

sooner or later and had the chance to admire his library. Among many outstanding guests the visit of Stith Thompson was especially memorable. Thompson, who has died since, was well over seventy when, at the invitation of Ortutay, he came to Budapest. The conversation of these two great folklorists will not be forgotten to those lucky to be present. While showing his books Ortutay slipped and fell but continued imperturbed, heedless of his broken ankle, until the doctor arrived and put his leg into plaster. He accompanied the "grand old man" of folklore research to the airport hobbling with his leg in plaster.

Hundreds of memories come to my mind but I will finish this memoir with the statement that the news of his death has travelled so fast around the world that heaps of letters from abroad started to pour in even before the obituaries had been sent from Budapest.

The truly dedicated student of folk poetry fulfills the role of interpreter: he interprets the truth of the silent masses.

Ortutay believed in the truth of those whose words he managed to save from oblivion. This is the key to his greatness as a man and the letters which mourn the man and the scholar bear witness.

Death has literally carried him off his desk. He refused to stop working, he fulfilled what he considered his duty to the last. His eyes in a face mortified by pain remained clear until the last moment, and behind his tormented features the face of the enthusiastic young student and of the mature man reappeared to his friends. His erudition and solicitude contributed to the enrichment of ethnography; he was "obsessed by reality" as he once wrote about a former fellow scholar.

Posterity will have to explore and assess everything by Gyula Ortutay for the cultural improvement of the Hungarian people. Here I limit myself to the statement that his work made Hungarian ethnographic research flourish and that he made folk poetry the common treasure of the Hungarian nation. And besides, he enriched the lives of his friends who loved and respected him.

BÉLA KÖPECZI

THE FRENCH NEW PHILOSOPHERS

The "third way" intellectual trend that emerged in the sixties, the "New Left," came out both against monopoly capitalism and existing socialism. This attitude characterized first of all the Western European "New Left," as the American one did not confront socialism either ideologically or politically.

The ideology of the West German, French, or Italian "New Leftists" was a theory full of contradictions and drawing from many sources but, in practice, not one of its versions could avoid confrontation with socialism, with Marxism in particular. In the thinking of Western European intel-

lectuals revolutionary attitude was always connected, in one way or another, with the working class, with its movements and its theory. Hence the various groups, with few exceptions, got to the point where, although usually referring to Marx and Marxism, they gave preference to Trotsky the "Leftists" of the twenties, over Lenin, to Mao Tse-tung and the ideology of the Chinese "cultural revolution." They criticized capitalist society on the basis of some ideas of Marx. From the old and new polemics within Marxism they tried to derive arguments in support of theses such as the primacy of subjective factors in the revolutionary pro-

cess, the role of the so-called militant minority in revolutionizing the masses, rejection of the concept of a united front, the highlighting of the autonomous activity of small groups, the revolution in lifestyle, rejection of bourgeois culture and even of the older culture in general, etc. To reject Marx (or any interpretation of Marxism) would have been a sin which the "New Left" as well as the leftist intellectuals in general would not have tolerated. Rudi Dutschke, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, A. Krivine and other representatives of student movements up to the middle of the seventies did not think of such a "revision"—not even when all and sundry had already been subjected to their criticism.

In the capitalist countries of Western Europe after 1968, mainly under the impact of the economic crisis, new processes led to the polarization of political forces. The "New Left" broke up in the late sixties and early seventies, a great number of its followers were integrated into capitalist society, some of them opted for anarchism, but many joined the Communist or Socialist parties. Thus it ceased to exist as a political movement and lived on in the everyday consciousness of the intellectuals and in the so-called "counterculture," as a rebellious attitude "contesting" established society.

After these antecedents, towards the end of the seventies a new tendency developed in France, that of the "New Philosophers."

