



MINORITY RIGHTS INDEX (2020)

A New Attempt to Evaluate Rights of National and
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A New Attempt to Evaluate Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities through a Quantitative Approach

PÉTER KÁLLAI¹

Abstract

The Minority Rights Index (MRI) 2020 is an attempt to comparatively analyse 11 Eastern-European and Central-Eastern European countries' attitudes towards national and ethnic minorities. The index number aggregates the evaluations of scholars in the field and shows the 'quality' of rights guaranteed by the respective states on a scale from 9 to 108. The MRI consist of 12 elements, including political participation rights, cultural rights and anti-discriminatory measures granted by the states. It pays particular attention to the evaluation of parliamentary representation and its correlation to the evaluation of other rights.

Keywords: minority rights; national and ethnic minorities; quantitative indexation; Eastern-Europe, political representation

Results of this research have been presented in Hungarian under the name of Kisebbségi Jogi Index (2020) as part of a monograph. Kállai, P. (2022.) *Nemzetiségi (külön)jogok Kelet- és Kelet-Közép Európában – Kisebbségi Jogi Index, fókuszban a parlamenti képviselőlet* [(Special) Rights for National Minorities in Eastern and Central Eastern Europe – Minority Rights Index, focusing on parliamentary representation] Budapest, ELTE TáTK, Eötvös Kiadó.

Available: <https://www.eltereader.hu/media/2022/04/Kallai-Peter-Nemzetisegi-kulonjogok-Kelet-Kozep-Europaban-web.pdf>

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Introduction

The vast majority of literature concerning the minority rights of national minorities in Eastern and Central Eastern Europe concentrates on only one given minority or on one single issue, e.g., on what given countries guarantee for their minorities. There is no question that national minority groups and their members are in a very different situation within the different countries, with different economic and social aspects affecting their situation. They may have different demands for different rights, and these aspects make comparisons difficult and problematic.

Given these circumstances, the literature lacks comprehensive comparative analyses. However, quantification of different attributes to establish grounds for comparison is not without precedent. Various indexes of democracy or rule of law exist,² and there are quite a few attempts to develop comparative frameworks for minority policies and integration questions.³

This study aims to fill this gap. With the help of experts and scholars it presents a new index, called the Minority Rights Index (2020) indicating the status of minority rights in 11 countries from the east of the European Union: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The research explicitly builds on the lessons of other research, namely the Multiculturalism Policy Index (Banting, Kymlicka), which excludes the countries of Eastern Europe, and the research of Christoph Pan and Beate Sibylle Pfeil (2006). In the following I explain the main reasons behind this new attempt, and the rationale for modifying the methods of these research projects.

In the Multiculturalism Policy Index (hereinafter MCP Index or MCPI) Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka measure different multicultural policies regarding three different groups: Immigrant Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and National Minorities. While the MCPI evaluates countries from different parts of the world, it does not contain any countries from Eastern Europe. This approach is basically in line with the

² See e.g. Freedom House Freedom in the World. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>. Or Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index <https://bti-project.org/en>.

³ See e.g. Migrant Integration Policy Index. <https://www.mipex.eu/>

mainstream liberal theory of multiculturalism, meaning that there are certain prerequisites of multiculturalism, namely a certain level of stability concerning democratic decision-making and rule of law. In this sense we can witness a certain backlash regarding some Eastern-European countries. The other main reason behind excluding Eastern Europe from discussions on multiculturalism regarding national minorities⁴ is the so-called “securitization” argument. As Kymlicka (2015) formulates it, Eastern-European states are more likely to see their minorities, especially those with a neighbouring kin-state, as a potential security threat, and therefore do not guarantee minority rights or multicultural rights.

While these reasons seem convincing⁵, this paper explicitly aims to involve the countries of Eastern- and Central-Eastern-Europe in policy debates in the context of multiculturalism, or more specifically multinationalism, while acknowledging the existing limitations of the concept regarding these peculiarities in the region. Three decades after the regime changes in the region, and in the context of European integration, the factors mentioned above are no longer sufficient arguments for the exclusion of a significant region. In the section on national minorities in the MCP index, Banting and Kymlicka examine Western European, Southern European and Scandinavian countries, with the eastern half of Europe completely excluded from the comparative analysis. In addition, should we accept the general argument of securitization, it would not be appropriate to examine Spain or Greece either. Interestingly, the Index includes Greece (and Japan) with zero points, and even France, a country which does not officially recognize the existence of nationalities in its legal system, with a score of 1,5 points since 2010, which implies that a country that does not even recognize the concept of national minorities can have a non-zero value of multiculturalism.

⁴ Well, not excluding it, but putting it on the margin of multiculturalism debates. To be fair, Kymlicka himself dealt with the peculiarities of post-communist cases and the problems of kin-countries. And of course, there are serious works regarding how multiculturalism, multinationalism can be interpreted in the region. (Cordell, Agarín, Osipov 2013; Csergő, Regelman, 2017)

⁵ Although, there can be situations where states are intended to present models to their neighbouring countries and by that taking a step towards minority protection. (Majtényi, 2005)

In general, even with the existing differences in democracy or nationalism, the existence or non-existence of certain minority-accommodating measures (or even their democratic nature) can be required from a normative standpoint. In addition, democracies are very different within the West as well: they have completely different electoral systems and we can find different forms of government. Moreover, given the rise of some new populist leaders, problems with the rule of law can now be observed in some countries of Western Europe as well. However, these issues are typically not part of evaluations of minority protection provisions.

Another important milestone regarding the quantitative measurement of minority rights was the comprehensive research of Christoph Pan and Beate Sibylle Pfeil published in 2006 (Pan, Pfeil, 2006). They do not use multiculturalism as a theoretical background, but nevertheless examine policies and rights which can be conceptualized as multiculturalist provisions. In their case, the quantitative assessment is complemented by rather exhaustive qualitative description. However, there have been significant changes in the last decade and a half that have prompted further research.

Also, their research is strongly based on reports of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM) and reports of the Committee of Experts of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, and these reports are not the best tools for proper comparison (Fiala-Butora, 2019). These reports, partly in order to sustain the states' motivation to further improve their policies, welcome every little positive change regarding the rights in question, and in some cases fall short in criticizing shortcomings in these developments.

