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Editorial


Diese Beiträge sind überwiegend in englischer Sprache abgefasst, in der auch die Tagung abgehalten wurde. Nur so war eine hinreichende Verständigung unter den Mitgliedern der inzwischen gewachsenen IFDA möglich. Übersetzungssprobleme sind daher nicht ganz ausgeschlossen.

Das reichhaltige Angebot der Beiträge in einen beschränkten zeitlichen Rahmen zu bringen erforderte von den Vortragenden verschiedentlich Kürzungen. Auch dürfte von manchem Zuhörer auf dem Kongress zwar eine Auswahl der Vorträge getroffen worden, aber auch das Bedürfnis entstanden sein, das Nicht-Gehörte, oder auch das Gehörte, im Ganzen in Ruhe nachzulesen.

Von einem unterschiedlichen Ausgang her treffen sich die Vorträge thematisch in der großen Bedeutung, die sie Zeit, Entwicklung und Geschichte, auch in einer Psychotherapie, zukommen lassen. Dabei stellt sich vor allem die Frage, ob die in unserem Dasein jeweils gewährte Zeit auch wahrgenommen wird, um innezuhalten und uns auf das Sein des uns beanspruchenden Seienden einzulassen, oder ob wir während wir laufend, blindlings, dieses erledigen – dessen „Sein“ und seinen Sinn „vergessen“ (Heidegger) haben.

Wie schon im September des Jahres 2007 (vgl. Jahrbuch 2009), so wurden vom Präsidenten der Ungarischen Daseinsanalytischen Gesellschaft, Herrn DDr.Tamás Fazekas, und von Frau Dr. Mária Lubinski und ihren Mitarbeitern alle Vorbereitungen geschaffen, dass sich die Gäste mit dem Tagungs- wie Rahmenprogramm in der gastlichen Donaumetropole wieder sehr wohl fühlten. Und wieder war Herr Professor István Fehér als Gastgeber der Andrássy-Universität, in der die Tagung wieder stattfand, sowie als aktiver Teilnehmer umsichtig um ihr Gelingen besorgt. Ihnen gilt auch in dieser Schrift unser aller grösster Dank!

H.R.
Heidegger’s Development up to
*Being and Time*: The Concept of Being-in-the-World
and the Distinction between Authenticity and
Inauthenticity

István M. Fehér

I. Preliminary considerations

At a conference the title of which is *Development and Daseinsanalysis: Psychotherapy from the beginning* it may sound obvious that one of the primary sources of *Daseinsanalysis* – if not the primary source out of which it emerged and, indeed, developed – is Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. This work was a breakthrough in the philosophy of the 20th century, it altered the philosophical landscape in Europe, insofar as it provided a radically new concept of man–man as Being-in-the-World, and as a being capable of existing in an authentic and inauthentic way.

Considerations concerning authenticity emerged for Heidegger basically in connection with the concept of *Being-with* [Mitsein]. The “existence” of other human beings was for Heidegger as unquestionable as that of the “outer” world. *Dasein*’s way of relating itself to others is called (parallel with, and contrary to, man’s *Besorgen* with the things of his environment) *Fürsorge*, care for. This has, apart from the deficient and negative modes characteristic of everyday Being-with, two positive modes: “leaping in” and “leaping ahead” [Einspringen, Vorausspringen]. This distinction was to become of decisive importance for the later development of *Daseinsanalysis*.

Insofar as *Daseinsanalysis* grew out of and developed from Heidegger’s new view of humans, as it was elaborated in *Being and Time*, it is important to realize that what *Daseinsanalysis* developed from was itself, in its turn, in need of development. *Being and Time* was not born overnight. Rather, it had been a work long in the making. Before its publication in 1927 Heidegger had published nothing for about ten years. The outlines of what Heidegger provided in the published work had been gradually developed in his Freiburg and Marburg lecture courses, beginning with the war emergency semester (*Kriegsnotsemester*) in 1919.
In what follows I propose to sketch some of the characteristic features of Heidegger’s development in the incubation period from the end of World War 1 up to the publication of Being and Time with an eye to those concepts that were to become crucial for the subsequent emergence and development of Daseinsanalyse: man as Being-in-the-World, as Being-with, as well as a being characterized by mineness, that is, the possibility of appropriating itself in its thrownness and being-appropriated.

II. Heidegger’s Hermeneutic Turn—Attempt to Overcome the Opposition Between Rationalism and Irrationalism

Heidegger was to find his own voice and start the move toward Being and Time after the war. Although it is plausible to speak about quite a few proto-hermeneutic motifs in Heidegger’s early academic writings as well as about various anticipatory signs of what was to come (e.g., Heidegger’s appreciation of Duns Scotus’ concept of haecceitas as conveying a sense of “proximity to real life” and being a “primal determination of living reality” in his habilitation work¹ clearly suggests a growing sense for individuality, leading all the way, through the thematization of factual life and, together with it, of the phenomenon called Selbstwelt in the postwar years, up to Dasein’s Gemeinigkeit in Being and Time), the prevailing atmosphere that permeates those writings remains nonetheless a Platonizing-wissenschaftstheoretisch one.

