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APPRECIATION OF THE IMF AND WORLD BANK ACTIVITY IN HUNGARY[1]

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IMF has to a great extent contributed to the preservation of Hungary's international solvency. However, IMF guide-lines for crisis management for 1990 put financial regulators falsely into the centre. Economic recovery cannot be expected if not a restructuring programme is focused at. Hungary's traditional transit role in East-West economic relations should be laid on new foundations. Acute crisis should be cured rather stepwise, than by a shock-therapy. Although debt service is a great burden to restructuring, payment obligations have to be met. Partial rescheduling, the Dornbusch/Modigliani Plan and DES could bring economic recovery and restructuring nearer.

The stand-by arrangement with the IMF

It was on 14 March 1990 when the IMF accepted the request of the Hungarian government for a new stand-by arrangement. With this the IMF has to a great extent contributed to the preservation of the country's international solvency. At the moment is is certain that cooperation with the IMF is the only guarantee for the prevention of our economic policy from all kinds of hazardous ventures. The danger to the Hungarian economic policy is great, because

— on the one hand, the communist regime institutionalized economically unrealistic, utopian ideas, which led to an irresponsible behaviour, first of all with respect to the supply of collective goods,

— on the other, the sharp criticism of policies from the past has caused a general approach that all vested interests and all kinds of benefits should be considered as "less than necessary."

The present stage of the Hungarian economy clearly shows the divergencies between expectations and possibilities. Hungary is now in a state of stagflation. In the last decade hardly any growth of GDP has been experienced. The rate of inflation is two-digit. It was 17 percent in 1989 and will go above 25 percent in 1990. The decrease of the general living standard has slowly become a permanent phenomenon. Real wage levels in 1990 are far below those of 1974. At the same time the net foreign debt per capita is above US$ 1300.

Under such conditions to preserve international solvency and, for this reason, to reconcile our economic policy with the IMF and with the World Bank seems

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[1] This is a revised version of the author's lecture at the World Bank on June 6 1990 in Washington. The author notes that in recent months advantageous changes have come about in the relationship between Hungary and the IMF.

to be the only reasonable way to put an end to the structural crises and economic stagnation of the country. At the same time by 1991 the whole process could simply "run out of steam", which would be a tragedy for the Hungarian economy.

To make my views more clear, it seems to be worthwhile to emphasize: one can evaluate rather positively the activity of the World Bank in Hungary. It was this activity which unquestionably pointed out to us that our enterprises must undergo a renewal in order to pursue a management policy aimed at achieving international competitiveness.

Thus my criticism is limited to the activity of the IMF, but even in this respect my evaluation is basically positive. Between November 30 and December 1, 1989 a conference was held in Budapest, organized by the Zentral-Sparkasse, Vienna. The theme of the conference was "European cooperation and East European indebtedness", and during its course a leading Polish economist criticized the IMF's foreign debt-treatment strategy. He traced the strategy's weakness back to the following factors:

1. deregulation
2. liberalization
3. privatization
4. abolishing budget deficit, and
5. devaluation

With such a policy—he added—the Polish economy could only become atrophied. It could not recover nor could it be restructured. I am not sure whether this is a correct approach to the matter, but I have picked this out for a better understanding of my point of view.

If I have properly understood the guidelines on which the arrangement with the IMF is based, they want to establish a market-conforming economic policy where financial regulations are the central point.

The main elements of the programme on the demand side are a sharp reduction of the consolidated deficit of the budget, continued implementation of a tight credit policy and the maintenance of interest rates which both provide appropriate incentives for saving and contain the demand for credit. On the supply side, the programme of the Government for 1990 includes further steps toward price, wage and import liberalization, a flexible exchange rate policy, the fostering of small and private enterprises, the establishment of a capital market, and actions to promote the effective restructuring or closing down of loss-making enterprises.

Measures have to be taken to prevent a surplus in the balance of payments in non-convertible currencies. With the use of financial instruments it should be ensured that this surplus is transferred to increase exports for convertible currencies.

