

Paving the Way Toward the Ideological Reception of Symbolism

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1. Symbol creation is not younger than poetry. Symbols are contemporaneous with the first attempts of the human mind to understand, explain and reproduce the world. It is understandable, therefore, that books dealing with them begin their discussion with the Greeks: with Pythagorean numerical symbolism, with Plato's sciagrams on the walls of the cave, the symbols of Old Christian catacomb paintings, the tropes of the hymns, mystical medieval flower decorations, animal and fiendish figures. The student of the history of symbolism, however, does not only quote practical examples, but numerous theoretical statements as well, much before the time when this trend reached its triumphant period, in the earliest stage, from Plato to Plotinus and from Augustine to Paracelsus.

It becomes quite obvious that the use of symbols and the critical literature dealing with them has considerably increased ever since the romantic period and emerged as a *key question* in the history of poetry, not less with the German and English romantics than with the German classicists contemporaneous with them. It is naturally evident that when in the second half of the nineteenth century, first in France and later on the whole continent and in the whole literature of a European type, the symbol rose from among main questions to a key problem occupying a *central comprehensive position* — so much so that the main representatives of the trend primarily referred to them, hailing them as theoretical initiators and ideological pioneers.

However, it can be well observed that both the symbolists proper and the researchers of the movements seemed to have preferred only one kind of the theoretical proof-material and of the theoretical citations which can be considered as intersectoral and interdisciplinary. The selections were chosen from such authors who had a philosophical bent and aptitude and from such thinkers who not only loved literature but who also wrote in a fine style and liked themselves to produce critical writings. There is no book dealing with the history of symbolism which would not refer and register the names of Herder, Goethe, Coleridge, Poe, Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis, Hofman, Schopenhauer, Baudelaire, Nietzsche and others more than once.

On the other hand, philosophy as a specific discipline did not interest either the critic or the man of letters, and vice versa, philosophers proper were little concerned in this historical problem of literary science. It is a fact though that a confrontation of this kind would be fruitful, contributing not only a lot of *new material* but also *many new approaches* to the history of the question. It would be particularly to the point if the researchers studied more closely from this aspect the philosophers before this trend had prevailed, looking for indications if the trend had affected them at all, either as provoking antithetic ideas they tried to neglect or as seismic motions commonly in the air.

Let us be frank, the researchers of the trend had tried to overlook them and if they approached at all the philosophical forerunners, as we have said above, they only turned to the romantic precursors, in most instances to the German romantics. Gradually a storehouse of more or less limited theoretical citations were amassed which are available, almost compulsively in all handbooks devoted to the subject; the only difference being that some authors quote more from these theoretical common riches others less, as seems to correspond to their particular needs. However, it still remains rather dubious how the trend prevailed during the decades between the decline of romanticism and the rise of symbolism, how the ground was being prepared for it by the immediate precursors to enter *public thinking*, both as a creative trend and as receptive thought.

It is generally believed and repeated that positivism emerged as a reaction to the so-called mechanical materialism as a new artistic effort, however, research has more or less avoided the question that a considerable portion of the romantic historico-philosophical ideology was only one facet of the same liberal philosophy devoted to the interpretation and formation of society, the second being positivism itself. Nonetheless, from our viewpoint, it only seems to matter that in the *ideo-historical* background of symbolism both trends transgressed the junction of Kantian *als ob* agnosticism; also that they did it in a manner that the features of the junction characteristically adhered to them. One of the main obstacles in the study of romanticism is (and together with it of symbolism as well) that its history is not investigated without exception side by side with positivism. On the other hand, it is evident that they form part of it not only as antithetical correlative trends but as complementary portions in one whole.

On the map tracing the study of symbolism there is a blank spot which is marked by a gap in the study of such philosophical works which are partly rooted in positivism as a trend, partly stand on the ground of one from which symbolism sprouted.

