Constructing Collective Identities within European and Latin American Integration Frameworks

Maria Fernanda CAMACHO POSADA[1]

This paper seeks to highlight the importance of creating a collective identity and strengthen the relationship between regional alliances and the civil society to achieve, not only economic, but political goals, concerning the implementation of effective national and international policies, and the influence of political leaders' positions on the resolution of contemporary crisis. Radical political discourses have gained strength through some of the most important social challenges nowadays such as pandemic, migration, armed conflicts and social inequality, among others. This has resulted in a global phenomenon of fragmentation and decline of regional powers. In a contrasting process, different nations have joint forces to prevent a social, economic and political collapse, and, in this framework, regional integration becomes a fundamental strategy to build international cooperation and stability.

Keywords: *regional integration, collective identity, citizens participation, political discourse*

Introduction

Historically, regional integration agreements have pursued economic goals focusing on trading and commercial initiatives. However, decision making and policy implementation are driven by members' political positions and interests. According to Page: "Trade may well be secondary to political or security objectives or constitute an instrument rather than an objective: it is difficult to find any group that has only a strictly commercial agenda."[2] In other words, regional integration is developed not only with financial purposes, but its success also resides in the consolidation of political ambitions, thus, politics plays a fundamental role in its development.

On the one hand, regional integration brings political outcomes that might have an impact on stability, for example the construction of peace and security. On the other hand, integration failures may lead to conflict and the fragmentation of relationships between the participants.

---

[1]   PhD candidate, University of Public Service, e-mail: mafecapo@hotmail.com
[2]   Page 2000.

The political scientist Alberto Van Klaveren presents the benefits of integration to promote economic, social and political growth. First, the success of regional integration cases such as East Asia and the Pacific regions, where intraregional trade and exports have significantly increased revenues, has influenced states' perceptions towards the importance of local alliances.[3]

Second, greater regional integration could drive policies that improve the quality of infrastructure and connectivity. For example, in the Middle East and North Africa logistics costs are among the highest in the world. Geographical obstacles make the region face higher costs than other regions. Regional efforts to guarantee the quality of transport routes lead to facilitate connectivity, to be more efficient and enhance mutual learning.[4]

The 2017 report by the World Bank *Better Neighbors: Towards a Renewal of Economic Integration in Latin America*[5] establishes that the more diverse the countries that enter into trade agreements, the more they can complement each other and the greater the profits, either by buying or selling products that make up the same value chain or by exchanging technology, knowledge and talents. In this regard, deeper integration between small and large countries in regions such as the Americas would be much more beneficial.

Third, regional integration is crucial to global integration. A business strategy can make a region much more efficient and powerful; this allows to share knowledge; have more competitive rates among partners that lower the cost of products; generate more business; and, ultimately, be more competitive with the rest of the world.

This paper will take a theoretical approach looking at various aspects of collective identity construction, and its relationship to political actors' discourses, demand–supply interaction and policy areas dimensions.

Conceptualising regionalism

The theoretical framework as far as the external perspective is concerned, is found in the Great Transformation by Polanyi.[6] Originally, integration theories were developed to explain the rise and fall of the market society in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but are currently used to characterise changes in the current international political economy and are interpreted, consequently, as a great transformation.

The new regionalism understood as a political project would question the homogenising trend of contemporary globalisation by working in favour of a multicentre world order, with regions that are not tyrannical but central, each one originating in historical civilisations, but multicultural, similar to the historical empires that have offered humanity relevant organisational systems that coexist with a normative universe of convergent cosmopolitan values created through dialogue and understanding between the parties.[7]

---

[3] Van Klaveren 2017.
[4] Gani 2017: 279–288.
[5] Bown et al. 2017.
[6] Polanyi 1994.
[7] Hettne–Söderbaum 2000: 457–472.