While their research was extraordinary in terms of being exhaustive, it is important to note that they mainly turned to representatives of the state to fill in gaps in information, and although, according to their record, the communication was extraordinary, the results may contain some bias subject to these circumstances.

The research tool developed here, the Minority Rights Index, used the lessons of both indexes, preserved certain elements and used minority rights as a starting point,

but left out some other elements. I also changed the scale and used the evaluation method typical of democracy-indexes, i.e., evaluation based on questionnaires filled by experts and scholars of the field.

The countries investigated in this study are members of the European Union from Eastern and Central-Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. It is typical among them to have citizens belonging to national or ethnic minorities recognized by the state in some way, but the proportion of ethnic groups within the populations, as well as the level of recognition, varies considerably from country to country, and even within countries. This despite the fact that regarding Western integration, the states faced requirements regarding economic policy, democracy, rule of law and minority rights.

It is important to note that since these are minority communities of very different sizes and needs, these different needs do not really appear in existing indexes. In this respect, therefore, macro-level comparisons between countries are limited. However, the behaviour of states and the legal institutions of the states (e.g., their existence or non-existence) remain comparable. These grounds for comparison are the main asset of the research. While every indexation method may obscure nuances and peculiarities of the states, they help researchers and policymakers evaluate countries in comparison to each other. This is what the Minority Rights Index serves.

In the following sections I introduce the items of the MRI and describe the scoring rules according to which experts evaluated the rights in question. Later I introduce the results in comparison, and provide a very short overview of the results of each country.

Finally, I present a thought experiment: I single out parliamentary representation and explore whether it can be seen as a means to adopting other measures assessed by the MRI. To conclude I present the limitation of the research and conclusions. In the text I use the terms *minority* or *nationality* interchangeably, referring to national or ethnic minorities. When I use the term *Minority Rights Index* (MRI) I am referring to the general idea or parameters of the index. When I use the

term *Minority Rights Index 2020* (MRI 2020) I am referring to the results of the research completed in 2020.

Expert Questionnaire, Scale and General Scoring Rules

For the evaluation of the countries, I sought out representatives of legal and social sciences, such as university professors, lecturers, researchers and experts from relevant NGOs, who are familiar with regulations related to minorities in the given country. I reached about 400 experts with the questionnaire. In addition to a small number of direct recommendations, I collected the experts' addresses from the staff lists of the relevant departments of universities, paying attention to their research areas and publications. Apart from a few exceptions of NGO members, most experts are from universities and/or research centres. I decided to not approach members of state bodies in order to keep the evaluation independent from any influence from states or governments.

The questionnaire was conducted in the last two weeks of March 2020, with a total of 103 responses available for evaluation via e-mail and the online interface. Some of the experts revealed their identity, but as the research is based on aggregated results, in this sense the used data is anonymous.

The main issue to solve in connection with the chosen methodology is the potential subjectivity of the experts asked. In order to preserve comparability, standardization of the scores is necessary. There is basically only one solution to this problem, and it is to formulate the rules of evaluation as accurately and concisely as possible. To quantitatively evaluate and compare the states of minority rights, it is essential to develop a scale with very precise rules for the values.

As a general principle, **1** meant the worst situation for minorities, or to be more precise, the worst state performance in ensuring the given right, while **9** meant the best situation, i.e., the best state efficacy. For most of the items, this general scoring rule was not controversial. However, as worst and best achievement of the state are not necessarily unequivocal, I decided to lay out precise scoring rules for the units **1**, **5** and

9. As such, the intermediate values can be used to show the countries' performance in a more nuanced way.

Apart from subjectivity, a related major challenge of the method is the natural critical approach of the experts, which is a proper and legitimate stance but can seriously distort the results. Standardizing the evaluation rules helps, but the management of this problem lies in the set-up of the scale.

A common risk when quantitatively evaluating countries is that full dissatisfaction and full compliance are rarely marked. Generally, respondents tend to give a somewhat balanced evaluation by not marking the extreme values. When we examine official evaluations of international organizations, avoiding poor ratings basically serves to preserve the states' engagement in the given process. Avoiding overrating serves as a means to motivate states to continue further implementation or to encourage the development of pieces of legislation in question. Given the naturally critical approaches of scholars, this risk is also present in the methodology I have chosen.

A narrow, three-value scale (no-partially-yes) used both by MCPI and the index of Pan-Pfeil does not provide room for this critical attitude coming from the position of the experts. The MCPI uses the 0-0,5-1 scale, and the Pan-Pfeil assessment used a 0-1-2 scale. This obscures fundamental differences between rights ensured by different states. Obviously, quantitative assessment in itself simplifies and blurs differences, as countries with the same index-values can have very different patterns. They may guarantee very different rights and thus minorities can be in very different situations. Widening of the scale can mend this problem.

Imagine for example a country that should be at the forefront in terms of securing minority cultural rights and thus may have a maximum score compared to other states. We must anticipate (as in most cases) that there are still minor things to object to. Country-specific expert would be reluctant to give a maximum score due to such minor problems. Criticisms can be voiced regarding all the institutions that have been rated positively in the study: the risk is that these legitimate criticisms of the institutions would lead many experts to be reluctant to rate their own country's

‘performance’ with maximum points, and thus the middle value would be marked more frequently, which would ultimately reduce comparability.

To avoid this problem, I asked the evaluators to score the items on a 9-value scale (from 1 to 9). This solution leaves room for expert criticism within the scoring and thus for a more detailed, nuanced assessment. The 1 to 9 scale provides an opportunity to give a relatively high score on the one hand, and elicit a more detailed comparison on the other. In addition, the 9-value scale can potentially be narrowed back to 3 values, making results directly comparable with previous quantitative studies.

In the following section I describe the items of the MRI, laying out different aspects I asked the experts to consider. For the precise scoring rules see the entire questionnaire in Appendix 1.

