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Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions

Kóczy, Á. László (2014) Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions. Műhelytanulmányok = Discussion Papers (31). Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest. ISBN 978-615-5447-50-1

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Item Type: Book
Subjects: J Political Science / politológia > JA Political science (General) / politológia általában
SWORD Depositor: MTMT SWORD
Depositing User: MTMT SWORD
Date Deposited: 25 Nov 2014 14:21
Last Modified: 25 Nov 2014 14:21
URI: http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/18551

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