When academics and researchers compared the old and the new regionalism, the findings were theoretically significant for the development of the new regionalism approach. In the first place, findings highlighted a great variety of actors, beyond the state-centred approaches. Second, the existence of a real region by itself was underlined, rather than a formal one defined by the member states. Third, it was pointed out that the globalisation process concentrated on regional integration as a planned fusion of national economies through cooperation between a group of nation states.[8]

The point of view of the new regionalism tried to consider that the process of regionalisation itself is also different in developed and developing regions, thus it gives rise to numerous regionalisms. In addition, the processes of globalisation and regionalisation interact in areas with different characteristics, which is why various modalities of regionalisation appear. This is evident if the new regionalism is compared with the old, or if the new regionalism in Latin America is contrasted with that of Europe. Even in Latin America the regional dynamics of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Mercosur differ considerably.[9] For this reason, it is important to analyse the internal and environmental conditions relevant to each case.

Challenges of regional cooperation

During times of crisis, Latin American and European regions have shown openness towards regional integration. However, current integration processes have had to face many global, regional and national challenges. For instance, the Covid-19 pandemic has led to worldwide economic issues and significant social changes which pose a series of questions regarding our way of living, health systems and governments' response to abrupt changes. All these realities bring with them political implications at local, national and international level. Moreover, consequences of the pandemic emergency are yet to be observed, political elites must re-think the way societies and all their institutions are structured, the "rules that govern behaviors"[10] or the concrete design of organisations.[11]

In the case of the European Union, the most efficient integration organisation so far, the implementation of restrictive measures such as the physical closure of borders has been criticised. On the one hand, for promoting the need for unified policies, and on the other, for showing incoherence between different responses by national governments of members states. In this context, benefits of being part of the union have been debated and, in some cases, the defence of domestic policies is seen as threatening the stability of the European integration.

Another obstacle of regional integration, for example, has been the lack of social and economic infrastructure; this is the case of Latin America. Due to the geographical location, Latin American countries are key to inter-American trade, however, some regions have

---

8   Hettne–Söderbaum 2000: 457–472.
9   Page 2000: 7.
10 North 1990.
11 Scott 2000.

poor road networks coverage and the inefficient levels of education reduce the possibilities to have personnel trained in border, port and customs operations.

At a national level, many countries in Europe and Latin America are experiencing political instability and polarisation in which radical discourses have emerged. In this regard, new strategies of communication have attracted part of the young vote and build opinion leaders with a strong presence in social networks. Thus, the discourses that associate political ideologies with the privileges of certain groups, for example, poor people who receive social plans, against a working class without social benefits, have been very effective to address people's demands.

Citizen engagement in integrated organisations might be considered challenging. Considering the European experience, assumptions are based on conventional views of civil participation, such as the role of formal debate for social and economic representation, and regional parliamentary structures. It also highlights some of the dilemmas involved in establishing bases for legitimacy of regional systems. Regional models and structures do not inherently have any greater merit than others, nor can particular structures of democratic government be drawn from national experience just by simply being transferred to regional level.[12]

According to Best,[13] civil society engagement in regional cooperation becomes crucial to identify keystones such as the success and suitableness of institutional structures in diverse national and international settings, consistent with fundamental principles of democratic actions and good governance which allows to assess the prospects and boundaries of high regional governance indicators.

Integration in Latin America and Europe

In the global scenario, examples of regional integration efforts are the Pacific Alliance and the Visegrád Group. On the one hand, the Pacific Alliance is a regional integration mechanism formed by Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, with a population of 229,777,189 inhabitants, a total area of 5,144,603 km² and a GDP estimated in US $18,818.23 per capita (2021 estimate). It was established in 2011 aiming to build an area of deep integration with free movement of goods, services, capital and people; to promote the growth, development and competitiveness of their economies to achieve greater well-being, overcome socioeconomic inequality and promote the social inclusion of their inhabitants; and to become a platform for political articulation, economic and commercial integration and projection to the world, with an emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region.[14]

On the other hand, the Visegrád Group is a political and cultural alliance formed in 1991 by four Central European countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, all members of NATO and the European Union. It has a population of 64,301,710 inhabitants, with a GDP per capita of US $26,502.48 (2021 estimate) and a total

---

[12] COOKE–KOTHARI 2001: 1–15.