Elements of the Minority Rights Index

One of the primary aims of the MRI is to include political participation, anti-discrimination measures and cultural rights in one single research framework. Thus the MRI consists of the following examined elements: 1. parliamentary representation, 2. representation through various advisory and coordination bodies, 3. territorial, federal, quasi-federal autonomy, 4. anti-discrimination policy, 5. actions against school and/or residential segregation, 6. actions against hate crime, 7. dual citizenship, 8. official language status, guarantee of language rights, nationally or regionally, 9. publicly funded minority language public education and/or higher education, 10. publicly funded media or media-appearance, 11. cultural autonomy, 12. constitutional or statutory recognition of multinationalism and/or multiculturalism.

The first element of the MRI is therefore parliamentary representation. As the MRI measures and scores the efforts made by states, the given value should be high if there are special representation solutions. A medium value is given if representation is established without them, and the value is low should national/ethnic minorities be under-represented or basically not represented in state legislatures. A handful of questions can arise regarding special representation and whether it should be evaluated

with high points in the first place. As the research is intended to assess the efforts of the states and is particularly interested in the effectiveness of special measures, I asked the experts to evaluate these solutions with high values.

The second element of the MRI is the possibility to express minority interests through coordination/advisory bodies. Several countries operate such mechanisms, and in many places this is specifically an alternative to parliamentary representation. Although the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention does not consider this alternative to be sufficient ((ACFC/31DOC(2008)001.), it does welcome the existence and operation of conciliation forums. Thus, where such an institution operates regularly, in a manner specified by law and on merit, a high value should be awarded.

The third element of MRI is the issue of territorial autonomy. According to the scoring rules of the MCPI, we speak of the division of power if the constitutional definition of different units, regions and provinces helps the self-government of national minorities. This index element must also take into account the powers of the decision-making bodies of a given geographical unit, since, if the formal division of power takes place between institutions without real power, we cannot speak of real self-governance. Through this item, non-national-level representative institutions become part of the assessment.

Regarding the fourth element, there is a need to measure discrimination against ethnic and national minorities. As the MRI basically examines institutions, the steps taken by the state to achieve equal treatment and the system of institutions implementing anti-discrimination must be evaluated. I also asked the experts to show discrepancies in guaranteed rights of different minorities through this item.

The research is supplemented with the issue of segregation, both in education and in a geographical sense. However, this item is inverted, as it should properly be called desegregation, because a higher score indicates the absence of situations of segregation while lower scores indicate segregation; this is done in order to get an exact result when adding the values of the index elements. To be more precise, once again,

the subject of the evaluation is not the ‘situation on the ground’ but instead the effort made by the state in tackling segregation.

It is also important to examine another area in which the existence or absence of relevant legislation and the functioning of the institutional system make a significant contribution to understanding the circumstances of nationalities, even without considering different aspects of funding. This is an examination of the legal provisions relating to hate crimes. If a country has an institutional system and a willingness to sanction crimes of prejudice or hatred directed at national and ethnic minorities, the country should be marked with a high score. If such a legal environment exists, but it is applied by the authorities inconsistently or poorly, or possibly in an ‘inverse way’ to protect majority society, an intermediate value may be given. If there is no such institution, low points are awarded.

It is also necessary to include the issue of dual citizenship among the policies examined. The MCPI only examines this regarding immigrant minorities, but in the region examined it is also a crucial right of members of national minorities. Also, this can be seen as the main problematic issue regarding the securitization issues mentioned above (Dumbrava, 2017). We know from the example of Hungary (Kállai, Nagy 2020), what kind of abuses of power and guarantees for the preservation of power can be hidden behind the cross-border extension of citizenship, or more precisely in the easing of the conditions for naturalization. Nevertheless, it can certainly be said that a state that does not prohibit its citizens from being citizens of other states is more accommodating towards its minorities than one that prohibits it. According to the classical view, guaranteeing the rights of national minorities is the responsibility of the territorial state. In fact, instances of a kin-state intervening not only as a result of a bilateral agreement in order to protect its ‘own’ nationality, and thus putting the cultural / ethnic concept of the state at the forefront, cannot, of course, be considered a multicultural step. At the same time, a state that responds to such a case by prohibiting dual citizenship is in fact deliberately handing over the field to the kin-state itself, stepping back in its intention to guarantee minority rights. This approach of the MRI is in line with the relevant point of the OSCE Bolzano Recommendations: states

must refrain from mass naturalization, but those with dual citizenship must not be discriminated against or disadvantaged by the territorial state.⁶ Thus, a comparative index-element through which we want to map the situation of the nationalities living in different countries, or more precisely the situation resulting from the legal environment created by the (territorial) state, must be employed.

The next three items refer to cultural rights. Above all, the possible official status of languages and the use of language rights in public life must be assessed. Of course, there are (also) very different states in terms of linguistic assimilation, and thus individual nationalities may have different needs in this area, but there are nationalities in each of the countries investigated that require legal provisions to assure their linguistic rights.

With the next two elements I split the MCPI's one item on central funding for minority language education and media. The eighth element thus concerns the existence of publicly funded educational institutions. It should be marked with a high value when education in the minority language enjoys full state support through central or regional government. An intermediate value can be given if ethnic education is not present at all levels of education and/or its funding is limited. A lack of education in the minority language should be assessed with a low value.

The next element, then, concerns media funding. High scores can be given if national minorities (or their organizations) have access to resources to implement their own media products. Medium scores can be given if such funding is rather limited, but national minorities appear regularly with their own cultural programmes in public media. A low value should be given when nationalities do not appear in the media, or only in a negative context.

⁶ Principle No. 11.: '(...) [states] should refrain from conferring citizenship *en masse*, even if dual citizenship is allowed by the State of residence. If a State does accept dual citizenship as part of its legal system, it should not discriminate against dual nationals.' The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations (OSCE/HCNM, 2008.), <https://www.osce.org/hcnm/bolzano-bozen-recommendations>; The same thought is expressed in The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies (OSCE/HCNM, 2012.), <https://www.osce.org/hu/hcnm/110502>.

