2 The Symbolic World of 1867
Self-Representation of the Dual Monarchy in Hungary

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Why is it important for a political system to feature in its citizens’ consciousness? What purposes can the self-representation of states and empires serve? And what consequences may it entail if some kind of bond is not formed in people with political institutions, which often operate intricately and at a distance, yet influence their lives?

The social sciences already took note of the significance of power symbols quite a long time ago. As a result, interest has reached international historical research of symbols, which it studied in the past only in connection with ancient societies and earlier historical eras. So symbols and rituals have started to be researched in relation to modern politics and the formation of new politicizing techniques.

The long 19th century had a prominent role in the continuous transformation of the world of politics. This century is usually characterized by the era of national awakening and parallel nation building, as well as the age of liberalism which, sometimes with revolutions, sometimes with small steps, brought equality before the law in a number of countries and involved an increasing number of people in the world of politics. It did all this mainly in the public spaces of rapidly developing large cities and via the new channels of communication. For that very reason, the era of masses and mass media commenced at that time. Naturally, it was also the age of empires, with the spectacular formation of great powers and worldwide conflicts.

The various developments listed here are, however, most certainly common in that the symbolic politicizing played an increased role in them, since the newly formed nations, states, empires or traditional communities which wanted to emphasize their separatism, as well as the old dynasties which wanted to preserve their power amidst the changes, all felt the need to let the outside world know about their existence and intentions via symbols. To do that they employed varied means and forums. Thus political symbols not only represented the spectacular components of a colorful surface embracing a political decision or action (their use is not a simple communication ploy), they were also symbols and procedures which established or reinforced identity and therefore ensured legitimacy. They

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could increase social confidence in the institutions of power and the leaders, could express integration, strengthen social cohesion and in the same way they could serve separation or signal isolation. "No government can exist without ceremonies and rituals, however far they may be from what can be referred to as magic and mystical. A government act cannot be established without stories, signs and symbols, which indicate and reinforce the government’s legitimacy in a thousand unpronounced ways."

In the knowledge of all of this, what can be said about the self-representation of a new political construction, Dualism and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which was realized via symbols? Did the elites who got into power endeavor, at all and if so how, to represent this political system in some way for the population of the Monarchy? A number of researchers have examined the operation of imperial integration and patriotism, and its symbolic relevance in connection with the provinces of Austria, yet only a few have done so in relation to the Hungarian Kingdom.

State Insignia in the Labyrinths of Constitutional Debates

From the beginning there was no agreement concerning the evaluation of the political system formed with the Settlement of 1867, yet by the turn of the century the until then minimum consensus about the interpretation of the legal documents which represented the basis of the compromise broke up, due to the Hungarian state doctrine becoming dominant and to current political aims. In addition the legal Hungarian and German texts of the Settlement differed in some places, which presented a pretext for long political and constitutional debates among Hungarian and Austrian politicians, as well as legal experts, about the “correct” interpretation of the compromise. For example, in contrast with the earlier conception and the present standpoint of history, constitutional lawyer, Ödön Polner described the constitutional connection between Austria and Hungary as “a relationship similar to a personal union” at the turn of the century. Therefore he thought that in reality there was no need for a common system of state symbols: “Since Hungary and Austria are not a joint state, there is neither a common state power, so nor can the two states have a common ensign, a common coat of arms or a common flag.” Naturally this quotation is merely a random example and does not reflect the viewpoint of the entire scholarly life, yet it renders well the constitutional concept, which intensified by the turn of the century, asserting the sovereign rights of the Hungarian state.

At the same time a debate unfolded about the interpretation of the constitutional system in Austria. However, it is not surprising that Cisleithanian legal experts conferred mainly about the indivisible constitutional law of the whole empire and, setting out from that, they rejected any attempt which aimed to express the parity of the two halves of
the Monarchy by state symbols. In reality there were current political debates beyond the animating theoretical discourse and thus hardly any objective standpoints can be found among the definitional attempts. The constitutional skirmishes can rather be evaluated as a crisis symptom, which indicated that the various political forces were no longer willing to cooperate.

Increasingly symbolic issues were involved in the focus of these protracted constitutional disputes, since the opposition was not able to enforce its essential political program within the rigid party system. Therefore it often clung to symbolic matters, the so-called national demands, in order to retain its popularity and its own image. Hence the issue of the coat of arms and the flag could attract special political attention at the beginning of the 20th century, yet at the same time it faithfully reflected the complicated constitutional structure of the Monarchy.

For the most part accepting Gyula Andrássy’s proposals, in 1868 Franz Joseph regulated by decree the official designation of the new state formation, as well as his own titles in view of the changed constitutional circumstance. From then on, for example, the name “Austro-Hungarian Monarchy” and the titles “Emperor of Austria and Apostolic King of Hungary” or, in a shorter version, “His Majesty, Emperor and King” or “His Imperial and Apostolic Royal Majesty” had to be used in international treaties.

Andrássy demonstrated rather much political and “linguistic ingenuity” in his submission written to the monarch and his answers to the opposition. While he argued for the designation of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy by expressing that the title “Austria and Hungary” proposed by many on the Hungarian side, “seems dangerous because in a final analysis it would lead to the relationship in which Sweden and Norway are with each other,” namely the conjunction and may easily refer to a personal union, while in his opinion the conjunction and in the regal title indicates the relatedness of the two state formations to foreign countries, as well as asserts the principle of parity laid down in the law of the Settlement, but it also carefully guards Hungary’s self-determination.

Nevertheless, the name “Austria” referring to the entire Monarchy was still used for a long time (for example, in certain maps and textbooks). Furthermore, the texts of some international treaties did not fully comply with the royal decree of 1868, and for a long time the German names of the common ministries still included the legally objectionable word “empire” (Reich), instead of the adjectives “imperial and royal” (kaiserlich und königlich).

Although the opposition remarked on the mistakes at the beginning of Dualism, Andrássy cited the law and the common foreign minister’s declaration clarifying the spheres of authority as guarantees, and he tried to present the incorrect usage as a temporary problem, which could not hinder the working of the system. Although everyone knew about the
existence of the problems and they appeared in interpellations from time
to time, they were not considered as principal issues in Hungarian poli-
tical life until the turn of the century. With regard to operating the
complex constitutional system, there was a consensus among the actors of
Hungarian and Austrian political life. The university professor of con-
stitutional law Károly Kmety called the two and a half decades following
the Settlement as a “pseudo 67” period retrospectively from the turn of
the century. In his opinion subsequent governments gradually departed
from the strictly defined text of the fundamental laws and, while they
developed the country, they debased the constitutional structure with
various tacit concessions and codificational inattention. Kmety regarded
his statement especially true in relation to the regulation of state symbols.

Following the change of system, the Austrian and Hungarian national
colors (red-white-red and red-white-green) were collectively used on the
Monarchy’s commercial ships according to Article VI of the customs and
trade union concluded in 1867. The same flags were hoisted on the
buildings of Austro-Hungarian consulates, while three flags flew in
principle on the façades of embassies: the dynasty’s (this time black and
yellow) and the colors of the two halves of the Empire. At the same
time, the opposition mentioned on several occasions that, according to its
information, certain foreign representations deviated from that practice
and did not fly the Hungarian colors.