It is not until after the war that the mainly Platonizing-wissenschaftstheoretisch perspective of the prewar student and academic writings is replaced by, and gives way to,

¹ GA 1: 203, 253. – Bibliographical Remark: Heidegger’s works will be cited with abbreviations. The abbreviations for the Gesamtausgabe volumes take the form of the letters GA followed by volume number, colon, and page numbers. Full bibliographical data are provided at the end of the notes. Other abbreviations: WS = winter semester, SS = Summer semester. In addition to the published texts, I shall occasionally also draw upon student transcripts of some of Heidegger’s lecture courses. These are the transcripts of WS 1919–20 “Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie,” of SS 1920 “Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks (Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung),” of WS 1920–21 “Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion,” and the transcript of 10 lectures that Heidegger gave in Kassel, in April 1925, under the title “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Forschungsarbeit und der Kampf um eine historische Weltanschauung.” These transcripts will be abbreviated hereafter as GP, PhA, PhR, K.

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a radical re-orientation. Whatever the underlying motivation may be that catalyzed this
turn, his new password sounds: back to life in its originality! In a sense, this was also the
general tendency of the age, so Heidegger may be seen to have just taken seriously and to
have radicalized this urge coming from thinkers, such as Dilthey, Bergson, Simmel,
Jaspers, Scheler, James. ²

The young Heidegger’s postwar turn may comprehensively be characterized as an
overall attempt at appropriation and reappropriation, i.e., as an effort to come to terms
with the significant tendencies of contemporary philosophy—inclusive of the philosophical
tradition in general—and, more importantly, with what philosophy really is, inclusive of its
subject matter, i.e., life (later Being). For it is somehow the prerogative or perhaps the fate
of every great and original philosopher to rethink and redefine the concept of philosophy
itself. Small wonder then that Heidegger, when he set out on his own, repeatedly reflected
upon philosophy itself, re-examining its very concept and meaning.³

The philosophical position which Heidegger preliminarily adhered to when setting
out on his own was phenomenology. It was Husserl’s phenomenology that provided him
with the “method” and the “devices” for re-examining the very concept of philosophy—
which means that the rethinking of philosophy became for him inseparable from coming
to grips with phenomenology.

While his remarks on phenomenology in the academic writings scarcely amount
to more than a faithful recapitulation or exposition, the postwar observations display a
tendency toward a comprehensive confrontation of its basic concepts and theoretical
fundaments. If we want to schematically characterize Heidegger’s efforts after the war we
may say that Heidegger enthusiastically adhered to the view of contemporary philosophy
that the object primarily to be approached and investigated was “life.”⁴ Heidegger heartily
accepted Husserl’s password “Back to the things themselves,” but the thing, for him, was
not the transcendental, worldless ego, constituting the world, but thrown Dasein, which is

² See GA 58: 3, 10, 162; GA 61: 117, 174, 189; GA 63: 64, 69; GP 10-10-19; PhA 5-6-20;

³ GP 10-14-19, on the “Ursprungsgebiet” of philosophy: “Das Schicksal der Philosophie! Tendenz in
der Geschichte der Philosophie: immer neu anfangen, um es zu erreichen”.

⁴ See, e.g., GA 9: 14f.; GA 58: 79, 81, 162; GA 61: 82, 117; GA 63: 69, 108. That philosophy has life as
its subject matter appears clearly from SZ 46. Heidegger says here that the expression “philosophy
of life” amounts to nothing more than “botany of plants” (a pleonasm), and that in a genuine
“philosophy of life” “there lies an unexpressed tendency towards an understanding of Dasein,” i.e.
existential analytic. See also GA 64: 40.
always already Being-in-the-World. This concept of *Dasein* has been developed and elaborated in an effort to gain a new access to life.

But for all his enthusiasm for the idea of getting back to life itself, Heidegger was reluctant to join in with the ardent critics of scientific philosophy or of philosophy conceived of in terms of a rigorous science. What he suggests is that, rather than a rejection of philosophy conceived of in terms of a universal science, as it has been understood traditionally, it is a thoroughgoing reform of it that is needed—something that will soon be called destruction. For those who suggest that philosophy as a universal science must be rejected because of its inability to embrace problems of life, do indeed, for all their criticism of traditional philosophy, uncritically accept the concept of philosophy as it has been handed down by the tradition. Their rejection is thus parasitic upon the adversary—upon what they want to reject. To claim that there is no way to get a “universal” knowledge of life—that life is unknowable, “irrational,” inaccessible to and impenetrable by general concepts—is to adhere surreptitiously and uncritically to what concepts and knowledge have traditionally been held to be, rather than to search for a way of transforming the knowing apparatus in order to make it conform to its subject matter. All those who complain about the irrationality of life, its impenetrability by rational means, tacitly borrow the measure or concept of rationality from the adversary rather than developing or elaborating a rationality or conceptuality of its own, conforming to its “object”. It is true that, as opposed to scientific philosophy which totally ignores or overlooks the ownmost “object” of philosophy, life, the other party does somehow perceive, behold it, that is, it has some awareness or knowledge of it—*but it does so with the devices provided by the adversary!* This is one major reason why they end up by complaining about the inadequacy of the tools, the impenetrability of life.\(^5\) Irrationalism is