The following can already be partly deduced from the previous elements, but a separate element examining cultural autonomy is also needed. Ensuring cultural autonomy implies that the means for preserving minority culture must be legally guaranteed. The question, then, is whether there are opportunities to set up organizations (within or outside the state institutional system) that can support the cultural life of national minorities (and whether adequate funding is guaranteed). Thus, in contrast to the third item of the index (territorial autonomy), it is not the question of participation in territorial administration that arises here, but the possibility of institutionalizing a community-formed autonomy specifically through personal autonomy. A high score should be given if cultural autonomy organizations can be widely formed and exist as public bodies, and if the state provides adequate funding. An intermediate score is given if these elements are weaker, and a low score is given if the freedom of establishment of organizations belongs to individuals belonging to the nationality, but no substantive authority can be taken over (and no funding is secured) from the state.

The last element of the MRI is also an element borrowed from the MCPI, which is the recognition of multinationalism or multiculturalism by the state. If the constitution recognizes the multi-ethnic nature of the state, a maximum score can be given. If the state does not recognize nationalities as constituent elements of the state, but in some way still grants special rights to certain groups, an intermediate value is to be given. If the state does not recognize the existence of national minorities in the country at all, and the law and the parliament only apply to a single, titular nation, i.e., the majority population of the state, this element should be scored low.

Results of MRI 2020

The Minority Rights Index of a state is the sum of the rounded averages of the evaluations received. With 12 items on a 9-value scale from 1 to 9, the theoretical maximum is 108 and the minimum is 12.

Table 1: MRI results


	No. of asnwers	MRI (averages)	MRI median values
1. Slovenia	6	78	82,6
2. Croatia	12	78	76
3. Romania	9	75	75
4. Poland	13	70	71
5. Hungary	12	64	66,5
6. Lithuania	12	64	63,5
7. Czech Republic	7	59	62
8. Estonia	6	58	54
9. Slovakia	14	55	58
10. Bulgaria	6	51	50,5
11. Latvia	6	47	47,5

In practice, Latvia earned the fewest points with a 47-point MRI 2020. Croatia and Slovenia earned the most, with 78 points each. The order of the countries according to their MRI 2020 is the following: Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Latvia. (See Table 1.)

As the main point of the research is comparability, it is useful to rank every country on an index figure, even though it is not easy to read exact index-numbers regarding each item. However, it is clear that questions of representation are at the right top of the figure, while anti-discrimination measures are at the right bottom of the figure. Cultural rights are on the left side. To put it simply, if the figure of a country reaches towards the left, it mainly guarantees cultural rights. In cases where it expands to the bottom right, it scored better in terms of anti-discrimination policies. When the top-right part of the figure is more expansive, representation is better guaranteed.

Different models will be more visible below in the state-by-state assessment. For evaluations of each item, see Appendix 2.

Figure 1: MRI 2020, all examined states




Before presenting a very short state-by-state assessment, there is an important fact to note about the analysed data. Although the data outlines different models, it shows that regardless of their expert status, a relatively high proportion of respondents were drawn to intermediate values. This is a natural phenomenon with a questionnaire like this. Consequently, the right decision to not use a narrower three-point rating scale, but a scale from 1 to 9, was a good one, as it increased comparability by ensuring that differences are reflected.

However, the variance of the data differs considerably from country to country. The table above shows the values of the countries included in the MRI 2020 using averages in accordance with the experts' assessments. The table above shows median values in addition to average values for the sake of demonstrating how

opinions differ in given countries. In a country where the average is not very close to the median there are fundamentally greater differences of opinion between the experts asked. These differences will be explained separately for each country. It is worth noting at the outset that this phenomenon has an effect on the distances between the countries in the evaluation, but not on their order, with the exception of the cases of Slovakia and Estonia. However, it separates the leading nations of Slovenia and Croatia and distinguishes Lithuania and Hungary.

Croatia and Slovenia scored 78 out of the potential maximum 108 MRI. Slovenia did not receive less than 5 points for any item, and fives were given for only two elements: territorial, federal, quasi-federal autonomy (no. 3) and dual citizenship (no. 7). However, it can be seen that even the top country did not receive a maximum of 9 points for any of the elements, justifying the choice to not use a narrower, 3-point scale.

Figure 2: SLOVENIA. MRI 2020, score of 78




As there is a clear, constitutionally ascertained difference regarding the recognition and ensuing rights between the different nationalities in Slovenia, we can

infer from the fact that the country leads the list of the MRI 2020 that indicating differences between nationalities in question no. 4 is not necessarily enough to express the differences in the enjoyment of rights between different national/ethnic minorities. Also, the median is higher than the average, meaning some low values pull down the average scores. This may mean that most people overrated the policies, scoring based on experiences of nationalities which truly enjoy minority rights, or which are able to exercise their different rights. In this sense, the MRI 2020 shows the legal environment related to minorities in a given country with a general value in which differences between nationalities are not reflected. Presumably, the situation of minorities in general is usually somewhat overrated. In other words, the rating is more accurate regarding minorities living in a well accommodated situation.

Croatia received the same high rating based on 12 responses. Only the median value puts Croatia in second place. What is peculiar is that the assessments for the third question (territorial, federal, quasi-federal autonomy) were quite different, and the country received both the highest and the lowest values. The country received a 4 average for this element, which shows that in this case the establishment of national representation is coupled with the lack of power sharing at the territorial level. Overall, as shown in the figure, in the case of Croatia, the highly valued parliamentary representation is accompanied by extensive cultural rights but less effective anti-discrimination measures. In this sense, therefore, while granting special rights to its citizens belonging to national or ethnic minorities and seeking to involve all nationalities in the establishment of minority representation, it underperforms in ensuring fundamental rights without discrimination.


Figure 3: CROATIA. MRI 2020, score of 78.



As models, the two countries are very similar. Representation is quite prevalent, but the left side of their figures is stronger, meaning while there are slightly more shortcomings regarding anti-discrimination, cultural rights are assessed fairly highly.

Romania is an interesting case, as it received a very good evaluation of the various minority rights in the questionnaire, but it appears to be underperforming in terms of ensuring territorial and cultural autonomy and eliminating segregation. While there are shortcomings regarding recognition and autonomy, some cultural rights are guaranteed in a well-assessed way. A score of 75 on MRI 2020, with a high score of 8 in the areas of parliamentary participation, dual citizenship and minority language education resulted in a third-place ranking.