Nevertheless, the Monarchy’s coats of arms were not changed after
1867. Essentially, a version of the official medium common coat of arms
introduced after the establishment of the Austrian Empire in 1804, which
was shaped in 1836 and somewhat modified in 1866, was used during
almost the entire time of Dualism. Franz Joseph sanctioned the laws of
1867 with the escutcheoned seal containing the shield joining the pro-
vincial coats of arms placed on the chest of the double-headed eagle
adorned with the imperial crown. Thus the name of the state formation
was renewed in 1868, but the coat of arms symbolizing it continued to
have the attributes of a bygone age: the Hungarian Kingdom which was
merged in the Empire only appeared on an identical rank with the other
provinces. Although the heraldic and political debates on harmonization
already began following the Settlement in order to create a con-
stitutionally precise coat of arms, negotiations made rather little progress;
moreover, they stopped for a long period of time.

Arguably, the manifesto issued in January 1892 by the National Party,
which was founded by Albert Apponyi and accepted the Settlement, yet
criticized the government’s policy, raised the theme to the political agenda.
According to the party program, the only politics which could be correct
was one “which asserts the national content of the Settlement, which con-
vinces the Hungarian nation of the fact that every factor in this Monarchy
is imbued with the consciousness of our state self-determination without
any afterthought.” Similarly, this nationally spirited politics would be able
to do away with distrust of the Habsburgs. Settling the issue of the coat of arms was also included in the party’s concrete demands, stipulating: “They carefully avoid denoting Hungary as an independent state in the coats of arms and ensigns used by the common institutions; foreign states are not aware of it; our state self-determination is only for domestic use, its recognition stops at the Leitha.” This manifesto is another proof of the tactics with which oppositional forces tried to appropriate the identity political issues and forcefully represent them in public. Presumably it was what István Tisza realized when he emphatically included the regulation of constitutional symbols in his government program announced in 1903. 

So by the beginning of the 20th century there was an agreement between the government and its opposition with respect to the official representation of the Hungarian state being rather deficient, both within the structure and outside the country. But while the government thought it could be resolved by meticulously working out the common system of symbols, the opposition, referring to the fundamental laws of 1867, demanded the emphatic representation of independent national ensigns. To them new common symbols extrapolated the horror of only making the constitutional connections closer. “If the nation voluntarily consents to accepting the common ensign and flag, it will be a giant step towards the politics of merging and it is the manifestation of a unified Austrian empire,” was how a radical MP reacted to the government program.

The ideas of the radical opposition were perhaps the most exhaustively summarized by the already quoted Károly Kmety, professor of law at Budapest University, who notably was also an MP for the Independence and ’48 Party from 1905.

His pamphlet starts from the principal statement that in the sense of the Settlement “there is nothing and no one else in the Monarchy than the two independent states. There is no other power than the principal authority of the two states,” i.e. the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy does not have (as a third) an independent statehood, it is not an independent legal entity. For precisely this consideration, the Monarchy has no common citizens, moreover it is senseless to talk about its territory and borders with regard to constitutional system, while common symbols must be reduced to the most required degree stipulated by the fundamental laws: “A new common matter or a new common institution more dangerous in its effect than a common Austro–Hungarian coat of arms and a flag cannot be envisioned.” That was because the fundamental laws of 1867 hardly dealt with this issue, thus this range of problems did not qualify as a common affair. Instead of their augmentation, a consistent representation of national symbols was required on both the diplomatic buildings and in the units of “all the army” (the adjective “common” must be avoided), as well as on the occasions of royal ceremonies. Kmety proposed the joint appearance of the heraldically precise Hungarian coat of arms and the national flag with the Austrian coat of arms and flag to
be created instead of the common insignia. This approach fairly sufficiently indicated the community, therefore its further emphasis was not needed. According to him the use of the Habsburg dynasty coat of arms and flag in state matters was also against constitutional law; therefore he regarded the use of these insignia correct only in the case of the unofficial programs of the monarch and his family members. So according to his concept, if Franz Joseph took part in something as the Hungarian king, it would be compulsory to use the Hungarian colors exclusively (for example in the Royal Palace in Buda) and if a ceremony were to be held in a common matter (for example when receiving delegations in Austria) the Hungarian and Austrian flags should fly next to each other.\(^\text{17}\)

As a matter of course, he deals with the use of the flag by the army most extensively. He hastens to make it clear that he considers that the government party was mistaken when it celebrated the royal decree of 1889 as a triumph, when it introduced the designation of “imperial and royal” (k. u. k.) army.\(^\text{18}\) The latter is not included in the laws of Settlement, yet it overshadows the expression “Hungarian army” codified in 1867.\(^\text{19}\) In his concept, the army should be reorganized in a dualist manner, by which Austrian and Hungarian national units would be established. Only the Hungarian national colors and ensigns may be allowed for the Hungarian troops. He reasoned that this change would increase the fighting spirit of the troops. He thought the navy alone presented a problem since there was no unit consisting of Hungarian national sailors. Until such were set up, he would have introduced the simultaneous use of the Austrian and Hungarian flags. Kmety did not conceal the political purpose of his proposal:

If the Hungarian troops of the whole army, the authorities and institutes are ornamented with the Hungarian flag and the coat of arms symbolizing the statehood of Saint Stephen’s realm, with overwhelming force and rapidly they will all be imbued with the awareness that they belong to the Hungarian state, namely they will be imbued with the Hungarian state doctrine and feeling.\(^\text{20}\)

Besides increasing national feeling, the change proposed by him in the politics of symbols could also be an explicit message for the “nationality agitation.” It is important to emphasize that Kmety’s pamphlet was published in the same year when, in his army order issued after a large-scale military exercise in Galicia, Franz Joseph expressed his adherence to his regalia, and that he stood by the unity of the common army which guarantees the protection of all “tribal groups” (Volksstammes) in the Monarchy (Armeebefehl von Chlapy). The sovereign meant these sentences as a definite response to all those who strove to unilaterally loosen the internal stability of the army.\(^\text{21}\)
The dissolution of the governing Liberal Party and the opposition getting to power delayed the resolution of the issue of the flag and the coat of arms by nearly a decade. The latter was not able to realize its national program including in the field of symbolic politics, and yet they had no interest in working out the common symbols of the Monarchy. In the end, only after the fall of the opposition and the victory of the National Party of Work headed by István Tisza, a committee of Austrian and Hungarian experts as well as government officials was set up in 1912 to bring the different constitutional and heraldic ideas to a common denominator. The sources show that it was only due to Premier István Tisza’s perseverance and ultimately to the war situation that an agreement was reached in autumn 1915. Tisza thought that the symbols could increase the fighting morale and the awareness of affinity between communities of different sizes: “I have been engaged in this issue for a very long time, being aware of how much these matters mean for the popular mind.” Amidst the world war efforts, he managed to convey his conviction to the very old sovereign, who declared that he would like to settle the issue comprehensively. In the spirit of dualism and parity Tisza succeeded in making Franz Joseph accept that the double-headed eagle would be included exclusively in the coat of arms of the Austrian imperial half, as well as that the Hungarian coat of arms and the national colors would appear on the common regalia on an equal rank. Austrian politicians and legal experts practically faced accomplished facts and could only implement minor changes to the concept. István Tisza himself clarified the size of the new military flags and the precise place of their border of triangles in national colors with the foreign minister of the Monarchy – all this amidst the military and political events of the second year of the World War I.