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for Heidegger just the “the counterplay of rationalism”: when it “talks about the things to which rationalism is blind, it does so only with a squint.” What it comes down to is, then, that, rather than taking over your tools from somebody else as ready-made you have to work out and refine them for yourself. The sense of philosophy can even be seen to consist in the “destruction of irrationality” thus conceived (PhA 5-20-1920).

What Heidegger offers in alternative to rational concepts and theoretical knowing, by way of such a “destruction,” is what he calls “hermeneutical concepts” (GA 9: 32), or over against pure or theoretical intuition—“hermeneutical intuition” (GA 56/57: 117). “Hermeneutics,” “hermeneutical,” have the meaning of rival concepts to “theory,” “theoretical,” understood in terms of “theoretically neutral.” Generally speaking, it is due to Heidegger’s search for proper methodological devices regarding an adequate conceptual expression of “factual life” that his hermeneutic outlook emerges in the postwar lecture courses. Theoretically (and ahistorically) neutral knowledge is opposed to, and gives way to, existentially (and historically) involved understanding (or pre-understanding) and interpreting—whereby knowledge becomes at best a subdivision of understanding. All these efforts are in the service of seizing upon “life.” The main character of the latter is claimed to be concern (Sorge) rather than knowledge.7

6 SZ 136. For rationalism’s blindness with regard to the subject matter of “life,” see GA 63: 108 (Heidegger probably has Rickert in mind). That rationalism and irrationalism, far from constituting a genuine alternative, do very much belong closely together was a thesis that Heidegger insisted upon all his life. See, e.g., GA 1: 410; GA 56/57: 88, 117; PhA 5-17-1920; GA 58: 20, 232, 239; GA 63: 44ff.; GA 32: 143; EM 136; N 1: 521; N 2: 372; GA 5: 9f., 12; GA 9: 348f., 388; GA 52: 133; SD 79; GA 13: 212. One of the most illuminating reflections is provided in GA 63: 45: „Was heißt irrational? Das bestimmt sich doch nur an einer Idee von Rationalität. Woraus erwächst deren Bestimmung?“.

7 See GA 61: 89ff.; PIA 240.
Heidegger’s new concept of philosophy is in itself hermeneutical, i.e., situation-centered, equally detached from rationalism and irrationalism, absolutism and relativism or historicism. This concept centers around questionableness, essential to it is passionate dedication to the matter itself—which is Heidegger’s way of taking over, appropriating, and immediately radicalizing, Husserl’s insistence on rigor (GA 58: 137, 231). “Pushed into absolute questionableness, to have questionableness by seeing it—that is what it means to seize philosophy” (GA 61: 37; see ibid., 35), he claims in 1921-22. Philosophy is essentially philosophy (as well as critique) of one given age; it is an understanding appropriation-retreival of its own subject matter, life, no less than of its past, (for both itself and its subject matter, life, are intimately historical, they are their own past), accompanying life as closely to its center or origin as possible. It is a re-enacting accompaniment of life, helping it to interpretively illuminate, that is, appropriate and re-appropriate, itself.

Philosophy becomes thus a hermeneutics that has assumed an ontological dimension by becoming, for Heidegger, “the self-interpretation of facticity” (GA 63: 14). In Heidegger’s postwar turn a new, hermeneutic approach to, and a corresponding conceptual elaboration of, the subject matter of philosophy, life or facticity, becomes integrated with the historical-critical aspect of destruction. Re-orienting philosophy toward life or facticity means obviously looking for the right conceptual tools able to seize it. One basic insight of Heidegger’s is that the descriptions that contemporary philosophy