Moreover, from the vista of some old hundred years, these philosophers count not more than second or even third-rate thinkers. They were not more

than systematizers of some earlier teachings, or epigones. However, in their own time, as it often happens, *they were read more extensively*, than the masters themselves whom they followed or interpreted. So we must admit that side by side of being second-raters and epigones, their work was popular, not lacking even the features of vulgarity. Let it suffice to mention from the period Büchner's "Kraft und Stoff" or Moleschott's "Kreislauf des Lebens". If we, however, take seriously requirements of general historical or socio-historical approach to the study of public thinking, these writers, despite the second-rate quality of their talent rise to primary importance. To neglect them would be the mark of aristocratic distinction which is contrary to the historical aspect.

2. However, the writer whose life and oeuvre we wish to discuss as a pioneer of symbolism and as an influence in the formation of public thinking was not a Büchner type of popular philosopher, or a Cousin or Kostlin type of eclectic epigone. Considering Friedrich Albert Lange (1828—1875) in retrospect, there is nobody who would place him in the front-line of philosophy, but he was a good second-rater in an age which was backward in this branch of learning. He belonged to the group which included Lipps, Vischer, Taladier, Guyau and others. Nevertheless, if we scrutinize the history of public thinking, we shall find that in spite of a seeming similarity, Lange was more important than the rest. He was a writer of primary importance, particularly his extensive basic work, *Geschichte des Materialismus*, which embraces a tremendous historical material, with a clearly written summary, the *Standpunkt des Ideals*, crystallizing his fundamental concepts.

This large, two-volumed work appeared first in 1865 and in the subsequent four decades was re-edited not less than ten times. In 1877 it appeared in French translation, in 1879 in English and in the 1880s and 90s, excerpts in Russian and Italian were published. On the other hand, the reviewers of the contemporary magazines seem to agree unanimously that after the first edition, the *Geschichte* became a widely read, debated and popular book, with frequent references to it.

More significant than the editions of some hundred thousand of copies is, however, the fact that young Nietzsche devoted fervent attention to this book and Vaihinger in his tremendously successful book *Philosophie des als ob* written in 1876 and published as late as 1911 borrowed the motto from Lange whom he considered throughout as his master. Nor was he an exception, there being many others, not only the Marburg School, but the whole neo-Kantian movement which is so important in the history of symbolism (let us take only E. Caspiere) considered Lange to be the pioneer of the movement and H. Cohen edited his works in 1908. Moreover, other thinkers who were closely attached to symbolism as, for example, Guyau among others, did not remain unaffected from the *Geschichte des Materialismus*.

The second edition brought important changes, particularly in the summary, the above-mentioned "Standpunkt des Ideals" which became more emphatic. Lange's summary contained his views on religion, art, metaphysics and transcendentalism and according to his disciple, Vaihinger who surpassed his master, were extremely popular among European intellectuals, especially those interested in art. It is interesting that Lange was even more in the limelight as a result of a radical, liberal (though petty bourgeois) work written on problems of the working class which even forced him to retire from the university, then we can understand that he had exercised a much greater influence on public thinking than other philosophers with a university background.

Nevertheless, in spite of his universal appeal, is it permitted to consider only Lange's oeuvre, particularly a single outstanding work of his?

Historians often disagree with the manner applied by many literary critics whose method of argumentation hinges on quotations which is obtuse, heterogeneous and narrow. The literary historian is inclined to pick out diverse quotations and introduce them as adhesives into his own text, which, on the other hand, is suggestive, sometimes even artistic in its appeal. In this way the quotation is subordinated to the text written by the literary critic; the reader is under the false impression as if the quotation would serve the purpose of objective argumentation, whereas it is nothing else than manipulated ornament, a paraphrase to reinforce the gist of the critic's text. This manner of applying quotations, particularly the false argumentation of *Geistesgeschichte* brought about the legitimate claim for the systematic analysis of full works.