The royal manuscript issued on 11 October 1915 and the following government decree in the end stipulated regulations “in the subject of the coat of arms for the use of the common institutions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.” On some five pages, the decree set forth the constitutionally precise description of the so-called medium common coat of arms and the simplified lesser common coat of arms of the common institutions – not the whole of the Monarchy, but merely the common organs of the two states. In the medium common coat of arms the crowned shield of the Austrian Empire and the Hungarian Kingdom was connected by the Habsburg dynastic coat of arms and the three most important orders the monarch awarded. The coats of arms were joined together by “indivisibiliter ac in-separabiliter,” the motto of Pragmatic Sanction as the underlying principle of the system of constitutional law established in 1867.

In his military command for the navy and the fleet issued on the same day, the monarch decreed the transformation of the ensigns of the army that had been awaited for decades. From then on, one side of the military flags had to bear the lesser common coat of arms while the other side had...
to represent the monarch’s initials, as well as the imperial and royal crowns. The prime color of the flag became white instead of the earlier yellow and was bordered with alternating black and yellow, as well as red, white and green triangles. The monarch ordained only the gradual replacement of the flags. However, in the case of warships, differently and in a way that the opposition disapproved of, he did not authorize the Hungarian tricolor and instead the “ancient Hungarian red and white coat of arms” was represented besides the dynastic coat of arms (visually it represented a negligible change).

In the knowledge of the antecedents, it is not surprising that the symbolic issues did not come to rest. That was partly due to the fact that Croatian politicians justly raised the concern that their national symbols were not represented in the lesser common coat of arms, despite their emphatic constitutional standing. By passing Law XV of 1916 the Hungarian parliament settled the issue by making room for the Croatian colors on the Hungarian crest in the lesser common coat of arms. Yet the constitutional controversy in the guise of scholarship continued in the columns of Austrian and Hungarian journals, since the success of István Tisza’s action surprised the majority of Austrian lawyers of constitutional law and received the regal signature of October 1915 accompanied by incomprehension.

The imperial manuscript about the matter of the coat of arms was issued, but no one understands why it had to happen. In my opinion it bears little significance from the aspect of state law. Austria, which was thus established officially, remains only the setting of kingdoms and countries involved in the February constitution. I doubt that the Hungarian gentlemen will enthusiastically receive the dual flag, which will too often be blown by the wind to their eye with the double-headed eagle on one side. The whole matter is no more than a burst semi-official bubble.

Thus wrote Austrian constitutional lawyer and politician Joseph Redlich in his diary. The dispute unfolded about the constitutional interpretation of the words referring to the indivisible and inseparable joint possession uniting the coats of arms and the entire Pragmatic Sanction in a broader sense. Without presenting the dispute in more detail, it must be remarked that the principle of indivisibility and inseparability in the Austrian conception in effect excluded the existence of statehoods independent of the Monarchy. Accordingly, ceremonies in civil and military schools commemorated the bicentenary of the issue of the imperial decrees of 1713 regulating the hereditary order of the Cisleithanian provinces in the spirit of Gesamtstaatsidee. As a matter of fact, the common coat of arms created by 1915 with its symbolism of parity questioned this very conception. That was exactly the reason why the
Austrian professors of public law tried to lessen the significance of the change on the one hand, while, on the other, they tried to maintain the concept of the unified empire by clinging to the text on the ribbon placed underneath the coat of arms.

In response, the Hungarian government set up a professional body whose task would have been to compile a major work by 1923 for the bicentenary of the hereditary treaty enacted by Hungarian legislation – which declared the unaltered preservation of Hungary’s constitutional standing – to counterpoise the Austrian interpretation. The committee actually began collecting foreign and Hungarian archival sources, and the work involved leading Hungarian historians and constitutional lawyers, as well as prominent representatives of the young generation of the era. Yet the events of the World War I and the collapse of the Monarchy prevented the accomplishment of the response publication.27

Returning to the question of the coat of arms, there were some Hungarian scholars who, in response to the Austrian criticism, conditionally admitted that the new coat of arms referred to rather a relationship of personal union, yet a more precise representation of the relationship of the common cause would be only “exaggerated detailing,” in addition it would obscure the dualism of parity and the sovereignty of the two states.28 In his response addressed to his Austrian colleagues, member of the Academy Gyula Wlassics, an active participant in the constitutional debates, proposed that by taking cognizance of the regal decision, the joint task instead of further scientific skirmishes was to “find the resource in the loyal recognition of the legal independence of the two states [...].” The aim could be to create some kind of feeling of belonging together: “The emotional harmony between Austria and Hungary should be so heartfelt for this harmony to develop to a constant characteristic feature of the people’s mind in the two states.” And in his writing of 1916 he stipulated his view that “to achieve it, rather too much remonstration here and over the Leitha must be defeated in school textbooks and constitutional literature, from small villages to governments and parliaments.”29

The Representation of Institutions of the Dual Monarchy

Delegations

When the latest monographies about the Dual Monarchy reason by the gradual formation of a common monarchical consciousness, they tend to mention the k. u. k. army and bureaucracy as examples.30 Yet the center of institutions of power symbolizing the new political system continued to be situated mainly in Vienna, moreover in imperial buildings which had generally been used for governmental purposes. So the change was noticeable in the inscriptions at most. The dualist system, however, did not even leave that much mark in Budapest. After all, the Hungarian capital, which rose to the
same constitutional rank as Vienna, was busy with developing national state representation at the turn of the century by constructing the monumental palace of parliament and the new buildings of the other national ministries. In effect, only the Austrian delegation’s three-story mansion completed in 1894 and the headquarters of the Austro–Hungarian Bank in Hungary became visible from among the common institutions. Delegations were genuine “inventions” of the compromising constitutional system. Law XII of 1867 stipulated that every other year the Hungarian capital would host the conference of the parliamentary delegation of 60 members each, which sanctioned the Monarchy’s common budget. However, the Austrian and the Hungarian committees conferred strictly separately – to avoid even the appearance of some kind of joint legislation – and they were far from each other even geographically: as a general rule the Hungarians met in the National Museum, while the Austrian delegates gathered in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, then rented the halls of the Hotel Hungária as a temporary solution. The unworthy condition from the aspect of representing the constitutional community was in the end resolved by the Austrian party having its own mansion built at 17 Akadémia Street in Budapest at the turn of the century. Stenographers, representatives of the press and catering staff were accommodated here during the negotiations. Even this building turned out to be small, but it was not extended. After 1903, the Hungarian delegation held its meetings in the new parliament building.

It became clear very soon that the principles of law and the practical aspects of politics must be harmonized, because some disputed or delicate (military, budgetary) issues could not be resolved by merely brief exchanges of messages. Therefore, informal meetings of the Austrian and Hungarian delegates were necessary. Tensions were usually settled over dinners of a narrow circle where only the most important members of the delegations were invited. Besides, however, all the members of the two delegations also got together. Joint lunches and dinners, as well as cultural events (e.g. a visit to the opera or theatre, a cruise on the Danube) served direct political purposes, while at the same time they aimed at dissolving mutual distrust, and last but not least they presented an occasion whereby the Hungarian politicians aimed to reaffirm and demonstrate the nature of Budapest as an imperial capital in the spirit of dualist parity. All this could, of course, succeed temporarily: the delegations as well as the common ministers and their officials moved from Vienna to the Hungarian capital only for a few weeks. Their activity mostly remained hidden from citizens.