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André Glucksmann, who was a professor of philosophy and Communist for a short time, then joined the "New Left" and became a Maoist, is often regarded as leader of the trend. He as well as the other Maoists, who now emphasize theory and point to the senselessness of political practice, had emphasized spontaneity and revolutionary action at one time. He first drew attention to himself in 1975 with his book *The Cook and the Cannibal*, in which, following Solzheni-

syn, he "wants to unmask" socialist reality and prove that there is no contradiction between theory and practice: Marxism has from the outset been a mistaken theory which inevitably leads to violence, oppression and inhumanity. The book argues against Lenin in the first place, and rejects his theory of the state by referring to certain anarchistic theses of the "New Left" and to Solzhenitsyn.

Glucksmann produced the greatest sensation with a book published in 1977 under the title *Les maîtres penseurs*. (A pretty close rendering of this compound title, with a certain ironical overtone, may be "Masterminds," to which we can add that *maître* in the "New Philosophy" denotes the "master," the holder of "power".) The principal message of the book is that all those philosophers who proclaimed that man is free and can rebel against the given social order, are guilty because with the idea of freedom they prepared the *state*. To add to their guilt, they did all this in the name of knowledge. The masterminds "fabricated, with a semblance of knowledge, the mental apparatus necessary to set in motion the great final solutions of the twentieth century. On a large scale. Overtly. A Nietzsche's sincerity cannot be questioned, he tells everything, so the twentieth century can read and understand him literally and can light up the lamp of Gulags in the wake of his sincere word. By raising to the level of speakableness the greed for power which stimulated, on a smaller scale and more secretly, the chiefs and sub-chiefs of the 'societies of discipline'."¹

He concludes his book with a quotation from Shakespeare's *The Tempest*:

These our actors,
As I foretold you, were all spirits, and
Are melted into air, into thin air;
And, like the baseless fabric of this vision,
The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous
palaces,

¹ André Glucksmann: *Les maîtres penseurs*. Paris, 1977, p. 310.

The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve
And, like the insubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind.²

The actors here are philosophers such as Fichte, Hegel, Marx and the above-mentioned Nietzsche, comparing them with the spirits of *The Tempest* is hazardous to say the least. Not to mention that Prospero, who pronounces these words, does not stop there but adds:

We are such stuff
As dreams are made on, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep. . . .³

In this "dream," however, the spirits help the good to victory. Therefore the pessimistic final conclusion does not at all correspond to the spirit of the Shakespearean drama.

But let us come back to Glucksmann's book. The author's starting-point is Rabelais's dream, the monastery of Thélème, where one can do as one will (Fay ce que voudras, "Do as you will" is the inscription on the façade of the monastery). According to the author this view led to a concept of liberty which resulted in just the opposite, one can only do as others will.

This conclusion includes the "New Left" anarchism of the sixties which regarded the state as a manifestation of so-called repressive society. The anti-state attitude of the "New Right," on the other hand, is directed first of all against the socialist state on the basis of a general historical and philosophical concept.

That is, the Renaissance criticism of Utopia prepares only the world of feelings. The author wants to prove first of all that all those intellectuals, particularly philosophers, who proclaimed the change, actually prepared barbarism. They formulated the *textus* which would be a peculiar passion

not only of the revolutionary but of the man of power as well. The political concepts which the twentieth century has tried to put into effect originate from this "text." It regards Marxism as one such *textus* because, although interpreted in a variety of ways today, it is referred to by everybody as if it were unique. The *textus* appears with the authenticity of knowledge, but in fact it authenticates only one thing: power, and servitude along with it.

Here again we come to a favourite thesis of the "New Left," the separation of power from the class struggle. Max Weber differentiated power from domination. In his opinion the former means a "chance" which, within social relationships, enforces its will in all circumstances, irrespective of what it is based upon. And by domination he means those possibilities and circumstances in which a specific command meets with obedience among the persons concerned. What Glucksmann has in mind is rather domination which, as interpreted by Weber and the "New Left", is built upon knowledge, and the organizational appearance of which is bureaucratism. (This distinction is worth keeping in mind because Glucksmann and the "New Philosophers" often speak of the "master.") He openly refers to a writing by a capable representative of the new French philosophy, Michel Foucault, who talks of a so-called society of discipline, a society which is governed by the law, and this law is accepted by the members of society as inner coercion on the basis of some *textus*.