[13] BEST 2004.

[14] For more information see https://alianzapacifico.net/en/

area of 533,615 km². Its main objectives are enabling, through integration and definition of common strategies, the insertion of member countries into the European community; the creation of mechanisms to enable economic cooperation among member states, with a view to economic development: establishment of strategies and actions aimed at cooperation in the energy field, and military and scientific cooperation between member countries.[15]

As it can be noted, both integration alliances have a strong focus on economic development, however, concerning the political sphere and society participation, there are significant differences. To understand citizens perceptions on Pacific Alliance, the Americas and the World project[16] carried out a survey in 2014, seeking to answer the following questions: What do citizens know about the Pacific Alliance? How do people assess this cooperation? What is the social value of this integration? Interestingly, the results showed that more than half of the population in the four countries do not know or do not have an opinion about the Alliance, as Figure 1 illustrates.


Figure 1: Level of awareness regarding the Pacific Alliance (2014)

Source: Compiled by the author based on the Americas and the World data (2014).

Data suggests that there are variations in the level of awareness between countries. While in Colombia 47% of the population does know and expresses an opinion about the PA (similarly to the almost 46% of Chile), in Mexico only 30% of the population knows and is able to assess it. Peru shows a more favourable level of awareness among its population, with 40%.[17] In principle, this implies an important challenge for the Alliance and its Member Countries, since there are relevant proportions of its societies for whom this mechanism is not yet part of their knowledge, within national and international contexts.

Behind the explanations, regarding the lack of awareness towards the PA, the survey showed that in the case of Chile, the greater the support of the free flow of goods, the more

---

15   For more information see www.visegradgroup.eu/about
16   For more information see www.lasamericasyelmundo.cide.edu/
17   For more information see www.lasamericasyelmundo.cide.edu/

likely people are to know about the PA; on the contrary, the greater the support for a Latin American regional currency, the lower the probability that people say they know about the Alliance. The case of Colombia shows peculiarities. It is the country where the highest percentage of the population know about the PA, and this seems to depend on the support for the free flow of investments. However, for female participants who support free market and are indifferent to the United States influence, it has a negative effect, meaning, it decreases the awareness level of the alliance.[18]

Mexico has also interesting results; in particular, it is the country where more factors can explain the degree of awareness. In addition to education and knowledge, international interest, evaluation of the economy and support of the free flow of investment and the regional currency have a positive effect. Finally, in Peru the only factor that determines awareness, seems to be the assessment of the economy. Based on the analysis of the data, it can be said that public opinion might become an obstacle to advancing the integration process within the PA as well as to the construction of a regional identity.[19]

As for the Visegrád Four countries, the most recent report on public opinion was in 2021.[20] The survey highlighted the highest level of awareness about the Visegrád integration in Hungary (69%), followed by Slovakia (65%), the Czech Republic (52%) and Poland (49%), as Figure 2 shows.


Figure 2: Level of awareness regarding the Visegrád Group (2021)

Source: Compiled by the author based on the International Visegrád Fund (IVF) 2021 data.

Data showed that in all four countries, people's awareness of the V4 increased considerably, in comparison to data from 2001. Hungary had the most significant increase among the member states. According to V4 citizens, the most important area of cooperation is economy and trade, evidencing their focus on socio-economic issues. However,

---

18   For more information see www.lasamericasyelmundo.cide.edu/
19   MALDONADO 2012.
20   For more information see www.visegradgroup.eu/about

priorities tend to differ slightly in the case of Slovak and Polish respondents who prefer the development of tourism, while the Czechs included security and defence within the alliance priorities. Overall, the report indicated that although there are different important areas of cooperation, society's views on priorities does not differ dramatically from one country to another.