Figure 4: ROMANIA. MRI 2020, score of 75.



The evaluation of the nine respondents is less scattered than in the other countries, with deviation of evaluations among the nine respondents lower than in other cases. One respondent rated almost every policy examined with a maximum score or at eight. This respondent thus pulls up the averages that would otherwise come out, but overall the country still stands out among the countries surveyed. Even if we had excluded the scores of the high scorer, the countries would still have placed third in the rankings.


There were 13 responses for Poland. The Poland figure shows that there is little difference between the ratings of each right, with the average rating of most items in the middle of the scale, between 5 and 7. Only the evaluation of territorial autonomy veers from this trend. It seems Poland fits into the general trend, in which representation and cultural rights are slightly better evaluated than anti-discriminatory measures. In the area of hate-crime Poland has more work to do than the countries above.

Figure 5: POLAND. MRI 2020, score of 70.



Hungary received a total of 64 points, and as such scored approximately 60% of the potential maximum.

Figure 6: HUNGARY. MRI 2020, score of 64.



It is important to note that in the case of Hungary, a larger-than-average deviation of the answers was observed: in the case of several elements, the median is above the average, meaning a handful of low ratings pulled down the average value.

Twelve answered questionnaires were used from Hungary to calculate the results, but another questionnaire was received in which the respondent indicated that his assessment was specific to the situation of the Roma minority. As the other respondents did not give such an indication, it had to be assumed that other respondents tried to fill in the questionnaire taking into account the situation of nationalities in general, so the enumeration of such a dataset would have impaired the reliability of the data. It should be noted that this single one dataset of 13 evaluations, which is specific to the Roma minority, would have worsened the average of five elements, so overall Hungary would have slipped significantly below Lithuania at 59 points instead of 64. This also affirms that indicating discrimination regarding the rights in question was not sufficient in question 4.


The chart summarizing the country's assessments shows that although Hungary grants different cultural rights to recognized nationalities, it underperforms in other elements regarding discrimination. Overall, its anti-discrimination measures were rated 6 by experts, but its response to segregation and hate crimes was evaluated as insufficient.

It is important to note that as a model, Hungary is quite similar to the Slovenian and Croatian cases. Overall, Hungary reaches lower scores and has more problems regarding anti-discriminatory measures, while in terms of cultural rights guaranteed and parliamentary representation it scores similarly. However, in this case, the serious shortcomings regarding measures against segregation and hate-crimes are more obviously prevalent.

Lithuania received the best rating among the Baltic states, with a total of 64 points, like Hungary. The interesting thing is that although the two countries are on the same level, the composition of the scores is completely different. In the case of

Lithuania, the deviation of the answers from the average is not as significant as in the case of Hungary.

Figure 7: LITHUANIA. MRI 2020, score of 64.




To put it simply, Lithuania provides fewer and much more limited cultural rights than Hungary, but, according to experts, its anti-discrimination policy is more effective. The very big difference between the two countries is essentially reflected in Lithuania's citizenship policy. Although Lithuania has made progress in resolving the issue of stateless persons, many people do not have citizenship compared to non-Baltic countries, and this does not go hand in hand with support for dual citizenship. As such, Russian citizens do not have Lithuanian citizenship and related benefits and rights. Lithuania therefore received only a score of 3 for this item. Overall, the main problem in Lithuania regarding minority rights remains the issue of citizenship, rather than the fact that the state does not grant minority rights to its own citizens belonging to a nationality. To compare, in the other Baltic states minority rights are rated lower. In terms of the models mentioned above, Lithuania is quite different. Its anti-discriminatory measures are assessed mainly the same as the cultural rights, while

shortcomings are also clearly present regarding language rights and, as stated above, its citizenship policy.

In the case of the Czech Republic, the Act on nationalities specifically refers to the creation of a multicultural society. Despite this, the Czech Republic received a total of 59 point in MRI 2020, with most of the items evaluated as medium. The MRI 2020 score of 59 pairs with a median of 62, indicating that a small proportion of the evaluations (of a total of 12 respondents) pulls down the averages.

Figure 8: CZECH REPUBLIC. MRI 2020, score of 59.




Overall, in terms of cultural rights, the Czech Republic is only slightly behind Hungary (by one point per each item) but with the other elements and especially the near lack of parliamentary representation, the difference becomes more pronounced.

While representation is clearly the biggest issue, it is also interesting to note that cultural rights are assessed as medium, while most of the anti-discriminatory measures score better.

Six responses were received for Estonia, with a total MRI 2020 score of 58, just below the Czech Republic. In fact, Estonia stands out among the Baltic states in terms of cultural rights, but its low evaluation regarding all forms of minority representation and its dual citizenship policy means that it is unable to guarantee the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. Overall, the score received is just over 50% of the theoretical maximum points.

It is also important to note that cultural rights score higher and anti-discriminatory measures a bit lower. In this manner Estonia is similar to the Slovenian-Croatian-Hungarian model, but this set-up is accompanied by very low scoring representation.


Figure 9: ESTONIA. MRI 2020, score of 58.



At the beginning of 2020, a big change took place in Slovakia regarding the parliamentary representation of the Hungarian nationality. Not only a specifically Hungarian party, but also a partially Hungarian party failed to get into parliament in the elections. This is also evident in the experts' assessment. It is also important to note that (similar to the Baltic states) the issue of dual citizenship is still a problem in

Slovakia, an element that experts have rated at only 2 points. Slovakia thus received a total of 55 points, which is a particularly poor result in the list, despite cultural rights being rated within the middle value.

Figure 10: SLOVAKIA. MRI 2020, score of 55.




Slovakia presents us with the ‘butterfly-model’: the figure is quite symmetric. However, as in most cases, the cultural rights are evaluated slightly better than anti-discriminatory measures.

It is also important to note that, although generalization can be a problem everywhere, most respondents in Slovakia explicitly noted that generalization made it difficult to complete the questionnaire. This may also explain the relatively larger deviation of the submitted values from the average.