The maker of the *textus* is philosophy, the function of which has changed considerably in the course of history. The author refers to Hegel, according to whom Socrates still philosophized as a private individual, but philosophy later assumed a public role, "affected the community, and even stood directly in the service of the state." In Hegel's eyes, Socrates is a kind of "contestant," a doubting spirit, yet Plato's master, who enforces the new social function of philosophy. According to Glucksmann, Hegel

² W. Shakespeare: *The Tempest*. Act IV, Scene I.

³ *Ibid.*

really identifies himself with this second Socrates, even though he accepts the "questioner" as a starting-point. "The thinkers of these past two centuries," he writes, "often remark that their starting-point is doubt, which each of them considers 'more radical' than was that of another." Occasionally they indicate that the source of doubt is Descartes (Fichte), or Socrates (Hegel and Kierkegaard), or the bourgeoisie which "opens the eyes" (Marx in the *Manifesto*). It is of little interest what screen the source of doubt is projected on. The point is that things should be gripped by the roots; the more radical the doubt the more serious is the knowledge into which it leads. The doubt is at the beginning, at the start, where one just starts from. Forward to *serious* religion, to *serious* politics, to merciless self-criticism!"⁴

He tries to justify this philosophical concept historically as well, on the one hand, by the "German misery" and, on the other, by the French Revolution, after which philosophy realized that it might be the science of revolution, or science in general. Here—and this is characteristic of his way of arguing—he does not content himself with the discussion of philosophy itself, but in a mordant tone of scepticism he poses the role of science in general as a subject of debate.

After such preliminaries he discusses the four philosophers of his own choice, the "four aces." According to him Fichte introduced the concept of philosophy as the science of revolution, and with it—beginning with the Enlightenment—its didactic function in respect of the *plebs*. Hegel created the metaphysics of philosophy, placing history in the centre in God's stead. Marx strengthened the idea of fatality by emphasizing the necessity of the class struggle and revolution. Nietzsche raised the subject of the "master" and of power in its most naked form and thereby drew his final conclusions from the evolution of German philosophy.

This entirely arbitrary explanation con-

cludes that philosophy became the science of revolution without being in need of revolution itself. Recalling debates which took place in French historiography, Glucksmann tries to prove that the French Revolution was practically pointless, one form of domination was only replaced by another, but all this did not affect the "intransparent" mass of people who were neither exploited nor exploiters.

Glucksmann's erudition cannot be questioned. But he connects up the items of his knowledge often arbitrarily, so as to support the general feeling of the disillusioned intellectual. He uses the philosophical theses by tearing them out of their logical and historical context and associating them with actual political questions. His principal device is one of "thematic leaps," which adds up to an irritating, abstract, complicated prose whose every line gives rise to contradiction not merely politically or philosophically but also from the point of view of intellectual honesty.

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This device is employed more forcibly, but rather on the level of political journalism, by Bernard-Henri Lévy, who likewise published his book *Human-faced Barbarism* in 1977. Lévy is also a professor of philosophy but at the same time an editor with Grasset Publishers, a specialist in propaganda who organizes the group of "New Philosophers." The author's basic tenet is that "one should reflect over pessimism in history." That is, one has to take a stand against the concept that history and human life have a meaning. The main issue is that of the "master," of power which is not imposed upon people from the outside but, as proved by the new psychoanalysis (Lacan, Derrida and others), because they themselves desire servitude. Thus one of the main objects of this "desire" is to shape power or the relation to it. Reality does not exist, for it is power that creates reality. Neither does history exist, for at most the forms of power change, social and

⁴ Glucksmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-88.

human relations do not. For this very reason the idea of a good society is an absurd dream. Under such circumstances there is no sense in arguing about the oppression or liberation of man.

