Central Europe at the Crossroads

What Future Awaits the Region?

by

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Preface

Ten years after a number of central and east European states joined the European Union, the region is again in flux, with some countries having weathered some turbulent economic storms and others having to face considerable challenges. New security uncertainties have also arisen, prompting many observers to wonder about the region's future.

With this in mind, I recommend this study by Tamás Novák, currently Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University; and Deputy Director of the Institute of World Economics in Budapest. He provides a thorough look at the region's challenges and opportunities, and offers some thoughtful conclusions and recommendations.

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Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has experienced a very deep economic and political transformation since the beginning of the 1990s. The early years of transition were characterized by big hopes for a quick and successful development. The opportunity for democratic transformation and catching-up was opened wide for these countries. The international community, including the EU and the United States, showed interest in the transformation of the region for a number of reasons. From a geopolitical perspective, the transformation was of tremendous importance, as it confirmed the end of the Cold War; the bipolar global system was replaced first by a unipolar superpower system and later gave way to a multipolar or a new bipolar system. This also signaled the weakness of the Soviet Union (and later Russia), as it was not able to prevent this transformation and was soon mired in a serious and long-lasting economic and political crisis that undermined its international position. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union during the 1990s, Russia remained very weak, both economically and politically. The power vacuum and the transformation in Central Europe made the establishment of a new international economic and security structure possible. The new economic and political pattern that started to develop within the region was based on the liberal market economy model, with the objective of opening up markets and integrating the region into the world economy and the North Atlantic security structure. Not least because of the political and economic changes in this part of the world, thought-provoking theories on the new world order and future global transformation were formulated, including the *end of history*\(^1\) or the *clash of civilizations*\(^2\). By introducing the market economy framework and adopting the principles of democracy, it was believed that countries would automatically enter upon a path leading to a rapid convergence with the richer countries after a relatively short transitional period.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) “From Latin America to Eastern Europe, from the Soviet Union to the Middle East and Asia, strong governments have been failing over the last two decades. And while they have not given way in all cases to stable liberal democracies, liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe.” Francis Fukuyama, *The end of history and the last man* (Maxwell Macmillan, 1992), p.XIII.

\(^2\) “During the cold war the world was divided into the First, Second and Third Worlds. Those divisions are no longer relevant. It is far more meaningful now to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems in terms of their level of economic development but rather in terms of their culture and civilization”. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs*, Summer (1993), p.23.

\(^3\) Such a belief explains the ‘one-size fits all’ approach of the Washington Consensus on which the approach to the transformation of the region was based and which was unanimously supported by international organizations and the majority of scholars. On the other hand, the original idea of the Washington Consensus was based on the poor Latin American economies, not East Central Europe. John Williamson, “What Should the World Bank
Systemic changes and sudden liberalization caused the collapse of the domestic economies and a surge of unemployment due to competitiveness problems and market loss. The transformational recession was further burdened by the lack of institutions able to manage the transition. This resulted in massive bankruptcies during the early years of transition as part of the structural change. Several non-viable firms with state aid survived that later prompted costly consolidation programs. Consumers instantaneously wanted to satisfy pent up demand after decades of scarcity, creating very profitable opportunities for foreign firms selling consumer goods. In addition to flooding the market with imported products, good investment opportunities opened up for large firms to take over domestic markets from insolvent local firms through privatization or create export-oriented greenfield investments attracted by cheap labor and cost related incentives also increased from early nineties. This rush of Western business into the region resulted in several positive structural changes and a number of negative consequences described elsewhere in several studies and analyses.

The significance of the transition from a geopolitical, security, macroeconomic and business perspectives made Central Europe a challenging and interesting region to analyze for at least a decade. The broader East European region also attracted international attention. In South East Europe, the breakup of Yugoslavia resulted in a chain of unexpected events in Europe and led to unsolved political and economic difficulties including the birth of still non-viable states. Political and economic developments in the territory of the former Soviet Union, not to mention political changes that could threaten the democratic transitions, like the one in Slovakia during the Meciar government, remained complex. North Atlantic political, economic, and security policy interest was very strong during this period and resulted in active involvement in the region’s affairs with the aim of stabilization.

But the situation later changed and around the millennium international attention started to turn to other important issues such as terrorism or the rapid growth of several large emerging markets threatening the leading role of advanced countries in global competition and international organizations. The new developments slowly but continuously changed international power relations and attracted much broader interest than the economic and


political developments in Central Europe. When membership in the European Union had become certain for several countries in the region, their importance declined even further. Even the term Central Europe started to lose its relevance and the region was sometimes considered as Eastern Europe, or simply as the EU new member states. For a while there were expectations that new member states would frame a common Central European interest within the EU. But it soon became clear that the formulation of common interests and their successful coordination was relevant only for a limited number of issues.

The first years of EU membership saw diverging economic performance within the region. Some countries achieved exceptionally dynamic economic growth (sometimes above ten percent), increasing external imbalances (double digit current account deficits in the Baltic States) or continuously high budget deficits (in Hungary). Catching-up prospects became very different. After the economic crisis struck in 2008-2009, small countries in Central Europe were seriously hit, leading to very deep recessions in the Baltic States and sovereign debt crises calling for IMF-EU programs in several countries. When the crisis in Greece and other Eurozone countries started to threaten the existence of the Eurozone itself, previously unimaginable and very costly rescue programs soon became unavoidable solutions for saving some countries from bankruptcy. In particular the so-called Visegrad four countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), but also the larger CEE region was overshadowed by these issues as well. Increasing negligence towards the region and the sometimes very rigid approach of EU policymakers to handling regional peculiarities gave rise to growing dissatisfaction with the EU itself. Voices questioning the success and rationale of more than

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7 The term Central Europe may be justified if it has a different economic or geopolitical significance from East and West. By entering the EU, it was thought that these countries are would undeniably become part of the West, and no longer Central Europeans, but rather Hungarians, Slovaks, etc. This explains continuous efforts for example to find common ground for joint interests in the V4 cooperation.

8 For example the Visegrad four did not elaborate any priority of as great importance as integration into the EU and the NATO during the pre-accession period. The most obvious case for individual approaches was observed during the last days of accession negotiations. There are initiatives in energy policy, Eastern Partnership, or the Western Balkans, and in common research areas. However, none of them has achieved real breakthroughs. In addition, they have not been able to formulate strong proposals regarding the future of the EU. See for example: Strategic issues for the EU10 countries main positions and implications (Feps-MTA KRTK, 2012). http://vki.hu/kiadvanyok.html On the other hand, the strategy and operation of the Visegrad Fund is a good example for joint initiatives, projects and researches in areas crucial for the V4.


10 One of the examples is the handling of the issue of private pension funds (created in late nineties in Central Europe on the urging of the OECD) “The European Union said a request by nine member states to account for the cost of pension overhaul in debt and deficit calculations is “not possible” to accommodate, which may spur countries to reverse changes. European Union Economy and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn in a letter to the countries said that while the request is “justified,” it’s “not possible” to accept it under the current accounting system.” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-22/eu-says-pension-accounting-change-sought-by-poland-hungary-not-possible.html. This approach did not improve the image of the EU. Ironically, later the EU made changes in accounting possible. But by that time it was late: several countries introduced measures that affected or even destroyed the three pillar pensions systems. This was a clear example of misunderstanding what unexpected reactions can be expected from governments under pressure in Central Europe.
twenty years of transformation and EU accession started to become stronger. In addition, the
divergent macroeconomic performance of the region’s countries further weakened the almost
non-existent solidarity across them. Deepening domestic economic problems and discontent
with international crisis management led to more active government intervention in several
countries. Some countries embarked on tough restructuring programs in order to rapidly
adjust to the new circumstances and introduce the euro.

All these changes have led to the (re)emergence of new-old issues in the region and to
problems that many thought had already been solved. Skepticism regarding the success of
economic transformation increased; negative perceptions of the EU’s role in the catching-up
of Central European countries emerged, lending space to very divergent strategies regarding
relations with the EU. In several countries, populism and nationalism began gaining strength.
In addition, crisis management in the EU may be judged as a very weak, incompetent and slow attempt that is unable to address the basic problem of development heterogeneity within it. Development and competitiveness problems make the operation of the Eurozone far from smooth and, instead of convergence, the position of countries using the single currency in international competition continues to diverge, in some cases without any realistic hope of catching up in the current framework. The trends in the eurozone and crisis management may lead to the conclusion that the future marginalization of the EU in world economic and political affairs, also forecast well before the crisis, may be quicker and deeper than expected. This would mean that the EU role as an anchor in international political and economic affairs for smaller, weaker neighboring or newly acceded countries abandoned. This would also weaken the attractiveness of the European Union for current and potential future members alike. Parallel to the not so promising economic developments in the EU, the (temporary) crisis resistance of some emerging countries governed in many cases by autocratic politics may convince some country leaders that economic and political relations have to be more independent from the declining west (EU) and replaced by strong ties with fast growing emerging regions.¹¹

Given this changing framework, for outside analysts, the region shows clear divergences,
while inside the region many feel that the transformation has been unsuccessful and that EU
accession has not answered previously expressed hopes. Instead of stimulating future-oriented
debates within the EU, some Central European countries have looked more and more inward.
The examples today are Hungary, where the basic principles of democracy have been

¹¹ Dariusz Kałan, *A beautiful future for Central Europe: Hungary’s regional policy in the period 2010-2013*, “The Orban government has made enhanced Asian ties a cornerstone of its foreign policy and its diplomatic efforts have concentrated increasingly on reinforcing the country’s contacts with a large part of the continent, from Northeast Asia through Central Asia and Transcaucasia, to the Persian Gulf.” *PISM Policy Paper* 28 (76), (October 2013), p.2.
questioned\textsuperscript{12}, or the Czech Republic, where the already inward looking political character was fortified by difficulties with political struggles.\textsuperscript{13} These two countries, in particular, have the worst long term economic prospects in the V4 region at the moment. But similar problems—although for different reasons—can be observed in other “new” member states like Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria or Croatia.

One might say that there is nothing special about these economic and political ups and downs in the region and, in previous decades, these countries have experienced similar economic and/or political problems. The ranking among the countries in terms of success has always been changing. The best-performing country can easily lose its positive image either due to internal political conditions (such as Slovakia during the second half of the 1990s), or economic problems (as in the Czech Republic at the end of the 1990s or Slovenia today). And sometimes economic and political problems cause dramatically worsening perceptions of the country. Government changes are easily able to turn countries here and in the wider East European region in a completely different direction. This should be taken into account when analyzing future prospects in Central Europe.

Recently several attempts have been made to theoretically describe the political and economic systems that have developed in the Central European region. The major lines of classification are based on relative endowment with production factors, a country’s initial point of development and social structure. From this point of view, the Visegrad countries certainly present a relatively coherent group in CEE, although even within this smaller circle of countries, significant differences exist regarding policy objectives, economic policy strategy, etc. Their peculiar problems are related to their special development model, sometimes called “embedded neoliberalism”\textsuperscript{14}. Others may argue that the pattern of the division of labor is driven by the interest of larger and stronger partners being either other countries or foreign firms and resulting in an ever-increasing dependence. Several papers deal with the different forms of capitalism that have developed in CEE and an increasing number of studies refer to the dependent market economy position of Central Europe.\textsuperscript{15}


\textsuperscript{14} See: Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits: \textit{Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery} (Cornell University Press 2012).

\textsuperscript{15} See for example: Andreas Nölke and Arjan Vliegenthart, “Enlarging the varieties of capitalism: The Emergence of Dependent market Economies in East Central Europe,” \textit{World Politics}, 61, 4, (2009), pp.670-702. “...doubt may still be raised as to whether stabilization of the current position in the world economy is really desirable, given that few countries would explicitly choose an export-oriented development path with a medium
theory tries to create a descriptive framework for the CEE countries, but has several variants within the region. In fact, it varies from country to country. The differentiation of Europe according to development paths is widely discussed by historians as well.  

Detailed comparative analyses from other scholars based on the role of foreign capital, the pattern of international integration and the different political and economic transformations also point to the great diversities across the former socialist region. The way a country in the CEE region integrates into the international economy is crucial from the perspective of its economic development path.

Dependency mostly considers trade relations and financing (foreign direct investment and foreign financial institutions). Dependency, however, is not at all a new phenomenon in Central Europe. In fact, Central Europe’s entire economic history is about dependence, most importantly from the beginnings of the emergence of the capitalist economic system. This was related to the division of labor between West and East, and within the CEE region, between more developed and less developed parts. It was hoped this dependent structure would ease during the last period of socialism when countries specialized within the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) and new industries were developed, many of which depended on cheap energy and raw materials imported from the Soviet Union. The scarcity of capital and the lack of technology imports, however, prevented an upgrading of the competitiveness of these countries.

After the systemic changes, the previous West-East pattern of dependency emerged again. But the current dependencies, probably for the first time in the economic history of Central Europe, were supposed to help some parts of the region close the development gap with the economic core of European development, as long as adequate policies were pursued. Upgrading and a measure of success are clearly visible in current export structures.

level of technology under the domination of foreign capital.” But obviously, the origins of this framework go back to Prebisch, Perroux or even earlier to Marx.


18 On the other hand, by now it seems certain that the existence of a large foreign-owned financial sector has played a stabilizing role, as the owners “saved” local subsidiaries in several countries while Slovenia, which had the largest state ownership share in its financial sector, faced the tremendous burden of consolidation in the banking sector. For more on this, see: Slovenia: 2013 Article IV Consultation—Concluding Statement of the Mission. IMF, Ljubljana, October 28, 2013.