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8 Situation-centeredness is of course also history-centeredness. Claiming that “the science of the origins is ultimately the hermeneutical science” (GA 58: 55 [„Ursprungswissenschaft letztlich die hermeneutische ist“]), Heidegger also makes the point that “Ursprungswissenschaft” is “historische Wissenschaft.” For Heidegger’s concept of “das Historische” in his early lecture courses, see GA 9: 31, 32f., 36, 38; GA 56/57: 85, 88f., 117, 206; GA 58: 252, 256 (at the last two places the term is “Geschichte”); GA 61: 1, 76, 111, 159, 163; GA 63: 83, 107; PIA 144; PfR, passim. See also “the first principle of hermeneutics” in BZ 26, directed clearly against historicism. Generally, it may be said that Heidegger works out his all important concept of “das Historische” in his early lecture courses in sheer opposition to historicism, the main critical suggestion being that historicism strives for an “objective” knowledge of history (an impossible aim), rather than for an authentic historical “being” of man—and that the first not so much promotes the second but instead suppresses it. The term “das Historische” will be replaced in Being and Time by “das Geschichtliche,” viz. “Geschichtlichkeit.” For later, see the distinction between “geschichtliche und historische Wahrheit” in GA 39: 144ff, viz., that between “historische Betrachtung” and “geschichtliche Besinnung” in GA 45: 34ff., 49ff., 88ff. Further see also GA 45: 11ff., 40, 201; GA 65: 32f., 151ff. 153 („Die Historie […] ist ein ständiges Ausweichen vor der Geschichte“), 359, 421f., 493f.

9 See GA 63: 18; PIA 238; PhA 5-6-1920, PhR 31; K 28f.

10 One of his main efforts is directed, Heidegger says explicitly in 1919, to revive, reanimate the great thinkers of the tradition: Plato, Kant, Hegel (GA 58: 2).
provides of everyday life, the environing world, etc., stem from, and are rooted in, theoretical comportment and conceptuality. They fail to do justice to factual life—its comportment and the language it speaks—precisely insofar as the theoretical attitude is a derivative mode of factual life. The access to this remains hermeneutical, preceded and indeed made possible by, a pre-understanding we always already have of it.11

III. The Epistemological–Metaphysical Tradition of Western Philosophy—Their Hidden Presuppositions Concerning the View of Humans

The attempt at a return to and a renewal of metaphysics as a program is announced by Heidegger as early as his habilitation work.12 Indeed, it was mainly for metaphysical purposes—that is, in order to arrive at metaphysical consequences—that the young Heidegger studied modern logical or epistemological theories. These studies meant, for him, recognizing the fact that such theories are not exempt from metaphysical presuppositions.13 Nor, inversely, can metaphysical or ontological theories be seen to be exempt from logical or epistemological presuppositions; that is, from more or less explicit

11 Heidegger’s theological origins are relevant not only for his becoming a philosopher in general but also, more especially, for the specific kind of hermeneutical attitude he was to adopt in philosophy and to develop in detail. Seen in the perspective suggested by the confessionally specified Christian theological influences, Being and Time might even be claimed to attempt to bring together the Catholic and the Protestant traditions—the former suggesting the ontological perspective characteristic of neo-Scholasticism and dating back to Heidegger’s early reading of Brentano’s dissertation Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles as well as of Carl Braig’s Vom Sein: Abriss der Ontologie, while the latter, extremely critical of Scholasticism, shifts the focus from an ontological perspective upon the divine order and harmony of the world to the individual believer’s living or enacting his/her faith, thereby drawing heavily on Luther’s critique of Scholasticism and taking up motives in St. Paul, Augustine, Pascal, Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard, and Dilthey. Indeed, the explicit program of Being and Time, the elaboration of a fundamental ontology in terms of an existential analytic of the human being in an effort to retrieve and work out the Being question may even be construed as making an attempt to unite and forge both traditions. Roughly, fundamental ontology as the discipline destined to elaborate the Being-question may be seen to be of Catholic origin, whereas the existential analytic, as a continuation and radicalization of the early hermeneutics of facticity, may be traced back to (and seen to take up and radicalize in a specific cally formalized and de-theologized manner) the Luther-Kierkegaardian sort of Protestant tradition centering around subjectivity and the believer’s existential enactment of faith. For more on this point, see in Fehér 2009.