To give an idea of this prose, let us quote a longer passage which practically sums up the above-mentioned ideas: "Here is perhaps a slogan to a fossilized generation: break the neck of optimism and its ridiculous reason, arm yourselves with pessimism, and make yourselves drunk with exasperation. Here is our tough truth which for a long time we have ripened and let bask in the black sun of our pieties: the downfall of the world, on top of which stands man, politics is pretence and the Supreme Good is unattainable. Happiness will never again be a new idea (here the reference is to the French Revolution and to Saint-Just—B.K.), except when societies break with what has made them possible ever since they have existed, and the revolution is not, and cannot be, placed on the agenda as long as History will be History, as long as Truth will be Truth. Man, even rebelling man, is just a failing god and a misfit. Therefore truth must be told some day to its vestal virgins, to its obdurate itinerant knife-grinders, who are the apostles of 'everything goes well' and of the historical happy ending. They must be identified where they are, not in the fog of the notion, but in their most concrete and most material embodiment. The parricide must be carried out, and the last step must be taken which separates us from the greatest sacrilege, and this is a *Task* for which we have to prepare: to go through the road broached thirty years ago with the criticism of Stalinism, continued in 1968 with the forgetting of Leninism, and ended provisionally in recent times with the break with Marxism: in other words, the *Name* of socialism itself must be criticized in the same form as tradition has bequeathed it to us."⁵

⁵ Bernard-Henri Lévy: *La barbarie à visage humain*. Paris, 1977, pp. 85-86.

The purpose of this summary, which may remind one of the Nietzschean style as much as of the pathetic journalism of the "New Left" (and which undeniably has a certain elegance), is no more and no less than to call in doubt, on the basis of the enumerated and unproved allegations, not only socialism but the possibility and the sense of practically all human effort.

The reason why Lévy opens fire mainly upon socialism is that in his opinion it is an "encyclopedia of lies," that in its conception there exist reality, history, evolution, there exists the proletariat of which the author speaks with "New Leftist" memories. To Lévy it is a proven certitude that capitalism will survive, for that is the natural form of existence of mankind, even if not socialism alone but capitalism as well is a certain kind of manifestation of barbarism. In his view socialism is but a miscarried sort of capitalism anyway. His pessimism is especially dark with regard to the future, for according to him in Western Europe there will emerge a barbarism which will pretend to be socialism but will take over all the "paraphernalia" of industrial societies, and there will evolve a "political siren whose body will be Capital with a Marxist head."

What is then to be done? Choose some kind of provisional morality for the intellectual who will stand up against barbarism as an artist, as a moralist, and as a metaphysicist alike.

When one reads such things, one is bound to recognize something familiar, a manifestation of irrationalism, of pessimistic philosophy of history, of anarchistic apostolizing, something which one might have thought to be not only forgotten but also rejected by humanity which has stood the tests of the twentieth century.

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It was a year before the books by Glucksmann and Lévy that two professors of philosophy, Guy Lardreau and Christian Jam-

bet, co-authored a book titled *The Angel*. This book, with its tendency towards irrationalism, called attention to another factor, notably religion. To no small extent the two Maoists owe their success to the fact that a man of letters well-known for his Rightism and his "search for God," Maurice Clavel, hailed the book with enthusiasm because it replaced reason with the "Angel," and drew a parallel between the Chinese "cultural revolution" and the movement of the first Christians.

The authors claim that reality does not exist, that it is essentially *discourse*, therefore talk about something; that history does not exist either, for it would presuppose reality. The main character of the history that nevertheless exists in some form or another is the "master," the holder of power, against whom there appears the "rebel" listening to the "Angel." Two main instruments of the "master" are "desire"—in the sense of the new psychoanalysis—and language, that of the "rebel" in the cultural revolution. "The rebel alone sets this life, which he likes so much, against political decadence and the dreadful monotony of inequality and injustice." Ultimately, he represents a kind of new asceticism, and the "Angel" embodies the big religious nothing.