19 There has been a continuous improvement of the export structure in Central Europe during the transition years. The fastest change took place in Hungary, followed by the Czech Republic and later Slovakia and Poland after the millennium. The value of high tech exports (as defined by the OECD) in percent of GDP in 2011 was 16.5% in Hungary and 11.7 in the Czech Republic, while in Germany it was 5.3%. Regarding the high tech share in the total volume of exports in Hungary it was 17.3%, in the Czech Republic 15% and in Germany only slightly above 10%. (Own calculations based on OECD data).
the presence of technology intensive multinational firms, no similar performance could have been achieved.20

Regional differences in Europe (and today within the European Union) have been a permanent issue on the continent. Its origin goes back to the well-known concept of two Europes.21 Immanuel Wallerstein’s type classification of European countries, including the peripheral and/or semi peripheral positions (of CEE and Southern Europe), also serves as a credible theoretical background for understanding the unequal and subordinated situation of the region in international relations. The history of CEE was entirely different from that of the West. As a result, the region was not able to follow the rise of the modern, merchant, industrializing Western capitalism, and shares a number of common characteristics. From the point of view of the international division of labor, the region itself became the raw material and food-supplying periphery, preserving traditional elements, and old social layers and structures. This dividing line between West and East strongly separates the two regions.

Speeding up nation-building and industrialization was the core objective of Authoritarian, Fascist and Communist regimes in the region in order to catch up at least partially with the more advanced, competitive West. However, none of these state-driven attempts succeeded. A Europe of different speeds is the official acknowledgement of the historically and institutionally existing differences in Europe. From another perspective, Francis Fukuyama classifies the concept of two Europes as a basically different path between Northern and Southern countries, defined by a clientilistic and a non-clientilistic Europe.22

What makes the case of Central Europe interesting is that it is the area where both concepts of the two Europes meet. Economic backwardness can be burdened by the tradition of clientilism.23 Economic backwardness can be mitigated with certain successes in catching up. But with the slow rise of living standards and the “propensity to clientalism”, an uncertain international environment can be the source of increasing risks to democracy and to long term success in catching up. The problem is further complicated by the recent emergence of North-South divergence regarding prudent fiscal policy and competitiveness in Europe. The junction of these diverging lines in Central Europe makes the fate and future of this region far more

20 A very telling example is the shockingly small share of high tech in Greek exports reflecting the competitiveness and structural problems there. In Greece the share of high tech products in total exports was only 1.7%, while the export/GDP ratio was also very small (27%) in 2011.
21 From an historical point of view, the idea of two Europes, West and East goes back to the historiography of Leopold von Ranke. See: Leopold von Ranke (Roger Wines ed.) The Secret of World History: Selected Writings on the Art and Science of History (1981).
22 Francis Fukuyama, “The two Europes,” American interest, December 5, 2012.
23 “There is a real degree of accountability in a clientelistic system: the politician has to give something back to supporters if he or she is to stay in power, even if that is a purely private benefit.” Ibid.
risky than anticipated by anyone a decade ago and should now attract greater attention from scholars, politicians and international actors alike.

Today the Central European region faces challenges that many had thought already resolved. This analysis tries to frame the future of the region in the context of change in the international economic and geopolitical environment, and within the countries themselves. The future is far more vague than it was at the beginning of the transformation or upon entering the European Union. I intend to elaborate on the most important trends from the recent past in the Central European region. These will serve as a basis for framing predictions of the region’s future. At the end, I will define a scenario that identifies the most likely trends in crucial areas of development. The focus is on the four Visegrad countries (V4). But other countries will also be referred to where relevant.

2. A New Framework in Central Europe

As the development in CEE transition proves, mistakes committed in previous decades and centuries could easily be repeated under a completely different international economic and political environment. Short term political objectives and long term development requirements frequently contradict each other. In this part of the world political competition can be totally counterproductive where longer term economic growth is concerned. In an extreme case this could lead to wars like the ones during the nineties in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In other cases, political fights between the dominant parties and a no agreement policy of their leaders, or misinterpretations of international developments and the understanding of domestic capabilities can prevent the favorable international environment from being translated into sizeable catching up.

Since the beginning of the transformation period, more than two decades have passed. The V4 countries have been integrated into the European Union. But perceptions of the success of more than two decades of transformation have changed substantially over the last five years. After a period of quick catching up, the last few years have brought slow economic growth and falling or slightly rising living standards with sharpening income differences. The Eurozone has fallen into recession and its breakup has become a possible alternative regarding its future. Emerging markets24 have exhibited an economic growth that has changed the global economic power balance between continents and regions. These trends and their extrapolation into the future25 create an environment where Western values and their future

24 There are several classifications of emerging markets, but from a geopolitical perspective, fast growing countries are the most important and can change global economic and political balances because of their size and high rates of growth. Generally, these countries are: China, India, Turkey, Brazil etc.

25 See: OECD, Looking to 2060: Long-term growth prospects (2012), etc.
attractiveness can be questioned along different lines of reasoning in the wider Central European region. The following points highlight some of these divergent lines of reasoning:

1. Small countries like the Central Europeans that would like to increase living standards should establish strong economic ties with faster growing regions. The EU certainly does not belong to this group;

2. International corporations that have invested in Central Europe only pump out their “extra” profits and disregard the true interest of the countries in which they have invested;

3. The European Union uses double standards when applying economic and political rules and regulations – “new” and weak members have to exhibit better performance than large countries; for example, far less public debt is tolerated\textsuperscript{26};

4. The whole transformation has been based on ideologies and principles that were not in the interest of the Central European countries, but only in the interest of the West (e.g. the basic principles of the Washington consensus, supported by renowned western, mostly American advisors);

5. International organizations also apply double standards when preparing their reports and analyses.

The other important trend observed in the region relates to democracy and the market economy. It has been a common belief among decision-makers and scholars that one of the biggest advantages of EU accession was the guarantee it provided against basic economic and political backsliding in the region through integration into a democratic, pluralist international order. It was also expected that North Atlantic integration would strengthen democracy and the liberal market economy and, by doing so, the Central European region would serve as a stable border region of the European Union delivering the message of the stability of democratic institutions and economic prosperity to the neighboring, less developed countries. However, the economic crisis that hit the European Union has seriously placed its future in question. And doubts were also raised about the ability of the EU to control its own internal economic and political processes. These doubts have led to increasing skepticism about the future of the European Union. Skepticism is coupled with the devastating impact of the strict conditions of financial stabilization in several member countries. Economic hardship can very easily lead to the reemergence of populism and nationalism; problems that, under the surface, continue to be characteristic of many CEE countries and as historical experience has taught,

\textsuperscript{26} For example, Hungarian public debt is less than the EU average (and the highest among “new members”) but a very strict macroeconomic policy was expected from it. Nor was it permitted to smooth or slow deficit reduction. (In order to be fair, we have to mention that Hungary has run a budget deficit above 3% for a very long period of time). At the same time, the average of public debt in the Eurozone is on the rise, and many countries run public debts larger than their annual GDP.
can be very extreme in the region. *All of these changes have weakened support for democracy and liberal capitalism in a number of countries.*

There is an additional interesting issue that, in contrast to previous experience and what was forecast in extreme financial and macroeconomic imbalances leading to long-term restructuring policies (“reforms”) in several countries, short-term political objectives prevailed. *Probably the right terminology for capturing the core of this approach is the “postponement oriented” policy.* An opposite strategy is for example the one that has been introduced by the Baltic States after the economic crisis revealed unsustainable economic imbalances. Postponement policy can be very risky, as this is the path by which negative consequences are accumulated, making the choosing of rational and long-term oriented policies even more difficult. From the accumulation of negative impacts, there is a straight line to populism, nationalism and hostile attitudes towards third countries or international organizations, including the European Union. Several authors have pointed out that the result of these approaches is stagnating growth and structural distortion. On the other hand, a number of researchers have tried to demonstrate that the position of countries trapped on this development path can be changed, but only with significant effort, and the necessary steps can be very different depending on the phase of economic development and the international economic environment.

*Besides external and internal economic and political challenges, one additional factor relating to the mentality of the population should also be mentioned that more and more influences policy decisions.* Just to mention an example for the importance of mentality issues in economic and political transformation: Hungary’s development during the 1970s and 1980s made this country well advanced by the beginning of the 1990s compared to its fellow

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27 It has been a common belief that, in some countries, painful political decisions are only taken if there is no other solution. For example, macroeconomic imbalances may only be tackled adequately when there is an increased risk of sovereign default.

28 The traces of postponement policy can be easily found in Hungary where political fights led governing elites not to introduce stabilization oriented economic policy measures for several years. More details on that: Ivan T. Berend, *Europe in Crisis: Bolt from the Blue?* (Taylor and Francis, Routledge, 2012), pp.42-46.

29 For example see: Anders Aslund, “Putin's Conservative State Capitalism”, *The Moscow Times*, December 17, 2013.

30 The proposed solutions can be classified either with respect to the theories that put an emphasis on domestic markets and resources, thus suggesting a protectionist approach (each of today’s strongest economies started their development applying this strategy) or on rapid integration into the global economy. Neither solution has been a panacea for less developed countries. But with the help of the international environment (direct political or economic support from larger countries, or international capital flows) a sizeable catching up has been achieved. Countries that can be mentioned include Asian Tigers, Finland, Estonia, Slovakia etc. Each case is different. What is common is the adequacy of their economic policy strategies.

31 In V4 countries this has much to do with the generous welfare state agreements developed during the eighties and at the beginning of the nineties in order to counterbalance the negative implications of marketization. This system made the V4 countries fundamentally different from the Baltic States or the countries in South Eastern Europe. See more detailed analysis on this: Dorothea Böhle and Béla Greskovits, *Capitalist diversity on Europe’s periphery* (Cornell University Press, 2012), pp.154-161.
countries, because of the appearance of the first forms of market and enterprise at that time. At the same time, it also meant very weak regulation that made people believe they could use state properties for their own profit (that was the case in initial forms of private enterprise), and there was no need to pay taxes (instead of paying taxes that is an unnecessary burden for the entrepreneur, and makes the product or service much more expensive to the customers it is much more profitable to avoid paying taxes). Another example: if people believe that their problems are not associated with their faults, but only those of others, then consolidation within the society (between losers and winners) and between countries that have long disputes over several questions (ethnic minorities, territorial problems), and making concessions and agreements between them, can become almost impossible. The problem with people’s thinking and the institutions that do not operate properly can make catching up or successful development very difficult, i.e. the price to be paid for misguided policies is extremely high. If people were always ready to blame somebody else for their problems, this feeling would easily be exploited by politicians. This has a long history in Central and Eastern Europe and it has much to do with the significant role the state has played in modernization and industrialization over the past one and a half centuries. The pattern of development followed a top down approach and lacked organic economic development and nation building. People felt that the problem of development was a result of external involvement or the negligence of the region when it needed help. In fact the people in the region have always been betrayed by the large Western or Eastern empires or coalitions of smaller countries. According to this reasoning, only a strong state able to protect national interests and only its intervention can be a solution to their existential problems.

This mentality also denied the benefits of competition and acknowledged political and economic clientelism as the most efficient path to success. The economic and political transformation could have led to the marginalization of this mentality. But the slower than expected rise in incomes and later the strong impact of the economic crisis prevented deeper mentality change. As a result, openness to state intervention in the economy and everyday life has remained strong, a feeling that can easily be manipulated by local politicians. On the other hand, it is false to say that this type of mentality cannot be changed. The Baltic states are clear evidence of this. They have been very forthright in implementing adjustments at the expense of political popularity and the public has accepted the hardships associated with the chosen method of crisis management. Even despite government changes, politicians have been adamant in executing the stabilization with the final aim of introducing the euro as a guarantee against external financial shocks.\textsuperscript{32} I am afraid, however that this is not entirely the

\textsuperscript{32} For more details on that see: Anders Åslund, \textit{The Last Shall Be the First: The East European Financial Crisis} (Washington, DC.: The Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2010), pp.111-114.
case in the Visegrad countries, where the picture is much more complicated and the
differences between the countries from every aspect are increasing instead of converging.

The changing attitudes, perceptions and behavior of Central European countries are a part of a
larger transformation process that was speeded up by the economic crisis of 2008. A number
of important global trends have shaped the future international economic and political
environment, and these should be carefully analyzed. Without taking them fully into account,
no country can elaborate a realistic future-oriented economic and international strategy.
Understanding international trends is becoming more and more important for Central Europe,
which covers a small region and is becoming ever smaller and smaller regarding its share in
global output. And the countries therein, probably with the exception of Poland, cannot
influence international economic and political developments.

Given these interdisciplinary factors behind the economic, political, mentality and social
developments in Central Europe, first of all, I look at the most important economic trends that
CEE countries have to be aware of when elaborating their domestic and international
strategies.  