Lange's main work which, let us stress again, had a strong impact on art already in its first edition published in 1865, although it was conceived in the late '50s and early '60s. This is an extremely important circumstance. Eminently not only because it coincided with the emergence of Baudelaire's and Verlaine's world of ideas. The latter were inspired by the strongly industrialized atmosphere of Paris, they were fashionable Frenchmen, Satanic, nostalgic Catholic poets; Lange, on the other hand, was a German provincial citizen, in the grip of lay pietism. More important than the influence of the environment is the general atmosphere of ideas, to which they adhered owing to their stature, position and heritage, which nevertheless embraced them all with a consistency of final significance.

3. The conception period of Lange's work coincided with the beginning of the prolonged process of disillusionment which followed in the footsteps of the short triumph of positivism during the middle of the nineteenth century. In the early of this century, positivism had acted as a supplement to the speculative aims and ontological character of the romantic historico-philosophical

trends. It kept in balance and made more realistic the abstract world of universal ideas floating in the air. From the '30s onwards, but particularly from the '40s, from the fall of Hegelianism, the two trends drifted far apart from each other, struggling more and more to oust the other trend of thought. The fall of the 1848 revolutions seemed to convince the European, particularly the West European bourgeoisie that positivism was in the right. The pragmatic ideal of progress from day to day, the idea of evolution which fosters culture, industry by means of well-organized administration and the manipulation of justice seemed to achieve a final victory, rendering useless the idea of a revolutionary change but at the same time any "metaphysical" meditation as well on man's final aims and destiny, his special role occupied in nature.

The majority of bourgeois intellectuals creating and needing literature, the arts and philosophy became, for a short historical moment, mesmerized by the basic principle of positivist thought, i. e. that all sciences related with man, history, the arts, the exact sciences can be cultivated and controlled with the exact numerical method of the natural sciences. It should suffice to refer to Ernest Renan's *L'avenir de la science*, or the example of Feuerbach's spirited disciple, Gottfried Keller, and his books written around 1850.

However, disillusionment was soon to set in. By the time positivist thought became universal, its crucial contradictions became more evident. The universal aims and general supports of the historico-philosophical trend seemed to be entirely disappearing. It became quite evident that this mode of thinking which in its manifestos seemed to stand by the universal claim of causality, could only produce masses of partial causes. It lacked the summarizing existential basis altogether. From the causal elucidation of man's past the definition of the human essence could not be explained, nor could the image of its future. As a result, this system of values remained ab ovo relative and partial, extending from day to day, with a pragmatism built around a partial aim. Its causal principle proved not only partial and relative but also mechanically determined and a specifically human liberty did not find its place in it. Consequently its ethics also consisted of negations; if it tried to provide more then it aimed at commonplaces containing the natural description of man (the preservation of the species, self-preservation, differentiation, integration, etc.).

Marx being still a young man had aptly referred to this fact when speaking of Feuerbach in his Economic-Philosophic MSS that this view considered the human essence merely natural and not natural and human. "Aber der Mensch ist nicht Naturwesen, sondern er ist *menschliches* Naturwesen, d. h. für sich selbst seiendes, darum *Gattungswesen*, als welche er sich sowohl in seinem Sein als in seinem Wissen bestätigt und bestätigen muss. Weder sind also die *menschlichen* Gegenstände die Naturgegenstände, wie sie sich

unmittelbar bieten, noch ist der menschliche *Sinn* wie es unmittelbar ist, gegenständlich, menschliche Sinnlichkeit, menschliche Gegenständlichkeit. Weder die Natur objektiv, noch die Natur subjektiv ist unmittelbar dem menschlichen Wesen adäquat vorhanden". (Karl Marx—Friedrich Engels Werke, Ergänzungsband, Erster Teil, Berlin, 1968. Dietz Verlag, S. 579.)