Bulgaria is the first country to receive less than half of the 108 points available, with only 51 points, indicating there are very few special rights for members of national minorities. As shown in the figure, in terms of cultural rights, a uniform score of 4 (the


lower third of the middle of the scale) is the result for Bulgaria, with only representation (through advisory, coordination bodies) and dual citizenship standing above the average. Almost every element below the average value, but with the value of dual citizenship serving as a peak. The variance of responses is not significant.

Figure 11: BULGARIA. MRI 2020, score of 51.



Latvia ranks last not only among the Baltic states, but also of all 11 countries surveyed, scoring a total of 47 points based on the expert assessments. Interestingly, although the infringements of rights of non-members of the majority are closely linked to citizenship regulation in Latvia, the country achieved the highest score (albeit it was just 4) among the Baltic states in terms of dual citizenship. It follows, therefore, that in Latvia there are problems with the guarantee of minority rights not only in relation to citizenship, but generally. Guaranteeing rights for citizens is problematic as well and all cultural rights are evaluated poorly.

Figure 12: LATVIA. MRI 2020, score of 47.



Measures against segregation stands out, which shows significant effort on the part of the state, but in terms of anti-discrimination, the overall score is also at the lowest value of the middle-range, namely 4.

A Thought Experiment: The Role of Parliamentary Representation

The amount of data collected, and further the standardized nature of the quantitative data, presents an opportunity to investigate the correlations. In the case of a well-established index-number, the values of the items correlate to one other, and the final index value also correlates to the values of each item. However, as a hypothesis I expected tensions among the different rights, thus creating different models.

After gathering the data, I singled out parliamentary representation and investigated its correlation to the other policies and rights. The reason for deciding so lies in the approach I employed regarding the role or use of parliamentary representation. While guaranteeing or helping representation on a national level may

be of important symbolic value, in my understanding it should serve a more substantive goal. Namely, it should help incorporate minority interests into legislation and thus encourage, influence or even press the parliamentary and national majority to adopt measures accommodating minorities, for example anti-discrimination policies and/or various cultural rights.

Other items could have been highlighted as correlation between any rights could have been interesting. However, in most of the cases the key purpose of any main purpose is not to serve other rights or measure. However, the opposite holds for representation. Representation for the sake of being represented or being present can be crucial, symbolically important, etc. However, according to this experiment, I chose to understand parliamentary representation as a means to serve reaching other measures and other rights. Minority representation, as a form of integration in the political sense, should lead to the integration of members of the minorities in other areas of life through, for example, anti-discrimination and cultural measures.

To sum up, in this thought experiment, the question was whether parliamentary representation helps and goes hand in hand with the granting of other rights. Reflecting on the purpose of parliamentary representation of minorities, we can turn to a vast literature on multiculturalism, minority rights and theories of representation.

Several authors emphasize that different nationalities may need different rights in different situations. As such, these issues need to be negotiated according to interests, values, principles, historical effects and other given circumstances of the political society in question. Therefore, political decision-making on different rights must also be fair, which means that the interests and opinions of minorities must be taken into account in the decision-making process. This is not merely a matter of symbolic significance: representation is used specifically to incorporate the aspects and perspectives of the national minority into the legislature (Kymlicka, 2007).

According to Bhikhu Parekh's argument in favour of representation, additional and special rights are not only tools to balance the situation of minorities, but also to achieve collective goals important for society as a whole, such as political integration,

peaceful social coexistence, political stability, or just encouraging cultural diversity and strengthening social cohesion. Parekh therefore rejects the idea that additional rights would be detrimental to social unity. Thus, for example, special or disproportionate representation in parliament or in other governmental institutions, and the right to consult and possibly veto, is intended to involve the group in question in the life of a 'mainstream' society and thus give real substance to the principle of equal citizenship (Parekh, 2000).

Iris Marion Young specifically emphasises representation. According to her, the focus of a just society should not be on individual rights and freedoms, but on democratic participation. This is because liberal individualism leads to the silencing of group-based demands. It is necessary to avoid such silencing, and one of the main means to that is participatory democracy (Young 1990). At the same time, Young points out that there are dominant and repressed groups in participatory democracy as well. This leads to the conclusion that the principle of 'effective recognition and representation' must be enforced such that oppressed or disadvantaged groups can have their own views and perspectives in public discourse and decision-making.

Melissa Williams (2000) also argues that the liberal conception of representation, which is based on the fact that everyone has the same number and weight of votes in a free election, needs to be complemented by a conception based on fair representation of different groups.

Anne Phillips provides three main arguments in favour of the politics of presence. First, the inclusion of a particular point of view in decision-making has a symbolic value that should not be underestimated. Second, there is a need for stronger advocacy for disadvantaged groups, and thus policies ensuring the presence of minorities can become an everyday channel for expression. Third, the politics of presence, i.e., the representation of nationalities in the parliament as I simplify it, helps to bring new arguments to the debates and expands the range of possibilities in political debates. At the same time, she points out that the ideological battles in party politics create a politically exclusionary situation that reinforces the need for a politics of presence (Phillips, 2006).

In addition to efficiency, certain authors use the concept of substantive representation, which – although not necessarily related to a specific institutional solution – is also a conceptual approach related to the effectiveness of representation (Pitkin, 1972; Dovi, 2018). Jane Mansbridge acknowledges that the goal should be to create substantive representation but does not contrast this with descriptive representation. She does however attach requirements that allow the institution of representation to move in a substantive direction (Mansbridge, 2000).

The approaches discussed illustrate that the mainstream concept of political representation contains a requirement of being more than mere symbolic. Representatives of minorities need to have the chance to actually influence legislation, or to put it even more simply, that the representatives of the minorities can have an actual *effect* on legislation. This is what the relevant international documents call *effective* representation. Whether states should guarantee any form of preferential representation of minorities centers around the question of the effectiveness of representation. International documents use the expression ‘effective participation’ (FCPNM; ACFC/31DOC(2008)001). However, it is important to point out that efficiency appears in international documents in relation to the concept of (economic, social and) public participation; in this sense it not only applies to the quality of representation, but is understood in a much broader sense to guarantee many general civil rights without discrimination.

In this thought experiment, I decided to deliberately schematize the question. In this view, the goal of minority representation is to form a legislative body on the national level which adopts acts to lay out other rights (cultural and anti-discriminatory) concerning the minorities.