1. The shift in the global economy continues. The advanced countries are expected to face
slow economic growth. But their growth prospects may be better than expected due to their
access to financing and new technologies. The availability of means of development, at least
in some of the more prosperous EU countries, is coupled with new promising initiatives
aimed at speeding up growth. The dividing line between advanced countries regarding their
economic development is sharpening, as is already evident in data for the eurozone countries
and the need to consolidate public debt. This will limit prospects for outstanding performance
in a number of countries. On the other hand, the stability of growth in emerging economies
and their continuous quick catching up cannot be taken for granted in the years ahead. This
expectation is supported by economic development experiences as well, according to which it
is much easier to reach a medium development level from a very low starting point, than to
achieve significant catching up from a middle-income level. Between 1950 and 2010 the
overall per capita income differences between advanced and developing countries has not
decreased, and the gap between the advanced and the poorest countries has reached record

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33 The list of decisive trends can be extended. I have emphasized those that are likely to influence the next
decade of development in Central Europe most. For an interesting analysis regarding the global megatrends sees
for example: Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (National Intelligence Council 2012-001, December

34 One of these initiatives is the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. “T-TIP will aim to boost
economic growth in the United States and the EU and add to the more than 13 million American and EU jobs
already supported by transatlantic trade and investment,” White House Fact Sheet: Transatlantic Trade and
high levels.\textsuperscript{35} Obviously there have been countries or country groups that have successfully decreased these development differences, but the picture is very complex.

2. \textit{The future of the EU} is a decisive question not just for the Central European countries, but also regarding its global implications. The EU has played a very important and undeniable role in anchoring the region’s countries. A few years ago it was believed that EU membership had the disciplinary force required for real convergence within the EU. And this has occurred in a number of countries. A similar expectation relates to the introduction of the euro. Although the future of the whole EU is much more uncertain than it was a few years ago, it is quite probable that the core of the Eurozone will try to further deepen integration. In spite of the expectations of several scholars during the Greek crisis, the euro has survived. Whether other countries will join this core may form the most important element of future economic policy strategy in the region.

3. \textit{The future development of the multilateral international institutional system} and the consequences related to this are also a key questions. If regional trade agreements become more and more important and a major shift takes place in the international trading system, countries with development and catching up objectives should focus on the utilization of opportunities connected to this. For small countries it is worth considering active participation in those multilateral or regional initiatives that bear the potential for rapid development. What is almost certain is that the overall openness of the global economy will not decrease. International firms continue to segment their production, leading to even stronger ties between countries. The further strengthening of network economy prevents tariff increases and the increase of protectionism at global level. From this perspective, countries that try to limit international competition by direct or indirect protectionist measures probably worsen their economic development prospects.\textsuperscript{36} The level of openness will be the decisive international economic key for the Central European countries. Their choice of economic model for the next decade has to observe this condition.

4. \textit{Technology development, innovation and education play an increasing role in successful economic and social development}. Technology has always been of key importance for countries to achieve successful or unsuccessful levels of global competition. Economic theory also acknowledges the increasing role of continuous technology development as one of the most important sources of competitiveness growth.\textsuperscript{37} The speed of technological development


\textsuperscript{36} See more on this in the 2013 World Investment Report, which describes the current international economic development by its title: \textit{Global value chains: investment and trade for development}. The existence of global value chains explains the rare appearance of open protectionist measures, despite the deep negative economic impact of the economic crisis.

\textsuperscript{37} I could not agree more with the early explanations of the importance of technology and innovation; “The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational development from the craft shop and
is increasing, product and technology cycles are becoming shorter, and increasing global competition bolsters the demand for new technologies and innovation. Having the most modern technologies instead of cheap labor within the boundaries of a country and large pools of educated people who can invent new technologies are preconditions for any substantial future catching-up. Besides government policies that support the mass inflow of modern technology, high-level education is the other starting point. This has undeniably been one of the most evident consequences of the global transformation in recent decades and the technological changes underlying this process. Obtaining competitive technologies is one of the most important national interests of less developed countries. Long-term sustainable catching-up for Central European countries is more and more conditioned by the availability of the latest innovations.\textsuperscript{38}

5. \textit{Social change, the core of which is increasing tensions and differences between countries and within individual states continues.} Increasing income inequality and the long-term negative impacts of unemployment have begun to characterize the next phase of the economic crisis. Increasing social problems, partly related to the long term consequences of the economic transformation, partly to the economic crisis and partly to bad economic policies could be easily manipulated by politicians, especially when middle income groups are also negatively affected. Social differences are only partly responsible for increasing tensions. The major problem is related to the generally low level of income in several Central European countries, which makes large segments of the population extremely vulnerable to shocks as living standards have fallen considerably. The management of this internal problem becomes more and more challenging.\textsuperscript{39}

There are many other trends that may play a role and have an impact on the region’s countries. But probably the above-mentioned factors are the most important ones directly linked to development prospects in Central Europe, because they require strategic responses from governments. Rational evaluation of these very powerful framework conditions and adjustment to them are the starting point if a country from the region aims to achieve significant development in the coming decades. It has to be emphasized that in small countries factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of industrial mutation – if I may use that biological term – that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in... ” See: Joseph Schumpeter, \textit{Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy} (Harper and Brother, 1947), p.83. Obviously, the role of technology and innovation has become even more important since his theory was first formulated.

\textsuperscript{38} This issue is extensively discussed in: Philippe Aghion, Heike Harrmargt and Natalia Weisshaar, \textit{Fostering growth in CEE countries: a country-tailored approach to growth policy}, EBRD Working Paper No. 118. (October 2011)

\textsuperscript{39} Per capita GDP in the Czech Republic and Hungary between 2003 (the year before EU accession) and 2012 remained around the same level as percent of EU average, while Slovakia and Poland have experienced significant catching up. (Slovenia has worsened its position in the same period.)
like those in Central Europe, inward-looking policies that disregard external conditions or do not adequately analyze them can have serious negative impacts. In the short-term, disregarding these trends can make the utilization of favorable business cycles difficult. In the longer term, however, this may cause structural changes that destroy the ability to adjust and could cause a delinking from international trends, including the utilization of most recent technological trends and favorable growth opportunities. *If adjustment is the objective, a fair analysis of external conditions has to be undertaken. If not, then this creates the potential for a completely different development path.* This latter perspective requires the understanding of political aspects as well since disregarding them when analyzing the Central European trends could be misleading,\(^40\) a mistake that has been committed by several economists and analysts in the last two decades.

The cost of misguided steps that lead countries to fall behind in certain periods may cost more than in other periods. At important turning points of innovation and change in global competition, mismanagement may result in faster and deeper fallback. Today we are witnessing one of these periods, when the external challenges for advanced countries are large. The revival of economic growth is a precondition for preventing a larger fall in living standards in many countries. In these periods, the advanced countries were only able to escape by restructuring their economies toward a higher innovation trajectory and creating larger markets. *We may expect that if the objective of the most advanced countries is to slow down their shrinking economic importance within the global economy, then they must become the drivers of global innovation all over again.*

Given this assumption, it should be asked what the prerequisites for catching up in the middle developed, semi-peripheral countries are. The export orientation (of oil exporters) or high domestic investment in the development of a competitive, strong domestic industrial base by applying import substitution strategies can, if executed properly, be good examples for breaking out of the vicious circle of underdevelopment. Integration into global supplier chains is also a viable option if foreign investors consider the country a place worth investing in. On the other hand, the value added level at which a given country can be built into global production networks is also a very important question regarding a country’s upgrading prospects. The higher the value added the more educated and innovative the labor force must be. Regarding this prerequisite, educational spending is a crucial question. In this respect, Visegrad countries’ records are not very competitive. In these countries the principal source of most modern and competitive technologies are foreign firms (because of the lack of domestic investments or a weak domestic R+D system). Thus a realistic way of preserving

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international competitiveness is to support technology intensive investments and their upgrading, and modernize education.

3. Catching-up Attempts and Current Strategic Questions

Regarding successful catching-up, during the last 2-3 centuries only a few dozen countries have been able to reach a high development level and maintain this success for a longer period of time, even when external conditions are favorable. The case of Central Europe proves that smaller, semi-peripheral countries that have only a limited domestic market and are not endowed with the crucial factors of production (capital, natural resources or a large pool of very cheap labor) can very easily be marginalized in the international system due to their own faults or unfavorable internal and external conditions (the negative impacts of which are based on inappropriate domestic capabilities). Only in exceptional circumstances can these countries achieve faster and sustainable growth rates in the long run. If the opportunity is missed leading to an inward looking political strategy or to one that is based on temporary advantages without the prospects of long-term modernization effects, the negative trends can only be turned back very slowly and with great difficulty here. This is especially true in countries where domestic growth potential is low due to the lack of capital and profitable business opportunities. As a result, a vicious circle of low savings and investment evolves, which—with few exceptions—characterizes the situation of peripheral, less developed countries where the mobilization of domestic savings sooner or later faces market barriers and state-directed investments often lack rationale or modernization impacts. The realistic evaluation by the elite of the position of small Central European countries’ and their options has rarely succeeded during the past one and a half centuries. This phenomenon, along with the geopolitical conditions and the dilemmas of participation in the international division of labor, is one of the principal reasons why most countries in the region could only reach the development level of middle-income countries in the last few centuries. Interestingly enough, the fastest catching-up took place between 1945 and the late 1960s for very specific reasons.

Economic history proves that less developed countries have pursued basically two different economic strategies in order to achieve catching up and faster economic growth in recent centuries. These strategies root either in a classical-neoclassical approach emphasizing the

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advantages of liberal external economic relations, even in the case of less developed economies, or in development economics understanding the special needs of less developed countries. Drawing from economic history one can conclude that none of the theories applied in practice led to universal success in every country. Either import substituting economic policy based on domestic resources and long-term vision of economic development was the underlying economic philosophy, or quick liberalization with a strong export orientation was the core of the approach, success generally depended on certain special favorable conditions. The first strategy, for which the earlier example can be the Friedrich List type approach, proved successful for example in the United States and Germany, and much later in some of the emerging Far Eastern regions. And it was supported by large domestic savings used for large scale investments, knowledge accumulation and technology development. The other model could only be successful if it was based on competitive advantages, large investments or favorable endowments with resources valued by the global market etc.

In fact, this should be the basic question of economic theory: which of them best serves a given country’s long-term development? Simply copying successful models has only very rarely led to the same results in other countries because of variation in the internal, international and geopolitical environment. Success can also be attributed to the domestic propensity for capital accumulation. Small countries with relatively unfavorable endowments of production factors cannot successfully repeat the economic policy strategies of large economies. They have to find the most adequate way of utilizing favorable options created by the international economic and political environment.

3.1. Modernization Efforts in Central Europe

For more than a century, several attempts have been made in Central Europe to break out of the vicious circle of underdevelopment. However each of these has failed, due either to

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43 “In the first stage they must adopt free trade with the more advanced nations as a means of raising themselves from a state of barbarism and of making advances in agriculture. In the second stage they must resort to commercial restrictions to promote the growth of manufactures, fisheries, navigation, and foreign trade. In the last stage, after reaching the highest degree of wealth and power, they must gradually revert to the principle of free trade and of unrestricted competition in the home as well as in foreign markets, so that their agriculturists, manufacturers, and merchants may be preserved from indolence and stimulated to retain the supremacy which they have acquired.” Friedrich List, *The National System of Political Economy by Friedrich List*, trans. Sampson S. Lloyd, with an Introduction by J. Shield Nicholson (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1909). Chapter X: The teaching history.

44 We cannot forget, however that no general recipes exist, especially for the long term, and elements of a successful approach have to be based on the fair evaluation of the geopolitical situation and the drivers of international economic and political development. It is important to note also that the term “small state” is very difficult to define. Sometimes small states can play an important role, as for example in the European Union because of the voting system and EU decision-making, and due to their peculiar problems related to their development level.
unsuccessful adjustment to international economic trends or to historical developments. We should bear in mind the causes of these failed attempts, as many governments in the region repeatedly commit the same errors in times when the window of opportunity for development opens.\(^{45}\) Far from believing in historical determinism, the propensity for some regions or countries to make mistakes during catching up periods is strong. A path dependence framework may be useful in explaining why some countries succeed and others do not.\(^{46}\) Avoiding typical mistakes is a requirement in today’s world, where the potential for rapid economic development is obvious (as the case of several emerging countries proves), even if the crisis still has negative consequences all over the world, and in an environment where a bad policy choice may result in very long-term stagnation.

Modernization periods have been observed in the last third part of the nineteenth century, between the two world wars and in the seventies in the Central European region. It has been common in these periods that—to a varying extent all across the CEE region—products were sold in a protected regional market. Before World War I, this market was the multinational Habsburg Empire, making the selling of less processed products possible.\(^{47}\) At the same time, even this less developed but integrated market helped the financing of investments that resulted in a remarkable development, for example in infrastructure, and new firms and the manufacturing industry started to develop. The protected market, which absorbed products from Hungary and other parts of Central Europe, delivered the benefits neoclassical economic theory would expect. Regions with far lower levels of development can profit from liberalizing trade and capital flows in a protected market. Capital could flow in underdeveloped regions making finance possible for development purposes, while producers could profit from selling products in a much larger market. The development was also supported by the favorable terms of trade, which made trade for less developed regions beneficial as agricultural products witnessed favorable price development. Later, this caused problems, as the profitability of this sector limited the need and pressure for investing in other sectors, mostly manufacturing. When the terms of trade started to worsen significantly these

\(^{45}\) This path dependency seems to be very convincing in some cases. This may be true for several reasons. In Central Europe, dependency may be based mostly on endowment with production factors and geographical location. These countries are too small and they are unable to catch up in economic terms without an external anchor. The existence of the external anchor always raises the question of sovereignty. Large national minorities in some parts of the region further complicate the situation. These factors can serve as a very unfortunate source of nationalism or populism. As a consequence, path dependence is mostly the failure of the political elite that uses populace as instruments to preserve their power, especially in economically difficult times.