**Common Bank and Money**

The Austro–Hungarian Bank began its operation based on parity two years after the expiry of the Austrian bank monopoly in 1878. The financial institution was headed by the governor, who was appointed by
the monarch on the recommendation of the Austrian and Hungarian ministers of finance. The office of governor was filled by a Hungarian and an Austrian citizen alternately. A Hungarian was first appointed to head the bank in 1892. Until the turn of the century the Hungarian center of the bank operated in József Square in Budapest, but its imposing headquarters to the design of Ignác Alpár was built in Szabadság Square in 1905. The capital intended the square to be the new center of Hungarian financial life, since the building of the Stock Exchange as well as the headquarters of several banks and corporations were situated there. The branches of the Austro-Hungarian Bank represented the common state established with the Settlement for the provincial population. Up to the start of World War I the bank opened branches, mostly new building investments, in 42 Hungarian towns.34

The legal tender issued by the Austro-Hungarian Bank was identical in both halves of the Empire. The coins depicted Franz Joseph’s regal profile, as well as the repeatedly corrected Hungarian lesser common coat of arms minted in the Hungarian Kingdom, while the lesser common coat of arms of the Austrian Empire was represented on coins in Austria. Unlike on coins, the dual state system was reflected on the format of banknotes. Their appearance was identical on both sides of the Leitha, with Hungarian inscription on one side and the corresponding German words on the other. Law XXV of 1878 stipulated that the “coat of arms of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy” had to be represented on banknotes. As has already been discussed at length, abiding by this provision met with constitutional and heraldic difficulties and thus its implementation was suspended (cf. Law XIII of 1880). That was the reason why before the turn of the century banknotes did not have the state insignia, only the profile of the sovereign. In the case of the korona (crown), the currency that replaced the forint (gulden) in 1892, one side of the banknotes had the imperial lesser common coat of arms and the other depicted the Hungarian medium common coat of arms (nevertheless, the portrait of the monarch disappeared). It can also be seen from this time that besides the German, the value of the given denomination was indicated in the languages of all the ethnicities who lived in the imperial provinces; however, the Hungarian banknote side remained monolingual.

The “All the Army”

The law stipulating the constitutional compromise (Law XII of 1867) recognized the monarch’s exclusive right (i.e. it did not require ministerial endorsement) to the army’s “unified leadership, command and internal organization” (§ 11), namely Franz Joseph as supreme warlord held all authority over the regulation, administration and operative leadership of the common military force. The controlling role of the Hungarian parliament was essentially limited to determining the operational framework
conditions, namely the degree of military expenses, as well as the size of the annual number of recruits and the length of the period of service. However, the Hungarian political leadership required long negotiations to be able to achieve the establishment of the Hungarian army which became “a supplementary part of all the army,” whose costs were borne by the Hungarian state.

Law XL of 1868 regulating the country’s defense system stipulated the principle of general and personal compulsory military service, and obliged men who were 20 years of age or over to be subject to conscription of three, later two years and a further service in reserve of seven years in the collective army. German was the language of command and service across the regiments of the common army, but it was used only as the language of administration and in the case of a few dozen commands in the regiments stationed in the territory of the Hungarian Kingdom. However, in everyday contacts if the number of soldiers belonging to the same ethnicity reached 20% of the regiment’s military personnel, their language could be used, because that was how they tried to make the practical training of soldiers as effective as possible. In multinational Hungary it was not rare to have three or four different ethnicities and languages within a regiment. At the same time, it also occurred especially in regiments conscripted in Transylvania that, besides the compulsory German, only the mother tongue of a non-Hungarian ethnicity (characteristically Romanian) could be officially used in the barracks in the territory of the Hungarian Kingdom, so the language of the state could not.

As Franz Joseph often made it clear over the decades of Dualism, he and those around him regarded the common army as a military body which was supra-national, loyal to the dynasty and serving the defense of the whole Empire, whose uniform spirit and strength could not be broken by any separatism. In contrast, the Hungarian opposition spoke of the common army as an alien body and a remnant of Absolutism.

The opposition followed by a group of Hungarian legal experts questioned the monarch’s military royal prerogatives and, emphasizing the principle of parity, wished to strengthen the national character of the army in the territory of the Hungarian Kingdom, for example with the compulsory use of Hungarian and the use of the national colors. In their opinion, the Settlement was not a bilateral contract but a law which could be modified unilaterally, with the will of the parliamentary majority. Moreover, the legally unconfined legislature possessed the entire sovereignty together with the king, which meant the denial of the monarch’s exclusive (reserved) rights. Thus they saw in Law XII of 1867 the model of parliamentary government instead of constitutional monarchy. In effect, the text of the Settlement became finally uncertain at that time. The word “state” increasingly often appeared in politicians’ speeches and legal texts, which expressed the need for supremacy and sovereignty of Magyars in a multinational empire.
This sharp conceptual difference was able to paralyze the operation of the dualist political system based on compromises for long periods. At the turn of the century the parliaments in Budapest and Vienna were equally, though for different reasons, resounding with the protest and scandal-generating politics of the anti-government forces. All this significantly delayed the reforms concerning the development of the army, which the other European great powers preparing for the war had already introduced.

In intense political periods several incidents took place between the officers of the common army and pro-opposition journalists, university students and politicians, for example in connection with a military wreath laying, a provocative newspaper article or playing the imperial anthem. The press tended to enlarge and distend these instances to a scandal. They excited public opinion, which was susceptible to sensation and imbued with national feeling for long weeks. Source information seems to show that similar conflicts became more frequent from the beginning of the 1880s. The opinion about the common army was also damaged by the fact that the government employed the k. u. k. corps to reinstitute public order in the case of larger demonstrations or riots, so it was not the Hungarian army (honvédsg) which clashed with the citizens.

Nevertheless, if we do not only pay attention to the scandals, which still must be regarded as singular events despite their number over the five decades of Dualism, but also to the everyday coexistence of civil society and the army, the emerging picture is more nuanced.

Besides the banknotes, the common army was certainly clearly present in the population's life. Tens of thousands of young men were annually drafted from the territory of the Hungarian Kingdom to be trained as a result of compulsory conscription and to go through a socializing process lasting three and later two years. During that time they gained a sense of duty, experienced the idea of camaraderie and became familiar with the feeling of imperial togetherness in a multilingual army with many religions. This was certainly and especially true for the officer corps, among whom the ratio of Hungarian ethnicity (Magyar) showed a slight increase: official statistics show that the ratio of Hungarian officers did not reach 8% at the end of the 19th century, while it already approached 11% at the beginning of the 1910s. At the same time, the proportion of Hungarians among reserve officers was around 24% at the turn of the century (secondary school qualification, voluntary service of one year and a successful reserve officer’s examination were preconditions).

Due to the changes that came into force from the beginning of 1883, the regiments had permanent military recruitment districts and they were more often stationed in their area of recruitment. Furthermore, soldiers from Hungary could only be recruited for regiments in Hungary, and the military leadership strove to station them within the borders of the Hungarian Kingdom. Although the opportunity to get to know the Monarchy decreased as an impact of the changes, at the same time the measure reduced
the operational costs of the army, as well as improving relations between the regiments and the local population, since a more lasting relationship could be formed between the soldiers and a given place, in addition to the rank and file of a regiment who came from that region.40

The living conditions (salaries, housing) of the common army’s officer corps improved gradually over the decades following the Settlement and their social prestige increased; as mentioned before, an increasing number of men found this occupation attractive temporarily or for life. The fact that 30–40% of active officers married reflects that, and having a family advanced their adaptation to local society.41

Until now Hungarian historical scholarship has not paid special attention to the associations which were founded by the retired members of the common army (hadastyánok). The aim of these veteran organizations was fundamentally self-assistance (providing financial support in cases of sickness or death), but the fundamental rules emphatically included cherishing loyalty to the monarch and the feeling of camaraderie.

