosy, tuberculosis, trachoma, venereal disease, etc.), drug addicts, and people under 18 or over 60. It also prohibited the entry of anyone who might alter

⁵ Law 1.641 of January 7, 1907, called the Adolpho Gordo Law, established the criteria for expelling immigrants quickly. Between 1907 and 1921, 556 foreigners were expelled, of whom 121 were Italians, 113 Spaniards, 181 Portuguese, and 141 of other nationalities. Sheldon Maran: *Anarquistas, imigrantes e o movimento operário brasileiro, 1890–1920*, Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1979, 79.

⁶ The name *Estado Novo* (New State) is given to the period corresponding to the dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas, when all political rights were suspended, congress was shut down, and auditors were designated for the different states of the federation.

⁷ Brasil: *Colecção das Leis da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil de 1930*, Vol. II, Atos da Junta Governativa Provisória e do Governo Provisório (October to December), Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa Nacional, 1931.

the country's social order, such as gypsies and nomads, anyone who could not prove that they had a licit profession or owned goods, anyone who practiced prostitution or exploited prostitutes, anyone who had shown behaviour that was noxious to public order and national safety, anyone who had previously been expelled from the country, and, finally, anyone who had been convicted of a crime in another country.⁸

Later, the 1934 Constitution, which incorporated the model of the National Origins Act of the United States, adopted a system of entry quotas for each nationality. The quotas were based on the annual limit of 2% of the number of foreigners of any single nationality who had arrived in Brazil between 1884 and 1933. This quota system, apparently universalistic and egalitarian, favored the Italians, Portuguese, and Spaniards, as they made up the largest contingents in the period over which the 2% was calculated. The Germans and the Japanese (the Japanese had begun to arrive in the country in the first decade of the 20th century) were quantitatively much less important. This fact coincides with the proposed objectives for assimilation at that time, as the Latin populations were made up of nationalities that were, racially and culturally, more similar. The Constitution simply reflected explicitly a current of opinion that had been outlined years before.⁹ In the so-called *República Velha*, a group of intellectuals had begun to reflect on national identity and other issues related to the formalization of the State, such as ethnic heterogeneity, the importation of foreign models, and immigrants, who could at times constitute a positive element but whose presence was at other times harmful.¹⁰

It is important to emphasize the changes that occurred at that time in the way Portuguese immigrants were represented. From that moment on, due to the defense of Portuguese roots carried out by the ideologues of the *Estado Novo*, Portuguese immigrants came to be in high demand, to the point that, from 1939 onward, they were even excluded from the quota system.¹¹

However, the Constitution also imposed a series of limitations that affected immigrants. Article 131 declared that foreigners did not have the right to vote, not even in municipal elections. Article 184 determined that they could not be civil servants. Article 155 limited the ownership of ships, the position of commander, and the crew to nationals (as well as stipulating that only a

⁸ *Boletín de la Inspección General de Emigración*, Fourth period, Year 4, No. 2–3, 1934, 508–509.

⁹ Brasil: *Constituições do Brasil*.

¹⁰ Octavio Ianni: *A Idéia do Brasil moderno*, São Paulo, Editora Brasiliense, 1992, 28–32.

¹¹ Maria Beatriz Rocha Rocha –Trindade – Neide Almeida Fiori: Migrações entre Portugal e Brasil: reciprocidade de preferências 1908–1945, *Revista Migrações* – Número Temático Migrações entre Portugal e América Latina, October 2009, No. 5, 215. http://www.om.acm.gov.pt/documents/58428/183863/Migr5_Sec2_Art3.pdf/f8d70930-eddb-485f-9e16-cdda2c19d70d

third of the crew could be made up of naturalized Brazilians). Article 160 excluded foreigners from the ownership, management, or administration of news companies, including radio news programs. Article 149 prohibited immigrants from working as pilots of ports, rivers, and lakes. And Article 153 stated that concessions for exploiting mineral and electrical resources would only be granted to Brazilians.¹²

In the same vein, there was legislation regarding the agricultural colonies. They could not be made up of immigrants of the same nationality. The Constitution determined that the concentration of immigrants in any part of the territory was prohibited. This measure completely forgot the long tradition that already weighed on the founding of agricultural colonies or nuclei, as the colonies created in southern Brazil, above all, were made up of people from the same country. At that time, the government believed this to be a way of encouraging ethnic solidarity in circumstances that were very difficult for the colonists, when they had to overcome the difficulties of the early period of their installation. The concern about populating colonial nuclei increased in 1941, when the Brazilian government supported the Allies in World War II, as Germans, Italians, and Japanese became “enemies” of the country.

In addition, from this period onward, the Brazilian elite continued to express in their discourse the need to pursue the “civilized whitening” of the population. The entry of immigrants contributed to this process, relegating black people to a secondary position.¹³ But it was also said that the immigration problem could not be solved the way it had been in the 19th century, by letting foreigners arrive freely. On the contrary, at this time it was necessary to control the movements of the people who arrived to Brazil, and it was the state who should intervene, preventing the entry of undesired individuals: “For new countries such as Brazil, the most suitable immigration policy is one that takes into account the need to avoid undesirable elements or those which are hard to assimilate, promoting the arrival of good immigratory flows in harmony with the country’s economic expansion.”¹⁴ Because of this, it is not surprising that on June 7, 1937, the Ministry of Foreign Relations prepared secret memo number 1127, authorized by Getúlio Vargas, which prohibited visas for anyone with Semitic origins, including both Jews and Arabs in this term.¹⁵ The inclusion of Arabs in these restrictions seems to have had to do

¹² Fernando Carneiro: *Imigração e colonização no Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro, Universidade do Brasil, Faculdade Nacional de Filosofia, 1950, 34–36.

¹³ Regarding the racial issue, see: Lilia Moritz Schwarz: *O espetáculo das raças: Cientistas, instituições e questão racial no Brasil, 1870–1930*, São Paulo, Companhia das Letras, 1993; Lilia Moritz Schwarz –Renato da Silva Querioz (org.): *Raça e diversidade*, São Paulo, Edusp–Estação Ciência, 1996.

¹⁴ Note published in the *Revista de Imigração e Colonização*, Year 1, 1940, 6.

¹⁵ Maria Luiza Tucci Carneiro: *O anti-semitismo na Era Vargas: fantasmas de uma Geração (1930–1945)*, São Paulo, Editora Brasiliense, 1988, 166–177.

with reactions provoked by the possibility of a group of Syrians settling in the state of Paraná, a group whose arrival had been proposed by the League of Nations to the Ministry of Foreign Relations at Itamaraty.¹⁶

The limitations that the secret memo established were not to be projected on people who were residents in Brazil, who were married to natives, who had Brazilian children, and who had real estate in the country. However, authors such as Lesser point out, regarding the Jews, that they needed to have lived in Brazil for at least five years, and spouses of Brazilians or people with Brazilian children but who did not have land or property were only granted visas in exceptional cases. Nevertheless, there were special permits that could be granted to people who were well-known in the spheres of culture, politics, and society.¹⁷

On the other hand, taking into account the May 1938 decree and a confidential memo from 1941, the government also decided to suspend temporary visas, with the exception of those applied for by citizens of American countries, by the Portuguese, by people in possession of a certain amount of money in foreign currency, and by specialized technicians for industry and agriculture.

Getúlio Vargas was quite explicit regarding this, defining precisely the ends sought with the arrival of foreigners: “The immigrants must build a force for progress ... (but) we must shield ourselves from the infiltration of elements who could be transformed into ideological or racial dissidents.”¹⁸ Because of this, in the conception of hegemonic groups of that time, the State had to be “the agent of national construction, and it had, therefore, to be strong, interventionist, responsible for defining the social order, and the regulator of work relations and social relations.”¹⁹

Foreigners, especially those who lived in the urban context, linked to industrial development, were perceived to be offenders and dangerous because they were held responsible for inciting political and social movements. As for the foreigners who had settled in the country, some of them, according to the authorities, did not intend to integrate into the country that had taken them in: they lived in real islands, and so they also were a threat to the political and cultural project of Getúlio Vargas’ government.

Because of this, it was necessary to construct the public order, implementing a legislation that would regulate immigrants’ activities. First of all, a campaign was triggered to “nationalize” foreigners living in the country. The so-called

¹⁶ Endrica Geraldo: *A “lei de cotas” de 1934: controle de estrangeiros no Brasil*, Cadernos AEL., Vol. 15, No. 27, 2009, 184–185.

¹⁷ Jeffrey Lesser: *A negociação da identidade: Imigrantes, minorias e a luta pela etnicidade no Brasil*, São Paulo, UNESP, 2001, 170.

¹⁸ Getúlio Vargas: *A nova política do Brasil. Realizações do Estado Novo*, August 1, 1938 to September 7, 1939. Vol. 6, Rio de Janeiro, José Olympio, 1940, 88.

¹⁹ Priscila Ferrerira Perazzo: *O perigo alemão e a repressão plicial no Estado Novo*, São Paulo, Divisão do Arquivo do Estado, 1999, 4.

nationalization campaign planned by the authorities was meant to impose assimilation, limiting all manifestations of immigrants' ethnicity through direct intervention in community organization and in the culture of the immigrant groups. The Brazilian army was responsible for carrying out this campaign, as it was understood to represent the highest expression of Brazilian nationality,²⁰ although commissions were also created in order to institute and visibilize the necessary channels to promote this assimilation. Pedagogic projects were prepared that would, among other achievements, make it possible to invisibilize the immigrants through their adaptation to national values and loss of the ties that united them with their countries of origin, such as language, customs, gastronomy, and so on.²¹

One of the measures adopted was the inclusion of the subject Moral and Civic Education in school educational programs. This was how the government attempted to impose Brazilian national "values" on students: the children were to act as conveyor belts and influence their parents, so that they, too, would acquire a Brazilian mentality.

The teachers were the key elements for implementing this new model, and this is the reason for the recommendation not only to raise their salaries, which were quite low at that time, but to ensure that they were paid regularly.

As complementary measures, the National Propaganda Department published *O Brasil é bom y Catecismo Cívico* in 1938, *Getúlio Vargas: o amigo das crianças*, in 1940, and *A juventude e o Estado Novo* in 1942, in order to instil the ideology of the *Estado Novo*, introducing it into schools and homes, while at the same time constituting a vehicle to exalt the figure of Getúlio Vargas.

The nationalization campaign was especially incisive in the schools installed in the colonies. The government felt that these establishments, which had arisen with the arrival of the immigrants to the farming colonies, sometimes with the aid of their governments, especially in the cases of Italy, Germany, and Japan, and of the clergy who, in general, were of the same nationality as the colonists, contributed to denationalize the children. These children, even though they had been born to foreign parents, were Brazilian, but they had been baptized with names that were not common in Brazil and they spoke foreign languages. In short, without even noticing, they were completely unfamiliar with local things.²² The importance of education for the children also influenced the passing of a Decree-Law which prohibited Brazilians under the age of 18, whether or not they were accompanied by

²⁰ Hugo Bethlem: *Vale do Itajaí – Jornadas de civismo*, Rio de Janeiro, José Olympo, 1939, ix.

²¹ Adriano Luiz Duarte: *A criação do Entranhamento e a construção do espaço público. Os japoneses no Estado Novo*, *Acervo*, Vol. 10, No. 2, July–December 1997, 133.

²² Aristoteles de Lima: *A nacionalização do ensino*, *Revista de Imigração e Colonização*, Year I, No. 2, April 1940, 239–240.

parents or guardians, from leaving the country. The origin of this legislation was the practice, thought by the authorities to be abusive, according to which foreigners of certain nationalities, especially the Japanese and Germans, sent their children and grandchildren to their homelands to be educated there, “removing them from Brazilian social contact, an essential condition for their assimilation to our political, social, economic, and cultural institutions.”²³

The complaints of consular representatives led to a provision allowing minors to travel if they had the authorization of the Supreme Council of Immigration and Colonization. This organism had been created in 1938 with the objective of controlling and organizing not only the entry of foreigners to the country, but also their departure.

I must insist on this point. Foreigners were expected to adapt to national values and break the ties that bound them to their countries of origin: they were supposed to become “true Brazilians.” Schools and religious, cultural, and even sports institutions were affected by the measures imposed. They all had to adapt to the legislation, changing their names if they included any nationality. For example, the Spanish Society for Mutual Aid of São Paulo was renamed the Hispanic-Brazilian Society of Mutual Aid, and the Spanish members on the board of directors had to be replaced by other members with Brazilian nationality. Other associations could not adapt, as was the case of the Spanish Society of Mutual Aid of Triunfo, in Rio Grande do Sul, which sold its properties to the Porto Alegre diocese.²⁴ All of these institutions were obliged to have Portuguese as their official language, carrying out all acts, celebrations, and events in this language. Special agents were designated to check their adherence to this obligation in these activities and in their businesses, factories, and hospitals. Not even the churches escaped from this norm, as all the sermons and preaching had to be done in Portuguese. This measure provoked tensions which were, in some cases, resolved with additional measures. In Rio Grande do Sul, the then Chief of Police gave instructions in this regard, with the exception that, after having given the sermon in the language of the country, priests and pastors were allowed to repeat it in the language of the foreign attendees, whenever there were enough to justify this.²⁵

Similarly, radio transmissions and newspapers in foreign languages were prohibited, as well as any activity that could be described as political. The Ministry of Justice and Domestic Commerce organized a section to keep

²³ Historical Archive of Itamaraty. Presidency and Vice-presidency of the Republic. Council of Immigration and Colonization. Services received. Rio de Janeiro. Bookcase 91, shelf 5, Volume Number/Box 07.

²⁴ Adhemar Lourenço da Silva Júnior: O mutualismo de fechamento étnico no Rio Grande do Sul (1854–1940), *MÉTIS: história & cultura*, Vol. 4, No. 8, July–Dec. 2005, 127–157, 150.

²⁵ Carlos de Souza Morales: *O colono alemão. Uma experiência vitoriosa a partir de São Leopoldo*, Porto Alegre, Escola Superior de Teologia, São Lourenço de Brindes, 1981, 26–31.

watch over these issues, the Superintendency of Political Security, with other official departments collaborating. One of these was the Service of Censorship and Inspection of Theaters and Public Entertainment, while another was the Postal Censorship Service, which reviewed all the correspondence directed to or sent by immigrants.²⁶

Decree-Law Number 392, of April 27, 1938, went farther, regulating the expulsion of foreigners who jeopardized national security.²⁷

Regarding the arrival of foreigners, Decree-Law Number 406 of May 4 was passed this same year, indicating that the federal government retained the right to limit or suspend, for economic or social reasons, the entry of individuals of certain races or origins, following recommendations by the Council of Immigration and Colonization.

A later decree, Number 3010 of August 20, 1938, regulated the previous decree, specifying that the conservation of the country's ethnic constitution, its political forms, and its cultural and economic interests should be taken into account when applying the decree. The Portuguese were exempt from these measures because, in their case, "the identity of religion, language, and customs, as well as rational and historical affinities" were taken into account.²⁸

Even though the campaign was directed at all foreigners, even those with Latin roots, it was enforced especially in the groups considered to be most deeply entrenched, the Germans and Japanese. Right from the presentation of the first issue of the Review of Immigration and Colonization, the official journal of the Council of Immigration and Colonization, in which theoreticians from different areas of knowledge participated, emphasis was placed on the need to plan and select the human flows into the country, given that "the accessibility of certain forms of ethnic assimilation and social contact"²⁹ was an indispensable condition for the progress of the nation. This is why one of the initiatives that the Council of Immigration and Colonization sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was that immigration treaties should be made with Denmark, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia.³⁰

This was not a good period for Spaniards; not being included in this selection of countries must have been related to the Vargas government's lack of sympathy toward the Spanish Republic. Among other issues, we must

²⁶ Adriano Luiz Duarte: A criação do Entranhamento ..., *Ibid.*, 132.

²⁷ <http://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/decllei/1930-1939/decreto-lei-392-27-abril-1938-348742-publicacaooriginal-1-pe.html>

²⁸ CONSELHO DE IMIGRAÇÃO E COLONIZAÇÃO: *Revista de Imigração e Colonização*, Rio de Janeiro, Year I, No. 2, April 1940, 69.

²⁹ CONSELHO DE IMIGRAÇÃO E COLONIZAÇÃO: Primeiro ano de trabalhos do Conselho de Imigração e Colonização, pela Secretaria do Conselho, *Revista de Imigração e Colonização*, Year I, No. 1, January, 1940, 3–4.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 11.

remember that after the communist uprising of 1935, some of the people who participated in this revolt became volunteers in defense of the Republican cause. With this precedent, even though Vargas did not acknowledge the Burgos government until the final months of the Civil War, Brazilians and Spaniards who met in Republican centers were subjected to police persecution.

In São Paulo, the Department of Political and Social Order (DEOPS) considered the activities carried out on these premises to be subversive, and the Spaniards detained were prosecuted. Even though official relations between the Republican government and the Brazilian government were described as normal by the head of the American section of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs until January of 1939,³¹ when immigrants held any act in support of the Republic, they were persecuted.³² We can find one example of this in 1936 when 26 Spaniards, accused of being extremists, were expelled from the country on the steamship *Campana*. The legal support of the consul did them no good, even though his intervention was important to prevent their being disembarked at a Spanish port, by paying the difference of the cost of the passage to get them to a port in French territory.³³ Another example from 1937 is the detention of a group of Spaniards by the regional delegate of the police in the interior of the state of São Paulo, in locations such as Baurú, Lins, and Francisco Alves, with the accusation of propagating communist ideas.³⁴ A month later, in the capital, the expulsion process began for Domingo Rex Muñoz, the cultural representative of the government of the Republic in Brazil. The decisive motives given by the police were the content of his conferences "Features and Profiles of Spain" and his participation in the radio program "The Republican Hour."³⁵ Sympathizers of the other side did not, however, receive the same treatment. The differences were such that the Chargé d'Affaires of the Spanish embassy in Rio de Janeiro sent a note to the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, formulating his complaints about

³¹ Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain. AMAE. File R.1070 Record 56. 1939.

³² A report prepared by the Adjunct Delegate of Investigation of São Paulo reflects the ideas held regarding the defenders of the Republic. This report stated that: "they had organized themselves in a special center (the Republican Center), to constantly work on ideas subversive to the social regime, whether disseminating the subversive and Marxist theories held by the present government in Valencia, that is, the Republican government, among the elements of the colony, or disseminating among us an education without God, without religion, contrary to our present constitution and to the condition of the Brazilian people. They are, then, in addition to being confessed and convicted communists, elements who are dangerous to Brazil, disrespectful of our constitution ... useless, with a truly international theory, with no idea of a Fatherland to illuminate the feelings steeped in a subversive, destructive passion ..." Arquivo do Estado, São Paulo, Departamento de Ordem Política e Social de São Paulo (DEOPS). Relatório para o Delegado Addido a São Paulo de Investigações. São Paulo 16/6/1937. Prontuario 3817.

³³ AMAE. File R 1000. Record 5. 1937

³⁴ *Gaceta Hispánica*, São Paulo, November 12, 1937, 2.

³⁵ AMAE, File R1070. Record 57, 1937.

“the unequal treatment given to the Spaniards loyal to the Republic and those belonging to factional elements in Brazil, which translates into facilities for the factional elements for propaganda, initiatives, etc., and persecution and obstacles for those loyal to the Republic for carrying out their activities.”³⁶

This civil servant referred, among other issues, to the censorship norms imposed on the press by the Ministry of Justice, which indicated that very close vigilance was maintained over the foreign telegraph service, avoiding any news that could awaken sympathy for communist ideology. Special attention was given to telegrams to Moscow and to Madrid. Additionally, there was a prohibition on the publication of news that praised either the Soviet regime or the victories obtained “by troops that defend Bolshevik regimes, such as the Valencia government, in Spain.” Although the development of the conflict continued to be published, the tenor of the news had to be carefully disguised to avoid the notice of the censors.

Some of their ethnic associations were also closed and anyone who took part in activities in defense of the Republican cause in Spain was prosecuted and expelled from the country. Between November 1935 and October 1937, 45.7% of the foreigners expelled from Brazil were Spaniards.³⁷

The norm was applied to the Republican Centers, which were closed. In November 1937, just as had occurred in Santos, Sorocaba, and Porto Alegre, the government ordered the closure of the Republican Center of São Paulo because it considered it to be a communist cell. Early in 1938, due to pressure from diplomatic personnel, due to the fact that the directors agreed to remove the people whom the authorities of Social Order rejected as subversives from the Center, and due to its activities only being related to recreational ends, the Center was reopened. In addition, the Center had to accept that, from the moment it reopened, all its activities would be under surveillance.

IN CONCLUSION

At the beginning of the 20th century, the entry of immigrants into Brazil began to be controlled. It was, however, starting in the 1930s that not only the issue of the arrival of foreigners, but also problems involving the foreigners who already lived in the country, came under intense debate. From that time on, the immigration desired was defined and a nationalizing policy was implemented and legislated, through innumerable decrees, in order to contribute to the assimilation of certain groups.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Alzira Lobo de Arruda Campos: *Estrangeiros e Ordem Social (SP 1925–1945)*, *Revista Brasileira de História*, Vol. 17, No. 33, 1997, 228.

In 1945, a coup d'état ousted Getúlio Vargas. On September 18 of this year, Decree Number 7967, which created the legislative basis for this decade and the following one, was passed. The president of the republic specified that, once World War II was over, it was necessary to “stamp a rational and definitive orientation on Brazilian immigration policy, to attend to the double objective of protecting the interests of national workers and developing an immigration that would be a factor of progress for the country.” It was emphasized that the main responsibility of the consular authorities was to foment the arrival to Brazil of “bons imigrantes,” above all, farmers, technicians, and skilled workers.³⁸ After that, the arrival of immigrants did not reach the magnitude of the period of massive immigration; however, as good workers were needed in this phase, the ethnic criteria imposed during the *Estado Novo* never held sway again.

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³⁸ http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto-lei/1937-1946/Del7967.htm

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HISTORIA, MODERNIZACIÓN E IDENTIDAD EN CUBA

IZASKUN ÁLVAREZ CUARTERO

RESUMEN

Mientras que en 1870 la gran mayoría de países de América Latina había diseñado, aunque no completado en su totalidad, sus modelos nacionales, Cuba permanecía siendo colonia de España. Sin embargo, desde finales del siglo XVIII, con la creación de las Sociedades Económicas de Amigos del País y la Real Junta de Fomento, el gobierno colonial tuvo como objetivo fundamental la modernización de las estructuras económicas y sociales. Esta circunstancia favoreció la articulación de un entramado de proyectos y realidades para hacer de Cuba el mayor productor azucarero del mundo al mismo tiempo que se desarrollaba su identidad nacional. El proceso de independencia y los tres periodos de intervención militar de los Estados Unidos situaron a la isla ante un dilema identitario entre el pasado colonial y esclavista y un futuro incierto dependiente del gobierno de Washington. La historiografía de este periodo se centra en definir la esencia de la historia y la cultura cubanas, un debate que podemos seguir a través de más de un siglo de publicaciones de la Sociedad Económica.

Palabras clave: Cuba, identidad, nación, modernidad, escritura de la historia, transculturación.

ABSTRACT

While in 1870 the great majority of Latin American countries had designed, although not fully completed, their national models, Cuba still remained a colony of Spain. However, by the end of the 18th century, with the creation of Economic Societies of Friends of the Country and the Real Junta de Fomento, the colonial Government had as a main objective the modernization of economic and social structures. This circumstance facilitated the coordination of a framework of projects and realities to make Cuba the largest sugar producer

in the world and, at the same time, fostered its national identity. The process of independence and the three periods of United States military occupation of Cuba meant the island was faced with an identity debate between its past of colonialism and slavery and an uncertain future under the pressure of Washington. The historiography of this period is focused on defining the essence of Cuban culture and history, a debate that we can follow thanks to the publications of the Economic Society over more than a century.

Keywords: *Cuba, identity, nation, modernity, writing of history, transculturation.*

El periodista y secretario de la Academia de Historia de Cuba en la década de los treinta del siglo pasado, René Lufrú y Alonso, autor de una breve historia colonial de la isla, consideraba que los “tiempos modernos en nuestra historia, [son] aquellos en los cuales adviene y se desarrolla una sociedad que gesta [su] propia individualidad, espiritual primero, política luego”¹. La estrecha relación epistemológica entre modernidad e identidad en América Latina ha llevado a autores como Jorge Larraín a explicar que “nacimos en la época moderna sin que nos dejaran ser modernos; cuando pudimos serlo lo fuimos solo en el discurso programático y cuando empezamos a serlo en la realidad nos surgió la duda de si esto atentaba contra nuestra identidad”². El intento por parte de los discursos científicos, sociales y políticos de dotar de sentido y valerle, e incluso abusar, del concepto de identidad ha sido una práctica común a lo largo de la historia. Es posible interpretarla apoyándose en múltiples posiciones, desde la etnografía, por ejemplo, para generar una justificación de la razón de ser de las reclamaciones de los pueblos indígenas, hasta articularla con la soberanía nacional; pero sin duda alguna en la mayoría de los casos ha venido asociada a la formación de un sentimiento nacional que afiance un discurso patriótico capaz de generar reivindicaciones de independencia y de formación de los estados-nación, especialmente en Europa y América Latina a partir del siglo XIX. Las nociones de modernidad e identidad han sufrido vaivenes a lo largo del tiempo, como también se han visto acompañados de otros conceptos inevitablemente ligados a ellas como civilización, Estado, patria, independencia o soberanía³.

¹ René Lufrú: *El Impulso Inicial. Estudio histórico de los tiempos modernos de Cuba*, La Habana, Imprenta “El Siglo XX”, 1930, 9–10.

² Jorge Larraín: Modernidad e identidad en América Latina, *Universum. Revista de Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales*, 12, 1997, 1–7, 1.

³ El grupo de investigación “Historia intelectual de la política moderna: lenguajes, conceptos y discursos” está realizando un encomiable esfuerzo para dotar de significado a lenguajes y conceptos políticos a través del tiempo, especialmente durante la era de las revoluciones en España y en América Latina, véanse especialmente las definiciones de estos términos en las

El término identidad aparece en el primer diccionario de autoridades de la Real Academia Española de 1734 definido como “razón, en virtud de la cual son una misma cosa en la realidad, las que parecen distintas”, significado que ha ido ampliándose y adquiriendo distintos sentidos hasta convertirse en un concepto poliédrico de significados múltiples dependiendo del momento histórico en el que se utilicen⁴. Benedict Anderson apuntaba que las naciones “[necesitan] considerar con cuidado cómo han llegado a ser en la historia, en qué formas han cambiado sus significados a través del tiempo y por qué, en la actualidad, tienen una legitimidad emocional tan profunda”⁵. Para el caso cubano – cuya independencia de España se produce a finales del siglo XIX, cuando el resto de sus vecinos latinoamericanos llevaban más de cincuenta años de andadura de sus estados-nación –, el debate ideológico respecto a la visibilización de su propia identidad se haría esperar hasta mediados del siglo XX⁶. La intervención de los Estados Unidos, que inauguraron la república neocolonial, facilitó una rápida modernización, sobre todo de carácter industrial y urbanístico, pero impidió que las fuerzas sociales proyectaran abiertamente su identidad como nación. La lucha por alcanzar nuevamente la independencia cohesionó con fuerza el *ethos* cubano – desde la clandestinidad y en lucha con los gobiernos dictatoriales apoyados por Washington –, y fortaleció el ideal identitario con brillantes aportaciones intelectuales, materializado en toda su extensión con el triunfo de la Revolución.

Algunos autores afirman que la modernización en América Latina “se inicia y consolida, paulatinamente, con la industrialización masiva, la urbanización en gran escala y los diferentes dispositivos de racionalización de la vida cotidiana”⁷; esta definición perfectamente válida se enfrenta a posiciones en las que se defiende que el proceso de modernidad está inconcluso, sobre todo por el desfase entre instituciones y contenidos⁸. Pero tal vez lo más notable sea, en opinión de François-Xavier Guerra, la confluencia del tradicionalismo social con esa modernidad en América Latina desde los procesos emancipa-

distintas regiones del continente: Javier Fernández Sebastián (dir.): *Diccionario político y social del mundo iberoamericano*, Madrid, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2009–2014, 11 vols., 2 tomos.

⁴ Recientemente el sinólogo francés François Jullien ha publicado un libro donde reflexiona sobre el tema y desarrolla la creencia de que es imposible determinar con exactitud la identidad cultural de un pueblo; véase: François Jullien: *La identidad cultural*, Madrid, Taurus, 2017.

⁵ Benedict Anderson: *Comunidades imaginadas. Reflexiones sobre el origen y la difusión del nacionalismo*, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1993, 21.

⁶ Sobre el sistema colonial véase: Javier Alvarado Planas (dir. y coord.): *La Administración de Cuba en los siglos XVIII y XIX*, Madrid, Boletín Oficial del Estado–Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2017.

⁷ Carlos A. Gadea: La dinámica de la Modernidad en América Latina: Sociabilidades e institucionalización, *Revista Austral de Ciencias Sociales*, 13, 2008, 55–68, 57.

⁸ Jaime Antonio Preciado Coronado: *La Modernidad no resuelta de América Latina*, http://www.robertexto.com/archivo20/modernid_amerlatin.htm

dores⁹. En Cuba asistimos a la circunstancia extraordinaria de la convivencia de la esclavitud con el proceso modernizador hasta 1880, fecha de su completa abolición, lo que determinó fuertemente las dinámicas de pensamiento sobre identidad y modernidad. Oscar Zanetti mantiene que la intelectualidad liberal criticaba la esclavitud como una “institución insostenible dentro del proyecto de modernidad capitalista”¹⁰. Entonces ¿tenía cabida la reflexión sobre la modernidad y la identidad con cientos de miles de hombres y mujeres sometidos por el régimen esclavo? ¿Pudieron los intelectuales cubanos trazar un discurso identitario mientras convivían con la esclavitud en un régimen colonial? ¿Era viable una identidad con una mezcla “racial” tan diversa? Aunque resulte paradójico, fue posible, es más, esta desigual armonía es una de las claves de la identidad cubana y de su modernidad.

En los *Anales de la Junta de Fomento* de 1861 se publicaron unos “Apuntes para la Historia de las letras en la isla de Cuba”, que incluían varias biografías de hombres ilustres, entre las que se podían leer las de Luis de las Casas, Francisco de Arango y Parreño, Juan José Díaz de Espada y Landa, Luis Peñalver y Cárdenas, Rafael del Castillo y Sucre, Alejandro Ramírez, Félix Varela, Pablo Veglia, Anastasio Carrillo y Arango, Alejandro Auber y José del Castillo¹¹. La publicación de estos *Apuntes* coincide con el período en el que la prosperidad de la economía esclavista-azucarera está concluyendo y puede servirnos de marco para contextualizar el agitado siglo XIX. Según los especialistas, 1762 puede considerarse la fecha de inicio del ingenio azucarero como eje central de la economía insular, y su exitosa productividad se mantiene hasta mediados del siglo XIX. A esta etapa le seguiría la Guerra de los Diez Años, durante la cual se dieron los primeros pasos en el proceso de abolición, para continuar con la Guerra de Independencia y el establecimiento entre 1903 y 1905 de las “relaciones mercantiles especiales cubano-norteamericanas”¹². Varios autores coinciden en fijar la Guerra de los Diez años como el punto de partida

⁹ François-Xavier Guerra: *Modernidad e Independencias. Ensayos sobre las revoluciones hispánicas*, México, FCE, 2000.

¹⁰ Óscar Zanetti: *Historia mínima de Cuba*, México, El Colegio de México, 2013. Véase el capítulo dedicado a “Procesos culturales e identidad nacional”.

¹¹ *Anales y Memorias de la Real Junta de Fomento y de la Real Sociedad Económica*, La Habana, Imprenta del Tiempo, 1861 [Serie 4.ª, tomo VI].

¹² Antonio Santamaría García: De Colonia a Nación. Los costes y beneficios de la transición en Cuba, en Josef Opatrný (ed.): *Cambios y revoluciones en el Caribe hispano de los siglos XIX y XX*, Praga, Universidad Carolina de Praga-Editorial Karolinum, 2003, 91–101, 92; Para comprender el sistema de plantación azucarero es imprescindible: Manuel Moreno Friginals: *El Ingenio. Complejo económico-social cubano del azúcar*, La Habana, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1978, 3 vols.

para hablar de nación cubana, eso sí, teniendo en cuenta las articulaciones en torno a la “raza” y a la biologización de la sociedad cubana por los científicos durante las etapas colonial y republicana¹³.

En las páginas de los *Anales* se insistía en las cualidades “realistas y leales de la isla”, en la fidelidad de los biografiados y en la defensa de sus intereses, que en conjunto propiciaron el progreso y bienestar de la economía cubana. Me detendré en cuatro de estas hagiografías correspondientes a los principales protagonistas de la historia colonial cubana, “a los hombres útiles que conformaron el adelantamiento en el que hoy se halla la isla de Cuba”¹⁴ para trazar los antecedentes de cómo se piensan la modernidad y la identidad. La primera de ellas es la dedicada a Luis de las Casas, el que fuera capitán general y gobernador de la isla a finales del siglo XVIII y gran impulsor de la industria azucarera, del reformismo económico y cultural; Las Casas fue quien promovió la edición de los primeros periódicos y la Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País, institución pensada para el desarrollo integral de todas las ramas del saber de la época, como las artes, la industria, las ciencias, la agricultura, ganadería, educación o caminos, que fueron cimentando el avance modernizador durante su mandato¹⁵. Entre los méritos que de él destacan los *Anales* estaban su capacidad de sustraer a la isla de “barbaries pasadas” y que facilitara la entrada al nuevo orden a través del monocultivo azucarero y el régimen de plantación, los dos ejes que llevaron a Cuba a una economía de mercado y a su internacionalización comercial. Las Casas era considerado uno de los primeros responsables de crear una ansiada cohesión social a través de la cultura: su mente se ocupaba del bien material, así como del moral e intelectual de los habaneros: bienes que “hermanan fuertísimos vínculos y que constituyen juntos la felicidad de un pueblo”¹⁶. La felicidad de las naciones estaba íntimamente unida a la identidad y a sus valores sociopolíticos ya que

¹³ Son muchos los autores que ha trabajado sobre estos temas; entre otros, véanse: Armando García González – Raquel Álvarez Peláez: *En busca de la raza perfecta: eugenesia e higiene en Cuba (1898–1958)*, Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas [en adelante CSIC], 1999; Consuelo Naranjo Orovio – Miguel Ángel Puig-Samper Mulero: El legado hispano y la conciencia nacional en Cuba, *Revista de Indias*, L, 190, 1990, 791–808; Consuelo Naranjo Orovio – Armando García González: *Medicina y racismo en Cuba: la ciencia ante la inmigración canaria en el siglo XX*, La Laguna, Centro de la Cultura Popular Canaria, 1996; y también de los mismos autores Antropología, ‘raza’ y población en Cuba en el último cuarto del siglo XIX, *Anuario de Estudios Americanos*, LV, 1, 1998, 267–289; Ada Ferrer: *Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868–1898*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1999; Alejandro de la Fuente: *A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth Century Cuba*, Chapel Hill-Londres, University of North Carolina Press, 2001; Luis Miguel García Mora – Consuelo Naranjo Orovio: Intelectualidad criolla y nación en Cuba, 1878–1898, *Studia Historica. Historia Contemporánea*, 15, 1997, 115–134.

¹⁴ *Anales...*, op. cit., 5 y 6.

¹⁵ M.ª Dolores González-Ripoll: *Cuba, la isla de los ensayos: cultura y sociedad, (1790–1815)*, Madrid, CSIC, 2000.

¹⁶ *Anales...*, op. cit., 9.

la vehiculiza de manera positiva, sustancialmente desde la aparición de *La riqueza de las naciones* de Adam Smith, obra que muy probablemente leyó el gobernador Las Casas¹⁷.

La segunda biografía es la de Francisco Arango y Parreño, “el amigo de todos los amigos de Cuba”¹⁸, y respondía a la imperiosa necesidad de agradecer sus esfuerzos por auspiciar la libre introducción de mano de obra esclava que determinó el despegue azucarero y por “augurar la tranquilidad de la Isla”¹⁹, cualidades necesarias para afianzar la cohesión social y establecer su identidad a través de la producción azucarera. A lo largo del texto podemos ver que los intereses cubanos se van a contraponer reiteradamente a los intentos de la metrópoli de cercenarlos. A pesar de estas tensiones, la fidelidad de Cuba a la Corona tuvo en Arango a uno de sus adalides, y a la postre el rechazo a la independencia fue utilizado por las élites para sumar otro rasgo identitario, la defensa de esta lealtad, que será manipulada a su antojo desde los acontecimientos de 1808²⁰.

La tercera biografía que puede ayudarnos a comprender cómo se concibe la identidad durante el siglo XIX es la de un eclesiástico, el obispo Juan José Díaz de Espada y Landa, que interpretó los deseos divinos para predicar a los cubanos e “inspirarles el amor a la Religión y a la Patria contra las tentativas pérfidas de Napoleón para dominar a España”²¹. Sus consejos espirituales se destinaron a “que se observe constantemente el orden”²², propuesta que converge con la cuarta y última de estas figuras, Alejandro Ramírez, intendente de La Habana en 1816 y gran defensor de la propiedad privada, “el principio que asegura sobre el interés común la permanencia del orden y bienestar de la sociedad”²³; esto es, una vez más el orden como aspecto esencial de la bonanza del país y como dispositivo de control de la población y aglutinante de la identidad. A Ramírez se le considera el responsable de acabar con el estanco del tabaco y el defensor más activo del liberalismo económico, pero por lo que quiero resaltar su trayectoria es por ser el fundador de la sección de educación de la Sociedad Económica, que se manifestó como el motor fundamental para despertar un sentimiento de identidad entre los niños y jóvenes cubanos y, sobre todo, por haber creado decenas de cátedras y escuelas que estaban destinadas en su mayor parte al cultivo azucarero. Para la Sociedad, las escuelas

¹⁷ *Investigación de la naturaleza y causas de la riqueza de las naciones*. Obra escrita en inglés por Adam Smith...; la traduce al castellano... Josef Alonso Ortiz, con varias notas é ilustraciones á España, Valladolid, Oficina de la Viuda e Hijos de Santander, 1794, 4 vols.

¹⁸ *Anales...*, *op. cit.*, 12.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, 16.

²⁰ Sobre la interesante figura de Arango, véase: M.ª Dolores González-Ripoll – Izaskun Álvarez Cuartero (eds.): *Francisco Arango y la invención de la Cuba azucarera*, Salamanca, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 2009.

²¹ *Anales...*, *op. cit.*, 29.

²² *Idem*.

²³ *Ibidem*, 60.

gratuitas, que llegaron a sumar 285 en 1861, eran el instrumento para acabar con la ociosidad de la población: “No hay nada posible en un pueblo: ni la grandeza, ni la dignidad, ni aún la riqueza de buena ley, que no tenga por base indispensable la educación del pueblo”²⁴; se recalca que la dignidad de un pueblo pasaba por la instrucción y la moralidad de todos sus habitantes para alcanzar la civilización, otra de las nociones asociadas a la idea de identidad y que se repetirá obsesivamente hasta el siglo XX²⁵. Quiero concluir que el azúcar ha sido un incuestionable signo de identidad que se perfila desde el siglo XVIII y pervive hasta nuestros días. Se enviaban becarios a Francia a aprender agricultura, se compraban decenas de volúmenes de agronomía o se publicaba el último invento para prensar caña. A pesar de la existencia de otros cultivos o de sucesivos intentos de diversificar la economía, una y otra vez el azúcar se transmutaba en la marca identitaria de Cuba²⁶.

La Real Sociedad Patriótica de La Habana y la imprenta de Andrés Pego publicaron en 1874 la obra que compilaba las tres historias de Cuba más importantes hasta entonces, junto a otra serie de opúsculos de carácter histórico, en un intento de conferir al discurso proespañol una narración complaciente²⁷. La obra se publicó a dos años del fin de la Guerra Grande, en un clima de confrontación y violencia que se cobraría cerca de 160.000 bajas en ambos ejércitos. La férrea y codiciosa posición del gobierno español y su nula capacidad de diálogo imposibilitaron que las principales reivindicaciones, como la abolición de la esclavitud, la plena libertad de comercio, la formación de

²⁴ Ibidem, 225.

²⁵ Sobre las distintas secciones de las Sociedades Económicas hasta principios del siglo XIX, véase: Izaskun Álvarez Cuartero: *Memorias de la Ilustración: las Sociedades Económicas de Amigos del País en Cuba (1783–1832)*, Madrid, Departamento de Publicaciones de la Real Sociedad Bascongada de los Amigos del País, 2000.

²⁶ Leida Fernández Prieto: *Espacio de poder, ciencia y agricultura en Cuba: el Círculo de Hacendados, 1878–1917*, Madrid, CSIC, 2008.

²⁷ *Los tres primeros historiadores de la isla de Cuba. Reproducción de las historias de José Martín Félix de Arrate y Antonio José Valdés y publicación de la inédita del Ignacio Urrutia y Montoya, adicionadas con multitud de notas y aumentadas con descripciones históricas de la mayor parte de las ciudades, villas y pueblos de esta isla que en ellas se mencionan*, Editada por Rafael Ángel Cowley – Andrés Pego, La Habana, Imprenta de Andrés Pego-Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País, 1876, Vol. 3; En el vol. I se editó: *La Llave del Nuevo mundo antemural de las Indias occidentales...* por J. M. F. de Arrate; *Memoria sobre la ciudad de San Felipe y Santiago del Bejucal*, por M. M. Acosta; *Noticias históricas de la villa de la Asunción de Guanabacoa...* por C. Núñez de Villavicencio; vol. II: *Teatro histórico, jurídico y político militar de la isla Fernandina de Cuba y principalmente de su capital la Habana...* por I. J. de Urrutia – Montoya. *Baracoa* [por R. A. Cowley] *Bayamo* [por M. J. de Estrada] *Trinidad* [por F. Lavallée] *Historia del doctor Urrutia*; vol. III: *Historia de la isla de Cuba y en especial de la Habana*, Por A. J. Valdés; *Historia de Puerto-Príncipe* [por T. P. Betancourt] *Historia de Sancti-Spiritus* [por T. M. Moles] *Apéndice: Parroquias existentes en las diócesis de la Habana y Santiago de Cuba*.

partidos políticos o la libertad de prensa, pudieran alcanzarse. El grito de Yara inició un largo y permanente proceso de rebelión que finalizó en 1898 con la humillante derrota de España por parte de Estados Unidos.