\(^{46}\) It is very interesting to compare country performance from this perspective. For Hungary see: Laszlo Csaba, *And the first shall be the last*, Hungarian Studies 25/2 (Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 2011), pp.235-248. [http://www.akademiai.com/content/n7l22p2368127328/?p=9f3cb6be8f99403194078180ae38d5ee&pi=50236-6568](http://www.akademiai.com/content/n7l22p2368127328/?p=9f3cb6be8f99403194078180ae38d5ee&pi=50236-6568) and for the Baltic States: Anders Åslund, *The Last Shall Be the First: The East European Financial Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: The Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2010).

\(^{47}\) For several decades, underdeveloped agriculture used very cheap labor proved to be competitive internationally. Beyond providing increased revenue, however, it failed to encourage the development of a manufacturing industry.
countries and regions were left worse off and without basic structural change. It has repeatedly been confirmed that in the long run change in the terms of trade favors countries and firms that export products with higher valued added.

Between the two world wars, Central Europe’s fate was decided by Germany, many countries of the region became suppliers of the German military industry based on their comparative advantage. This has further strengthened the already existing structures and division of labor (e.g. Hungary and Poland were the food suppliers, Czechs were based more heavily on industrial traditions, etc.). Obviously, as this period was characterized by a much larger trade protection in the global economy, the number of potential economic partners was very limited. From a political perspective, the available markets were dangerous, as was demonstrated by later developments during World War II.48

After the Second World War a different pattern emerged. During that time, the most powerful partner within the CMEA, Russia, was economically underdeveloped, a situation that differed from the previous periods when strong economic ties had been maintained with economically more advanced partners. Many Central European countries profited from the favorable terms of trade position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union by selling manufacturing goods and processed agricultural products in exchange for cheap natural resources and energy. At the same time, however, the incentive system and the low resource prices cut the need and the possibility for modernization and improved competitiveness. The lack of incentives to improve quality and competitiveness were further worsened by the trade restrictions with advanced countries, cutting them off from more competitive technologies. Modernization was based on domestic technology and capital, which was a serious limitation, because of the lack of innovation potential and industrial tradition. This period proves that without access to modern technologies (or to the investments of firms that carry these technologies) it is very difficult to achieve a breakthrough by simply using only domestic resources for copying technologies in the less developed region of Central Europe. Extensive development is possible, but upgrading is strictly limited by available means and knowledge. Here again, a secured market guaranteed the revenues of firms, but significantly limited economic development, preserved economic structures and contributed to the development of parallel economic structures instead of complementarity across the region.49

The most powerful attempt to alleviate these huge differences was made after the political transformation of the nineties in a very favorable international environment. This attempt has

48 This division of labor was subordinated to the German military economy and did not help real international economic adjustment.
affected mostly the western, more developed part of the East Central European region. Transformation and the international integration of the rest of the region has been much weaker and slower because of less developed economic structures (Bulgaria, Romania), the unfinished state and nation building (Western Balkans) or geographical location (Ukraine, Moldova). Those countries that were able or were forced to integrate rapidly into the network of large international firms that invested heavily in the region, started to achieve early and remarkable development. Research focused earlier on the advantages and pitfalls of economic transition and centered on the speed and the methods applied for transformation, including privatization, industrial restructuring, trade liberalization and the inflow of FDI, or the role of the state and the social consequences.

Probably the most important issue from development and catching up point of view is the integration into a customs union (European Union) and the inflow of foreign direct investment. Central Europeans again have a secured large market and an opportunity for development—along with its certainly existing limitations. Besides the institutional relations within the EU, the long-term presence of large manufacturing firms can be considered as a kind of guarantee of economic integration. One of the key questions here is the integration of large firms into the domestic economy and the way local firms are able to link to them as subcontractors. The more intensive the business contacts between domestic and foreign firms, the larger the possible positive technology impacts. The much needed technology modernization and structural change is strongly related to the presence of these firms, especially if the countries are characterized by a serious lack of domestic capital and low levels of domestic R&D spending.

Each of the countries in the Central European region was able to achieve faster economic growth after liberalizing their policies regarding foreign direct investment. Hungary and Poland did it first and not surprisingly their competitive position improved first, although from a different initial level and for different reasons. Czechs and Slovaks were more cautious and their economic transition started later (because they wanted to strengthen national capitalism that in practice prolonged state or nomenclature ownership). But soon they realized the development problems with the model they had chosen, either because of the economic crisis (the Czechs) or after the formation of the Dzurindza government (the Slovaks), and they revised their policies, leading to a more balanced and fast growing

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51 During the 1980s, Hungary became one of the most market-friendly countries in Central Europe, making it attractive to foreign investors very early. In addition, the huge burden of foreign debt service early on forced the country to quickly attract as much capital as possible. In Poland, “shock therapy” rapidly created the conditions for market economic development, but the rescheduling of foreign debt made investors reluctant to invest for a while.
development path. Competiveness improved and GDP growth gained momentum, soon leading to structural changes. Slovenia on the other hand tried to avoid deeper changes in its economy, which was enough to maintain competitiveness for several years, but the failed structural transformation appeared well before the crisis broke out and left Slovenia with significant state ownership in the manufacturing and banking sector. As it later turned out, because of the consolidation costs of the state owned bank system caused by the dramatically worsening financial position of export-oriented domestic firms, the country has entered a deep and long lasting recession and faces a heavy financial burden.

Referring to examples of economic development from other parts of the world, those countries that have been able to modernize their educational and R&D systems and were able to manage social conflicts as well seem to be successful in the long run and in a sustainable way. For small catching up countries, export orientation is the most important element of a balanced economic growth. Although they can hardly resist external shocks, export orientation makes them part of a large international network that can mitigate external shocks compared to a situation when this type of international economic integration is missing and domestic demand is not able to deliver sustained economic growth because of the small size of the economy. At the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008, export-oriented countries were hit most seriously. But their export performance rebounded very quickly resulting in higher growth, except in countries where domestic economic policy measures or structural problems curbed domestic demand to the extent that it cancelled out the growth related to net exports. This clearly reflects the necessity of sound domestic economic policies that support balanced development. But their development mostly depends on external demand channeled through foreign firms either in manufacturing or services.

3.2. Framework for a New (?) Development Model

On account of the two enlargement waves of the European Union that created new conditions for economic development and convergence, we have witnessed a radical change in the international economic relations of countries in Central Europe between 2004 and 2007. EU accession lent new momentum to economic growth and therefore convergence in all the new Member States, including the V4 countries. In contrast to the dynamic growth recorded in the

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52 I am aware of the criticism related to the role of foreign investment into the region and the speed of liberalization that is sometimes called mismanaged (See: Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontent (New York, W.W. Norton & Co. 2003). But the region was very rapidly integrated into Euro-Atlantic economic and security policy structures, stabilizing its international position and contributing to the inflow of FDI (technology) and EU assistance, even before the accession.

other countries, Hungary, where the initially relatively higher rate of growth had been substantially subdued by 2007 while living standards measured in terms of per capita GDP have merely stagnated since joining the EU, provides the sole exception.\textsuperscript{54} The causes of this significant divergence of economic growth had several reasons leading to the accumulation of negative implications that led to a dividing line within the Visegrad group regarding their development path.

For two decades, Central Europe’s pre-crisis economic model was based on export orientation led by large inflows of foreign direct investment. This was the case for each of them, sometimes leading to strong competition for FDI, not least because of the expectation of associated economic benefits in terms of employment, growth and competitiveness. The expectation for the post accession period was that the need to comply with the Maastricht criteria pushes the Central European countries to implement economic policies in order to increase competitiveness that automatically leads to faster development and catching up in terms of per capita GDP and living standards, including wages.\textsuperscript{55} The indirect harmonization of economic policies in order to become successful in the single market and eventually adopt the euro was supposed to be a tool for supporting convergences between their economies.

This expectation has not been fulfilled. The will to introduce the euro weakened in several countries and was questioned in many others as a consequence of the Eurozone crisis. In the previous two decades, the EU served as an external anchor that significantly helped the economic and political transformation of the CEE countries. External pressure indirectly helped the convergence of economic policies between the Visegrad countries, independently of economic or strategic coordination during the EU accession process. Coordination has been almost non-existent during the past two decades and only serious (economic) security policy threats could alter this situation. Each country aimed to enter the EU as soon as possible, contributing significantly to the fast and successful adjustment to the new conditions the democratization and marketization of the economy required. External pressure in complying with EU rules and regulations was a very important factor in the convergence of policy measures that contributed to the fast and similar transformation path within the region and the creation and strengthening of democratic institutions.

In the past few years, however, instead of similar strategies for responding to the same challenges the countries in the region faced, divergence was already observed well before the economic crisis hit. During the past 6 years (since the beginning of the crisis) the


development of the Visegrad countries has begun to show greater signs of divergence than in the 5-6 years before. This is largely due to the differences inherent in the economic models pursued by the individual states—which had already seemed to begin to cement a few years ago—the different intensity of the impact of the economic crisis and the different levels of success that accompanied EU accession. The deepness of the crisis and its duration depended very much on the countries’ openness and structural preparedness for rapid changes in the international environment. The economic model differences were mostly related to public finance, government debt levels and the level of integration into the production network of large multinational firms.

The crisis created an environment previously unknown to many of the EU countries. And facing the challenge of this almost unprecedented problem and the unexpected processes that took place within the EU, countries’ room for maneuver paradoxically seems to have increased their policy choices. While the external financing constraint forced the countries to focus on improving government finances and stabilization, at the same time governments started to introduce measures that had been unimaginable only a few years before. Just to mention some examples: the solution offered by Iceland to the banking crisis; partial or full nationalization of private pension funds in several countries; different forms of quantitative easing, such as in the USA; Europe also started to change its monetary instruments; massive bailouts in different sectors, most importantly in the banking industry, or sectoral taxes introduced by many countries (although at very different rates); very expensive bailouts in the Eurozone to save countries from sovereign default. There was no other choice than to introduce instruments that had not previously been used in market economies. These interventions are creating precedents to which any country can refer later as instruments to be used in exceptional circumstances. And there is an increasing risk that all these measures may have an impact on political stability and the quality of democracy, especially in countries where the democratic tradition is weak and the temptation to create authoritarian regimes is greater. Besides several countries in the territory of the former Soviet Union, the most endangered group of countries in this respect seems to be in the Southern part of the Central European region. But the risk is endemic to the entire region.

56 Countries chose different strategies regarding private pension funds. The reason why this issue became important is that the EU for a long time (until 2012) did not take into account the negative budgetary impact of private pension transfers in calculating budget deficits in excessive budget deficit procedures. In order to meet Maastricht criteria, countries started to introduce administrative and other measures to channel private money back into the government budget. The long-term implications, however, are very different in individual countries depending on the details. In the Baltic States, where a part of the private money was redirected to the budget, still meant a better position on the budget in the long-term. In Poland, though spending was redirected into the budget, the state pillar was fundamentally reformed, achieving long-term sustainability. In Hungary fundamental reform of the state pension system has not taken place, thereby worsening the long-term sustainability of the pension system.
The rapid pre-crisis development was very much been based on huge capital inflows (including FDI and financial capital),\textsuperscript{57} while savings rates were generally very low. The financing of investment is probably the most significant bottleneck, as domestic savings are too small in international comparison, making foreign-sourced financing essential. The lack of financing for growth and the possible decline or very low level of investment that is already the case in some of the countries may result in long-term slow economic growth. Without todays’ (mostly corporate) investments, a high level of sustained future economic growth cannot be achieved. State investments may substitute corporate investment for a while, but in the long run, only corporate investment can lead to sustainable growth.\textsuperscript{58} An additional aspect beyond investment in production or business services is investment in education, which is an increasingly important precondition of future growth due to its role in fast technology development. Regarding this issue, worsening trends can be observed in several member states in the Central European region due to budget consolidation needs. Budget cuts have curtailed spending on education and innovation. Low investment levels and uncertainty would definitely negatively affect potential growth rates and can cause a slowing down or cessation of the catching up process.\textsuperscript{59} If these issues are not addressed properly in order to manage the problems associated with long-term trends, the current short-term growth problems could easily be converted into long-term development problems, stopping the catching up process for longer periods. Any future oriented strategy in the region must seriously consider these observations.

Certainly, the 2008 crisis makes the forecast of future trends regarding the successful development and catching up path more difficult. But the most likely scenario is that the chances of middle and high-income countries with low tech and an undereducated labor force for overcoming development gap will deteriorate. According to the most recent trends, the advantages of cheap labor have been seriously questioned in the short and medium term. There are basically two reasons for this. For one, for large international firms that locate their activities where they can operate most efficiently, labor cost and the international division of labor only represent one factor among several important factors that influence the location decision. Secondly, cheap labor locations become more and more expensive as they catch up economically and gradually lose their advantages, causing firms to reconsider their

\textsuperscript{57} The most dynamic phase of FDI inflow took place \textit{before} the accession. Alan A. Bevan and Saul Estrin, “The determinants of foreign direct investment into European transition economies,” \textit{Journal of Comparative Economics} 32 (2004), pp.775-787.

\textsuperscript{58} Charles Roxburgh, Eric Labaye, Fraser Thompson, Tilman Tacke and Duncan Kauffman, \textit{Investing in growth: Europe’s next challenge} (McKinsey Global Institute, December 2012).

