

(Re)Discovering the Sources of
Bulgarian and Hungarian History

Помощни исторически дисциплини

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**(Re)Discovering the Sources of
Bulgarian and Hungarian History**

Editors

Penka Peykovska

Gábor Demeter



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Abbreviations

а.е.	архивна единица [archival unit]
АМВнР	Архив на Министерството на външните работи – София [The Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Sofia]
АВП РФ	Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации
БЕ	Български език
в.	век
Год. СУ	Годишник на Софийския университет
ЕЛ	Език и литература
РР	Родна реч
ОДА-Враца	Отдел „Държавен архив” – Враца при Дирекция „Регионален държавен архив” – Монтана [Section of the “State Archives” – Vratsa at the Department of “Regional State Archives” – Montana]
ИБИД	Известия на Българското историческото дружество
ИДА	Известия на държавните архиви
ИПр	Исторически преглед
М.	Москва
МПр	Македонски преглед
НА–БАН	Научен архив на БАН [The Scientific Archives of the BAS]
оп.	опис [inventory]
Пер. сп. на БКД в София	Периодическо списание на Българското книжовно дружество в София
РГАНИ	Российский государственный архив новейшей истории
С.	София
См.	Смотрите [See]
СПб.	Санкт-Петербург
ф.	фонд [fond]

ЦДА	Централен държавен архив – София [The Central State Archives – Sofia]
BAS	Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
BayHStA	Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv
BHR	Bulgarian Historical Review – Sofia
Bp.	Budapest
cs.	csomó
ADBFP	Documents on British Foreign Policy
EtB	Etudes balkaniques – Sofia
Ethn.	Ethnographia – Budapest
FO	Foreign Office
Ford.	Fordítás
fűz.	fűzet
HAS	Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Ism.	Ismertetés
Ld.	Lásd [see]
ÖHHStA	Österreichische Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv
ÖHHStA PA	Österreichische Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Politische Archiv
MmL	Moson Megyei Levéltár [The Moson County Archives]
MNL (OL)	Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár (Országos Levéltár) [The Hungarian National Archives]
MREZsL	Magyarországi Református Egyház Zsinati Levéltára – Budapest [The Archives of the Council of the Hungarian Reformed Church – Budapest]
MNy	Magyar Nyelv
RAS	Russian Academy of Sciences
SML	Sopron Megye Levéltára [The Sopron County Archives]
StB	Studia balkanica – Sofia
sz.	század [century]
t.	tétel
Tört. Szle	Történelmi Szemle – Budapest
úő.	úgyanő [the same author]
Vol.	Volume

Papers included in the current volume were prepared in the framework of the BAS and HAS joint international research project entitled “Shared Pasts in Central and Southeast Europe: New Sources, New Approaches”. They present research results, methods and viewpoints of scholars from Bulgaria and Hungary of shared pasts in the target regions with a special focus on the historical sources. Some of the papers participated in the *Bulgarian-Hungarian history conference* entitled “*Old Topics - New Approaches: Rediscovering the Sources*”, which was carried out within the abovementioned project and held in Sofia on *May 21st 2015*.

**Приветствие от Н. Пр. Андраш Клейн, извънреден и
пълномощен посланик на Унгария в България /
Őexc. Klein András Magyarország bulgáriai rendkívüli
és meghatalmazott nagykövetének megnyitóbeszéde**

Уважаеми дами и господа!

С настоящото бих искал да благодаря от името на Посолство на Унгария на организаторите, които направиха възможно днешното събитие. Често чуваме да звучи констатацията: Унгария и България са две приятелски страни. Това действително е така, изпитваме симпатия едни към други, проявяваме взаимен интерес към културата на другия и нямаме политически спорове помежду си. В същото време трябва да признаем, че много от контактите между различните институции, които бяха естествени до настъпването на прехода, бяха отхлабени след 1990 г. Днес стипендиантите от двете страни са по-малко, по-малко са хората, изучаващи езика на другата страна, по-слабо е сътрудничеството между нашите образователни и културни институции. За съжаление, това отчасти е естествено, тъй като от края на ХХ в. пред гражданите на нашите страни се откриха нови хоризонти и възможности. За щастие обаче, има

едно изключение, а именно дейността на смесената историческа комисия, която е жива, активна и успешна, което се потвърждава и от днешния форум.

Често казваме, че историята трябва да се познава, за да се поучим от миналото и да не повтаряме едни и същи грешки. За съжаление често това са само едни изпразнени от съдържание думи. В определени случаи обаче, това се променя тогава, когато преживяваме периоди, изпълнени с кризи, когато заставаме пред неочаквани предизвикателства. В такива моменти, обществото, политиците и експертите отново отдават дължимото на дейността на историците. Сега също изживяваме един такъв период.

Именно затова Благодаря на Вас и организаторите за днешния форум и Ви пожелавам едни приятни, полезни и успешни дебати. Благодаря за вниманието, с което ме удостоихте!

Tisztelt Hölgyeim és Uraim!

Ézúton szeretném megköszönni a magyar nagykövetség nevében a szervezőknek, hogy lehetővé tették a mai eseményt. Gyakran hangoztatjuk, hogy Magyarország és Bulgária két baráti ország. Valóban így van, kölcsönös szimpátiát érzünk egymás iránt, érdeklődünk egymás kultúrája iránt, élénkek a gazdasági kapcsolatok, és nincsenek politikai vitáink. Ugyanakkor látnunk kell, hogy nagyon sok intézményes kapcsolatrendszer, ami természetes volt a rendszerváltásig, 1990 után meglazult. Ma már kevesebb az ösztöndíjas a két országban, kevesebben tanulják nyelveinket, kevesebb az oktatási és tudományos intézeteink közötti intézményes együttműködés. Sajnos, ez részben természetes is, hiszen a 20. század végétől új lehetőségek, új horizontok nyíltak meg állampolgáraink számára. Szerencsére azonban van egy kivétel, és ez a történész vegyes bizottság tevékenysége, mely élő, aktív és sikeres, amit a mai nap is bizonyít.