Of course, restructuring is an essential part of this economic policy. Government wants to strengthen enterprise autonomy, competition and factor mobility. The whole restructuring process should bring about a market system with mixed ownership relations. The new laws introduced in 1989 establish uniform conditions for business activities across the economy and widen the scope for the entry and expansion of small enterprises, and establish the framework for the transformation of state enterprises into stock corporations in a transparent manner.

The specific features of Soviet-type economy

As one can see, we are dealing with an economic policy where financial instruments, i.e. the instruments of the monetary and fiscal policy, are at the centre. This kind of economic policy is obviously correct in an open economy. Economics describes an open economy as one where the structure of production is formed in the process of the international flow of production factors and under market impulses. However, the Hungarian production structure has not developed in this way, but on the bases of the autarkic structural policy of the COMECON.

What is more, with Soviet-type planning Hungary introduced—in the early 50s—financial, accounting, calculation and information systems unsuited for rational decisions. Under such conditions all kinds of recommendations pre-supposing an open economy with a market system will fail to work. It is not accidental that macro-economic results fell short of initial targets in 1988 and in 1989. Also, it is difficult to believe the situation will be different in 1990. It is for this very reason that the danger of a potential "falling out" between partners is a possibility if the cooperation between the Hungarian government and the IMF is not founded on a middle-range, let us say, a three-year all-embracing restructuring programme.

I do not think that what I have in mind is too far from the viewpoint of the IMF, because a middle-range programme is already in progress. The difference may be in the hypothesis of whether a set of measures can be realistically decided upon without having some perspective and without being complex.

Let me pick out only one issue: According to guidelines the budget deficit for 1990 should not be more than 10 billion forint.[2] At the same time, for 1990 a 60 billion forint revenue is calculated mostly due to the surplus from price equalization in COMECON trade relations. In normal cases, this kind of price manipulation should be out of budget operations. The better part of this surplus will come to an end with the decrease of machine exports, i.e. with the shifting of settlement in transferable rouble to US dollar. In this case the second question will arise: can we, or is it necessary at all to, suppose that for stopping the convertible current account deficit, the budget deficit must be abolished?

The main problem is connected with the outstanding function of the budget; the latter is typical for Soviet-type planning and Hungary, in spite of the economic reform, has not transformed this pattern to a market type one.

[2]Surprisingly, the actual budgetary deficit in 1990 was even under this limit. *Ed. note*

The speciality of Soviet-type organization is that it starts with an irrational structure of enterprises, with the intention of optimal central control. It is well known that enterprise autonomy will produce a suitable result if marketing orientation is established with the enterprises in the broader interpretation, whereby the business policy establishing a successful market work has repercussions for the whole economic management of an enterprise. This ranges from research and development to product programming and production organization. All this can be interpreted as a comprehensive enterprise strategy, which can be considered as successful if:

— the production process is undisturbed, as the combination of the factors of production and the international flow of the products do no come up against obstacles. Even if the government is obliged to have recourse to restrictions it is always done in a way as permits a continued conduct of the rational enterprise strategy;

— a readiness for innovation is manifested, as it is provided for by a smooth functioning of the innovation chain, an appropriate selection of cadres, a due remuneration of the creative work, longer-run interests, and sensitivity to time;

— the research and development is production-oriented. It ensures keeping abreast of the technological progress in domestic and international relations—at least at the level of up-to-dateness which the Hungarian industry is capable of sustaining by relying on international production relations;

— the enterprise information system (accountancy, statistics, calculation, etc.) provides a solid basis for enterprise decision.

The reorganization which attempted to make the enterprise structure suitable for socialist planning has fully deformed this pattern. A) It started with the segregation of the unified innovation process, establishing special units for research, development, investment, production and marketing; it created adequate authorities for controlling all those activities. Consequently, a vertical organization structure has replaced the previous horizontal one. B) Harmonized with this, the whole information system was set to supply adequate information for central planning. C) The vertical profile and specialization gave the best opportunity for government agencies to control production and distribution through enterprises in a monopoly position.