\textsuperscript{59} Over the past ten years, gross capital formation as a share of GDP went down in the Czech Republic from about 27% to 22%, in Hungary from 23% to 17%, and in Slovenia from 25% to 17%. A more favorable but very volatile trend has been observed in the Baltic States that have been able to increase investment rates after a sharp decline during the worst period of the crisis. Slovakia, on the other hand, has been able to stabilize after the crisis and Poland has successfully avoided drops compared to ten years ago.
investment strategies. Instead of operating in a country where production costs are quickly increasing (but still lower than elsewhere) firms prefer to invest in countries where technology and educated human capital are easily available. As a result, the largest development impact is supposed to come from the networks of international firms only if a given country enters this network chain at higher value added levels.\textsuperscript{60} This has three consequences. First, the most promising growth potential is still related to countries that have the greatest potential to develop new technologies.\textsuperscript{61} Second, since today’s competitiveness is more and more linked to large firms operating worldwide, it is imperative for less developed countries to attract high value added production or services firms and to offer a business-friendly environment and stability in economic management. Third, the creation of a business-friendly and innovative environment is more and more important for the support of small and medium sized domestic high tech firms and their ability to become competitive on a global scale.

As a result of the changing international environment and the crisis, the effects of national economic choices are gaining increasing importance. The quality of politics and economic policy has gained increasing importance, but the problem here lies in political traditions, culture and political interests. The above-framed developments can provide room for politically motivated actions that could not have emerged in times of stable, well-functioning EU markets, delivering an increasing standard of living. This is currently the case in an EU that has lost most of its credibility as an external anchor. Given the weakening attractiveness of the EU and the political culture, as well as the negative experiences with economic transformation and crisis management, populist approaches can easily be strengthened.

All in all, international and domestic economic development, the current state of international political relations and the uncertain development of the European Union have created an environment where previous relations and decisions can be questioned, or previously developed relations changed, strategic directions modified, but without clear identification of future objectives.\textsuperscript{62}

This can also be the source of increasing uncertainty about the strategy of the countries in question. And this may lead to differences partly related to the current economic indicators (growth, public debt level, investment trends etc.). But more importantly, divergence in economic philosophies must also be identified. Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia continue to apply a market oriented model where the state aims to create the conditions for

\textsuperscript{60} See for example: \textit{World Investment Report} (UNCTAD, 2013), pp.133-139.

\textsuperscript{61} Large R&D expenditure as a percent of GDP is measured in Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Japan, Germany, Norway, Switzerland, South Korea, US, at around or above 3 percent. More on that see: OECD Research and Development Statistics. http://www.oecd.org/innovation/inno/researchanddevelopmentstatisticsrds.htm

\textsuperscript{62} Probably this explains the unknown or very vague EU strategies, for example, in Hungary and the Czech Republic.
long term economic growth by providing incentives through the provision of a business friendly environment. This also entails that state intervention in the economy is limited to business friendly regulation. At the same time, in Hungary, state control is thought to be superior to market solutions in many areas, not an unknown phenomenon in other countries as an after crisis approach. This explains why the state is attempting to extend public ownership in many sectors and influencing macroeconomic processes with non-market interventions (price control of many products) that temporarily can decrease inflation and moderate costs for the population. But in the long run, the related negative impacts cannot be calculated. Widespread state intervention is a clear sign of departing from mainstream European economic policy approaches and recalls the state capitalist models pursued in countries like Russia or China.

As noted above, this belief has been partly justified by the economic performance of many emerging countries over the past decade. But it must be realized that this can only work temporarily in less developed countries, and especially in those where the tremendous resources available through saving or natural resources make possible non-market solutions carrying potential financial losses as well. In recent years the diverging economic philosophy in Hungary seems to run so deep that it differentiates this country’s path from the development model in the rest of the Visegrad region.

### 3.3. Strategic Decisions for the Future

In the past five-six years the countries that have sunk into the most difficult situations are those, whose economic growth was largely fuelled before by external funds — regardless of the actual reasons that underpin the need for external financing (large trade deficit or external debt service). Therefore, long-term economic policies and strategies go hand in hand with the room for maneuver and the means chosen in the course of crisis management. And they also call for a need to adjust the direction of the economic policies pursued before the crisis, although to varying degrees. The situation however, is much more severe now than it was before the crisis—particularly when we look at individual countries—since the shrinking or moderately increasing GDP figures are coupled with decreasing living standards at a time when drastic budgetary and structural adjustments had and still have to be introduced and implemented in most countries of the region. An increasingly divergent development trend can be observed within the region, with its favorable macro and microeconomic performance Poland is more and more dominating in the region, not just because of its strategic role in the
EU, but regarding microeconomic issues as well, like the size of firms. In the Central European region, the differentiation between South and North that characterizes the older EU member states as well seems to be developing, and this relates either to macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth or to the microsphere, such as the problems (that can have different origins in the individual countries) in the banking sector. Countries like Hungary, Croatia, Romania, Slovenia and Bulgaria seem to be going in a different direction compared to the Northern countries, most importantly Poland and Slovakia (in Slovakia also there are warning signs, especially regarding competition policies). The Czech Republic is somewhere in between but its structural features make it more like the Northern countries. Slovenia’s case is a clear sign of a failed economic transformation strategy based on domestic resources and avoiding larger penetration of foreign capital or foreign interests. The picture is even more complicated in the case of the Baltic States.

Because of the lack of strong democratic traditions and institutions in Central Europe, increasing tensions within the societies and open skepticism regarding the development model pursued since the beginning of the nineties that resulted in declining living standards for large segments of the society and was further burdened by the negative economic impacts of the crisis, could turn back time in a number of countries. The result would be a fundamentally different development path compared to that of Western Europe. The once integrated countries, depending on the policies pursued by their governments, could easily become less integrated. This previously unimaginable scenario has today become an option. Weakening integration can have very different meanings ranging from strong anti-EU political attitudes to institutional disintegration. This latter option was not entirely ruled out for example during the most severe period of Greek crisis management, and it probably cannot be avoided if realistic economic calculations regarding the country’s development options are taken into account. The well-known concept of two Europes, according to which Western and Eastern Europe follow fundamentally different development pathways, can again become stronger in

63 See: Deloitte TOP500 Central Europe 2013. http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Global/Local%20Assets/Documents/Central%20Europe/CE%20Top%20500/CETop500_2013_web.PDF. Polish firms are becoming the most powerful in Central Europe. Thus they play an increasing role in intraregional investments as well.

64 The changing strategies and policies are well reflected, for example, in changes in EBRD transition indicators. EBRD Transition Report (2013). p.112.

65 The risk, however, is increasing in the Czech Republic regarding the future economic directions, due to the policy of the new government formed after the elections held in the fall of 2013.

66 The responsibility of politicians regarding the long-term development prospects of the regions’ countries is huge. It also has to be noted that the negative role of politicians has been stronger or weaker in each Visegrad countries over the past twenty years. It is sufficient to recall the case of Slovakia in the nineties or Poland under the Kaczyński government not long ago. This also means that country positions regarding the method of economic and social development have changed rapidly within each country and across the region over the last two decades. The depth and impact of bad policies may differ significantly however depending on the external political, economic and institutional developments.
the next decades if this disintegration (broadly understood) takes place and already integrated countries loosen their ties significantly within the EU. This can renew the peripherisation of countries that have moved closer to core Europe in recent decades.

3.3.1. Development Centers

One of the crucial questions is related to the role of development centers in the world, including most importantly the role that European integration can play in the shaping of the economic and political strategies pursued by the Central and East European countries. Can other regions gain more importance in the shaping of the long-term strategies of these countries at the expense of the EU?

During the 1990s, the existence of a single hegemonic power in the world was the case, with quite good economic performance of the advanced countries. After the millennium, the multipolarization of the world sped up, first in the economic sphere and later at a much slower pace in global politics and international relations. As a result, today’s world cannot be described in the simple terms of the bipolar world’s traditional center-periphery relations when political support of large powers helped the economic development of less developed states in order to gain more international influence. The picture is further complicated by the transnationalisation of business activities as a result of increasing global competition between large firms and by the surge of regional integration initiatives that sometimes overlap each other in scope or geography. Peripheral countries in that way are no longer the background territories of only one economic or political center, but are influenced by several at the same time, although the level of political and economic influence varies from one center to the other. For example, in countries like Ukraine the parallel impact of the EU and Russia is obvious. Even if a peripheral country is integrated into the EU, this does not necessarily mean the elimination of the influence of other centers. The same is true for neighboring non-member countries that started close to the EU but, under changing international conditions, have been subjected to the rising importance of other countries and regions, like some of the Western Balkan countries and Turkey. On the other hand, it also has to be noted that today different centers represent very different rules and values, as reflected for example in different civilization patterns (EU, China, Russia, etc.). This multipolarity makes the situation of

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68 The difficult situation of Ukraine in negotiating the conditions of a possible associate status with the EU is a telling example. See: Tamas Novak, Changes in Ukraine and the future of Central and Eastern Europe (Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2013). http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/NovakT-Changes%20in%20the%20Ukraine.pdf
peripheral regions very difficult, as it is not possible to utilize each center’s advantages—which otherwise would be desirable. This would only be possible if each center operated according to the same rules. Since they do not—and clearly this is the case now—the only viable option is to choose the center that has the biggest potential development impact.

Dominant centers create the framework for Central European development. Small peripheral countries have to realize what the centers are demanding from them. This does not sound too attractive to these countries, but in practice this means cooperation. The global market and international business and politics view only clear, well-defined strategies positively and do not like instability and unpredictability. If a given country does not act accordingly, it starts to drift. Its struggle for sovereignty and utility maximization remains unanswered from the center. If this happens and a given country drops out from the interest and positive approach of the most important center, then there is no realistic backdrop from which to expect development finance and the catching up of the given peripheral countries.\textsuperscript{69} And—what is clear from the last two decades of transition—external financing (either EU funds or FDI) are needed for sustainable catching up.\textsuperscript{70} If funding decreases continuously for whatever reason, stagnation or economic decline is unavoidable as a result of low business investment, and no international actor will be interested in counterbalancing that. A result of this would be a very bitter inward-looking economic and political development in the affected country. Given this background, the question logically arises – will the EU remain the development center for the whole region despite the problems with its economic development and the widening division between countries? In order to answer this question realistically, we must carefully evaluate the major future drivers of development regarding power shift between countries.

We appear to be witnessing one of the greatest economic and political transformations in our history and the process is likely to accelerate further in the coming decade. After the expansion and deepening of globalization from the nineties, partly explained by the economic and political transformation of the former Soviet bloc and the dynamic development of some of the developing countries, the further increasing role of transnational firms in global production and services does not allow for a loosening of the strings linking the countries’ economies. This has been partly unexpected in light of the deepness of the crisis that could

\textsuperscript{69} If a drifting country lost the interest of the core region, then nobody would bother with it and even the (partial) financing of development becomes impossible. More on this see: Ferenc Kozma: External economic strategy (in Hungarian), (Budapest: AULA, 2001). 605p.

\textsuperscript{70} An interesting aspect of that is the continuous withdrawal of foreign bank funding from the Central European region from the beginning of the crisis, the level of which shows significant differences across countries. ‘The reduction of cross-border funding by Western banks for CESEE is continuing at a moderate pace, but with major country differences. A shift to a model relying more on domestic funding is well under way. Meanwhile, credit growth remains slow as a result of supply and demand factors. In view of shallow local capital markets, domestic deposit growth may well prove insufficient to support a meaningful revival of credit growth.’ Quarterly Deleveraging Monitor: Q2 2013. CESEE delivering and credit monitor, (October 31, 2013). The Vienna Initiative
have easily led to the protectionist measures. But it has not happened. Although more and more sophisticated protectionist instruments are being introduced, global trade is still growing.\textsuperscript{71} The crisis and the ensuing stagnation accelerated changes in the power status quo and have eventually led to the rapid economic advance of the developing world and some Asian states in particular. Strategic answers to these increasing challenges for example are the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).\textsuperscript{72} This has also meant that even large countries like the United States and the EU (if we consider it as an entity) face increasing challenges on a global scale. This transformation has a diverse effect on the situation and opportunities available to the smaller states of the world, and particularly to the Central and East European countries recently integrated into the system.\textsuperscript{73} All in all, the international environment still favors increasing global trade as a very important instrument for growth.

Growth in emerging markets speeded up substantially at the end of the nineties, a process through which the political leaders of these countries realized the importance of economic issues. Development of these countries has also been supported by factors like low international interest and inflation rates. The very rapid growth rates that exceeded those of the advanced countries hinted at the intensification of decoupling: the growth rates of emerging countries appeared to be independent from the growth trend in developed world. Today, however, this decoupling no longer appears to be the case, at least in the majority of emerging economies. The slowing growth rates of emerging markets shortly after the collapse of growth in the developed countries and the new trends in the global economy (reshoring, strengthening economic performance of the United States, etc.) suggests that there are limits to this growth model, calling for a new model more focused on domestic demand. This also questions the superiority of the state capitalist model, attractive to several country leaders, over democratic decision-making processes in crisis times due to the simplified decision-making path.\textsuperscript{74} Bearing these changes in mind, in emerging markets and given the forecast according to which the next decades are set to be characterized by increasing development and income differences across the global economy, countries with innovative capacity and the capability to create new technologies are the most likely to improve. The prospects for

\textsuperscript{71} See progress of global trade protection at Trade monitoring news archive at WTO webpage http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/archive_e/trade_arc_e.htm

\textsuperscript{72} Regarding the geopolitical importance of TTIP see for example: Erik Brattberg, Reinventing the West: The geopolitical importance of TTIP (November 8, 2013).