12 GA 1: 406 („Die Philosophie kann ihre eigentliche Optik, die Metaphysik, auf die Dauer nicht entbehren“).

13 The metaphysic-ladenness of epistemological or logical theories is, however, of a peculiar sort—one which those moving within the theory cannot become aware of. Incapable of being thematized, it is not susceptible of critical discussion or examination. See e.g., Heidegger’s discussion of the latent, “dogmatic” metaphysical presuppositions inherent in Husserlian phenomenology (GA 20: 140ff., in particular 147, 155, 158, 178). Concerning Heidegger’s confrontation with Husserl, see Volpi, 1984a; for the concept of phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger see Herrmann 1981, in particular 37ff.
assumptions concerning human thinking or knowing – in short, from a theory of man as a rational animal. The insights into the metaphysic-ladenness of the logical-epistemological tradition and into the logic-ladenness of traditional ontology may be said to be the two basic, and reciprocal, results of Heidegger’s early confrontation with, and appropriation of, Western philosophy. The necessity of positing the Being-question as the question to be asked first and foremost is derived, for Heidegger, from the highly paradoxical result of his confrontation with Husserl’s phenomenology (the most advanced transcendentally oriented epistemology of the day). Indeed, Husserl, though claiming to suspend or bracket “assertions concerning being,” cannot help committing himself to certain prior ontological distinctions, in particular, that between Being as consciousness and transcendent being – which Husserl himself called, symptomatically, “the most radical of all distinctions of Being” (Husserl 1976: 159). This prior commitment is left completely unthematized, having been antiphilosophenologically (that is, dogmatically) assumed (see GA 20: 157f., 178). If the claim to dispense with the Being-question is thus shown to be a pure illusion, necessarily presupposing a dogmatic prior answer to it, exempt from and unsusceptible to any kind of critical examination (or, in other words, if dispensing with it turns out to be equivalent to answering it without first posing it), then the situation seems simple enough: what is needed is to explicitly pose or thematize this first and foremost question of all philosophy. In the light of the recognition, however, that traditional ontology is from its very beginning grounded in, or centered around, the doctrine of logos, i.e., logic, an uncritical natural recourse to any kind of traditional ontological perspective must be out of the question. It even remains uncertain if the Being-question, lacking a prior ground in which to be embedded, can be posed at all.

The way out of this impasse was suggested to Heidegger by his insight into the strict correlation between being and logos in Western philosophy – more concretely, by an ontological thematization of logic, of the theoretical-cognitive attitude or comportment (Einstellung) in the broadest sense. Heidegger’s starting points were (1) the correlation of being and logos in the history of philosophy; (2) the functioning of the logos of the “subject” as the “ground” or “place” of the ontological problematic properly so-called; and

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14 Cf. GA 20: 200f.; GA 24: 103f., 154f., 172, 444; GA 25: 167; GA 26: 19ff., 109; SZ 154, 183, 212; later e.g., EM 78. In Heidegger’s perspective it is no mere accident that Hegel’s ontology, as the offspring of a long development, is symptomatically called Logic (cf. GA 25: 167; see also GA 21: 311).

15 For Heidegger’s discussion of the logic of questioning in his dissertation, see GA 1: 160.
(3) logic as the theoretical comportment \textit{par excellence}. Thus he was able to thematize the \textit{being} of the subject in a deeper way than that provided by the tradition – one capable of showing the very epistemological comportment as a derived mode of being. As the above considerations suggest, this becomes embedded in, and begins with, a thematization of the \textit{being} of the subject – a discipline named existential analytic.\textsuperscript{16} The immanent critique and internal radicalization of phenomenology and epistemology, and the attempt at a radical reexamination of the whole metaphysical tradition through the assimilation of the “irrationalistic” problematic, are fused in Heidegger’s effort to gain a new ground for the Being-question.\textsuperscript{17}

IV. The Changed View of Humans

Man’s\textsuperscript{18} fundamental mode of being, Heidegger claims in \textit{Being and Time}, is Being-in-the-world. His original relation to things emerging in his environment is one of using, handling, employing, arranging rather than “knowing” them. These are modes which presuppose antecedent acquaintance, familiarity, with the world. Even “knowing” things is one way of having to do with or caring about the world – a comportment which comes about as a modification of man’s original relating himself to things. A phenomenological description of man’s primary way of being should, therefore, suspend, i.e., “put into brackets”, theoretical, scientific or epistemological concepts and strategies of description.

\textsuperscript{16} Existential analytic might be seen as a polemic radicalization of Kant’s replacement for traditional ontology, namely, a transcendental analytic of the pure intellect (“blosse Analytik des reinen Verstandes”: \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} A 304 – B 247). Heidegger, writes Richardson, “shifts the emphasis from an investigation of man’s reason ... to an investigation of man in his totality” (Richardson 1963: 31).

\textsuperscript{17} Existential analytic, so conceived, is not anthropology. For to elaborate a theory of man as one being among others already presupposes a prior clarification of the different domains of Being – a task not to be accomplished until after the Being-question is answered; cf. \textit{SZ} 17, 45ff.; KPM 202ff., 227.

\textsuperscript{18} The term used by Heidegger for man is \textit{Dasein}, which will be left untranslated in the text. The reason why Heidegger does not use the term “man” is, negatively, that this term is laden with traditional metaphysical presuppositions. suggesting as it does a “rational animal,” a being “endowed with reason” (a conception Heidegger intends to criticize). The positive reason is that man, for Heidegger, has an intrinsic relation to \textit{Sein}, and possesses a pre-conceptual understanding of Being. Man is indeed the very being which poses the Being-question. The term \textit{Dasein} is apt to suggest all these connections with \textit{Sein}. Concerning the term \textit{Dasein} see King 1964: 65ff.; Richardson 1963: 44ff.; W. Marx 1961: 209ff.; Fell 1979: 31f.; Pöggeler 1983: 93; Biemel 1978: 111ff.
Man’s primary way of being is not to be approached on the level of—or with the
conceptuality provided by—theoretical comportment. Only thus will it be sufficiently
original, sufficiently unaffected by traditional theories concerning the issue, and able to
derive scientific or theoretical comportment from man’s primordial way of relating himself
to his world. If, apart from and prior to any kind of self-description such as “the totality of
foundational connections of true statements”, science is primarily one of man’s modes
of being – “not the only and not the first possible mode of being” at that (SZ 11) – then
existential analytic must not resort to the conceptual framework provided by science. To
do so would imply losing the possibility of gaining a perspective upon it.