Considering the PA and V4 data on public opinion, it can be noted that, in the first case, discourses of integration have not been as effective as in the European case, where seems to be a wide awareness of the cooperation and its advantages. This comparison highlights the importance of adopting an emphasis on political efforts to construct collective identities under discourses of belonging, leading to the consolidation and production of a new common sense that might be favourable to regional integration.

One of the events that promoted the construction of collective identities occurred during the crisis triggered by the two world wars, which made imperative for European individual and group ambitions to be reconfigured. Thus, with the end of the bipolar world order, in 1991, the V4 initiative meant both, a return to historical regional cooperation, and an attempt of a group of Eastern and Central European states to re-position themselves in a re-integrating Europe.[21] Meanwhile, within Latin America's context, collective imaginary was not changed so abruptly at a specific point in time, as it was in Europe. Instead, Latin American countries have experienced their own national crises at different moments and in different circumstances, making it difficult for a solely discourse to find in regional integration a way to rewrite national and international identities.[22]

Hence, integration discourses that emerge from damaging events have the capacity to connect the interests and identities of societies that could have been seen as rivals, fostering a feeling of acceptance and making individuals believe they have a common fate belonging to the union, which favours the idea of integration. To illustrate this, regardless of Germany and France wars, these nations constructed a new collective identity in which having united interests and identities was the basis of pro-regional integration policies.

In order to identify, locate, contextualise and map out the discursive strategies employed as collective identities and carry out a comparative analysis among successful regional integration groups, it is important to pay special attention to citizens' and leaders' positions, and the identification of discourses that are competing amongst themselves and resisting or facilitating the construction of a regional identity.

Political discourse seeks to persuade citizens in different ways, it cannot be understood without analysing the power of political concepts, the implicit agreements and the importance of how to produce a persuasive discourse.[23] In addition, due to the development and evolution of the media, it is fundamental to face the need to carry out an objective discursive analysis. Citizens are saturated with large amounts of information making it hard to identify facts and understand the content of news. Thus, today's society needs critical thinking tools that allow passive political actors to analyse in detail discourse changes and variations.

---

[21] BRAUN 2020.
[22] RAMANZINI 2017: 1506–1507.
[23] FROMKIN et al. 2007.

Taking into account Pacific Alliance and Visegrád Group characteristics and the benefits and challenges of international cooperation mentioned before, it is crucial to analyse the role of regional integration in the implementation of effective public policies, how current citizen's demands are addressed and how political actors' discourses shape the present and future of the two regional alliances.

Political actors within regional cooperation

The current health crisis has aggravated the lack of credibility and confidence in international and national organisations, and the complex context of communication has radically modified the notion of authority, a fundamental concept to understand the discursive and ideological relationships between the constructions of collective identities. In this scenario, political actors have profoundly transformed their communication strategies, in a process of hybridisation and convergence of discourse.

In addition, the electoral results of the last decade in Latin America and the European Union are evidence of major political shifts. Regional powers have adopted new communicative strategies to attract people's participation, however, in the last years, political discourses have been changing constantly.

On the other hand, the analysis of social and economic actors in the decision-making process will allow to identify the types of actors that participate in these processes, the positions they adopt towards integration negotiations and the impact of their communicative strategies.

According to Moravcsik,[24] social and economic actors do not participate directly in the decision-making process, however, they do participate indirectly through pressure they exert on their respective governments and considering that the only political actors to occupy a seat in the intergovernmental negotiation table are national governments, citizen participation is channelled through the organisations that represent it.

Historically, political leaders have played a leading role in nation building, however, at a regional level the role of heads of government might be overshadowed due to the nature of regional integration, which leaves no room for imposition of guidelines and times by one state over the others. As stated by Haas,[25] integration as an open process, is described by the spill-over from one area to another. Although the end point is supposedly open, "it is clear that it must be institutional".[26] This would involve technological and scientific changes which would lead to "political learning" from national bureaucracies, political leaders and international organisations.