En la introducción a *Los tres primeros historiadores de la isla de Cuba*, que fue firmada por la comisión especial de la sección de Historia de la Sociedad, se denunciaba que la historia se podía tergiversar apelando al honor nacional:

“La isla de Cuba hace ya un papel muy distinguido en el mundo por su comercio, población y riqueza, para que su historia sea desconocida o solamente se encuentren relaciones diminutas acerca de sus progresos, escritas las unas por autores apasionados que han apelado a la fábula para embellecer sus tareas, y las otras por enemigos envidiosos de su prosperidad y grandeza, que la han desacreditado; exigía pues el honor nacional abrir al público los archivos, y dar un testimonio del acierto con que ha sido gobernada”²⁸.

Atacaba al *Ensayo político* del barón Humboldt por inexacto y apelaba a la consulta de la documentación de los archivos de Sevilla, Simancas y Madrid para escribir un relato profesional de la historia de la isla desde una visión glorificadora de la “gesta conquistadora hispana”. Es decir, existía una clara conciencia de cómo debía modelarse el discurso de la historia. El problema de la narración histórica como un relato que legitima la nación y que apela a la identidad puede observarse con más intensidad en la modernidad. Pierre Nora delimita con sus *lieux de mémoire* la facilidad de las comunidades para fabricar lugares simbólicos y escribir su propia historia²⁹.

Para Hayden White los teóricos de la literatura han sido reticentes a estudiar las narrativas históricas como ficciones, como “lo que manifestamente son”, ficciones verbales con contenidos tanto inventados como encontrados, y cuya estructura formal estaría más cercana a la literatura que a las ciencias. Esta reflexión constituyó en los años setenta el punto de partida de su obra sobre filosofía de la historia, según la cual es imposible aceptar una distinción entre relato de ficción y relato histórico. En la propuesta de White, los hechos no hablan por sí mismos, es el narrador quien los dota de significado según la formación textual y la ideología en la que está involucrado, de ahí que el historiador interfiera en la historia, que se entrometa, intrusión que no tiene por qué identificarse como una práctica errónea, carente de profesionalidad; debemos asumir nuestra capacidad de interferencia como una cuota inherente de nuestra disciplina. La escritura y la construcción del relato por parte del historiador son componentes básicos para elaborar el texto histórico, el

²⁸ *Los tres primeros historiadores...*, Vol. I, 2.

²⁹ Pierre Nora (dir.): *Les lieux de mémoire*, 7 vols., París, Gallimard, 1984–1995.

historiador no reconstruye la historia sino que la construye, añade su imaginación, su propio pasado, se enlaza con su propia subjetividad, condición que no debe menospreciar nuestro oficio, al contrario, tal vez lo humaniza:

“La historia es, según mi forma de ver, una construcción, más específicamente un producto del discurso y la discursivización. Sin duda, en nuestros tiempos, los historiadores desean ser objetivos, y contar la verdad, así como agudos en lo que tienen que decir acerca del pasado, lo que, en la práctica, normalmente significa ocultar sus propias actividades como compositores de esta condición de existencia llamada historia”³⁰.

White señala la importancia de lo literario en la imaginación histórica y en la recreación que realiza el historiador de un hecho histórico determinado. Este concepto nos ayuda a comprender la construcción del relato histórico de la primera historiografía cubana, en la que confluyeron la necesidad de cohesionar una narración que avalara la credibilidad nacional, la influencia del movimiento romántico y su exaltación del yo y la naturaleza, un proyecto diferenciador ante la diversidad étnica y, en particular, una estructura económica y social que facilitara su andadura y supervivencia. Esta vocación por rescatar las obras históricas más sobresalientes y cimentar una genealogía de historiadores cubanos es la que alienta las reediciones de la *Revista Bimestre Cubana*, a principios del siglo XX, de textos precedentes, como *Lo que fuimos y lo que somos* o *La Habana antigua y moderna*, escrito a mediados del XIX por José María de la Torre³¹.

En 1898, un mes después de la rendición del Ejército español ante el general estadounidense Nelson Miles, cien personalidades cubanas, encabezadas por el pensador Enrique José Varona, redactaron un manifiesto dirigido al pueblo de Cuba³². En el primer párrafo abogaban por “la necesidad suprema de la unión de todos sus elementos vitales en identidad de propósitos y uniformidad de conducta” ante la transitoriedad de la ocupación militar, sin sospechar que la Enmienda Platt, impuesta tres años después, iba a consolidar su tutela en la isla. Se apelaba a la unidad nacional:

“Vamos a dar a Cuba, el sosiego que demanda, para que le demos cuanto antes la organización definitiva que le permita asegurar la prosperidad que le es tan fácil obtener y la cultura que le promete la historia de sus grandes empeños. Vamos a

³⁰ Hayden White: *El texto histórico como artefacto literario*, Barcelona, Paidós-UAB, 2003, 43.

³¹ Publicado originalmente 1857 por la Imprenta de Spencer y Compañía. La reedición es de 1912.

³² *Al pueblo de Cuba. Dirigido y firmado por 100 destacados cubanos desde New York en 1898 en relación a la ocupación de los Estados Unidos a Cuba*, Impreso en Nueva York, 1898. El documento está depositado en la Biblioteca Digital del Caribe.

llevar a Cuba el espíritu de tolerancia y concordia, que unifica. Vamos a juntarnos todos en el seno de la paz, que permite los grandes esfuerzos, puesto que permite acumular riqueza y acumular ciencia”³³.

El deseo de concordia y de equiparar a todos los cubanos independientemente de su estratificación social queda reflejado en la Constitución de 1902; en su título II, “De los cubanos”, artículo sexto, hablaba de los cubanos por naturalización y entre ellos se incluía a “los africanos que hayan sido esclavos en Cuba, y los emancipados comprendidos en el artículo 13 del Tratado de 28 de junio de 1835, celebrado entre España e Inglaterra”³⁴, es decir, el importante tratado sobre la abolición del tráfico de esclavos; el artículo al que remite la Constitución estipulaba que los africanos transportados en un buque condenado por practicar la trata quedaban a disposición de la nación propietaria del barco que lo había apresado y que debían ser puestos inmediatamente en libertad, circunstancia por la que se asume legalmente el largo pasado esclavista de la isla y su diversa identidad.

No obstante, en su libro de *La Colonia a la República*, Varona reflexionaba sobre la complejidad de lograr la unión social para alcanzar la independencia debido a la diversa estratificación racial que soportaba Cuba:

“Cuando la conquista pone en presencia dos o más razas completamente disímiles, y las obliga a ocupar el mismo territorio, la sociedad se divide en capas, en estratos superpuestos que se mezclan difícilmente, y que toman más o menos la organización de castas cerradas. El elemento étnico que ha conquistado domina y, de un modo u otro, se aísla dentro de sus privilegios. El resultado es que se forman distintas conciencias sociales. No hay una nación, lo que supone un alma colectiva, sino un grupo de señores y numerosas manadas de vasallos”³⁵.

Esta división jerarquizada supondría uno de los mecanismos más importantes de la articulación de la identidad. Para llegar a entender cómo se manifiesta es necesario examinar brevemente la obra del etnógrafo Fernando Ortiz, analista agudo de la realidad social cubana y el iniciador de los estudios antropológicos en la isla. Autor del concepto de transculturación, que explicó en su obra *Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar*, de 1940, como:

“Los variadísimos fenómenos que se originan en Cuba por las complejísimas transmutaciones de culturas que aquí se verifican, sin conocer las cuales es imposible

³³ *Al pueblo de Cuba...*, op. cit., 1.

³⁴ *Constitución de la República de Cuba*, comentada por José Clemente Vivanco, La Habana, Imprenta y Encuadernación San Ignacio, 1902, 12.

³⁵ Enrique José Varona: *De la Colonia a la República*, Selección de trabajos ordenados por su autor, La Habana, Sociedad Editorial Cuba Contemporánea, 1919, 120.

entender la evolución del pueblo cubano, así en lo económico como en lo institucional, jurídico, ético, religioso, artístico, lingüístico, psicológico, sexual y en los demás aspectos de su vida”³⁶.

Las mezclas de indígenas, europeos, negros africanos, indígenas americanos, árabes, hindúes o chinos no dejaron de exhibir sujetos “desarraigado[s] de su tierra nativa en doble trance de desajuste y de reajuste, de desculturación o exculturación y de aculturación o inculturación, y, al fin, de síntesis de transculturación”³⁷. El trabajo de Ortiz por asimilar esta mezcolanza social, descartando la categoría racial como eje estructural de la sociedad cubana, le condujo a un profundo análisis de su diversidad durante toda su trayectoria científica³⁸. Por ejemplo, a él le debemos la organización del primer museo etnográfico de La Habana dentro de las instalaciones de la Sociedad Económica. En la *Revista Bimestre Cubana*, fundada por la Sociedad en 1831, e impulsada de nuevo en 1910 por Ortiz, que era el presidente de la sección de Educación y Beneficencia junto con Ramiro Guerra, historiador y economista, se recoge la entrega en depósito de “varios objetos de interés para el estudio de las costumbres típicas que se mantienen en el país, y para el conocimiento de los diversos componentes étnicos del pueblo cubano”³⁹.

Cabe detenerse unos instantes en la percepción negativa que se tiene de lo negro, asociándolo a la criminalidad y teniéndolo por una nefasta influencia en una civilización, la cubana, que procuraba modernizarse. Esta visión fue una constante en las interpretaciones sociales cubanas, derivada también de los estudios que sobre el tema emprendieron Fernando Ortiz y otros especialistas en medicina legal y criminología como el médico Israel Castellanos, que aprovechó las páginas de la *Revista Bimestre* para publicar varios de sus textos; en el titulado “La briba hampona”, deja entrever la opinión que merecían la criminalidad y los afrodescendientes⁴⁰:

³⁶ Fernando Ortiz: *Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar*, La Habana, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1983, 86.

³⁷ Fernando Ortiz..., *op. cit.* 87.

³⁸ Sobre cómo articularon Fernando Ortiz y el puertorriqueño Antonio S. Pedreira la identidad y la nación, véase: Consuelo Naranjo Orovio: *Cultura, identidad y nación* en las obras de Fernando Ortiz y Antonio S. Pedreira, *Tebeto: Anuario del Archivo Histórico Insular de Fuerteventura*, 5, 2004, 150–165.

³⁹ Museo de costumbres cubanas, *Revista Bimestre Cubana*, La Habana, noviembre–diciembre de 1910, 309.

⁴⁰ Sobre la figura y transcendencia de los estudios de Israel Castellanos, véanse: Tania de Armas Fonticoba: Fernando Ortiz e Israel Castellanos en la genealogía de la criminología en Cuba, *Derecho y Cambio Social*, 2, 2011, <http://www.derechoycambiosocial.com/> (consultado el 13 de septiembre de 2017); Consuelo Naranjo Orovio – Miguel Ángel Puig-Samper Mulero: Delincuencia y racismo en Cuba. Israel Castellanos versus Fernando Ortiz, en Rafael Huertas – Carmen Ortiz (eds.): *Ciencia y fascismo*, Aranjuez, Editorial Doce Calles, 1997, 11–24.

“El mundo hampón cubano, o séase la región de su mala vida, tiene diversas facetas, variados aspectos, aunque en la misma perspectiva. Sobre el campo de la delincuencia en general, sobresalen con contornos propios la Brujería o Ñañiguismo, supervivencias netamente africanas, que subsisten con bárbaros matices y negrera intensidad. El psiquismo selvático de los ñañigos y brujos contrarresta el ambiente civilizador en que vegeta; pero sus peculiaridades y atributos influyen poderosamente en todos los límites de la mala vida cubana: inoculándole a los extrasociales blancos que le rodean sus pasiones, sus bailes, sus lenguajes, etc. Por ley biológica es natural este hecho, pues el atavismo de los hampones blancos se identificaba con el retraso ético y lingüístico del negro”⁴¹.

Las aportaciones de otros antropólogos europeos también tuvieron cabida en la *Revista Bimestre*, como el trabajo del francés, Henri Dumont, que publicó un ensayo titulado “Antropología y patología comparada de los negros esclavos”, traducido por el propio Castellanos, lo que demuestra el gran interés que despertaba este tipo de estudios que podía ayudar a dilucidar una parte constitutiva de la sociedad cubana⁴².

No puedo dejar de citar a José Martí quien, a pesar de su prematura muerte, legó un bello texto escrito en 1891 titulado *Nuestra América*, que sirvió de inspiración para una Cuba moderna; las frases “no hay odio de razas porque no hay razas”⁴³ o “peca contra la humanidad el que fomente y propague la oposición y el odio de razas”⁴⁴ fueron una declaración de intenciones de lo que el pensador pretendía, no sólo para Cuba sino también para toda América Latina. Después de la intervención, los deseos martianos no se correspondían con la realidad cubana: las autoridades rendían pleitesía a los vecinos del Norte y denostaban el pasado colonial español, elevando a los estadounidenses a la categoría de héroes. El secretario de Estado cubano, Manuel Sanguily, recibió con el siguiente mensaje a su homólogo estadounidense Philander C. Knox, con motivo de su visita al país: “Cuba es un lugar hospitalario en que fácilmente olvidan los extraños su tierra nativa entre las caricias de pródiga naturaleza y la dulce hermandad de un pueblo tan noble como bueno”⁴⁵. El discurso contenía una *laudatio* hacia la política de Estados Unidos, alabando el espíritu de fraternidad y de armonía de los presidentes estadounidenses, el

⁴¹ Israel Castellanos: La briba hampona, *Revista Bimestre Cubana*, marzo-abril, 1914, 94-104, 94.

⁴² El ensayo se publicó consecutivamente en los números 3, 4, 5 y 6 del volumen 10 correspondiente a 1915 y en los números 1 y 2 del volumen 11 correspondiente a 1916.

⁴³ José Martí: *Nuestra América*, Edición crítica de Cintio Vitier, Guadalajara-La Habana, Universidad de Guadalajara-Centro de Estudios Martianos, 2002, 21.

⁴⁴ José Martí... *op. cit.*, 21.

⁴⁵ Dos brindis diplomáticos. El pronunciado en el banquete que el honorable Sr. Presidente de la República obsequió al Sr. Secretario de Estado de los Estados Unidos, *Revista Bimestre Cubana*, marzo-abril, 1912, 127-137, 127.

ser “portadores del mismo mensaje de concordia y de amor” o ensalzando “la eficacia de sus originales y salvadores principios”⁴⁶. A destacar de las palabras de Sanguily, la identificación que hace de Estados Unidos con el progreso y la modernidad, un modelo a seguir frente al retraso que había representado España durante la Colonia; venían a ser los americanos los salvadores de una patria en ruinas, los ángeles de la modernidad “por lo que sintetizan en la evolución de las ideas y en las transformaciones de la Historia, el espíritu americano, las doctrinas americanas y la acción de los americanos en la vida de la sociedad moderna”⁴⁷. Knox replicó endulzando los oídos de los cubanos sobre la importancia de su posición estratégica para los intercambios comerciales por encontrarse cerca del canal de Panamá, poniendo en práctica la *Dollar Diplomacy* de Taft, y las posibilidades de expansión que Cuba poseía con una constitución democrática, como república libre e independiente que eventualmente podría alcanzar cualquier logro económico.

Me interesa subrayar del discurso del representante del presidente William Taft sus palabras referidas al orden interno en Cuba:

“Siempre resulta mucho más conveniente unir a todas las clases que desunirlas, y aquí en Cuba al igual que en las demás repúblicas del continente, todas las clases del país deben mantenerse alertas, cumplidoras, conscientes de sus deberes cívicos, para no permitir que los destinos de la nación pasen a manos de unos cuantos que, no teniendo nada que perder y sí algo que ganar, conviertan en una granjería la vida política de la nación”⁴⁸.

Declaración que a todas luces pudo haber inspirado el propio Taft, que era un gran conocedor de la realidad cubana dado que inmediatamente después de la independencia, en septiembre de 1906, se había autoproclamado gobernador provisional de la isla. Una circunstancia que era consecuencia de la solicitud del primer presidente republicano, Tomás Estrada Palma, a Estados Unidos para que interviniese militarmente ante los graves conflictos existentes entre las facciones políticas mayoritarias de la isla, los liberales y los conservadores. El enfrentamiento político con los Estados Unidos sería frecuente a lo largo de toda la centuria, con una economía ligada al azúcar que aprovechaba cualquier oportunidad para ampliar sus réditos. En 1920, y debido al desplome del cultivo remolachero europeo por las consecuencias de la Gran Guerra, Cuba se vería beneficiada por la demanda de azúcar y por los altos precios que alcanzó en el mercado internacional, en un período que se conoce en Cuba como la “danza de los millones”, lo que también significó un amplio desarrollo

⁴⁶ “Dos brindis...”, *op. cit.*, 128.

⁴⁷ *Idem.*

⁴⁸ *Ibíd.*, 136.

económico. Este periodo coincidió con la presidencia de Mario García Menocal, un mandato que tuvo como denominador común las intervenciones estadounidenses (1917, 1919 y 1924) y los conflictos partidistas.

Como fiel observador de la realidad, Fernando Ortiz desgranaba la situación de amplia desunión que reinaba en el panorama social y político, que atribuía a la falta de preparación histórica de los cubanos, a la incultura general de los grupos subalternos, a los “egoísmos personales de los malvados”, a la deficiente cultura de las élites – que las hacía incompatibles con el progreso mundial –, a los intereses económicos extranjeros, a la debilidad de la psique cubana ante las demandas de la civilización y a la “desintegración de los diversos elementos sociales de Cuba en razas y nacionalidades, a veces antagónicas”. De nuevo las fricciones raciales se valoraban negativamente, como un obstáculo frente a la identidad y la modernización. Entre los remedios que, en aquel momento, propuso Ortiz en este discurrir identitario estaba una vez más la “fortificación del sentimiento nacionalista, sin quijotismos santamente ilusos ni xenofobias anacrónicas”⁴⁹; habría que favorecer “la inmigración hispana, acompañada de nutridos contingentes europeos, de los pueblos avanzados, para aumentar la importación de brazos y, lo que es al menos tan beneficioso, la importación de ideas”⁵⁰. Como si nos sumergiésemos en una máquina del tiempo, recuperando planteamientos de etapas anteriores, el pensamiento de Ortiz no aleja la duda de si un cierto blanqueamiento – cultural e ideológico, pero también étnico – favorecería el fenómeno identitario; para el antropólogo al menos, supondría un halo de esperanza, confiando en las posibilidades de la juventud para acometer el proceso, la única fuerza capaz de amalgamar de una vez por todas la ansiada identidad y modernidad cubanas:

“Y es en la juventud nuestra más firme fe... La salvación de un pueblo no puede deberse fundamentalmente más que a su propio esfuerzo. Tenemos que rejuvenecerlo todo en Cuba; o resignarnos a llorar la lenta agonía de un pueblo bueno que moriría sin gloria, teniendo para un porvenir esplendoroso las más envidiables posibilidades”⁵¹.

El discurso en torno a la identidad y la escritura de la Historia es objeto de una reflexión inconclusa por parte de los especialistas. El pensamiento identitario en Cuba surgió como una estructura ideológica de oposición al poder colonial, necesario para acompañar las luchas independentistas iniciadas a mediados del siglo XIX. Las obras de intelectuales como José de la Luz y Caballero, José Antonio Saco o Félix Varela fueron liminares para pensar cuáles

⁴⁹ Fernando Ortiz: La crisis política cubana. Sus causas y remedios, *Revista Bimestre Cubana*, enero-febrero, 1919, 5–22.

⁵⁰ Fernando Ortiz: La crisis política cubana..., *op. cit.*, 16.

⁵¹ *Ibíd.*, 22.

eran las características esenciales del *ethos* nacional; más tarde se añadieron los autores que hemos estudiado en estas páginas y que considero de lectura necesaria para proveernos de pistas que ayuden a una mejor comprensión del fenómeno. Todos ellos analizaron las cualidades y defectos que poseía la sociedad cubana y los retos que debían afrontarse para alcanzar la modernización. La necesidad de buscar anclajes identitarios para poner en valor la lucha contra la hegemonía blanca española y estadounidense generó la escritura de un relato histórico particular. Y la obsesión por desentrañar la identidad ha sometido a este concepto a un recurrente debate en torno a la raza, al ser cubano, caribeño y latinoamericano, todo esto en la encrucijada económica y política de los dos últimos siglos.

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LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DE LA “RAZA CHILENA”. NACIÓN E IDENTIDAD NACIONAL EN LA GENERACIÓN DEL CENTENARIO (1904–1918)



SEBASTIÁN HERNÁNDEZ TOLEDO

ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the construction of the idea of the “Chilean race” that emerged at the beginning of the 20th century in Chile. From the most relevant essays of the Centennial Generation constituted by Nicolás Palacios, Tancredo Pinochet, Luis Emilio Recabarren, Alejandro Venegas, Francisco Antonio Encina and Guillermo Subercaseaux, the discourses and representations that redesigned the characterization of a new national identity are examined. The hypothesis holds that for these thinkers the moral problems, political corruption and the pauperization of the popular classes were the symptoms of the national crisis, proposing that in order to reform the Chilean race, new previously marginalized social sectors should be included, foreigners should be excluded, new study programs should be proposed and economic nationalism disseminated.

Keywords: *nation, Chilean race, nationalism, generation of turn of the century*

Desde los primeros años del siglo XX, el Estado chileno inició los preparativos para la celebración de su centenario. La festividad incluyó muchos invitados, eventos artísticos, y por supuesto, la inauguración y reinauguración de varios edificios públicos como el Palacio de Tribunales, la Estación Mapocho, el Cerro Santa Lucía y el Museo de Bellas Artes¹. La idea fue mostrar “lo mejor del país” a los extranjeros, establecer la imagen de una nación moderna y estable

¹ Véase Soledad Reyes: *Chile en 1910. Una mirada cultural en su Centenario*, Chile, Editorial Sudamericana, 2004.

políticamente. Fue esta sensación autocomplaciente de la elite la que hizo que nuevos intelectuales provenientes de sectores sociales medios presentaran diversas críticas sobre un país que, según ellos, estaba en crisis. El impacto y desaliento generalizado en las clases bajas y medias producidas por el cambio urbano, la pauperización de las condiciones de vida obrera, el impulso industrializador y las diferencias económicas experimentadas desde fines del siglo XIX fueron alicientes suficientes para establecer variados diagnósticos sobre los males que aquejaban a la nación chilena.

La crítica a la sociedad chilena desarrollada durante la celebración del centenario estuvo relacionada a la aparición y ascenso de la clase media. Según Patricio Silva, las ideas tecnocráticas del positivismo francés como establecer un gobierno basado en el mérito, hacer de la ciencia la principal guía del Estado, excluir los asuntos religiosos de la política, expandir la educación y fortalecer la ciudadanía, fueron apropiadas y defendidas por la clase media chilena en contra del gobierno oligárquico². El acceso a lectura y a la educación media fue el principal motivo para que los sectores medios alcanzaran mayor protagonismo en el espacio público gracias a nuevos puestos de trabajo obtenidos en la complejización de la banca, comercio y servicios públicos³. A través del ensayo, folletería y literatura, los nuevos intelectuales, hijos de esta nueva clase, hicieron que diversas instituciones enfocaran sus políticas y objetivos hacia este nuevo sector emergente.

Gran parte de los ensayos publicados a principios del siglo XX tenían en común la crítica a la vieja aristocracia y la demanda de una intervención estatal que incluyera a la clase obrera, al ejército, a los indígenas y otros sectores olvidados en nombre de la nación⁴. Diagnosticaron a un “país enfermo” que aquejaba a la “raza chilena”. Fue la categoría de raza el eje de análisis de todos los ensayistas, pues su flexibilidad permitió esgrimir argumentos desde todos los ámbitos, según apunta Bernardo Subercaseaux, fue considerada “la base étnica de la nación, fue, por lo tanto, una invención intelectual, una representación que carece de fundamento objetivo. Se trata de un significante que puede ser llenado con distintos rasgos, sean éstos biológicos, psíquicos, culturales o sociales”⁵. Es decir, fue una herramienta funcional para explicar los problemas de un país.

² Patricio Silva: *En el nombre de la razón: Tecnócratas y política en Chile*, Chile, Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales, 2010, 262.

³ Azun Candina: *Por una vida digna y decorosa. Clase media y empleados públicos en el siglo XX chileno*, Chile, Lom Ediciones, 2009, 27.

⁴ Según Patricia Funes, la aparición de intelectuales contestatarios que rompen con “la aristocracia del saber” del modernismo es similar en gran parte del continente latinoamericano durante la década de 1920. Véase en Patricia Funes: *Salvar la nación. Intelectuales, cultura y política en los años veinte latinoamericanos*, Argentina, Prometeo Libros, 2006, 18.

⁵ Bernardo Subercaseaux: *Historia de las ideas y de la cultura en Chile. Tomo IV*, Chile, Editorial Universitaria, 2010, 78–79.

Este trabajo analizará las características y críticas centrales expuestas en seis ensayos pertenecientes a la llamada "Generación del Centenario", publicados en Chile entre 1904 y 1918. Los libros son: *Raza chilena: libro escrito por un chileno y para los chilenos* de Nicolás Palacios publicado en 1904; *La conquista de Chile en el siglo XX* de Tancredo Pinochet Le Brun publicado en 1909; *Ricos y pobres* de Luis Emilio Recabarren publicado en 1910; *Sinceridad. Chile íntimo en 1910* de Dr. J. Valdés Cange (seudónimo de Alejandro Venegas) publicado en 1910; *Nuestra inferioridad económica. Sus causas y consecuencias* de Francisco Antonio Encina publicado en 1911; y por último, *Los ideales nacionalistas. Ante el doctrinarismo de nuestros partidos políticos históricos* de Guillermo Subercaseaux publicado en 1918. La elección de estos ensayos radica en el ajustado periodo de publicación, en sus diversas dimensiones de análisis (economía, sociedad y política) y en el afán rupturista respecto publicaciones anteriores⁶.

El texto tiene por objetivo demostrar cómo los ensayistas del Centenario construyeron la idea de "raza chilena". La caracterización de una identidad nacional que incluyó a nuevos sectores sociales antes marginados y excluyó a extranjeros, la propuesta de programas de estudios centrados en la educación cívica para niños y la exposición de proyectos políticos en los que destacaba el nacionalismo económico. En definitiva, explicar cómo para estos pensadores los problemas morales, la corrupción política y la pauperización de las clases populares fueron los síntomas de una crisis nacional provocada por el exceso de extranjerización y menoscabo de la raza.

El artículo se organiza en cuatro apartados. En el primero se analizan las características biológicas y morales que, según los ensayistas, conformaron la particularidad de la "raza chilena". En el segundo se examinan los elementos que se presentaron como los causantes de la crisis racial, y por ende, nacional. En el tercero se hace referencia al nacionalismo político y económico que postularon los ensayistas como crítica al capitalismo y la oligarquía extranjerizada. Y por último, se presentan las conclusiones del trabajo y los vacíos que darán la oportunidad a formular nuevos análisis respecto al tema tratado.

⁶ Véase en Bernardo Subercaseaux: *Tiempo nacional e integración. Etapas en la construcción de la identidad nacional chilena*, en Francisco Colom (ed.): *Relatos de nación. La construcción de las identidades nacionales en el mundo hispánico. Tomo II, España, Iberoamericana*, 2005, 647-61; Cristian Gazmuri: *Testimonios de una crisis. Chile: 1900-1925*, Chile, Editorial Universitaria, 1979; Mariana Aylwin - Carlos Bascuñán - Sofía Correa - Sol Serrano - Matías Tagle - Cristian Gazmuri: *Chile en el siglo XX*, Chile, Planeta, 14ª edición, 2012; Sofía Correa - Consuelo Figueroa - Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt - Manuel Vicuña - Claudio Rolle: *Historia del siglo XX chileno: Un balance paradójico*, Chile, Editorial Sudamericana, 4ª edición, 2001; Harold Blakemore: *Desde la Guerra del Pacífico*, en Leslie Bethell (ed.): *Chile desde la independencia*, Chile, Ediciones Universidad Católica Silva Henríquez y Cambridge University Press, 2009, 47-110.

LA RAZA CHILENA

A fines del siglo XIX y principios del XX surgieron una serie de movimientos sociales que reivindicaron mejoras en las condiciones de vida e hicieron público los problemas sociales de los cuales no se hizo cargo el Estado⁷. Fue en este contexto, en el que aparecieron un sinnúmero de discursos y publicaciones que abogaron por incorporar nuevos sectores sociales y étnicos en las políticas públicas y culturales. Este cambio político afectó al funcionamiento del Estado chileno y reformuló la idea de nación en una mezcla de connotaciones biológicas y culturales, donde ahora se conformaba también con los sectores populares⁸.

La Generación del Centenario fue un grupo heterogéneo profesionalmente. Entre ellos destacaron abogados, líderes políticos, profesores, ingenieros, periodistas y filósofos, quienes reflexionaron sobre la negativa realidad del país desde su área de especialización. Según Javier Pinedo, como representantes de las capas medias de provincia estos nuevos ensayistas analizaron problemas concretos como la pobreza, la crisis económica y las malas condiciones de vida, rehuendo de la exposición doctrinaria decimonónica en que primaron las interpretaciones ideológicas y filosóficas del pensamiento político con escasa alusión a la realidad inmediata⁹. Estos intelectuales estuvieron profundamente influidos por la generación española del 98, el evolucionismo de Darwin y Spencer y las ideas positivistas de los pensadores social-darwinistas encontradas en Gobineau, Taine, Laboulaye, Vacher de Lapouge y Gustave Le Bon. En estos autores, según Bernardo Subercaseaux, descubrieron la idea de “la nación como una colectividad humana descrita en términos de un conjunto histórico, biológico y racial”¹⁰.

El proceso de integración en el discurso racial de la identidad chilena también estuvo asociada con la idea de homogenización. La construcción de la nación en Chile mostró una falta de densidad intelectual, donde la descripción de rasgos biológicos se unieron a creencias, tradiciones y valores culturales que – se supone – poseían la gran mayoría de los chilenos. Para dar forma a este discurso se desarrollaron tres áreas específicas. Primero, se explicó el origen de la raza chilena, resaltando la pureza y superioridad étnica de sus antepasados. Segundo, se describió las características físicas de la mayoría de los chilenos, enfatizando en los aspectos positivos de los rasgos biológicos. Y, por último, se presentaron cualidades subjetivas de la personalidad del chileno como parte esencial del desarrollo de costumbres y prácticas cotidianas.

⁷ Correa – Figueroa – Jocelyn-Holt – Vicuña – Rolle: *Historia del siglo XX chileno*, 24.

⁸ Subercaseaux: *Tiempo nacional e integración*, 647.

⁹ Javier Pinedo: *Apuntes para un mapa intelectual de Chile durante el centenario: 1900–1925*, *América sin nombre*, 16, 2011, 30.

¹⁰ Subercaseaux: *Historia de las ideas. Tomo IV*, 57.

El concepto de raza chilena fue utilizado por primera vez durante la Guerra del Pacífico, también conocida como la guerra del salitre, que enfrentó a Chile contra Perú y Bolivia entre 1879 y 1884. En este periodo el conflicto fue catalogado como una "lucha de razas" donde su principal promotor, el historiador y político Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, caracterizó a los chilenos como una raza "activa, vigorosa e inteligente", en detrimento de los peruanos y bolivianos que calificó como una "raza inferior" por ser "perezosa, muelle, desmoralizada por el clima y el ocio"¹¹. Así, el primer uso del término hizo alusión a los factores positivos de la población en un contexto bélico donde la unidad nacional fue vital para continuar la batalla. La diferencia con los ensayistas del centenario fue que a principios del siglo XX, por primera vez, se reformuló el concepto con base en las problemáticas internas que vivía el país, donde se resaltaron los errores de la administración pública, de las elites gobernantes y de las políticas culturales. En definitiva, fue un diagnóstico crítico del proyecto país.

La Generación del Centenario sostuvo que Chile se componía de características raciales particulares, exaltando la idea de un tipo étnico superior basado en la idea de la mezcla. Para el médico oriundo de Santa Cruz, Nicolás Palacios, la raza chilena era mestiza con elementos del conquistador español y del araucano. Según el libro *La Raza Chilena*, "el padre de la raza", como lo llama el autor, fue un conquistador de rasgos godos, "descendiente directos de aquellos bárbaros rubios, guerreros y conquistadores", prototipo de una raza teutónica, germana, digna de orgullo¹². La base de este argumento se concentró sólo en el análisis de retratos de los conquistadores españoles como Pedro de Valdivia, donde Palacios señala: "puedo asegurar que a lo sumo el diez por ciento de ellos presentan signos de mestizaje con la raza autóctona de España, con la raza iberia; el resto es de pura sangre teutona"¹³.

Por su parte, la "madre de la raza" era la sangre araucana. Según Palacios, la influencia mapuche la aportaron las mujeres porque toda raza nacía de "la conjunción del elemento masculino del vencedor con el femenino del vencido, cumpliéndose así la sentencia bíblica de que la mujer vengará su raza"¹⁴. De este modo, se desarrollaba la fórmula de una nueva identidad digna de estar orgulloso como descendiente. Para el médico, el pueblo chileno era de una raza superior "Araucano-Gótico" y si alguien osaba en cuestionar esta afirmación debía tener "preparación científica suficiente, pues estas materias no pueden tratarse con declamaciones ni con el mero auxilio de la literatura"¹⁵.

¹¹ Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna: *Historia de la Campaña de Tarapacá*, Vol. I, Chile, Imprenta y Litografía de Pedro Cadot, 1880, 33-34.

¹² Nicolás Palacios: *Raza chilena: libro escrito por un chileno y para chilenos*, Chile, Editorial Chilena, 1904, 35.

¹³ Palacios: ob. cit. 36.

¹⁴ Palacios: ob. cit. 51.

¹⁵ Palacios: ob. cit. 36.

A diferencia de México y Brasil, donde la influencia indígena fue fundamental para la construcción de discursos raciales a partir de 1900, en Chile sucedió lo contrario¹⁶. La Generación del Centenario se esforzó por incluir rasgos – idealizados – del pasado Mapuche en el concepto de raza, pero no integró al indígena contemporáneo al nuevo discurso en construcción. El descarte del pueblo mapuche cotidiano y presente fue la continuación de una política de exclusión llevada a cabo por el Estado y los intelectuales. Según Jorge Pinto, la creación de la provincia de Arauco en 1852, la expropiación de tierras, la intervención del ejército chileno y argentino, el poblamiento de colonos en territorios indígenas y la educación de los pueblos originarios generó que el Estado de fines del siglo XIX asentara las bases de una nación que no admitió ni la diversidad ni el respeto por formas culturales ajenas a la racionalidad occidental¹⁷. Se uniformó el país aplastando expresiones culturales.

Nicolás Palacios describió las características físicas de la raza chilena como una fisonomía bastante uniforme en tallas y facciones, argumentando que esto se debía a la pureza racial de araucanos y godos. Según el ensayista, el 70% de la población chilena posee el cabello rubio o castaño durante su niñez, pero se oscurece entre los 7 y los 15 años, a su vez, es liso y poco flexible. Sus ojos son “amarillentos o verdosos sombríos”, su color de piel “es más oscuro que el de las razas blancas de Europa”, sus labios son de dimensiones normales, el dorso de la nariz es sinuoso, sus ojos horizontales, cejas caídas y su frente es pequeña¹⁸. En definitiva, el médico concluye que “el aspecto general de la fisonomía [del chileno] no es la del hombre buen mozo. Sin ser verdaderamente prognato, su cara es algo grande relativamente a la cabeza; es megalognato”¹⁹. El argumento de la *Raza Chilena* se legitimaba a través de su “aspiración científica”, es por esto que las descripciones enunciadas se acompañaban con datos como el promedio de estatura del hombre (1.66 m) y de la mujer (1.54 m), el índice orbitario (86 ml) o el índice nasal (47 ml). La intención de este tipo de trabajos, según Andrea Kottow, fue “proponer una modernidad reformulada desde lo que se considera el paradigma científico por excelencia, siguiendo así a los positivistas que orientaron su mirada en la biología”²⁰.

¹⁶ Para el caso de Brasil véase Gilberto Freyre: *Casa-grande y Senzala. La formación de la familia brasileña en un régimen de economía patriarcal*, Argentina, Emecé Editores, 1943; y para el caso de México véase Manuel Gamio: *Forjando Patria*, México, Editorial Porrúa, 1916.

¹⁷ Jorge Pinto: *De la inclusión a la exclusión: la formación del Estado, la nación y el pueblo Mapuche*, Chile, Editorial Universidad de Santiago de Chile, 2000, 208–209.

¹⁸ Palacios: *Raza chilena*, 213–15.

¹⁹ Palacios: ob. cit. 215.

²⁰ Andrea Kottow: Tramas inmunitarias en la modernidad chilena: raza, salud y porvenir en *Raza Chilena* de Nicolás Palacios y *Casa Grande* de Luis Orrego Luco, *Anales de la Literatura Chilena*, 23, 2015, 48.

La argumentación seudocientífica de la Generación del Centenario, señala Bernardo Subercaseaux, vino acompañada de ideas impresionistas que postularon la unidad nacional y la integración en una raza de rasgos peculiares²¹. De este modo, el discurso de racionalidad científica se vinculó con una invención emocional que dieron sentido a representaciones que buscaron presentarse como rasgos naturales del chileno común. De ahí que estos discursos tuvieron un alto impacto en la sociedad chilena, no por su valor real, sino por su capacidad de reconocimiento y legitimación social. Así, una vez presentada los rasgos físicos concretos de la "raza chilena", se incluyeron ciertas cualidades subjetivas de la personalidad general del país que se tomaron como una realidad intrínseca de los nacidos en Chile.

La valentía y la resistencia fueron conceptos frecuentes en la historia de confrontación entre españoles y mapuches desde la época colonial. Estos elementos fueron rasgos característicos de la raza chilena para toda la Generación del Centenario. Por ejemplo, el profesor y periodista nacido en Talca, Tancredo Pinochet, reseñó: "Somos valientes. Registramos en nuestra historia guerrera heroísmos de los más puros y grandiosos que puedan ufanarse los anales de la guerra de la humanidad. Y esta valentía y este amor a la libertad no podrán desaparecer tan luego, pues tienen sus raíces allá en la cuna de nuestra raza, en los hijos de Arauco"²². Por su parte, el profesor de Melipilla Alejandro Venegas, quien firmaba sus trabajos con el seudónimo de Dr. Valdes Cange, postuló que el heroísmo del pueblo mapuche existió en la época colonial, pero que en el nuevo contexto moderno estos valores se degeneraron, perdiendo parte esencial de su identidad. El autor señala: "La antigua Araucanía fue conquistada a sangre y fuego por nuestro ejército que, provisto de mejores elementos bélicos que sus predecesores, los soldados de la península, no encontró en los mapuches, ya degenerados, aquella resistencia heroica y obstinada que cantó Ercilla"²³.

Todos los ensayistas de este periodo coincidieron que los chilenos poseían una alta moral en el periodo colonial y a inicios de la independencia. Señalaban que había un conjunto de costumbres y normas sociales que eran el camino hacia el progreso nacional. El abogado de Linares, Francisco Antonio Encina, por ejemplo, señaló: "la evolución moral del pueblo chileno, especialmente de sus capas superiores, adquiere proporciones vertiginosas. La moralidad se eleva en una forma desconocida en la historia de los pueblos"²⁴. Toda esta construcción discursiva se manifestaba en el rescate de tradiciones

²¹ Subercaseaux: *Historia de las ideas. Tomo IV*, 93.

²² Tancredo Pinochet: *La conquista de Chile en el siglo XX*, Chile, Imprenta, Litografía y Encuadernación La Ilustración, 1909, 188.

²³ Alejandro Venegas (Dr. Valdes Cange): *Sinceridad. Chile íntimo en 1910*, Chile, Imprenta Universitaria, 1910, 171.

²⁴ Francisco Encina: *Nuestra inferioridad económica. Sus causas y consecuencias*, Chile, Imprenta Universitaria, 1911, 122.

superiores como el espíritu guerrero, la valentía y la alta moral. La imagen de nación se proyectaba desde un nuevo nacionalismo con ideas integradoras y proyecciones futuras que readecuaban la identidad nacional vigente en ese momento.

La reformulación del mito del carácter nacional generado por estos ensayistas se asoció a la reflexión sobre la crisis de la raza chilena a inicios del siglo XX. La religión, las disímiles condiciones de vida de las clases sociales, la aceptación de inmigrantes, entre otros elementos, fueron las grandes causas, según esta generación, de la crisis racial que golpeaba a Chile. De este modo, no sólo se podía describir las características positivas que formaban la raza chilena, sino que también había que denunciar los problemas que aquejaban y debilitaban la identidad nacional.

LA CRISIS NACIONAL

La idea de raza chilena fue permeada por una sensación general de crisis. La Generación del Centenario describió desde diferentes perspectivas de análisis cuáles fueron los problemas que aquejaban a la nación. Se observan cuatro problemáticas transversales identificadas por todos los ensayistas: la cuestión religiosa, los vicios de la clase obrera, la extranjerización de la elite y el problema de la inmigración. Según Javier Pinedo, junto con establecer las causas que afectaron moralmente a Chile y sus habitantes, también “se trata de un discurso para ocultar las diferencias de clases a través de una supuesta igualdad identitaria nacional”²⁵.