Without going into the details of Heidegger’s description of Being-in-the world, it
may be relevant to see how the epistemological problematic, with which Heidegger had
first engaged himself on his way to Being and Time and whose insufficiencies led him to
assume an explicit ontological standpoint, is treated within the framework of the new
ontological perspective.

Given his thesis that man’s primordial mode of being is Being-in-the world,
Heidegger’s treatment of the epistemological tradition from Descartes on has two major
aspects: a negative, or polemic, one and a positive, or “integrating”, one. As to the first, he
shows that the epistemological perspective properly so-called (with its typical questions
concerning the relation of the subject to the object, of mind to the world, the way the
knower can acquire knowledge about the object) is not meaningful without a prior

19 Concerning Heidegger’s early critique of and attack upon “das Theoretische”, see, e.g., GA 56/57: 59:
„Weiterhin hat die Bevorzugung des Theoretischen ihren Grund in der Überzeugung, daß es die
fundamentale Schicht darstellt, alle übrigen Sphären in bestimmter Weise fundiert, was sich z.B. darin
kundgibt, daß man von sittlicher, künstlerischer, religiöser ‚Wahrheit‘ spricht. Das Theoretische, meint
man, färbt auf alle übrigen Wertgebiete ab [...] Diese Vorherrschaft des Theoretischen muß gebrochen
werden [...]” (Italics I.M.F.). See futher ibid., 87, 89, and, especially, 97: „Dann ist auch eine Wert-theorie,
und noch vielmehr jedes Wert-system, ja überhaupt die Idee des Systems, das seinem Wesen nach die
Verabsolutierung des Theoretischen bedeutet, illusorisch.“ (the last italics I.M.F.)

20 „Das Ganze eines Begründungszusammenhanges wahrer Sätze“ (SZ 11). For the term
“Begründungszusammenhang” see Husserl 1980. What Husserl means by this central term of his
Wissenschaftslehre is that Wissenschaft (as opposed to mere Wissen) consists not only in one’s
knowing particular perceptions, or having isolated knowing acts. Rather, it requires, if it is to be
worthy of its name, some “systematic connection in theoretical sense,” that is, “the founding of
knowledge” [Begründung des Wissens] (cf. Husserl 1980: 15, 230ff.).
ontological dualism such that knower and known, subjects and objects are assumed to be two separate entities, their relation being one of mutual exclusion (subject is what is not object and vice versa). However, if man and world are not two independent entities, and human Dasein is not the worldless [weltlos] “subject” characteristic of modern philosophy, but is in itself worldly [weltlich], having always already committed itself to the world, then the ontological ground underlying the epistemological perspective becomes untenable. Heidegger’s attitude is negative or polemic in that he elaborates his concept of Dasein and Being-in-the-world by opposing them to, and challenging, the traditional concepts of “subject” and “object.” He insists that Being-in-the-world, as Dasein’s fundamental mode of being, must not be conceived of as an epistemological relation between subject and object. The initial contention of Being and Time that traditional metaphysical concepts of man like “subject”, “ego”, “reason”, “spirit”, and “person” are ontologically unthematized and thus obscure (SZ 22) implies that these concepts have become vacant, worn out and empty. Indeed, the concept of an “ideal subject”, characteristic of transcendentally oriented epistemologies, is, as Heidegger unequivocally says later in the book, a “phantastically idealized subject”. Such a subject fails to do justice to nothing less than the “a priori” of the “factual’ subject”, that is, Dasein (SZ 229).

Having developed his concept of Being-in-the-world through a contrast with the subject-object relation, he is in a position to show how, in virtue of what modifications of Being-in-the-world as an all-encompassing phenomenon, man’s knowing relation to the world springs. This may be called the positive, or integrating, aspect. Heidegger shows, in a series of analyses, that in order for a thing to become an object of theoretical knowledge or scientific research, our preliminary access to it, that is, our way of having to do with it, must have undergone a specific modification. Only as a result of this will the thing as tool originally made use of, or handled, reveal itself as a neutral substance, simply “out there,” susceptible of being determined by what traditional philosophical theories have come to call “qualities” and “properties”.