Gyakran mondjuk, hogy a történelmet azért is ismernünk kell, hogy tanuljunk a múltból, annak érdekében, hogy ne

kövessük el ugyanazokat a hibákat. Sajnos, igen gyakran, ez egy üres mondat marad. Bizonyos esetekben azonban ez változik, akkor, amikor válságokkal teli időszakot élünk meg, amikor váratlan kihívások előtt állunk. Ekkor a közvélemény, a politika és a szakértők világa ismét fölértékeli a történészek tevékenységét. Most egy ilyen időszakot élünk meg.

Éppen ezért köszönöm meg Önöknek és a szervezőknek a mai rendezvényt és kívánok Önöknek egy kellemes, hasznos és sikeres tanácskozást. Köszönöm megtisztelő figyelmüket!

Inheritance Inventories (*tereke defters*) in the *Kadı* Court Records in the 17th – 18th Centuries: Opportunities for a New Reading

Stefka Parveva

Institute for Historical Studies – BAS

Inheritance inventories (*tereke/muhallefat defters*) are documents which have a major significance in studying a number of social aspects of the history of Ottoman subjects. They were recorded in the *kadı* court records (*sicils*), due to the wish of the relatives of the deceased person to share the property he has left, by the Islamic rules of inheritance, or due to a Sharia procedure whereby the State took possession of the estate of the deceased person where no heirs were known to exist. The law required the heritage to be divided by a *kadı* court also in cases where the legator had underage heirs or a pregnant wife at the time of his death; when there were no heirs at the place where the deceased person resided or transited so as to make sure that any heirs residing elsewhere will be notified; in cases when the deceased person was fully or partially bankrupt. Any disagreement among the heirs in dividing the inheritance could also be a reason for taking the matter to a *kadı* court. Some documents report cases of coercion by a *kadı* or other court agents over the relatives of a deceased person to have his inheritance divided in court – apparently because of the fees that were charged.¹

¹ Matthews, H. J. Toward an *Isolario* of the Ottoman Inheritance Inventory, with Special Reference to Manisa (ca. 1600–1700). – In: Quataert, D. (Ed.) Consumption Studies and the History of the Ottoman Empire, 1550–1922. An Introduction. State University of New York Press, 2000, 75, note 29; Gradeva, R. On “Frenk” Objects in Everyday Life in Ottoman Balkans: the

Even though they had their own legal rules and traditions in respect to inheritance, non-Muslims from various denominations were also able to divide their property by the Sharia procedure. The estate was listed, divided and entered in the *kadı* court records, by the *kadı* or by an expressly authorized official, the *kassam*.

The structure of the inheritance inventories consists of several parts. They start with personal information about the deceased: name, religion and occupation or rank, place of residence and heirs. In this part of the inventory is recorded and the date of its completion.

At this point, we need to pay special attention to the categories of people who were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased. The right to inherit was acquired by blood or by marriage. The heirs had to be alive or conceived prior to the moment of division of the estate. In mixed marriages (i.e. when the wife was non-Muslim), the heirs were only those belonging to the Muslim denomination. The heirs were divided in seven groups. These groups included the spouse, children, relatives on the fraternal or maternal side, the patrons of freed slaves, and those recognized by the legator as his heirs or legatees. Where no heirs who were known to the court, the inheritance went to the public treasury (*beytülmal*). The people who were not eligible for inheritance were the murderers of the legator, slaves and those who had renounced Islam.

The core part of this type of documents was a description of the personalty and real estates of the deceased person expressed in cash. We will focus here on the property and belongings in the inheritance of villagers, which differed considerably from those of townsmen due to the differences in the micro economy of the village and the town and the different everyday activities of their residents. In this part of the inventories we find the house and its belongings: most frequently kitchen utensils and rugs, as well as the clothing of the deceased person. Often the

Case of Sofia, Mid-17th – Mid-18th Centuries. – In: Gradeva, R. War and Peace in Rumeli, 15th to Beginning of 19th Century. Istanbul, 2008, 274.

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catalogue of items was accompanied by description of size, color and the material they were made of. Sometimes their condition was specified as well: usually as “worn” or “old.” In the case of non-Muslim inheritance, some items of clothing and jewelry were described with the attribute “infidel” underscoring the specifics of the craftsmanship they displayed.

This part of the inheritance inventory also included the farm animals and hay and/or straw to feed them. The amount of hay, measured in stacks or carts, suggested that the villagers also possessed meadows. This type of property has a state (*mîrî*) status and was not included in the inheritance inventory which consisted only of private property (*mîilk*) of the legator. This type of land possessions and how they were inherited is mentioned later in this paper.

This part of the inventory also included the working animals of the villager: pairs of oxen and/or buffaloes, horses and mares; young animals: calves and heifers; animals that provided milk and cheese for the villager’s table: cows and buffalo-cows, often with calves, and sheep. There was sometimes a quantitative reference (in *okka*) of the cheese output. Pigs and fowl were rarely included in the records. Where they were mentioned, they were in larger numbers which suggests that they were not grown only for own consumption but also for the market. Beehives were also mentioned infrequently.

Next, in the same part of the inheritance records came the villager’s farm tools and cart. Sometimes each tool was entered separately and sometimes under the general term “*alât*,” or tools, implements. The ploughs were indicated by their ploughshare. Maybe the wooden parts of the ploughs were not evaluated and were therefore excluded from the total evaluation of the inheritance due to the fact that they were home-made by the villager rather than bought on the market.