La cuestión religiosa fue uno de los elementos que constituía la crisis nacional que vivía Chile. Según el tipógrafo y líder obrero nacido en Valparaíso, Luis Emilio Recabarren, el fanatismo religioso no tenía hábitos virtuosos, sino más bien sólo creaba fanáticos de una doctrina teórica sin moral amparada por el Estado. En su discurso de 1910 señaló: “después de la ceremonia [del matrimonio] se entregan, en la miserable vivienda, a la borrachera desenfundada y libertina llena de inmoralidades. El bautizo religioso de los niños ha sido siempre un motivo de borrachera con todo su natural cortejo de degradación”²⁶. Con esto el líder obrero mostraba que el catolicismo no ayudaba al progreso moral del país, ayudando, incluso al aumento del vicio en la sociedad.

Por su parte, el economista e ingeniero civil, Guillermo Subercaseaux, mostraba que la cuestión religiosa se transformó en el debate y preocupación

²⁵ Pinedo, Apuntes, 36.

²⁶ Luis Emilio Recabarren: Ricos y pobres a través de un siglo de vida republicana, en Julio César Jobet – Luis Vitale – José Barría (Comps.), *Luis Emilio Recabarren. Obras selectas*, Chile, Editorial Quimantú, 1971, 256.

fundamental de la elite nacional y sus partidos políticos, dejando de lado la organización social y del Estado. Para el economista, el Partido Conservador sólo se preocupaba de mantener una relación activa entre la Iglesia y el Estado, mientras que el Partido Liberal y el Partido Radical buscaban reformar esta dependencia. De este modo, la estabilidad ministerial, la política internacional, la condición intelectual y económica de los obreros, entre muchos otros temas, fueron subordinados al debate doctrinario. En este contexto, Subercaseaux señaló que mantener la religión católica "es impropia de un pueblo progresista; manifiesta un estado de baja cultura que repugna a cualquier espíritu impregnado de los ideales morales y económicos de la época contemporánea", más adelante continuó su crítica expresando que el aislamiento geográfico también es causante del atraso, "encerrados entre el mar y la montaña nos hemos aislados de los verdaderos ideales del progreso moderno; y siguiendo por este camino corremos el peligro de quedarnos atrás en la civilización americana"²⁷. Como solución a este problema, el autor propuso la libertad de conciencia sin resistencia política de los partidos y de la Iglesia.

Los vicios fueron vistos como otro problema que aquejó fuertemente a las clases populares de principios del siglo XX. Para los ensayistas del Centenario, la prostitución, el alcoholismo, las enfermedades venéreas, la mortalidad infantil y la adicción a los juegos de azar, fueron los grandes males que degeneraron la raza chilena. Según Francisco Encina, todas estas dificultades tenían efectos directos sobre la raza y derivaban de las irregularidades del desarrollo social. Sin embargo, también observó que la pronta muerte de personas a causa del vicio era un aspecto positivo, pues "evita que nuestro país se llene de criminales, locos y enfermos"²⁸. Para el autor de *Nuestra inferioridad económica* la única solución a estos problemas fue consolidar una enseñanza de tipo racional en todo el país. Abandonar las profesiones liberales y promover la lectura, la educación física, la manufactura y el comercio, ya que "las inclinaciones y aptitudes de la raza van por caminos muy diversos de aquellos que la naturaleza trazó a sus destinos"²⁹. Según Marco Antonio León, la idea fue controlar todos los aspectos de la vida del trabajador, enseñar el respeto a las jerarquías sociales y alejarlos de los vicios, difundiendo valores morales como el trabajo, la honradez y la familia³⁰.

Para Luis Emilio Recabarren el aumento del vicio y del crimen tenía relación inmediata con el progreso económico de la burguesía. El conventillo, aquella casa de varias habitaciones donde se hacinaban numerosos grupos de

²⁷ Guillermo Subercaseaux: *Los ideales nacionalistas. Ante el doctrinarismo de nuestros partidos políticos históricos*, Chile, Imprenta Universitaria, 1918, 15.

²⁸ Encina: *Nuestra inferioridad económica*, 101.

²⁹ Encina: ob. cit. 103.

³⁰ Marco Antonio León: *Construyendo un sujeto criminal. Criminología, criminalidad, y sociedad en Chile. Siglos XIX y XX*, Chile, Editorial Universitaria, 33.

escasos recursos económicos, era la escuela del vicio y el crimen. En palabras del líder obrero, “los niños se deleitan en su iniciación viciosa empujados por el delictuoso ejemplo de sus padres cargados de vicios y defectos. El conventillo y los suburbios son la antesala del prostíbulo y de la taberna”³¹. El autor se pregunta reiteradamente por qué en cien años de vida republicana existían esos “antros de degeneración” que iban aumentando a mayor incremento de la población³². La respuesta era clara: gran parte de la elite santiaguina era dueña de este tipo de viviendas, por lo que en ellos recaía la responsabilidad de la degeneración moral a la cual hizo referencia Recabarren.

En *Los ideales nacionalistas* el alcoholismo, la carencia de condiciones higiénicas y la falta de cultura aparecen como un vergüenza y una traba para el desarrollo de un “nacionalismo fuerte”. Sin buscar culpables de las deplorables condiciones de vida de los obreros, Subercaseaux postuló desarrollar una nueva legislación social que incluyera penas de cárcel “a elementos malsanos como anarquistas, los vagos, los enfermos y degenerados”³³. Sin embargo, lo más importante era crear “leyes adecuadas a las condiciones de nuestra patria, evitando de esta manera la trasplatación inconsulta de las adoptadas en los otros países”³⁴. La crítica apuntó hacia la fuerte influencia extranjera que permeaba todos los ámbitos de la vida nacional en ese momento, dejando sin espacio a discursos surgidos y creados en Chile.

La extranjerización de la elite fue parte de las características que propiciaron la crisis nacional según los ensayistas. Tancredo Pinochet señaló que muchos estudiantes se connaturalizaban en el extranjero, siendo tan influenciados que a su regreso ya no reconocían su propio país. La influencia de las grandes potencias llegó a tal extremo que el consumo de artículos traídos del exterior representaba el nivel de riqueza y sofisticación de estos grupos sociales, mientras que en sus prácticas cotidianas abundaban lecturas, comidas y vestimentas forasteras³⁵. En palabras del periodista chileno, el gran problema fue que “está ya en el alma de la raza el desprecio por lo nacional”³⁶.

La elite nacional de inicios del siglo XX imitó, lo más rápido posible, las modas de las clases prominentes francesas. La idea fue, según Manuel Vicuña, resaltar “en forma simbólica la diferencia de rango existente entre los detentores del poder y los desposeídos”³⁷. Para la Generación del Centenario

³¹ Recabarren: Ricos y pobres, 254.

³² Recabarren: ob. cit. 175.

³³ Subercaseaux: *Los ideales nacionalistas*, 28.

³⁴ Subercaseaux: ob. cit. 28.

³⁵ Para profundizar sobre el desarrollo de la oligarquía chilena y sus formas de comportamiento véase Manuel Vicuña: *El París Americano. La Oligarquía chilena como actor urbano en el siglo XIX*, Chile, Universidad Finis Terrae y Museo Histórico Nacional, 1996.

³⁶ Pinochet: *La conquista de Chile*, 94.

³⁷ Manuel Vicuña: *La belle époque chilena. Alta sociedad y mujeres de élite*, Chile, Catalonia, 2010, 36.

el afrancesamiento de la alta sociedad mostraba la intención de supremacía con el resto de las clases sociales, y, a su vez, redundaba en el distanciamiento de elementos característicos de la identidad nacional. Recabarren fue enfático en señalar que las clases populares no tenían nada que celebrar en cien años de república, sino más bien debían entristecerse al ver como la elite gozaba de la fortuna chilena mientras aumentaba la inequidad entre clases sociales. En su discurso *Ricos y pobres* señaló:

¡Celebrar la emancipación política del pueblo! Yo considero un sarcasmo esta expresión. Es quizás una burla irónica. Es algo así como cuando nuestros burguesitos exclaman: El soberano pueblo...! cuando ven a hombres que visten andrajos, poncho y chupalla. Que se celebre la emancipación política de la clase capitalista, que disfruta de las riquezas nacionales, todo eso está muy puesto en razón³⁸.

Por último, la emigración extranjera y la raza fue otro problema analizado por los ensayistas del Centenario. El incremento de mano de obra foránea no sólo se vio como una amenaza para los trabajadores nacionales, sino también como una trasgresión directa hacia la pureza de la raza chilena. Nicolás Palacios señaló como una aberración admitir extranjeros en Chile, pues ninguna doctrina sociológica de ese momento creía en la pluralidad de raza como factor de progreso, ya que "la organización social está fundada en la cooperación voluntaria de sus individuos, y ésta sólo es posible cuando sus pasiones, sus sentimientos, su modo de pensar, etc., su alma es semejante, esto es, cuando sus individuos pertenecen a un mismo grupo étnico, cuando son de la misma raza sicológica"³⁹. En este sentido, para el autor era una necesidad poner coto a la inmigración porque el pluralismo étnico estaba directamente asociado al atraso nacional.

Tancredo Pinochet también pensaba que la inmigración hacía peligrar la raza chilena. Por lo mismo, presentó una crítica a las políticas de gobierno interesadas en difundir y apoyar la colonización extranjera en Chile, ya que según el autor este tipo de programa sólo provocaban el quebranto de la unidad nacional. El autor escribió: "nosotros debemos acusar como un peligro nacional los centros de colonización extranjera de que principia a cubrirse nuestro país, y empeñarnos porque los elementos que los componen se pierdan en la raza chilena para seguir formando siempre un solo grupo nacional"⁴⁰. Así, el extranjero fue presentado como el principal causante de la degeneración de la raza y de la pérdida de la identidad nacional, señalando que el inmigrante cumple "la traicionera labor de precipitar la rendición de nuestra patria"⁴¹.

³⁸ Recabarren: *Ricos y pobres*, 262.

³⁹ Palacios: *Raza chilena*, 85-86.

⁴⁰ Pinochet: *La conquista de Chile*, 194.

⁴¹ Pinochet: ob. cit. 194.

Parte de los ensayistas analizados apoyaron la opción de la inmigración selectiva. En Chile desde 1850 se implementaron estímulos para el asentamiento de colonos alemanes en el sur, desarrollando una pequeña industria en la zona dedicado a los astilleros, aserraderos y elaboración de cervezas, que se percibieron como focos de progreso para el país⁴². El Dr. Valdes Cange comparó la colonización alemana con la italiana, inglesa y estadounidense, señalando que la fortaleza de los alemanes se encontraba en la semejanza de su raza con la chilena. En *Sinceridad* publicó: “al lado de estos inestables colonos [italianos, estadounidenses e ingleses] encontrareis, señor, los hijos de un pueblo fuerte, laborioso, frugal, aseado y económico, es decir con cualidades armónicas con la de nuestro pueblo y que las completan: ya comprenderéis que me estoy refiriendo al pueblo alemán”⁴³. En la Generación del Centenario, Alemania era el ejemplo de un proyecto modernizador basado en la industrialización y en el desarrollo de una cultura asentada en la afirmación nacional de sí misma, por lo que obviamente era el modelo a seguir para construir una identidad nacional propia⁴⁴.

La sinofobia se desarrolló en gran parte de Latinoamérica, generando persecuciones constantes, expulsiones masivas, violencia popular y política oficial de características racistas. Alentado por autoridades e intelectuales los chinos fueron estereotipados como sucios, plagados de enfermedades y adictos a los vicios, elementos suficientes para que sean representados como un peligro para cualquier raza nacional. Según Alan Knight, el sentimiento antichino “representó diversos y fuertes prejuicios ‘irracionales’, lo que sirvió para legitimar la persecución y prestarle justificación teórica”⁴⁵. En estas ideas se basó Guillermo Subercaseaux para señalar que era urgente dictar una ley que detenga la inmigración de “individuos de raza asiática, [ya que] presentan serios peligros, tanto por la competencia ruinosa que vienen a hacer a nuestros obreros cuanto porque representan una cultura que no se debe constituir para nosotros en un ideal”⁴⁶. En el lenguaje se puede notar la intención de seguir construyendo la idea de raza chilena, buscando modelos ideales de migrantes, de identidades nacionales y de patrones de comportamiento homogéneos.

Los problemas asociados a la raza chilena identificados por la Generación del Centenario tuvieron que ver con un proyecto a largo plazo donde se trató de reconstruir una nueva identidad nacional. La cuestión fue mostrar la

⁴² Carlos Sanhueza: *Chilenos en Alemania y alemanes en Chile*, Chile, Centro de Estudios Diego Barros Arana, 2006, 12–19.

⁴³ Valdes: *Sinceridad*, 272.

⁴⁴ Bernardo Subercaseaux: *Historia de las ideas y la cultura en Chile. Tomo III*, Chile, Editorial Universitaria, 2010, 156–158.

⁴⁵ Alan Knight: Racismo, revolución e indigenismo: México, 1910–1940, en Alan Knight: *Repensar la Revolución Mexicana*, Vol. II, México, El Colegio de México, 2013, 92.

⁴⁶ Subercaseaux: *Los ideales nacionalistas*, 28.

pertenencia nacional estableciendo los mecanismos de inclusión y exclusión bajo un discurso racial. Esta preocupación se adhirió a propuestas económicas y políticas que abogaban por un ideal del nacionalismo desde todos los ámbitos.

NACIONALISMO ECONÓMICO Y POLÍTICO

Los ensayos presentados por los intelectuales del Centenario mostraron una construcción discursiva basada en ideas sociales y aspectos raciales, y también postularon un nacionalismo político y económico. El mayor ejemplo de ello, fue la fundación del Partido Nacionalista en 1914, creado por Tancredo Pinochet, Guillermo Subercaseaux, Francisco Antonio Encina, Luis Galdames y Alberto Edwards Vives. La propuesta programática fue instaurar un Estado fuerte, antiliberal, proteger la industria nacional, nacionalizar los recursos naturales y de la banca, así como separar la Iglesia y el Estado. Según Stefan Rinke "Chile comenzó 'a aceptar lo chileno' y a transformar tal aceptación en acción política [...] el objetivo fue reforzar el ejecutivo para garantizar la estabilidad política y un programa de nacionalismo económico"⁴⁷.

Para Guillermo Subercaseaux, Chile vivía una etapa de desgobierno reflejada en el régimen parlamentario y sus vicios políticos como la compra de votos, tráfico de influencias y la demora en la legislación de políticas públicas necesarias para los sectores populares⁴⁸. El economista postuló "el robustecimiento del Poder Ejecutivo, hasta implantar un régimen de Gobierno que dé garantías de estabilidad política y de eficaz acción administrativa, dentro de la más absoluta libertad electoral"⁴⁹. Más adelante, para justificar dicha propuesta señalaba que todos los problemas políticos también se relacionaban a la baja moral de los congresistas, quienes "suelen aprender a costa del país; y algunos hay de tan baja estirpe moral, que en vez de dedicarse al estudio de los negocios de interés público, sólo atienden a los que afectan su situación partidista, y, lo que es pero aun, sus negocios particulares"⁵⁰.

Por otro lado, según Tancredo Pinochet, la teoría política debía separarse de la conveniencia nacional. Es decir, para el periodista, Latinoamérica intentaba imitar ciertas ideologías como el liberalismo que sólo ayudaban a "los

⁴⁷ Stefan Rinke: *Cultura de masas: reforma y nacionalismo en Chile. 1910-1931*, Chile, Centro de Estudios Diego Barros Arana, 2002, 128.

⁴⁸ Gran parte de la crítica a la inestabilidad o desgobierno de Chile se sostenía en la rotativa ministerial que tuvieron los gobiernos parlamentarios durante el periodo de 1891 y 1925. Esta práctica consistió en que el Congreso Nacional, con su facultad de interpelación a los ministros de Estado, tenía la capacidad de destituirlos de su cargo, llegando al punto de cambiar de gabinete cada tres meses.

⁴⁹ Subercaseaux: *Los ideales nacionalistas*, 19.

⁵⁰ Subercaseaux: ob. cit. 19.

grandes imperios” a mantener cuotas de poder en los países pequeños. Por lo mismo, había que tomar “con más frecuencia el partido de la conveniencia, sin preguntarse si la razón abstracta los juzgará de ilógicos”⁵¹. La referencia se relaciona con el hecho de no seguir modelos políticos y democráticos extranjeros, sino más bien desarrollar cierta organización que responda a las necesidades políticas de Chile sin seguir parámetros ajenos.

La política nacionalista buscaba proponer una nueva forma de hacer política. Era la propuesta de funcionarios que realicen bien su trabajo, sin robos ni clientelismo, otorgar puestos administrativos por meritocracia y no por lazos familiares. Según el Dr. Valdes Cange, después de la victoria de la Guerra del Pacífico hubo una “relajación moral” de los políticos, señalando que “las clases gobernantes olvidaron los verdaderos intereses nacionales, para mirar solo los propios, se produjo un desquiciamiento general de los partidos que hasta entonces se habían disputado la dirección de los negocios públicos”⁵². El nacionalismo político se presentó como una postura antipartidista o bien como una opción a los partidos tradicionales. La idea fue presentar soluciones a los problemas nacionales prescindiendo de doctrinas ideológicas foráneas, religiosas o de negocios extranjeros.

El nacionalismo económico fue mucho más claro en estos intelectuales. Para éstos, el desarrollo industrial era precario, la presencia de capital extranjero desmedido y los sectores como la marina mercante, los ferrocarriles y la industria de papel estaban descuidadas por el Estado chileno. Cabe destacar que, como señala Stefan Rinke, a pesar de los discursos y propuestas que se publicaron a favor del nacionalismo económico, ésta sólo “siguió siendo teórica, dada la carencia de potencial industrial y de productos de exportación importantes en Chile”⁵³.

Francisco A. Encina presentó dos problemas fundamentales en la economía nacionalista. Primero, reprochó la pérdida de ganancias en manos del extranjero, tanto en las exportaciones como en el mercado interno. Con relación a esto, el economista sostuvo: “En menos de cincuenta años, el comerciante extranjero ahogó nuestra naciente iniciativa comercial en el exterior; y dentro de la propia casa, nos eliminó del tráfico internacional y nos reemplazó, en gran parte, en el comercio al detalle”⁵⁴. Segundo, criticó el consumo de bienes extranjeros en desmedro de la producción nacional, añadiendo que se pagaba con oro y plata chilena más de los dos tercios del extravagante consumo de la elite nacional. En palabras de Encina: la oligarquía “entrega al extranjero sus

⁵¹ Pinochet: *La conquista de Chile*, 37.

⁵² Valdes: *Sinceridad*, 42.

⁵³ Rinke: *Cultura de masas*, 144.

⁵⁴ Encina: *Nuestra inferioridad económica*, 15.

pertenencias por unos cuantos miles de pesos, para derrocharlos en Europa en atavíos y menajes, o en el mejor de los eventos, para vegetar a expensas de la renta en Santiago o invertirlos en fundos rústicos⁵⁵.

La solución de Encina para enfrentar el problema es de tres propuestas. Primero, dejar atrás la imitación de modelos económicos extranjeros, pues con ellos la sociedad nacional era subordinada a los países europeos. "La influencia económica del industrial y del comerciante extranjero – sostenía el economista –, aquí, como en todos los pueblos atrasados y de desarrollo débil, se tradujo en los fenómenos ya conocidos de estímulo a la actividad productora y desplazamiento del nacional"⁵⁶. Segundo, desarrollar un Estado fuerte que sea capaz de entregar capital y hacerse cargo de la producción agrícola y minera del país. La idea sería modernizar la producción agrícola y desarrollar mayor capacidad industrial. Por último, organizar un sistema educacional que fomente la instrucción técnica basada en las necesidades industriales del país que, según Javier Pinedo, "podemos denominar como un neopositivismo, práctico, antiintelectual y antiliberal"⁵⁷.

También se presentó la idea de modernizar las políticas económicas implementadas por el Estado. Para Tancredo Pinochet era necesario apoyar los capitales locales con un fácil acceso a créditos, con menores tasas fiscales y un proteccionismo económico basado en los impuestos de aduana. Sin embargo, lo principal era nacionalizar las materias primas y las industrias del país, ya que al igual que la mayoría de los intelectuales, Pinochet consideraba que el gran problema de la economía nacional era la fuga de capitales hacia Europa. En la *Conquista de Chile* escribió: "si nosotros no hacemos política de chilenización de las grandes riquezas nacionales, y si – lo que es más grave aún – continuamos en nuestra política de extranjerización de cuanto posee el país que tenga algún valor, no pasará el primer tercio del siglo sin haber marcado antes la desaparición de nuestra nacionalidad"⁵⁸. Es claro que el sentimiento patrio tenía que ver también con la administración de la mayor parte de los recursos nacionales del país, sino la nación también estaría en peligro.

Siguiendo la línea de toda la Generación del Centenario, Guillermo Subercaseaux planteó la idea depromover "la decidida protección a las industrias nacionales y el fomento y expansión de todas las fuentes productoras, por los medios más conducentes al alcance del Estado"⁵⁹. Para esto, el economista planteó siete formas en las cuales debía intervenir el Estado: a) desarrollar una educación práctica y técnica dirigida a obreros, comerciantes y emprendedo-

⁵⁵ Encina: ob. cit. 105.

⁵⁶ Encina: ob. cit. 140.

⁵⁷ Javier Pinedo: El pensamiento de los ensayistas y científicos sociales en los largos años 60 en Chile (1958–1973). Los herederos de Francisco A. Encina, *Atenea*, 492, 2005, 81.

⁵⁸ Pinochet: *La conquista de Chile*, 236.

⁵⁹ Subercaseaux: *Los ideales nacionalistas*, 22.

res; b) el deber del Estado de administrar las industrias fundamentales como el papel, las forestales, la siderurgia y la marina mercante; c) la construcción de obras de regadío artificial en los campos; d) la creación del Ministerio de Agricultura; e) el mejoramiento de caminos y la construcción de ferrocarriles; f) la creación de una Dirección General de Organización de la industria salitrera; y g) la creación del Cuerpo de Ingenieros en Minas para el estudio del subsuelo nacional⁶⁰. La idea fue desarrollar una buena administración que consolide la economía del país y, con ello, sentimiento nacional de Chile.

La economía nacionalista fue parte del entramado discursivo hecho por los ensayistas del Centenario para desarrollar el resurgimiento de la “raza chilena”. Fueron nuevas ideas que sustituyeron al liberalismo, en específico el *laissez faire*, para educar y transformar la vida de las clases populares del país, proponiendo que el Estado sea el mediador entre la desigual relación de capital y trabajo.

CONSIDERACIONES FINALES

La raza chilena fue un mito nacional hecho a partir de la combinación de elementos físicos, prejuicios sociales y construcción de imaginaria. La idea fue que a través de formas sofisticadas de pensamiento se generara un discurso nacional que integrara a los sectores sociales olvidados por el Estado chileno. De este modo, se puede interpretar que la construcción discursiva de una identidad nacional hecha por la Generación del Centenario respondió a una necesidad política que se adelantó a los representantes de los partidos tradicionales, como el Conservador, Radical y Liberal, actuando de manera paralela al Estado oligárquico chileno.

Los vicios, la religión, la influencia extranjera y la inmigración fueron los grandes males que afectaron a la raza chilena. Según Marcelo Sánchez, la pobreza y el estado de deterioro de los campesinos y obreros del país era visto por parte de la elite como un proceso de degeneración racial que provenía directamente de la irresponsabilidad de las familia pobres⁶¹. Sin embargo, los ensayistas del Centenario responsabilizaron a la elite gobernante como los causantes de la degeneración moral que afligía a los chilenos, mostrando entre las causas el extremo afrancesamiento de su cultura, el descuido de la política nacional, la falta de exclusión extranjera en todos los ámbitos sociales del país y las pocas propuestas políticas que encaminaran a Chile hacia una unidad nacional. A partir de este diagnóstico, los intelectuales de la crisis

⁶⁰ Subercaseaux: ob. cit. 22–25.

⁶¹ Marcelo Sánchez: La teoría de la degeneración en Chile (1892–1915), en César Leyton – Cristian Palacios – Marcelo Sánchez (eds.): *Bulevar de los pobres. Racismo científico, higiene y eugenesia en Chile e Iberoamérica*, Chile, Ocho Libros Editores, 2015, 59.

postularon la reconstrucción de una nueva identidad nacional, la cual estaba relacionada a una reformulación de la política y a la búsqueda de nuevos representantes.

Las contradicciones en el pensamiento racista fue algo recurrente y los ensayistas chilenos no fueron la excepción. De este modo, por ejemplo, se puede advertir lo incoherente que resulta la defensa de la raza nacional frente a la influencia extranjera a través de los inmigrantes, cuando resaltan y valoran el mestizaje. O, por otro lado, observar la fuerte crítica al afrancesamiento que daña lo nacional, pero aprecian y siguen como guía al modelo británico. Si bien estas inconsistencias son típicas, demuestran las endebles bases en las cuales se asentó el discurso racial.

El problema de la raza chilena permeó todos los ámbitos de la sociedad, ya que en la construcción de este discurso también estaba en juego la idea de nación y la forma de gobernabilidad que cierta parte del país buscaba. Problemas como éste muestra que es necesario seguir profundizando en este tipo de estudios, donde categorías como raza, nación y nacionalismo deben ser analizados en los diversos debates económicos, políticos, historiográficos, artísticos y científicos que se dieron en distintos periodos en Chile. Aunque existen algunas investigaciones, aún son pocas para iniciar un debate complejo que ayude a comprender los motivos de los actuales discursos xenófobos de la política chilena y su elite.

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II. SOUTHERN EUROPE AND EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

IBERIANISM, NATIONALISM AND (LITERARY) REGENERATION: A CHAPTER FOR A COMPARATIVE IBERIAN LITERARY HISTORY¹



SANTIAGO PÉREZ ISASI

ABSTRACT

This paper will focus on the ideas of decadence and regeneration in the Iberian context, and the way in which they were shaped in different Iberian cultural spaces. The idea of decadence has been predominant in Iberian cultures from at least the mid-19th century; several works published from 1950 onwards, in both Portugal and Spain (including Catalonia, Galicia, the Basque Country) have tried to offer different solutions to this decadence, through cultural and literary means. In this paper, I will examine some of these literary manifestations of the idea of decadence and regeneration, proposing a comparative approach that goes beyond mere supranational juxtaposition and shows how the Iberian framework enlightens new aspects of these ideas.

Keywords: nationalism, literary history, Iberian literature, decadence, regeneration.

INTRODUCTION: LITERARY AND CULTURAL IBERIAN STUDIES

To a great extent, the birth and development of nationalism has shaped European and world history during the last two centuries; not only that,

¹ This paper is a result of my ongoing project "Nationalism and Literary Regenerations in the Iberian Peninsula (1868–1936)" [Ref: IF/00838/2014] funded by the Portuguese Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia.

but it has also shaped the scientific and academic disciplines devoted to understanding and explaining such history. The creation of departments and disciplines of French, German, Spanish and Portuguese language, literature and history has greatly conditioned the way in which knowledge has been constructed, organized and disseminated. Furthermore, the close link between a national-construction project and the production of a national (literary) history puts into question the scientificity (if there ever was such thing) of these historiographical enterprises.

In recent (and not so recent) times, this connection between national identity and academic knowledge has been put into question, challenged and subverted: from Comparative Literature to Area Studies; from Transatlantic Studies to World Literature. This paper is located in one of those supranational fields: literary and cultural Iberian Studies. This is a field which still has a doubtful epistemological position (sometimes located within Comparative Literature, at other times within Cultural Studies, and sometimes identified as a branch of Area Studies²), but with a growing recognition and theoretical and methodological cohesion. This can be seen in the number of conferences, projects and publications devoted to this field, particularly when these publications have the impact and importance of the *Routledge Companion to Iberian Studies*³ or the two volumes of the *Comparative History of Literatures in the Iberian Peninsula*⁴, to which I will refer again later on.

The common ground of all these scientific efforts, which emerged on both sides of the Atlantic, is the reconsideration of the Iberian Peninsula as a complex geocultural space, bound together by strong historical and cultural ties, but characterized, at the same time, by its multilingualism and cultural heterogeneity. It is important, in fact, to stress the rizhomatic or

² In fact, Area Studies are, in their 21st-century manifestation, deeply in debt to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's proposals, one of the key topics outlined by the American Comparative Literature Association in their *report on the discipline* of 2014: "While the term 'critical regionalism' does not yet seem to have been widely adopted as a name for this kind of critical agenda, I would argue that it is in fact indicative of a general trend in literary scholarship over the past decade: the pursuit of new (or renewed) geographies that go beyond the nation but resist the centrifugal pull, the temptation, of 'the world'." Cristopher Bush: *Areas: Bigger than the Nation, Smaller than the World*, ACLA 'State of the Discipline' Report, ACLA (2014), <http://stateofthediscipline.acla.org/entry/areas-bigger-nation-smaller-world>, (Accessed 8th September, 2017).

³ Javier Muñoz-Basols – Laura Lonsdale – Manuel Delgado: *The Routledge Companion to Iberian Studies*, London – New York, Routledge, 2017.

⁴ Fernando Cabo Aseguinolaza – Anxo Abuín González – César Domínguez (coords.), *A Comparative History of Literatures in the Iberian Peninsula*, Vol. 1, Amsterdam – Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 2010; César Domínguez – Anxo Abuín González – Ellen Sapega, *A Comparative History of Literatures in the Iberian Peninsula*, Vol. 2, Amsterdam – Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 2016.

“prismatic” character of current Iberian Studies,⁵ which reject the traditional contraposition (or, in the worst case, juxtaposition) of Spain and Portugal, or of Madrid and Lisbon as their representatives; alternatively, Iberian Studies propose a complex and multicentric view of the Iberian cultural space, considered as an “interliterary polysystem” (following Dionýz Ďurišin⁶ and Itamar Even-Zohar’s proposals⁷). Arturo Casas, for instance, argues that:

De hecho, el espacio geocultural ibérico admitiría ser estudiado como un ejemplo de (*macro*) *polisistema*, entendido este, al modo de Even-Zohar, como un grupo de literaturas nacionales vinculadas históricamente que mantienen entre sí una serie de relaciones jerárquicas y de flujos repertoriales o interferencias.⁸

While these considerations apply, theoretically at least, to the whole extent of historical Iberian relations, they are particularly fitting to the period between the mid-19th century and early 20th century: a period in which interactions and exchanges were particularly frequent, intense and fruitful.⁹ The numerous studies published about this period so far are mostly *rappports de fait*, in the sense that they compile facts and objective productions that manifest these Iberian relations: writers’ encounters and correspondence, multicultural or multilingual publications, mutual translations, travels through the Iberian Peninsula or literary works that show an Iberian or Iberianist intention.

⁵ The term „prismatic” is owed to Helena Buescu, and applies to current Comparative Literature in general: “A perspectiva eminentemente comparatista que aquidefendo da literatura-mundo permite passar de umavisão contrastiva e binária (por exemplo Eça e Flaubert, ou Eça e Machado, o famoso ‘e’ da primitiva tradição comparatista) a umavisãomais prismática, em que não faz sentido um gesto exclusivista”. [The eminently comparative perspective I defend for World-literature allows us to go from a contrastive and binarian vision (for instance, Eça and Flaubert, or Eça and Machado, the famous “and” of the primitive comparative tradition) to a more prismatic vision, in which the exclusivist gesture makes no sense]. Helena Buescu: *Experiência do Incomum e Boa Vizinhança. Literatura Comparada e Literatura-Mundo*, Porto, Porto Editora, 2013, 16. All translations from Spanish, Portuguese or Catalan texts are my own.

⁶ Dionýz Ďurišin: *Theory of Interliterary Process*, Bratislava, Veda – Publishing House of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, 1988.

⁷ Itamar Even-Zohar: Polysystem Theory, *Poetics Today*, No.1, 1979, 287–310.

⁸ “In fact, the Iberian geocultural space could be studied as an example of (*macro*) *polisystem*, understood, as Even-Zohar proposes, as a group of national literatures which are historically linked and which maintain que mantienen entre sí una serie de relaciones jerárquicas y de flujos repertoriales o interferencias”. Arturo Casas: Sistema interliterario y planificación historiográfica a propósito del espacio geocultural ibérico, *Interlitteraria*, No. 8, 2003, 73–4.

⁹ The 60 years known as the “Dual Monarchy” (1580–1640), in which the Habsburgs reigned in both Spain and Portugal, has also attracted the attention of Iberian Studies scholars for obvious political and cultural reasons. Other historical moments (for example, the Middle Ages, the 18th century or the second half of the 20th century) are still almost unexplored from the point of view of Iberian Studies.

Without negating the value of such studies, I would suggest that there is still the need to go further in the comprehension of Iberian interliterary relations (to continue with Āurišin's terminology), which goes beyond the effective contacts between people and texts. This new approach, which would be "prismatic" in the sense invoked by Helena Buescu, would investigate all these facts and documents in the light of a systemic comprehension of the cultural exchanges, and highlight common phenomena and common processes, with or without strict chronological simultaneity, with or without mutual contamination.¹⁰

This is the methodology that I will try to apply in this paper: without, of course, abandoning the consideration of concrete and objectifiable contacts and influences between Spanish and Portuguese writers, I would like to explore the possibility of writing a chapter of a comparative history of Iberian literatures, a chapter which would show how the idea of literary decadence and regeneration, common at the end of the 19th century, was deeply conditioned by the development of national construction processes in the same period. It is not my intention to establish a mechanical and one-directional link between politics and literature (between literary history and national identity) but to highlight the complex connections between those areas as an object of study for future (and more extensive) research.

BEFORE REGENERATION: DECADENCE

The connection between the appearance of literary historiography and the emergence of national construction movements is, by now, well established¹¹. Although both nationalism and literary history had their antecedents and precursors,¹² it is only after what Pascale Casanova calls the "herderian

¹⁰ I am not, of course, the first one or the only one to propose such an approach. Antonio Sez Delgado, for example, proposes a similar methodology, moving away from the mere recollection of direct influences and interferences and pointing to future lines of research. Antonio Sez Delgado: *Relaciones literarias entre Portugal y Espaa 1890–1936: hacia un Nuevo paradigma, 1616 – Anuario de Literatura Comparada*, 4, 2014, 25–45.

¹¹ For example, in Itamar Even-Zohar: *The Role of Literature in the Making of the Nations of Europe: A Socio-Semiotic Study, Applied Semiotics/Semiotique Appliquee*, No. 1, 1996, 39–59.

¹² As J. Leersen puts it: „To sum-up: nationalism emerges in the nineteenth century from eighteenth-century roots: Herder's belief in the individuality of nations, Rousseau's belief in the sovereignty of the nation, a general discourse of national peculiarities and 'characters'. What changes from the eighteenth century to the nineteenth is this: an unprecedented imperial campaign mounted by Napoleon and fiercely resented outside France; [...] the rise of Romantic idealism which sees national character as a spiritual principle, a 'soul', rather than as a set of peculiarities; the Romantic belief that a nation's culture, and in particular its language, are the manifestation of its soul and essence; the historicist belief that all culture

revolution"¹³, that the circular link between national identity and literary history gets firmly rooted. The circularity of the relation could be defined as follows: firstly, a specific *Volksgeist* ("spirit of the people" or "national character") was defined for each nation – namely, by scholars such as the Schlegel brothers, but also following well established, traditional stereotypes –, the literary critic selected a group of works which more closely represented this national character, and displayed them in the form of teleological narration, that is, in the form of literary history; this literary history, in turn, served to "proof", but also to disseminate through the state education system, the national character as previously defined.

It was therefore the job of the European intellectuals (writers, poets, philosophers, scholars, etc.) to, "bring some order into the collection of texts and names which in principle could be rendered instrumental in justifying their cause"¹⁴, adopting, for their objectives, the narrative model of political history or history *tout court*¹⁵. By this process, the literary objects of the past, which were in themselves multiple, complex, heterogeneous and chaotic, were transformed into an intelligible tale, with the "people" as its main character, and which adopted, to some extent at least, a pseudo-biological and cyclical model: birth, childhood, maturity or "Golden Age", decadence or senility (sometimes even death) and then resurgence or renaissance.¹⁶

It is not by any means gratuitous to remind ourselves that most literary historians (in the Iberian context, at least) locate themselves precisely at this point of decadence and renaissance, therefore attributing to their work a higher mission: the salvation of the national spirit through literature. Their historical work, then, moved in a double direction: towards the past, searching for the literary productions that best suited their objective; and towards the future, by proposing "national" models that could inspire future generations in the good old ways of the "Golden Age". Other initiatives, such

must be seen as an organic tradition linking generations across centuries." Joep Leersen: *National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History*, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2006, 125–126.

¹³ Pascale Casanova: *La République Mondiale des Lettres*, Paris, Seuil, 1999.

¹⁴ Even-Zohar, *The Role of Literature*, 369.

¹⁵ For a discussion on the always complex topic of narration and history, see Hayden White: *Metahistory: The historical imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Baltimore – London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973; Hayden White: *The content of the form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation*, Baltimore – London, John Hopkins University Press, 1987 or Paul Ricoeur: *Tiempo y narración*, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 3 vols., 1995–6.

¹⁶ The only literature in the Iberian Peninsula that does not correspond to this standard narrative model is Basque literature: since Basque was not a literary language until at least the 19th century, Basque literary history (which, incidentally, did not appear until the second half of the 20th century) did not have a Golden Age to go back to; at most, there were a few literary geniuses (Etxepare, Axular, etc.) and an oral and popular poetic tradition.

as the recollection of folklore and popular literature, the organization of poetry competitions and, of course, the development of state education, were aimed at the same objective.

The political and cultural atmosphere during the second half of the 19th century in the Iberian peninsula is characterized, in fact, by a strong sense of decadence and loss: be it in Spain, which would lose its last colonies in the 1898 “Disaster”, or be it in Portugal, where the British Ultimatum of 1890 was felt as a national humiliation, and as the consequence of centuries of abandonment and bad management. This atmosphere of generalized decadence is, of course, a prerequisite for any movement of regeneration: both concepts are mutually dependant, both necessarily coexist in the narrative and explicatory scheme of the nation.

Narratives of decadence abound in Iberian literatures and literary historiography, much earlier than 1898 or 1890. One of the best known examples of this genre is Antero de Quental’s *Causas da decadência dos povos peninsulares* (On the causes of the decadence of the Peninsular peoples), a lecture presented at the “Conferências do Casino” which had a great impact on the Portuguese and Iberian discourse:

A decadência dos povos da Península nos três últimos séculos é um dos factos mais incontestáveis, mais evidentes da nossa história: pode até dizer-se que essa decadência, seguindo-se quase sem transição a um período de força gloriosa e de rica originalidade, é o único grande facto evidente e incontestável que nessa história aparece aos olhos do historiador filósofo.¹⁷

The reasons for that decadence varied from one author to another (from Antero de Quental to Herculano, Oliveira Martins or Teixeira de Pascoaes); however, they all agreed on some common elements: political absolutism, religious fanaticism, and the overseas Empire. Antero’s answer to this crisis (“renegar a nacionalidade”, to resign one’s nationality) was exceptional; the opposite solution, that is, going *back* to the national well and *recovering* nationality, was much more extended.

In a previous article¹⁸ I have analyzed how this idea of decadence applies to Spanish and Portuguese literary historiographies, with significant similarities

¹⁷ “The decadence of the peoples of the [Iberian] Peninsula in the last three centuries is one of the most undeniable and most evident facts of our history: we could even say that this decadence, which followed almost without transition a period of glorious force and rich originality, is the only evident and undeniable fact that appears in that history to the eyes of the philosophic historian”. Antero de Quental: *Causas da decadência dos povos peninsulares*, in C. Reis (ed.): *As Conferências do Casino*, Lisboa, Alfa, 1990, 95.

¹⁸ Santiago Pérez Isasi: *Reescrituras ibéricas de la decadencia*, in S. Augusto – A. Dotras Bravo – D. Santos Sánchez (eds.): *Literatura y Re/escritura*, Coimbra, Centro de Literatura Portuguesa, 2014, 457–468.

and also important differences. What is relevant for the purpose of this paper is to remember that in both Spain and Portugal literary decadence was said to be connected with a parallel political or national degeneration. One example of many is the following, taken from George Ticknor's *Historia de la literatura española*:

A una decadencia tal en el character nacional hubiera seguido en cualquier otro país la correspondiente decadencia en su literatura; en España, donde estos dos elementos habían estado siempre tan íntimamente unidos, y apoyándose de una manera tan notable en una misma base, la gente precursora presintió muy luego la caída rápida y desastrosa de todo element intelectual y ameno en la literatura patria.¹⁹

In the Portuguese case, much more than in the Spanish one, this process of decadence might lead to a total “desnationalization”, provoked, at least according to some authors, by foreign elements: the Spanish domination, Italian and Spanish baroque poetry, and the Jesuits: “Da decadência das letras patrias são acusados, pela maioria dos que tratam estes assumptos, os jesuitas e os reis castelhanos intruzos pelo direito da força”²⁰. Other authors, however, recognize internal causes for this long decadence:

Por maiores que fossem os damnos causados ás letras portuguezas pela dominação castelhana injustos seriamos si lhe fizessemos unicamente responsavel pela rapida degeneração em que as vemos cahir logo no começo do seculo decimoseptimo. Poderosas causas, e d’ha muito accumuladas, trouxeram esse funesto resultado, que cordialmente lamentamos, e que abysmaram no barathro da ignorancia, ou do pedantismo, o genio portuguez que contemporaneamente do italiano e muito antes do francez, o allemão, ou o inglez fulguráran’horisonte da historia.²¹

¹⁹ “In any other country, such a decadence in the national character would have been followed by the corresponding decadence in their literature; in Spain, where these two elements had been always inextricably tied and supporting in such a notable way on a common base, people with foresight felt very soon the rapid and disastrous fall of every intellectual and enjoyable element in national literature”. George Ticknor, *Historia de la literatura española*, Madrid, Imprenta de la Publicidad, 1851–1856, 445.