Nevertheless, the spill-over process can be unpredictable. Consequently, Waltz began to emphasise the role of ideas and "consensual knowledge", paying greater attention to the relevance of political leaders and their objectives.[27] Therefore, the role that individuals

---

[24] Moravcsik 1993: 473–524.
[25] Haas 1975.
[26] Mutimer 1994.
[27] Waltz 1991: 21–38.

can play in the international arena, and the institutional contexts that can provide incentives or restrictions for their actions, must be clarified as key elements of a more general development.

In the European case, supranational institutions and leaders have managed to generate positive effects on integration by demonstrating that the strength or weakness of the heads of government are the most important factor when it comes to explain the positive or negative results of the processes of regionalisation. Regarding Latin American intergovernmentalism, lack of objectivity has led to retreats from integration, as the Venezuelan case currently suggests.[28] Although these views may be considered negative, this paper does not intend to support such negative perspectives but contribute to avoiding them.

As introduced by Kitschelt, components of the political system, organised around fundamental issues (e.g. Sustainable Transport, Agriculture, Health, etc.), are known as policy areas classified within the following dimensions:[29]

External boundary drawing: The exclusionary dimension

Kitschelt presents the notion of citizen taking into consideration a collective category. According to the American scholar: "Political systems erect boundaries between the in-group and the out-group on the basis of place of residence and/or biological descent."[30] As pointed by De Vries and Marks,[31] the exclusionary dimension involves particular subgroups of political issues such as multiculturalism, immigration, ethnicity, etc. Hence, it is likely to explain just a sphere of political positions, while the other areas are covered by other dimensions in the policy area, namely, the authoritarian and economic dimensions.

To illustrate this dimension, it is interesting to examine the positions taken by the Visegrád Group and the Pacific Alliance on an exclusionary issue such as migration. In the first case, Poland Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have been known for its common stance in favour of a restrictive migration and asylum policy, which attracted the outrage of a large part of European public opinion during the 2015 refugee crisis. The Prime Minister of Poland, Mateusz Morawiecki, highlighted this same facet in his speech on the occasion of the alliance's 30th anniversary: "The strength of the Visegrád Group is based today on the synergy of community action, a stronger negotiating position in the EU structures and the representation of our international strategic interests in the international arena."[32]

Hence, the Visegrád Group's aims to renegotiate the hegemonic understanding of the European identity system from the position of peripheral states, seeking the acknowledgment of Brussels of the complex and contested nature of European identity construction. As stated by Maria Leek and Viacheslav Morozov: "This attempt to protest

---

[28]   ELLNER 2001: 88–93.
[29]   KITSCHELT 2007.
[30]   KITSCHELT 2007: 1179.
[31]   DE VRIES – MARKS 2012: 185–193.
[32]   For more information see www.visegradgroup.eu/about

the current manifestation of the European Union can also be understood more broadly as the rejection of an entire European political system that organizes itself along complex practices of orientalism."[33]

Regarding the Latin American scenario, the tension generated by migration crisis occurs in the Americas, where due to the Venezuelan crisis, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru have experienced constant flows of forced and violent migration, causing humanitarian problems and insecurity. In this context, the Pacific Alliance has aimed to promote political dialogue to address Venezuela's economic, social and political challenges, by exercising leadership, promoting collective action and building strategies among the governments in power.

Socio-political governance: The authoritarian dimension

Concerning the modes chosen to make group decisions, the socio-political governance dimension must be introduced. It can be explained as the set of rules which drive behaviour in a community, and it manifests, as Kitschelt states: "The balance between compliance with a higher group authority versus members' rights to choose their own lifestyles, express individual preferences, and make them heard in the formation of collective decisions."[34] Thus, this balance involves the ideological elements recognised as the authoritarian dimension where issues such as law and order, traditionalism and social values, interact.