The positivists had left out of account metaphysics and what is even more important from our point of view, ontology too. Comte, spoke in his early years already of the illusory nature of ontology: "vaine ontologique illusion". However, the true philosophers with deep insight did not deny its existence. So it was parenthetized and made use of in this way, as if not noticing its existence. The claims of consciousness, or even more those of the subconscious which seemed to them as being metaphysical ones, were in fact ontological, so they were being shifted to the field of the religions and poetry. With this they seemed to satisfy rational, experimental and scientific claims as well, without denying the existence of these disturbing questions. Spencer for example, never disregarded the "unknowable", although his system was built upon rationality and science (see, for instance, the parts on Mansel in his *First Principles*). Also John Stuart Mill, in his posthumous essays on religion (published in 1874), in order to enlarge on morality, took account of the inspirations of the range of metaphysics and ontology as well. At the end of his life he was more and more disturbed by the fact that these questions had remained unresolved and he was more and more attracted and reassured by the in Kantian solutions. It is well-known that Comte too in his late age, who had once spoken of the "vaine ontologique illusion", was so much overpowered by the pressure and legitimate existence of this need that in order to offer some solution, he tried to found a childish and muddled new religion.

Moreover, in the truly creative and expansive phases of their activities, the problems of poetry were shifted over to other fields, even those of religion, fields which fell outside the boundaries of up-to-date adult thinking, even lacking somewhat in dignity.

So it was no coincidence that in Comte's three stages scheme poetry had no role but in *the first and second*, whereas in the third, it was allotted some sort of popularizing function side by side with science, as *ancilla scientiarum*. In Spencer's system of thought, it was not without reason that it became a sort of valve to let off steam, a *game to dispose of superfluous energy*.

4. Lange too who was much devoted to Mill belonged to that stratum of the intellectual bourgeoisie which, either owing to its disposition of standards, could not be reconciled with such a degradation of poetry, nor with the relegation of these important questions of the human soul which form *the range of ontology*. For him too, as for the majority of the European bourgeoisie, positivist or as he believed "materialistic" evolutionism seemed to be the only possible

road of history, or the only possible mode of evolution of the world. It must be sufficiently stressed that among the liberal bourgeois thinkers there was hardly anybody who could defy the justification of the positivist trend and produce arguments to make up a rational system, although they themselves suffered from this mode of thinking and disliked immensely this attitude to the world. Let us give two examples to prove the cult of this ideology which grew into *science-ism*, into a power of norm making. H. Vaihinger who wrote his above-mentioned work in 1876, a prototype of the neo-Kantian philosophy and in 1911 he felt the obligation to give it the following title: *System der theoretischen, praktischen und religiösen Fiktionen der Menschheit auf Grund eines idealistischen Positivismus*. Nor did Friedrich Nietzsche receive any encouragement, in spite of having influential friends, for further numbers after the edition of the first few parts of his *Zarathustra*.

Is there no seeming contradiction here? Has Lange not been able to produce at least half of the editions of his above-mentioned work during the same time, although we said that it *partly grew out of the ground* which was responsible for the symbolical way of expression of *Zarathustra*. This is the crux: he only partly followed the trend. The intellectual citizen with a literate background who suffered from the teachings of determinism, from the seemingly pious, but actually cruel code of Spencerean evolutionism, groping in the dark of ethical relativism and yearning for a freedom of action, more and more desired the rehabilitation of poetry and "metaphysics" (i. e. ontology) and the revival of religious feeling, or a lay variety which could dispose of the churches and theology. At the same time he did not renounce the claim to "the scientific" nor to "the enlightened" either. This citizen had been deprived by Spencer and his socio-Darwinian followers of the former, Nietzsche, on the other hand, of the latter, in a way of not being able to give him back the former either; certainly not the need to satisfy piety. However, Lange insisted on the justification of both needs, reconciling the two, in his own right, with each other, making even them indispensable for both.

5. An idea which had been for a long time at large and desired for has been turned into a system, an attempt worth experimenting with in Europe. This idea had been gaining force during the Enlightenment and the Romantic Movement (i. e., in Chateaubriand or Friedrich Schlegel). The role fulfilled by religion was taken over by poetry, even in retrospect, and estimated as a manifestation of poetry. The adherents of Romanticism were all convinced that *it was the poet who could best understand and grasp the essence of life and its final conclusions*. This made the poet, in that period, the most prominent man in society and history, what the poet and churchman used to be.