²⁰ “Most of the authors who deal with these issues accuse the Jesuits and the Castilian kings, introduced by law of force, of the decadence of [Portuguese] literature”. José Maria de Andrade Ferrera – Camilo Castelo Branco: *Curso de Litteratura Portugueza*, Lisboa, Mattos Moreira, 1875.

²¹ “Even if the damages caused to the Portuguese literature by the Castilian domination were great, we would be unfair if we made it the sole reason responsible for the quick degeneration into which we see it fall from the seventeenth century. Other powerful causes, accumulated from long before, brought this terrible result, which we wholeheartedly regret, and which sank the Portuguese spirit, which had shone on the horizon of history as soon as the Italian

A wider comparative study, which we do not have the space to do here, would show how these same concepts and paradigms apply to Galician and Catalan literary history: in the Galician case, the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries are known as the “Séculos Oscuros” (dark centuries) while in Catalan literature “la Decadència” (the decadence) prolongs itself from the 15th to the 18th century. As we see, the narrative arch is the same for all Iberian literatures (save for the Basque); what changes are the periods and milestones to which that narrative arch is applied.

THE PATH TO REGENERATION

We must insist once more on the double direction of national history: towards the past in search of models; towards the future in search of regeneration. Therefore, those authors who diagnosed the Spanish and Portuguese national and literary decadence did so with the intent of subverting it; with the intention of promoting a regeneration that is, once more, both national and literary.²² These movements of “resurgence”, “renaissance” or “regeneration”, which appeared all over Europe at this time (for example, in Italy or Ireland), tried to “wake up” peoples that had been asleep for centuries, guiding them to independence in some cases, and to unification or to recovering past glories, in others.²³

One of the most evident manifestations of this interest to promote the (re)creation of a national literature, particularly in cultural areas where the vernacular tradition had been interrupted (such as Galicia or Catalonia) or never existed (the Basque Country), is the „Juegos Florales” (Floral Games): literary competitions that linked themselves with their medieval counterparts (specially with the Floral Games of Toulouse, France), and which rewarded the best and most national poetic productions created on a previously assigned topic. The first Floral Games of the 19th century in any Iberian literature did

and even before the French, the German or the English, into an abyss of ignorance and of pedantry”. Joaquim Caetano Fernandes Pinheiro: *Curso elementar de litteratura nacional*, Rio de Janeiro, Livraria de B. L. Garnier, 1862, 177–178.

²² Anthony Smith clearly described this regenerative trend within 19th-century nationalism: “We see this particularly clearly in the third activity of the nationalist: that of collective regeneration. Regeneration involves a summons to the people, mobilising the members of the community, tapping their collective emotions, inspiring them with moral fervour, activating their energies for national goals, so as to reform and renew the community.” (Smith, 1995.)

²³ We will not have time to discuss, in this article, whether nationalism “invents” or “discovers” the nations; this debate, most prominently held between Ernest Gellner and Anthony Smith, is fascinating, but does not really affect the purpose of our research. See, for instance, Anthony Smith, *Gastronomy or geology?: the role of nationalism in the reconstruction of nations*, *Nations and nationalism: Journal of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism*, No. 1, 1995, 3–23.

not, paradoxically, take place inside the Iberian Peninsula: these were the Basque Floral Games, celebrated in Iparralde, or the French Basque Country, in 1853. In Catalonia, the first modern Floral Games took place in 1859; in Galicia, in 1861; and in the Spanish side of the Basque country, in 1879.

In some cases, these cultural initiatives were due to single, particularly energetic individuals (such as Antoine d'Abbadie, driving force of the first Floral Games in the French Basque Country); in many other cases, however, these literary celebrations were but a manifestation of a wider cultural movement named (by themselves or by others) as "literary Renaissances", and which were, more or less explicitly, linked with late 19th-century nationalistic movements, be they centripetal or centrifugal.

Some of these 19th-century and early 20th-century literary and nationalistic movements are vague and fluid, and have only been identified as such by the critics: they were formed by an open group of writers who shared the general idea of recovering and elevating the national literature, but who did not adhere to a strict ideological or programmatic unity. This is the case of the Catalan *Renaixença*, which for some critics starts in 1833, with the appearance of the journal *El vapor*, and for others in 1877, the date of Verdagner's poem „L'Altantida"; in the case of the Galician *Rexurdimento*, there is some consensus on the year 1863 as its starting point: the year in which Rosalía de Castro's *Follas Novas* was published. In the case of the Basque Country, it is not even clear if the term "Renaissance" (or its Basque counterpart, *Pizkundea*) is appropriate:

...puede resultar que este [el término "Renacimiento"] no termine de convencer, no solo porque intenta reproduciren el caso vasco el proceso cultural catalán de la *Renaixença* y el gallego del *Rexurdimento*, sino porque también es un término que aparecen la época, pero la palabra vasca que lo traduce, *Pizkundea*, no se documenta hasta los primeros años del siglo XX.²⁴

In the case of Spanish literature and culture, the link between a national regeneration program and literary and cultural production is much thinner than in other Iberian spaces: although there is a political and intellectual trend known as "Regeneracionismo", it did not have a clear cultural counterpart, a defined group of authors who supported it or any specific Poetics. This does not mean that "Regeneracionismo" did not have any influence on literature:

²⁴ "It may very well be that this term [Renaissance] does not convince us, not only because it tries to reproduce in the Basque context the cultural processes of the Catalan *Renaixença* and the Galician *Rexurdimento*, but also because it is a term that appears in that time, but the Basque word that translates it, *Pizkundea*, is only documented in the first years of the 20th century". Jon Kortazar, *La literatura vasca y la creación de la nación. Las ideas de José Aristimuño, Aitzol (1896–1936)*, in L. R. Tobar (ed.): *Literatura y nación. La emergencia de las literaturas nacionales*, Zaragoza, Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2008, 222.

its traces can be found in Benito Pérez Galdós's novels and more specifically in the works of the writers of the so-called "Generación del 98" or Generation of 1898 (Ganivet, Maeztu or Unamuno, for instance).

If we consider Portuguese literature and culture, the group with the name "Renascença Portuguesa" only appeared, as a defined movement, in the first decades of the 20th century; however, ideas of national, literary and cultural regeneration can be traced back to the mid-19th century, with a series of reformist waves that go from the "Polémica de Bom Senso e Bom Gosto" (Debate of Good Sense and Good Taste, 1865), even to the generation of *Orpheu*, in the 1910s and 1920s. The "Renascença Portuguesa" (or "Renascença Lusitana", Portuguese Renaissance) was a literary, cultural and political movement whose duration coincides with the dates of publication of the journal *A Águia* (1910 to 1932).²⁵

The case of the Portuguese Renascença is particularly paradigmatic as a nationalistic literary movement: several manifestos were published, most of them penned by Teixeira de Pascoaes, which called for a resurgence of the national essence of the Portuguese people. For instance, in his text "Ao povo português a 'Renascença Portuguesa'" (The Portuguese Renaissance for the Portuguese people), Pascoaes announces the objectives of this initiative, and the means they intend to apply to get them:

O fim da *Renascença Lusitana* é combater as influências contrárias ao nosso carácter étnico, inimigas da nossa autonomia espiritual e provocar, por todos os meios de que se serve a inteligência humana, o aparecimento de novas forças morais orientadoras e educadoras do povo, *que sejam essencialmente lusitanas*, para que a alma desta bela Raça ressurja com as qualidades que lhe pertencem por nascimento...²⁶

It is not difficult to find similar texts in the manifestos of other regeneration movements, be it in Catalonia, Galicia or the Basque Country. For example, in the first issue of the Catalan journal *Renaixensa* we find this excerpt:

²⁵ Even in this case it is not possible to talk of a completely homogeneous group, with no dissensions or internal tensions; the documents published by Paulo Samuel give a good idea of these internal debates and confrontations between intellectuals of the Portuguese Renascença. See Paulo Samuel: *A Renascença Portuguesa: Um perfil documental*, Porto, Fundação Eng. António de Almeida, 1990.

²⁶ "The aim of the *Renascença Lusitana* is to combat the influences that are contrary to our ethnic character, enemies of our spiritual autonomy, and to provoke, by any means available to the human intelligence, the appearance of new moral forces devoted to guide and educate the people, forces which are essentially Portuguese, so that this beautiful Race is revived with the qualities that belong to it by birth...". Samuel: *A Renascença Portuguesa*, 13–14.

Entenem, en fi, anar, no pelcamí del provincialism exclusivista, sino del esperit provincial, no pelcamí del partidarisme polítich, sinó del esperit patri, no pelfraccionament, sinó per la atracció, per la unió, per la germanó de criteris, de afeccions y de voluntats á la reconstituició del element nacional que es la mesalta potencia civilizadora del spobles.²⁷

And a few years later, in the foundational act of Eusko Ikaskuntza (the Society for Basque Studies), we read that its purpose is to "...reunir a todos los amantes del País Vasco que, ansiando la restauración de la personalidad del mismo, se proponen promover, por los medios adecuados, la intensificación de la cultura como condición indispensable para tal fin".²⁸

What is quite obvious in these texts (and we could have quoted many others with similar sentiments) is the combination of three basic elements: 1) the idea of recovering something that was lost in the past; 2) the identification of that lost element with an essential part of nationality („forças essencialmente lusitanas" in Pascoaes; „element nacional" in the manifesto of the *Renaixença*; „personalidad del pueblo" in the foundational act of Eusko Ikaskuntza); and 3) the conviction that this recovery would bring a new era of national glory („para que a alma desta bela Raça ressurja com as qualidades que lhe pertencem por nascimento", in the words of Pascoaes). It is very fitting, then, that the symbol of the Catalan "*Renaixença*", which appeared on every issue of their journal, was a phoenix.

AN IBERIAN PERSPECTIVE FOR AN IBERIAN PHENOMENON

In the previous pages I have tried to show that the ideas of national and cultural decadence, and of national and cultural regeneration, were very much present in all Iberian cultural spaces (Spanish, Portuguese, Catalan, Galician, Basque). I have also tried to show the close link between the construction of national identities and their literary manifestations, be they literary histories or Floral Games. The theoretical and methodological basis of this work, then, is that these phenomena can only be properly addressed with a wide

²⁷ "We intend, then, to walk not on the way of exclusivist provincialism, but of the provincial spirit; not of the political partidism, but of the national spirit; not of fragmentation but of attraction, of union, of the joining of criteria, affections and wills to the reconstruction of the national element, which is the highest civilizing power of the peoples". Journal *Renaixensa*, 1881, quoted in Josep Maria Figueres: *Materials d'història de la premsa a Catalunya: segles XIX i XX*, Barcelona, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 1995, 206.

²⁸ "...to join all those who love the Basque Country and who, desiring the restoration of its personality, intend to promote, by the adequate means, the intensification of culture as an indispensable condition to that end", quoted in Idoia Estornés Zubizarreta: *La Sociedad de Estudios Vascos. Aportación de Eusko Ikaskuntza a la culturavasca (1918-1936)*, Donostia-San Sebastián, Eusko Ikaskuntza, 1983, 20.

comparative Iberian perspective (which does not sever the links with other cultural or political spaces, such as Europe or the Atlantic, but which does highlight its historical particularities and its internal interrelations).

In the previous pages we have seen a series of common traits, ideas and topics that appear across the Iberian space: the sense of loss of national character, the consciousness of a literary decadence, the rejection of foreign influences, and so on. We have also seen that, even if there is no strict synchronicity in all Iberian cultural systems, there is, in fact, a common underlying narrative arch, that places the turning point of these peoples' histories in the late 19th century and early 20th century. It would be very interesting, in fact, to compare this narrative scheme with that of other literatures in other cultural spaces and with different historical traditions. These phenomena are, then, a perfect example of the possibilities and of the need of a "prismatic" comparative approach to literary history.

In fact, there is one more element that justifies applying the methodologies of Iberian Studies to this period, and that is the emergence of Iberianism.²⁹ Make no mistake: Iberian Studies do not have, at their core, any Iberianist agenda; they do not intend to promote any political initiative towards the unification of Spain and Portugal, nor do they search for any Iberian essentialist identity, as Oliveira Martins did in his *History of Iberian civilization*. The reason I mention it here is because Iberianism, which appeared as a political enterprise in the early 19th century and had transformed itself into a mainly cultural project by the 1850s, was in itself a means to this national and cultural regeneration, and to give the Iberian peoples a united voice in the concert of European nations.

We have already seen how Antero de Quental, in his text "On the causes of the decadence of the Peninsular peoples", advocated for renouncing nationality; without getting to that extreme, it is very interesting to point out that many of the authors that have been mentioned in this article (such as Miguel de Unamuno or Teixeira de Pascoaes) also had at least a sympathetic view of Iberianist movements: Unamuno was a strong lusophile, and promoted, with Joan Maragall, a literary journal written in all Iberian languages; Pascoaes also advocated in favor of a tripartite Iberianism (Portugal-Castile-Catalonia), and so on. It could be argued, in fact, that for these authors establishing an inter-Iberian dialogue was not so much an end in itself, but a way of achieving a higher end: the regeneration of the Iberian nations and cultures.

²⁹ About Iberianism in its many variations, see José Antonio Rocamora: *El nacionalismo ibérico*, Valladolid, Universidad de Valladolid, 1994; Sergio Campos Matos: *Conceitos de Iberismo em Portugal Revista de História das Ideias*, No. 28, 2007, 169–193; Santiago Pérez Isasi: *Literatura, iberismo(s), nacionalismo(s): Apuntes para una historia del iberismo literario (1868–1936)* 452^oF, No. 11, 2014, 64–79; César Rina Simón: *Iberismos. Expectativas peninsulares en el siglo XIX*, Madrid, FUNCAS, 2016.

A comparative history of Iberian literatures, then, could address these issues in a way that has several advantages over a merely national perspective: firstly, it would highlight the common aspects in all these movements and also the particularities among them; secondly, it would help discover the meta-historical elements (for example, the common narrative arch) which underlie the national literary histories; and thirdly, it would contribute to a comprehension of the way in which literary systems work in close interrelation and interference with one another. Individualities could be analyzed from a systemic point of view; what traditionally was seen as mere juxtaposition could be explained better in terms of intertwined processes.

As I also stated before, I am neither the first nor the only scholar to propose such an approach to Iberian literatures and cultures; there already is a *Comparative history of literatures in the Iberian Peninsula* in two volumes, sponsored by the International Comparative Literature Association. And while this publication has many admirable attributes and qualities (and being the first of its kind is no small matter), it still leaves room for reconsideration and for other future, similar endeavors: for instance, it leaves space for a more chronological, more systemic, maybe even more narrative (if narrative history is to come out of its eclipse) kind of history of Iberian literatures. This paper is but a modest proposal of how one chapter of that history could be written.

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NATIONALITY: GREEK CATHOLIC.
FATHER JÁNOS BOKSAY – JOANN BOKSAJ (1874–1940)
SUBCARPATHIAN COMPOSER

TAMÁS BUBNÓ

ABSTRACT

János Boksaj was a talented and emblematic representative of the Greek Catholic community, in the Sub Carpathian region during the eve of the 20th century, who left a significant legacy through his work as a composer and pastor. His works merge his spirituality with the local unique culture, which evolved after the 1646 Ungvár Union, further supported by her majesty, Queen Mary Teresa in 1771 by founding the Munkács county diocese. At that time, the Rusin and Hungarian Greek Catholic population did not boast of an intellectual circle, henceforth only the Greek Catholic clergy could represent these people in social, political and cultural spheres. Bishops Bacsinszky, Olsavszky and Firczák were exceptionally active in spiritually and culturally lifting the then socially disadvantaged Greek Catholic community, who were struggling with a serious identity crisis as well as living under poverty level. Gyula Firczák had commissioned the then young Boksaj to gather, scribe and publish all Greek Catholic songs sung in the Mukács Diocese (The Divine Liturgy of Saint John Chrysostom, morning and sunset hymns), as well as elevating and manage the choir culture at a higher level. Being inspired by his music collecting journey, Boksaj wrote many of his own pieces to be added to the Diocese's stockpile, further enriching the musical history of the region. His exceptional talent for using late romantic and eclectic styles in his religious compositions pay testament to his vast knowledge, elevating his musical legacy above the average of his peers.

Keywords: *Subcarpathia, Rusyn people, Greek Catholic Eparchy of Mukachevo, János Boksay, Queen Maria Theresa, Bishop Andrei Bachinsky, Bishop Julius Firczak, Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, Prostopinie Chant, Composition for male choirs of Franz Liszt, Saint Ephraim Male Choir*

CHOIR: BOKSAY: SVJATIJ BOZSE (TRISAGION CHANT)

<https://open.spotify.com/album/5AwtTCAzPg9Z9PPLPjQAhD> No.5

The Divine Liturgy of Saint John Chrysostom is the equivalent of the Roman Catholic Mass in the Byzantine rite. From this, we performed the so-called trisagion or thrice holy hymn with the Saint Ephraim Male Choir. The text comes from the early years of Christianity: "Holy God, Holy Strong, Holy Immortal, have mercy on us." The music is from 1921 by János Boksay, Greek Catholic priest and composer, who wrote his liturgy for male choir in that year.¹ Through his life and art I would like to introduce you to Greek Catholicism, this unique denomination among the religious traditions of Hungary.

By 1900 the number of worshippers in the Byzantine Rite surpassed one quarter of the entire population of the country. Orthodoxy was at 14.3 per cent and Greek Catholics at 9.7 per cent. The latter comprised Romanian, Rusyn, Slovakian and Hungarian nationals.²

The Rusyn and Hungarian worshippers of the Byzantine Rite in Subcarpathia became united with Rome under the Union of Uzhgorod (1646) and the diocese of Munkacs was founded for them by Queen Maria Theresa in 1771.³ However, legitimation of the denomination was by no means a solution to the constant attacks inflicted on the Greek Catholic way of life by other Christians, especially their clergy. They considered the followers treacherous, imbecilic and misleading, who need guidance to return to the respective one true faith. (This view is still widely supported in certain circles.)

¹ The unpublished version of the 14 movement Old Slavonic Divine Liturgy's manuscript remains in private ownership in Ungvar (Uzhhorod). Many had believed that the original manuscript had been destroyed during World War II. In 2002, the owner showed the lecturer the surviving document, giving permission to copy, by which Tamás Bubnó was able to teach the composition to an ad hoc male choir, which later was recorded by Hungaroton. This male choir was later to be named Saint Ephraim. It was this recording which kick-started the since internationally recognised choir's career. (HCD 32315.)

² Dr. Károly Kocsis: A Historical Review of the Religious Geography of the Carpathian Basin from 10th-21st Century, in: András Gál – Sándor Frisnyák – Sándor Kókai: *A Historical Review of the Religious Geography of the Carpathian Basin*, Volume I, College of Nyíregyháza, Tourism and Geography Institute, Nyíregyháza-Szerencs, 2016, 14.

³ Pope John Paul II: The 350th anniversary of the Union of Uzhhorod. Apostolic letter issued 18 April, 1996. <https://www.ewtn.com/library/PAPALDOC/JP2UZHHO.HTM>

There was no nobility of Rusyn origin and the Hungarian nobles had no Greek Catholics in their ranks. Only the clergy represented this poor population who sought and found solace only in its faith, liturgy and customs.

János Boksay was born in to a Hungarian family in Huszt. His musical talents became apparent early on; however, his parents always meant for him to become a priest. He received the holy orders in 1898 from Bishop Gyula Firczak, who promoted him the next year to musical director of the College of Pedagogy and Theology of Uzhgorod.⁴

The bishop commissioned him to collect and write down all the liturgical music used in the diocese and publish two versions: one for the Rusyns in Church Slavonic and one for the Hungarians in Hungarian. The books that appeared in 1906, entitled *Tserkovnoye Prostopiniye* and *Egyházi közénekek* (Common songs of the church), serve as a basis for the Greek Catholic population in Subcarpathia.⁵ Being gifted with a composer's attitude he also put his own musical ideas into writing: he composed complete liturgies in both Church Slavonic and Hungarian with an eclectic musical language. They are a mix of Slavic and Hungarian romanticism and the Italian opera as well as the Liedertafel-tradition of Germany. These he synthesized with a capable hand and in good taste, placing him on a higher level than most of his contemporaries.

CHOIR: BOKSAY: DOSTOINO JEST (IT IS TRUTH, INDEED...)

<https://open.spotify.com/album/5AwTCAzPg9Z9PPLPjQAhD> No.14. 0,00-2,20

We heard the song of the God-bearer from the liturgy. From the before performed parts, Boksay's subtle, lyrical romantic verses are apparent through the warm melodic strands which piece together his work. These simple melodies, which are easy to master, are also rich in intonations, while being placed on complex harmonies. These melodies are not reminiscent of the classical Greek Catholic liturgy, much rather being characteristic personal compositions. Regardless of the melodies seeming easy to follow, this piece requires high concentration, as following an organ or piano accompaniment for a male choir is no simple task. From this perspective, Liszt must have been Boksay's role model. It was the great musical mastermind, Liszt, who paved the way for artistic male choir compositions from the previously primitive German and monarchic Liedertafel traditions. In 1852, when he presented

⁴ Péter Boksay: János Boksay biography in: István Ivancsó (ed.): Liturgical heritage VI. – material from the symposium organised in remembrance of the 100 year anniversary of the Boksay-Malinics Irmologion publication, November 16, 2006, Nyíregyháza, 68.

⁵ <http://mci.archpitt.org/books/Bokshai/index.html> (Accessed: 1st November, 2017).

his first male choir cycle, his Leipzig promoter was sceptical on the matter. Kahnt had written “My dear master, is it your mission to create demigods from beer drinking choir members?”⁶ We are not sure how familiar Boksay was with Liszt’s male choral pieces; however, we can guess he had some notion when examining his compositional creations. The question remains, why did a Subcarpathian priest not use religious melodies for this liturgy? Nor for the remaining three from his legacy? In addition, he was the first, as mentioned, who transcribed and published the pieces in Ungvár in 1906. Perhaps he did not value them enough?

One cannot be sure; however, I have an inkling, which I plan to share with you. We must travel back in time to the church district of Munkács in 1771, which was established by Mary Theresa, then passed on to the direction of the charismatic Bishop András Bacsinszky, who had spent much time in Vienna during the establishment of the bishopric and thus became greatly regarded and loved by the empress and queen. A descendent of a Rusyn Greek Catholic priest family, he visited the Jesuit school in Ungvár and completed his theological studies in Nagyszombat. His consecration was in Hajdúdorog, where he had served for decades, remaining a servant of God within the borders of Hungary.⁷

He was a wise and active man, an apostle for the “Greek Catholic Nation”, having also worked towards the recognition of spiritual and artistic achievements cross-culturally. In 1793 he founded the Ungvár Singing School to ensure that the Greek Catholic liturgical music was not only passed on through oral traditions.⁸ Boksay finished this school when the school’s centenary celebrations were held. Much praise was showered on the founder and mastermind of the school during the celebration, which had a profound influence on the young native Hungarian Boksay, most probably embracing Bacsinsky as the ultimate idol and representative of the Greek Catholic Church. His other idol, who was also his teacher and pastoral leader, was Gyula Firczák, who was appointed as Bishop of Munkács in 1892. This

⁶ Mária Eckhardt: Introduction to Liszt’s Male Choruses I. BMC CD 168, Budapest, 2009. Full material available at: <http://bmcrecords.hu/pages/frameset/index.php>

⁷ István Udvari: Bishop András Bacsinszky was the representative of the Rusin enlightenment. Published under: István Udvari: Rusins in the 18th Century. Historical and cultural studies. Pál Vasvári Association Notes iss.9 Nyíregyháza, 1994.

⁸ 9 Articles published on András Bacsinszky, Bishop of Munkács. The following articles were published in iss. 12 (2010) of Folia Athanasiana Magazine, Institute of Greek Catholic Theology Saint Athanas – Nyíregyháza, Hungary. (<http://byzantinohungarica.hu/sites/default/files/01V%C3%A9ghse%C5%91.pdf>)

Hungarian High Priest, who completed his doctorate in theology in Vienna, became known as the “Rusyn’s Great Bishop and Spokesman” during those times.⁹

In retrospect I can only partly agree, since he became the Bishop of the region, which in those times was the “Rákoczi State”; however, his nationality remained Greek Catholic. Already during his student days, he had organised a music circle in the seminary, having been perfectly aware that just as a true Christian cannot be a racist, a true musician cannot be a nationalist. He entrusted his young priest, Boksay, to record the Greek Catholic melodies sung in the diocese district of Munkács. Obviously Bacinsky was acutely aware of the young man’s ideology and musical talents, thus appointing him the director of music at the theology faculty when Boksay was only 25 years old. Boksay allied with Ungvár’s Greek Catholic Cathedral’s main cantor, József Malinics, to do the job. The Bishop felt his and Boksay’s missions were one; to establish a notation book, which could serve as an etalon for cantors and priests, sustaining the passing on of musical traditions. We know today that the idea, as well as the published book, has become more regarded as a historical manuscript. Only a small number of Rusyn and Hungarian cantors and priests were willing to learn the slightly altered melodies published in *Cerkovnoje prostopinije* or *common church songs*, the majority continuing to keep to the local melody variations.¹⁰

One cannot dutifully proclaim that this so-called disobedience had grown out of malice as some perceive, but rather it is an example of the nature of oral traditions. Folk traditions exist in variation. (According to Bartók, melodies which have no variations cannot be regarded as folk music.)¹¹ The congregation is not one chorus which rehearses and takes great pains to perfect a musical production. In the history of Byzantine liturgy, especially in the Orthodox regions, a chorus was invited to sing instead of the mass, whose job it was to elevate the musical quality of the sacral rituals. However, from its beginnings, the Greek Catholic Church has preferred the modes of the Protestant worship, so that those who attend church may also join in the singing.

I believe that Boksay saw two goals in front of him: to guide the believers towards attaining a higher quality in the singing of the collected melodies, as well as to nurture choral traditions by composing new pieces. He did not

⁹ István Marosi: *Study on Bishop Gyula Firczák’s research on the Greek Catholic Church’s challenges and developments in Mohács (1891–1912)*, Pázmány Péter University, 2010, (license paper).

¹⁰ István Marosi: *Study on Bishop Gyula Firczák’s research on the Greek Catholic Church’s challenges and developments in Mohács (1891–1912)*, Pázmány Péter University, 2010 (license paper), 111.

¹¹ Béla Bartók: *Hungarian Folk music* (Originally titled *Muzyka*, 1929), VI, No. 4, April 20, 201–202. First published in Hungarian by: BBÖI 579–580. Translated by István Varsányi.

therefore use folk melodies in his own compositions, staying clear of creating a sort of “sacral world music”, having perceived his own melodic ideas to be innovative enough. Otherwise he felt similarly towards the Greek Catholic melodies as Bartók had on folk melodies, who famously quoted:

To handle folk-tunes is one of the most difficult tasks; equally difficult if not more so than to write a major original composition. If we keep in mind that borrowing a tune means being bound by its individual peculiarity, we shall understand one part of the difficulty. Another is created by the special character of a folk-tune. We must penetrate into it, feel it, and bring it out in sharp contours by the appropriate setting. The composition around a folk-tune must be done in a „propitious hour” or-as is generally said – it must be a work of inspiration just as much as any other composition.¹²

CHOIR: BOKSAY: TEBE POJEM (WE HYMN THEE)

<https://open.spotify.com/album/5AwtTCAzPg9Z9PPLPjQAhd> No.13

A canonic prayer from the Liturgy of Saint John Chrysostom was just heard; “We praise thee, we bless thee, we give thanks to our Lord and we pray unto thee, O our God.” As I mentioned previously, my conviction is that Ferenc Liszt’s influence on Janos Boksay is obvious in his choral works. If only I could reference this theory with quotes or extracts from correspondance; however, no such references are known to exist in Boksay’s written heritage, either from his own pen or from critics or reviews written by others. As a result, we can only offer the musical “preview” of the before performed liturgical song extract, Liszt’s motette *Über allen Gipfeln ist Ruh*, which shows much resemblance to Boksay’s composition in mood and structure, despite it not being a liturgical piece, but the musical version of Goethe’s poem *Wanderers Nachtlied*.

CHOIR: LISZT-GOETHE: ÜBER ALLEN GIPFELN IST RUH –
BMC CD 168, 2009.

<http://bmcrecords.hu/pages/frameset/index.php>

It may be unnecessary to further analyse Boksay’s works for the time being; however, it should be apparent that we are speaking of an exceptional church musician and teacher. At 35 years of age he was posted to Budapest by his

¹² Béla Bartók: Folk music’s influence on modern music, Ch. 3, originally published in *Új idők*, Vol. 37, No. 20 (10th May), 23 (31st May) and 26 (21st June), 1931.

bishop. First from 1909 to the Szegenyhazi Square's (later known as Rozsak Square) Roman Catholic Church, which was given over to the Greek Catholics by order of Kolos Vaszary Cardinal Primate. Boksay founded the Pest Greek Catholic Choir, further training himself musically during his three years in Budapest before being stationed back to Subcarpathia in 1912, where he took on the role of parson. After the war in 1919 Bishop Antal Papp appointed him parson and dean of Huszt, where he composed the before heard male choral liturgy in 1921 from which we performed excerpts.

He became a much respected priest of his home town, which by this time was no longer a part of Hungary. Ardently serving his congregation as well as composing music, Boksay strove to strengthen the Greek Catholic identity in his Rusyn and Hungarian flock, especially so after the rearrangement of borders as a result of Trianon. In 1925 a complex media controversy unfolded in which the implantation of the Boksay-Malinics irmologion was questioned. There is no evidence that Janos Boksay responded to the media frenzy; I myself am under the conviction that he did not wish to become involved in the issues of another diocese, even if the issue in the forefront was his own piece. It is also important to note that Subcarpathia was then going through complicated and difficult times, which was the main concern of the Huszt Parsonage.

All in all, Greek Catholicism as well as the Byzantine Rite Catholic music and Hungarian music have much to be grateful for to Boksay. He was an important musical master and exceptional conductor and choral leader, a true steward and example to his flock through turbulent times.

Finally it has to be mentioned that he put a lot of effort into raising the social and spiritual niveau of the Rusyn and Hungarian people of Subcarpathia. The treaty of Trianon re-shaped the structure of the only recently established Greek Catholic Diocese. As a member of the Rusyn National Committee, Boksay tried to keep the forces of the partitioning and nationalism at bay. From 1939 until his death in 1940 he represented Subcarpathia in the Hungarian Parliament as a so-called "invitee representative".¹³

It is the custom to hail the congregation after the final blessing of a Byzantine liturgy with the following words: "May you live for many years,

¹³ "On 28–29th May, 1939, they held parliamentary votes across Hungary; however, the Subcarpathian region was not allowed to vote. On 22nd June, 1939, after they accepted the 6.200/1939. sz. M. E. (prime ministerial) enactment, on the temporary governance of the Subcarpathian region as per the 1939:VI. tc., in reference to the region's unification to Hungary, 10 Members of Parliament from Sub- carpathia were invited for talks in the persons of György Bencze, János Boksay, András Bródy, Mihály Demkó, István Fenczik, Gyula Földesi, Péter Hajovics, Vladimir Homicsko, Iván Spák and Ödön Zsegora." Csilla Fedinec: *The Subcarpathian Autonomy Question in Fedinec-Vehes* (eds.): *Kárpátalja 1919–2009*, Budapest, Argumentum – Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Etnikai-Nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intézete (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Ethnic and Minority Studies), 2010, 157–163.

for many years to come. May God bless them with health and peace for many years to come.” We bid farewell with this excerpt of Janos Boksay’s liturgy, which we sing to the praise of the master and those gathered here today. Thank you for your attention.

CHOIR: MNOGAJA LETA (FOR MANY YEARS)

<https://open.spotify.com/album/5AwTCAzPg9Z9PPLPjQAhD> No.20.

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ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT AND HUNGARY: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN SCIENCES.¹

—◀—▶—

ILDIKÓ SZ. KRISTÓF

ABSTRACT

The author of this essay started investigating the writings of Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859) as a member of a German-American research cooperation in 2001. The project was affiliated to the Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures in the University of Kansas in Lawrence, KS, it was directed by Professor Frank Baron, and it was aimed at digitizing and electronically publishing the English translations of the works of Alexander von Humboldt (see <http://www.avhumboldt.net/index.php?page=136>).

*As a historian of cultural anthropology, the author explores the Hungarian relations of the work of Humboldt. She reveals how much he knew about Hungary (its geography, its language and, to a certain extent, its history), and that he not only had personal connections, acquaintances in contemporary Hungarian aristocratic and scientific circles, but he also made trips to Hungary (in 1797 and 1811). Members of the Podmaniczky family – József Podmaniczky (1756–1823) for sure, and perhaps also Károly Podmaniczky (1772–1833) – as well as other Protestant scientists like Pál Almási Balogh (1794–1867) could function as his closest acquaintances in Hungary. Having a considerable reception in Hungarian scientific culture, the works of Humboldt seem to have had an impact upon the emergence of, among others, geography and world ethnology in that country. The impact of Alexander von Humboldt testifies to the presence of the French *géographie humaine* but also a Romantic *Gesamtforschung* in 19th century Hungary – research directions that the*

¹ This research has been supported by a grant of the Office of the National Research and Development, Budapest, Lorand Eötvös University, 2016–2020: A tudományos tudás áramlásának mintázatai Magyarországon, 1770–1830 / The circulation of scientific knowledge in Hungary, 1770–1830, No. NKFIH 119577.

Hungarian scholars of the age could and did turn against Habsburg science. Their scientific orientation and choices seem to have been intertwined with their cultural and political identity.

Keywords: *history of geography and ethnology, Alexander von Humboldt about Hungary and the Hungarians, Alexander von Humboldt's travels in Hungary, Hungarian cultural and political identity in the first and the second half of the 19th century*

Let me begin this essay by revealing what is not included in the title. I have been studying the history of cultural anthropology and geography in Hungary since 2001. I have two research projects relating to the past of those sciences. One of them is about, on one hand, the reception of the oeuvre of Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859) in Hungary, and, on the other, the reception of the Hungarians by Humboldt, that is, the representation of the Hungarian people, language and culture in his works. This research began as part of a German-American cooperation in 2001–2004 to digitize the English translations of the works of Alexander von Humboldt. The project was led by Professor Frank Baron from the University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, in the United States (see <http://www.avhumboldt.net/index.php?page=136>). The second research project of mine concerns what could be called *human geography* in Hungary, especially in the late 18th and early 19th century. I use the term *human geography* in a double sense in this place. In a wider sense, it refers to the classification of the “other”, that is, mostly non-European societies and peoples according to certain geographical – and also hierarchical – concepts. In a stricter, narrower sense, however, *human geography* refers to the kind of science that was born during the first half of the 19th century in France. It was called *géographie humaine* and Alexander von Humboldt himself was one of its representatives, at least to a certain extent.²

² On the results of those research projects see, for example, Ildikó Sz. Kristóf: Alexander von Humboldt és Magyarország: Egy romantikus természettudós jelentősége a magyarországi egyetemes néprajzi érdeklődés kibontakozásában, *Századok*, Vol. 151, No. 5, 2017, 987–1006; Ildikó Sz. Kristóf: Alexander von Humboldt és a Podmaniczkyak. Mozaikok a földrajz és az egyetemes néprajz 19. századi tudománytörténetéhez, in Dezső Gurka (ed.): *A báró Podmaniczky család a 18–19. századi magyar kultúrában*, Budapest, Gondolat Kiadó, 2017, 25–40; Ildikó Sz. Kristóf: “Terepmunka” a Terepmunka kora előtt: Dobosy Mihály, a grönlandi inuitok és az etnológia (antropológia) születése a 19. század eleji Magyarországon, *Ethno-lore, az MTA BTK Néprajztudományi Intézetének Évkönyve XXXII*, 2016, 1–23; Ildikó Sz. Kristóf: The Uses of Natural History. Georg C. Raff's *Naturgeschichte für Kinder* (1778) in its Multiple Translations and Multiple Receptions, in: Adams, Alison – Ford, Philip (eds.), *Le livre demeure. Studies in Book History in Honour of Alison Saunders*, Genève, Droz, 2011, 309–333; Ildikó Sz. Kristóf: Domesticating Nature, Appropriating Hierarchy: The Representation of European and Non-European Peoples in an Early-Nineteenth-Century

In the following essay, I am going to discuss some of my findings resulting from the two research areas and concerning especially how an intricate relation existed between 19th century (national) identity in Hungary and the emergence of modern sciences. That relation is very clear in the case of the reception of Alexander von Humboldt. His impact in 19th-century Hungary could help throw light upon certain processes of scientific canon-formation that led toward the establishment of geography and ethnography/anthropology as institutionalized sciences in Hungary by the 1870s–1890s.

What did Alexander von Humboldt know about Hungary and the Hungarians? What struck me as I read his works for the first time was not so much the abundant knowledge that Humboldt possessed of America, its local nature and indigenous peoples. It was much more the ways in which he represented the *Hungarians*. I was fascinated by the rich philological apparatus – an abundance of footnotes and other relevant references – that he relied upon to support his depiction of the country and the analysis of the language. I studied especially his works relating to America – *Voyages aux régions équinoxiales du nouveau continent* (1804), *Vues des Cordillères* (1813), *Kritische Untersuchungen* (1836)³ –, and found that it is exactly in those works that the Hungarians appear the most. As it is already known, Alexander von Humboldt and his French friend, Aimé Bonpland, a surgeon and botanist, made a journey to South and Middle America to, as Humboldt put it, the “regions of the equator”.⁴ Between 1799 and 1804, the two traveled in today’s Venezuela, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, then went up to Cuba and Mexico, and finally further up into the north, to Philadelphia and Washington, and they returned to Europe from there.⁵

Schoolbook of Natural History, in Dagnosław Demski – Ildikó Sz. Kristóf – Kamila Baraniecka-Olszewska (eds.): *Competing Eyes. Visual Encounters with Alterity in Central and Eastern Europe*, Budapest, L’Harmattan, 2013, 40–66; Ildikó Sz. Kristóf: The Representation of the Australian Aborigines in Text and Picture: Dr. Med. Pál Almási Balogh (1794–1863) and the Birth of the Science of Anthropology in Central Europe/Hungary, *Caiana Revista academica de Historia del Arte y Cultura Visual de Centro Argentino de Investigadores de Arte (CAIA)* (Buenos Aires), No. 5, Segundo semestre, dossier special “Ciencia y Cultura Visual” (ed. Pirooska Csúri – Mercedes García Ferrari), 2014, 126–140.

³ Alexander von Humboldt: *Vues des Cordillères et monumens des peuples indigenes de l’Amérique*, Paris, 1810–1813. I used the edition of 1824: Alexander von Humboldt: *Vues des Cordillères* Vol. I. (1824) [1813]; Alexander von Humboldt – Aimé Bonpland: *Voyages aux régions équinoxiales du nouveau continent, fait en 1799, 1800, 1801, 1803 et 1804*, Paris; Alexander von Humboldt: *Kritische Untersuchungen über die historische Entwicklung der geographischen Kenntnisse der Neuen Welt*. Translated from French by Dr. Jul. Ludw. Ideler, Berlin, 1836.

⁴ Alexander von Humboldt – Aimé Bonpland: *Voyages aux régions équinoxiales du nouveau continent, fait en 1799, 1800, 1801, 1803 et 1804*, Paris.

⁵ See Ildikó Sz. Kristóf: Alexander von Humboldt és Magyarország: Egy romantikus természetű jelentősége a magyarországi egyetemes néprajzi érdeklődés kibontakozásában, *Századok*, Vol. 151, No. 5, 2017, 990–991.

What a Hungarian reader would immediately notice in Humboldt's accounts of that journey and also in his later works are the following points: several Hungarian place-names (names of smaller and bigger towns) are cited here and there and used as a comparative material to geographical descriptions and analyses, and, what is more, the spelling of the place-names is strikingly correct. Even the specific Hungarian diacritical marks are used correctly, such as those in *Kecskemét*, *Cegléd*, *Vác*, and so on.⁶ Certainly, this could be attributed to some knowledgeable editors of Humboldt's works, but, according to my findings, there is more than that. Humboldt describes some of the geographical regions, characteristic landscapes of Hungary in detail. One such is the Great Plains, the so-called *puszta* (desert). Humboldt himself refers to it as "die ungarischen *puszten*" (the Hungarian deserts) and he claims to have *traveled through* a part (the northwestern part) of them between, as he puts, Oedenburg (today's Sopron, Hungary) and Bratislava (today in Slovakia).⁷ This journey took place most probably in August 1797, when Humboldt as a young assistant inspector in the Department of Mines, visited the mines of certain Western and Central European countries. He seems to have made a short (and since then mostly forgotten) excursion in northwestern Hungary on that occasion.⁸

Beyond place-names, the names of contemporary Hungarian aristocrats and scholars are mentioned here and there in Humboldt's works. Aristocrats such as the Podmaniczky – Baron József Podmaniczky (1756–1823) for sure, and perhaps also Károly Podmaniczky (1772–1833) – and scholars including the mapmaker János Lipszky (1766–1826), the orientalist Sándor Körösi Csoma (1784–1842), and the Zipser-Austrian historian Johann Christian Engel (1770–1814) figure in his texts, footnotes and references.⁹

At a certain place in one of his works, Humboldt even refers to one of the Hungarian medieval chronicles, the so-called *Turóczi krónika*. And, as far as I could establish, he refers to it in its 18th-century edition, published by Johann Georg Schwandner (1716–1791) in 1746 in Vienna and prefaced by

⁶ Alexander von Humboldt – Aimé Bonpland: *Voyages aux régions équinoxiales du nouveau continent, fait en 1799, 1800, 1801, 1803 et 1804*, Paris. A later German translation and adaptation of it is Alexander von Humboldt: *Reise in die Aequinoctial Gegenden des Neuen Continents*, Deutscher Bearbeitung von Hermann Hauff, Stuttgart, 1859.