These brought about specific relations between the budget and enterprises. Let me pick out only one element. The business cycles of products is well known. It is precisely this that introduced the distribution of the overhead cost in price calculations according to the changing cost-bearing capacity of the individual products. It is thus not accidental that the more specialized the organizational structure of industry, the more probable it is that the budget will have to see to the solution of such tasks as are handled by enterprises themselves in a diversified production structure. In accordance with this it may happen that loss-making enterprises—substituted therefore by the budget—will bring profit in the next period.

There are other points too, which call for cautious treatment of loss-making enterprises. There is nothing more costly than the liquidation of capital-intensive big enterprises. For loss-making enterprises this is only unavoidable if, within the framework of a rehabilitation process, there is no chance of re-instituting a profit-generating production. Yet independently of this, it is worth pointing out some relationships in connection with the subsidization of state enterprises from the budget.

1. The subsidized enterprises make payments to the budget under various titles. Consequently, the elimination of the subsidy cannot be considered as such a saving on state level as is fully available for disposal. It may happen that the outcome in some cases is negative.

2. In international relations the price policy is differentiated. A producing country is treated differently from a merely importing one. Price deviations may range between 20–30 percent. Thus it is by no means sure that the discontinuation of the manufacture of a product will bring the saving indicated by preliminary calculations.

3. An economic policy with import restrictions must act carefully in connection with the fate of the products manufactured as domestic inputs. One should not forget that 25–35 percent of imports are subject to restrictions and one can only hope that liberalization will continue in the coming years.

There is also considerable misunderstanding with respect to price subsidies. Let us deal first of all with subsidized retail prices. In this connection, the budget is doing nothing by merely redistributing incomes. If we consider wage levels as constant in real terms, abolishing prices subsidies must be connected with the decrease of turnover taxes; in all other cases the change of relative prices will decrease income levels of the population. Of course, if there is an excess demand and living standards have to be reduced, for this purpose cutting down price subsidies may be a solution. But this is quite a different matter, and even in this case one has to know that with such a decision the consumption pattern will be shifted in favour of collective goods. This may cause concern because it is a general characteristic of Soviet-type economies that only 35–40 percent of value added produced by the workers is refunded in wages, compared to the developed capitalist countries where this is 65 percent or more. Thus what seems to be untenable is to consider retail price subsidy in itself as a factor of budget deficit.

Special problems emerge with arrangements regulating foreign trade prices in the COMECON. In the Hungarian price setting world market prices dominate. This is the case with primary energy and basic raw materials. Deviations from them in COMECON trade will be levelled or subsidized. But in the (then) prevailing system of accounting price levellings were not included in profits, but subsidies were considered to be loss-making for enterprises.

Summing up: Hungarian budgetary system fulfills the requirements of Soviet-type planning. Thus the budget is many-sided in its links with the economy. Profit and loss accounts will hardly explain anything about the competition position of enterprises.

The restructuring programme with the elimination of socialist planning

I advocate the necessity of a restructuring programme with the elimination of socialist planning, because the Soviet-type economy has failed to provide a manageable system. Hungary is in a better position than other COMECON countries because, as a poor "recompensation" of military interference in the Hungarian liberation movement during and after 1956, the political leadership of the USSR allowed Hungary greater freedom in the formation of its economic control and management system. Thus the economic reform process started in 1957 with the abolition of the obligatory delivery system of agricultural products and with the inauguration of the profit motive. These paved the way to a "new economic mechanism" in 1968. Within the framework of socialist planning this process ended in 1984 with a resolution about the introduction of a socialist market economy.

The transition from socialist plannning to a social-minded free-market system was paved in 1988–1990 by the fact, that, up to the time of the free elections and the inauguration of the democratic government, many institutional arrangements were undertaken fostering the mixed economy with a developed capital market. Nevertheless, the better part of this transition is the task of the new democratic government.