The aim of the association is to spread and cherish an honest spirit which enthuses the imperial and royal common army, as well as the military virtues every veteran knows well, such as loyalty and devotion to the king and country, honesty, integrity and respect for the superiors and the law; comradely love and agreement, order, moderation and precision in fulfilling duties, etc. By cherishing these virtues and attributes diligently a veteran will become and remain a useful member of society.

Thus stipulated the rules of the Vas County association.42 “To cultivate and spread love of the king and country between army veterans who were in service and citizens,” announced the rulebook of the municipal association of veterans.43

An article published in the paper of the Budapest association of veterans is about the effect the army had on socialization and forming self-consciousness, parallel identities, i.e. a community of comrades and the possibility of forming a bond with the local and the larger homeland:

Once a veteran is retired from actual service and he and his comrades join the camp of veterans, he will experience an important metamorphosis that is essential for all his life. He was exclusively the citizen of the Hungarian state before his actual military service. When he joined the service the cause of the honor of the flag occupied the chief place in his bosom and he became a champion serving the entire Monarchy equally. In whose life would it not be an important momentum, who could not have felt the change that occurred in his body and spirit as a result of this great event? Then after a long period, he leaves his champion’s uniform behind and takes his place
again among his companions of civil occupation, among whom he feels himself the son of a smaller homeland and devotion to the locality rises in his soul again – the love of homeland. This is the second great change in a soldier’s life, which makes him a civilian again. But vicissitudes, joy and pain he experienced in service under peace and war linked him with the sons of Mars so much that he is no longer able to obliterate the memories of the experienced events from his memory.\textsuperscript{44}

At the same time, the boundaries of belonging together in the Monarchy and loyalty to the larger homeland are clearly indicated by the need for organizing in an independent and national framework, which was expressed in their papers published in Hungarian and German: “In the past we served our common prince as loyally and with all our heart as our Austrian comrades did, so we are entitled to bear our own sorrow and joy independently and advance our well-being independently. However, in no way should it be thought that we had antipathy towards our Austrian comrades and that we would not sympathize with their causes.”\textsuperscript{45}

The associations of veterans held marches with military music in the streets of villages and towns generally on 20 August and on Franz Joseph’s birthday, as well as on other occasions (for example ecclesiastical holidays and the anniversaries of the association). They collectively participated in funerals of their deceased comrades. They appeared at these events in uniforms made by the association and with the association’s flags. The more affluent veteran associations had memorial plaques minted and took part in the marches of the Cisleithanian associations.

Associations linked with the common army not only tended to have good relations with the civilian population, but their majority was also open towards the Hungarian soldiers of 1848. Many rulebooks stipulated that the soldiers of the War of Independence could join the associations.

The statistics of Hungarian associations compiled ten years after the establishment of the common army in 1878 lists altogether 13 veteran associations and gives the membership together with the supporting members a total of 3,015.\textsuperscript{46} However, their number and membership surely grew, since an increasing number of military personnel experienced the formative impact of the common army. At the same time, it is telling that according to the statistics, outside Budapest, veteran associations were set up in places to the west of the Danube with a more significant number of ethnic Germans. It is known that veteran associations functioned in the Bánát and Transylvania, yet it seems that regions between the Danube and the Tisza and beyond the Tisza remained untouched.

The thriving military culture and vibrant life of associations in Cisleithania – a minimum of 883 veteran associations were founded in the Austrian provinces in 1880 and their number at least tripled by the end of the era\textsuperscript{47} – spread only slowly to the territory of the Hungarian Kingdom,
and regiments and towns of mainly Hungarian ethnicity do not seem to have been susceptible to such self-organizations. Sources indicate that the papers of the associations soon ceased to exist due to the absence of a sufficient number of subscriptions; nor did the national association of veterans, the establishment of which had been urged on several occasions, see the light of day.

**On the International Scene**

With regard to the Monarchy’s self-representation, participation in world expositions is worth mentioning briefly. If the history of the exhibitions is examined more thoroughly, the intention to separate and the emphasis on Austria’s and Hungary’s independence can be detected. After the Settlement, both halves of the Monarchy exhibited in a neo-Renaissance hall jointly and without any national character only in 1878. Yet in 1873 Austria held the World Expo in Vienna independently, Hungary being invited together with the other foreign states. Hungary used the Paris World Expo of 1900 for representing national autonomy (“a strong racial character”) and the independent Hungarian state. The historical exhibition emphasizing the 1,000-year-old past expressed the need for European great power legitimacy. It is also interesting that with regard to the approaching 50th anniversary of the Settlement the plan for a Hungarian World Expo in 1917 was raised, which would have also proclaimed the country’s cultural and economic development, but paradoxically for the society it “could also prove that we are on the right way and it would not be reasonable to haphazardly change the constitutional fundament as some article of clothing from one day to the next.”

The participation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy’s competitors in the modern Olympic Games was rather similar. Hungary took part in the international sport contests with their gradually rising prestige from the beginning, in fact in its own national colors. Moreover, besides Austria, the Czechs also appeared independently, which clearly contradicted the constitutional situation. Later, Franz Joseph recognized the independence of the Hungarian Olympic Committee but not that of the Czechs.

The Olympics in Stockholm held in 1912, the last before the war, was the only exception. Since according to the Swedish alphabet Hungary (and Czech) would have been before Austria, on the pressure of Vienna and at the request of the organizers, “the Hungarian team marched at the opening after the Czechs, who followed Austria,” as the Hungarian Olympic Committee announced. “Otherwise it stressed its truly practiced independence gained at the previous Olympics in everything and insists on this as its right in the future.” At the declaration of the results a larger black and yellow flag and a smaller national flag were hoisted by the Swedish organizers, who themselves felt the importance of the symbolic matter, since the union of Sweden and Norway lasting nearly 100 years had
broken up just a few years before, in 1905. It cannot be known what the official representation would have been at the next Olympic Games because the World War I and then the dissolution of the Monarchy removed it from the agenda once and for all.

It must be remarked here that the legal integration of the empire’s peoples did not take place with the Settlement because, due to the emphasis on different constitutional concepts, no common citizenship was achieved and the constitutional status of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not arranged in a satisfactory manner: provincial domicile was created for them, but they were regarded as foreigners in the Monarchy, outside their homeland.

**Scholarly and Artistic Representation**

The book series *The Austro–Hungarian Monarchy in Word and Picture*, published on the initiative of heir apparent Rudolf, was intended to deepen the union of the Monarchy’s peoples and the consciousness of imperial patriotism being supra-national. In the spirit of this mentality, Franz Joseph decided to have the income from the series of volumes spent on the new building of the Monarchy’s institute for training diplomats, the Consular Academy. “The insight into the merits and peculiarities of each of the ethnographic groups and their mutual and material dependencies on one another that will be portrayed in such a study as this shall substantially fortify the feeling of solidarity, which shall further unite all the peoples of our Fatherland,” wrote Crown Prince Rudolf in the introduction of *Kronprinzenwerk*. The illustration opening the first volume was designed to reflect this idea. The engraving, where the authors dedicated their work to Franz Joseph, depicted the allegory of Austria and Hungaria featuring the imperial and royal crowns with the monarch’s portrait over them. The outline of the two capitals could be detected in the background. The opening image in the Austrian edition was on a similar theme, yet the Danube winding through the two countries symbolized belonging together in place of the images of the capitals. The Hungarian edition with Mór Jókai as editor-in-chief was published from 1887 to 1901. The richly illustrated and substantial series of 21 volumes rather became a monument itself than a “truly popular” work.