In this respect, the V4 nations have adopted more divergent views on governance, rule of law, the protection of the so-called liberal values and the European Union prospects. Most of the Western countries have condemned signs of illiberalism and have opposed the V4 unorthodox positions on migration, media independence and minorities, among others, as a threat to democracy and EU stability, deepening the division between west–east nations.[35]

In his article, the director of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, Emil Brix proposed inverting the polarity and stopping seeing the Visegrád Group as an example of internal opposition to start considering it as an incentive to rethink the foundations of the European Union and adapt it to the new times.

As for Latin America and the Caribbean, the region has not been oblivious to the imbricated response to the liberal international order. During the second decade of the 2000s, more conservative governments detected echoes of the anti-globalisation, anti-political liberalism and anti-international institutions phenomena observed in Europe and the United States. For instance, one of the electoral campaign promises of Colombia's former president, Iván Duque, was that his government would not sign free trade

---

[33] Leek–Morozov 2018: 122–152.
[34] Kitschelt 2007: 1178.
[35] Brady-Martin 2018.

agreements, and throughout his tenure there were multiple collisions with international organisations such as the United Nations.[36]

Attitudes pertaining to distribution: The economic dimension

The third dimension, the economic one, refers to the distribution of resources and the political postures and discourses towards the question of readjustment versus spontaneous economic order.[37] Since the 20th century, economic issues such as market regulation, redistributions and protectionism, among others, have played a significant role in the political system formation.[38] In that matter, according to several political researchers,[39] the behaviour of integration cannot be addressed based just on one economic issue. Consequently, as pointed by De Vries and Marks: "In recent years, the debate on the economic dimensionality has intensified."[40] In fact, different phenomena such as globalisation and the variations in citizens' principles, have led to the idea that the debate on the state's role in the economy is determined by rival ideologies.[41]

Despite the fact that V4 members are relatively small countries, its large population has an undeniable impact as a group. If economic figures are explored, the Visegrád Group is ranked as the fifth largest-economy in the European continent and number 12 worldwide. In terms of population, V4 represents the 22nd-largest in the world and 4th in Europe with around 64 million people.[42]

Although Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic benefit from European Union funding, the V4 has opposed the EU's relocation policy, disapproving the idea of a two-speed Europe, but also supporting cohesion policy conservation. The only Visegrád Group member that has adopted the euro is Slovakia, while the other members have no plans to join the Euro zone in the near future.[43]

Despite divergent economic policies, the Visegrád nations have a key role within EU trade. In 2017, as a result of their incorporation into EU large supply chains, collectively, the alliance became Germany's main trade partner surpassing China and the United States.[44] Currently, Germany remains the number one trade partner of the Visegrád countries.

Regarding the Pacific Alliance, Tremolada[45] affirms that the PA contributes to the fulfilment of a series of economic objectives at the national level, such as overcoming the lag that still persists compared to other economies in the region, increasing production based on the demands of export, find quality substitutes for products that previously came from the battered Venezuelan market, improve interest and investment by foreign

---

[36] Sanahuja 2019: 59–94.
[37] Kitschelt–McGann 1997.
[38] Lipset–Rokkan 1967.
[39] Bakker et al. 2012: 219–245.
[40] De Vries – Marks 2012: 186.
[41] De Vries – Marks 2012.
[42] MFA 2022.
[43] Gotev 2022.
[44] Tilford 2017.
[45] Tremolada 2014: 721–752.

economies and strengthen cooperation ties with the Asian continent. PA insertion strategy was used to project simultaneously towards several markets, including USA connections. In this line, the PA established as objectives the creation of an area of deep integration for moving progressively towards liberalisation of goods, services, capital and people.[46]

More recently, the PA agreed on the need to face the economic impact of the Covid pandemic; however, the efforts of the alliance have not been successful due to social instability. Prior to the pandemic, citizen unrest was observed in Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, a product of entrenched socio-economic inequality, corruption, violence and in some cases lack of basic resources. One of the most media covered cases was the social outbreak in Chile, in October 2019, in a country considered a "model" of successful development. Scandals between large companies and the illegal financing of politics have contributed to citizens' dissatisfaction and discontent with government institutions.[47]

Consequently, the development of alliances such as the V4 and PA might be quite effective to the extent that they are established as a way to support the institutionalisation of multilateral dialogues, which combine the ideas, knowledge and experience of the participating countries. Thus, cooperation can be reflected in a greater development of competitiveness and the economy, as well as in better bases and opportunities to combat the problems faced by the region at a social and security level.