It is not the intention of this work to make recommendations for a middle-range arrangement with the IMF and the World Bank which aims at giving the best chance for finding a new path of economic growth for the Hungarian economy. However, one thing seems to be sure: it is not the financial, but the restructuring programme which should be at the centre of such an arrangement. Monetary and fiscal measures must stay in a position of high importance, but the latter should be deduced from requirements derived from the restructuring programme.

Such a programme cannot start with the hypothesis, so very typical in recent years, according to which the lack of capital is a pure quantity and not a quality issue.

If it was truly only a question of quantity, the main basis of restructuring would be to withdraw the capital used now by loss-making enterprises and transfer it to profit-making enterprises. Yet this is only a part of the story and not the most important factor by far. This is not only because the loss or profit account figures appear in a not well founded financial and pricing framework, but also and primarily because of the irrational production structure of an autarkic economy.

It should have appeared fundamentally obvious that the intellectual capacity of a small country would be unable to absorb all that was translated into practice by the general process of development of the world. Despite this, even the five-year plan covering the period 1966–1970 formulated, as a general requirement, that the country must catch up with the world's technological standard relying on its own resources alone. The matter of the capital shortage was simply interpreted as a relative shortage manifesting itself in terms of physical volume, which could be offset by raising foreign loans. The assumption was that the import of new technology would increase the export potential and the equilibrium would thus be restored on a higher level of development; furthermore, that by meeting the debt service obligations it would be possible to preserve the country's international solvency. This concept did not prove to be correct. Holding the country's positions in the competition without getting involved in the international movement of direct capital investments simply caused increasing problems.

In other words: because it was production cooperation and specialization in the framework of the COMECON that controlled the Hungarian industrialization process, it was liable to get in a crisis as soon as the internal growth resources of the COMECON became depleted. Having recognized this, it would have been necessary to place state planning—hence the whole economic policy—on new foundations, where the starting point for external economic relations should have been an orientation to *two principal markets* instead of one principal market. This was not done.

Instead of transferring Hungarian foreign trade from one to two principal markets, we are now speaking about the restructuring process connected with the reorientation of the economy with regard to international relations. Yet it would be irrational to understand this as alienation from the traditional trading partners, first of all from the USSR. A production and trade co-operation with the world market based on capital penetration may offer advantages for Hungary in cases when it also links the two principal external markets. It may thus strengthen the country's position within the traditional markets, especially with respect to the USSR. It is, incidentally, a fundamental interest of Hungary to place the so-called transit activity on new foundations and to change over from the ever more unbearable extensive methods to the intensive ones, focussing more on mutual advantages.

Initially, the transit activity contributed to maintaining the equilibrium of the regional balance of payments (in, respectively, transferable rouble and convertible currency). This was made possible by currency conversion carried out in such a way that a part of the primary energy and industrial raw materials bought for transferable roubles were exported, after partial processing, as semi-manufactures and for convertible currencies. With the passing of time, however, the production and export of Hungarian industrial products (mainly engineering manufactures) was tied to such state-of-the-art (technological) requirements as could be met only by the use of product components (occasionally raw materials) bought for convertible currencies. Beyond this, the export product-mix has shifted in the direction of products with highly demanded import components that are available only for convertible currency. This is the way in which transit activity has become one of the factors of the chronic deficit of payments with the developed industrial countries.

The most obvious manifestation of an intensive-type transit activity may be the establishment of joint ventures with the participation of non-COMECON and COMECON countries. The setting up of such ventures in Hungary appears to be self-evident in domains where—by virtue of the high standard of production, traditional relations, a capacity for adaptation and other factors—all participants will enjoy proper benefits. The benefits for the USSR would primarily be a saving in costs and time. Thus Hungary may also be interested in the foundation of "tripartite" ventures, and in the intensification of East-West relations on this basis.