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21 Concerning parallels between Heidegger’s ontological refutation of the epistemological standpoint and the perspective of German Idealism see Gadamer 1976: 140f.
V. The Distinction between Authenticity and Inauthenticity

What remains to be seen is the way in which the irrationalistic or existentialist or historian problematic, accompanied by a strong anti-metaphysical bias in the thinkers who gave rise to and defended it, joins in, and becomes an integral part of, Heidegger’s systemic ontological perspective.

Considerations concerning authenticity emerge basically in connection with the concept of Being-with [Mitsein]. The “existence” of other human beings is for Heidegger as unquestionable as that of the “outer” world. Dasein’s way of relating itself to others is called (parallel with, and contrary to, man’s Besorgen with the things of his environment) Fürsorge, care for. This has, apart from the deficient and negative modes characteristic of everyday Being-with, two positive modes: “leaping in” and “leaping ahead” [Einspringen, Vorausspringen]. The first is characterized by taking the “care” over and away from the other, “leaping in” for him in order to do what constitutes the other’s concern for him. The other may thereby become dependent and dominated. The second, by contrast, does not refer to the other’s Besorgen with things. One “leaps ahead”, not in order to disburden the other, but rather to give him back his authentic and primordial care, that is, his existence, thereby helping the other to become conscious of it and free for it (cf. SZ 122; for a fuller analysis see Elliston, 1978: 66ff.). Everyday Being-with, however, is characterized by Dasein’s losing itself in the faceless amorphous anonymity of the “One” [das Man]. Only therefrom can it pass to the authentic way of existing.

The full concept of authenticity is developed in the second division of Being and Time. Living originally in an inauthentic way, Dasein can reach authenticity only in Being-toward-death [Sein zum Tode] and resoluteness [Entschlossenheit]. The concept of authentic existence is often explained very crudely by interpreters as something denoting an aristocratic detachment from, and a scornful contempt of, everyday life. A closer examination of the Heideggerian texts lets one dismiss this reading as wholly unfounded. Deriving as it does from inauthenticity, authentic existence remains forever bound to it: it is but the constant transition or passage from the inauthentic existence to the authentic, and not a kind of independent realm opposed to it. Authenticity, to put it briefly, consists in consciously setting a limit to one’s manifold possibilities – seeing them against the background of one’s ultimate possibility, that is, death. This resolution, once taken, is capable of transforming one’s life into a whole and giving oneself selfhood [Ganzheit, Selbstei]. The authentic project of Being-toward-death is then confirmed, on the part of
the factually existing *Dasein*, by the phenomenon of conscience. *Dasein*'s proper response to the call is, first, to make itself ready for it, that is, to-want-to-have-conscience [*Gewissen-haben-wollen*], and second, resoluteness. Rather than eluding death by escaping into the anonymity of everydayness, authentic *Dasein* anticipates it; rather than averting the call of conscience, thereby precluding becoming itself and being responsible for what it is, *Dasein* resolutely assumes it. Both ways enable *Dasein* to be authentic [*eigentlich*], that is, to appropriate the being it already is. On a closer look, resolution turns out to be not only compatible with, but even requires, authentic Being-toward-death. If resolution arbitrarily varied, without a view to death as *Dasein*'s ultimate possibility, there could be no question of resolution being authentic (SZ 302, 305ff.; see Gelven, 1970: 176; Demske, 1963: 48f.; Ugazio, 1976: 48). The unified concept of authenticity is therefore anticipatory resoluteness [*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*]. Resoluteness in its turn gives rise to “situation.” The latter does not mean a set of conditions given in advance, but rather being revealed and disclosed only by and in resolute *Dasein* (cf. SZ 299f.). Authentic *Dasein* should nevertheless not persist rigidly in any one situation; it has to leave itself open for the possible, and indeed necessary, re-appropriation of itself. Since the relapse into the existential irresolution of *das Man* remains a constant possibility, it is only in repeating, retrieving itself that resolution is what it is (SZ 307f.).

For the full concept of authenticity to be arrived at, however, a further addition is needed. The question of what should fill in the “content” of resolution is, Heidegger repeatedly claims, no part of the existential analytic. It may be answered only by resolution itself. However it is legitimate to ask whence such possibilities may arise (SZ 294, 383). This origin is history. Resolute *Dasein* opens up its possibilities by taking upon itself a given heritage of the past – a heritage in which it resolutely hands itself down. Grasping its innermost finitude in anticipating death, *Dasein* is driven back to itself. In handing itself resolutely down in a freely chosen tradition, it acquires destiny [*Schicksal*]. Seen from the perspective of Being-with, authentic historicity reveals itself as the common destiny of a community [*Geschick*] – a community in which the destinies of individuals are preliminary assigned their role (SZ 384). It is not necessary, Heidegger remarks, that *Dasein* should explicit be aware of the origins of the possibilities upon which it projects itself. But there lies in it the possibility to derive its project (the “content” of its resolution) explicitly from a tradition. Resoluteness, coming back upon itself from fallenness and handing itself down consciously, becomes then the repetition, or retrieval [*Wiederholung*] of an inherited
possibility of existence. To “repeat” in this sense does not amount to “make a piece of the past actual again,” “bringing it back,” but rather “retorting,” “replying” to a past possibility of existence (SZ 385f.). Thereby the full concept of authenticity is arrived at and has been developed.