The fundamental concept of the enterprise was accompanied by some disagreement, and by the turn of the century the circulation of the Hungarian volumes had significantly fallen.

We have discussed at length the lively and rather over politicized debates between Hungarian and Austrian scholars of constitutional law. However, while studying the entire constitutional structure of the Monarchy, although from an imperial angle, constituted a part of the curriculum of legal training in Austria, including fundamental information concerning the Hungarian Kingdom, it was omitted in Hungary for a
long time. In 1913 law school lecturer of Kassa/Košice, Olivér Eöttevényi Nagy, was the first to write a textbook in Hungarian about the operation of the political institutions in the Austrian Empire.\textsuperscript{55} He also initiated that Austrian public law as an optional subject would be included in all the institutes of Hungarian legal higher education. Yet he hurried to make it clear that he did not intend to diffuse the idea of the common Monarchy. His action derived far more from an independence approach: “We cannot battle against Austria without knowing their conditions and since especially the constitutional differences between us are sharp, it is exactly their constitutional situation which we cannot ignore. [...] Despite our relations, the connections between us and Austria are adversarial. What is better? If we do not or do know our opponent?”\textsuperscript{56}

At the same time, the Hungarian historian employed by the common Ministry of Finance, Lajos Thallóczy, decided to write a manual from practical considerations. Seeing the complicated operation of the constitutional system, he wrote an easy-to-understand guide for everyday use by Austrian and Hungarian diplomats to help them find their way in their jobs more easily. He especially wanted to show how political life interpreted and applied in practice the fundamental laws passed in 1867. His textbook, however, remained a manuscript.\textsuperscript{57}

Hungarian government politicians, who at the turn of the century encouraged Kalman Mikszáth to write a novel about constitutional law in order that readers would understand the constitutional system of the Settlement, were guided by a similar motive. However, the popular writer failed to complete the work that was basically intended for American and British readers: altogether three short chapters of The American Bride were written, which was in the end finished by his son during the months of the system’s collapse.\textsuperscript{58} The journey of an American lady and her brother through the Monarchy’s important locations presents the basic idea for the novel. They are actually looking for a Croatian MP who promised to marry his wealthy American fiancée and tricked her out of her money. First they travel to the session of the Sabor in Zagreb, then to the parliament in Budapest; yet they find the Croatian deputy at the session of the delegation in Vienna (namely, Croatian representatives participated in the Hungarian legislation and the delegation). The Americans, who are disappointed with the lack of a wedding, find happiness during a bear hunt in Transylvania. Due to a sprained ankle, they spend some time with a Szekler family, where they learn about the constitutional system of the Settlement in connection with a portrait of Ferenc Deák hanging on the wall. At the same time, both fall in love with a Magyar. The story ends with two weddings, both Americans settle in Hungary; moreover, the American man decides to obtain Hungarian citizenship and become an MP.

From the aspect of representing integration, Mór Jókai’s The Novel of the Next Century can be regarded as perhaps the most successful literary
work which “recreates a Habsburg myth by connecting it with a Hungarian national perspective.”

In the utopian novel published in 1872 the monarch of the Dual Monarchy with its center in Buda is Árpád Habsburg and in its parliament, which operates like clockwork, every ethnic group living in the Monarchy can speak up in its own language in the spirit of perfect equality.

Unlike with symbols of 1848/49, artists rather rarely chose to represent the Settlement or Austro–Hungarian coexistence as their subject matter. As a rule, the ruling couple and the coronation replaced the representation of the constitutional agreement. This can be mostly explained by the fact that the legal and political agreement that was formed at complicated and protracted negotiations can be depicted visually only with difficulty. Therefore, artists tended to connect it with portraying Ferenc Deák the “founding father” of the system and referring to the noble value of reconciliation with some kind of allegory.

As a rule, the motif of the handshake and/or two young human figures of a similar age aim to represent the Austro–Hungarian Settlement in these works. They have one point in common. Neither representation received an easily interpretable and fully visible central place in the artworks. They did not especially want to render the political construction based on parity in principle in Austria either; they far more wanted to reinforce the idea of the imperial uniform state in public works of art.

Further works of art which clearly express the idealism of the Settlement and the integration of the commonwealth would be difficult to list. Of course, the idea of reconciliation and Austro–Hungarian co-existence appeared in a concealed manner in other works, too: Liszt’s Hungarian Coronation Mass or the operetta The Gypsy Baron, created in cooperation by Jókai and Johann Strauss, are usually mentioned as such. Yet it is doubtful how far the indirect political message reached the audiences.

From the very outset, popular political cartoons of the period already depicted the common finances as a leaky barrel from which money was flowing out wastefully to the newly founded institutions and red-tape activities. The common affairs connecting the Monarchy were characterized by making two people with equally leaky shoes stand next to one another. By the turn of the century the image of an embracing couple suggesting trust in the Settlement was replaced by a cartoon depicting Austria and Hungary as a quarrelsome couple. Furthermore, an Austrian humorous magazine represented the relations between the two halves of the Monarchy in the figures of Cain and Abel.

**Franz Joseph as a Symbol**

Principally, the dynasty and its head, Franz Joseph, represented political integration for the peoples of the Monarchy. They could see him on cheap picture postcards, on coins and in sculpture. They saw his name in
school textbooks, as well as in street names and on memorial plaques. Most of all, the coronation in June 1867 made the broad masses of people realize the successful conclusion of the long negotiations about the Settlement. That was why it was especially important and of symbolic significance that since 1792 such a deed of constitutional law took place for the first time in the capital of the nation, and even such that the coronation ceremony was not merely limited to the Castle of Buda but was extended to the Pest side. As a result, a broad range of the capital’s population was able to participate in the change of system to a certain extent. For example, they could experience the king’s oath-taking, whereby he pledged to maintain the country’s laws and constitutional customs. Those who could not be present at the event were informed about the news of the political change and the spectacle of the coronation by illustrated papers, specially issued decorative albums or separately sold prints and colored photographs. Naturally, not only the ceremony itself was an outstanding manifestation of symbolic politics, so was the demonstrative withdrawal of the seven politicians of the opposition from the capital, who in this way indicated their protest against the political system being formed and ultimately against the monarch.

Research shows that loyalty to the sovereign was artificially maintained and fed for a long time after the Settlement, and that the court had to do much to develop the sovereign’s favorable image. Such a gesture was, for example, the regal offering of the coronation gift to assist the 1848 Hungarian soldiers and it was also helped by consciously putting Queen Elisabeth in the foreground in the years around the Settlement. Yet the “original sin” could not be entirely deleted from people’s memory, since Franz Joseph’s succession to the throne coincided with the events of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence, although there were attempts to reconcile the dynasty and the cult of 1848. For example, 11 April, the day of legal assent to the 1848 laws, was legally declared a holiday in Hungary on the 50th anniversary of Franz Joseph’s reign.