Starting from an analysis of *The Angel*, the authors of the first book written against the "New Philosophy," F. Aubrard and X. Delcourt, who could not yet know the works by Glucksmann and Lévy, ask the question: how is it possible to get from Maoism to religion? The answer: "It is an abstruse question to our Maoists, who have never been other than religious. These 'Christian Leftists' have lived through their relation with Maoism in the form of faith. . . They open their little red book as they do the Catechism in search of the balm of their angelic simplicity. . . A return to the desert of intellect where there 'Christian ascetics' meet 'Maoist ascetics', the saints and the heroes, who lead along the way: *via sacra* to the immortality of the soul and to salvation. . .

Taking on the wings of Rebellion, the 'New Philosophy' joins the choir of angels."⁶ The scornful tone is entirely warranted, but their criticism, even if it reckons with certain political consequences, smacks excessively of professional philosophy.

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The appearance of the "New Philosophers" gave rise to extensive discussion in France, the more so because an organized campaign of propaganda was unleashed around it. The volte-face of the "New Left" was received with understanding by a great part of the bourgeois press but also by many intellectuals who for the past twenty years had followed all intellectual fashions. It will suffice to refer here to Philippe Sollers, editor of the periodical *Tel Quel* and a well-known novelist, who greeted Bernard-Henri Lévy's book as a herald of truth, the "first great romantic style since 1968."⁷ Roland Barthes, the famous semiotician, welcomed in an open letter Lévy's courage, his exercises in philosophy of history, and particularly his views on language as an instrument of oppression. Most indicative, as regards the general reception, is the understanding shown by the Right which had most vehemently condemned the New Left in former times. Today there may be even monarchists who find the questions raised by the "New Philosophers" at least legitimate.

The majority of those who spoke up, however, pronounced against the "New Philosophy." Criticism began as early as 1976 and its principal elements were summarized up to February 1977 by Aubrard and Delcourt, who in their afore-mentioned book condemned the methodology and policy of the "New Philosophers" in the name of philosophy. The well-documented work is, according to the authors, "a critical in-

⁶ François Aubrard and Xavier Delcourt: *Contre la "nouvelle philosophie."* Paris, 1977, pp. 139-140.

⁷ *Le Monde*, Nov. 12, 1977.

terjection against the wave of spiritualism which submerges contemporary thinking and policy, against the 'New Philosophy', against stupidity, thus for philosophy itself."⁸

After the publication of the books by Glucksmann and Lévy, criticism became even sharper and now deals with more general issues such as relationship to science, to history, to progress. Also many non-Marxists, ranging from Sartre to Lévi-Strauss, rejected the views of the "New Philosophers." And their views were rejected even more forcefully by those who claim to be Marxists, although not today members of the French Communist Party. (Jean-Pierre Vigier, *Le Monde*, Oct. 16-17, 1977, and others.) The debaters accuse the "New Philosophers" of being against science and progress first of all, but criticize their political orientation as well.

The political orientation is exhibited with brutal openness by the daily *Le Figaro*, which voices the hope that "... the 'New Philosophers', preserving the Parisian style, will put an end to the Marxianizing obsession of the intellectuals. And let us admit," it goes on, "that public opinion in France, and beyond the frontiers, is enthusiastic about the political aspects of the 'New Philosophy': its questioning of the Soviet system, its indirect challenge to the parties of the Left."⁹

Why should one feel preoccupied by this phenomenon? Not only because socialists try to keep track of Western ideological discussions, but also because they believe they are facing a new kind of politico-ideological orientation which is intent on reversing the inclination of Western intellectuals towards socialism and Marxism, and because this tendency shows clearly where anti-Marxism is leading to. Many intellectuals

pin great hopes on the unity of the leftist parties and on political change in Western Europe. Anti-Marxism is what representatives of the technocratic ideology professed, and the policy built upon it does not seem opportune under such circumstances. The "New Left" failed as a political movement and ideology capable of attracting wider strata of intellectuals. So there was need for a plain philosophy which broke not only with Marxism but with all sorts of Marxianizing hustle—in modern form. The emergence of the "New Philosophers" who ideologically all came from the "New Left" but got into contradiction with their former politics, and whose self-criticism and new ideology may suggest a new intellectual attitude, made this possible.