The legator’s property also included the crops sown in the fields and/or grain that was harvested and kept in the barns. It was

entered by type (wheat, barley, rye, oats, millet) and by quantity (*kile*, *okka* or *şinik*) and evaluated by the current market prices. Here is the point to mention the main disadvantage of the inheritance records as a historic source. Due to the fact that by the Islamic law on inheritance only private property were distributed and inherited, arable land which was one of the main sources of income and sustenance was not included in the inheritance inventories. Similarly to the meadows, the land for grain cultivation – called *raiye*t çiftlik or *baştina* – was *mîrî*, property belonging to the state. The use of such land was strictly regulated by the Sultan's law (*kanunname*). Whether the villager's *raiye*t çiftlik was on state land or on *vakıf* land, in both cases a *tapu*² regime applied. It said that the villager was entitled to possession (*tasarruf*) and usufruct (*istiğlâl*) of arable land. He was not allowed to sell and donate it, to pledge for a loan, alter its use from a grain field to a vineyard or an orchard, or build a building on it. This type of land was inherited unconditionally only by the sons of the villager. From the time of Sultan Suleyman I (1529–1566) onward, the law on the land were supplemented and revised to broaden the scope of relatives entitled to a certain priority in obtaining the land of a deceased person but only in exchange for payment of a *tapu* fee, like any other villager.³

Unlike the plough land, the vineyards, orchards and vegetable gardens were entered in the inheritance inventories because they were a private property of the villager. Their area was measured in *dönüm* or *çapalık*. Sometimes the orchards or

² Турски извори за историята на правото по българските земи. Т. 1, С., 1961, 63, 81, 89 и др.; Турски извори за историята на правото по българските земи. Т. 2, С., 1971, 67–73.

³ See legislative acts from the time of Suleyman I (1520-1566) and the early decades of the 17th century. Турски извори за историята на правото по българските земи. Т. 1, 66–75, 128–132, 135, 137; Турски извори за историята на правото по българските земи, Т. 2, 67–68; Мутафчиева, В. Аграрните отношения в Османската империя през XV-XVI в. – In: Мутафчиева, В. Османска социално-икономическа история. С., 1993, 147–149.

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vegetable gardens were recorded only by their cash value. Some inheritances also included barrels of wine or raki.

Finally, even though infrequently, some inheritance inventories included cash and/or the value of loans granted to individuals.

The inheritance records hardly included all movables. A justifiable assumption can be made that clothes, tools, accessories and others were left to close relatives or concealed from the heirs before the inheritance was recorded and divided. The belongings of deceased persons with no known heirs, whose inheritance was due to be handed over to the State Treasury, could have also been stolen by their employers, neighbors or co-workers. Therefore we do not know for sure that the inheritance inventories contained the full information about the property of the legator.

The next part of the inheritance inventory mentioned the expenses of inventorying, dividing and legalizing the inheritance and burying the deceased. His debts were also entered here. The final part contained information about the share of the inheritance going to each of the heirs mentioned at the start of the inventory after subtracting the debts of the legator and the costs for inventorying and dividing the inheritance. The distribution of property was based on the principles of the Koran and related to the size of the shares going to the male and female heirs in the event of equal kinship with the deceased, such as daughters and sons, brothers and sisters, and so on. According to this principle, the male-to-female shares were 2:1. The law used complex calculations and fine details to determine the share for all relatives on each level of kinship and in various kinship combinations.⁴

Structured as described above, the inheritance inventories offer valuable information about the possessions and immovables left after the death of their owners, about their economic activity and property status, their everyday life, family and

⁴ More information about the shares that heirs receive from the inheritance according to the Koran and the Muslim inheritance law see in: Гълъбов, Г. Мюсюлманското право с крагък обзор върху историята и догмите на исляма. С., 1924, 65–76.

relatives inheriting the deceased villagers.⁵

As mentioned earlier, one of the key components of a villager's possessions, the fields which constituted his *raiyyet çiftlik* for production of grain and provided a considerable part of the revenue in the family budget, were not included in the inheritance due to their status as State property. A new opportunity has recently emerged which largely overcomes this deficiency thanks to the information from a *deFTER* which is in the focus of the following pages.

In 1715 the Ottoman Empire re-conquered the Peloponnese, ruled at the time by Venice. Its territory was officially added to the Empire after the Peace Treaty, signed in Passarowitz in 1718. The conquest of the peninsula was followed by issuing a Law (*kanunname*) of the *vilayet* of Mora, which restored the *mîrî* status of the land and regulated the issues concerning its cultivation and taxation. Parallel to it a process of registering the population, its property and sources of income was carried out. One of these registers (*deFTers*) concerns the settlements in the districts (*kazas*) of Arcadia (mod. Kiparissya), New and Old Anavarin (mod. Pilos) in South–West Peloponnese. The *deFTER* is dated 20 *Muharrem* 1128 / 15 .01. 1716.⁶

The aim of the registration was to determine and describe the real property (*emlâk*) and land possessions (*tasarrufat*) of the Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of the towns and villages after

⁵ More information about the structure of this type of documents, the right to inheritance and the reasons for having an inheritance divided by a *kadı* court see in: Гълъбов, Г., Op. cit., 64–76; Тодорова, О. Жените от Централните Балкани през османската епоха (XV–XVII в.). С., 2004, 330–333; Inalcık, H. Sources for Fifteenth-Century Turkish Economic and Social History. – In: Idem, The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire. Essays on Economy and Society. Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1993, 177–193; Matthews, H. J., Op. cit., 45–75; Gradeva, R., Op. cit., 272–274; Gradeva, R. Towards the Portrait of “the Rich” in Ottoman Provincial Society: Sofia in the 1670s. – In: Anastasopoulos, A. (Ed.), Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire. Rethymno, 2005, 149–200.

⁶ Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, TD 880.