\textsuperscript{73} The small country definition may vary considerably and can depend on several factors (territory, population, economic indicators etc.), but it can be agreed that Visegrad countries are small or at best medium sized countries. There are definitely large when compared to Baltic States or Slovenia.

countries that continue to base their strategies on low wages are the most likely to worsen. Thus, the attractiveness of emerging countries from the point of view of the effectiveness of their economic development model can be questioned.

If economic problems are numerous domestically and the credibility and attractiveness of an external anchor region has considerably weakened due to disputes over future development directions or economic and/or political crisis, this would reduce the interest to adjust to their norms, even if, in the long-term, the advantages are still obvious. Given this situation, those countries that are less strongly integrated with the center may prefer to challenge the situation for political reasons. If these political objectives are based on incorrect interpretations of the international trends, or short-term political interests dictate new strategies, the international position of the given countries may worsen in the long run by closing windows of opportunity. Sometimes, “windows of opportunity” can be based on friendly relations with “core” countries (external “anchor”) that support smaller countries through diplomacy or international economic policy.75 Other times they can be based on the external perception of the country, like a position in different international comparative rankings (competitiveness or confidence indicators, corruption index), which may influence credibility in international economic and political relations and may also have an impact on business perceptions, having implications for trade and capital flows.76

Economic growth and the room for maneuver of Central and East European countries in the next decade largely depend on their ability to adapt to the changes unfolding in global and regional power relations and the economic systems. Far from being unconditional supporters of historical determinism, we must take into account the experiences and mistakes repeatedly committed by the region. After the early 1990s, the driving force behind democratization and economic transformation was associated with the continuous integration of the region into the euro Atlantic structures, including both NATO and the European Union. During this period, the transformation seemed unstoppable and the only question was when the catching up process would result in substantial rises in income for the population. The dynamic phase of

75 The “core” is understood in this analysis as a center that sets the rules and standards of global competition and serves as a dominant model for economic and social systems. Certainly, the peripheral and semi-peripheral regions are influenced by several centers (either politically or economically) that are delivering contradictory signals. This renders the position of these countries difficult and can be solved efficiently only if the objectives of the different centers are similar (which is obviously not the case today, enough to compare the Western European, Russian and Chinese models). The other way is the clear commitment to only one center.

76 Despite a number of weaknesses of international indicators and rankings, consider the latest Doing Business ranking in which Poland improved its position from the previous year’s 48th position to 45th and Hungary went down from 52nd to 54th. This may provide an incentive for international business and investment decisions. See more detail: http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2014. The region’s overall worsening position is reflected in the WEF competitiveness indicator. The V4 average position worsened from 45th to 57th between 2007 and 2013, with significant changes among the individual countries. If improving or worsening trends are maintained for different international comparative indicators, these trends can influence business sector perceptions of these countries.
eastern enlargement, however, has ended and there are clear signs of destabilization in parts of the region as a result of unfulfilled expectations, mostly in living standards. The weakening external anchor creates the opportunity for increasing uncertainty in the region depending on the intentions of domestic political forces.

3.3.2. Openness to the World Economy

The next very important and relevant question relates to the international position of these countries regarding their openness to international economic integration. Can the economic model pursued so far, which is based on international corporate networks and foreign direct investment, be replaced by another realistic alternative? How different are the opportunities in this respect across the countries? Model questions are always on the forefront of the economic and political thinking of countries where catching up or faster economic growth are among the basic problems. In the case of emerging markets, export oriented (or rather: export dependent) economic development in most cases is extremely important for achieving a certain degree of catching up. Some of these countries can utilize cheap labor (China), the availability of crucial natural resources (Russia, oil exporting countries etc.), or economies of scale, the impact of which can be crucial for smaller countries where even a very limited number of large, export-oriented firms can contribute significantly to GDP growth (and jobs). The prospects of these country groups differ regarding their export potential and FDI relations in the coming decade.

1. Cheap labor countries can face increasing difficulties in a post-crisis world. First of all, the demand for their products in a more uncertain environment faces growth problems. Although cost factors are still important, at the same time the speeding up of technological development renders labor force skills more and more important. This change is clearly reflected in the intensification of reshoring from developing countries of industries to developed nations. In this respect it is clear that those countries that have been able to achieve some catching up but are still underdeveloped have to change their strategies and

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78 Paul A. Krugman, “Robots and Robber Barons”: ... one of the reasons some high-technology manufacturing has lately been moving back to the United States is that these days the most valuable piece of a computer, the motherboard, is basically made by robots, so cheap Asian labor is no longer a reason to produce them abroad...

focus more strongly on domestic consumption. This relates mostly to large, and relatively large emerging countries that need to change their underlying development model.  

2. The position of exporters of natural resources seems to be strong, especially when we take into account that even after the strong commodity price increase of the last decade, the future price developments for most of these commodities are rather favorable. Obviously, they are also forced to diversify their economies. And this is not underway everywhere. But their economic development model is not endangered as the forecast prices of crucial commodities has stabilized at a high level. Their export orientation model remains virtually unchanged over the next decade.

3. The third group consist of export-oriented small countries that do not possess easily exportable natural resources, and have very high export openness (export/GDP) reaching 75-80% (this is the case in three out of the four Visegrad countries). Their economic development mostly depends on export performance, largely because of the small domestic market that cannot be changed easily. If firms in these countries are to increase sales and create more jobs, there are simply no other alternatives than internationalization. And as the exports of these countries are mostly based on the performance of FDI-related manufacturing and services firms and their domestic purchasing power is limited, they have to elaborate strategies that preserve and strengthen this export orientation. (This does not mean the negligence of domestic demand factors—consumption and investment—but their role is rather to balance the growth pattern, not to replace their export orientation).

As Central European countries cannot compete with really low wage countries (though their wages are still low in international comparisons), long-term sustainable strategies cannot avoid upgrading technological capabilities to maintain current export levels or increase them by attracting more technology intensive FDI. Strategies that attempt to disregard export orientation will soon face sustainability problems. As a result, the long term realistic and sustainable economic strategy of these countries is export orientation, with further modernizing of their structure and the upgrading of their technology level.

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80 The success of export-led growth strategy depends on several factors and there are a number of risks and challenges of such a strategy as well. For a comprehensive list of arguments for and against export-led economic strategy in small countries see: Andras Inotai, “Sustainable growth based on export-oriented economic strategy”, *Economic policy analyses* (FES-EPI, April 2013) pp.3-8. [http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/sofia/10070.pdf](http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/sofia/10070.pdf)

81 Hungary may be an exemption. Here the long term growth and competitiveness model is based on cost advantage. Cost advantage is supposed to be achieved by ensuring cheap labor force. This objective is served by the measures introduced in education (shortening the compulsory period in education). As a result they can be employed only in low value added jobs – assembling in manufacturing firms. If this labor is cheap enough in European comparison, then some firms may consider locating their production to Hungary instead of moving into geographically remote countries.
To conclude, regarding international economic policy strategy, one can realistically argue that the export-orientation is expected to remain, but structural modernization cannot be avoided. Success requires clever domestic economic policy steps, the aim of which should be to improve the knowledge and technology level. Structural upgrading is even more important, as in the Visegrad region a large share of exports and thus GDP is dependent on the automotive industry. In fact, this industry produces a very significant share of GDP in Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Poland also has a large vehicle production sector.\textsuperscript{82} From an economic development point of view, the development of outward-looking economic and political strategies that draw policy conclusions from external economic and political developments and use them as an initial point of departure for developing future economic and international strategies seems to provide a logical approach. On the other hand, \textit{there is no guarantee that economic rationality or long-term development objectives represent the only motives of decision makers when elaborating policies and strategies.} What if domestic economic policy or political strategy overwrites this seemingly realistic approach to development? What, from development and catching up perspective is rationale may not be from political point of view. If political motives overwrite economic rationality, one may argue that these changes are simply indications of regaining international sovereignty by easing dependence on external powers and forces and shifting to a potentially less dependent position. At the end of the day, however, all these changes may lead to worsening perceptions, leading to a weak position in terms of economic performance and/or the functioning of institutions.

\textbf{3.3.3. The Euro}

The next decisive question regarding divergence in Central Europe concerns strategies for introducing the euro, willingness to comply with the Maastricht criteria and the subsequent loss of monetary policy control. This may be the critical question for the next few years in Central Europe regarding the development model. As far as the future of the euro is concerned, I frame the fate of Central Europe in terms of Robert Mundell`s statement; “The euro—barring a political revolution in Europe—is here to stay.”\textsuperscript{83} However, the crisis created a completely new environment for the introduction of the euro in the “new” member states. Formally, the system of conditionality has not changed. But the problems of the Eurozone


\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Financial Times}, June 8, 2012
have become quite complex, creating a new perception of the euro in many countries of the region. As a result, the decision on euro adoption in Central Europe is probably even more politically determinant today than it was a decade ago, and it is likely to have an even bigger economic impact. Few continue to believe that Euro adoption is feasible in a country that is not prepared for it. On the other hand, given the problems of the Eurozone, its attractiveness to the population is substantially weaker than previously.

The four most important drivers of international economic development at the millennium listed above were: globalization, the creation of the euro, technology revolution and the remarkable growth in the United States. As regards technology and globalization, their importance has not declined at all. Rather, global competition has increased as a result of these. Economic growth has witnessed radical geographic change, but the role of the US remains as important globally as it was in previous decades. As regards the euro, the image of the single currency has been hit hard by the crisis of the eurozone. This may deliver the message that the region that uses the euro is, without doubt, set to decline. Knowing the forecasts about the continuously declining role and share of the European continent in world affairs, the attractiveness of the region as a core development center may be judged negatively. This could be bad news for Central European countries, as it may question their long term commitment to economic development based on strong economic and institutional integration with Western Europe. However, we consider several factors that may slow the weakening importance of the region in the long-term and that (apart from unexpected changes) may support the idea of a strong single currency in the future. These include, among other factors, significant knowledge and capital accumulation (which represent very important assets in the most advanced EU countries), the availability of and development potential for new technologies (that are becoming more and more important for the approaching decade of global competition), and strong economic ties with the United States and emerging markets, etc. Political and international relations are also very important when judging the future of the euro. A collapse would contribute to the deterioration of Europe’s image and would thus undervalue the role Europe can play in international affairs. This would also negatively affect the reserve function of the euro, which is not in the interest of a number of countries (the share of euro in official global currency reserves is about 25%).

84 For more on this, see for example: Looking to 2060: Long-term growth prospects for the world. OECD Economic Policy Paper, No. 3. (2012), or Angus Maddison, Contours of the World economy, 1 – 2030 AD, Essays in Macro- Economic History (Oxford University Press, 2007).

85 Besides the impetus it may give to growth and employment creation, one of the objectives of the TTIP (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) is its strategic importance for counterbalancing the increasing role of emerging countries in world economic affairs.
Long-term forecasts make little sense given the potential for abrupt and unexpected change, but it may be possible to predict the framework conditions for the coming decades. The basic scenario for Europe is that it already possesses all the capacity and knowledge required for entering into even more technology and knowledge-driven economic development path. In the medium term, even if the very negative impacts of the economic crisis are definitely felt, this does not necessarily mean that the EU (and especially its fastest growing, more developed countries) will lose its role in international economic development and competitiveness, as expected from shifts in global GDP shares. Even if the EU becomes even more diverse, its core development area continues to lead global competitiveness and this can preserve its global political role as well. The underlying interest of the advanced world is to maintain the eurozone in the forecast period. Thus it remains a development core that will have a strong impact on neighboring regions’ trade and capital development. Despite all the problems related to the developing heterogeneity in the EU, the eurozone (or a part of it) will continue to play a decisive role in international relations and global economic development.

Central European EU member countries have had quite different positions and strategies during the real and nominal convergence required for EU membership and later the adoption of the euro. Not least because of their similar starting positions and development levels, the Visegrad four countries applied more or less similar tools for several years. As part of its economic strategy, the general framework of which has not changed over the past 15 years, Slovakia introduced the euro in 2009. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic chose a flexible exchange rate regime. The much smaller Baltic states and Slovenia, which had quite short periods of independence, chose a different development model and economic strategy (including monetary policy). Not least because of their very small size, they realized very early on that they were extremely vulnerable to international capital flows. This realization raised the need for guaranteeing their exchange rate stability. Estonia and Lithuania in 2004 and Latvia in 2005 became part of the ERM II exchange rate mechanism. Slovenia in 2007, Estonia in 2011, and Latvia in 2014 introduced the euro (and accepted its potential costs). This divergence is in line with economic theory, which supports the introduction of the euro in small open economies where, precisely because of the small size of the domestic economy and the high level of trade and capital relations with the rest of the world, the advantages of the single currency are likely to be high even if domestic monetary policy is lost. And, according to various calculations, the growth surplus can be very large. In larger countries, considerations may differ. But in this case—apart from currency stability—an additional


87 The case of Greece is totally different and this country can hardly serve as a negative example for small Central European countries as its openness to international economy has been much lower than in the majority of Central European states.
strategic issue must also be taken into account. Stable, high-performing Eurozone countries can further strengthen their integration. Germany, a country that has the strongest economic ties with the Central European region, provides a prominent example.