Lange thought to have seized this idea, although, as he imagined, not in the romantic but positivist manner, quasi "scientifically". He blamed both

Spencer and Tyndall, even Mill, for relegating the claims rooted in the human soul *into the unknown, the unfathomable* ("in das Gebiet des Unkennbaren"). Although the desire to satisfy claims by means of notions such as future prospective after death ("Zukunft nach dem Tode"), the divine world order ("göttliche Weltregiment"), the moral of thinking ("die Sittlichkeit des Denkens"), nevertheless, he stipulated that instead of "vain suggestions" ("wage Möglichkeiten"), such as "the unknown", priority be given to the scientifically most probable ("stets dem Wahrscheinlicheren den Vorzug geben"). In this case, the most probable is poetry itself. In this question Lange did not blame his positivist contemporaries only, but also his adored master. He believed that Kant had sensed the way towards a solution but did not take the trouble to pursue it.

Lange blamed Kant (and in retrospect even Plato) for not allotting any role in his epistemology, or in his theory of values tending towards ethics, to poetry. He believed that Kant was conscious of the autonomous function of poetry, without elaborating it, nor did he consider its role in substituting religion. "Kant wollte nicht einsehen, was schon Platon nicht einsehen wollte, dass die ‚intelligibile Welt‘ eine Welt der Dichtung ist, und dass gerade darauf ihr Wert und ihre Würde beruht. Denn Dichtung in den hohen und umfassenden Sinne, in welchen sie hier zu nehmen ist, kann nicht als ein Spiel talentvoller Willkür zur Unterhaltung mit leeren Empfindungen betrachtet werden, sondern sie ist eine notwendige und aus den innersten Lebenswurzeln der Gattung hervorbrechende Geburt des Geistes, der Quell alles Hohen und Heiligen, und ein vollgültiges Gegengewicht gegen den Pessimismus, des aus den einseitigen Weilen in der Wirklichkeit entspringt. Es fehlte Kant nicht an Sinn für diese Auffassung der intelligibilen Welt, aber . . . Bildungsgang und Zeit . . . verhinderten ihn hier, zum vollen Durchbruch zu kommen".

Lange believed that pessimism necessarily emerged after the fall of religious ideologies and the Kant-worshipping philosophers, such as Schopenhauer were so much overpowered by it, because they did not see that the function formerly performed by the religions should be given to poetry. They had misunderstood the epistemological role fulfilled by poetry in life as its pietist ethical role as well.

That it was poetry only which could grasp and organize into a unity certain inevitable questions of the human consciousness, emerging from the human soul, Lange thought that only Kant's noble disciple, Schiller could fully grasp. He said that Schiller had "mit divinatorischer Geisteskraft das Innerste der Kantischen Lehre erfasst". "Schiller hat mit Recht die intelligibile Welt anschaulich gemacht, als er, indem er sie als *Dichter* behandelte, und damit ist er in die Fusstapfen Platons getreten, der im Widerspruche mit

seiner eigenen Dialektik das Höchste schuf, wenn er im Mythos das Übersinnliche sinnlich werden liess, Schiller, der Dichter der Freiheit, durfte es wagen, die Freiheit offen in das ‚Reich der Träume‘ und in ‚das Reich der Schatten‘ zu versetzen, denn unter seiner Hand erhuben sich die Träume und Schatten zum Ideal. Das Schwankende wurde zum sicheren Pol, das Zerfliessende zur göttlichen Gestalt, das Spiel der Willkür zum ewigen Gesetz . . . hier verkörpert sich die Flucht an den Schwanken der Sinne in die intelligibile Welt. . . Nur was mit dem Masstabe dichterischer Reinheit und Grösse gemessen Bestand hat, darf beanspruchen, als Unterweisung in Ideal zu dienen.“

However, if Lange beared a grudge against Kant that he had not recognized art's potential for cognizing notions and values tending towards ethics and did not enlarge upon them sufficiently, as far as Schiller is concerned, his text reveals that he did not approve entirely, blaming the poet of Don Carlos that he did not elucidate enough the differences between poetry and other human manifestations. In this instance Lange was unjust even from a historical viewpoint as far as his favourite poet was concerned, nor was he objective with regard to the period. He lacked objectivity, because in the matter of differences he ought to have turned to Goethe, he was unhistorical, because he wanted to find something in Schiller which was not likely to be there before the middle of the nineteenth century.