Conclusion

As mentioned before, regional change might be influenced by the positions the government takes in formulating internal/external policies and deciding how they will be implemented. Thus, the success of regional integration groups such as the Pacific Alliance and the Visegrád Group will be largely down to the efficient implementation of domestic public policies, citizens' participation, and political leaders' roles.

To explore political positions towards national and international policies that have been taken by regional unions, there must be a focus on inner dynamics of cooperation in each organisation, discourse changes regarding public policies such as unemployment and refugees/migration, and world powers' influence on global changes. This might be achieved by comparing state policies in light of the impact of the past five years in Latin America and Europe, examining people's perceptions towards regional alliances, their role on each region and especially their influence on current peace processes, by promoting political, social and economic stability.

Finally, a fundamental element in the analysis of regional integration processes is the conceptualisation of crucial policy areas which poses different questions concerning the current worldwide social, economic and political crisis. Firstly, the relations among the different policy area issues and how their components interact. Secondly, the question of the effect of regional integration on policy areas involving external issues to examine its performance. This involves an examination of political actors, economic and political

---

[46]   Quiliconi – Salgado Espinoza 2017: 15–41.
[47]   Oyarzun 2020: 578–590.

interests within integration organisations and towards third parties. Thirdly, it is crucial to analyse the importance of each policy dimension and assess whether there is a focus on a certain group of issues while ignoring others.

References

Bakker, Ryan – Jolly, Seth – Polk, Jonathan (2012): Complexity in the European Party Space: Exploring Dimensionality with Experts. *European Union Politics,* 13(2), 219–245. Online: https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116512436995

Best, Edward (2004): *Regional Integration and (Good) Regional Governance: Are Common Standards and Indicators Possible?* Belgium: UNU Institute on Regional Integration Studies. UNU-CRIS Occasional Papers. Online: https://cris.unu.edu/sites/cris.unu.edu/files/O-2004-6.pdf

Bown, Chad – Lederman, Daniel – Pienknagura, Samuel – Robertson, Raymond (2017): *Better Neighbors: Toward a Renewal of Economic Integration in Latin America.* Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Online: https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0977-4

Brady-Martin, Molly (2018): *The Discursive Battle for Europe. The Visegrad Group and the Renegotiation of European Identity.* Master's thesis. University of Groningen.

Braun, Mats (2020): Postfunctionalism, Identity and the Visegrad Group. *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 58(4), 925–940. Online: https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12994

Cooke, Bill – Kothari, Uma (2001): The Case for Participation as Tyranny. In Cooke, Bill – Kothari, Uma (eds.): *Participation. The New Tyranny?* London: Zed Books. 1–15.

De Vries, Catherine – Marks, Gary (2012): The Struggle over Dimensionality: A Note on Theory and Empirics. *European Union Politics,* 13(2), 185–193. Online: https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116511435712

Ellner, Steve (2001): The "Radical" Thesis on Globalization and the Case of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez. *Latin American Perspectives,* 29(6), 88–93. Online: https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X0202900609

Fromkin, Victoria – Rodman, Robert – Hyams, Nina (2007): *An Introduction to Language.* Boston: Thomson Wadsworth.

Gani, Azmat (2017): The Logistics Performance Effect in International Trade. *The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics,* 33(4), 279–288. Online: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajsl.2017.12.012

Gotev, Georgi (2022): Visegrád Group Spells Out its Vision of EU's Future. *Euractiv,* 18 April 2022. Online: www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/visegrad-group-spells-out-its-vision-of-eus-future/

Haas, Ernst (1975): *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory.* Berkeley: Institute of International Studies.