Given these framework conditions, the euro adoption decision can have several motivating aspects, not only the requirement of meeting the Maastricht criteria. The adoption of the euro would mean an underlying change in economic policy, a shock similar to the period during the beginning of the economic and political transformation and a chance to become a part of the core of the European Union. The approaches in the Visegrad region regarding the euro vary significantly. The Czech view is much more ambivalent towards the future of the EU, a position which roots in the split of the economic and political elite over the issue of deepening integration. This euro skepticism has been observed as early as the mid-nineties. The Hungarian approach to European issues, including the introduction of the euro, has changed the most in Central Europe. Over the past ten years, politically motivated economic steps have significantly worsened the ability to fulfill the Maastricht criteria in a sustainable way and recently political objectives stressing the importance of sovereignty in many fields, including monetary policy, have fundamentally undermined the need to move closer to the introduction of the euro. The Czech Republic and Hungary lack a strategic vision of the future development of the EU. In these two countries, instead of long-term economic considerations and a vision of Europe, only short-term political considerations play a role in EU issues and euro introduction. Poland is currently following a fundamentally different approach based more on international political considerations. This country seems to be very much interested in taking part more actively in future EU decision-making. This can also be observed in relations with Germany and Russia, all of which demonstrate that this country is probably aiming at playing a more important role in European affairs. Poland clearly supports Germany’s leading role in the European Union and also has the ambition of becoming one of the policy-maker countries. These differences can further be observed in the very different quality of their EU strategies and in the emergence of strong anti-EU sentiment and behavior as well.

88 “The Czechs and Hungarians are the black sheep in the game: neither of them has a strong strategic vision of where the EU’s economic governance should be heading.” See: Central Europe Digest, Center for European Policy Analysis (August 1, 2012), p.2.
89 Interestingly enough, it seems that this international political strategy is expressed in economic terms as well. In the recent two years the foreign direct investments from the USA have increased at a much faster pace than it was the case in previous several years. See: Daniel Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan, The Transatlantic Economy 2013, http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic-topics/transatlantic-economy-series.htm
4. What Future for Central Europe

Today’s very rapidly changing environment makes it almost impossible to make business forecasts for the next quarter or half year. Short-term developments are always overwritten by very sudden changes that cannot be anticipated even with the most sophisticated econometric models. On the other hand, major drivers of development in the international and domestic environment have to be identified for strategic planning reasons. In spite of uncertainties, we must undertake the framing of the most important geopolitical, economic and political drivers of trends for the Central European region. Simply describing trends does not help policymakers, economic strategy planners and the business community very much in a period when Central Europe once again reached a turning point. Much depends on the responses to the new challenges that will decide the fate of the regions’ countries for the next decade.

As a starting point for elaborating a probable future for Central Europe, reference must be made to the multiple geopolitical developments noted above that will influence their strategies and maneuvering room.

1. The enlargement process towards the East has ceased (even if Croatia was admitted to the EU), and there is only a very slight chance additional countries will join the European Union in the next 8-10 years. The fragmentation caused by development heterogeneity may also slow down accession talks with potential new members. Failure to manage economic crisis in a sustainable way can cause further weakening in the attractiveness of membership.

2. The eurozone crisis has not been solved; competitiveness and structural problems in the South may persist for a long time, although to varying degrees across the countries in question. Less competitive countries in the eurozone will face long-lasting economic problems that can only be solved with underlying structural reforms, which even in optimal cases will take a decade. On the other hand, most probably the EU’s core region will again become a relatively fast growing, global competitive development center in the next few years. If we consider all 18 members, development gaps in the eurozone will further increase and its structure will become even more fragmented.

3. The eurozone crisis may represent a turning point in European political and economic history. High-performing EU countries like Germany can exert a positive impact on countries that have strong economic ties, including both trade and investment. In fact, Germany has become the leading country in the region and, due to its competitiveness oriented policy, it has all the instruments that make it able to become even stronger economically and achieve an increasing role in international affairs, including
relations with Russia and the Central European region. The increasing role of Germany in Central Europe is a very important framework condition for the next decade.

4. **Russia has been able to strengthen its position in international relations and to take part in halting the enlargement process.** It has become strong enough to try to regain and increase its influence in some parts of the CIS. Russia’s efforts to reintegrate a part of the CIS will continue and strengthen as a number one priority of Russian foreign policy.90 Regarding economic issues, Russia is becoming an increasingly important player in the Eastern part of Europe, despite the many structural problems scholars refer to that the Russian economy faces in the long run.91 Russia has gained strength recently during the economic crisis as a result of its energy resource exports that have shielded the country against the international storm. Besides economic development and the stabilization of the authoritarian Russian regime, the country clearly signals its increasing will to regain its economic and political importance in international matters, at least in its neighboring regions.92 In recent years, Russia has become one of the most important capital investors in the world, mostly through state-owned enterprises, though obviously not independently from politics, and it has become the number one investor in the East Central European region. In addition to achieving economic penetration, it is also more and more in its interest to stop the spread of Western-style democracy, perhaps even in countries where democracy seemed to be solidly rooted.93

5. **Given the changing geopolitical situation, a potential breakup of the Eurozone would not just cause economic problems, it would also further strengthen the possible influence of Russia, especially in economically weaker EU countries.** As a result, completely new security policy uncertainties would emerge again. This is why the division between north and south countries within the European Union bears risks in

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90 After his recent presidential election, Putin framed to achieve a more complete reintegration of the CIS with Russian leadership as a number one strategic objective. Russia initiated the Customs Union within the Eurasian Economic Community in 2010 now called as “Single Economic Space,” and with the final goal of creating an Eurasian Economic Union.


93 See the citation from an interview with Francis Fukuyama: “I think that's right, that Russia doesn't have an interest in having a healthy democracy on its borders because that's going to give the wrong signals to its own people. So I think it's probably right that Russia would prefer to have other authoritarian neighbors around it. And I think [that] increasingly you're seeing a lot of cooperation between Russia and these other dictatorships in terms of trying to re-create a single trade zone or economic space and unifying it through energy policy and through transportation and so forth.” Interview: Fukuyama on Democratization in Eastern Europe. *RFE/RL*. Augustus 27, 2013. http://www.rferl.org/content/interview-fukuyama-democratization-eastern-europe/25087539.html
addition to the associated economic woes. But precisely this risk and the fear of geopolitical consequences make a breakup of the Eurozone less likely, at least during the coming decade. This is especially important in the Central European region, where, in addition to the risk of economic backsliding, there is both open and partly hidden support for nationalism and populism. Authoritarian regime changes in a disrupted Europe may not be avoided.

6. The American interest in Europe and in particular Central Europe has declined after the millennium. American attention has turned to other regions (the Middle East and Asia). This has also been encouraged by a politically and economically weak Russia. Given the past few years of economic and political development in Europe, Russia’s intensifying involvement, the North-South division of Europe and the persistent periphery position of Central Europe or a part of it, developments here are less predictable than a decade ago. As was the case after the collapse of the Soviet Union, what happens in the region does matter. The role of the United States in the region is still and increasingly will be important for the whole of Europe.

Apart from geopolitical considerations, economic trends both internationally and domestically have to be taken into consideration. As regards growth prospects in the coming years, a number of risk factors may affect the Central European region.

1. The growth rates of advanced countries have been slowing over the last 30 years. At the same time, technology developments may add some additional impetus to growth. But given the unstable demand factors, I do not expect support for significant growth in the advanced regions. It is very likely, however, that advanced countries will try to strengthen or regain their leading role in world economic development through instruments like the TTIP. As part of a multisectoral growth strategy in the advanced

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94 I completely share the view expressed in a detailed analysis on why the US has to reconsider strategically its interests and presence in Central Europe: “Preventing a new fault line from emerging on Europe’s northeastern periphery is in America’s overriding strategic interest. It not only ensures that the process of democratic transition may again be strengthened in its journey eastward, not only in Eastern Europe but possibly, one day, in Russia itself. This is what a very great power with a supreme interest in supplying common global security goods ought to be about. To not see this is to be strategically blind.” Andrew A. Michta, “Back to the Frontier”, The American interest (November/December 2013)


96 The EU must work to make this agreement open to others, in due course broadening it to include key partners such as Canada, Mexico and Turkey (if not preceded by EU accession). The agreement must not only be compliant with World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, but also set the gold standard when it comes to regional trade regimes. The resulting economic and norm-setting potential should in turn spill over into more robust political and security cooperation. See: Towards a European Global Strategy. www.europeanglobalstrategy.eu. (I disregard here the obviously overoptimistic statements contained in this report).
regions, this will probably result in a renewed impetus for growth, overwriting the current longer-term GDP growth forecasts.

2. *The growth prospects of developing countries and their continued catching up are not at all given in the next decade.* Most of the successful emerging countries have improved their position from a less developed status to a median income status. But catching up with the developed world in the next period seems far more difficult and requires a different economic policy and international economic strategy. The economic prospects of large emerging countries may vary from country to country with high potential volatility. This is an important issue, as their uneven development may weaken the positive growth impetus expected from the intensification of economic relations with these countries and may question those strategies that base their development on strengthening relations with them. Likewise, emerging and advanced countries are following different cultural, business and governance strategies. This makes it very difficult for any strategy to utilize the benefits from such relations without harming development potential.

3. *The extensive phase of economic growth is over in Central Europe.* This means that more technology intensive, higher value added production and services are required for maintaining or increasing growth rates. Alternatives to achieving these objectives include the significant development of domestic innovative capacity and the attraction of high value added foreign direct investment.

4. *Given the size of the V4 countries and the small combined economic weight of the region, external conditions (global growth, the Eurozone crisis, international capital flows, etc.) are of primary importance and continue to shape the region’s economic prospects.* A notable exception is Poland, which has a relatively large domestic market that makes a growth pattern feasible that is more balanced and is able to put equal weight on external demand, domestic consumption and investment. The other three countries in the region, with 75-85% export openness ratios, are far more dependent on external demand driven growth. A weakening export orientation in these countries would subdue GDP growth and worsen macroeconomic balances.

5. *Central and Eastern Europe share important characteristics (economic structure, transition experiences, role in the international division of labor) in spite of the differences in growth trends in recent years.* All of them depend on economic relations with Germany (a significant share—around 25-30 percent—of their exports goes there). They have all profited from foreign direct investment for the upgrading their economic structures. They are still very much dependent on the inflow of technology; their system of innovation needs to be upgraded, research and development spending
are low by international comparison and all of them need significant additional investment financed by FDI and/or EU transfers.

6. Besides common features, differences in their economic development have become numerous, leading to very different growth potentials over the next decade. From an economic perspective, investment and the business environment primarily influence the growth pathway. Investment, most importantly business investment, forms the core of long term sustainable catching up in the region. Data show relatively low levels in each country, with a clear declining trend in Hungary and a sizeable increase in Poland over the last decade, while Slovakia and the Czech Republic reveal a minor but declining trend. The trend in competitiveness indicators and other business related rankings reveal big differences across the region, clearly signaling backsliding in Hungary, the rise of Poland and Slovakia, and moderate changes in the Czech Republic. In some historical periods, backwardness has produced remarkable growth and modernization. Today, however, backwardness in many cases has eliminated the potential to absorb new technologies and knowledge, thereby worsening the conditions and prospects for innovation-driven development. In theory, catching up is possible\textsuperscript{97}, but it requires that these basics be adjusted to the needs and requirements of the new technology phase of our days.

7. Slow global growth and a worsening or not improving economic environment in many countries may cause increasing social tensions and polarization, resulting in declining living standards everywhere. The share of the poor population is just one aspect of this issue. The problems of the unemployed also have to be taken into consideration, similarly to the prospects for social mobility, which are strongly connected to the educational system. All of these questions need to be managed if we wish to correctly view the divergent pathways forming in these countries. The share of low income people with very limited mobility is on the rise, which leads to increasing migration from the bad performing countries of the region, (and in spite of the worsening labor market situation in the major target countries). The high, persistent unemployment rate may also easily create a difficult situation.

8. International competition will be further strengthened due to the intensifying global presence of multinational firms and liberalization (including free trade negotiations between the United States and EU). In this environment, maneuvering room for countries with cheap labor and low value added will be more limited in long term

because of increasing competition with other international locations.  

**Innovation, education and the ability to effectively use the most modern technologies will become ever more important in economic development in Central Europe.** Clearly, those countries that are unable to meet this requirement and adapt their economic structure and most importantly their educational systems (requiring large investments, change in mentality and the utilization of modern technology in education), will face increasing difficulties in coping with competitive countries. This will further burden the social welfare system, the long-term sustainability of which has to be established in the coming decade. This will be probably the most difficult task in the coming decade: achieving higher competitiveness while reshaping welfare systems. There is a great danger that instead of a long-term approach, short-term politically motivated actions will prevail.