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the reconquest of the Peloponnese. The compiling of the survey was part of the efforts the authorities made to facilitate the return of the expelled Peloponnesian Muslims to the region by reinstating them in their former homes and lands. This was done under the direct orders of sultan Ahmed III. Interesting details from that time were provided by a Greek merchant, a witness of the events, who told the following story:

“...I was an inhabitant of Gastouni at the time of Venetian rule. Now I am established with my family in Ioannina, my homeland. Twenty-eight days ago I was in Patras on business and there was a tahrirci or commissioner there, who was making the cadaster of all the properties. He is in charge of that part [of Patras] where the majority of the inhabitants are Jews of Larissa... In each district there is a tahrirci who is registering the properties, but they are not issuing a property deed (cozzetto: Turkish hüccet) to anyone of those [the Christians] who used to possess them [the deed]. The Turks who used to live in the Kingdom are arriving from Roumeli, and they are taking all their houses and fields; thus does an Order of the Grand Signor prescribe, and these Turks are arriving from there every day...”⁷

It is mainly due to the desire of the Ottomans to restore the *status quo* that we have now unique information about the property and possessions of the townsmen and villagers, including their houses, fields, vineyards and orchards, giving their extent in *döniims*, the number of olive trees, sheep, pigs, mills, oil mills and other important items.

The last part of the survey of the town and every village provides a summary of the type and quantity of landholdings and other property, and of some agricultural products subject to taxation. This part is especially valuable for the data it provides about the annual yield ratio and money valuation per measurement of some of the basic crops (wheat, barley, millet, oats, rye, olives, grapes, cotton, and silk). These explanations

⁷ Topping, P. Pre-modern Peloponnesus: the Land and the People under Venetian Rule (1685–1715). – *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 268, 1976, 101.

were probably included to facilitate the estimation of the annual productivity and the taxes the inhabitants had to pay on agrarian products. These explanatory notes, are based on the information obtained by the Ottoman clerks from the local people knowledgeable about the fertility of the crops they were cultivating. Thus, for example, in the list of the first village registered after Arcadia, Filiatra, before describing the annual yield ratio per olive tree, per sown *kile* wheat, barley, oats, per one *dönüm* vineyard, and so on, the following explanation is given: “*This is the answer which [the peasants] gave when [they] had been asked about the yield (hasil) of the mentioned village.*” In addition, at the end of the list for the village of Christianu it is explained that: “*When it has been asked about the crops the taxpayers of aforesaid village answered as followed...*” and so on. For the other villages, near the above-mentioned ones, or with similar natural characteristics and crops productivity, the clerk recorded that the calculation of their harvest and revenue was done in the same way as in the village, which we can consider a “model” or a “village-type”.

The information regarding peasants’ reports about the sowing rates and the yield ratio of grain has allowed us to reconstruct first, the annual production of cereals in the *raiyet çiftlik* (peasant’s farm) in various types of villages, designated by the Ottoman registering clerk as a “model” and second, to reconstruct the productive capacity of an average *raiyet çiftlik* in South-West Peloponnese.⁸

⁸ Първева, Ст. Земята и хората през XVII – първите десетилетия на XVIII век. Овладяване и организация на аграрното и социалното пространство в Централните и Южните Балкани под османска власт. С., 2011, 145–173; Parveva, St. Agrarian Land and Harvest in South-west Peloponnese in the Early 18th Century. – In: Village, Town and People in the Ottoman Balkans 16th – Mid-19th Century. Istanbul, 2009, 61–65, 86–95; Parveva, St. Agrarian Surplus and Agrarian Strategies in the Village Micro Economy in South-West Peloponnese in the Early 18th Century. – In: 8th International Symposium: Halcyon Days in Crete VIII, ‘Ottoman Rural societies and Economies’, 13–15 January 2012, Rethymno (*forthcoming*).

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Court Records in the 17th – 18th Centuries...*

The results of these reconstructions provide a benchmark which allows a new reading of the information from the inheritance inventories. We mean here the analysis of the recorded quantity of sown and/or harvested grain. These quantities acquire a new meaning. They have the capacity to form an idea about the scale of the fields which were possessed and cultivated by the legator. Thus we establish the quantitative parameters of one of the most important elements in the peasant farm – his *raiye* çiftlik.

The Effects of Russia's Balkan Aspirations on the British Diplomacy in St Petersburg. The Treaty of Adrianople and Its Consequences (1829–1832)

Katalin Schrek

University of Debrecen

Russia's growing great power status and strengthening influence in the Balkans at the end of the 1820s were partially the consequence of the role Russia had played during the Greek Cause, as well as of its foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire. As regards the latter, the issue of an upcoming war launched against the Porte had the greatest significance, the probability of which could increasingly be perceived since the autumn of 1827. Despite the fact that the alternative of a Russo-Turkish war had been an integral part of the rhetoric of Russia's foreign policy, it had not been realized in practice. Since the main diplomatic tool in Russia's foreign policy was to sustain the theoretical possibility of an upcoming war, which was not only regarded as a means for crisis management and a temporary solution in solving the Eastern Crisis, but also as a means in shaping international relations, in particular the Anglo-Russian diplomatic relations.

Year 1828 brought sharp changes in this respect. In consequence of an actual armed conflict developing between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, Russia had managed to achieve substantial war successes, while the results ratified by the Treaty of Adrianople resulted in an unequivocal growth of the great power prestige of the Russian Cabinet. It was in this context that the allied cooperation between Russia and Great Britain, based on the treaties of April 4, 1826 and July 6, 1827

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was broken, the precursors of which had started to reveal themselves since 1828, but it was not until the beginning of 1830s that its actual consequences became apparent for both the London and the St Petersburg Governments.

The main objective of my paper is to give an overview of the most important stages of this process, and to demonstrate Great Britain's foreign policy toward Russia following the Treaty of Adrianople, and also to present the major factors influencing this policy. For the interpretation of the British position I used foreign affairs sources from the British National Archives/Public Record Office, from the collections of which I used in particular volumes recording Britain's direct communication with Russia (General Correspondence – Russia). I also used several publications mostly issued in the 19th century, comprising both private correspondence and collections of official government material, such as correspondence, dispatches of Arthur Wellesley the Duke of Wellington.