To cure the acute economic crisis two scenarios have been developed. I do not want to give the impression that these ideas are worked out completely but, as is typical, they represent two profoundly different lines. The one is a so-called shock therapy, the other a step-by-step restructuring process. If I understand events well, the Yugoslav and Polish governments have decided to take the first line, and there are economists who recommend the same behaviour for Hungary as well.

Anyone who has closely followed my deliberations can see that these come to the conclusion that a rational solution can be expected rather from a step-by-step restructuring process. I prefer the step-by-step solution not simply because this way it is much easier to manage social tensions. If there were only the social effects at stake, shock therapy could be used without hesitation. The fact is that the problem in question is so very complex, the time demanding nature of the issues are so very different and the linkage among them so very specific, that shock therapy could hardly bring any hope of a solution—rather it could create a great risk to the country at large.

We have to go ahead carefully when considering the social and economic crisis, and break out from this crisis in the same way as a Schumpeterian-minded "creative destruction" process. Such a fundamental restructuring cannot be implemented overnight.

We could not set ourselves the target to identify, or even outline, the main principles of a possible consolidation programme. But the statement may be ventured that privatization is the principal problem for both economic consolidation and the future of industry. This is an essential statement in itself, because it means that every kind of shock-therapy abstracting from it rather makes problems more acute instead of solving them. It also means that the programme of medium-term consolidation has to be derived from this, inclusive of the order in which tasks should be solved.

Looking at the economic policy of the years 1988–90 from this aspect, it may be stated that the measures taken in the interest of attracting foreign capital were insufficient. Deregulation is still merely a slogan. Over-bureaucratization is still characteristic today. One cannot agree with those who consider the special advantages to be secured to enterprises by foreigners as discrimination against the domestic enterprises. He who introduces new technology and makes available his technological and research base must be separately paid for it. The preferences serve this purpose. Only in this way can we compete with other countries which raised their economy from the state of backwardness mostly linked to the international flow of capital.

Economic recovery and foreign indebtedness

The high level of foreign debts makes the implementation of a recovery programme aimed at ensuring relative price stability and the convertibility of the Hungarian currency rather intricate. In this respect indebtedness itself is not the reason for concern, but rather its socio-economic background. Let me refer, with respect to Hungarian history, to the twenties. During this period, based on a reasonable four-year programme, the consolidation of the economy was achieved in spite of a structural crisis—a crisis perhaps more severe than the present one.

In the twenties, the convertibility of the "Pengő" was made possible by an inflow of international capital, which was the main regulator of the structure of industry. If we want to compare the twenties with the period of 1974–1987, the difference can be established particularly in three respects.

1. The former was based on *an open* economy and the latter on a *closed* one. After the rupture of relations with the world market, socialist industrialization did its best to "complete" the manufacturing processes, incorporating into its own structure of production the phases which had earlier been concentrated in the mother country by the companies exporting the working capital to Hungary. Naturally, this led to a general deterioration of industrial production culture.

2. The former was based on the principle of *innovation* and the latter on *reliable marketing* under COMECON cooperation. Market-conforming enterprise behaviour was substituted by a plan-conforming one.

3. The former was controlled by *competitiveness* in the market and the latter by self-accounting (khozrazchot) subordinated to the centrally-determined structural policy.

Also, the above does not include the fact that foreign credits in the period between 1974–1987 partially financed excess demand for public goods and personal consumption of individual products.

Thus the question must be raised: Is it realistic to believe that Hungary can, in the middle range, put an end to the deficit of the convertible current account?

Up to now, in the evaluation of this issue, it has never been taken into account that the reform of the COMECON system is to involve a change in which the accounting of foreign trade changes from the transferable rouble into US dollar. This idea in Hungarian–USSR relations was raised from the Hungarian side with the intention of fostering the penetration of working capital in Hungary.