The different governments made unsuccessful attempts to create new community-shaping symbols to reinforce the existing political system (for example, celebrating 11 April soon faded); yet they could not identify with the symbols kept by the nation because of the written and unwritten rules of the compromise of 1867. For example, the initiatives which aimed at composing a Hungarian royal anthem to replace the “saddest song” the *Gott erhalte*, ran out of steam. Although several lyrics and tunes to praise the king were created at the request of singing societies, none of those became popular and thus the musical choreography of ceremonies held with the participation of representatives of imperial and royal institutes failed to be re-created.

Similar aversion adhered to the colors black and yellow: “For us black is mourning, yellow is bile. Black is the shroud of our homeland, yellow is servitude of our nation,” wrote *Budapesti Hírlap* (Budapest News) in
Accordingly, the opposition often objected to these colors at official ceremonies in Hungary and to the schwarz-gelb flag flying on the Royal Palace of Buda Castle. Yet because these colors indicated the monarch himself, they reluctantly acquiesced in seeing them. Nevertheless, Hungarian political thinking markedly separated the imperial from the royal functions (albeit they united in the person of Franz Joseph); therefore it insisted on the principle of the Hungarian royal household and the maintenance and lavish extension of the independent royal residence (note the reconstruction of the Gödöllő Palace and Buda Castle Palace).

Concerning this symbolic issue, the increasingly vehement Hungarian constitutional endeavors were successful in many instances at the turn of the century. Although the Hungarian political elite accepted that Franz Joseph did not maintain a permanent Hungarian royal household in Buda for economic and practical reasons – after all, he generally stayed in Hungary for only a few weeks – but relying on the unfolding doctrine of the Holy Crown, he did not renounce the principle of Hungarian household. In contrast, the attitude of the majority of Austrian constitutional lawyers was that the household was linked to the person of the sovereign, so it was indivisible (i.e. common) and therefore it was where the emperor and the king happened to stay. The Hungarians seem to have succeeded in convincing the monarch with regard to this issue, because in 1893 he issued a decree that only Hungarian court dignitaries may be on service by him at every constitutional act which concerned the countries of the Hungarian crown. The royal decree lists five such events: the coronation, opening and closing ceremony of the Hungarian Parliament, reception of the common delegations, national holidays and the oath-taking of bishops and state leaders in Hungary. Following this, the Hungarian Court of the Grand Marshal (Obersthofmarschallgericht) was established (Law XVI of 1909), the authority of which extended to the lawsuits of the members of the royal dynasty and their estates in Hungary.

A change in Franz Joseph’s image had undoubtedly taken place by the end of the 19th century. As early as in 1888 Mikszáth wrote how “following Kossuth, the king slowly managed to get access into the people’s heart,” which he thought was a sign of the gradually changing public sentiment. However, empathy with the old king, who was struck by family tragedies yet worked much, cannot be identified with an emotional commitment to the system. Although there certainly were examples of pictures of Franz Joseph and Lajos Kossuth hanging next to each other on the walls of peasants’ dwellings, what this phenomenon may have expressed is indicated by the saying collected by ethnographers: “Franz Joseph is dead, happiness is lost; Lajos Kossuth is dead, justice is lost!” This carried the meaning that the king was regarded the symbol of bygone welfare and security, while Kossuth was considered as the advocate of lost legality and freedom. So the saying presented paternalist provision
and the value system of national interests side by side. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning here that, although the erection of a dignified statue of Franz Joseph in the Hungarian capital was raised during his lifetime on several occasions and was decided by parliament recalling his memory after his death in Law I of 1917, it did not take place. As far as we know, only a single public statue of Franz Joseph was erected in Hungary, unlike in the Austrian provinces: it was included in the statues of rulers in the Millennium Monument in Budapest in 1906. Case studies concerning the other half of the Monarchy provide evidence that, while supranational institutions (e.g. the common army, the imperial bureaucracy and the Catholic Church) had transformed their political meaning by the turn of the century and were far less able to reinforce the values of state patriotism, the role of the monarch gradually changed. Franz Joseph became depoliticized and having gained space in folklore and being clothed in an increasingly religious robe, he embodied this ideal almost alone. However, the dynastic loyalty to him without much ado was compatible with strong patriotism (provincial/ethnic nationalism) relating to a narrow geographical territory, alongside an open aversion to other peoples of the Monarchy in some cases.72

Conclusion: Monarchical Consciousness and Nation Building in Hungary

Our extensive review can be summarized as follows: the Monarchy’s cultural and economic interrelations undoubtedly resulted in several “Monarchicums” such as in high culture the form of expression in architecture and music, or the affinity of writers’ vision relating to various issues. Yet we are of the opinion that an awareness of belonging together spanning the whole Empire was not formed. The main reason was that only relatively few people could emotionally identify with the political institutions which were complicated in their operation and could hardly be perceived in everyday life; thus a personal bond was absent and none of the peoples in the Monarchy was entirely satisfied with the construction the compromise of 1867 produced.73 The bargaining process occurred far away from the Empire’s subjects and the accomplished system change did not especially require social reinforcement providing a communal experience – for example, a referendum or ceremonial mass meetings. In fact, there was rather a fear of these types of actions. The new political system relied far more on citizens’ passive acceptance, in return for which it offered relative security and prosperity. For citizens the system was essentially embodied only in Franz Joseph’s person (indeed, that was consciously encouraged). Loyalty to the dynasty served as a substitute for imperial patriotism, while at the same time the monarch himself also hindered the deepening of trust in the system of Settlement. That was partly because the legacy of 1848 (for example, due to the
Kossuth cult) accompanied the reign of Franz Joseph throughout, and partly because loyalty to the king made it possible to allude to commitment to the Dual Monarchy, even for Hungarian officials who worked in the common administration.\textsuperscript{74}

Even the subsequent common minister of foreign affairs, Gyula Andrássy Jr., who wrote a book in defense of the Settlement, did not think it important to develop the belonging together of the two member states’ citizens; rather he wanted to strengthen the internal cohesion of the two halves of the Empire.

If we do not regard the Monarchy as a makeshift creation, and if we do not want to reduce the power which holds it together to loyalty to the dynasty, we must find its animating principle in the fact that the permanent and great interests of the existence of the historically developed units can best guarantee and advance in the ties of the Monarchy. The patriotic self-esteem of these units represent the base of the Monarchy, which is as firm as a rock. It is only from this that the ideal of the Monarchy can draw strength.\textsuperscript{75}

What this son of a founder of the system is saying is that concluding the Settlement gave a green light to state-building Hungarian nationalism. Hungarian liberals in power increasingly used the broad autonomy of internal affairs to assert the fiction of independent statehood with a 1,000-year past, independence from Austria and supremacy over the non-Magyars. Instead of integration, they were interested in hammering in difference, for which they forcefully employed the means of symbolic politics.\textsuperscript{76}

As a matter of fact, a part of this nationalizing endeavor was that they tried to “appropriate” Franz Joseph. In addition to hospital, library and museum constructions, the memorial act (Law XXVIII of 1907) passed on the 40th anniversary of the monarch’s coronation and the restoration of constitutionalism also enacted that a church was to be erected over the presumed grave of the founder of the country, Grand Prince Árpád. This latter decision was closely connected with the striving, already lasting for a decade, which kept asserting the kinship of the Habsburgs and the kings of the Árpád dynasty.\textsuperscript{77}

The assertion of Franz Joseph’s lineage from Grand Prince Árpád, especially with the active participation of Kálmán Thaly, vice president of the Independence Party in opposition, paradoxically signaled the imperial desires of Hungarian nationalism spanning across parties at the turn of the century.\textsuperscript{78} Opinions which expressed that Hungary had to prepare to take over the role of Austria, which was weakening due to the danger of federalism (for example with moving the monarch to Buda), intensified in Hungarian political thinking. For Hungary to achieve its goals in the battle of the races, it was necessary to maintain the 1867 system of
constitutional law because it guaranteed its great power status and independent statehood. Therefore the use of “Hungaro–Austrian Monarchy” would be more precise over the course of time according to former Prime Minister Dezső Bánffy. In his opinion, the nationalism of the member states and its stronger symbolic representation were actually to make the Monarchy more solid.