The major policy guideline defining the British foreign policy of the era is marked with names of Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen, and its basic principle was the reconsideration of the relationship with Russia, namely keeping under control St Petersburg's position and ambitions represented in the Eastern Question. Endeavors to create a counterbalance had appeared as a main objective of the Foreign Office as early as during the months prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war. The turning point however, was undoubtedly the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war, which for the Cabinet of St James resulted in understanding that London is not able to substantially influence the course of the Russian policy. The real or perceived possibility of launching an armed conflict turned out to be even more dominant, since during the Goderich Government, as a result of the Anglo-Russian negotiations, Britain still had a slight chance that St Petersburg would give up his plan of a war against the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, this failure of the British policy resulted in the gradual break-up

of the Anglo-Russian alliance, concluded in the spring of 1826, and issued in the continuous weakening of the Anglo-Russian diplomatic relations. London's concerns or hypotheses, according to which Russia was a potential threat to the English geo-strategic, political and economic interests, as well as to the sovereignty and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, had a top influence in this process. As a result, the need to protect the Balkan and Middle Eastern status quo gained more significance than ever.

One of the most prominent moments of the British-Russian disintegration process was the Russo-Turkish peace treaty, signed on September 14, 1829, in Adrianople. The foreign policy determined and applied relating to the Ottoman Empire offered an alternative for the two leading Great Powers of Europe for a long term preservation of their cooperation, based on coordination of interests and exercising mutual control, which thus became the guarantee for either the stability or the instability of the formed coalition. In this context, the moment any difference in the attitude of the two Cabinets occurred, the conditions of the partnership based on mutual temperance would change at their core. And the Russo-Turkish war and the Treaty of Adrianople created a situation exactly of this nature, in which due to the changing international circumstances Great Britain was forced to redefine its relationship with Russia. Consequently, in the first part of this paper I attempt to find the motives of the Government of London in changing their foreign policy toward St Petersburg, while the second part will be a presentation of the actual political steps induced by the changes in the tone of the Foreign Office.

The successful peace talks in Adrianople resulted in the implementation of several beneficial decrees for the Russian Empire, perhaps one of the most important of which was the reinforcement of the rights of the Danubian Principalities, which was a constant and dominant element of the foreign

policy of the Russian Court “(...) *the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia pursuant to their specific capitulation had subordinated themselves to the power of the Sublime Porte, and since Russia had accepted to guarantee their well-being, at present they are granted all rights, advantages and privileges, which were assured for them by their capitulations, also by the agreements concluded between the Courts of the two Empires, and finally as a result of the Hatti Sherifs issued in different periods.*”¹

The status of Moldavia and Wallachia and the reformation of their internal political structure also determined the degree of the Russian influence in the given region. The points of origin for the privileges of the Principalities went back to the Peace Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji of 1774,² to the Treaty of Jassy of 1792³ and to the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812,⁴ as well as to the Sultan's Hatti-Sherif of 1802⁵ and the Convention of Akkerman concluded in 1826⁶. Based on these treaties, Russia gained more and more influence in the internal policy of the Danubian Principalities,⁷ a prominent example

¹ Внешняя политика России 19 и начало 20 века. [Henceforward: ВПР] Документы Российского Министерства Иностранных дел. Сер. II. т. 8 (16). М., 1995. Док. 103. Мирный договор между Россией и Османской Империей, Адрианополь, 2 (14) сентября 1829 г., 267.

² Кючук-Кайнарджийский мирный договор между Россией и Турцией, 10 июля 1774 г. Под стягом России: Сазонов, А. А., Г. Н. Герасимова, О. А. Глушкова, С. Н. Кистерев. (Сост.). Сборник архивных документов. М., 1992, 78–92.

³ Extracted text In: The National Archives / Public Record Office / FO [Henceforward: TNA] 352/61/5. Abstract of Articles of Treaties between Russian and Turkey, – 1774–1849 –, subsisting April 4, 1854.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ The Hatti-Serif ratified the election of Hospodars every seven years, as well as the manner and possibility of their removal, which in case of a justified failure should be carried out with the consensus between the Porte and the Russian Court, with their full agreement. – In: Ibid., 15.

⁶ Extracted text In: Ibid.

⁷ Taki, V. Russian Protectorate in the Danubian Principality: Legacies of

of which was the issue of representation of Moldavia and Wallachia, which could legitimately be fulfilled by the current Russian ambassador to Constantinople. Although the Russo-Turkish Treaty of 1774 assured for both provinces the orthodox representation through a chargé d'affaires at the Porte, the same Treaty granted the Tsar's ambassador delegated to the Turkish capital a similar power.⁸

Thus the gradual expansion of rights of the Danubian Principalities by means of the above mentioned Treaties, proved to be part of a well-constructed guideline of the Russian foreign policy. Since the results achieved in this region – besides being the means of a possible reinforcement of the Empire's position in the Balkans as well as of the control over the internal affairs of Moldavia and Wallachia – would also offer international legislative points of reference for St Petersburg in his policy toward the Ottoman Empire. Later, St Petersburg's freedom to act in this area was further enhanced by the Organic Statutes issued in 1831–1832.⁹

The issue of Russia's influence exercised in the region of East-Balkans became even more pronounced as the economic aspect was brought into the fore. In the strengthening of the economic and strategic role of the Danubian Principalities a

the Eastern Question in Contemporary Russo–Romanian Relations. – In: Frary, L. J., M. Kozelsky. (Eds.). *The Russian–Ottoman Borderlands. The Eastern Question Reconsidered*. Madison, 2014, 42.

⁸ TNA/FO/352/61/5.14.