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Already towards the end of the sixties, disillusion with the "New Left" aroused the interest of many in the early Greek philosophers, Zen Buddhism, primitive Christianity, in various medieval heresies, the modern philosophy of Nietzsche, Bergson and Heidegger, in the new interpretations of psycho-analysis (Derrida, Lacan).

After such intellectual antecedents the "New Philosophers" elaborated a pessimistic philosophy of history. Their basic tenet is that reality does not exist, and consequently there is no point in trying to know the world and especially to change it. Neither does history exist; all that now exists existed before and will continue to exist. Mankind is urged by the desire for domination, and servitude is a natural condition. At most there are rebellious elements, such as intellectuals who cultivate metaphysics, ethics and arts. Their task is to fight science which professes the knowability of the world, to fight any ideology that can see the sense of history and accepts the idea of progress—and to fight, last but not least, policy built upon this ideological basis. The chief enemy, of course, is Marxism, for theoretic-

⁸ Aubrard-Delcourt, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

⁹ *Le Figaro*, Oct. 25, 1977.

cally it combines into a system all things which during the past centuries science has accumulated in outlook and in actual results, and which furnish a basis for changing society. Therefore they want to discredit Marxism not only philosophically but morally, too: they want to suggest that socialism amounts to barbarism.

Socialists are not horrified by all this. Neither politically nor philosophically do they want to overrate the significance of this tendency, its ideological and literary value. The views of the "New Philosophers" can, of course, produce an effect in the ranks of the bourgeois intellectuals or even beyond them. Their action, however, can lead to a clarification of the lines of division in poli-

tics, in science, and in the arts alike. The "New Philosophers" cast doubt not only upon socialism or Marxism but upon reason, upon science, and social progress in general. They make it clear that the pessimistic philosophy of history which builds upon anarchism can coexist well with conservatism. Looking at the "New Philosophy" from here in Hungary it seems that it is a trend disconnected from reality and disregarding the actual social processes. This trend could only have come about as a result of the despair manifested by the completely disabused intellectuals of Western Europe. By its fatalistic form it draws our attention to the principal human alternatives in science, society and culture.

RÓZSA KULCSÁR

MARRIAGE AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

Several turning-points influence the further way of life of an individual. One of the most important is marriage not only for the individual but also from the angle of society.

In the past marriage has played a greater role in the life of women than in that of men. The individual and social position of men enabled them to have their objects in life in different fields, but the main objects in the life of women realized themselves in marriage, in the role of wife and mother. At a time when most women were dependents, their place in society was determined, until marriage, by their father, and after marriage by the social position of their husband. In these circumstances marriage could be one of the means for a person to rise from her environment and to climb socially instead of achieving social status as an individual. The style of life of a woman depended on the chances offered first by her father, then by her husband. In marital relationships of this type it was natural that the husband had a better

education and a higher post than his wife (if the latter worked at all), and also naturally the husband's earnings constituted the material resources of the family. With the growing economic activity of women the decisive role of marriage in a woman's life has somewhat diminished because gainful employment ensures a livelihood to more and more women, and along with this, a woman's own work has a greater role in the determination of her social status. However, there are still many views on marriage and the family according to which it is primarily the husband's task "to make a career," and his position determines the status of the family, while the wife, in the "division of labour" within the family, is first and foremost wife and mother.

Qualifications as Differentiating Influence

How does this unequal "leading role" in the family manifest itself in marriage