⁷ Alexander von Humboldt: *Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of the New Continent*, London, 1819, 294–295. German editions containing references to Hungary are Alexander von Humboldt: *Reise in die Aequinoctial Gegenden des Neuen Continents*, Stuttgart–Tübingen, Cotta, 1820, 250–251.

⁸ See also Ildikó Sz. Kristóf: Alexander von Humboldt és Magyarország: Egy romantikus természettudós jelentősége a magyarországi egyetemes néprajzi érdeklődés kibontakozásában, *Századok*, Vol. 151, No. 5, 2017, 1003.

⁹ See Ildikó Sz. Kristóf: Alexander von Humboldt és Magyarország: Egy romantikus természettudós jelentősége a magyarországi egyetemes néprajzi érdeklődés kibontakozásában, *Századok*, Vol. 151, No. 5, 2017, 1000–1005.

Matthias Bél (1684–1749). Both scholars belonged to an important circle of geographers and statisticians working in Bratislava in the second half of the 18th century.¹⁰

Alexander von Humboldt seems thus to have possessed a rather direct knowledge about Hungary. This led me to the hypothesis that there might have been important, most probably direct, but so far neglected communication between him and some Hungarian scholars. And so it turned out. It was a communication about which our historiography has known very little until these days, and which is not included in the great Western European surveys of the history of European geography either.¹¹

It also occurred to me that Humboldt elaborated a representation of the Hungarians in which he made them different from the other peoples of Europe – a “Europe” which itself was constructed by this very act of othering. One aspect of that representation concerned nature. It consisted of the natural and geographical characteristics of the landscape of Hungary, described by Humboldt: the enormous, uninhabited low plains – the “*puszten*” – as opposed to other, densely habited geographical regions of “Europe”. The second aspect of Humboldt’s representation concerned linguistics, the characteristics of the Hungarian language. In his view, expressed several times, Hungarian was unrelated to the other big language groups of “Europe”.

All this indicates that Humboldt was well aware of contemporary research – including Hungarian research – concerning the Finno-Ugric relation of the Hungarian language. The great *Berghaus Physikalischer Atlas* published in 1852 under the supervision of Humboldt in Gotha referred, for example, to the research of contemporary linguist-ethnographers Sámuel Gyarmathi (1751–1830) and Antal Reguly (1819–1858), both working on Finno-Ugric comparisons from the end of the 18th century well into the 19th.¹² (Reguly pursued his field research mostly during the 1840s).


According to my findings, there is thus a reading in which the Hungarians appear in the descriptions of Alexander von Humboldt as *inner-others*, *intra-aliens* in Europe. One of his most influential early works, *Vues des Cordillères*, provides several interesting paragraphs on the linguistic aspect of this “othering” – or, I might also say – “exoticization,” so characteristic of Humboldt. Let me cite three paragraphs to illustrate it. I am going to quote the English translation of *Vues des Cordillères*, from 1814.

¹⁰ See Ildikó Sz. Kristóf: Alexander von Humboldt és Magyarország: Egy romantikus természettudós jelentősége a magyarországi egyetemes néprajzi érdeklődés kibontakozásában, *Századok*, Vol. 151, No. 5, 2017, 1001.

¹¹ One of the most recent ones discussing the development of Western geography from a post-colonial point of view is, David N. Livingstone: *The Geographical Tradition: Episodes in the History of a Contested Enterprise*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992.

¹² Berghaus, Heinrich (ed.): *Physikalischer Atlas*, Gotha, 1852.

First of all, Humboldt made a general observation according to which “we may conclude that ... the multiplicity of languages is a very ancient phenomenon. Perhaps those which we call American [i.e., Native American, I. Sz. K.], *belong no more to America than the Magyar or Hungarian, the Tschoud or Finlandish belong to Europe.*” Secondly, one of his more specific analyses of the names of particular geographical regions refers to a place-name well known from ancient Hungarian history. Humboldt made use of several images like the one shown in Picture 1.



Picture 1

This is a reproduction of indigenous Mexican/Aztec picture-writing; Humboldt analyzed both pictograms and the words of the indigenous, Nahuatl language to support his argumentation. In the case concerning the Hungarian language, he followed the same procedure and said:

The word *atl* or *atel*, is met with in the east of Europe. According to the observation of Mr. Frederick Schlegel, the country inhabited by the Madjares [the Hungarians, I. Sz. K.] before the conquest of Hungary, bore the name of *atelkusu*. Under this denomination were comprised Moldavia, Bessarabia, and Walachia, three provinces bordering on the mouths of the Danube, which, like the Wolga, bore the name of the great water, *atel*. The Mexican hieroglyph of water [is] *atl*, [and it is] indicated by the undulation of several parallel lines, the motion of the waves...¹³

It is in the footnotes to this paragraph that Humboldt referred to the medieval Hungarian chronicle, the above-mentioned *Turóczi krónika*. We now see why he needed it: to support his argument that the word *atl* is not only an Aztec word, but also a Hungarian – or, rather Finno-Ugric – one. According to my findings, the Schwandner-Belius edition of *Turóczi krónika* from 1746 did mention *atelkusu* and described the region in detail. Even the page numbers were correct that Humboldt cited in the footnote. As for the reference to Friedrich Schlegel, however, which shows that Humboldt was not alone in his interest in the linguistic relation of the word *atl* in the period, I have so far been unable to find it.

Let us see now the third paragraph in which Humboldt identified certain similarities between Aztec and Finno-Ugric – and, in this case also Mongolian – words. This paragraph discusses the case of the *calli* or *teo calli*, the house of the Aztec divinities:

We shall [...] observe that the Aztec word *calli* has the same signification as the *kuala*, or *kolla*, of the Woguls, who dwell on the banks of the Kama and Irtisch. [...] *By the migration of the tribes from Asia to America, and from America to Asia, a certain number of roots have passed from one language to others, and these roots have been transported, like the fragments of a shipwreck, far from the coast into the islands.* (Italics are mine: I. Sz. K.). [...] house in Aztec *calli*, in Wogoul *kuala* or *kolla*; water in Aztec *atel*, [...] in Mongol, Tscheremiss and Tscouvass, *atl*, *atelch*, *etel* or *idel*...¹⁴

Humboldt nowhere claimed explicitly that the Finno-Ugric peoples – and, among them, the Hungarians – would indeed be relatives to the indigenous inhabitants of the American continent, called American “Indians” in his age. His underlying ideas about the peopling of the New World seem however to lead in this direction. Humboldt argued for a particular possibility in this respect: the migration of the so-called *Mongolian* “race”, as he put it, or – as

¹³ The citation is from Alexander von Humboldt: *Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of the New Continent*, London, 1819, 294–295, (italics are mine: I. Sz. K.).

¹⁴ Alexander von Humboldt: *Vues des Cordillères II*, 1824, 25–26, (italics are mine: I. Sz. K.).

it was treated at the time as a common language family – the *Finn-Tartar* peoples from Asia to the American continent.¹⁵ And, according to the then prevailing classification, the Hungarians also belonged to that wide language family. This is how the peopling of America was discussed, for example, in the *Berghaus Physikalischer Atlas* which was edited, as I mentioned above, under the supervision of Humboldt in Gotha in 1852.¹⁶

The Hungarians seem thus to have been interesting to Humboldt as a kind of “ethnographic/linguistic aliens”, as exotic, Finn-Tartar “inner others” in Europe. One has to admit however that it was not more than in a few cases that Humboldt discussed them in his works. Although more research is needed in this respect, I would say that we should not overestimate his attention either.

Now let us turn to the other side of the story. Examining the same period, in what respect could Alexander von Humboldt himself be interesting to the Hungarians?

According to my findings, a certain kind of heroisation – a positive kind of “othering”, a scientific and political idealization – surrounded Humboldt in Hungary already during his life. The scholars that knew and cited him the most, and that he had the closest contacts with throughout his long life, seem to be (not exclusively but) mostly Protestant and reformist, and later on, more or less cosmopolitan (*szabadelvű*) thinkers.¹⁷ They stood in opposition to the Habsburg government(s) and were in search of an independent Hungarian – political and cultural – identity at the same time. They were linguists, astronomers, surgeons, and also geologists and ethnographers. Many of them were aristocrats and some also politicians. The older generation (or, more precisely, many of them) took part in the Martinovich-conspiracy, the attempted revolt of the Hungarian nobles against the Habsburg government which took place in the end of the 1790s. One of them was, for example, János Besse (Jean de Besse, 1765–1841), a linguist-turcologist, who later moved to live in Paris and joined Humboldt in his second great journey to Asia/Siberia in 1829. One of his letters written to Humboldt earlier in that year is preserved in the National Széchenyi Library, Budapest. I found it there a couple of years ago. It is written in French and it emphasizes how much Besse and his noble supporters are excited to be able to search into the (ethnographic and linguistic) past of the Hungarians in Asia.

¹⁵ Alexander von Humboldt: Introduction, in: *Vues des Cordillères*, 31–32.

¹⁶ Heinrich Berghaus (ed.): *Physikalischer Atlas*, Gotha, 1852.

¹⁷ A preliminary study of those relationships is to be found in Ildikó Sz. Kristóf: Alexander von Humboldt és a Podmaniczkyak. Mozaikok a földrajz és az egyetemes néprajz 19. századi tudománytörténetéhez, in Gurka Dezső (ed.): *A báró Podmaniczky család a 18–19. századi magyar kultúrában*, Budapest, Gondolat Kiadó, 2017, 25–40.

Members of the younger generation of Hungarian admirers of Humboldt took part in the movement of the Hungarian national awakening during the 1830s–1840s. Some of them even participated in the War of Independence in 1848. Such was, for example, Pál Rosty (1830–1874), a traveler-ethnographer, who then left for Paris, learnt photography there and, during a trip made to America in 1856, followed the route of Humboldt and Bonpland in South America, and then in Mexico and Cuba. He published a richly illustrated album of this journey and sent a copy of it to Humboldt himself. There seems to have been a whole network of the Hungarian admirers of Humboldt who even after the death of the latter formed a circle of kin, friends and good acquaintances. They kept coming together in social as well as scientific events; I am thinking of members of the great Protestant families, such as the Podmaniczky, Radvánszky, Kubinyi, Prónai, and Hunfalvy families.

Alexander von Humboldt came from a German Protestant family and his cosmopolitan views were well known in Hungary, too. He argued for the liberation of the South American Spanish colonies and the abolition of slavery. According to my findings, he seemed to symbolize something like the revolutionary Paris or the rebellious American states fighting for self-determination against the British for the Hungarian nobles and aristocrats in opposition to the Habsburg government. It was Pál Almási Balogh (1794–1867), the chief surgeon of Lajos Kossuth (1802–1894) and István Széchenyi (1791–1860) – and himself an admirer of Humboldt – who delivered his eulogy in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1859. Humboldt was elected honorary member of the Academy in the same year. In his speech, Almási Balogh praised another Hungarian scholar, Ferenc Kubinyi (1796–1874), a geologist and archeologist, himself a cosmopolitan thinker and founder of the Association of Hungarian Doctors and Investigators of Nature (this learned society was founded in 1841). As another member of the opposition against Habsburg rule, Kubinyi was revered by Almási Balogh for “in his summer villa in Tata, [having] raised a monument to *commemorate the two heroes of public freedom*, Washington and Humboldt, engraving their names on an enormous grey marble block.”¹⁸

As instruments of such a *cult* of Humboldt in the second half of the 19th century, not only were his portraits distributed in various Hungarian scientific and popular journals and newspapers (Picture 2), but there appeared a certain “Humboldt-pattern” in porcelain art as well. Mór Fischer (1799–1880) and his porcelain manufacture of Herend (Veszprém county) designed the pattern

¹⁸ Pál Almási Balogh: *Emlékbeszéd Humboldt Sándor lt. felett*, 59–60, (italics are mine: I. Sz. K.). See also Ildikó Sz. Kristóf: Alexander von Humboldt és a Podmaniczkyak. Mozaikok a földrajz és az egyetemes néprajz 19. századi tudománytörténetéhez, in Dezső Gurka (ed.): *A báró Podmaniczky család a 18–19. századi magyar kultúrában*, Budapest, Gondolat Kiadó, 2017, 25–40.



Picture 2

specifically for the 88th birthday of the great German scientist, and they produced a porcelain portrait of him, too (Picture 3 and 4).

In the light of such a scientific cult, it is somewhat odd to note that only one attempt seems to have been made in Hungary to translate his works. This attempt concerned a chapter of Humboldt's *Kosmos* only, and even that attempt failed. According to my research, not more than two short booklets appeared by a seemingly unskilled translator, a secondary school teacher called Imre Miksits (?–1882) in 1857. The quality of the text met with such indignation in the circle of the above-mentioned scientific (and Protestant) admirers of Humboldt that Miksits finally decided to give up the whole enterprise.

The circle, or network, of the Hungarian scientific admirers of Alexander von Humboldt is especially important in the history of sciences because it seems that the same circles – the same families, friends, kin and acquaintances – contributed enormously to the emergence of geography and ethnography as institutionalized sciences in Hungary. Geography – together with




Picture 3

global ethnography, that is, the ethnography of non-European peoples – was institutionalized with the geographer János Hunfalvy (1820–1888), another Protestant/Lutheran scholar) during the 1870s, while domestic ethnography was institutionalized under the older brother of the latter, the linguist-ethnographer Pál Hunfalvy (1810–1891), somewhat later, during the 1890s.¹⁹

Considering these relations, it is necessary to discuss, in conclusion, what kind of a scientific approach and what kind of a research methodology arrived in Hungary with Alexander von Humboldt. In my reading, three important ideas were communicated by his oeuvre during the 19th century.

First of all, there was the idea of an “antiquarian ethnography.” Humboldt himself used the term “ethnography” in his works (especially those relating to America), and it meant for him as well as many of his followers an explicit search for the past: a search for “antiquities” or “monuments” (*monumens*) which would carry messages from the remote past of a certain people, and also humankind as such. This search appeared as a kind of “intellectual archeology”, as it was called by a French historian of geography.²⁰ In the frame of linguistic and mythological approaches and meticulous analyses, it focused especially on what was tangible and visible in the world, such as ancient ruins, buildings, objects and artifacts (utensils, dress, etc), that is, pieces of material culture, and it was identified later as an area of descriptive ethnography. It focused also on the physical appearance of human beings (height, skin colour, skull form, specificities of the hairstyle, etc). I should mention in this place that among the many objects that Humboldt and Bonpland brought back from America to Europe there were also Native American skulls (crania), which they exhibited in the Museum of Natural History in Paris. They were “crania of Mexican Indians, Peruvians, and others....” – as Humboldt says – and we



Picture 4

¹⁹ See Ildikó Sz. Kristóf: Alexander von Humboldt és Magyarország: Egy romantikus természettudós jelentősége a magyarországi egyetemes néprajzi érdeklődés kibontakozásában, *Századok*, Vol. 151, No. 5, 2017, 1005–1006.

²⁰ Claude Blanckaert: Géographie et anthropologie: une rencontre nécessaire (XVIII^e–XIX^e siècle), *Ethnologie française*, No. 4, (Octobre–Décembre), 2004, 661–670.



Picture 5

do not know much about how they actually came into their possession. Finally, written documents also constituted the sources of this “antiquarian ethnography”: books of history, handwritten manuscripts, all kind of archival material – even indigenous documents, such as the Aztec maps (Picture 5) which Humboldt himself analysed in *Vues des Cordillères*.

The methodology of “antiquarian ethnography” was comparative in the strictest sense of the term. Seemingly it compared everything to everything or anything to anything, such as comparing Finno-Ugric words to Aztec ones as I discussed in the first part of this essay. And the purpose of the comparison was to establish descentance, succession, migration: its goal was to reveal or unveil the mysterious ways and sequences of the past.

The second idea that was communicated by the works of Humboldt to Hungary was a new human geography, a *géographie humaine*, as it emerged in France during the first half of the 19th century. Humboldt lived in France for twenty three years (from 1804 to 1827, the year that he was called back to Berlin by the emperor). He worked in close contact there with the French geographers of the age, who developed the methodology of *géographie humaine* under and after Napoleon I. We can think of geographers such as Conrad Malte-Brun (1775–1826), Charles Athanase Walckenaer (1771–1852), Jean-Baptiste Eyriès (1767–1846), or Julien-Joseph Virey (1775–1846). The same group founded the first geographical society in France, the *Société de Géographie* in Paris (1821), a scientific institution which was sharply criticized by recent post-colonial scholarship (by Edward W. Said and others) as having had too explicit colonial ambitions and having supported Bonaparte’s imperial wars all too readily. The early relations of Humboldt to the *Société* should be studied more profoundly, since we know that he was not on very good terms with Napoleon. Later, however, he functioned indeed as an honorary president of the *Société*, and even acted as a co-editor of *Nouvelles Annales des Voyages*, the most important periodical publication representing the new French geography.²¹

²¹ I had the opportunity to study the volumes of *Nouvelles Annales des Voyages* in Somogyi Library, Szeged.

At this point it seems worth considering in what sense this geography – and also Humboldt’s geography – can be considered new. It admittedly set itself against the discourse of Enlightenment “world histories”, that is, the late 18th-century genre of *geographia mundi*:

Geography, as it is conceived today [...] – to quote *Nouvelles Annales des Voyages* from 1839 – is not restricted any more to a brief and dry description of places; to some paragraphs on the rivers and the mountains; to an approximative survey of the products of a region, its natural and artificial frontiers: ... [It] has a wider scope: it aims at giving an exact account of not only what exists, but also the events that affected it, and the events that could modify it; it aims also at showing the manners (*moeurs*) of a people, so it tells what successive variations these manners have undergone through time, it reveals the appropriate reasons for it, it teaches us which were the most glorious days [of the people concerned] and which the most miserable ones, how the population has increased, or how and why it has decreased, which period has made its wealth grow, and how its sources have been used up [...]

[This] geography [...] is universal, because it draws on religion, history, the arts (*les arts*) and manners of a nation, and so in this way nothing is alien to it...²²

Probably the most important aspect of the new geography was that it was proposed as the science of something *social* and *collective*, something which was held to be different from the sphere of the natural environment, but which was treated – and this is very important – as included in it, as embedded in it. (A similar idea of “*social geography*” was taken up later by Paul Vidal de la Blache (1845–1918) and through him, the historians of the *Annales*-circle themselves in France at the beginning of the 20th century.²³)

Finally, the third idea which was communicated by Humboldt’s works to Hungary was his concept of history. In general, Humboldt relied on the *stadial* concept of the Enlightenment: he conceived history as a universal and also unilinear development advancing from the stage of *savages to*, the stage of barbarians, to that of half-barbarians, and finally to that of so-called civilizations. However, another of his scientific obsessions modified the general idea of development and made it less linear, less straight, and altogether less rigid. This was the role that Nature could play in the formation of human societies. As regards the American Indians, for example, Humboldt argued that just as Nature provides multiple centers (or *foyers*) for the distribution of

²² A. E.: *Statistique de l’industrie française. Exposition des produits de 1839*, 63–64. The citation is the first paragraph of the article; the English translation is mine: I. Sz. K.

²³ See Claude Blanckaert: *Géographie et anthropologie: une rencontre nécessaire (XVIII^e–XIX^e siècle)*, *Ethnologie française* No. 4, (Octobre–Décembre), 2004, 661–670.

certain climates, plants and animals²⁴, so do indigenous societies. Mexico and Peru (the Aztec as well as the Inca states) could thus be considered nature-dependent centers of “highland civilization”; just like the Hungarian *puszta* could and should be considered similar to the South American *pampas* and other grasslands.²⁵

Humboldt seems to have made an important distinction in this way between two (equally imagined) poles of indigenous social development. On one of the poles were those “half-barbarians” who could get closer to “civilisation” because they lived in a more favorable natural environment. They were thus capable of developing agriculture, writing (such as pictograms and *kipus*), and organizing themselves into states. On the other of the poles, however, were those less fortunate miserables who – according to the ethnographically and geographically informed stadial classification of Humboldt – remained savages (“savage hordes of hunters”) because they were less favored by their natural environment, could not manage to advance beyond gathering and hunting, could not develop writing, and stay(ed) far from organized life and state formation.

I would say in sum that it was a kind of early evolutionary cultural ecology that Humboldt proposed in his works on America, and it had quite an impact on the emerging sciences of ethnography and geography in 19th-century Hungary. The ways in which Hungarian, non-Hungarian, and non-European peoples and cultures have been represented in our schoolbooks and handbooks, and their images testify to a considerable influence of such a pre-Darwinian imagination. It seems to have set the background for our scientific and political, linguistic and ethnic, accepted and contested, attributed and experienced identities; it provided one of the choices for our early social scientists to orient themselves. More research is needed in this field, however. Mine will be continued.

²⁴ About the pre-Darwinian concept of *foyer* see Claude Blanckaert: *Géographie et anthropologie: une rencontre nécessaire (XVIII^e–XIX^e siècle)*, *Ethnologie française* 4 (Octobre–Décembre 2004), 665.

²⁵ Alexander von Humboldt: Introduction, in: *Vues des Cordillères et monumens des peuples indigènes de l'Amérique*, Paris, 1810–1813. I used the edition of 1824: Alexander von Humboldt: *Vues des Cordillères*, Vol I. (1824) [1813].

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NATIONAL IDENTITY AS A LITERARY QUESTION:
THE SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF THE ANECDOTE IN
HUNGARIAN FIN-DE-SIÈCLE LITERATURE

ESZTER TARJÁNYI

ABSTRACT

The most significant point on which researchers agree when the anecdote, that most distinctive of literary forms, is placed under the microscope in order to capture its multifaceted character is that it is no easy task, indeed it is almost impossible, to give it a satisfactory definition. This may also be coloured by the Hungarian usage because the anecdote occupies a particularly important place in the Hungarian cultural heritage. In contrast to any other national literature, the anecdote became a most significant and dominant literary genre, which essentially characterised the Hungarian literary tradition at the turn of the twentieth century. Its importance led to the concept of the anecdotal novel.

The anecdotal novels of Mór Jókai and Kálmán Mikszáth, as the name of the genre would suggest, are derived from the anecdote and result in what is known in English literature as the composite novel. This kind of novel is mostly comprised of anecdotal episodes which do not adhere to any strict logical order and are associated with a light and amusing tone as well as being coupled with a historical outlook.

*Yet the anecdote has another important context in the Central-European literary tradition. As a special genre associated with the gentry, it is characterised by national issues and national consciousness. Thus the genre came to represent national identity. Likewise, Polish culture can be compared with its similar form, the *gawęda*. Just as in Hungary there was a connection between the gentry and the anecdote, so Polish culture established a strong link between the *gawęda* and the noble, so-called Sarmatian tradition. There is, however, an important difference: while the novels by Joseph Conrad and Gombrowitz can be traced back to the *gawęda*, *Nyugat* (West), the representative journal*

of Hungarian literary modernity, abandoned the anecdote, stigmatising it as conservative, outmoded, antimodernist and all too familiar, turning instead to western literary models. Only Hungarian postmodern writers (notably Péter Esterházy) have reinvented the features of the anecdotal tradition.

In my paper I would like to examine how this old tradition can serve the national identity and how it can be seen as a hidden path towards literary modernity.

Keywords: *anecdote, Hungarian anecdote, gawęda, national identity*

The most significant point on which researchers agree when the anecdote, this very particular literary form, is placed under the microscope is the inability of reference books to capture its multifaceted character, and how difficult, indeed almost impossible, it is to give it a satisfactory definition.

We may gain a better understanding of the anecdote when we see its place in Hungarian literature, since the Hungarian variation bears specific features and qualities that are absent in the literature of Western Europe. A tradition related to ideology and social issues may be mentioned here, as well as a distinctive presentation of episodes as anecdotes in novels and other literary texts, thus creating the anecdotal novel as a distinct literary genre. Consequently, the Hungarian anecdote became a more complex phenomenon. It comprised both literary and non-literary qualities, endowing it respectively with poetic and prosaic functions far more relevant than those experienced in Western Europe. It also represented a culturally determined pattern of attitude that shaped identity. While a recent American publication dealing with the anecdote virtually apologises for focusing on this marginal form,¹ Hungarian studies continually view the anecdote as a traditionally central element of literary discourse in its local complexity and variability.² Studying the differences between the West-European and the Hungarian concept, which entails comparing a general and a specific approach, may enable us to form a more relevant picture of our subject.

Analysing the way we understand the anecdote can lead us to a more precise definition. In the context of literature we are presented with two major interpretations of the word *anecdote*. One is based on factual components,

¹ Cp. Andea Loselle: Introduction, *SubStance. A Review of Theory and Literary Criticism*, Issue 118, Vol. 39, No. 1, *The Anecdote*, 2009, 3.

² Elaborations of Hungarian reception history: György Bodnár: *Az anekdotavita és elméleti távlatai* (The Debate on Anecdote and Its Theoretical Outlooks), in *A 'mese' lélekvándorlása* (The Incarnation of the 'Tale'), Budapest, Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1988; István Dobos: *Anekdotikus novellahagyomány* (The Anecdotal Tradition of the Short Story), in *Alaktan és értelmezéstörténet* (Morphology and History of Interpretation), Debrecen, Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó, 1995.

historicity and oral tradition. Henceforth I will call this version the *factual anecdote*. It is a shorter narrative with characters living in historical memory, using the form of a dialogue, ending with amusing conclusions and having no author, rather just a collector. The other variety is a fictional component of novels with a considerably more blurred connection to history, which came to exist in Hungarian prosaic and poetic literature as “an episode of comic modality”. For the sake of convenience, it will be called the *fictional anecdote*. This interpretation is relatively unknown to Western scholars, so it is easier for them to understand the type of Hungarian novel composed of fictional anecdotes and classified as an “anecdotal novel” by comparing it with the “composite novel”.³

In Hungarian culture the anecdote developed into a fundamental means of expression approaching the status of a specific genre that had a major impact on Hungarian fin de siècle literature. The dominant fictional prose of the period can be characterised by the anecdote, a phenomenon giving rise to the anecdotal novel. Such a novel mostly organises itself through episodes formed anecdotally in an unaffected and playful tone, the plot being adventurous and amusing, and related, one way or another, to history. Furthermore, it often has some connection with national issues.

The composite novel differs from the anecdotal novel in that the story is less organic, whereas the latter includes a mainline narrative to which minor stories are linked, although not in a logical order with precedents or consequences. The anecdotal novel is not necessarily related to national identity, although anecdotes may have a factual character and strong historical references, in which this connection is strong. However, the factual and fictional anecdote frequently change position, so cultivating and affecting the national identity as a function appears in the fictional variation, as will be illustrated in our example.

It would appear Polish culture has created a similar formation, the *gawęda*. The Poles, however, usually mention the Russian *szkaz* for comparison in order to highlight the perceptual circle of this national literary genre⁴

³ The composite novel was accepted as a genre in the 20th century forming a conceptual framework that can be applied to similar texts written before that time. The term comes from Maggie Dunn – Ann Morris: *The Composite Novel. The Short Story Cycle in Transition*, New York, Twayne Publishers, 1995, 2, who wanted to define the term *short story cycle*, relatively popular in the 1970s, more precisely: “The composite novel is a literary work composed of short texts that – thought individually complete and autonomous – are interrelated in a coherent whole according to one or more organizing principles.”

⁴ Czesław Miłosz (*The History of Polish Literature*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, 1983, 255.) wrote:

[The] *Gawęda* may be roughly defined as a loose, chatty form of fiction (not unlike what the Russians call *skaz*) in which a narrator recounts episodes in highly stylized, personal language. Both the language and the character of the storyteller are usually those of an average, old-fashioned squire [...]. Episodic anecdotes taken from the life

and its connection with orality. It is only recently that a closer link between the Hungarian anecdote and the *gawęda* has been presumed.⁵ The *gawęda* originally appeared as a “nobleman’s tale”:

[It] is a loose, informal narrative, told by a speaker in the manner of someone’s reminiscing. It is often involved and full of digressions. Little attention is paid to chronology. At first, seemingly unimportant details and fragmentary episodes come to the fore, then gradually a coherent picture emerges. By the time the speaker has finished, everything has fallen into place. This form of narration, originating from an oral tradition, first appeared in Polish literature during the Romantic period. It was used both in poetry and prose. [...] In the nobleman’s house and the lord’s castle the water that we nobles drank was the *gawęda* [...] [which] was an academy and a school, especially given the social life of our fellow landowners [...]. The *gawęda* gave one the exact history of each family and even that of national events.⁶

The *gawęda* is a relative of the Hungarian anecdote in that both literary genres are closely linked to a sort of social and national class consciousness as well as adhering to orality, with a special regard to its socially adhesive character. Just as a strong connection was formed between the gentry and the anecdote in Hungary, so it also appeared for the Poles with the *gawęda* and the noble Sarmatian tradition.⁷ The common features the *gawęda* and the anecdote share, logically suggesting a meditation on comparative social and literary history, rely on their being embedded in ideologically influenced societies and determined by tradition. This form of narrative in both cultures was regarded as an adequate literary manifestation of national feeling and self-reflection on their cultural heritage. The anecdotal novel, however, also differs from the *gawęda*. While the former in our country was mostly dismissed by contributors to *Nyugat* (1908–1941), the leading journal of Hungarian literary modernity, the latter found its way directly to a modern intellectual literary forum thanks to a number of outstanding twentieth-century Polish

of the eighteenth century are related in humorous essays connected by the personality and colourful speech of the narrator. [...] The *gawęda* remained popular up to the second half of the nineteenth century.

⁵ Lajos Pálfalvi: *A Transz-Atlantik megállói* (The Stops of the Trans-Atlantyk), Pozsony, Kalligram, 2015, 28–29.

⁶ Andrzej Busza’s and K. W. Wóycicky’s definitions are quoted: Marek Pacukiewicz: Cultural Aspects of Joseph Conrad’s Autobiography. On the Digressive Structure of Some Reminiscences, *Yearbook of Conrad Studies*, Krakow, Vol. 7, 2012, 78, 80.

⁷ As Andrzej Wasko put it: “The centerpiece of Sarmatism is the political ideology of the Polish gentry, with its strong republican preferences and opposition to absolutism of either Western or Muscovite type, love of liberty and chivalry, excessive disregard for trade and craft, and simplicity and austerity of morals.” – Andrzej Wasko: Sarmatism or the Enlightenment: The Dilemma of Polish Culture, *Sarmatian Review*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2006, www.ruf.rice.edu/sarmatia/497/wasko.html (Accessed 2 February 2017).

or Polish-born writers making worldviews and stereotypes associated with the *gawęda* compatible with modern thinking. Typically the writing styles of Joseph Conrad⁸ and Gombrowicz are paralleled to this 18th and 19th-century variety of Polish narrative. By comparison, in Hungarian literature a move towards the anecdotal tradition can rather be discerned with authors classified as postmodern, most notably in the case of Péter Esterházy (1950–2016).⁹ At present, however, I am not focusing on the prosaic and poetic role of this genre but, in line with the agenda of the conference, I will examine the Hungarian anecdote as a builder and nurturer of national identity and consciousness.

The anecdote, from this perspective, can easily be associated with a form of expression evading modern literary forms, linked to the paradox of conservative modernisation and, at the same time, highlighting the connection between novels based on anecdotal episodes and postmodern novels. A certain aspect of a literary transformation, more hidden than the one in Poland, may spring to mind, demonstrating a variation of literary modernisation evolving from the Hungarian tradition as an alternative to following western patterns. In this way, the novels of Kálmán Mikszáth (1847–1910) and Gyula Krúdy (1878–1933) may be more easily related to, for example, those of Péter Esterházy with his collection of anecdotes entitled *A Little Hungarian Pornography* than to the style essentially regarded as Hungarian modernity and represented by the first generation of *Nyugat* (Endre Ady, Mihály Babits, Dezső Kosztolányi), whose ideal was the West-European psychological novel. As a consequence, this literary form, which was often considered (especially by Ady) to be a reflection of a feudal, patriarchal world, and the cultural traditions accompanying it can be placed beyond modernity, in the world of a postmodern form of storytelling.

In our literary terminology, besides the term anecdote another word, *adoma* (saying) may contribute to clarifying our definition. The term *adoma* was coined by János Erdélyi in 1851, when he “translated” *anecdote* as *adoma* in Hungarian in his study written for a collection entitled *A Book of Hungarian Proverbs*.¹⁰ In that period both terms were used simultaneously, and were initially considered synonyms.

⁸ Marek Pacukiewicz: *Cultural Aspects*, *ibid.*, 78.: “The digressive nature of much of Conrad’s writing (fictional or otherwise) has often been linked to the traditional Polish *gawęda*, or ‘nobleman’s tale’, which ‘was particularly suited to the volatility of the Polish imagination’ – an opinion shared by Polish writers for many, many years.”

⁹ Reviewing the position of the anecdote in Hungary and the history of its development: Károly Alexa: *Anekdoták, magyar anekdoták* (Anecdote, Hungarian Anecdote), in *Bujdosó mondatok* (Exiled Sentences), Lakitelek, Antológia Kiadó, 2015.

¹⁰ János Erdélyi: *Közmondásokról* (On Proverbs), in *Nyelvészeti és népköltészeti, népzenei írások* (Writings on Linguistics, Folk Poetry and Folk Music), Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1991, 180.

By the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, however, the two terms had become separated. Béla Tóth, who compiled the most significant collection of Hungarian anecdotes (virtually factual anecdotes) in six volumes (*The Hungarian Treasury of Anecdotes*, 1898–1903), clearly interpreted the anecdote as a narrative with a historical viewpoint, rooted in a real element of an event, with well-known historical figures living in the cultural memory of the nation, who do not need to be introduced. Béla Tóth made distinctions regarding types of anecdote, although he did not use the word *adoma*. In his preface he mentions two varieties of anecdote to distinguish between. One type “always adheres to a *person*, so in a way it can be considered *authentic*.” The other, which he himself ignored, was later given the name *adoma* and, as he explained, “it is bodiless for it is only about types”.¹¹ As a result of this distinction, the historical character of the anecdote became more substantial from the middle of the 19th century. By the turn of the 20th century the meaning of the Hungarian anecdote had been reduced to a narrative with a historical atmosphere and a concrete person or persons. The plot does not necessarily have to be real, but rather a form of storytelling that seems authentic, with specific references, reflecting national history in the cultural memory of the nation and thus creating a historical atmosphere. This procedure refers to historical heritage as mythical, a correlation elaborated by Jan Assmann. The authenticity of the anecdote and its perception of the past draw a parallel with Assmann’s theory about the two variations of collective memory, namely communicative and cultural memories, being intertwined. So what we have is something that is informal and formed, personal and symbolic, contemporary and national at the same time, arousing a sense of national identity, in which it is the memorable and not real history that matters.¹²

¹¹ Béla Tóth (ed.): *A magyar anekdotakincs I.* (The Hungarian Treasury of Anecdotes), Budapest, 1898, 6.

¹² Jan Assmann: Communicative and Cultural Memory, in Astrid Erll – Ansgar Nünning (eds.) in collaboration with Sara B. Young: *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, (Medien und Kulturelle Erinnerung 8/Media and Cultural Memory 8), Berlin/New York, de Gruyter, 2008, 113. [http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/propylaeumdok/1774/1/Assmann Communicative and cultural memory 2008.pdf](http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/propylaeumdok/1774/1/Assmann%20Communicative%20and%20cultural%20memory%202008.pdf) (Accessed 2 February 2017).

The cultural memory is based on fixed points in the past. Even in the cultural memory, the past is not preserved as such but is cast in symbols as they are represented in oral myths or in writings, performed in feasts, and they are continually illuminating a changing present. In the context of cultural memory, the distinction between myth and history vanishes. Not the past as such, as it is investigated and reconstructed by archeologists and historians, counts for the cultural memory, but only the past as it is remembered. Here, in the context of cultural memory, it is the temporal horizon of cultural memory which is important. Cultural memory reaches back into the past only so far as the past can be reclaimed as “ours”. This is why we refer to this form of historical consciousness as “memory” and not just as knowledge about the past. Knowledge about the past acquires the properties and

While the English definition (“a narrative of a detached incident, or of a single event, told as being in itself interesting and striking”¹³) is considerably more general and may not imply a historical outlook, the factual anecdote in the Hungarian usage is crystalized as a short narrative of comic modality (being funny, having a punch line if you like) with clear reference to history including real historical persons.

The term depends on the differences in meaning between anecdote and adoma in the Hungarian language. In English, further differentiation is made regarding *fait divers*, which is a brief story, such as those typically found in some French newspapers, that is sensational and lurid. Hungarian, however, is unable to interpret *fait divers* as an anecdote, and what is more, it cannot accept it even as an adoma, precisely because it lacks a historical outlook. The translator of Roland Barthes’s basic study in which *fait divers* is analysed explained why he had kept this particular expression: it is “sometimes translated by the journalist’s term *filler*. By retaining the French expression, emphasis is placed on the phenomenon itself than on its function for the composition.”¹⁴ For the Hungarian mind, however, it is much more connected to the daily news sheet (*filler*). The French expression, which appeared in the middle of the 19th century, is becoming increasingly popular in European languages as a synonym for anecdote.¹⁵ This is not the case in Hungarian, as it cannot disregard historical references, and perhaps partly because the terminological problem is made clearer by distinguishing the anecdote from the adoma.

Fait divers is construed by Roland Barthes as a closed structure containing intrinsic information, which accordingly does not fit into other contexts. He

functions of memory if it is related to a concept of identity. While knowledge has no form and is endlessly progressive, memory involves forgetting. It is only by forgetting what lies outside the horizon of the relevant that it performs an identity function.

¹³ Lionel Gossman quotes the headword of the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED), Lionel Gossman: *Anecdote and History, History and Theory*, Vol. 42, No. 2, May 2003, 148.

¹⁴ Roland Barthes: *Structure of the Fait-Divers*, in *Critical Essays*, translated by Richard Howard, Northwest University Press, 1972, 185.

¹⁵ “The term *fait-divers* [...] appears to have no equivalent in other languages, which simply borrow the French term. What is now understood by *fait divers* used to be designated in French as ‘anecdotes’, ‘nouvelles curieuses, singulières’ or ‘canards’. Lionel Gossman: *Anecdote and History*, *Ibidem*, 150; It is likely, however, that its meaning depends on different contexts, so it can not always and everywhere be regarded as the equivalent of the anecdote. Dominique Jullien, not so unanimously, refines the correlation between them: “the anecdote and *fait divers*, while not identical (the *fait divers* belongs to a more specialized cultural context, that of the daily press with its hierarchy of bigger vs. smaller news items), obviously have significant overlap” (Dominique Jullien: *Anecdotes, Fait Divers and the Literacy*. Sub Stence, *A Review of Theory and Literary Criticism*, Issue 118, Vol. 39, No. 1 (*The Anecdote*), 2009, 66) Gossman presumes the French term appeared in 1863 (Lionel Gossman: *Anecdote and History*, *Ibid.*, 150), while Dominique Jullien puts it earlier, and referring to Dominique Kalifa’s studies she names Theophile Gautier as the first user in 1838 (Dominique Jullien: *Anecdotes*, *Ibid.*, 75.).

tries to illustrate the distinct character of the *fait divers* that distinguishes it from other items of (daily) news by describing the difference between a political murder and an ordinary murder, which is an everyday event. While a political murder is embedded in the context of politically determined background information, news about a common murder does not have any such aspects regarding the background of the case, nor does it explain the cause by highlighting any political correlations. Thus Barthes highlights a relevant feature that compares both the *fait divers* and the anecdote to the joke: they cannot be interpreted, and commentaries merely weaken the effect. Any attempt at explanation kills its spontaneity and obvious immanence. The anecdote, like the joke, is a form that defies interpretation.

In Joel Finemann's study aimed at clarifying the historical view of *New Historicism*, the anecdote appears as an intrinsic entity, as the *fait divers* does in Barthes' quasi-structuralist analysis. With Finemann, however, the focus is not on its present-relatedness, but instead its correlation with history is underlined. The anecdote here is a "historème", which is the "smallest minimal unit of the historiographic fact".¹⁶ This definition is the closest to the Hungarian one, although our usage is supplemented with the national consciousness, which adds a special flavour to its composition.

The strong connection between the anecdote and national sentiment in Hungary, which is probably also a result of Béla Tóth's activities as a collector and editor, is manifested in most of the dialogical stories in our anecdotes, with the Hungarian side being victorious at the narrative level. In the punchlines, national sentiment gains the upper hand through witty ripostes and brilliant analyses of situations, even in anecdotes in which our political and historical position is that of the vanquished. The narrative formation of the text is capable of reevaluating the actual historical situation. This particular quality of the Hungarian anecdote, as both constructing and building on the cultural memory of the nation, modifies its characteristic as merely a source of information and makes it a sort of mutant that can enrich the West-European spectrum.

Consequently, the Hungarian anecdote differs from its Western counterparts in yet another field, in that it cannot be regarded as a "historeme" providing complete and immanent information for all its readers. Béla Tóth's anecdotes assume that the reader possesses a knowledge of Hungary's history as background information. Moreover, the story involves the recipient taking sides, as the sympathy of the reader, who naturally is strongly committed to national issues, is always won by the Hungarian side, even if we know that the reality behind the story reflects the position of the loser. The story itself is actually revealed

¹⁶ Joel Fineman: *The History of the Anecdote*, in H. Aram Veese (ed.): *The New Historicism*, New York, London, Routledge, 1989, 56–57.

by those who are rooted in Hungarian culture. This information bearing capacity differs from that of Western Europe, in that it contains immanent information, but exclusively for a community with the same national memory and consciousness. This particular feature may be interpreted with the help of “thick description”, a term coined by Clifford Geertz.¹⁷ Thick description provides both a description and an interpretation of the past, for the Hungarian anecdote includes interpretative procedures and sympathies, too. It comprises a historical text that is not intended to reveal anything, but rather prides itself on its partiality. This characteristic, relying on our background knowledge of national history, evokes a community spirit and urges us to read with a sense of national identity at the forefront.