Similarly to the Hungarian, the Austrian elite was not specially interested in the symbolic legitimization of the dualist structure; after all, it could not participate in concluding the political agreement, and the celebration of the thus created real union would have meant the final abandonment of the idea of a unified Austrian state (Gesamtstaatsidee), just like any stronger representation of the Dual Monarchy would have hindered the preservation of regional identities and federal endeavors.

So the new political structure established in 1867 was short of legitimizing symbols, yet that was not why the Monarchy broke up, since it was able to exist and contribute to the economic and cultural development of the region for five decades, even in such a position. Moreover, the Settlement produced a constitutional system which existed for the longest period of time in Hungary’s modern history. However, in our opinion the legitimacy problem of the dualist system had a clear impact on the uncertainty surrounding the subsequent evaluation of the Settlement of 1867: the compromise of 19th-century Hungarian politics, which achieved successes, has not become an integral part of national memory up to the present.

At the same time, it is important to emphasize that, while political systems can succeed each other even from one day to the next, changing public thinking is a very slow process and thus the five decades of Dualism may not have been sufficient to overcome centuries-old distrust and to deepen integration – if only because the political machinery of the Monarchy did not settle on the everyday life of its citizens, but due to its pluralistic system, it worked much more as a “cultural commonwealth,” which provided space for national movements competing with each other. Looking back from the rather bitter and bloody 20th century, the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy may justly seem the citadel of peace, humanity and culture, as Helmut Rumpler writes in his book.

Notes

2 See, for example: Riesenfellner, ed., Steinernes Bewusstsein; Bucur – Wingfield, eds., Staging the Past; Unowsky, The Pomp and Politics; Cole – Unowsky, eds., The Limits of Loyalty; Wingfield, Flag Wars and Stone.
4 Polner, Magyarország és Ausztria, 167.
5 Budapesti Közlöny, 15 November 1868, No. 264.
6 Andrássy, Promemoria für Titelfrage. The wording is quoted in Wertheimer, Gróf Andrássy Gyula élete, 524.
8 Ibid., 295–301.
9 Kmetry, Elmékeléssel a magyar, 9.
10 Rendeletek Tára 1869, 216–217.
12 See, for example, the response of Prime Minister Gyula Szapáry to the criticism of the National Party, on 24 March 1892. Az 1892. évi február hó 18-ára, 366–367.
13 Méri and Pölöskei (eds.), Magyarországi pártprogramok, 155–156.
14 Speech of István Tisza, 6 November 1903 (session 329); see Az 1901. évi október hó 24-ére hirdetett, 282.
15 For Géza Hellebronth’s interpellation on 22 December 1903 (session 362) see Az 1901. évi október hó 24-ére hirdetett, 394.
17 Ibid., 39–41.
18 Budapesti Közlöny, 20 October 1889, no. 244.
20 Ibid., 15.
21 Budapesti Közlöny, 18 September 1903, no. 212.
22 István Tisza to János I. Papp, Greek Orthodox Bishop of Arad, Budapest, 12 November 1914. See Gróf Tisza István Összes Munkái, 288.
23 István Tisza to foreign minister István Burián, Budapest, 24 September 1915, Ibid., 71–73.
24 Budapesti Közlöny, 12 October 1915, no. 236.
25 Redlich, Schicksalsjahre Österreichs, 90–91 (11 and 13 October 1915).
26 Turba ed., Die Pragmatische Sanktion, For the ceremonies, see Wiener Abendpost, Beilage zur Wiener Zeitung, 19 April 1913, no. 90.
27 For material relating to the work, see Pragmatic Sanctuary, documents of the Hungarian preparatory historical sub-committee for the planned publication marking the bicentenary: Hungarian National Archives, State Archives (Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár, Országos Levéltára). MNL OL P 2262.
29 Wlassics, Az austriai közjogi irodalom, 11 and 15.
30 Deák, Forging a Multinational; Judson, The Habsburg Empire.
33 Pollak, Dreissig Jahre, 97. For urban architecture and the connection with power representation, see, for example, Heiszler, “Birodalmi és nemzeti szimbólumok,” 173–192.
37 Péter, Hungary’s Long Nineteenth, 221–228.
41 Deák, Beyond Nationalism, 139–142.
64 András Cieger

42 Alapszabályok a „hadastyán egyetnek”. A publication in Hungarian and German.

43 Az első magyar hazafias hadástyán, A publication in Hungarian and German.

44 „A hadastyánok országos egyesületének”. (On the Issue of the National Association of Veterans), Hadastyánok Lapja. 2 July 1882. No. 17.

45 “Az osztrák hadastyán-szövetségről”. (On the Austrian Association of Veterans), Első Magyarországi Hadastyán Újság, 20 August 1878. No. 1.


47 Cole, Military Culture, 130.


49 Kutassi ed., Magyarország olimpiai, 54.

50 Kutassi and Niedermann, A magyar és az osztrák Széchenyi, 122–123.

51 Dzankic, Citizenship in Bosnia, 47–48.

52 Somogyi, Magyarak a bécsi, 136.


55 Nagy, Osztrák közig.

56 Nagy, Az osztrák közig tanítása, 10–12.

57 Somogyi, Magyarak a bécsi hivatalnokvilághban, 138–142.

58 Mikszáth, Az amerikai menyecske.


61 Krasa-Florian, Die Allegorie der Austria.

62 Batta, Träume sind Schäume, 105–122.

63 Buzinkay, “Deutscher Michel,” 239–244.

64 Tomsics, Kacagány és emera.


67 Budapesti Hírlap, 9 August 1890, no. 218.


69 Budapesti Közlöny, 26 November 1893, no. 274.

70 Mikszáth, “Hazahiják az öreget,” 72–73.


72 Unowsky, The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism; Cole – Unowsky eds., The Limits of Loyalty.


74 Somogyi, Magyarak a bécsi hivatalnokvilághban, 45–46.

75 Andrássy, Ungarn Ausgleich, 412.

76 For more details, see Varga, The Monumental Nation.

77 Part of Thaly’s genealogy is published in Századok 31 (1897), 567–570. For more on the nationalisation of Habsburgs, see: Gerő, Imagined History. On the cult of Árpád, see Sinkó, “Árpád versus Saint István,” 9–26.


79 Bekcsics, A magyar politika új alapjai, 1–18.

80 Bánffy, Die ungarische Nationalitätapolitik.

81 Csepeli, National identity; László, Historical Tales, 77–97.

82 Kokoschka, Mein Leben, 46.


84 Rumpler, Eine Chance, 15.
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