The first regulation to promote the import of working capital to Hungary goes back to 1972. In spite of this, the currency problem has greatly limited the import of working capital. The Western partners were interested in penetrating the COMECON market. But Hungary wanted to enlarge its earnings capacity in convertible currency. From 1991 a new situation will emerge. In Hungarian–USSR relations the US dollar will replace the transferable rouble. This may promote the import of working capital, but it could also sharpen the current account issue.

We are facing a peculiar problem. According to preliminary estimations with this transformation Hungary will suffer a deterioration of the terms of trade of US$ 1–1.2 billion per annum. At the same time such estimations do not match with the fact that, in the past, several enterprises in Hungary—the national airways company, steel factories, agricultural cooperatives, etc.—asked for import licences from the world market, in spite of the fact that import prices from the USSR were essentially cheaper. The investigations have shown the large differences that arise when input prices are separated from general trade conventions. That is what we can consider as the difference between market-conforming and plan-conforming trade-treatment.

It has often been voiced that discrimination is applied to the socialist countries in the world market. The instruments used in this connection (COCOM list, etc.) are well known. Nevertheless, it does not fully explain the evolution of things. Looking at the other side of the events, from a purely business aspect, we have to deal here with a self-discrimination process, because socialist theory suggests the elimination of monetary need, and consequently suggests an anti-market viewpoint. The alienation from the market brings with it, of course, a self-discrimination on the world market. In other words, there exists some sort of self-discrimination, which consists of the transfer of a kind of plan-consistent enterprise-behaviour, that has evolved within the COMECON with respect to relations with the capitalist market. Out-of-schedule deliveries, uneven quality, insufficient parts supply and servicing and the like entail practically no consequences in intra-COMECON trade relations. This has led to the evolution of a peculiar and bureaucratic enterprise-management practice, alien to the market, which the enterprises are often unable or not ready to deviate from, even in extra-COMECON relations—despite the fact that this involves such consequences as the payment of penalties, blacklisting from the market and the like.

It is in our deepest interest to do the best to implement in economic relations with the USSR a change to US dollar accounting in its whole complexity. Yet even in this case, new problems will emerge in the convertible current account.

Even if we leave out of consideration the new problems which, at least in the short run, Hungarian–USSR relations can cause compared with the period of 1985–1988, the export volume in convertible currency has to be doubled with a lower rate of import increase in order to solve the current account deficit problem. Only this can provide enough room to enlarge the foreign trade income sufficiently from US$ 0.5 billion to approximately US$ 1.3 billion per annum. If we succeed in reaching this target, debt service interest will consume this surplus; i.e. a 1.3 billion US$ foreign trade surplus could hardly contribute to the restructuring process. In other words: one has to suppose that by and large the given production potential, with marketing reorientation, can solve the problem.

However, in this respect the points of view of experts basically differ from each other. It was recently that the president of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences floated the opinion that without Marshall-type aid Hungary would hardly be able to overcome its economic crisis. Also, there are many economists who believe that we have to ask creditors for a partial rescheduling of debts, because the present debt service ratio is unsustainable.

Not only is partial debt rescheduling seen as necessary, but so are other specific debt reduction tools—for example the Dornbusch/Modigliani Plan and debt-to-equity swaps have also been discussed extensively several times. The Dornbusch/Modigliani Plan contains the proposal that creditors should—at least for a few years—invest their interest income in the debtor countries. According to the view of most economists, for a rather small part of the foreign liabilities debt-to-equity swaps are seen as a useful tool for reducing the debt burden. These swaps, however, can only be carried out in combination with a comprehensive privatization programme. In addition, the necessary legal framework for foreign investors must be established in advance.

It is no wonder that in these questions the official and academic lines do not coincide. To deal with this in a little bit more detailed manner, one can say the following.

There are economists who believe that a successful restructuring programme can only be expected if the annual burden of interest service is not more than US$ 0.5 billion or so, instead of above US$ 1 billion. This would be, of course, a profoundly new situation presupposing a global settlement on a worldwide level.