⁹ Florescu, R. R. Stratford Canning, Palmerston and the Wallachian Revolution of 1848. – *The Journal of Modern History*, 35, 1963/3, 229; Арш, Г. Л., В. Н. Виноградов, Э. А. Джападзе, И. С. Достян. (Ред.). *Международные отношения на Балканах 1815–1830*. М., 1983, 270; Régault, E. *Histoire politique et sociale des principautés danubiennes*. Paris, 1855, 166–186. Concerning the autonomy and aspirations for independence of the peoples of Balkans also see: Достян, И. С., А. В. Карасев, И. В. Чуркина. Национально-освободительная борьба балканский народов как проявление кризиса Османской империи в 19 в. Революции и реформы на Балканах. *Балканские исследования*, 12. М., 1994, 5–20.

substantial role was played by their unlimited freedom of shipping and commerce along the Danube,¹⁰ which resulted in Moldavia and Wallachia soon becoming significant stations of an important southeastern European grain transport route, especially in the period after the flourishing of the two port towns and commercial depots, Brăila and Galați.¹¹ Even though the region gained relevance in European commercial life only starting from the 1840s, the supervision of the Danube Delta and the privilege of control over its most important sections had been one of the most fundamental great power policy issues since the 1830s.¹² It was particularly true related to Great-Britain and Austria, who had kept the issue on the political agenda since 1829, and with Russia's acquisition of the Sulina Channel the topic attracted further attention during this period.

Russia's leading position and control over the Danube Delta was closely linked to the policy of territorial acquisitions. The problem related to that and emerging on the part of the allies, in particular on the part of Great Britain, was connected with the evaluation of the Russian Empire's true intentions. London's concerns due to the Russian borders expanding to the South and Southwest, based on the tendencies of the former Russo-Turkish war, could be regarded as a natural reaction. In this case, however, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

¹⁰ For Moldavia and Wallachia this right was guaranteed by article V of the Russo-Turkish peace treaty of 1829. – In: BIP. Cep. II. т. 8 (16). М., 1995. Док. 103..., 267.

¹¹ Ardeleanu, C. Russian-British Rivalry Regarding Danube Navigation and the Origins of the Crimean War (1846-1853). – Journal of Mediterranean Studies, 29, 2010/2, 165; Ardeleanu, C. The Navigation of the Lower Danube (1829-1853). – Transylvanian Review, 22, 2013, Supplement. No. 2, 230-241; Demeter G. A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom. Társadalmi és gazdasági átalakulások a 18. század végétől a 20. század közepéig. I. Kötet. Általános rész és Bulgária. Bp., 2014, 150.

¹² Hajnal, H. The Danube. Its Historical, Political and Economic Importance. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1920, 53-63.

distanced itself from the view of regarding the territorial expansion as warfare moves, or later, after the armed struggles ended, as war achievements. This view was justified by the provisions of the peace treaty, as according to article III *“The border between the two Empires will be river Prut, starting from the point it enters Moldavia, as far as the confluence with Danube. From that point the borderline shall follow the flow of the Danube, as far as the arm of St. George meets the sea, in a way that all island, formed by various branches of this river, will belong to Russia, while its right bank will remain the property of the Sublime Porte.”*¹³

The Russian diplomacy both theoretically and in practice stuck to the principles pursued during the Eastern (Greek) crisis of the Ottoman Empire, namely, despite of taking part in its settlement, they refused to take advantage of the international situation by territorial acquisitions.¹⁴ Parties signing the Protocol of St Petersburg *“(…) will not seek in this arrangement any increase of territory, nor any exclusive influence, nor advantage in commerce, for their subjects which shall not be equally attainable by all other nations.”*¹⁵ A very similar formulation can be seen in the agreement concluded between the great powers and signed in July 1827, where the content is supplemented with the fact that the liabilities of the Treaty shall be undertaken by Governments of three states – Great Britain, Russia and France – instead of two.¹⁶

Despite of Russia’s manifested statements and restrained policy bearing in mind the support of the Ottoman Empire’s integrity, St Petersburg’s political attitude was still not in

¹³ БИП. Сер. II. т. 8 (16). М., 1995. Док. 103..., 267.

¹⁴ Jelavich, B. *Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State, 1821–1878*. Cambridge, 2004, 29–30.

¹⁵ Protocol of St. Petersburg, 23rd March (4th April), 1826. – In: *The Duke of Wellington (Ed.). Dispatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington*. Vol. 4. London, 1871, 60–61.

¹⁶ Treaty of the Settlement of Greece, 6th July, 1827. – In: *Ibid.*, 60.

accordance with its former promises. As even though the completed war was not an expansive one and did not result in large scale territorial acquisitions, Russia's economic and political influence relocated to new territories of interest, one of which was the above mentioned Danube Delta, while the other was the northeastern and eastern region of the Black Sea, the Coast of Western Caucasus.¹⁷ From this aspect, the Russian party did not fully comply with the intentions agreed in the provisions of the Protocol.

The same conclusions can be made related to Russia's countenance in gaining economic advantage. During the peace talks it was an important endeavour to preserve a favourable balance between the Ottoman and Russian commercial conditions along the Danube, which was a crucial issue for both Empires. This was one of the reasons why the Government of St Petersburg stuck to the goal of acquiring control over the Danube Delta, and through that, over the Sulina Channel for his fleet "*Merchant ships of both empires were granted free navigation along the full length of the Danube, considering that these ships under Ottoman flags may enter the Chilia and Sulina arms unhindered, while navigation in the St. George arm will remain free both for military and merchant fleet of both empires.*"¹⁸ However, based on the above section, an expansion of larger latitude for the Russian fleet could be predicted, while from safety aspects Russia's opportunities were restricted by the fact that: "*At the same time, Russian military vessels shall not navigate the Danube upstream further the point it meets river Prut.*"¹⁹

In order to present the English position formulated concerning territorial issues and navigation on the Danube, it is important to take a look at the characteristics and political

¹⁷ The section between the river St. Nicholas and Kuban. See: БИП. Сеп. II. т. 8 (16). М., 1995. Док. 103..., 267.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

aspects of the Foreign Office's reflections on the Treaty of Adrianople. One of the most insightful sources concerning the topic was Wellington's, the Prime Minister's (1828–1830) detailed assay addressed to Lord Aberdeen, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1828–1830), in which besides describing the articles of the Russo–Turkish peace agreement, he also put forth the short-term and long-term consequences of the newly formed situation in the Balkan and Middle Eastern area, in a close context with the valid international legislative treaties of the period.²⁰ One of the most meaningful topics described by the British Prime Minister was the range of changes concerning the Danubian Principalities, and parallel to that, the question of navigation, as well as the changes concerning the Russian commercial activities within the Ottoman Empire.