Given the underlying changes that have taken place in the international arena, both from a political and an economic point of view, much depends on the adequacy of the economic policies and international political strategies that influence growth potential and the ability to manage macroeconomic imbalances. Given the extent of the changes and the further restructuring of the global economic order and power relations, we have arrived at a historical period when changes are set to speed up. It has to be understood that the *success or failure of economic catching up cannot be separated from the political characteristics of a given country.* This is a problem of primary importance, since bad policies that are not sufficient to support long-term economic development needs and the catching up requirements of a given country can hinder the utilization of windows of opportunity that rarely open up in the less developed, small, weak countries. Future scenarios cannot be forecast with any acceptable level of certainty without understanding the political intentions. And if political conditions are not sufficient to support the development needs of a given country, this can cause long term development and catching up problems. This is also related to the underlying principles behind political motivations: whether it is state capitalism (active state control in the economy), liberal democracy based on free market competition, socialism or simply pragmatism, drawing upon instruments from any of these models. A belief in the utility of state intervention is frequently connected to statements according to which the success of

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98 “The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational development from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of industrial mutation – if I may use that biological term – that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in...” See: Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.* p. 83.

emerging countries is at least partly based on direct intervention of the state (Russia, China etc.). However, this utility is far from being unambiguous.\textsuperscript{100}

That the \textit{rational expectations of countries with strengthening pro-western attitudes, or more precisely their governing elites after EU accession, may have been misguided or mistaken}, must also be considered. Instead, and amidst the waves of the economic crisis, some political leaders and the economic elite behind them have turned away from western type values and institutions. A long tradition supporting this exists in many East European countries, and is based on hostile or envious behavior toward other countries. The background for this lies in the region’s history and reappears from time to time under certain historical or economic circumstances. This is a form of mental path dependence in Central Europe (again: it should be emphasized that the risk of this kind of behavior differs across the region, but due to the consequences of the economic crisis its possible reappearance is greater than before). Apart from the CIS, other examples can be cited as well from the Southeast European countries in the Visegrad region, including the years under the Meciar government, the strong support of Kaczyński after the collapse of the social democrats in Poland, or the most recent case of Hungary making the country’s political structure more similar to some authoritarian CIS countries, using direct and indirect economic and political instruments.\textsuperscript{101} The current turn is best reflected in polls showing a large decline in positive opinions on the European Union, the falling popularity of the political and economic transformation, increasing acceptance of state intervention, or the hostile attitude toward foreign investors.\textsuperscript{102} The risks associated with the geopolitical transformation and divergent economic development within the European Union could easily lead to a break up or further worsening of the situation in the Central European region.

What these countries must achieve in the next decade in order to re-open the window of opportunity is to provide clear-cut answers to the questions that have emerged within the framework of international and domestic change and the conditions analyzed above. The

\textsuperscript{100} Ruchir Sharma, “Broken BRICs,” \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Volume 91. No. 6. (2012), pp.2-8. See also footnote no. 74.

\textsuperscript{101} For example: Francis Fukuyama, “What’s Wrong with Hungary?” \textit{American interest}, February 6, 2012, “The threat to democracy in Hungary is thus not new institutions per se, but an old political culture that is re-emerging….. I said in my earlier post that the Orbán government displays an “authoritarian thin skin” and this is something that I would doubly underline”; or Paul Krugman, “Depression and Democracy,” \textit{New York Times}, December 11, 2011; and Janos Kornai, \textit{Centralization and the capitalist market economy}, “Already there is a wide circle who agree on the fundamental question: this country is under autocracy instead of democracy; the state of law has weakened; human rights are being infringed.” (English translation of the article “Központosítás és kapitalista piacgazdaság” published in the 2012, January 28 issue of Népszabadság available at: http://301a32ba31149ad50392-db76e8c8d9f43adfd40f06644f9ca222.r22.cf1.rackcdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Kornai_2012_I_30.pdf

\textsuperscript{102} On support for free markets and democracy, see for example: Pauline Grosjean, Frantisek Ricka and Claudia Senik, \textit{Learning, political attitudes and crisis in the transition countries}, EBRD Working Paper No. 140. (December 2011)
answers are not at all obvious and this creates economic, political and security risks for the future.

1. **Decision on strategic partners.** Central European governments’ choice of economic and political model may be influenced by success or failure in economic performance of advanced and emerging countries. There is an increasing need on the part of the most advanced countries for counterbalancing the increasing power of emerging markets that, more and more frequently, re-evaluate the importance of transatlantic relations. If this occurs, then the transatlantic region has a good chance of remaining at the core of future global economic development. Though these countries probably cannot avoid declining shares in global economic output, this region could still gain new momentum. Such developments seem unavoidable, despite fears and reservations in this regard in some of the European countries. There is a danger that regional governments and politicians see the EU as a weak economic center whose economic and political model is not adequate to current global trends. The conclusion may easily be that, instead of the European model, emerging countries should follow potentially more successful strategies. This view is also supported by a belief in the successful decoupling of emerging fast developing countries from the developed world. The most important strategic partners for the countries of Central Europe are in the transatlantic region. Anti-EU economic and political strategies in the countries shattered by economic difficulties and characterized by relatively poor economic outlook and declining standards of living, however, are on the increase (quarterly economic data that sometimes displayed more positive data is not worth drawing long-term conclusions on; high level and stable Central European economic growth simply cannot be achieved in a **sustainable manner** over the next two to three years).

2. **Striving for Eurozone membership may express the will of a country to join the core euro area.** This is also a complex economic and political strategy and a new development model. Instead of a kind of inward-looking policy that tries to close the country (i.e. reducing openness to the world economy, including international trade and the free movement of capital and labor), the principal aim in this case is to fully open a country’s economy. In order to be successful in the core of Europe, significant structural change and increasing competiveness is required. This is the key question in Central Europe for the next 5-10 years that will decide the fate of the region’s countries for the long-term. Poland seems to be interested in adopting the euro in the

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103 The deteriorating positions cannot be described better, than by this year’s EBRD Transition Report (TRANSITION REPORT 2013: Stuck in Transition?) in which several indicators of the countries that joined the EU in 2004 (Hungary, Slovakia) have been lowered, which is almost without precedent in the last ten years. (p.112). Regarding growth uncertainties, see: pp.104-105.
foreseeable future, while, under the current political situation, Hungary and the Czech Republic will not seriously consider this option during the forecast period.

3. **There are persistent problems with the understanding of short- and long-term consequences.** There is a very strong temptation to look at short-term issues in order to gain political advantage. The lack of a consolidated long-term strategy to which politicians must stick creates a framework for daily intervention into structurally important fields. This can harm some sectors, resulting in huge distortions and poorly operating institutions. Any political force that really wants to change the mentality of the population in a way that can be adapted to the coming decade’s changing environment (the major features of which have been explained above) must focus on a long-term approach. Obviously, the vicious circle of populism is not easy to break. But it must be done if we wish to distinguish Central European countries from the more Eastern countries.

4. **Growth must follow a more balanced pattern.** Though from a sustainability perspective small countries should give priority to exports, healthy, balanced and long-term growth can only be secured with the stability of domestic demand factors (investment, consumption). From the perspective of growth and convergence based on both internal and external factors, it is evident that new Member States that have coped better with catching up challenges are those that have produced high but not overheated growth, coupled with appropriate levels of external and internal financial stability, low budget deficits and healthy public debt indicators. But first of all, corporate investment must be increased.

5. **Social mobility and labor force upskilling represent increasingly important tasks in managing social “dualization”.** ¹⁰⁴ Low incomes and relatively high unemployment rates require steps that avoid limiting social mobility and strengthening the cementing of society’s social structure into winners and losers. Failing to do so may result in huge losses of human capital made possible by freer movement of labor within the European Union. Negative examples can easily be mentioned: due to the civil war, social mobility in the former Yugoslav territories was reduced and several hundreds of thousands emigrated, permanently weakening the qualified labor force endowment; millions have emigrated from Bulgaria and Romania during the decades following the transformation due to economic hardship and the lack of opportunity. In countries where, besides economic problems, decision-makers have reduced mobility through changes in the educational and other systems, they have eliminated the most important

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¹⁰⁴ Gini coefficients may not demonstrate extreme income disparities within the region’s countries. A more important problem is related to income levels. Differences in income are increasing, but still oscillating around the EU average. But average income levels are too low to overcome poverty lines.
element of a successful country: flexibility and the ability to adapt to an ever-changing environment. Social mobility can only be improved if education also becomes one of the top priorities.

6. **The role of technology and the capacity to utilize it in growth and modernization has become increasingly important.** Without this, no country in the region will be able to leave behind the phase of extensive growth. The changing international strategies of global firms can also be extremely relevant from this perspective. Many firms are forced to search for further cost-cutting measures in order to regain their competitiveness in an economic environment where demand in several sectors is expected to stabilize at lower levels than before the crisis. In such circumstances, firms are eagerly looking for cost-saving measures that may result in a re-thinking of their global presence, lead to the shutting of high cost production facilities and to their partial relocation in lower-cost countries. As large multinationals in some cases are deterred from closing facilities in home countries (due to government warnings, as has occurred for example in some major Western European countries), they may choose to downsize production in other high wage countries. Visegrad countries are low cost locations and the capacities in some sectors (the car industry for example) are technologically modern and very competitive, so they can expect some additional investment as a part of multinational’s global cost optimization strategies. Strategies related to foreign direct investment remain one of the most important factors in the modernization of the region. In the meantime, the role economic policy plays in supporting the business environment (investment friendly, non-distortive etc.) has become more and more important.

7. **The management of public finances.** Public debt and budget consolidation are some of the most difficult economic issues, and it is certain that the debt problem will pose a continuous challenge, both for the Visegrad 4 countries as well as for the global economy. When analyzing Visegrad country challenges in this respect, several unique features must be taken into account and the significant differences regarding debt management and outlook must also be considered. 1. State debt indicators are the highest in Hungary, while the other three V4 countries exhibit indicators that are favorable even in European comparison. Debt indicators for Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic are relatively positive, despite increased budgetary spending during the worst periods of the crisis. 2. Improving budget balances in Europe, including the V4 countries, is one of the most pressing necessities for at least three interrelated reasons: a. the EU approach toward balanced budgets; b. uncertainty and volatility with respect to international financing; and c. the unpredictable future economic, political and social consequences of the crisis. Debt issuance has led to many non-
conventional measures being introduced, especially in Hungary. But other countries have also chosen similar interventions and they will do so increasingly if additional waves of economic disruption emerge. Countries are running out of options regarding the management of public debt. This leads to the discussion of more and more non-conventional measures. As soon as the very favorable international financial environment worsens, monetary policies and fiscal policies are likely to face sudden pressures.

8. The logic of capitalism and its advantages and disadvantages are not adequately explained. It is important to openly provide the population with clear and balanced views on the pros and cons of different measures. This relates first to the important differentiation between democracy and Russian (or other similar) types of governance. The second point is the explanation of the structure and shape of capitalist systems. These explanations are very important because of the unfavorable consequences of the transformation over the past two decades and due to mentality. In several countries or regions in East Central Europe, people need and want to have a strong state that intervenes forcefully: its democratic nature is less important. It is much easier to solve problems in Eastern Europe by force than through democratic and well elaborated cooperative processes – at least this the perception of large numbers of people. In several countries, many policies have simply not been clearly explained or defended.

5. In Lieu of a Conclusion

Is there a real chance for a completely new strategy to be introduced in Central Europe regarding economic instruments or the approach to development centers, democracy, openness or relations with the EU? The answer is clearly “yes.” This is probably the worst-case scenario for the region or a part of it.

Developments over the past few years could easily lead to the introduction of measures that are shockingly different from European traditions and that would probably weaken the ties that have developed over the past more, than two decades. Economic integration can be considered “too deep” because the original objective of economic and political transformation has not been achieved and, instead of catching up with the living standards of more developed countries, a more complicated balance has been experienced. From here, questioning the basic development model, the principles of free market competition and the efficiency of

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105 “The tax rates needed to bring down public debt to precise levels, moreover, are sizable: reducing debt ratios to end-2007 levels would require (for a sample of 15 euro area countries) a tax rate of about 10 percent on households with positive net wealth.” In: IMF Fiscal Monitor (October 2013). http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2013/02/pdf/fm1302.pdf
democratic institutions in crisis times is not a big step. This approach has already pushed some countries in the region to pursue strategies similar those pursued by some of the CIS countries regarding either indirect or even open limitations on democratic procedure. The situation could easily worsen. Tempted by the almost unlimited power of leaders in some post-Soviet countries, democratic systems could morph into something “new”, into very destructive, obsolete structures in which country identity is defined in opposition to the European development model. This would represent a complete change compared to the pre-accession period, when it was commonly accepted that the EU, with its conditionality principle, could promote the democratization of new members, enforce economic and political discipline, and thereby consolidate the democratic transformation. This also suggests that while the EU presumably played a strong disciplinary role prior to accession, it no longer has the tools to enforce these principles.

Commitments and obligations within the EU were further weakened by the perception that the EU has not been able to manage the impact of the crisis in quite the same way that some large and not so democratic emerging countries have been able to. Moreover, most of the more developed countries were unable to respect the Maastricht criteria immediately after the crisis broke out. In other words, rules are meaningless when large countries face hardships. In this regard, only the example of successful countries (such as China, Russia and many others) has provided the pattern for some countries to follow, raising incentives to strengthen economic relations with these countries because these connections are thought to be different (better) than those with the euro-Atlantic institutional systems. While the latter generally demand democratic and business-friendly economic conditions in exchange for economic support, the former do not make the same demands (though of course they want something else). If large, liberal, democratic international actors do not consider Central Europe important, the region’s fate will ultimately be more and more strongly defined by Russia and/or local inward-looking nationalistic or populist politicians. Especially with the emergence of new waves of economic hardship, such options cannot be foreclosed.

The former socialist countries that are implementing different models of capitalism may today still be under Western influence, but the future is much more unpredictable than anyone would have thought during the period of EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007. At that time it seemed that most of the region was firmly committed to the Western European development model in terms of economics, politics and the institutional system. In countries suffering from the adverse effects of the economic crisis, the weakening of the EU and the increasing influence of populism may result in unpredictable political and economic changes in the future.
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