The main finding of this thought experiment can be summarized easily: the data shows that there is a very high correlation between parliamentary representation and other rights. Expert assessments from the questionnaires show that better and higher-scoring parliamentary representation is more likely paired with better-evaluated cultural rights and anti-discrimination measures. It is important to note here again that special representation mechanisms are rated high according to the scoring rules,

meaning these indeed influence the existence and value of other rights. At the individual level of the respondents this means that those who assessed parliamentary representation solutions higher are more likely to assess cultural rights and/or anti-discrimination measures higher as well.

It is important to mention that the experts interviewed could not have been aware of the purpose of the research to evaluate representation and other rights in relation to each other.

The main results of the research are shown in the figure below. The better a country is rated in terms of parliamentary representation, the higher it is in terms of MRI 2020 (excluding parliamentary representation) scores for cultural rights and anti-discrimination measures. The main exceptions are Latvia, which is rated as medium in terms of representation but lowest in terms of other rights, and the Czech Republic, which is rated as low in terms of representation but medium in terms of other rights, and which also mentions multiculturalism in its Law on Nationalities. However, the other nine countries very clearly fit into the trend resulting from the hypothesis.

Figure 13: Correlation between parliamentary representation and the other rights



It is important, however, to note the limitations of the research.

The very character of the analysis and the chosen method is such that we can only talk of correlation, which is not necessarily the same as a causal relationship. The method is not suitable for explaining the reason for introducing different rights and measures. This would require not only more in-depth, non-macro-level country studies, but also an analysis of the specific debates and arguments related to the acceptance of certain rights. The causes for adopting minority rights and accommodating measures vary. It is clear that some of the countries adopted minority rights in to better their chances at European integration, while another part of them in order to set an example for neighbouring states and thus put their “own” national minority in a better position. Others states are motivated by a sincere commitment to a multi-nationalist society. It would be almost impossible to grasp these differences using a quantitative approach exclusively.

The hypothesis (and the results) therefore refer to coexistence and correlation and not to causation. It is by no means certain that members of a national minority present in parliament can have an influence on the political (and thus typically national) majority that would lead to the adoption of cultural rights or anti-discriminatory measures. It is possible that when a state in question decides to introduce minority-friendly regulation as a ‘preceding variable’ this approach will apply to the representation as well as cultural and anti-discrimination rights.

Conclusions

Overall, states can be ranked according to the expert responses in the order shown in the Table 1 above. The figures show that if a country occupies a larger area on the chart, it guarantees more or well-established minority rights.

The limitation of the research is that such macro-level research is naturally less detailed than case studies or comparative analysis by another method. National and ethnic minority communities with quite different characteristics live in the countries studied, and these characteristics may lead to quite different needs. A minority in an ethnically relatively homogeneous state and others in a more diversified society may

need different rights and different measures. Different rights may be needed for a socially or economically integrated groups; relatively assimilated groups may be less able to exercise their rights. Different rights may be needed in a country or for a minority in societies lacking all the fundamental elements of Raz's (1994) multiculturalist conditions, or where the breaking of the link between ethnicity and poverty has not taken place.

This research, on the other hand, has focused on the rights granted by the states, not on the needs of minorities. As such, these differences can only be taken into account partially. The survey explicitly asked the experts who completed the questionnaires to index them despite these differences. Thus, this research does not reveal in which country it is better to live as a member of a minority community, because this can be quite different regardless of the policies provided. The research evaluated three areas of rights regarding national and ethnic minorities – rights concerning political participation (i.e., representation), anti-discriminatory measures and cultural rights.

This research project aimed to reveal insights about the rights granted by states, evaluate them relatively comprehensively, and thus offer an indirect overview of the situations of the minorities. However, in the case of several countries we could see that the questionnaire did not provide sufficient space to explicitly indicate the different treatment of different minorities. We must thus conclude that the treatment of the most disadvantaged national and ethnic minorities most probably should be evaluated lower than indicated in the research.

Related to this, another limitation arises from the indexation method, namely that the index numbers alone say little about the minority protection regulations of a country. Behind identical values may be different rights and different models. More in-depth analysis is needed to reveal these differences in detail. In the case of the countries I examined, the cases of Slovenia and Croatia, as well as the cases of Hungary and Lithuania, are good examples of equal scores with diverse explanations.

Regardless of the challenges, the research succeeded in presenting a comprehensive, comparative indicator, showing the rights guaranteed by the states in

one single index-number, i.e., the Minority Rights Index 2020. It provides a rank ordering from Slovenia to Latvia. Also, the paper empirically verifies that minority representation might be useful in order to achieve other minority rights. The research clearly shows that there is correlation between the value of parliamentary representation and the value of other rights and measures regarding minorities. Overall, the MRI 2020 suggests that parliamentary representation (even special, or token representation) is beneficial for minorities.

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Appendix 1. The substantive part of the questionnaire

1-12. RIGHTS OF MINORITIES

Please indicate the state of minority rights in your country on a scale from 1-9, on which 1 is the least favourable situation and 9 is the best situation for persons belonging to minorities.

Scaling rules for values 1, 5 and 9 are given, but feel free to use the intermediate values as well to indicate the quality of the state's measures.

Please be careful to mark only one number in each row, but please answer all of the questions.

(You may also ask a colleague to help fill out if needed.)