This historically-induced special relationship is illustrated in the following well-known anecdote from Béla Tóth's collection, entitled *The Most Appropriate Solution*:

The emperor, Frances Joseph was to travel to Pest.

Officials in charge did their best to make the reception as magnificent as possible. Baron Antal Augusz, the governor, requested Baron József Eötvös to help him with a good idea for the reception. It shouldn't cost too much, but it should surprise His Majesty and delight the people.

Eötvös shrugged and said unwillingly:

– I have no idea.

After a while, however, he began.

– Perhaps there is something...

Augusz, his eyes radiant with joy, urged him:

– Go ahead!

– His Majesty will be riding across the bridge.

– That's correct.

– So, on those two poles on the abutment...

– What about them?

– Well, get Protmann hanged from one of them and get yourself hanged from the other. The cost will be modest, His Majesty will be surprised, and the people will be happy.

With this he took his hat and left.

¹⁷ Clifford Geertz: Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in *The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays*, New York, Basic Books, 1973; Stephen Greenblatt similarly interpreted the anecdote as an adequate narrative manifestation in order to reflect reality. He, however, did not take into consideration Hungarian cultural tradition, which encourages collective affirmation when creating sensible utterances. (Stephen Greenblatt: *The Touch of the Real*, in Catherine Gallagher – Stephen Greenblatt: *Practising New Historicism*, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 2001, 21–30.)

I don't know whether this conversation happened, but I know for sure that it was common talk and every Hungarian man rejoiced to hear that.¹⁸

In order to understand the story, we have to be familiar with the relevant history taught in every Hungarian primary school. The episode dates from the 1850s, when Francis Joseph (1830–1916) visited Hungary shortly after the revolution and war of independence had been crushed in the country, so apparently a hidden and rebellious expression of national consciousness is evoked here. Both Antal Augusz and Superintendent Josef Protmann represented the policy of oppression in the 1850s and were utterly loyal to the emperor, while József Eötvös, the minister of religion and education in the Batthyány government (1848, March 23rd–October 2nd), belonged to the Hungarian patriotic movement.

The following version of this story was written by Kálmán Mikszáth, although it did not appear in a collection of factual anecdotes but in the fictional anecdotal novel *The Two Beggar Students* written in 1885, which is set during Rákóczi's War of Independence (1703–1711).

Leopold was not liked by the Hungarians, and the reason why, in spite of this, Pest received him with great pomp was none else than the mayor, Tamás Nesselroth, who wanted to do his utmost on the occasion.

He was an evil man seeking glory, hated by the people, and when the discussions at the Town Hall (which stood in the same place as the present one does) were going on about how to receive the emperor so that he should be surprised, the people should rejoice but it shouldn't cost much (since, a sad fact, the whole annual income of the city at the time wasn't more than 13,430 Rhenus forints), a courageous Hungarian burgher rose to speak:

– Gentlemen, in order to fulfil our plan, the best possible solution would be if his Excellence, our honorary mayor was hanged from the Gate of Vác, from which direction His Majesty will come. In that case all would be achieved: His Majesty would be very much surprised, the people would be extremely happy, and it wouldn't cost any money either.

A roar of laughter broke out. Nesselroth went red and stormed out of the council hall. (...) ¹⁹

¹⁸ *A magyar anekdotakincs* (The Hungarian Treasury of Anecdotes), III, Ibidem, 278.

¹⁹ Kálmán Mikszáth: *A két koldusdiák* (The Two Beggar Students), in *Regények és nagyobb elbeszélések* (Novels and Long Short Stories), Vol. III, ed. by István Király, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1957, 111.

Mikszáth's version changed the basic story considerably. He created a fictional anecdote from a factual anecdote. The only historical character is Leopold I, (1640–1705), who features less vividly in our national memory than Francis Joseph.

Another variation follows more precisely the original source in Béla Tóth's collection, but with a most daring transformation. It is entitled *The Solution* and can be found in Péter Esterházy's *A Little Hungarian Pornography* (1984), and also in another of his works, *Introduction to Literature* (1986). The latter comprises a marginal note as well: "*Bad, Little Hungarian Tale Little Red Riding Hood and the wolf michael [!]*".²⁰ Esterházy's two versions differ in their genres, however. The story appears in *A Little Hungarian Pornography* rather as an anecdote, while it is treated in the *Introduction* as a "tale". As the realms of reality and unreality intermingle, emphasis is laid on the absurdity of the historical situation. The two different contexts depict different stories, although the stories are essentially the same. The title of *A Little Hungarian Pornography* (*Kis Magyar Pornográfia* in Hungarian) is itself an anecdotal reference to the Communists' Hungarian Party (Kommunisták Magyarországi Pártja, or KMP), and the story is considerably more anecdotal than its counterpart in *Introduction*. Consequently, the first Esterházy version without a marginal note can better be paralleled by an anecdote illustrating an entire era than the one in *Introduction*.

For some unfathomable reason *plus* the assiduous undercover activities of the Imperialists, Rákosi began to slip down the popularity list. Since he was just about to attend a peace rally, the officials in charge wanted to ensure that the great man's welcome should be as warm and enthusiastic as humanly possible. It fell to Minister of Transport Comrade Gerő to ask the popular writer Tibor Déry [Déry (1896–1977): generally regarded as the finest writer of socialist prose. But his political activities immediately before and after 1956 created much friction] to come up with a plan for the reception. It shouldn't cost much, it should take the First Secretary by surprise, while the people, too, should be pleased.

Déry, who liked to do things in a big way whatever the situation, gave a reluctant shrug and said, "I can't think of anything". After a while, though, he added, "Well, perhaps I can." His eyes sparkling with hope and anticipation, Gerő urged him on: "Well? Well?"

"Will dear Mátyás have himself driven over the bridge?"

"Da." [trans. from the Russian: Yes]

"Past the two pillars at the head of the bridge?"

"Da. Da." [trans. from the Russian: Yes. Yes]

²⁰ Péter Esterházy: *Bevezetés a szépirodalomba – bevezetés a szépirodalomba* (Introduction in the Literature – introduction in the literature), Budapest, Magvető, 1986, 437. – Mihály Farkas (1904–1965) as "wolf michael" was Minister of National Defence in the Rákosi era.

"In that case, have Mihály Farkas hanged on one pillar and yourself on the other. It won't cost much, the dear man will be surprised, and the people will be deliriously happy." With that he grabbed his hat and walked out.

Whether this exchange really took place or not I cannot say. But that it was on everyone's lips and that every Hungarian was glad to hear it is as sure as I stand here.²¹

Considering the style, this version reflects a more substantial transformation of the basic story, although formally Mikszáth's does so more adequately. Esterházy's actual text is more strongly connected to Béla Tóth's, even preserving the same form in the last paragraph not closely linked to the plot, which refers back to oral tradition gaining authenticity from it. Just as Mikszáth adjusts the names to the period of his narrative, so does Esterházy, finding equivalent characters from the beginning of the 1950s with the prevailing cult of Rákosi. However, as with Béla Tóth, the answering character is given a name here. Francis Joseph corresponds to Mátyás Rákosi (1903–1971), the communist leader bearing the greatest responsibility for the Stalinist Soviet policy of oppression in the 1950s. The writer, Tibor Déry (1894–1977) can be paralleled by József Eötvös, while August and Protmann are analogous to Ernő Gerő (1898–1980), who controlled the area of science as Rákosi's right hand. Kálmán Mikszáth also tried to imitate the way people communicated in the 17th and 18th centuries ("Rhenus forints", "plánnum") but this is not so distinctive. Esterházy's version is more courageous, as it features the party apparatchik's parodistically trite clichés ("imperialist subversion") and Russian-style language ("Da") of the 1950s as well as hearkening back to older, more particular language ("készködött" compared to "készült" in Béla Tóth's variant – both of which mean "prepare" in Hungarian). When compared to the original anecdote in *The Hungarian Treasury of Anecdotes*, Esterházy's adaptation evidently loses any reference to reality, for the reader knowing the earlier version can not regard it as authentic but rather as a fictional anecdote based on a factual anecdote – just as in Mikszáth's story. Readers, however, who are unaware of the narrative that was originally linked to the 1850s tend to read it as a factual anecdote. For them the only warning sign might be the presence of anachronism in the style. Factual anecdotes tend to be related in a neutral style, without such a specific use of language. Yet here the narrator and his stylistic invention reflect two historical periods simultaneously, with their different styles of locution being accentuated. The historical interpretation in Esterházy's text creates an associative connection between absolutist forms of government in two different periods, the 1850s and the 1950s, which is

²¹ Péter Esterházy: *A Little Hungarian Pornography*, translated by Judith Sollosy, Evanston, Illinois, Northwest University Press, 1995, 56–57.

unacceptable for historical research, but as far as literature is concerned, this association functions effectively. All three versions display a common pattern: after a failure or a crushed war of independence the patriotic side still gains the upper hand by giving a witty rejoinder to the oppressor.

The three versions of the story demonstrate the relationship between the Hungarian anecdote and history, for which Catherine Gallagher, following Amos Funkenstein, coined the term “counterhistory.”²² Beyond this, however, it can also be considered a significant cultural tradition expressing sentiments of national solidarity, which can be reinterpreted and even adapted for our age.²³

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²² Catherine Gallagher: Counterhistory and the Anecdote, in Catherine Gallagher – Stephen Greenblatt: *Practising New Historicism*, Ibidem, 54. “The new historicist anecdote was a conduit for carrying [...] counter historical insights and ambitions into a field of literary history. It might, indeed, be said to have carried too many of them in ill-assorted bunches, for the anecdotes often seem to combine desires for maintaining enigmas and for recovering lost words, for anachronizing events and for historicizing texts.”

²³ I should like to thank Tamás Sály and James Craymer for their help in preparing the English translation of this paper.

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NOBLE AND BOURGEOIS VALUES IN HUNGARIAN
LITERATURE IN THE LAST DECADES OF THE 19TH
CENTURY AND THE FIRST DECADES OF THE 20TH
CENTURY



TIBOR GINTLI

ABSTRACT

It was through the opposition of gentry and bourgeois values that the social effects of modernization mainly appeared in the literature of the period. A well-known characteristic of Hungarian demographic changes is that most of the population in Hungarian cities was not of Hungarian ethnicity. In literature, this fact was often depicted in a way that connected the bourgeoisie not only with novelty, but with foreignness, in comparison with the older, traditional values of the nobility, which were considered an element of the Hungarian character. Nevertheless, this did not result in the complete dismissal of bourgeois values and culture. One of the most characteristic figures of modern Hungarian literature was the middle class intellectual of noble descent, liberal in politics, and bourgeois in way of life. However, historical ancestry was often stressed by several modern authors. In part, because several influential modern writers were themselves members of this changing middle class. Many different interpretations were given of the relationship between the values of the landed gentry and bourgeois values in the period, from complete dismissal, through a foreign but desired set of values, to an evident element of identity.

Keywords: *assimilation, doctrine of a single political nation, Industrial Revolution, Jewish immigration, mentality, middle class.*

In the Hungarian literature of the era, the social aspects of the problems of modernization are presented primarily in the form of a confrontation between noble and bourgeois values. Although the first wave of the Industrial

Revolution had come to a successful conclusion between the 1870s and the turn of the century in Hungary, creating a social class of industrial workers, in literature the confrontation between the working class and bourgeois values emerges relatively late, its first aesthetically significant manifestation being Tibor Déry's novel *The Unfinished Sentence* (A befejezetlen mondat) finished in 1938 and published only in 1947.

One widely recognized characteristic of social development in Hungary is the fact that, from the Middle Ages, the vast majority of the urban population were not ethnic Hungarians. The stratum of entrepreneurs that emerged during the Industrial Revolution that began in the last third of the 19th century did not comprise primarily Hungarian social groups, but craftsmen from outside the country. As a result, the significant economic gains achieved during the Industrial Revolution were largely owing to immigrants from Germany (and to a lesser extent from Italy, France etc.), and to Jews who had settled in Hungary both during and after the great 18th-century wave of immigration from Galicia. In literature, this fact is often illustrated in the form of bourgeois characters who are not only representatives of innovation, but also of alien values that are contrasted with the values of the old nobility, identified as belonging to the Hungarian character. Based on the Romantic cult of the past and the natural world, at the beginning of the era national identity was generally personified in literary works by both the nobility and the population, which was identified with nature itself and with origin — two social groups whose emergence dates back long before the era of modernization, to the Middle Ages. However, this approach did not necessarily mean the rejection of bourgeois values and the cultural exclusion of the bourgeoisie. Especially since a significant part of the Hungarian nobility supported the bourgeois transformation — as clearly illustrated by the fact that, in Hungary, the bourgeois revolution took place within a constitutional framework, under the jurisdiction of the feudal Parliament in 1848. In modern Hungarian literature, the bourgeois intellectual of gentry origin emerges as a distinctive character, liberal in terms of political beliefs, and consciously embracing a bourgeois lifestyle.¹

However, according to the typical political approach of the era, in Hungary there was only one political nation — the Hungarian. Although this approach was not categorically exclusive, assimilation was seen as the only possible means of integration into the national community. The nation would only accommodate members of different ethnic and religious communities on condition that they accept the doctrine of a single political nation, and identify with the values that defined the so-called Hungarian national

¹ Gábor Gyáni – György Kövér – Andrea T. Kulcsár: *Social History of Hungary from the Reform Era to the End of the Twentieth Century*, New York, Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc., 2004, 233–234.

character. This assimilation-based approach placed significant value on the concept of tradition, and on the importance of social groups that were seen as embodying the traditional Hungarian way of life and attitude to life. Ultimately, this approach led to the survival of the identification of noble culture and the Hungarian mentality.

In the Romantic era, in keeping with the cult of nature, the figure of the Hungarian peasant emerges as another representative of the Hungarian character. This change in cultural approach is without doubt related to the concept of giving up the prerogatives of birth, and to the concept of liberalism. However, it should be borne in mind that these two embodiments of the national character are not in fact alternative interpretations of identity in the Romantic Age, but merely variations of the same attitude. In the latter approach, the "people" in fact represent the same values as the nobility, in a naive form. In the patriarchal approach of the 19th century, the relationship between landlord and serf (and later between gentleman and peasant) was defined using the analogy of the family. This approach can be interpreted as an extension of the noble attitude, as it cast the peasant in the role of a child in need of benevolent paternal guidance. A significant change takes place in literary depictions of the peasant at the turn of the century. In the prose of Zsigmond Móricz, the relationship between the landowner and the poor peasant is typically presented in the form of an irreconcilable conflict, where the earlier patriarchal world becomes the backdrop for passionate anger. Prompted by naturalism, as well as by the relatively distant Romanticism, or by Expressionism interpreted from the perspective of Romanticism, the peasant appeared as either a struggling, exploited figure, or as a mythical character personifying the power of nature.

If we turn our attention to those works of literature that directly thematize the nature of Hungarian identity, we find that most of the texts are characterized by a confrontation between the noble and the bourgeois mentality, while in the case of texts that do not directly address the issue, but merely imply related assumptions, the noble and bourgeois value systems are often merged. This peculiar duality can probably be explained by the fact that texts directly dealing with the issue of Hungarian identity typically represent a more traditional stance by default. In other words, the centralized problem of national identity, as an explicitly formulated question, was dominated, by default, by the concept of the single political nation. It was as if the compromise that characterized Hungarian social relations were reflected in literature. Accordingly, only the traditional Hungarian ruling classes could have political power, while the bourgeoisie had to be satisfied with economic power. Members of the upper middle class, or high bourgeoisie, could only become political figures if they assimilated, in terms of lifestyle and values, to the historical ruling class — or, better still, if they purchased a noble title.

Politics and literature, however, despite the parallels, follow a significantly different approach to issues of national identity, and to noble and bourgeois values. While, in public life, only radical parties with limited political influence addressed the anachronistic nature of noble values, in the literary context, with a few exceptions, this realization prevailed. Below, I present some typical attitudes to noble and bourgeois values in the literature of the era, using the example of four writers. Two of the authors, Kálmán Mikszáth and Gyula Krúdy, belong to a circle of writers whose work reflects deliberately and continuously on the obsolete nature of noble values. The prose of Zsigmond Móricz represents a position according to which there is still no clear evidence of the anachronistic nature of the noble lifestyle and the related national identity. Finally, Dezső Szabó is a typical representative of conservative nationalism, according to which the key to the development of the nation is the amalgamation, or mythical marriage, of the two “pure” Hungarian social classes: the Hungarian nobility and the Hungarian peasantry.

Kálmán Mikszáth's novels that deal with such issues reflect, without exception, on the anachronistic nature of noble values and the noble way of life. This reflection leads to a dualism, characterized by both a nostalgic and a comic-ironic perspective. The nostalgic attitude can be explained by the fact that, in line with the Romantic interpretation of the noble tradition, the noble was regarded as an exceptional personality, as the embodiment of ideal values, and as someone who transcends the utilitarian pragmatism of the new age. This aspect of the noble approach is perhaps best represented by sub-prefect Görgey, the protagonist of *The Black Town*, whose death is depicted as a tragic event. The novel *The Siege of Beszterce* (*Beszterce ostroma*, 1896) presents both points of view simultaneously. The protagonist, Count István Pongrácz, is a quixotic figure, regarded as a fool for his lofty ideals and anachronistic behaviour, while at the same time the implied author does not entirely deny his character a certain moral grandeur. The *New Zrínyiád* (*Új Zrínyiász*, 1898) presents the untenability of medieval values and behaviour in the context of a satire. Due to a mistake on the part of Archangel Gabriel, Miklós Zrínyi and his gallant soldiers, who were martyred during the wars against the Turks in 1566, rise from the dead to find themselves in modern, bourgeois, urban Hungary, where they feel distinctly out of place. In an allusion to the non-viability of the old noble mentality, there is no other authentic role left to them following their resurrection than to die again in defense of their country. The noble way of life is evaluated most critically in *The Young Noszty's Affair with Mari Tóth*, (*A Noszty fiú esete Tóth Marival*, 1908) where the noble family is

revealed as a secret alliance of cheaters and freeloaders, whose sole purpose is to ensure a fortune for the forger Feri Noszty through marriage to a wealthy bourgeois girl.²

Krúdy continues this quixotic representation of the anachronism of the nobility. In contrast to Mikszáth, Krúdy's representation of the noble world view has no specific social aspects, thus there is no confrontation with the bourgeois lifestyle either. The gentleman, who has been tricked by the passage of time, is no longer a representative of a certain social class, but rather the symbol of human existence confronted with transience. Krúdy thus approaches the question of anachronism from a more meditative point of view than his predecessor. To someone contemplating the finite, virtually all human values and ways of life are anachronistic, as they are all equally obliged to submit to the universal and unquestioned power of transience. The ironic depiction of the outmoded, old-fashioned gentleman no longer targets a specific social group. Instead, it illustrates the inherently comic nature of all human existence. Krúdy's characteristic relativism often calls into question whether the chivalric mentality ever in fact existed.³ Nostalgia for the age of chivalry, and an ironic perspective that highlights the comedy of the knightly era, are inextricably intertwined in his works.

For Zsigmond Móricz, the question has even more specifically social aspects than in the novels of Mikszáth. In the respective works of Móricz, the concern is not so much with the content of noble values, as with the social role of the rural gentry. His novels *Until Daybreak* (Kivilágos kivraddtig, 1926) and *The Gentleman's Way of Having Fun* (Úri muri, 1927) both explore the question of whether the historical middle class would ever be fit for the role of social leadership. The answer, in both cases, is negative, although the narrative conveys the dissolution with a kind of pathos.⁴ Self-destruction, bacchanalian delirium, emotional outbursts and susceptibility to the subsequent lethargy, are all presented as a manifestation of the national character in Móricz. While the narrator, who explores his own ideas in commentaries of varying length, offers the industrious Jewish merchant and the German engineer as examples worthy to be followed, a certain aversion can be sensed to the sober and quotidian way they live. Móricz was following an old tradition when representing the Hungarian national character as essentially emotional, prone to outbursts and exaltation but incapable of sustained, monotonous

² Lóránt Czigány: *The Oxford History of Hungarian Literature*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1984, 237–241.

³ Anna Fábri: "Once upon a time I used to be a novel hero...": The Cult of Literature in Gyula Krúdy's Works, in Tibor Gintli (ed.): *The Hungarian Writer of the Lost Time: Memory and Poetical Imitation in Gyula Krúdy's Works*, Jyväskylä, University of Jyväskylä, 2015, 11.

⁴ Attila Tamás: Years of the Nyugat, in Tibor Klaniczay (ed.): *A History of Hungarian Literature*, Budapest, Corvina, 1982, 353–354.

labor, which is considered boring and uneventful. A kind of myth of Romantic doom sometimes looms in the background of national self-analysis. The topos of Eastern laziness meets the decadent cliché of lethargic impotence.

Some of the attempts to define national identity in the Hungarian literature of the era are ostentatiously exclusive. Szabó Dezső's novel *The Village That Was Swept Away* (*Az elsodort falu*, 1919) depicts Hungarians as dispossessed and destitute in their own country. According to his anti-Semitic and xenophobic approach, free capitalist competition was the means of conquering the Hungarians. Bourgeois culture could therefore only be subject to biting satire, while the world of the village is an idyllic context for the manifestation of the power of nature. The city is painted in demonic colors: whoever leaves the village will inevitably be destroyed by the city. The tendentious message of the novel is that the future of the Hungarians depends on their return to the village. This is symbolized by the marriage of the young landowner, who, having travelled in Europe, consciously chooses the archaic life of the rural farmer, to a healthy peasant girl. Dezső Szabó's novel embodies an authorial attitude that is extremely damaging for society. He mobilizes worn-out romantic myths in such a way that he presents them as genuine solutions, removing them from their original, abstract-mythical context. He attempts to respond to real social issues using an eclectic myth construction, irreparably confusing fiction with referentiality. Instead of mythical opponents existing in the fictitious context of literature, this solution seeks and finds enemies who exist in reality, in order to channel the frustration aroused by national failure into hatred against them.⁵

A significant part of modernist Hungarian narrative fiction does not directly thematize the issue of relations between the nobility and the bourgeoisie. There are several reasons for this. On the one hand, the interests of modern prose often lay in a different direction. In the Hungarian literature of the era, psychological narratives were at least as popular as social novels. Psychological narratives, however, had no deep-seated interest in the question of national identity, for obvious reasons. Some of the writers who gathered around the most important forum of modern Hungarian literature, the periodical *Nyugat* (West), followed the aestheticizing trends of Western European modernity, and thus had no interest in presenting social issues. These writers associated a focus on public issues with the pre-modern period before Flaubert, and turning away from realist-naturalist tradition and its concentration on social context, they did not expect literary texts to raise specific social issues, but rather to explore the more general, existential questions of the human condition.

⁵ Gintli Tibor: False Wishing Dreams. Szabó Dezső, *The Eroded Village*, *Öt Kontinens*, 2012, 45–51, http://tortenelemszak.elte.hu/images/toriszak/ot_kontinens/2012/2/07-GintliTibor.pdf, (accessed 7 July 2017).

One of these writers was Dezső Kosztolányi, whose works were mostly concerned with the irrationality manifested in the finite nature of human life, and the unfathomable inner secrets of personality. Social questions, such as the contrasts between the noble and bourgeois lifestyles, are apparent only in the background.⁶ His novel *Skylark* (Pacsirta, 1924) explores the unredeemable loneliness of the human condition through the story of an unattractive old maid, and examines the complex system of emotional and psychological relations among family members, all of whom are aware of the hopeless situation of the title character. The real hero of the novel is the father, who, out of all the characters in the book, relates to the unresolvable situation with the greatest complexity, and perceives with the greatest clarity the hopelessness of their lives. The character of the retired archivist Ákos Vajkay amalgamates noble tradition and bourgeois lifestyle. His noble origins are suggested not only by the spelling of his family name, but also by his favorite hobby of researching the family trees of the nobility. His former work as a bureaucrat, and his sober lifestyle that is entirely free of gentry allure, connect him to the bourgeoisie, while his reserved manners and non-judgmental attitude are suggestive of liberal thinking. In terms of character he represents a noble attitude, which, while wholeheartedly adopting the principles of the bourgeois transformation, is identified equally by noble origins and bourgeois liberalism. This identity is perfectly symbolized by the portrait of Count István Széchenyi, the initiator and most significant figure of the Hungarian bourgeois transition, which hangs on the wall of the town casino.

For the next generation of writers, the relationship between noble and bourgeois values was already a thing of the past. For the generation of modern writers born around 1900, the noble lifestyle was no longer a living tradition, as it had been for Kosztolányi, for example, whose own grandfather had taken part in the 1848–49 war of independence. The work of Sándor Márai can be interpreted as a symbol of passing beyond the issue. While Mikszáth and Krúdy, the latter being revered by Márai as one of his masters, recorded the decay of noble values, in his most significant works Márai presented the bourgeois mentality as sentenced to extinction. In his view, the rational order of the bourgeois lifestyle had created a culture that made possible the value-based autonomy of the individual. In his interpretation, the age in which he lived — due, to some extent, to contemporary ideas of crisisology — was defined as a time of the mass man coming to power. According to his projections, the appearance of the mass man, stripped of his autonomy, means not only the end of bourgeois culture, but the end of European culture, too.

⁶ Szegedy-Maszák, Mihály: The Age of Bourgeois Society, 1920–1948, in László Kósa (ed.): *A Cultural History of Hungary in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, Budapest, Corvina – Osiris, 220.

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AGAINST PROGRESS: UTOPIA, IDYLL, NOSTALGIA
AND MELANCHOLY. (NATIONAL IDENTITY AND
MODERNITY IN SLOVAK LITERATURE, 1880–1900)¹

IVANA TARANENKOVÁ

ABSTRACT

This paper deals with the relationship of Slovak literature to Modernity in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, which was based on denial. The Slovak culture of this period was still under the influence of the ongoing National Revival, which began in the early years of the nineteenth century and accelerated in the 1840s. This influence is mainly visible in contemporary literature, since this continued to be seen (as in the previous period) as the main vehicle for the articulation of national identity. On the other hand, what is evident in these decades is a confrontation between outstanding figures of Slovak literature (such as Svetozár Hurban Vajanský, Pavol Országh Hviezdoslav and Martin Kukučín) and the modern culture that was in the course of formation. The paper explores several aspects of these attitudes from an ideological, aesthetic and anthropological angle. In the first place, we can speak of an explicit animosity: Modernity, with its emphasis on individualism and heterogeneity, is perceived as a threat to the fragile identity of the nascent Slovak nation. The response to this threat was a utopian vision of the nation's future that was apparent in not only its conception of Slovak culture but also manifested in most of the novels of this period. This attitude to Modernity was evident in the work of the "national leader" Vajanský, a poet and novelist as well as a literary critic, who left his imprint on Slovak literature for several decades. Second, the response to Modernity in terms of aesthetics was a nostalgic desire for the classical ideal of art, defined as the unity of Beauty, Goodness and Truth (as seen in the poetry of Hviezdoslav as well as the novels

¹ This study is the outcome of grant project VEGA 2/0025/16 Textové figurácie slovenskej literatúry 19. storočia (Textual Figurations of Nineteenth-century Slovak Literature), principal researcher Ivana Taranenková.

and poetry of Vajanský). Another important aspect of the aforementioned attitude towards Modernity was a discreet and melancholic distance, which is present, most prominently, in the work of Kukučín. His short stories, novellas and novels offered an idyllic representation of the traditional and archaic values of rural communities. They also showed that this world belonged to the past and was disappearing due to the irreversible forces of progress. This awareness of unavoidable changes to individual lives but also to the life of societies was accompanied by a pronounced melancholy and nostalgia.

Keywords: Slovak culture and literature of the nineteenth century, National Revival, Modernity, Utopia, Idyll, Nostalgia, Melancholia

In the course of the nineteenth century, Slovak culture was shaped by the ongoing process of the National Awakening. Various currents within this process aimed to transform the Slovaks from a mere ethnic group into a modern nation and establish its culture within the European context. The emergent culture evolved gradually, asserting its identity, complexity and continuity. Its beginnings date back to the 1840s, specifically the year 1843, which marks a seminal event, that of the codification of the written form of the Slovak language. Henceforth the language would be used to produce works of literature and culture. While other European cultures had undergone the same process earlier, in Slovakia it started later and lasted almost until the early years of the twentieth century.

Slovak culture in the nineteenth century – characterised as it was by a discontinuity in efforts and achievements as well as a continuity that emerged only slowly, indeed sometimes as an arbitrary artefact – is perfectly aligned with the concept of revivalist cultures, as developed by Czech literature scholar Vladimír Macura in his book *Signs of Birth* (*Znamení zrodu*, first published in 1985). The book explores the relatively new cultures of small nations whose evolution may be regarded as “hobbled and complex”² and whose main aim was achieving the “ideal of an undivided, ‘full’ national culture”.³

Writing about the National Revival, Macura speaks of “miraculousness” and “implausibility”.⁴ He points to a feature of the National Revival process occurring in the awareness of its main actors right from its outset, namely the fact that the very event of the National Revival, as manifested in the codification of Slovak as a written language and resulting in a series of further literary, cultural and social initiatives, is a historic moment which appears out of the blue from the given paradigm of reality, resisting the established

² Vladimír Macura: *Znamení zrodu*, Praha, H&H, 1995, 13.

³ *Ibidem*, 14.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

order of things and fundamentally transforming it. The existence of the Slovak National Revival, its key figures, initiatives and activities, aspiring to the transformation of an ethnic group into a modern nation with its own homogeneous culture, can indeed in this context be interpreted as an Event, not just in a historical but also a philosophical sense. The philosopher Slavoj Žižek characterizes this type of Event as “the surprising emergence of something new which undermines every stable scheme.”⁵ This event is the “signifier, which structures an entire field of meaning”, causing “radical politic ruptures”⁶ and representing “a change of the very frame through which we perceive the world and engage with it”⁷. However, an essential element in the emergence of such an event is an awareness that it cannot be taken for granted, and amazement that such a thing could have happened at all and that in a place where nothing had existed before, there was suddenly something.

Key figures of the nascent Slovak culture were confronted with the absence of historicity, direct cultural traditions and, last but not least, with the actual non-existence of a nation on whose behalf the entire process of the National Revival had been carried out. One of the responses to this non-existence was the creation or invention of a tradition, a mythopoeic narrative of national beginnings that may never have existed, as well as a reading of historical events that was meant to furnish evidence of traces of “Slovakness” in a past that was supposed to be fully realized in the future.

Throughout this period, Slovak culture had to grapple not only with parallel and competing nationalisation processes (Hungarian and Czech, to mention only two) but also with the disruption and discontinuity that characterised this process. That is why the assertion of Slovak cultural and ethnic homogeneity also involved the exclusion and rejection of everything that might have been regarded as being at odds with it. The “whole” and “wholeness”, emphasizing the collective to the detriment of the individual, became key concepts in cultural manifestos that advocated the cultural and national project. This approach significantly affected and shaped the various emergent cultural and national activities, leading to the rejection of anything that did not conform or went counter to the imperative of unity and that might have jeopardized the achievement of the goals that had been set.

In Slovak culture these tendencies were most clearly visible in its attitudes to cultural modernity. As a result of the dynamic evolution of modernist tendencies in Western Europe, which began during the Enlightenment and encompassed the entire nineteenth century, the holistic society of the West

⁵ Slavoj Žižek: *Event*, London, Penguin Random House UK, 2014, 6.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

gradually turned secular. Instead of wholeness and integration, it championed differentiation and individuality, eventually resulting in disintegration and fragmentation (society or self).⁸

An explicit rejection of these trends formed a key component of the self-identifying strategies of emergent Slovak culture. Its representatives strove to create a type of culture directly opposed to the Western model. They were driven by a conviction, based on Hegel's and Herder's teleological concept of history, which posited that embracing and submitting to another cultural model would enable Slovak culture to achieve greater potential and move to a higher level of historical development. Influenced by ideological trends prevalent in nineteenth-century Russian philosophy and literature, Slovak culture embraced the "Eastern" or "Slavonic" paradigm. Slavonic culture was believed to be diametrically opposed to its Western counterpart and thus predestined to fulfil a historical mission. Russophilia and the idea of Slavonic unity began to make inroads into Slovak culture in the mid-nineteenth century, as a reaction to the failure of the political aspirations of the revolutionary years 1848–1849. The concept of a Slavonic literary mutuality, forged by Ján Kollár in the early nineteenth century, was highly influential in this respect. However, Ludovít Štúr's essay *Slavdom and the World of the Future*, composed in German and published in 1867 in a Russian translation, played a key role in the establishment of this concept. Though not published in Slovak until 1993, Štúr's essay was widely known in Slovak intellectual circles and its principal theses influenced key tenets of cultural, national and political thinking until the turn of the century.

A negative reading of the term "modern" goes back to cultural and aesthetic ideas, developed in the 1830s partly under the influence of Hegel's philosophy. The "modern" and modernity – with its doctrine of novelty, change and progress – was unambiguously identified with Western culture and its subsequent rejection became a staple of the dominant ideological and cultural discourse. The cultural and social phenomena associated with modernity were perceived as extreme or excessive, posing a threat to the achievement of the ideal of a national culture, its homogeneity and complexity. The basic starting point for the initiation efforts of the nineteenth-century Slovak national revivalist culture can thus be said to be defined in opposition to the modern. We can say that it was based on the principle of the classic model of culture. What we see here is a juxtaposition of the principle of the whole and the individual, of harmony and excess. This opposition was manifested not only in the sphere of ideology but also affected the arts, literature in particular.

⁸ See Jürgen Habermas: *Modernity – An Incomplete Project of Modernity*, translated by Seyla Ben-Habib, in Hal Foster (ed.): *The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture*, London: Bay Press, Port Townsend, Washington, 1983, 3–16.

In fact, until the late nineteenth century Slovak literature remained a key element of the National Revival movement, its scope transcending individual poetics or literary periods. It took on a high-profile role in promoting and implementing the idea of political, national and cultural identity, significantly affecting the artistic autonomy of literature and foregrounding particular genres as well as the preferences of the period as regards poetics.

A further issue that highlights the importance of art and literature in the National Revival project is that at any given time leading cultural figures in Slovakia tended to associate various facets of cultural modernity with the work of specific authors. Whereas the Slovak Romantics (Štúr, Hurban, et al.) railed against "Byronism", which for them represented Western-style Romanticism⁹, the next generation was critical of "Zolaism", that is, naturalism, and artistic currents of the *fin de siècle*. Not surprisingly, their objections were articulated in similar terms.

The main argument against the trends they rejected was that art ought to be a manifestation of the specific identity of the Slovak culture and nation, of its "essence", which came to be referred to as its "specific selfhood". Key themes reflected by the literary discourse of this period thus aimed to develop and assert this principle and ensure its survival in confrontation with the "Other" and the antagonistic forces that the "Other" represented. Such a subordination of literature and art to the collective principle and social ideal derived from a classical, that is, pre-modern, foundation: by such reasoning art is an expression of the integration of community and society, articulating its spirit.

The aesthetic ideal of the unity of Goodness, Truth and Beauty, which defined the idea of "high" art until the end of the nineteenth century (authors such as Svetozár Hurban Vajanský and Pavol Országh Hviezdoslav¹⁰), also had its origins in a classical model of art. It was used as an argument to expunge (as understood in terms of Hegel's aesthetics) from the art and literature of the time everything perceived as ugly, low and extreme, failing to conform to the prevailing moral conventions. Every presentation of everyday life that did not aspire to the (national) ideal was also seen as problematic. Because of this strategy, individual aspects of life were idealised and forms of literary representation and genres promoting this approach were prioritised.

This is clearly shown in the model of literature established in the last quarter of the nineteenth century (1880–1900), which in many respects formed the

⁹ Matei Calinescu further points out that „at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the word romantic (is) a synonym for modern" (Matei Calinescu: *Five Faces of Modernity. Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism*, Durham, Duke University Press, 1987, 37.

¹⁰ Svetozár Hurban Vajanský (1847–1916) writer, journalist, literary critic and politician, a key figure of contemporary ideology; Pavol Országh Hviezdoslav (1849–1921) poet, playwright, translator, regarded as the greatest Slovak poet.

basis of the canon of Slovak literature, specifically novel writing. Elements of the fictional world, such as characters and the setting, were categorized depending on their allegiance to the national element, that is, “selfhood”, and plots were driven by the need to extend this “selfhood”, predestined as it was to overcome antagonistic phenomena represented by the “Other”. Similarly, the need to preserve the homogeneity of “selfhood” was asserted by eliminating all centrifugal forces and differentiating phenomena. However, the evolution of national elements was not based on an objective representation of the world being portrayed. Rather, it asserted itself as an effect of covert phenomena. These works of fiction anticipated a state of affairs they regarded as desirable, employing the genres and forms of social utopia. In the context of Slovak culture of this period these literary texts thus represented not only a product of the national culture that asserted its identity, but also helped to bring this about by envisaging a world they aspired to in real life. The genres most suited to this model of fiction were the romance¹¹ and *Bildungsroman*: love stories in which one of the protagonists, who stood for the national principle, would initiate the national awakening of his or her partner, who had become temporarily alienated from it. The protagonists’ union subsequently aimed at the establishment, or renewal, of national life. The harsh juxtaposition that dominates the basic narrative in this model of fiction resulted, in its turn, in melodrama becoming the key form of literary representation, constantly stressing manifestations of good and evil, dominated by powerful emotions and resulting in highly schematic works of literature.¹²

The rejection of modernity and the modern can thus be observed within nineteenth-century Slovak national literature both in terms of ideology, as individualisation and disintegration of a cohesive model of the world threatened

¹¹ I base this view on the definition of romance developed by Northrop Frye, whose works, *Anatomy of Criticism* and *The Secular Scripture*, define it as a type of fiction in which the protagonist, who is superior to his environment, performs extraordinary acts. At the same time, Frye defines romance as having a “generic plot”: a genre narrative with an archetypal story projecting the ideal of an ideal society. In terms of nineteenth-century Slovak literature, we might thus speak of the nationally oriented elites’ projection of the creation of a modern national culture.

¹² In his book *The Melodramatic Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, Melodrama, and the Mode of Excess*, Peter Brooks regards the melodramatic representation regime as an expression of imagination characteristic of literature in the “post-sacral age”, that is, in modern literature of the age of the bourgeois revolutions. He locates its beginnings in Romantic literature and also in authors such as Honoré de Balzac, Henry James, Charles Dickens and Fyodor Dostoevsky: “I remain largely convinced by my own arguments: that melodrama is a form for the post-sacred era, in which polarization and hyperdramatization of forces in conflict represent a need to locate and make evident, legible, and operative those large choices of ways of being which we hold to be of overwhelming importance even though we cannot derive them from any transcendental system of belief.” (Peter Brooks: *The Melodramatic Imagination. Balzac, Henry James, Melodrama, and the Mode of Excess*, New Haven – London, Yale University Press, 1995, viii).

the creation of a coherent cultural and national whole, and also in terms of aesthetics, with a holistic, classic (in fact, Aristotelian) model of art being championed, one that was supposed to make visible the essence, the idea.

However, in canonical texts of Slovak literature we can also discern another kind of relationship to cultural modernity, one that focuses on the past. It derives from the literary construct of a “Golden Age”, a “primordial past in which human anxieties had not yet surfaced”¹³, an idyllic prehistoric and pre-modern world located in the countryside or nature, which exemplified the archaic values of the Slovak “people” as an ethnic group. This anthropological dimension is ultimately present in every culture.

However, the category of “the people” further played a key role by providing the ideological foundation for the National Revival project. In this context “the people” act as an element that helped to preserve its national “selfhood” and its moral values, albeit, at this stage, only in the form of ethnic specificity. “The people” had to undergo the process of national awakening in order to grow into a confident nation, with the “avant-garde” – that is, the “nationally oriented” intellectual elite – playing the role of subject in this process. Works of literature produced in this period thus not only made use of mythopoeia but also of the ideological potential of the Slovak “people”, with the dominant mode of literary representation being the idyll: a world governed by self-regulating processes that shape the relations between man, his environment, and tradition.

In the case of utopia and idyll, we are dealing with worlds that are yet to be created or have become extinct. That is why their relation to the present is marked by melancholy and nostalgia¹⁴, a natural consequence of the clash between the ideal and reality. Melancholy and nostalgia were a way of reflecting on the absence of a lost or unrealized ideal world, but also of the inevitability of progress and change. They stemmed from ruptures in positive reality, present as an ideal in the efforts of individual key representatives of Slovak literature and culture of this period. As the Hungarian aesthetician László F. Földényi notes in his book *Melancholy*: “Melancholy emerges not from pure order (no such thing actually exists) but from the inevitable hidden

¹³ Terry Gifford: *Pastoral*, London and New York, Routledge, 1999, 21.

¹⁴ In her book *The Future of Nostalgia*, literature scholar Svetlana Boym (Boym 2001, 7) speaks of melancholy and nostalgia as historical emotions, both of which are, however, rooted in culture rather than in history. While melancholy relates to the sphere of individual consciousness, nostalgia concerns the relation between an individual's biography and that of a group of nations, the relation between individual and collective memory. Both phenomena are linked to a fixation on something that has been irretrievably lost. (Ibid., xvi)

cracks in order.”¹⁵ Thus, in nineteenth-century Slovak culture melancholy and nostalgia represent a “negative reality”¹⁶ in which are reflected ambitions and contradictions that reach far beyond their period.

All of this is also present in the literary output of canonical figures of Slovak literature of the last third of the nineteenth century, Vajanský, Hviezdoslav and Kukučín.¹⁷ Ironically, all these authors, regarded as key representatives of literary realism, in their work turned their back on their own time in favour of a world that did not exist in the present. Recognising that such a world could not be taken for granted, they suffered from a constant sense of loss.