Lange wanted to clarify things in the consciousness of both the artist and the reader. First, certain parts of every work loose their sense, as soon as they are not regarded in the proper context; they become even nonsensical if, for example, we approach them as the instruments of scientific cognition. Should we, however, study them as parts of a whole, they offer such manifestations of the human existence which cannot be revealed by other manifestations of the consciousness. The second aspect shows that works must be looked upon in their entirety and in individual parts too *as symbolical*. They also submit to us reality; this reality is, nevertheless, the inner reality of the consciousness. Work and their parts as symbols have their own laws which can be and must be interpreted psychologically, these, however, are never identical with the laws of the natural sciences. Should we subject them to the other scientific laws of the material world, they vanish into thin air, without being able to fulfill their tasks. In this case symbolism, i. e. the cognizing function, disappears from the symbol and becomes a dogma. “. . . das Symbol wird unwillkürlich und allmählich zum starren Dogma, wie das Heiligenbild zum Götzen, und der natürliche Widerstreit zwischen Poesie und Verstand artet auf religiösem Gebiet leicht in Abneigung aus gegen das schlechthin Richtige, Nützliche und Zweckmässige” . . . The dogmatic seems as . . . “denkt sich das ideale Lebenselement . . . zugleich mit genuiner Wirklichkeit begabt und nimmt allen historisch”, “was symbolisch gelesen soll”.

Wanting to spare the reader from other long quotations, we shall summarize Lange's views throughout the whole work, from the point of view of symbol and symbolism. As to him poetry is able to depict and express, make perceptible and recognize such manifestations of life which cannot be expressed, made perceptible and recognized by any other region of the consciousness. However, if they are not known and perceived, man's world of consciousness remains not only void but painful and vexing as well. The chief mode of the cognizing and depicting function of poetry is symbolism, its main feature is synthesis and the main result is harmony. Poetry takes its objectivizing symbols from reality and reality itself must be not only depicted but expressed as well. However, this is not the reality of external but of internal existence. The main function of art, therefore, is to find the external symbols of internal reality. These two worlds, these two realities can be brought to harmonize and synthetize with each other. Since a loss of faith in dogmatic religions, based in a belief in the world to come, poetry only can accomplish this task.

However, internal reality presents but a *fictional world*, yet it is one of realistic desires. This internal reality of the human soul is characterized by such an inner contradiction ("ein /solcher/ Widerspruch in der Natur unserer Organisation") that it constantly tends to achieve self-expression which can never occur but partially by means of poetry . . . "uns die Dinge ganz vollendet gerundet nur auf dem Wege der Dichtung gibt stückweise, annähernd, aber relativ genau auf dem Wege der Erkenntnis."

Hence it is evident that for Lange the synthetization and harmonization of internal reality with the help of a system of symbols taken from external reality means a desire to be rid of the contradictions of external reality and an escape into an internal harmony . . . "... alle Dichtungen und Offenbarungen (sind) einfach falsch, sobald man sie nach ihrem materialen Inhalt mit Masstabe der exakten Erkenntnis prüft, allein jenes Absolute hat nur Wert als Bild, als Symbol . . . und diese Wirklichkeit tun nur Schaden, wenn man sie als materielle Erkenntnisse gelten lässt . . ." In poetry the outward world is but fragmentary and partial, man giving up his relative world, "der Boden der Wirklichkeit (wird) mit Bewusstsein aufgegeben", in order to obtain in the internal world harmony and synthesis in exchange for it. If the outward is always relative, the internal world expressed with symbols always retains the character of the absolute, ("den Charakter des Absoluten").