1. How do you evaluate <u>parliamentary</u> representation of minorities in your country?								
There is no meaningful minority representation.			There are no special representation measures, but due to relative high integration into public life, there are minority representatives in parliament.			There are special measures to guarantee or to assist representation (reserved seats or redrawing of constituencies, etc.), which lead to effective, substantive representation of minority interests, based on electoral authorization.		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. How do you evaluate possibilities to express minority interests to the government through coordination/advisory bodies?								
There is no effective system for channeling interests to the government by these kinds of bodies.			There is some room for representing minority interests in these kind of bodies (or body) but it is incidental and used arbitrarily by the government. Such bodies do not contain many members of minority groups.			There is an effective institutional system to channel interests and opinions of minority communities to members of the government. The functioning of this body (or these bodies) is continuous, regular and prescribed by law. It is composed (mainly) of members of the minority groups. (Please consider such functions of national self-governments as well!)		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



3. Are there power-sharing mechanisms in your country leading to federal or-quasi federal territorial autonomy of minorities?								
The central state is supreme and does not delegate powers to sub-national units, which perform administrative functions at most.			The central state is supreme but delegates powers to sub-national units, including legislative and financial powers, through a process of decentralization, and the territory of the national minority corresponds to one or many constituent unit(s) of the state to provide some form of minority autonomy.			The division of power between the central state and the constituent units (provinces, regions, etc.) is enshrined in the constitution or otherwise guaranteed by the central state, and the territory of the national minority corresponds to one or many constituent unit(s) of the state so as to provide some form of minority autonomy.		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Are there effective institutional systems to guarantee anti-discrimination and equal treatment in the country? Please indicate if there is widespread discrimination on the part of the state regarding general human rights and regarding the special rights for minorities as well.								
Discrimination is widespread on the part of the state, and the state does not guarantee any reparation regarding discrimination.			There is no special institutional framework regarding non-discrimination, but general courts apply relevant domestic or at least international obligations.			There is a well-functioning institutional and legal system in order to guarantee non-discrimination. Reparation, compensation and awareness raising measures also take place.		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



5. How effective are the measures taken by the state to prevent segregation?								
There is systemic separation of people into ethnic groups, both residentially and in schools. The state is reluctant to do anything against it.			There is some segregation, but it is not a statewide phenomenon.			Members of ethnic and national minorities are well integrated into society spatially. There are effective measures to prevent segregation.		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. How effective are the measures taken by the state against hate-crimes?								
There are no relevant legal instruments at all OR there are, but authorities and courts tend to use them in order to protect the ethnic <i>majority</i> of the state – contrary to the concept's purpose.			There are relevant legal instruments, but the authorities and courts tend to be reluctant to apply them.			There are extensive legal means for punishment of those convicted of hate crimes.		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Is dual citizenship allowed in the country?								
Dual citizenship is prohibited AND/OR there are still groups without citizenship in the country and the state is reluctant or slow in granting them citizenship status.			It is allowed, but there are restrictions. (e.g., members of parliament cannot be dual citizens, etc.) There are some residents without citizenship.			It is allowed and naturalization processes are not particularly difficult.		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



8. Is the use of their own language for minorities guaranteed?								
The minority language is denied support or recognition by the central and regional governments.			Using minorities' own language is guaranteed with restrictions. The minority language does not have full official language status but is granted some level of recognition as a protected language in legislative documents or treaties. The minority language does not have equal footing with the majority (official) language.			The minority language is granted official or national language status in the region or nationally. The minority language has equal footing with the majority language.		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

9. Are there guarantees for minority education? Is there public funding of minority-language schools/classes/universities?								
There is no public funding of minority-language education. However, private funding of minority-language education is possible. – If private funding is not prohibited, or is indeed prevalent in your country, please indicate so by marking the upper side of the lower third of the scale. (2 or 3)			Minority education is guaranteed, but not at every level of education There is public funding of minority-language education, but this is marginal or limited. This funding can be provided either by the central state or the regional government.			Minority education is guaranteed at every level of education. There is full public funding of minority-language education. This funding can be provided either by the central state or the regional government.		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



10. Are there opportunities to be represented in public media? Is there public funding of minority(-language) media? Are there minority media products?								
<p>There is no public funding of minority-language media. However, private funding of minority media is possible. – If private funding is not prohibited or is indeed prevalent in your country, please indicate so by marking the upper side of the lower third of the scale. (2 or 3)</p>			<p>There are no individual minority media products/outlets, or only a couple of them are financed by the state. However, public media reports on minority issues, minorities are well represented in public media.</p>			<p>There is full public funding of minority media. This funding can be provided either by the central state or the regional government. Minorities are also fairly represented in public media.</p>		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Are there any guarantees from the state which can be considered a measure toward cultural autonomy?								
<p>Freedom of association is enjoyed by individuals belonging to nationalities, but no substantive power can be transferred (and no funding is added) from the state.</p>			<p>There can be some organizations, but with very limited authority in the field of cultural autonomy. Financing is restricted or incidental.</p>			<p>Organizations for cultural autonomy can be set up extensively. They can exist as public bodies, and the state provides adequate funding (from a central state or regional government).</p>		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. Constitutional or legal affirmation of multiculturalism or multinationalism.								
<p>There is no recognition of the existence of national minorities in the country. The constitution and the parliament refer to only one nation, that of the state's majority population.</p>			<p>The parliament does not recognize the existence of more than one nation (the majority nation) but recognizes that minority groups have a distinct status (e.g., as "communities," "regions" or "linguistic minorities") that grants them special group rights.</p>			<p>The plurinational character of the country (or the existence of two or more nations on the state's territory) has been recognized in the constitution or in other official documents adopted by the parliament.</p>		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Appendix 2. MRI 2020 values for each item

	1. parliamentary representation	2. representation through different bodies	3. territorial, federal, quasi-federal autonomy	4. anti-discrimination policy	5. actions against school and/or residential segregation	6. actions against hate crime	7. dual citizenship	8. official language 8. status, guarantee of language right	9. minority language education	10. media or media-appearance	11. cultural autonomy	12. recognition of multinationalism	SUM = MRI 2020
Bulgaria	3	6	4	5	3	3	7	4	4	4	4	4	51
Croatia	8	7	4	7	5	5	7	7	7	7	7	7	78
Czech Republic	3	6	3	7	4	6	5	4	5	5	5	6	59
Estonia	4	4	3	7	4	5	2	5	6	6	6	6	58
Hungary	6	5	2	6	3	4	8	5	6	6	7	6	64
Latvia	5	4	1	4	6	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	47
Lithuania	6	6	3	7	6	6	3	4	7	5	6	5	64
Poland	6	6	4	6	7	5	5	7	7	6	7	6	72
Romania	8	7	4	7	4	6	8	6	8	7	5	5	75
Slovakia	3	5	4	5	4	5	2	5	6	6	5	5	55
Slovenia	7	7	5	6	6	6	5	7	8	7	7	7	78