Hettne, Björn – Söderbaum, Fredrik (2000): Theorising the Rise of Regionness. *New Political Economy,* 5(3), 457–472. Online: https://doi.org/10.1080/713687778

Kitschelt, Herbert (2007): Party Systems. In Boix, Carles – Stokes, Susan C. (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. Online: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566020.003.0022

Kitschelt, Herbert – McGann, Anthony (1997): *The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Online: https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.14501

Leek, Maria – Morozov, Viacheslav (2018): Identity beyond Othering: Crisis and the Politics of Decision in the EU's Involvement in Libya. *International Theory,* 10(1), 122–152. Online: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971917000148

Lipset, Seymour – Rokkan, Stein (1967): *Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments. An Introduction.* New York: Free Press.

Maldonado, Gerardo (2012): Multilateralismo, integración regional y opinión pública en América Latina: ¿la sociedad es un obstáculo? In Aravena, Francisco Rojas (ed.): *América Latina y el Caribe: Vínculos globales en un contexto multilateral complejo.* San José de Costa Rica: FLACSO-CIDOB.

MFA (2022): *Facts and Figures, Hungary's 2021/22 Presidency of the Visegrad Group.* Online: https://v4.mfa.gov.hu/page/v4-facts-infographics-tbc

Moravcsik, Andrew (1993): Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 31(4), 473–524. Online: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00477.x

Mutimer, David (1994): Theories of Political Integration. In Michelmann, Hans J. – Soldatos, Panayotis (eds.): *European Integration. Theories and Approaches.* Lanham–London: University Press of America.

North, Douglass C. (1990): *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Online: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808678

Oyarzun, Yesmar (2020): Plantation Politics, Paranoia, and Public Health on the Frontlines of America's Covid–19 Response. *Medical Anthropology Quarterly,* 34(4), 578–590. Online: https://doi.org/10.1111/maq.12623

Page, Sheila (2000): *Regionalism among Developing Countries.* London: Palgrave Macmillan. Online: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333982686

Polanyi, Karl (1994): *The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time.* Boston: S. Beacon.

Quiliconi, Cintia – Salgado Espinoza, Raúl (2017): Latin American Integration: ¿Regionalism à la Carte in a Multipolar World? *Colombia Internacional,* 92(1), 15–41. Online: https://doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint92.2017.01

Ramanzini, Haroldo Júnior (2017): Post-Hegemonic Regionalism in the Americas: Toward a Pacific–Atlantic Divide? (Book review.) *International Affairs,* 93(6), 1506–1507. Online: https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix195

Sanahuja, José Antonio (2019): Crisis de la globalización, el regionalismo y el orden liberal: el ascenso mundial del nacionalismo y la extrema derecha. *Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política,* 28(1), 59–94. Online: https://doi.org/10.26851/RUCP.28.1.3

Scott, Robert (2000): *The Facts about Trade and Job Creation.* Issue Brief. Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute. Online: www.epi.org/publication/issuebriefs_ib139/

Tilford, Simon (2017): All Is Not Well in the Visegrád Economies. *Centre for European Reform,* 29 November 2017. Online: www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/bulletin_117_st_article2.pdf

Tremolada, Eric (2014): ¿La Alianza del Pacífico facilita la inserción de Colombia en la región Asia-Pacífico? *Papel Político,* 19(2), 721–752. Online: https://doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.PAPO19-2.apfi

Van Klaveren, Alberto (2017): Regionalism in Latin America. Navigating in the Fog. *SECO/WTI Academic Cooperation Project Working Paper Series,* 25. Online: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3129996

Waltz, Kenneth (1991): Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory. In Rothstein, Robert (ed.): *The Evolution of Theory in International Relations.* Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 21–38.