The situation is not yet ripe for a general rearrangement of debts. This is understandable. Nobody wants to pour more money into an empty bag than is necessary for survival, that is, for the meeting of debt service commitments. Therefore, first the institutional and financial systems of a rational management have to be brought about. It is our basic interest that this should happen in one or two years. It seems, namely, that even if the rearrangement of debts were put on the agenda, there will be no general scheme, but the modes of partial discharge will be determined depending on national features.

If economic policy is based on the principle of maintaining the solvency of the country then, of course, the authorities must stress that Hungary is strongly determined to honour all its foreign debts according to the principle that contracts must be fulfilled. In this approach Marshall aid, any kind of debt service relief, or partial debt forgiveness are welcomed as undertakings which could bring nearer economic recovery, and could provide a better foundation for the restructuring process.

What can be a realistic concept? Deliberations concerning the absorption capacity of the country figuring around US$ 0.5 billion interest payment per annum are based on experiences gained in a highly inefficient system. Of this one can be sure. The elimination of the specific features of a Soviet-type economy will bring new growth factors into operation. If we succeed in penetrating the mainstream of the worldwide development processes, the democratic government concept could work, in spite of the fact that, based on the maturity schedule of liabilities, we are facing hard years.

ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТЬ МВФ И МИРОВОГО БАНКА В СВЯЗИ С ВЕНГРИЕЙ

Б. ЧИКОШ-НАДЬ

Анализируя деятельность МВФ в связи с Венгрией, автор подчеркивает, что она имеет большое значение для сохранения международной платежеспособности страны. Хотя он и критикует некоторые требования МВФ, он отмечает еще большее закрепление во второй половине 1990 г. позитивных тенденций.

Поставленные МВФ в начале 1990 г. принципиальные условия выдвигали цель формирование такой ориентированной на рынок экономической политики, в центре которой должны были стоять финансовые регуляторы. Поскольку производственная структура венгерской экономики развивалась на основе автаркической структурной политики СЭВ, система экономической информации оказалась непригодной для обоснования рациональных решений, и рекомендации в направлении открытой экономики и рыночной системы не могли быть выполнены. Проблема усугубляется тем, что в ходе хозяйственных реформ бюджетная система советского типа, в которой бюджет множеством нитей связан с экономикой, оставалась неизменной. При такой системе невозможна структурная политика на основе прибыльности или убыточности предприятий, потому что эти данные ничего не говорят о действительной конкурентоспособности предприятий. Вследствие этого венгерская экономика может идти в направлении нового пути роста, если поставит в центр не финансовую программу, а программу структурных изменений.

Производственные и торговые связы с мировым рынком на основе импорта капитала будут для Венгрии выгодны в том случае, если в связях Восток-Запад удастся укрепить позиции страны на восточных рынках.

Насущные интересы страны связаны с тем, чтобы сохранить свою роль как транзитной страны, которую она выполняла и до сих пор. Возможные формы этого — венгерские смешанные предприятия, организуемые как с западным, так и с восточным участием.

Автор выступает за постепенность в ликвидации глубокого кризиса экономики. Эта задача является комплексной, трудоемкой и настолько сложной, что шоковая терапия вряд ли принесет результаты. Необходимые и кардинальные структурные изменения не могут произойти мгновенно. Существенным препятствием для проведения программы стабилизации и конвертируемости является значительный внешний долг. В связи с тем, можно ли достичь в средней перспективе ликвидации дефицита платежного баланса, автор подчеркивает, что несмотря на благоприятные воздействия перехода к расчетам в долларах, это вызовет обострение текущего платежного баланса в обороте с восточными странами. Основой политики в связи с внешней задолженностью является точное выполнение платежных обязательств. Это может быть дополнено такими решениями, как частичная отсрочка платежей, план Дорнбуша-Модильяни, изменение структуры долга как такие факторы, которые способствуют стабилизации и ускорению структурных преобразований.