The content of article VII of the Treaty provoked particularly vehement responses, according to which besides the unlimited freedom of movement and trade, ships with the Russian flag as well as merchandise transported by Russian merchants on Turkish territories, were granted exemption from the liability of inspection.²¹ As another neuralgic point, in his assay the Duke of Wellington also pointed out the provisions of the same article relating to the Black Sea, stating that “(...) *the Sublime Porte commits itself to assure (...)*”²² the free access to the Black Sea, as well as free passage through the straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and also to establish Russia's free connection to the Mediterranean Sea.²³

The official criticism of the given section from the British side was formulated in the Memorandum of October 29,

²⁰ Memorandum. – Observation on the Treaty of Adrianople. London, 10th October, 1829. – In: *Dispatches...*, Op. cit., Vol. 6. [July, 1829, to April, 1830], 1877, 212–219.

²¹ ВПР. Сер. II. т. 8 (16). М., 1995. Док. 103. Мирный договор между Россией и Османской Империей, Адрианополь, 2 (14) сентября 1829 г., 268.

²² Ibid.

²³ Exclusively for merchant vessels.

1829,²⁴ in which the British Prime Minister did not primarily see the root of the problem in the advantages obtained by the Cabinet of St Petersburg, but in the content of the given statement relating to the merchant fleets of the other states, namely: “(...) *Based on the same principles and in compliance with conditions identical with those for vessels under Russian flag, the passage through the straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles is announced to be free for merchant ships of all states friendly to the Sublime Porte, regardless they are travelling to Russian ports, towards ports of the Black sea or returning back with cargo or ballast. (...).*”²⁵ The complexity of the problem and the cause for the concerns of the Cabinet of London could be basically explained by the fact that the treaty did not lay down clear and transparent rules concerning vessels flying flags of other states. That is to say, the treaty did not discuss and did not even mention, whether other states could expect the Russian Empire's action in case their above described rights are violated, since on the event of the infringement of the scope of authorities included in article VII of the Treaty of Adrianople, the Tsar's Court had the right to respond with retaliations, declaring those events as hostile acts.²⁶ It is not clear however, whether St Petersburg could also use these measures in case of violations suffered by ships of other foreign powers,²⁷ so Duke Wellington saw in this context the real danger of the Russo-Turkish Treaty, which could restrict the Ottoman Empire in his freedom to act.

Lord Aberdeen goes even further with his arguments, and according to the Head of the Foreign Office Russia has “*Prominently advanced into the centre of Armenia, in the midst of a Christian population, Russia holds the keys both of*

²⁴ Memorandum Upon the 7th Article of the Treaty of Adrianople, 29th October, 1829. – In: *Dispatches...*, Op. cit., Vol. 6. 1877, 268–271.

²⁵ ВПР. Сер. II. т. 8 (16). М., 1995. Док. 103..., 268.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Memorandum Upon the Seventh..., 270.

the Persian and Turkish provinces; and whether she may be disposed to extend her conquest to the East or to the West, to Teheran or to Constantinople, no serious obstacle arrest her progress",²⁸ while its forging ahead „(...) is not hindered by any restrictions.”²⁹ With reference to the same point the British Ambassador to Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby, in one of his subsequent letters wrote the following: „*Lord Aberdeen observes that the Treaty of Adrianople is not in conformity with Russian promises but appears to affect vitally the interests (and) the strength the dignity, the present safety and the future independence of the Ottoman Empire.*”³⁰

In fact, the most conspicuous and alarming sign for the British diplomacy was the message right at the core of the Treaty of Adrianople: Russia had become independent from their allies in the formation of the Eastern Question,³¹ by which the British foreign policy had to face a new challenge. From that moment on, subsequent to, or rather parallel to the great power reconciliations closing the Greek Cause, Great Britain had to focus on taking a more active role, a more dominant and unequivocal one both in their rhetoric and acts. This was all the more important for Britain, since none of the other participants of the European Concert of Great Powers gave him any support in counterbalancing Russia's policy. The British Prime Minister wrote: *“France will not move with England and Austria without Prussia, and Prussia will not move without being certain that the movement will be agreeable to*

²⁸ Lord Aberdeen to Haytesburry, 31 October, 1829. Quotation. In: Ingram, Edward, In Defence of British India. Great Britain in the Middle East, 1775–1842. New York, 2013 (first published in 1984), 173.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Quotation. – In: Wiebe, M. G., M. S. Millar, A. P. Robson (Eds.). Benjamin Disraeli. Letters, 1852–1856. Vol. 6. Toronto, 1997, 247.

³¹ Temperley, H. The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1820–1827. – In: Ward, A. W., G. P. Gooch (Eds.). The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. Vol. 2. Cambridge, 1923, 101.

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the Emperor of Russia."³²

Based on those ideas and on the knowledge of the international relations, it soon became clear that London did not have a strong basis of allies during that period. However, this change of course did not bring an immediate success, moreover, the primary task of the Cabinet of St James was now to face all the negative consequences of the last two years, as well as the apparent lowering of their political prestige. The most representative standpoint for the failure of the British foreign policy was formulated in the following: "*Go to the North, and hear the terms of bitterness and contempt in which England is assailed by the Russian Government for our vacillation, by the Russian people for our illiberality... Turkey complains of being betrayed. Greece considers us her enemy.*"³³

By studying the two diplomatic acts of the period following the Treaty of Adrianople, we may get a representative picture of the main features of the British Government's attitude toward Russia, characteristic of the whole 1830s. The first example to that was the signing of the act of navigation and commerce with Austria. As to its essential point, Great Britain and Austria agreed in a joint Treaty about the commercial benefits used toward each other, defining first of all trade concessions in the field of export and import. A special gesture from the side of the British Government concerned the overseas colonies, with an exceptional attitude toward the province of India: the Cabinet of London held out prospects of future advantages – similar to those of Britain's – for the Government of Vienna during their local trade activities in the overseas provinces.³⁴ From one hand, the agreement tightened the

³² Memorandum. – Observation on the Treaty of Adrianople. London, 10th October, 1829. – In: *Dispatches...*, Op. cit., Vol. 6. 1877, 218.