In the case of Vajanský this was a world in which national life could be fully regenerated once obstacles were overcome; for Hviezdoslav, it was the ideal of universal justice or the ideal world of poetry, from which one is constantly cast back into crude reality. These two authors set their sights on a (near) future or transcendent world in which their ideal was supposed to come true. Martin Kukučín, on the other hand, stayed rooted in an irretrievably lost past that he had repeatedly to recreate in his fiction. Ultimately, he was one of the very few nineteenth-century Slovak authors who succeeded in transcending the ideological limitations of Slovak literature and touching upon universal questions of human existence.

Martin Kukučín kept harking back to a “Golden Age” that was not just the mythical era of the Slovaks but also the place of his childhood. However, this place was located in the past, a past that was fast disappearing under the pressure of cultural and civilizational change. Kukučín’s melancholy and nostalgia were brought about by two factors we might call the infantile-archaic and the evolutionary. The infantile-archaic aspect is represented by a fixation on the community’s “Golden Age” or, in the case of an individual’s life, on childhood; while the evolutionary one reflects the inevitability of progress, change and adulthood. In his fiction, there is present a subtle sense of loss and sadness, albeit often disguised as a humorous take on everyday life in the Slovak village.

Nevertheless, in the overall context of nineteenth century Slovak culture, melancholy and nostalgia have actually proved to be culturally productive since, in the circumstances of a literature that stressed the collective ego, they focused on the individual. This individual was sometimes represented by the figure of the intellectual misunderstood by “his own people” (Vajanský, Hviezdoslav), or someone whom cultural change had robbed of his native environment and background, alienating him and preventing him from

¹⁵ László F. Földényi: *Melankólia*, Kalligram, Pozsony, 2003, 301.

¹⁶ “We might as well regard melancholy as a negative imprint of the everyday: everything that is hidden in the former is articulated in the latter while that which occurs as a mere possibility in reality becomes an elaborated “negative” reality [...] showing the world from the opposite perspective.” (Ibid, 190)

¹⁷ Martin Kukučín (1860–1928) fiction writer, regarded as the “chronicler” of Slovak village life.

finding a new home (Kukučín). It is the melancholic and nostalgic elements that question identity, the relationship between the individual and the collective, the fragmented and the whole, the will, creativity and passivity, from perspectives that bring these authors, located as they are on the boundary of two eras, closer to the mood and trends of cultural and artistic modernity. Moreover, it is just as indicative that by amplifying this mode of melancholy and nostalgia and by moving further towards scepticism and disillusionment, key turn-of-the-century Slovak authors (Božena Slančíková-Timrava, Jozef Gregor Tajovský, Janko Jesenský, and Ivan Krasko) came to reassess the concept of Slovak literature and culture forged by the National Revival, and to embrace modernity.

We can thus say that throughout the nineteenth century, until its very end, the narrative of Slovak literature and culture was not just one of national and cultural emancipation but also represented a – possibly quite protracted – transition to the modern.

Translated by Julia Sherwood

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THE LOST LAND OF OURS – THE IMAGE OF KOŠICE IN THE WORKS OF SÁNDOR MÁRAI AND DUŠAN ŠIMKO

— ◀ ▶ —
CSABA HORVÁTH

ABSTRACT

*This essay focuses on the image of Košice in the works of two writers of different languages, ages and identities. One of them is Sándor Márai, a Hungarian writer from the 20th century, and the other one is a contemporary Slovak writer, Dušan Šimko. Márai was born in Kosice in the epoch of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and left the city when he was 14. Dušan Šimko is a Slovak writer living in Basel, Switzerland. He left Czechoslovakia in 1972. In his first book, *The Kosice Marathon (Košický maratón, 1984)* he wrote the collective memories of the city. This essay is going to show how these writers make in their works a Kosice of memories and how they build a special literary identity belonging to the lost city.*

Keywords: Sándor Márai, Dušan Šimko, Kassa, Košice, Kaschau, emigration, cultural crossroads, multiculturalism

The subject of this essay is to show the process and the result of the construction of literary images of the city Košice in the works of two writers of different languages, ages and identities: the 20th Century Hungarian Sándor Márai and the contemporary Slovak Dušan Šimko.

The paper attempts to read the artistic attitudes of the authors in question and show how they constructed their “cities of memories” based on the real Kassa–Košice.

In their works they create a city which had long vanished before or may not even have ever existed. Márai and Šimko have rebuilt an imaginary place in literature. Their version of Košice-like the real city – is located at the crossing point of cultures.

There are many parallels in the life of Sándor Márai and Dušan Šimko. Both of them were born in the same city into reputable families, and both of them left the city in their youth and then decades later tried to rebuild the city they had left behind.

The most important works of the Hungarian Sándor Márai belong to the middle of the 20th century. Originally named Grosschmied, he was born in 1900 in a patrician family of Saxon origins, so his mother tongue was German.

The city Košice, Kassa, Kaschau is the largest city in eastern Slovakia, with a population of approximately 240,000 inhabitants. From the early Middle Ages the city had been a royal free town of the Hungarian Kingdom. The significance and wealth of the city was represented by the decision to build a completely new cathedral in the 14th century. From the late Middle Ages' glorious past to the era of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy it was a very important city in the region. After the Treaty of Versailles, the city became part of the new state of Czechoslovakia. Seventy years later, after the so-called *Velvet divorce*, Košice has become the second-city of Slovakia.

Márai left Kassa when he was 14, during the first year of World War I, when he was sent to a boarding school. After the war he faced the reality that the Treaty of Versailles had made his birth town part of another country. In the chaos at the end of the war and during the differently "colored" revolutions which followed, he spent almost a decade in Frankfurt, Berlin and Paris. After coming back from Western Europe he settled down in Budapest in 1928. In his writings Márai reconstructed the lost world of the 19th century and put the myth of his lost city, Kassa in their center. But Márai's Kassa is a metaphor for a world of peace forever lost.

The Slovak writer of Košice is Dušan Šimko. He was born in the Czechoslovakian era of the city, in 1945. Like Márai he comes from an established local family known mainly as medical practitioners. Among them the most famous was his grandfather, Mudr Ludovít Šimko, who had founded the Ear, Nose and Throat ward at Košice State Hospital. The family's house was situated on Mlynská ulica, the city's main street.¹

Dušan Šimko left Košice after the Prague spring in 1968 when he was 23, but the city has remained ontological in Šimko's life. As he says: "My city of birth represents an "Archimedean point" in my life. It is also important to my literary work."²

Márai's political opinion was rather typical among the Hungarian intellectuals of his time. He welcomed the Vienna Awards in 1939, in which Germany

¹ Dušan Šimko: *Košice is important to my literary work*, <http://www.kosice2013.sk/en/Dusan-simko-kosice-is-important-to-my-literary-work>. (Accessed on 19th Feb 2018)

² Dušan Šimko: *Košice is important to my literary work*, <http://www.kosice2013.sk/en/Dusan-simko-kosice-is-important-to-my-literary-work>. (Accessed on 19th Feb 2018)

forced Czechoslovakia and Romania to give back parts of the territories which Hungary lost in the Treaty of Versailles. Nevertheless, Márai was highly critical of the Nazis and was profoundly antifascist. And because he also disliked the Communist regime that seized power after World War II, the writer was driven to leave the country in 1948. After living in Italy for years, Márai settled down in the U.S.A, in San Diego, California. He continued to write in Hungarian till his death.

Márai wrote forty-six books, mostly novels, in the course of his career, and there is a consensus in Hungarian literary criticism that there are several masterpieces among them, including *The Confessions of a Haut Bourgeois*³, *Sinbad goes home*⁴, and *Embers*⁵. The latter, written in 1942, expresses a nostalgia for the bygone multi-ethnic, multicultural society of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, reminiscent of the works of Joseph Roth.

As for Šimko, he lives now in Basel, Switzerland, and writes his novels in Slovakian. In his first book, *Juan Zabal's Marathon*⁶, he built a city of memories from the interwar period of Czechoslovakia. The book was published in 1984 by the exile-publishing house Rozmluvy based in London. He worked among authors such as Milan Šimečka, Jan Beneš, Václav Havel and Milan Kundera.

When he illegally emigrated from communist Czechoslovakia, it seemed certain he would never see the city of his birth again. But history was merciful and he was able to visit Košice 1989 – the same year Márai died.

So Kosice is a city of the past for Šimko as Kassa was for Márai. Each writer supposed they would never return, so both made an attempt to rebuild the city they left behind as a fictive place of literature.

The following lines from Šimko could be taken as this *ars poetica*:

At these times, always over a pint of beer, he would tell anyone willing to listen that if someday an earthquake, flood, fire, or similar act of God destroys Kassa, he'll redraw the map of the city with his eyes closed. He'll draw the same Kassa, with the same city park, town hall, theatre, and homes of the bourgeois; and running down main street once again will be the same rundown tram, the product of the Kolben & Dank Czech-Moravian assembly line⁷

And to top it all, real cities, real small towns are always characterized by a mixture of freedom and the feeling of closeness; the cultural incentive is always accompanied by the fear of provincialism. As Márai wrote about

³ Márai, Sándor: *Egy polgár vallomásai*, Budapest, Révai, 1934.

⁴ Márai, Sándor: *Szindbád hazamegy*, Budapest, Révai, 1940.

⁵ Márai, Sándor: *A gyertyák csonkig égnek* (literary: *The Candles Burn Down to the Stump*), Budapest, Révai, 1942.

⁶ Dušan Šimko: *Maratón Juana Zabalu*, Rozmluvy, London, 1984.

⁷ Dušan Šimko: *The Košice Marathon*, translated by M. Zwecker, 12. Special thanks to Michael Zwecker for the translation of Sándor Márai's and Dušan Šimko's quoted details.

the bourgeoisie of Kassa, “Western culture fitted us shabbily, like a tuxedo on a negro.”⁸ So the city the two writers establish in their works is rather a primary subject of literature than a real place to live. The created city was to be remembered, while the real one was to be left.

Márai and Šimko write a Košice of memories; more precisely each built their own city: Márai rebuilt his Kassa of the Monarchy, while Šimko rebuilt his Košice of Czechoslovakia between World War I and II. Both of them created not only the city of their personal pasts but also the city of their collective memories.

Márai never saw 19th century Kassa and Šimko could know the interwar period's Košice only from family stories. By different means and ways, both overcame the national point of view. They changed the national narration for a personal and familiar level of story-telling. Márai writes in *The Confessions of a Haut-Bourgeois*: “But the myth of the family was still alive, and this mystic consciousness gave energy to live to those of us who had painted the family legends with our actions. When the human race is forced to live without well-known shared myths, the miniature histories of families become particularly significant resources of experience.”⁹

And as for Dušan Šimko's opinion: “our city has all the prerequisites to become a center of communication between the East, West, and the Pannonian cultural space.”¹⁰ Moreover, it was always a multicultural space, and this multiculturalism belonged strongly to its identity. Following Csáky, Kassa/Košice has always been a hybrid communication space where different cultures could coexist.¹¹

But the collective and personal identities seemed very flexible during the problematic years of the city's history. Real cities are never as tolerant and open as their ideas are.

Furthermore, although Košice has always been an important city, using the language of sports, it has always finished in second place. Within Slovakia it was second after Bratislava, just as Central Europe feels like it has always been behind the West. Márai wrote about this special way of being: “With

⁸ “A ‘nyugati kultúra’ kissé lógott rajtunk, mint frakk a négeren.” Márai, Sándor: *Egy polgár vallomásai*, translated by M. Zwecker, Budapest, Révai, 1934, 247.

⁹ “De a család mítosza élt, s ez a misztikus öntudat adott életerőt valamennyiünknek, akik cselekedeteinkkel a család meséjét színeztük. S korszakokban, mikor az emberiség nagy, közös mítosz nélkül kénytelen élni, különösen jelentős élményforrás a család miniatűr világtörténelme.” Ibid, 138.

¹⁰ Dušan Šimko: Košice is important to my literary work, <http://www.kosice2013.sk/en/Dusan-simko-kosice-is-important-to-my-literary-work>, (Accessed 19th Feb 2008)

¹¹ Csáky, Moritz: *Das Gedächtnis der Städte: Kulturelle Verflechtungen: Wien und die urbanen Milieus in Zentraleuropa*. Wien: Böhlau 2010, 55.

our sensitive nerves we were puzzled to find that it was not the same to be bourgeois in Nantes as in Košice. Up there, in our great urbane cities of the Uplands, we somehow lived our bourgeois lives in scrupulous unease."¹²

For our writers in question, the city (whether Kassa or Košice) has become a city of lost paradise which can be regained only through the act of writing. It is the only way to redeem the city which is not only a real existing phenomenon of space but also a created phenomenon of the time in memories. And this latter defines the paradigms of living.

Thus, for Márai, this is not only a ceded area of Hungary but also part of the missing world of the 19th century: "Writers nowadays attempt to testify to the future that the century of their birth once championed the triumph of reason."¹³

And for Šimko the Košice of his books also has a temporary character. In one of the fragments of "My very brief encyclopedia of Košice"¹⁴ he remembers the multilingual city of the past: "Lola Márai was a friend of my grandma. They were chatting in Hungarian."¹⁵ It is an interesting literary fact of our topic that the mentioned Lola was Sándor Márai's wife. This fragment is not a simple postmodern roleplay; Šimko's grandmother really was friends with Marai's family.

By interesting coincidence, the term "cross-cultural"¹⁶ emerged in social sciences in the 1930s, when Márai wrote his famous confessions about Kassa, and became well-known in the late 1960s, the period when Šimko fled from Košice.

Though both writers left the same city, the cities reconstructed in their works differ from each other not only because of each writer's language. When Márai had left the city at the age of fourteen he thought he would never return to his small town. After the Treaty of Versailles, he decided not to return to Czechoslovakian Košice. Due to the Second World War and post-war political events, he was forced to leave first Hungary and then Europe. During both exiles Márai recreated his home town as a topic which became a

¹² "Zavartan éreztük, nagyon finom idegekkel, hogy polgárnak lenni nem egészen ugyanaz Nantes-ban, mint Kassán – s mi odafent, a mi 'nagy urbanitású' felvidéki városainkban, valahogy kínos-lelkiismeretesen voltunk polgárok, úgy iparkodtunk, mint az eminens diákok, valósággal szorgalmi feladatokat végeztünk polgáriasságból, ernyedetlenül civilizálódtunk." Márai Sándor: *Egy polgár vallomásai*, 247–248.

¹³ "Aki ma ír, mintha csak tanúságot akarna tenni egy későbbi kor számára...tanúságot arról, hogy a század, amelyben születünk, valamikor az értelem diadalát hirdette." Márai Sándor: *Egy polgár vallomásai*, 502.

¹⁴ Dušan Šimko: Az én nagyon rövid Kassa enciklopédiám, translated by Ildikó Forgács, Vol. 59, No. 4, Jelenkor, 2016, 409–413. [http://www.jelenkor.net/userfiles/archivum/JELENKOR_2016-04%20\(teljes\).pdf](http://www.jelenkor.net/userfiles/archivum/JELENKOR_2016-04%20(teljes).pdf) (Accessed 19th Feb 2008)

¹⁵ "Márai Lola nagymamám barátnője volt. Magyarul beszélgettek." Ibid, 411.

¹⁶ See: Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin (eds.): *Post-Colonial Studies. The Key Concepts*, Routledge, London, 1995.

topos. In the 1930's he looked at Kassa from Budapest and during this period the city was the subject of nostalgia towards a Hungarian city of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. After the Second World War he wrote from Italy, and then later from America, where he was using the city as the metaphor for the lost 19th century. Even in his language and style Márai referred to the century which he wanted to save and evoke.

That these writers build up cities of their own from personal memories helps them to avoid the conflicts and contradictions among different ethnic groups, cultures and languages. According to Bhabha

different cultures, the difference between cultural practices, the difference in the construction of cultures within different groups, very often set up among and between themselves an *incommensurability* (...) it is actually very difficult, even impossible and counterproductive, to try and fit together different forms of cultures and to pretend that they can easily coexist.¹⁷

Šimko had left Košice after the Prague Spring and then Basel some decades later. It was in Basel where he formed a city of the interwar period's collective memories. Just as Márai wanted to rebuild a 19th century image, Šimko makes a small town with a Hrabalian touch.

Márai and Šimko made a city from their personal past. Márai evokes the age of the Monarchy, Šimko that of post-Trianon Košice. So the personal memories give the literary rebuilt cities a diachronic character, and the cultural circumstances give them a synchronic one. Both writers seemed to draw a social map with the ethnic constellations and the social hierarchy of the city.

Both of them build the city with a special literary identity. They go beyond the national narratives – thus realizing the Dissemination of Bhabha¹⁸ – and they create a narration based on the special identity of a multicultural city. This kind of narration is defined by the multilingual and multicultural characters of the region, but it is also made of the authors' personal nostalgias. The literary city is put into the narrative crossroads of the collective identity of cultural studies and the personal memories and expectations of Márai and Šimko.

¹⁷ Jonathan Rutherford: The Third Space. Interview with Homi Bhabha. *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*. London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1990, 207–221, 209.

¹⁸ See: Homi K. Bhabha: *DissemiNation: Time, narrative and the margins of the modern nation*, Routledge, London, New York, 1990.

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NATIONAL STYLISTIC ASPIRATIONS IN THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY



MÓNIKA PILKHOFFER

ABSTRACT

This article aims to introduce various questions of national identity appearing through the stylistic aspirations of architecture in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In the discussion of the topic the major emphasis falls on the unfolding of the Hungarian national style; however, the Austrian, Polish and Slovakian aspirations will also be mentioned. As a focus common to all the aspirations is the locus of the conserved authentic forms, namely, those enclosed mountain areas that were distant from civic centres. The timber houses of Zakopane and Slovacko with their sunray ornamented pediments, the German Heimatkunst deriving from rural architecture, or the architectural trend led by Károly Kós and the group called the Youngsters, drew on very similar roots.

The role of national language, literature, music and gastronomy as means to gain cultural and political independence from Vienna was discovered by the intellectuals in the Romantic era and thus can be considered the forerunner of Hungarian national style. Ödön Lechner made an attempt to renew the language of ornaments thus creating the national style. The application of floral motifs originating from folk art provided a possibility to leave historicism for Art Nouveau. While Austrian artists challenged the relevance of a Hungarian national style, Hungarians found the lack of Austrian national identity the reason for not having developed a peculiar national style over the river Leitha. Another fascinating question is why the popular style amongst the citizens of territories with mixed nationalities (Szabadka, Marosvásárhely) and the "peasant burghers" of the settlements in the Great Plain region could not find

a path to mainstream art. Although, the operation of Lechner was gradually undermined, his followers and imitators not only provided a continuation but also renewed his artistic mode of expression.

Keywords: national style, architecture, folk art, Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

The attempt to initiate a national style as a cultural movement was a trend in Europe in the case of nations in peripheral situations during the Art Nouveau period, providing a possibility for the renewal of art. Due to lagging behind in economic development, folk art representing its local and particular character, which according to contemporaries conserved their ancient and national origins, was still existent in Central Europe in the second half of the 19th century. The forms drawn from folk art and national style both gave an opportunity to get rid of historical styles as well as to be purified of foreign (German and Austrian) influences. The unconcealed authenticity of folk art shows common features with modern architecture, such as the salient mode of ornamentation and structures rooting in the properties of building materials. Moreover, the aspiration could be considered as the democratization of art, since its source of inspiration may be found in the art of a lower social sphere.¹

The artists seeking a national style in the multinational Austro-Hungarian Monarchy defined the mountain area as their source of inspiration, where they believed they would find the archaic and national forms due to the enclosed and remote qualities of the locations. Such mythical territories were Zakopane in Galicia, Slovákó in Moravia and Kalotaszeg in Hungary.² While in Austria, the German regional house construction, Heimatstil, had an impact on some architects of the period, in other corners of the Monarchy it was rather the works of the British John Ruskin and William Morris, as well as the aesthetic innovations related to the anti-capitalism of the Arts and Crafts movement, that led to the discovery of a new ideal of beauty in folk architecture.³

It was the second half of the 19th century when the question of national style was raised in Poland. In almost all of the historical styles, from Gothic

¹ Katalin Keserü: Az építészeti gondolkodás átalakulása a 19–20. század fordulóján Közép-Európában, in Katalin Keserü – Péter Haba (eds.): *A modernizmus kezdetei Közép-Európa építészetében. Lengyel, cseh, szlovák és magyar építészeti írások a 19–20. század fordulóján*, Budapest, Ernst Múzeum, 2005, 9–26.

² Ákos Moravánszky: *Versengő látomások. Esztétikai újítás és társadalmi program az Osztrák–Magyar Monarchia építészetében 1867–1918*, Budapest, Vince Kiadó, 1998, 208.

³ Ákos Moravánszky: *Versengő*, 1998, 202–207.

to Baroque, local peculiarities were intended to be demonstrated.⁴ The mansion-style appearing after 1900, the manor houses of the nobility with columned porches, drew inspiration from dworek architecture.⁵ The so-called Zakopane style excels as an example of Polish national style. In the peasant houses of the Tatra Mountains the “ancient Slavic spirit conserving its pagan character” unspoilt by the impact of western civilization was discovered at the beginning of the 19th century. Stanislaw Witkiewicz, the painter and critic, first visited Zakopane in 1886 and settled in the mountain village in 1890. Witkiewicz presumed that the sheds of the Górale (the highlanders) who dealt with herding sheep on the territory stretching from the foot of the Tatra Mountains, the so-called Podhale area, preserved the ancient Polish architectural designs of the Piast era.⁶ The Zakopane style made an attempt to establish a national style finding its roots in Podhale architecture, design and ornamentation, nourished by “the original Polish soul”.

The initiative of Witkiewicz’s found more and more followers.⁷ Soon the remote tiny village became a place for the majority of Polish intellectuals where they had annual gatherings for three months.⁸ Zakopane not only turned into a favourite resort, but the spiritual centre of the national romantic movement, which, beyond spreading Zakopane style, found its programme in the realisation of Polish political independence.

⁴ The Polish shade was first discovered in the Gothic architecture of Krakow in the 14th century. The local peculiarity of the Vistula was available through the red brick façade and the application of ceramics. Almost at the same time the interest in the local version of the Renaissance appeared, represented by the Sigmund-style with its characteristic high ledges and yards with arcades. The Polish Neo-Baroque found its basis in the sacral architecture of the countryside. Wojciech Balus: *A zakopanei stílus és a lengyel nemzeti stílusról folytatott viták az építészetben és iparművészetben*, in Katalin Keserü – Péter Haba (eds.): *A modernizmus kezdetei Közép-Európa építészetében. Lengyel, cseh, szlovák és magyar építészeti írások a 19–20. század fordulóján*, Budapest, Ernst Múzeum, 2005, 26.

⁵ It became the model for national architecture in the Kingdom of Poland, but edifices designed with a veranda at the entrance and a skylight located in the middle of the façade, adorned with a triangular frontispiece and a high roof also appeared in Galicia in about 1908.

⁶ Ákos Moravánszky: *Építészet az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchiában*, Budapest, Corvina, 1988, 153.

⁷ At the same time of their first visit, the Dembowski couple saved the old furniture and pots from decay in their collection of Gural artefacts forming the basis of an Ethnographical Museum. The work by Wladyslaw Matlakowski titled *The Podhale Folk Art* was published in 1892 introducing the orientation and openings of the Gural dwelling places in relation to the geographical and climatic conditions, as well as discussing the décor of the buildings related to their mode of construction and the nature of wood. Katalin Keserü: *A századforduló*, Budapest, Kijárat Kiadó, 2007, 193.

⁸ Wladislaw Ekielski: *Zakopane (részletek)*, in Katalin Keserü – Péter Haba (eds.): *A modernizmus kezdetei Közép-Európa építészetében. Lengyel, cseh, szlovák és magyar építészeti írások a 19–20. század fordulóján*, Budapest, Ernst Múzeum, 2005, 36–37.

Witkiewicz designed several villas in Zakopane, first Koliba for the Ukrainian Zygmunt Gnatowski, an enthusiast of Tatra, and in 1893 villa “Pepita”, then his own dwelling house, Pod Jedlami, in 1897.



Witkiewicz, Stanislaw: Villa Koliba, Zakopane, 1892.

The rustic basic structure made of stone, the log walling, high roofs, the porch, balconies, covered staircases, skylights and the gable with the ornamentation depicting the rising sun, as well as the decorative jointing of timber structures were shared characteristics of the edifices.⁹ Part of the décor was due to the materials applied and the mode of construction. Another feature of the Górale house is the protruding frieze, the warsolka, the roof ridges adorned by pazdur, the curved door ornamented with wooden pegs and the lavishly decorated beam of the interior.¹⁰ The essence of Zakopane style is available through the development of a common set of motifs; instead of looking for unique forms and being based on the pattern books of Historicism, the properties

⁹ Colours had a significant role in the overall effect. Zakopane timber architecture was characterised by two colours: the natural colour of wood made golden by the rays of the sun, and grey, which appeared at the bottom of the walls through stones and on the top through the thatched roof. Stanislaw Witkiewicz: A zakopanei stílus – II. rész: Az ácsmesterség (részletek), in Katalin Keserü – Péter Haba (eds.): *A modernizmus kezdetei Közép-Európa építészetében. Lengyel, cseh, szlovák és magyar építészeti írárok a 19–20. század fordulóján*, Budapest, Ernst Múzeum, 2005, 61.

¹⁰ Wladyslaw Matlakowski: A Podhale népi építészete (részletek) in Katalin Keserü – Péter Haba (eds.): *A modernizmus kezdetei Közép-Európa építészetében. Lengyel, cseh, szlovák és magyar építészeti írárok a 19–20. század fordulóján*, Budapest, Ernst Múzeum, 2005, 32–33.

of applied materials were decisive. In addition, the houses of Zakopane prove that forms borrowed from folk art are suitable to meet both aesthetic and comfort demands.¹¹ Not only the typical medieval Polish house design was rediscovered in the timber architecture of the Tatra region, but also the myth of the noble savage, originating in Switzerland, had been spreading since the enlightenment era hand in hand with the trend of the Swiss house type in Europe.¹²

Witkiewicz himself mentioned that the house types of Podhale share common features with the architectural style in the Moravian region. The Slovakian Dušan Jurkovič designed similar buildings to Zakopane style structures, also drawing his inspiration from the Carpathian house types of wooden-sides and shingled roofs. Jurkovič had already become familiarized with the characteristics of Tirol-architecture and the theory of the Austrian urbanist, Camillo Sitte, promoting the conscious application of building and the psychological impact of the environment during his studies in Vienna. Works by the Slovakian architect Blažej Bulla, who was inspired by Slovakian folk art, also greatly influenced him.¹³ Having settled in Brno he focused on the research of Czech and Slovakian folk art and published his findings in several volumes. The architect used the language of forms developed throughout his research as a stylistic device in accordance with the demands of a new work of art and following the logic of matter-construction-form. He borrowed the picturesque roof-designs from the architecture of the Carpathians, while in designing ground plans the English mansion influenced him with its organization of rooms around the central hall, which solution is well demonstrated by his villa design erected in the Bohemian Rezek.¹⁴

¹¹ Stanislav Witkiewicz: *A zakopanei*, 2005, 60.

¹² Following the turn of the century, Zakopane-style was considered regionalism by more and more; some architects debated whether the forms of gural timber houses could be applied at different locations and could be built of other materials as well. Meanwhile not only new national trends appeared, but folklorists more often opined that the art of other ethnic groups such as of the mazurs or krups were not at all inferior to gural. Wojciech Balus: *A zakopanei...* 2005, 27–28.

¹³ Dana Bořutová: *Kommentár Dušan Jurkovič 'Építőművészet egykor és ma' című cikkének margójára* in Katalin Keserű – Péter Haba (eds.): *A modernizmus kezdetei Közép-Európa építészetében. Lengyel, cseh, szlovák és magyar építészeti írások a 19–20. század fordulóján*, Budapest, Ernst Múzeum, 2005, 112–113.

¹⁴ Dana Bořutová: "Dušan Samo Jurkovič." *Dušan Jurkovič 1868–1947*. Exhibition of the Slovakian National Gallery organised by OMvH's Museum of Hungarian Architecture (Catalogue), eds.: András Hadik – Pál Ritoók, Budapest, 1995, 20–28.



Jurkovič, Dušan: Jurkovic's villa, Brno-Zabovresky, 1906.

Although Jurkovič was considered as the leading Slovakian architect of his age, except for the Club House in Szokolca, all his designs were realized in Bohemia and Moravia. The national trend in architecture had been present in this area of the Monarchy even before edifices designed by Jurkovič appeared and shared the ideal and motivation to be freed of the influence of Vienna regarding taste and design.¹⁵ The realization of the mentioned demand had diverse forms. Hubert Gordon Schauer set out the trend of Bohemian architecture in moving structure, function, and a mode of thinking related to engineering, to the foreground.¹⁶ Conversely, Antonín Balšánek had an approach contrary to Schauer's regarding the dilemma of modern versus national architecture, and believed the typical sgraffito of the Bohemian Renaissance adorning façades, symbolizing the independent Czech style, alloyed with modernism could provide grounds for a differentiating power from foreign art.¹⁷

¹⁵ Jindřich Vybíral: A közös nevező: a nemzeti jelleg. A cseh modern építészet kezdeteiről, in Katalin Keserü – Péter Haba (eds.): *A modernizmus kezdetei Közép-Európa építészetében. Lengyel, cseh, szlovák és magyar építészeti írások a 19–20. század fordulóján*, Budapest, Ernst Múzeum, 2005, 68.

¹⁶ Hubert Gordon Schauer: A jövő építészete, in Katalin Keserü – Péter Haba (eds.): *A modernizmus kezdetei Közép-Európa építészetében. Lengyel, cseh, szlovák és magyar építészeti írások a 19–20. század fordulóján*, Budapest, Ernst Múzeum, 2005, 72–74.

¹⁷ Antonín Balšánek: Modernizmus avagy nemzeti irányzat? in Katalin Keserü – Péter Haba (eds.): *A modernizmus kezdetei Közép-Európa építészetében. Lengyel, cseh, szlovák és magyar építészeti írások a 19–20. század fordulóján*, Budapest, Ernst Múzeum, 2005, 78–81.

The establishing of a national style in Hungary is linked to Ödön Lechner; however, its precedents go back to the 18th century.¹⁸ The idea of initiating an architectural national style was articulated by István Széchenyi in the 1830s¹⁹ and an attempt was made to put it into practice by Frigyes Feszl in the 1860s. According to Feszl, the national style was mostly conserved in traditional clothing thus his major piece of work, the edifice of the Vigadó in Budapest, was adorned with the broidered bonds of the Hussar uniform as well as by statue figures depicted in traditional Hungarian attire. Via the flat, geometrical ornamentation of the building – that Theofil Hansen, the Austrian architect, called “czardas sculpted in stone” – the eastern origins of Hungarians were also referred to.²⁰

Eastern motifs in Hungarian architecture carried a deeper meaning than in Orientalism, applied as a mode of rejuvenation in art all across Europe. Those who professed the eastern origins of Hungarians were eager to indicate those relations in the field of art as well. József Huszka, a teacher of art in Transylvania, elaborated this idea through his writings by drawing a parallel between the forms of Hungarian folk art and that of Chinese and Sassanid motifs. The collection of folk art objects and their research appeared as a preparation for the world exhibition in Vienna in 1873. In the ethnographical village of the expo several Hungarian cottages and in the framework of the national home industry the first Hungarian ethnographical collection were exhibited.²¹

¹⁸ The first naïve attempt is related to Johann Nepomuk Schauff's name, who designed a Hungarian national column order in 1790. Its ornamentations – the royal and hussar emblems – met the ideal concept of the traditional regnum. Katalin Keserü: *Az építészet és iparművészet nemzeti keretei*, in Erzsébet Király – Enikő Róka – Nóra Veszprémi (editors of the catalogue): *XIX. Nemzet és művészet. Kép és önkép*, Budapest, Magyar Nemzeti Galéria, 2010, 229.

¹⁹ Regarding the construction of the edifice of the National Academy of Sciences in the middle of the 19th century, this was the period when the first debates were raised about national style, in which the pioneer in national art history writing, Imre Henszlmann, was eager to force Gothic style on the applicants of the tender, since he considered that period a glorious epoch of our national history. Similar approaches were decisive in the choice of style for the building of the parliament. Mária Kemény: *A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia palotájának pályázati tervei, 1861*. Katalógus és források. Budapest, MTA Művészettörténeti Kutatóintézete, 1996; and Keserü, Katalin: *Nemzeti gondolat a 19. század magyar építészetében. Az egyetemestől a regionális stílusig*, in *Sub Minervae nationis praesidio. Tanulmányok a nemzeti kultúra kérdésköréből Németh Lajos 60. születésnapjára*, Budapest, ELTE and ELTE Művészettörténeti Tanszék, 1989, 103–104.

²⁰ Zsuzsanna Mendöl: *A magyar formatörekvések és az ornamentika problémája építészetünkben, Építés-Építésztudomány*, No. 3–4, 1979, 415.

²¹ Mónika Lackner: *Az első magyar néprajzi gyűjtemény: a Magyar népi kultúra prezentációja az 1873-as bécsi világiállításon*, in Katalin F. Dózsa (ed.): *Az áttörés kora. Bécs és Budapest a historizmus és az avantgárd között 1873–1920*, Budapesti Történeti Múzeum, Budapest, 2004, 101–104.

Huszka's work greatly influenced Ödön Lechner (1845–1914) who consciously looked for possibilities to be free from the shackles of Historicism he acquired in Berlin. Studying Hungarian folk art took him to the art of the peoples of Asia. The most prominent example of this was the edifice of the Museum of Applied Arts of which Lechner himself declared it became “a bit too Indian”.²²



Lechner, Ödön: Museum of Applied Arts, Budapest, 1896.

The glazed ceramic items produced in the Zsolnay factory of Pécs, the brick stripes appearing on his later buildings, the application of decorative borders drawing their design from the ribbon motifs of the traditional herding vest, resulted in modern architecture through the expression of national identity. National style, however, was regularly beaten in design competitions by the concurrent competitors of Historical style, thus Lechner designed less and less. In 1906 he produced his *ars poetica* entitled “There has been no Hungarian architectural language, but there will be”.²³

An interesting difference of opinion unfolded in relation to national style between the most prominent Hungarian and Austrian architects of the Monarchy. Otto Wagner claimed Hungarian national style had no relevance since artistic expressions ought to be uniform throughout the Monarchy

²² Ödön Lechner: *Önéletrajzi vázlat*, in László Pusztai – András Hadik (eds.): *Lechner Ödön 1845–1914 emlékkiállítás a művész születésének 140. évfordulójára*, Budapest, O.M.F. Magyar Építészeti Múzeuma, 1995, 9.

²³ *Ibid.*, 12–16.

because the mode of living and the system of governance was similar; on the other hand, Lechner argued that Austrian Art Nouveau applied Assyrian motifs without any reference to “national or folk characteristics”.²⁴ The fact that Wagner was not interested in folk architecture was explained by the lack of Austrian identity par excellence.²⁵ The diverting intentions of the two architects could only be harmonized by István Medgyaszay who finished his studies in the master school of Otto Wagner. He was both the first to apply ferroconcrete in Hungary as well as the one to follow the national language of architectural design considering his research tour of Kalotaszeg with reference to the traditional ornamentation with its symbolic architecture of timber work.²⁶ The houses of the artist community of Gödöllő and the theatre of Veszprém city well represent the mentioned characteristics.




Medgyaszay, István: Theatre of Veszprém, 1908.

²⁴ Ákos Moravánszky: *Építészet...* 1988, 144.

²⁵ For German initiatives there were some signs of the impact of folk art even in Austria. The Viennese representative of Heimatkunst (Heimat=homeland), Joseph August Lux, emphasizing a local and regional basis against technical development and urbanization published articles about the “open earnestness” of the cottage and its “charming coziness”, also establishing the journal of the movement titled *Hohe Warte* (High-altitude Sentinel Post).

²⁶ Katalin Keserü: *A századforduló...*, 2007, 207.

Several followers and even more emulators of Lechner appeared.²⁷ National style became popular mostly in the cities of the Great Plain region: “where the peasant citizens found ornamentations from folk art close to their hearts.” It was applied by choice in regions with mixed nationalities since it was considered to be “an indirect but effective means of cultural assimilation”.²⁸ However, it could not take root in Transdanubian cities, a fact well demonstrated by the design contest for the city hall of Pécs, in which case the jury remarked regarding Károly Fülöp’s work that its style made the edifice too expensive, and moreover it did not fit into the cityscape.²⁹



Fülöp, Károly: Plan for the city hall of Pécs, 1902.

At the beginning of the 20th century the younger generation turned away from so-called “gingerbread Art Nouveau”, since they found Lechner’s vital error was that he solely took ornamentations from folk art and applied them on the facades of city architecture instead of originating his compositions in the whole of folk architecture.

Transylvanian study tours became very popular among artists in the period and their outcomes were incorporated into the works of architects

²⁷ For more about the topic see: János Gerle: A Lechner követőkről, in László Pusztai – András Hadik (eds.): *Lechner Ödön 1845–1914 emlékkiállítás a művész születésének 140. évfordulójára*, 1985, 74–82.

²⁸ Ilona Sármány-Parsons: Magyarországi városház-épületek a századfordulón. *Történelmi Tanulmányok*. 3., Debrecen, KLTE Történelmi Intézet, 1994, 59–63.

²⁹ Mónika Pilkhoffer: *Pécs építészete a századfordulón (1888–1907)*, Pécs, Pro Pannonia, 2004, 195.

surpassing the pursuit of Lechner, such as into the interior and building designs of Ede Wigand Toroczka. ³⁰ International architectural journals also published building designs by Toroczka and his interior designs even earned international recognition at world exhibitions in the first decades of the 1900s. ³¹ Similar to Toroczka's case, Transylvanian folk art had a great impact on the art of Károly Kós, who became the inspirational leader of a group of architects who graduated from the Technical University in 1907 called the Youngsters. Kós said:

we need to drill our souls into this land on which we are to build... That is the reason I want to live the life of this beautiful nation, of Hungarians, to dream their dreams, to think as they do, to be able to feel and remember as they do. Since this feeling, thought and remembrance are available in their deeds... when they build their churches, cottages and barns. ³²

When Károly Kós designed his own house called Crow Castle in Sztána in 1910, he set out from *székely* architecture characterized by “the closed and integrated qualities of its ground plan, the generous and simple structure neglecting almost any ornamentation emphasizing structural functionality and the monumentality springing up from the relations between planes and openings” in his understanding. ³³ In his art, the influence of English and Finnish architectural designs may be recognized besides folk architecture, mostly the impact of Saarinen. The key importance of the Youngsters lies in the sensitivity with which they composed their structures within a specific environment. Nevertheless, the dilemma persisted whether the principles and forms crystallized in designing cottages for the rural environment were applicable in the city and for public buildings. The cosmopolitan citizens of Budapest did not become part of the clientele of the Youngsters; however, the school and small-flat programme under Mayor István Bárczy provided them with some possibility of work. ³⁴

³⁰ For more about the topic see: Katalin Keserü: *Toroczka Wigand Ede*, Budapest, Holnap Kiadó, 2007.

³¹ Since only a few of his designs were realized, his books published about the art of *székely* villages, illustrated by his own drawings, as well as his drawings appearing in architectural journals such as the *Der Architekt* and *The Studio* had a significant role in promoting a national style of romanticism.

³² Quoted from: Ákos Moravánszky: *Építészet...* 1998, 217–218.

³³ Balázs Pál: *Kós Károly*, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1971, 21.

³⁴ Gyöngyi Erdei: A mintaadó polgármester. Bárczy István beruházási programja, *Budapesti Negyed*, No.3, 1995, <http://epa.oszk.hu/00000/00003/00008/erdei.html> (2017.04.29.)



Kós, Károly: *Crow castle, Sztána, 1910.*

Though the collapse of the Monarchy and the birth of national states followed by the penetration of modern architecture removed the issue of national style, within art deco, the folk and national taste enjoyed a revival in Hungary between the two World Wars.

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BÉLA ZSOLT, THE HUNGARIAN “SOCIOLOGIST OF JEWRY”¹

ALEXANDRA M. SZABÓ

ABSTRACT

My presentation discusses Jewishness as a differentiated identity from the Hungarian national collective identity in the 20th century through a literary mirror. More precisely, I argue that Béla Zsolt’s novels, written and published in the interwar period function as instruments for understanding Jewish identification of the time.

*My line of reasoning is based on four of his novels: *Házassággal végződik* (1926) – (transl. *It Ends in Marriage*), *Gerson és neje* (1930) – (transl. *Gerson and his Wife*), *Kínos ügy* (1935) – (transl. *The Embarrassing Affair*), and *A dunaparti nő* (1936) – (transl. *The Woman from the Riverside of the Danube*). While studying the identification techniques, and in some instances the identity representations, I only take the world of the novel into account, never the author’s personal expression of identity, nor do I implement any psychological evaluation.*

I analyze Jewish identification techniques through the narrative positions, the protagonists’ utterances of identity inconvenience, and the representation of the Jewish body in the worlds of the novels.

The emphasis of the different narratives is an important aspect due to its (hidden) emancipatory aim, as the focalization is the perspective of contemporary society. I also exhibit the first instances of the word Jew, Jewess, Jewish (zsidó) in each novel to show their context, and to identify the value(s) they represent. The representation of the Jewish body is shown as another crucially important

¹ The reference is to Péter Sz. Nagy’s essay on the author, where Béla Zsolt is considered to be a sociologist of the Hungarian Jewry through his works. Péter Sz. Nagy: Zsidóirodalom? A zsidóság szociográfusa: Zsolt Béla, in P. Török (ed.): *A határ és határolt, Töprengések a magyar-zsidó irodalom létformáiról*, Budapest, Yahalom, 1997, 368.

technique of identification. I demonstrate how the novels assume the truth of corporeal differentiation between Jewish and non-Jewish in the contemporary understanding of interwar Hungary.