The poet's courage betrays itself, according to Lange, in Schiller's words, "Wage du zu irren und zu träumen". Err but dream. Make mistakes at the expense of the small affairs of the day and dream as protection against a world without ideals ("Erhebung der Gemüter über das Wirkliche") do not waste your energy on parts but on the whole ("nicht im logisch-historischen Inhalt der Einzelnen"), and substitute to the phenomena of a feeble world

the values of a dream-world in order to create the symbols of these values: this is a poet's mission. The overall universal values of the interior dream-world are more genuine realities, their objectivity truer than the tangible outward, bound to fall into pieces. However, the latter cannot exist without the former and man can only be reconciled with the existence of the external world if he can regulate it with the help of the interior order of values. Man must lean on this order of values, because it does not rest on insignificant matters from the angle of life, "sondern auf einer grösseren Wertschätzung, gegen die ein für allemal weder mit Logik, noch mit der tastenden Hand und dem sehenden Auge etwas auszurichten ist, weil für sie die Idee als Form, der Gemütsverfassung ein mächtigeres Objekt der Sehnsucht sein kann, als der wirkliche Stoff."

Nevertheless, Lange cannot stress enough that poetry which is symbolical and ranges values from the angle of man's inner life must not be in conflict with external life but synthesize the two. Poetry making use of the symbol and symbolism is "ein Erzeugniss freier Synthesis". A harmonizing, pattern producing synthesizing form principle is bound to be present in all the elements of poetry. In its parts, in the whole, in the insignificant and the characteristic as well, it must be there: "Von den niedrigsten Stufen der Synthesis . . . bis hinauf zu ihrem schöpferischen Walten in der Poesie ist das Wesen dieses Akten stets gerichts auf Erzeugung der Einheit, der Harmonie, der vollkommenen Form."

We have discussed Lange's work which as we have emphasized above with its editions and numerous translations reached millions of readers and influenced other millions as well, is a significant book expressing the trend of public thought. We have presented it as a work voicing the general attitude of the intelligentsia of the 50s and 60s, with a powerful effect in the formation of the coming decades. As such it invites the following conclusions as far as the history of symbolism is concerned.

It is a matter of fact that the literate intellectual bourgeoisie never sympathized with the sensuo-empirical world image presented by positivism, we can say, from the very minute of its ascendancy. Nor was it satisfied with the positivist synthesizing power and ability to present a full world image. All this was due to four different aspects. Positivism did not satisfy man's ontological claims, it could not reveal domains behind the conscious, it could not bring into harmony man's natural and his typically spiritual features, it was unable to provide a scale of values, and if it did, then it was based on the inhuman principle of the struggle for life.

Lange's suggestions for a solution are double-edged. Just as much as the contemporary intellectual bourgeoisie was also double-faced in its artistic and cultural gestures. This meant, on the one hand, an unprecedented apprecia-

tion of the importance of poetry, the restoration of its ontological character and the recognition of its autonomy, the expansion of the objects to be described and of the instruments to be used. However, it also meant, on the other hand, its very opposite. Although poetry was raised from its subsidiary position versus the sciences, yet it remained as such versus philosophy. True, it was raised from the position of serving maid to that of lady's help and treated as an equal. Lange's disquisitions seem to suggest that autonomy has been achieved, nevertheless, as far as poetry is concerned, his views contain only amendments, additions. He tried to suggest help to philosophy in such fields where the positivist ideology was helpless. That is to say, Lange blamed Mill, Spencer, Tyndall and others for shifting practically everything to appear under the heading of the Unknown and Unknowable, everything which could not be explained by the particular sensuo-empirical rationalism of positivism, so he shifted them all, on behalf of the symbolism of artistic expression to the field of poetry. Thus, Lange seemed to question even the autonomy of philosophy; or rather, the confines of these two manifestations of the consciousness became blurred. What is more, the claim for harmony which had been expected from the poet by the older philosophies in the name of the World Order or Providence, whether in a dialectic or moral spirit, Lange expected it from the human psyche in the spirit of symbolism. In this way the symbolical manner of expression does not only mean the recognition of the inner world of yearning as a justified manner of expression (Eduard von Hartmann speaks unequivocally of the Unbewusst) but more particularly a sort of escape from drab reality, the "gemeine Wirklichkeit".