If the existential analytic (moving, according to its hermeneutic character, in a circle) is guided by a “presupposed” idea of existence, and if philosophy, for Heidegger, must not deny its own “presuppositions”, but rather elaborate them together with that for which they are presuppositions (SZ 310), then it seems legitimate to examine whether, and to what extent, such an idea may be brought to bear upon the author of Being and Time himself. Indeed, we should realize that the philosophical undertaking named Being and Time is highly consistent with, and lends itself easily to, being interpreted in its own terms.

If authentic existence consists in retrieving a historical heritage, then the philosopher’s activity as one possible human activity, one way among others to relate oneself to the world, is authentic insofar as it aims at retrieving his own historical heritage – that is, the tradition of philosophy itself. It is easy to see that Being and Time should be understood from its very first pages in terms of an explicit attempt at bringing back the most original of all the traditions of philosophy, that is, the Being-question.

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22 Cf. SZ 383f. For the variety of meanings and implications of the term Wiederholung see Caputo 1982: 343ff.
VI. Authenticity, Inauthenticity, and the Social World: Consequences for Daseinsanalysis

Authentic existence is explained in *Being and Time* in terms of anticipatory resoluteness. Coming back upon itself from the world of inauthenticity characterized by the anonymity of *das Man*, resolute *Dasein* does not become detached from the world. This would be impossible, for *Dasein* is and remains Being-in-the-world all along (cf. SZ 298). Resoluteness implies, on the contrary, entering fully into the world, opening up and projecting oneself upon the (finite) possibilities which offer themselves in a given situation. It is in anticipating death, in becoming aware of what it means *not* to be, that the awareness of what it means to be becomes accessible. Although in anticipation and conscience *Dasein* becomes isolated, deprived of all its (inauthentic) links (that is, it becomes precisely its own self), nevertheless, in choosing itself, *Dasein* not only chooses itself “out of” the world (to use Kierkegaard’s illuminating terms), but at the same time and in the fullest sense, chooses itself “back into” it (cf. Kierkegaard 1957: 265; see Chiodi 1965: 107; Guignon 1984: 337f.).

It is also resoluteness that makes authentic Being-with possible, permitting *Dasein* to let the others “be” in and for their own being and possibilities. Once free for its own possibilities, *Dasein* is both free of the danger (inherent in its tendency to fallenness) of losing sight of or ignoring others’ possibilities – possibilities which may supersede its own – and of the temptation to reduce them to, and thus take them to be identical with, its own.\(^{23}\) Since finitude is the basic character of *Dasein*, gaining awareness of it by anticipating death helps it become conscious both of what possibilities are uniquely its own (that is, not the others’), and, *vice versa*, of those possibilities of others which are not – and perhaps necessarily cannot be – its own.\(^{24}\) “Leaping ahead”, as the authentic positive form of Being-with, gains its full concreteness only in and by resoluteness. As opposed to inauthentic *Dasein*’s tendency to disburdening [Entlastung], only the willingness-to-have-conscience, the assumption of one’s own being, makes responsibility for oneself and others possible. Only resolute *Dasein* can become the “conscience” of others (cf. SZ 122, 1f., 288, 298; see also Demske, 1963: 66). The thesis that *Dasein* is

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\(^{23}\) Cf. SZ 264, 298.

\(^{24}\) Demske rightly speaks in this sense of a “social aspect” of the anticipation of death (Demske 1963: 38).
always its own, that it exists for its own sake, Heidegger says, does not imply egoism; the concept of *Dasein* is not equivalent to that of the isolated, egoistic subject. Because only in relating to itself can *Dasein* understand something like “self” [selbst], only thereby can it listen to a “you-self” [Du-selbst], and thus make something like human community [*Gemeinschaft*] possible (GA 26: 244f.).

Anticipatory resoluteness, therefore, points to something like social activity, or even engagement, interaction among people. “Leaping ahead” makes a relation among people possible that will prove to be highly beneficial for *Daseinsanalyse* as well as for psychotherapy in general. It is a concept according to which humans are not treated instrumentally. On the contrary, their dignity is wholly preserved, the primary aim being that of restoring a disturbed way of being to its full possibilities, of making it for the patient again possible to be able to be—that is, to regain his or her *Seinkönnen* in the only possible way fitting for a being whose main characteristic is freedom and autonomy.
Abbreviations of Heidegger’s Works Cited

For the abbreviations of the student transcripts referred to see note 1.

Other References