Keywords: *Béla Zsolt, Jewish identity representation, literary representations, narrative techniques, Jewish inconvenience, the Jewish body*

The Jew is one whom other men consider a Jew: that is the simple truth from which we must start. – Jean Paul Sartre

Béla Zsolt, Hungarian poet, writer and journalist, was born in Komárom at the end of the 19th century, in the empire of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Due to the hasty jumps in political situations, national identity was a constantly changing construction in the region and typical of the era. Therefore, not surprisingly, Zsolt's significant life events occur in the course of historical changes, which directly point at his ideological turns. I will discuss these points on an introductory level, as it will help in the understanding of his (change of) thought, which he dedicated not only his career, but his life to. Subsequently, I will be mainly concentrating on his projections of contemporary social problems in the interwar period, most significantly of the anti-Jewish atmosphere and its consequences. In order to bring the issue of Hungarian anti-Semitism into public discourse, Zsolt exploited the forms of prose and journalistic pieces, leaving poetry somewhat behind.² I will base my reasoning on four of his novels in order to outline the role and importance of Jewish identity and identification represented in them. I will analyze three main identification techniques used in the selected works: narrative positions, the inconvenience of the Jewish identity, and the representation of the Jewish body. Rereading and reviewing Zsolt's work not only helps us in understanding the interpretation of the "Jewish Question" from another viewpoint, but opens up operative and ontological dimensions in the understanding of the construction of the Jewish identity and identification on a micro-level.

At a young age, presumably due to some family problems, Zsolt found himself strongly believing in and thus following the ideology of Hungarian nationalism. His view on the importance of the Hungarian national identity

² "Now you can see (...) that I couldn't stick to poems. (...) You do think I am right when I say I cannot do it any other way, don't you? When bombs, stink bombs, Jew beatings, underworld maneuvers bring the subject matter, it is very hard to write poems! The era, this age forces me not to use my pen to write poetry, but for a weapon." Quoted by Clara Royer in her study published not only in French, but Hungarian: Clara Royer: A VI. és VII. kerületpublicistája? Zsolt Béla elkötelezett magyarsága, *Múlt és Jövő*, No.2, 2015, 82.

was especially loud compared to his parents' generation (who might have felt the same amount of respect towards Vienna as to Budapest). He later fought in World War I and his reminiscences from the time he spent in hospital are emphatic in the understanding of his shift from nationalism to Marxism, next to some utterances about the fact that his Jewish roots bore some negative reactions — some of which can be read in his earliest biographical work, *Thunderbolt (Villámcsapás)*. By the time he moved to Budapest in 1921, Zsolt was again looking for an ideological solution. He started writing for left-wing liberal papers; however, he left Marxist ideas behind because of contemporary Hungarian politics, aiming for a reformist direction.³ Initially, he became known as a poet and started writing for *Nyugat*, one of the most important and prominent Hungarian literary journals of the 20th century. He had always been inspired by the well-known *Nyugat*-writers such as Endre Ady⁴ and Mihály Babits⁵, and his work was recognized by such acclaimed writers as Dezső Kosztolányi⁶ and Attila József⁷. Later on, most of his expectations failed him, and besides ideological and political frustrations, Zsolt fought his battles in the literary scene as well. Zsolt was one of the representatives — together with Attila József — of those second generation *Nyugat*-urbanists who went against the new peasantism movement led by László Németh and Gyula Illyés. The main points of conflict were far from only being ideological, since the peasant-writers started to present a racist attitude and published some anti-Semitic utterances.⁸ Today, having the possibility to read Gyula Illyés's thoughts from his diary, we can see that Zsolt's struggles against a general anti-Jewish atmosphere were interpreted as unethical pro-Jewish "propaganda".⁹ Consequently, the most significant distress for Zsolt came to be the time's growing pressure of anti-Semitism, and therefore his sense of injustice and anti-fascism began to rule his reputation. He mainly exploited the platforms of prose and journalistic pieces to give voice to these social (and not only personal) problems.

³ For a more detailed introduction of Béla Zsolt's ideological background see Clara Royer: A VI. és VII. kerületpublicistája? Zsolt Béla elkötelezett magyarsága, *Múlt és Jövő*, No. 2, 2015, 78–85.

⁴ Zsolt Béla: *Tanulságok és reményeségek*, Nagyvárad, Béla Zsolt (author's edition), 1942, 148.

⁵ Lőrinc Szabó: Zsolt Béla: Minden hiába, *Nyugat*, No. 19, 1921, 1508.

⁶ Dezső Kosztolányi: *Egy ég alatt*, Budapest, Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1977, 553.

⁷ They worked together and were on good terms not only concerning literary taste and criticism, but for the journal *A Toll* (transl. *The Pen*), which periodical gave place for their social and literary aspirations.

⁸ This conflict wound up being a very own "Jewish question" of the Hungarian literary scene, arguing how much influence or part a Jewish intellectual should take in the making of Hungarian literature. For further reading, see László Németh: *Ember és Szerep, Kalangya*, No. 3, 1934, 46–47.

⁹ Gyula Illyés: *Naplójegyzetek, 1929–1945*, Budapest, Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1986, 379–380.

Béla Zsolt wrote several best-sellers during the interwar period, I will be analyzing four of his novels which best represent the sinuosity of this interval. The first novel in chronological order is *It Ends in Marriage* from 1926, which was translated into English by Louis Rittenberg and published in 1931. The second chosen work is *Gerson and his Wife* from 1930, the following *An Embarrassing Affair* from 1935, and the last, *The Woman from the Riverside of the Danube* from 1936.¹⁰ I believe that these novels represent, through a period of ten years, Zsolt's discernment of the common issues in Hungarian society. His fight against anti-Semitism in the years right before World War II was, in my opinion, the trickiest and the most effective when using the media of literary entertainment. He did so with very specific techniques in his novels through which Zsolt paints a precise picture of an anti-Semitic society, while he also exploits the medium of books to reach that same Hungarian society, mostly by making fun of its superficial anti-Semitic values. In order to make this issue more definitive, thus highlighting its importance, in his creative process he used specific Jewish identification techniques. I will be discussing three of these techniques: the positioning of the narrators, with an emancipatory aim, depicting the inconvenience of Jewish identity, and the representation of the Jewish body.

(JEWISH?) NARRATORS

The narrative positions are significant in all of the novels because focalization takes place from the perspective of contemporary society and all of the plots are more or less set in the time of their writing. Each narrator gives the impression of a public storyteller — no wonder Zsolt's style was compared to Kálmán Mikszáth's anecdotic storytelling¹¹—, who even if he is clearly omniscient, seems biased by society and behaves like a “smooth operator”. Due to the narrators' behavior and choice of words, it is apparent that they represent a focalization that is the eye of Hungarian society, which is either not Jewish, the fashionable anti-Semite of the time, or the silent Jew seeking to assimilate. All the narrators strongly want to connect to their audiences and separate themselves from the traditional Jewish identity, while behaving in the characters' manner (who are all Jewish, in some cases tradition-hiding, assimilated Jews). On a lexical level, the rhetorical attitudes of the narrators show that they are only discussing their protagonists' Jewish identity in

¹⁰ Due to the lack of translations, I have translated the sections quoted with impunity; I will be quoting the original Hungarian sections in the accompanying footnotes.

¹¹ Nagy: *A zsidóság szociográfusa*, 368.

depth, and are stately not equal to them.¹² I strongly believe this duality is the writer's intention to contradict the reader, just as anti-Semitism divides a society, but here with the aim of emancipating Jewish values. The author uses *irony*¹³ as a literary technique to do so. In relation to other canonized Jewish writers discussing the Jewish identity and traditions, we can see what a vigorously different attitude some other narrators have. The positions of Károly Pap's narrators and the convenience (not inconvenience) is already articulated in the first sentence of his famous novel *Azarel*: "*My paternal grandfather was a Jewish wool trader.*"¹⁴

JEWISH INCONVENIENCE

Another noteworthy Jewish identification technique in Zsolt's work is the depiction of the Jewish identity as an inconvenient factor for a persona. The inconvenience of being Jewish is implicitly discussed in Zsolt's prose, to which conclusion I have come by examining the first occurrences of the word *zsidó* (Jew, Jewess, Jewish), in accordance to the conceptualization of the main characters' self-identification. In my analysis, I aim to show the direct connection between the protagonists' Jewish self and the first instance of the word "Jewish" that can be read regarding their story. In *It Ends in Marriage* the plot of an interfaith marriage emphasizes the woman's Jewish identification through the man's perspective and not through self-identification. The woman, a wealthy aristocrat, does not care about her Jewish roots, this being well illustrated by the first appearance of the word "Jewish" (*zsidó*). The first time it is said out loud that Eszter is a Jewess is long after the beginning of the story; we already know the characters and about their romance by the time an argument arises between the two.

Besides that, he does have something to lose. For example, his traditions. I beg your pardon, but she can't sense this, women don't have a sense of traditions; moreover, she is... Just say it loud, she doesn't have a sense of traditions because she is "Jewish"? Is that right? That's what you wanted to say. No, he did not even think of this – he objects, because he saw it was best to retreat.¹⁵

¹² An analysis of this narrative behavior can be found in my first Master's thesis: Alexandra M. Szabó: *Represented "Jewish" Identity Forms in Zsolt Béla's Novels*, Budapest, ELTE, 2016.

¹³ Kierkegaardian irony, to be specific.

¹⁴ Károly Pap: *Azarel: A Novel*, Vermont, Steerforth Press, 2001, 1.

¹⁵ "Azonkívül van vesztenivalója. Például a tradíciói. Ne haragudjék, de ő ezt nem érzi, a nőknek nincs érzékük a hagyományok iránt, és azonkívül ő... / Csak mondja ki bátran, neki nincs érzéke a tradíciók iránt, mert zsidó? Ugye? Ezt akarta mondani. / Nem, erre nem is gondolt – tiltakozik, mert jobbnak látja, ha visszavonul." In Béla Zsolt: *Házassággal végződik*, Budapest, Ulpius-ház Könyvkiadó, 2007, 44.

This section of the quarrel between the two main characters speaks for itself in terms of relations and attitude towards the “Jewish question” in regard to Hungarian traditions. The inconvenience of Jewishness is represented through the non-Jewish protagonist, who is bothered by the fact that his lover is both rich and a Jewess¹⁶. Just as one of the earliest thoughts of anti-Semitism, Zsolt’s earliest novel talks about the idea how the rich Jew/Jewess is a bother to society, who also cannot take a nation’s traditional values into consideration. The novel later on culminates in the couple’s love story through the man’s related sufferings.

In *Gerson and his Wife* the indecisive appearance of the word “Jewish” is a perfect metaphor to Gerson’s Jewish identity. At the beginning, there is only a hint that the man is of a different religion compared to his soon-to-be wife, the word *zsidó* is not used yet:

It has been five days since they got married. Only in front of the registrar because of the religious differences. Gerson did not want to change his faith, in consideration of his elders.¹⁷

Thereafter, the first instance of the word in ink is not even a statement of the protagonist directly, but concerning his elders (who are also a point of reference to his Jewishness as quoted above):

Above the beds we can find grandpa’s and grandma’s chalk drawings (...) Above the candle there is a drawing of Jewish letters and numbers decorated in Indian ink and with gold.¹⁸

Gerson’s self-search harmonizes with the narrator’s attentive use of the word “Jewish”: initially, it is unclearly stated that the main character is Jewish just as the main character does not clearly see that his life will never be on track with such a self-deceptive nature. This becomes especially unambiguous through the plot when he introduces himself to his boss as an orphan, not only by killing his very much alive parents (thus his elders) by a lie, but by silently killing off his Jewish roots, too.

In the *Embarrassing Affair*, the protagonist Dr. Hell is the typical Central-European assimilated Jewish man, who does not care about his Jewish

¹⁶ The question of gender equality rises here as well.

¹⁷ “Öt napja, hogy megesküdtek. Csak az anyakönyvvezető előtt, a felekezeti különbség miatt. Gerson nem akart hitet változtatni, tekintettel az öregekre.” In Béla Zsolt: *Gerson és neje*, Budapest, Magvető Könyvkiadó, 1994, 14.

¹⁸ “Az ágyak felett nagypapa és nagymama krétarajza (...) A mécs fölött a tussal és arannyal cirkalmazott rajz zsidó betűkből és számokból.” *Ibid.*, 16.

identity, or at least he considers it as an irrelevant attribute of his identity, even if he is in a sort of soul-search himself. However, his handling of Jewish self-identification is not self-deceptive as in Gerson's case because Dr. Hell does not actually see the significance of his roots, whether religiously, or with his ancestry. Not surprisingly, the first instance of the word *zsidó* in this novel is not even about him; some of his friends are talking about a man who later will never be mentioned again:

Ottó Kerz, a dentist, wanted to become an anthropologist and now he is passionately demonstrating that the Jewish intellectual's and rebel's only way out is Zionism.¹⁹

Ottó Kerz is an insignificant character in the world of the novel, similarly to the role of the Jewish intelligentsia; therefore, this occurrence illustrates both the narration's and the main character's attitude towards Jewishness. This negligence is strikingly and beautifully used in the novel; its implication is the ambivalence of the assimilated attitude of the contemporary Jew (not caring about being Jewish) and the impossibility of an actual assimilation (because of being viewed Jewish by society). Eventually, Hell's lack and failure of self-identification becomes his fatality, thus legitimizing the fact that this negligence and ambivalence evolve into self-destruction. Another example of the author's intentional use of ambivalence can be traced back on a metaphorical level in the plot as well: the main character engages in important business on a Saturday ignoring the Sabbath laws, but at one other time, eagerly tries to pray in Hebrew.

The last of Zsolt's novels to be discussed, *The Woman from the Riverside of the Danube*, is the deepest and most complexly worked out one in terms of Jewish identification. Here the narrator speaks in the first-person singular, presenting himself as a self-aware Jewish man. The first mention of his Jewish identity is in the form of a corporeal description, which technique will be discussed in the next section. Nonetheless, the most articulate Jewish identification technique in this novel is the embodiment of fear. The era's "Jewish fear"²⁰, which can only be cognizable from the narrator-protagonist, speaks for itself through the key sentence of the novel:

¹⁹ "Kerz Ottó fogorvos, antropológus akart lenni, és most szenvedélyesen bizonyítja, hogy a zsidó entellektüel és forradalmár számára egyetlen kivezető út a cionizmus." In Béla Zsolt: *Kínos Úgy*, Budapest, Ulpus-ház Könyvkiadó, 2008, 18.

²⁰ Here I am not referring to any established notion; my denotation only aims to mark an idea that can be perceived as a culmination of the "Jewish inconvenience" Zsolt depicts in his works.

But such a panic had never in my life captured me when I realized that I am Jewish...a helpless Jewish citizen in Central Europe.²¹

The fear of being Jewish in Central Europe at the time is not only emphasized through this declaration, but also by the plot consisting of a storyline of a German fascist being married to a Hungarian Jewish woman, through whom the Nazi ideology is presented to the reader with all its nightmares. (Literally nightmares because Viktor, the main character, talks in detail about his surrealistic dreams about Hitler.)

THE JEWISH BODY

The representation of the Jewish body is a significant and also a modern identification technique Béla Zsolt uses throughout his oeuvre. As mentioned above, in the *The Woman from the Riverside of the Danube*, the first instance and statement of the narrator-protagonist being a Jew is in a corporeal lamentation about himself:

Many times I even had the courage to think that maybe I am not uglier than the usual Jewish-type of my age, which after a long struggle of nomadism finally settled down and is just about to mature the even bodily evolving effects of the Asian, North African, Spanish, Slavic environment, climate, soil, nutrition, lifestyle and culture.²²

This depiction of a Jew as being nothing but ugly is one of the many typical stereotypes born out of anti-Semitism. As Jay Geller, professor of Modern Jewish Culture, points out: at the emergence of anti-Semitism and during the interwar period, the interpretation of the Jewish body image came to be of significance and with modernism there was a growing desire to depict the Jewish body in all forms of art²³, which, due to an anti-Semitic atmosphere, led to the birth and the empowerment of stereotypes. The development of stereotypes discussed in professional literature can be traceable in Zsolt's novels accordingly.

²¹ "De hasonló pánik még sohasem fogott el, mint amikor ráészméltem, hogy zsidó vagyok... védtelen zsidó polgár, Közép-Európában." In Béla Zsolt: *A dunaparti nő*, Budapest, Nova Irodalmi Intézet, 1936, 39.

²² "Sokszor már arra is mertem gondolni, hogy talán nem is vagyok csúnyább, mint a korombeli átlagos zsidótípus, amely hosszú nomádság, kecmérgés után végre letelepedett és az ázsiai, észak-afrikai, spanyol, szláv környezet, klíma, talaj, táplálkozás, életmód és kultúra testet is formáló hatásait éppen most forrja ki." *Ibid.*, 25.

²³ Jay Geller: *The Other Jewish Question: Identifying the Jews and Making Sense of Modernity*, New York, Fordham University Press, 2011, 2–3.

Eszter's body in *It Ends in Marriages* is continuously regarded in the text as hideous and plump. As discussed previously, this novel being one of the earliest ones, deals with the early manifestations of anti-Jewish ideas, thus here the motif of the presented body images can be interpreted as the stereotype of a Jew being hideous and the rich being plump. In Gerson's case the body portrayal is mainly discussed through his sanitary issues, next to other metaphorical depictions. The stereotypical Jewish body of Gerson is directly displayed and he constantly worries about his "inherited untidiness"²⁴ in the interval sections of the storyline. The exaggeration of hygienic issues leads to the point where Gerson, the Hungarian white-collar worker, is compared to a negro by the narrator, claiming he is as dirty as a black man's skin. Dr. Hell's (*The Embarrassing Affair*) body issues are to be understood as a metaphor for his self-identification (evolving around the fact that he is Jewish, without him seeing its significance). The corporeal issues develop with the progression of his self-negligence in the plot: starting with a toe fracture, he ends up coping with sexual incompetence, which then leads to an identity-crisis and eventually he commits suicide (gets rid of the burden of his body)²⁵. And with the passage of time, by 1936, not only does the inconvenience of being Jewish evolve into a strong fear, but the depiction of a Jewish person held to be ugly evolves into a terrifyingly surrealistic picture. In *The Riverside of the Danube*, Viktor, the protagonist-narrator draws hypnagogic pictures not only of Hitler, but of his nephew's appearance, the son of a German Nazi painter (an obvious reference to Hitler again) and a Jewish mother, with the mixed attributes of a stereotypical Aryan and a Jewess.

Zsolt's prose, from which I have analyzed four pieces, mirrors the social problems of the interwar years in Hungary through a biased, but omniscient narrative voice. I have concentrated on well-established Jewish identification techniques to find an outcome that is, in my opinion, of greater significance regarding the era than pure aesthetic values. All in all, I believe that the chosen works between 1926 and 1936 are not only important in the portrayal of the reception and representation of interwar Hungary's social issues regarding "the Jewish question", but they reveal Béla Zsolt's talent in having an extensive sociological and documentarian approach throughout his creative process by depicting the several layers of Hungarian society. Béla Zsolt, referred to as an undeservedly forgotten writer²⁶, truly deserves to be reconsidered both as a writer and as a literary sociologist from a historically significant period.

²⁴ Zsolt: *Gerson*, 12.

²⁵ Zsolt explores the bodily event of suicide on a whole new level in his book written after the Holocaust, *Nine Suitcases* (translated to English by Ladislaus Löb). However, the notion of Jewish identity and identification after the Shoah are of a different aspect, therefore I am not discussing it here.

²⁶ He is called so on almost all of the back-cover copies of his republished novels, as well as by recent reception.

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THE ROLE OF THEATRE AND DRAMA IN BUILDING THE SLOVAK NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD



DAGMAR KROČANOVÁ

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the role of drama and the Slovak National Theatre in shaping Slovak identity in the first half of the 20th century. It describes the institutional background of the modern Slovak theatre: the rise of the professional theatre in 1920, the tension between Slovak and other cultures including the co-existence of Czech and Slovak theatre groups in the 1920s, the gradual evolution and modernisation of theatre, as well as the role of theatre during WW2. It mentions major trends in Slovak dramatic literature and analyzes the repertoire of the Slovak National Theatre, focusing on the interplay between the “national” and “international”, as well as between Modernist and avant-garde tendencies on one side, and Realist tradition on the other side. The goal of the paper is to show that the Slovak National Theatre in Bratislava asserted the culture of an emerging nation in a nationally heterogeneous region, and that the original competence among respective cultures in the early 1920s was replaced by their coexistence in the 1930s, but eventually replaced by the dominance of Slovak culture after 1939.

Keywords: *Slovak drama, the Slovak National Theatre in Bratislava, interwar period in Slovak culture, national culture*

Slovak theatre culture went through considerable changes between 1920 and 1945. When seen from the Slovak perspective, two aspects must be taken into consideration: one related to the culture of an emerging nation, and the other one related to the culture of a particular town and region, namely, of today's Slovak capital, Bratislava, also known as Pressburg and Pozsony (in

German and Hungarian, respectively).¹ The rise of professional theatre and the development of drama written in a national language serve as a case study to show how feeble the Slovak national identity in this period still was.

After the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Slovak national identity developed within the official concept of one Czechoslovak nation². Since the Czechoslovak Republic also served as a “buffer zone” and its population included large German and Hungarian minorities, this concept guaranteed the majority for the Slavic population in the state. Slovak autonomy, originally granted by the Cleveland and Pittsburgh treaties, thus became undesirable.³ Besides, Slovaks could not base their demand for autonomy on previous historical, political or territorial claims. Traditional linguistic and cultural nationalism that perceived language as the core of the national identity was still vital; however, the Slovak language was only considered a “branch” or a “dialect” of the Czechoslovak language, or a “literary language.”⁴ Slovak society was split: some segments of the Slovak population and political representation voiced their dissatisfaction with the national principle in the Czechoslovak Republic, whereas a part of the Slovak population and representation adhered to a Czechoslovak orientation. Some Slovaks also still felt their link with the Hungarian nation and the monarchy. Complex geopolitical interests in Europe interplayed with the Slovak demands for autonomy, and eventually lead to the split of the Republic in March 1939.

The Slovak National Theatre (Slovenské národné divadlo) as a professional theatre institution was only founded in 1919, and several paradoxes accompanied its rise. First, the authorities of a new state negotiated about establishing the Slovak National Theatre even though the official concept of the nation and

¹ The Slovak name of the town referring to the Slavic prince Braslav became official in 1919. In vernacular Slovak the town was called Prešporok. After the disintegration of the monarchy, there were plans to grant the town an autonomous status and call it Wilsonovo, after President Woodrow Wilson.

² This political and ideological concept was based in the constitution of 1920. It is related to the idea of Slavic reciprocity and the concept of one “Czechoslovak tribe” among Slavs, influenced by J. Herder and phrased especially by Ján Kollár (1793–1852) in the period of the national awakening

³ The Cleveland treaty was signed on 22 October, 1915. It stated that a foreseen new common state of Czechs and Slovaks will be a federation, that Slovakia will have its territorial autonomy, and that Slovak will be one of official languages of the state. The Pittsburgh treaty was signed on 31 May, 1918, and it modified some aspects of foreseen state administration. It abolished the idea of a federation but Slovakia was supposed to have an autonomous status, its own parliament and administration. Slovak was still supposed to function as an official language. Among major signatories of both documents were the Czech National Association and Slovak League in the USA.

⁴ The language taught at schools in the Czechoslovak Republic was “Czechoslovak in a Slovak variety”.

language only distinguished one Czechoslovak nation and language.⁵ Next, the theatre was established by hiring a semi-professional Czech theatre troupe whose actors only “Slovakised” their Czech after moving to Slovakia.⁶ Their first season started in March 1920 and ended in June 1920. Last but not least, the Slovak National Theatre was based in the newly renamed Bratislava, which was populated by predominantly German and Hungarian speaking inhabitants that did not welcome the rise of the Czechoslovak Republic.⁷ Although the city’s geographical position bordering two foreign countries was peculiar for a capital of a region, its location on the Danube was strategic, giving the landlocked Czechoslovakia an access to the sea. In terms of ideology, Bratislava, if changed nationally, could become a new centre of Slovakia and could diminish the influence of Turčiansky Sv. Martin, which was a traditional conservative Slovak cultural centre in the 19th century that could still undermine the ideology of Prague. In the 1920s, Slovaks became an “emerging cultural identity” in Bratislava, and Czech state employees (mostly clerks, officials, and teachers) became a new layer in the town’s population. In the first decade after the rise of Czechoslovakia, Bratislava witnessed a competition among languages and cultures; whereas in the 1930s, the situation changed towards a more balanced and harmonious state of cultural plurality. However, in the 1940s, as a result of “purgings”, the town acquired a forced national homogeneity; and it underwent massive and violent interventions in urban planning during Communism that also continued after 1989.

The next section considers theatre from three perspectives: first, as a means of creating a community that supposedly shares some emotions and communicates meanings; second, as a building and physical space; and third, the relation between a dramatic repertoire and a national culture.

In the case of the Slovak National Theatre in Bratislava we are in the situation of a void, or of an “imagined theatre” when we perceive theatre as a place of an

⁵ Negotiations were held between the Czechoslovak Ministry of Education and National Enlightenment (MŠNO, Ministerstvo školstva a národnej osvety) and a newly established Cooperative of the Slovak National Theatre. They were accompanied by political tensions and problems with financing the theatre. The director of the Cooperative of the Slovak National Theatre was Vavro Šrobár (1867–1950), at that time the Plenipotentiary Minister for the Administration of Slovakia.

⁶ This was the Eastern Bohemian Theatre Company led by Bedřich Jeřábek.

⁷ Before the Ausgleich of 1867, the predominant segments in the population were Germans and Slovaks; the Hungarian segment rose significantly from the last third of the 19th century. In 1910, the town had approximately 80,000 inhabitants (out of them about forty per cent were of German nationality, forty per cent were of Hungarian nationality, and fifteen per cent were of Slovak nationality). In 1930, the town had approximately 125,000 inhabitants (out of them twenty-five per cent claimed German nationality, fifteen per cent Hungarian nationality, and almost fifty per cent Slovak/Czechoslovak nationality). After the disintegration of the monarchy, the town was besieged by Czechoslovak legions supported by the Italian army; and only the treaty of Versailles in June 1919 decided that the town be included in the Czechoslovak Republic.

exchange between a stage and an auditorium. On the part of the “stage”, there was no tradition of professional theatre and no theatre professionals in Slovakia. Slovaks only had a tradition of amateur theatre in the 19th century but this was developed in towns other than Bratislava. Besides, as previously mentioned, the troupe of the Slovak National Theatre consisted of Czech actors combined with several Slovak actors who either had some experience from amateur theatres or studied acting at the State Conservatory in Prague.⁸ On the part of the audience, the feeble theatre tradition in Slovakia was also related to sociological factors. Slovakia lacked an aristocracy and bourgeoisie, and it did not undergo the processes of urbanization and modernization in the 19th century. Instead of the situation in which nations develop a theatre tradition and eventually found national theatres, in the Slovak case, theatre was established as an institution that was also supposed to contribute to nation-building. The Slovak National Theatre was thus burdened with a double task: political/ideological on one side, and artistic/aesthetic on the other side.

The story of the Slovak National Theatre, however, was mostly related to Bratislava. Theatre in Bratislava was originally either in German or Hungarian. Establishing the Slovak National Theatre in the town was a step towards a forced emergence of the national culture combined with the forced Slovakisation of a city. In the 1920s, a separate Propagation troupe of the Slovak National Theatre, established in 1921 and called *Marš* among its members, held performances in other Slovak places. Another Czech company, known as a Rural troupe of the Slovak National Theatre and directed by Otokar Novák, also travelled in Slovakia. In 1932, a separate Slovak troupe of the Slovak National Theatre in Bratislava was founded. Between 1932 and 1939, two troupes – a Czech and a Slovak one – performed in the theatre. The Czech troupe was dissolved in 1939. In other Slovak towns, such as Košice, Trnava, and Nitra, entrepreneurs took up theatre activities throughout the entire interwar period but these only lasted a few years. Regular theatres were only established in Nitra, Prešov and Martin in the late 1930s and early 1940s; the development of theatre culture in this period coincided with the cultural policy of the autonomous Slovak Republic. Speaking of the relation between theatre and national identity developing in history, we can also mention that a conservatory was founded in Bratislava in 1919 but university education for theatre professionals only became possible in 1949 (after the Communist coup d'état) when the Academy of Performing Arts was established in Bratislava.

The evolution of theatre is connected, of course, with the concept of space, including its concrete form. The Slovak National Theatre in Bratislava took over the premises of the Municipal Theatre, built in 1886 and designed

⁸ Among the pioneers of Slovak acting were Andrej Bagar, Jozef Kello and Gašpar Arbet, who had experience from amateur theatre, and Jozef Borodáč, Országhová-Borodáčová and also Hana Styková who studied in Prague.

by Vienna architects Ferdinand Fellner and Hermann Helmer, who also designed theatres in numerous other places of the monarchy, among them Budapest, Prague, Zagreb, and Sofia. Several institutions that represented the authority of the Czechoslovak Republic in Bratislava (for example, the Police Headquarters, the Slovak National Museum but also the Czechoslovak National Bank, Tatra Bank, the Central Slovak Credit Bank, and others) had new buildings constructed, but some other institutions (besides the Slovak National Theatre, for example, the government) used already-existing Austro-Hungarian imperial (informally referred to as “Kakanien”) structures.⁹ In the 1920s, the building of the Slovak National Theatre in Bratislava was shared by German, Hungarian and Czecho(Slovak) theatre groups: an agreement on the division of the season was reached after negotiations with the Municipal Council¹⁰. Multilingualism in the theatre reflected the situation seen and heard in the streets of the town.

The next aspect in the relation between the national theatre and the national identity perceives theatre as a materialization of intentions present in dramatic texts belonging to national literatures. Drama, based on a text written in a national language, can imply “national spirit” more directly (even though any national literature also belongs to the general contexts of literature as such); theatre, combining extra-linguistic means (such as body, gesture, facial expression, along with a set of visual and acoustic means) with linguistic ones might be more cross-cultural and universal.¹¹

Speaking of the language, the interwar period meant a new stage in the development of Slovak: whereas the awakening between 1780 and 1850 brought codifications of standard Slovak, a new code of Slovak was discussed in the early 1930s. However, since the original proposal was prepared by a Czech

⁹ “Kakanien” (also k.u.k.) refers to “kaiserlich und königlich” (imperial and royal), that is, to the Austrian (Austro-Hungarian) Empire/Habsburg Monarchy.

¹⁰ For more details, see Lajcha, Ladislav (ed.): *Dokumenty SND*, Vol. I, Zápas o zmysel a podobu 1929–1938, Bratislava, Divadelný ústav, 2000.

¹¹ Even though music and dance genres are not discussed in this paper, it is also relevant to mention that the first Slovak opera, named the *Krútnava* (the Whirlpool), only originated in the 1940s. It was thought of by the commissar of the Slovak National Theatre during the Slovak Republic in 1940. Its composer, Eugen Suchoň (1908–1993), who, along with Štefan Hoza (1906–1982), also wrote the libretto based on a short story by the Slovak fiction writer Milo Urban (1904–1982), began to write it in 1941; it was premiered in December 1949 but some Christian motifs were already unacceptable for the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia; thus a new version was prepared in the early 1950s.

linguist and was meant to bring Slovak closer to Czech, it was eventually refused.¹² The rise of the professional theatre after 1918 also facilitated using the varieties of the language in a new form, such as stage speech.¹³

The 1920s in Slovak literature are sometimes referred to as the time of “opening windows to Europe” and catching up with modern literary trends. This development compensated for a reserved attitude to Modernism among ideologues of the 19th century Slovak culture, such as S. H. Vajanský (1847–1916).¹⁴ Slovak culture was supposed to refuse Western European decadence and lack of values. The appeal of Modernism at the turn of the century was a threat for the Slovak nation, since Slovak literature was expected to advocate national interests. An initial post-1918 enthusiasm which replaced the rural setting and Realism by urban and exotic themes and formal experiments, influenced by Modernism and the avant-garde, gradually faded in the 1930s. Village themes and a praise of the simple life in the countryside led to the rise of the Lyrical Prose School (also referred to as “Naturism.”)¹⁵ In poetry, along with revived Symbolism, avant-garde movements such as Poetism and Surrealism dominated. In dramatic literature, after a decade of eclecticism in themes and movements that produced drama of mediocre quality, the 1930s witnessed rising quality. Realist plays set among villagers and petit bourgeoisie were still frequent and popular, and so were plays with historical themes and protagonists. From 1935 until roughly 1948, there were two major trends in drama: the drama of ideas and of the model situation, and lyrical drama. Whereas the former trend was close to Existentialism in themes and approaches, the latter one offered the chance to apply poetic avant-garde techniques (especially Poetism and Surrealism) to drama.

Among representatives of the Realist tradition in Slovak drama of the interwar period, we can mention the playwright and medical doctor Ivan Stodola (1888–1977) whose works (especially social plays and comedies as well as historical plays) belonged to the core of the repertoire. Vladimír Hurban Vladimírov (1884–1950) was a gifted playwright and Protestant minister who combined Realist tendencies with belated Naturalism and Symbolism, as well as with Expressionism, but his plays were not staged in the Slovak National Theatre, partially due to the fact that he lived outside Czechoslovakia, in the Slovak enclave in Vojvodina in Yugoslavia. The drama of ideas and of model

¹² The main editor, a Czech linguist and a professor at Comenius University Václav Vážný (1892–1966), adhered to the concept of one nation and language; the proposal was criticized especially by the Slovak Matica (a Slovak cultural institution founded in 1863; its activities were prohibited in 1875 and renewed in 1919).

¹³ A similar process was noticeable in terminology and in translations.

¹⁴ Vajanský, a Slovak writer and the editor of a newspaper *Národné noviny*, advocated idealistic and conservative values, as well as tsarist Russia.

¹⁵ This movement can be considered a version of regionalism that developed in the interwar period in some European literatures.

situations in the interwar period is represented especially by Július Barč-Ivan (1909–1953), originally a Protestant minister from a mixed Hungarian and German-Slovak family background. His dramatic work was a metaphor for the historical, philosophical, ethical and spiritual agenda of the 1930s and 1940s, and it gradually shifted from amateur provincial stages to the Slovak National Theatre. Kazimír Bezek (1908–1952), Peter Zvon (1913–1942, real name Vladimír Sýkora), both lawyers by profession, and several other playwrights wrote lyrical drama between 1936 and 1949. This movement was influenced by the Czech avant-garde, especially by Poetism and Surrealism.¹⁶

The repertoire of the Slovak National Theatre in the interwar period can be examined using three sets of criteria: one, the proportion between original Slovak plays and translations from other national literatures (considering both preferences and exclusions); two, the proportion between the classical dramatic repertoire (preference of tradition) and contemporary plays (expressing a shift towards Modernism and the avant-garde in culture); and three, the proportion between traditional staging and directing and modern/experimental staging (including those cases when a traditional piece was staged in a modern manner, and, vice versa, an experimental drama was adjusted to Realism in staging). The list of twenty-six staged plays in the 1920–21 season contains one Slovak play (by a Realist playwright Jozef Gregor Tajovský, 1874–1940), about ten plays by Czech playwrights (both older and contemporary), and among other pieces are, for example, two plays by Ibsen, one by Shakespeare and one by Przybyszewski¹⁷. Thirty-two plays were premiered in the next season, out of which three were Slovak and nine Czech, whereas other national literatures were represented by dramatic works or literary adaptations by such writers as Wilde, Ibsen, Bahr, Rolland, Maugham and Dumas. The 1932–33 season contained thirty plays, four of them Slovak and four Czech, and other national literatures were represented, for example, by Ostrovsky, Hasenclever, Gorky, and Afinogenov, as well as Shakespeare, Goldoni, and others. The 1939–40 season, during the rise of the nationalist Slovak Republic, brought seventeen new premieres, four of them by Slovak playwrights, while Czech literature was only represented by the nineteenth-century writer Karel Jaromír Erben. That year's classic repertoire included Sophocles, Moliere, Hugo, Ibsen, Hauptmann and Shaw. In the 1944–45 season only eight plays were premiered; out of these two were Slovak, and Calderon, Shakespeare and Moliere represented the classical repertoire.

¹⁶ Bezek studied in Prague and Zvon was Czech – his family moved to Slovakia after 1918. Their theatre plays show their experience of theatre avant-garde in Prague (especially from the theatre D34 and from the *Osvobozené divadlo* – Liberated Theatre).

¹⁷ The entire list of the repertoire in the dramatic theatre between 1920 and 1959 was published in *Pamätnica Slovenského národného divadla*. Bratislava, SVKL, 1960, 297–349. The book also contains a similar list for opera, operetta and ballet.

Overall, the entire interwar period in Slovak theatre is marked by a clash between traditional Realism and Modernism. Realism in theatre maintained the focus on dramatic texts, mostly respected traditional dramatic categories (such as dramatic plot, dramatic conflict, dramatic tension, the principle of the three unities, and others), and did not violate traditional composition (division into scenes and acts) producing an illusionary performance (theatre *like* reality). Modernism, especially lyrical drama, subdued dramatic texts emphasizing extra-textual and extra-linguistic elements instead. This led to the rise of a new form in drama and theatre: they were not *like* reality but they *were* a separate artistic reality capable of conveying emotions by producing beauty and enchantment. The integration of epic and lyric elements in drama decomposed dramatic characters, plot, tension, unities and composition. Whereas Realism still used metonymy as a predominant approach to theatre, Modernism tended to exploit metaphor instead. Drama and the theatre of ideas and of the model situation was an attempt to preserve and update the genre: a secluded and hostile setting with characters that had to enter mutual relations by chance produced forced dialogues that reflected the emotions of anxiety and hostility. These elements respected genre requirements, and enabled playwrights to preserve dramatic characters, plot, conflict, tension and other dramatic categories. Directors of the Slovak National Theatre usually favoured one style; for example, among the first generation of Slovak directors, Ján Borodáč (1892–1964) adhered to Realism even with plays that would enable him to experiment; Ján Jamnický (1908–1972) became famous for his staging of lyrical drama that enabled him to apply his concept of a stage metaphor; Ferdinand Hoffmann (1908–1966) was considered a Modernist influenced by Expressionism in theatre.¹⁸ Among Czech directors of the Slovak National Theatre who significantly contributed to the development of Slovak theatre culture in the 1920s and 1930s, we can mention, for example, Vilém Táborský, Bedřich Jeřábek, Josef Hurt, Václav Jiříkovský, Viktor Šulc, and Drahoš Želenský.

In conclusion, the 1920s witnessed the emergence of the Slovak National Theatre as a cultural institution that was supposed to confirm the identity and culture of an emerging nation. The emancipation process shows some similarities with the emancipation of the Slovak language in the 19th century. The 1930s asserted that the institution could be legitimately called “theatre”

¹⁸ Their role in culture during the Slovak Republic was questioned after 1945, and all three of them left the Slovak National Theatre; Borodáč was sent to revive the theatre in Košice, a town ceded to Hungary after the First Vienna Arbitration of 1938; Jamnický already disagreed with the artistic profile of the Slovak National Theatre around 1944, and left it; he became involved in film, radio and teaching instead; Hoffmann emigrated to Italy in 1945, and later to Argentina. Besides being a director, Hoffmann was also a dramaturge of the Slovak National Theatre in the first years of the Slovak Republic (1939–1941); censors interfered in the case of several plays directed by him (see footnote 19); instead of perhaps being dismissed, he was promoted to the head of the cultural section of the Propaganda Office (1941–1945).

with the attribute of being “Slovak” (rather than “Czech” or “Czechoslovak.”) Between 1939 and 1945, the Slovak National Theatre did not have to assert its legitimacy in terms of *national theatre* since the Slovaks acquired a national state and the arts caught up with modern trends. However, due to the historical circumstances of the regime, the Slovak National Theatre again balanced its function as an artistic and cultural institution with the limitations of a totalitarian society: it again mirrored situations and languages heard in the streets. It was a venue both for ceremonies of the regime and for expressing freedom. However, in conditions of censorship and state supervision, freedom was found more likely in escapism rather than in protest.¹⁹

The development of the professional theatre in Slovakia was closely related to historical and political changes in the 20th century. The Czechoslovak Republic facilitated the foundation of the professional theatre after 1918, and the Slovak National Theatre asserted a Czechoslovak (Slovak) segment in Bratislava. The rise of the Slovak Republic in 1939 coincided with the period of artistic blossoming of the professional theatre, but it was blemished by political circumstances. A network of professional theatres created in Slovakia after 1948 helped the regime to spread Communist cultural policy but it also developed culture outside Bratislava. The idea of building a new Slovak National Theatre was frequently proposed; eventually in the 1980s a new project was approved, but the institution only moved into its new building in 2007, almost twenty years after the end of Communism and almost fifteen years after Slovakia’s independence.²⁰ Like the old theatre (still used for some performances) in the historic centre, the new building, which adjoins a large shopping centre facing the Danube, is an architectural palimpsest written in two different regimes. This temporal coincidence may help to smooth the discontinuity between the pre-1989 and post-1989 periods.

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¹⁹ Among performances cancelled due to censorship after 1939, we can mention J. Barč-Ivan’s play *Diktátor* (Dictator), which had obvious implications for the political situation. A satire on achievers in a new regime had to be softened in another of Barč-Ivan’s plays, his comedy *Mastný hrniec* (Greasy Pot) premiered in 1940. A play on a Slovak national hero, the robber Jánošík, written by M. Rázusová-Martáková and premiered in 1941, was also modified since it expressed ideas about freedom and the struggle against oppression. All these plays were directed by F. Hoffmann.

²⁰ Since 1 January, 1993, the Czech and Slovak Republics have been the successors of the Czechoslovak (Czecho-Slovak Republic/Czechoslovak Federative) Republic.

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