It is evident that all this is connected with an epistemological bourgeois uncertainty which achieved its first universal expression in Kant's agnosticism. As most of the Neo-Kantianists, he too shared this view owing to the duality of the uncertainty of value and the desire to produce it. It is no coincidence that the motif of *als ob* affected his thought so considerably. Nor is it a coincidence that the same motif dominated the famous work of this most faithful disciple, Vaihinger, partly due to him and partly to Kant. Symbol-creation served as a means both in Lange and Vaihinger to defeat scepticism in knowledge and value. Whereas Lange still believed, though in a subjective manner that it was possible with an absolute force to obtain knowledge, the latter, however, considered knowledge and any value built upon it as mere fiction, neither being evident as realities but due to their function to sustain life.

6. Naturally, we are not concerned here with the internal evolutionary logic of a school's system of thought. Both Lange and Vaihinger expressed different stages of the general uncertainty in knowledge and value of the bourgeois world. This is at the same time a momento that we should not look for the primary cause in the emergence of a ruling trend in a period which tended

to renew a literary programme (certainly not in J. Moréas' manifesto in the *Figaro*), but study the general spirit which emanates from bourgeois thinking. Nevertheless, we should not forget that the trend, despite a relatively short survival, was rich, many-sided and had several phases. The *Geschichte des Materialismus* came out in ten editions and was translated into many languages but when *Zarathustra* appeared it had no chance. The restless citizen discontented with the empiricism of positivism was happy and satisfied with Lange's ambiguous solution, he was, however, repelled by the great masters of the trend, such as Baudelaire, Rimbaud, or Nietzsche who elaborated consistently all the facets of this trend. Only at the end of the 19th century, at the time of the land slide changes of the social structures, did the great intellectual masses show any susceptibility for it.

However, in spite of the strong impact of the trend as a ruling movement, it was necessarily and relatively short-lived. The epistemological and ethnophilosophical doubt could only achieve for a stance, a euphoric moment, the semblance of its absolutism in the absolute rule of the ego's subjective, existence and value determining will. Nonetheless, although symbolism as a ruling trend was comparatively short-lived, it continued to remain extremely effective as a storehouse offering useful poetic solutions. Naturally this is quite understandable. Scepticism concerning knowledge and value which, as we have emphasized above, was first forcibly expressed by Kant's *als ob* did not disappear but it increased from day to day. Growing uncertainty had swept symbolism away, however, its position was considerably strengthened.

The static world image presented by the dogmatic religions favoured more the allegorical than the symbolical manner. At the time of the rule of dogmatic religions, world explanations using symbolical expressions were due to the mysticism of individual faith. Adopted into the field of a static, dogmatic world image, the symbol is inclined to be swiftly iconized, becoming either topos, emblem or even allegory. When the static world image and system of values of dogmatic religion became insecure, classicism fearing constant changes to be in store, began to express with its symbols the hope of a more humane image of the world and a system of values. Romanticism, on the other hand, supplied with its symbols the dream and hope of a new pantheistic metaphysics. Although the self-confidence of positivism did not bring back the allegory, nor did it directly influence the significance of symbolism. Filled with security due to the growing self-confidence, it did it, however, indirectly; so much so that within a few decades it raised it to the rank of a ruling trend. However, after its marked decline, the ever growing changes (and crises) in epistemology and ethnophilosophy had not only kept alive a susceptibility for symbolical expression but made it into an indispensable necessity in the mind of twentieth century human being.