³³ Quotes Lady Canning's opinion, Temperley, Op. cit., 104.

³⁴ TNA/PRO/FO/94/35 – FO and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Ratification of Treaties. Austria Convention on Navigation and Commerce. Place and Date of Signature – 31 December 1829.

Anglo-Austrian connections, and from the other hand, it was also a clear response to the dynamic changes of the Russian foreign policy tangible in 1828–1829. The agreement – concluded in two months after the Russo-Turkish Peace Treaty – was ratified on December 31, 1829,³⁵ while the Russian diplomacy's reaction followed only a year later, in September of 1830.

St Petersburg standpoint was mediated to Aberdeen by Andrzej Josef Matuszewicz. The Polish-born diplomat had represented the Russian interests as authorized ambassador extraordinary on the Conference of London discussing the question of the Greek State since 1830.³⁶ The cause of the Anglo–Austrian agreement was not a negligible factor for the Cabinet of St Petersburg. Evidence to that was Matuszewicz's ultimatum of September 26, 1830, in which he requested information from the Foreign Office's regarding the provisions of the contract between London and Vienna, valid since February 1 of the same year. Lord Aberdeen answered in an official letter, with full details of the treaty and with its regulations concerning the Ionian Islands. Since as it was revealed by the British Prime Minister's response to Matuszewicz, the Russian ambassador primarily wanted to obtain intelligence concerning the Greek territories in question, which was not surprising at all during the period of consultations on the circumstances and conditions of establishing an independent Greek State.³⁷ Based on the statement of the Foreign Office and the provisions of the official agreement the contracting parties confirmed for the Austrian Government all the formerly

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Satow, E. *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*. Vol. II. Cambridge, 2011, 101; *The Cabinet Annual Register and Historical, Political, Biographical and Miscellaneous Chronicle for the Year 1831*. Vol. 1. London, 1832, 426.

³⁷ Draft, Count Matuszewicz, FO, September 29, 1830. – In: TNA/PRO/FO/65/189 – Foreign Office and Predecessors. Political and other Departments. General Correspondence before 1906, Russian Empire. Domestic, Prince Lieven, Matuszewicz, Prince Troubetskoy, and various.

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offered benefits as regards the commercial activities with the Ionian Islands,³⁸ which were included in the contract about placing the given territories under a British protectorate, signed in the Four Power Agreement of November 5, 1815.³⁹ Beyond those, Austria did not have any further benefits.

The curiosity of the situation was that according to the ultimatum received from the Russian ambassador, the Russian Government must have wished to expand the given regulations to Russian merchant ships, too. But the head of the Foreign Office in his answer to Matuszewic brought forth detailed arguments claiming that the benefit granted to Austria was not a new improvement in the British-Russian relations, as it was a confirmation of the related section of the former Treaty, signed one and half decade ago. And since in 1815 Russia fully supported the contents of article VII of the Treaty of Paris without insisting on its expansion, in view of all that, the British Government saw no reason for the Russian demands.⁴⁰

Another intriguing diplomatic affair of the time was the case of the British ambassador to St Petersburg designated to replace Lord Heytesbury (1828–1832). The Government led by Charles Grey, in agreement with the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, for the position of the outgoing diplomat appointed Stratford Canning.⁴¹ The candidate in theory could be a perfect choice for the position, as Stratford Canning had previously completed two periods of diplomatic missions in the capital of the Ottoman Empire, from 1809 to 1812 and from 1825 to 1827. Despite his profound experience and background knowledge related to the Eastern Question, to the

³⁸ TNA/PRO/FO/94/35.

³⁹ No. 426. Трактат, заключенный в Париже между Россией и Англией относительно Ионических островов Собрание Трактатов и Конвенций, заключенных Россией с иностранными державами. По поручению Министерство Иностранных Дел составил Маргенс, Ф. Ф. СПб, 1895, 250–255.

⁴⁰ Draft, Count Matuszewic, FO, September 29, 1830 (TNA/PRO/FO/65/189).

⁴¹ Jones, R. *The British Diplomatic Service, 1815–1914*. Waterloo, 1983, 39.

Russo–Turkish, as well as the British–Turkish relations, his person caused a huge dilemma for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁴² Stratford Canning’s great disadvantage derived from his very advantages, mentioned before. Karl Nesselrode, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the official diplomatic body, as well as the Tsar, were very well aware of the British ambassador’s capabilities, owing to his anti-Russian performance during the mid-1820s. So when the Russian Court had to respond to the Foreign Office’s request, because of the raised concerns in connection with the candidate, Nicholas I. refused to receive him.⁴³

The categorical attitude from the side of the English diplomacy manifested in Palmerston’s refusal to change his decision, by rejecting all the compromise proposals from the other party.⁴⁴ The delays in the agreement led to a situation in which Great Britain was left without a representative of ambassadorial rank in St Petersburg, which did not change until 1835. Thus, the Russian connection, which was of great importance for the British political and economic interests, seemed to loosen. The more so, since by 1834 based on the Russian Government’s decision, Prince K. A. Lieven – after more than two decades of ambassadorship to London – was recalled to Russia.⁴⁵ The inefficiency of the consultations that lasted over two years, in the end forced the Court of St Petersburg – remaining temporarily without a representative in London – to make a decision. Several months later it was the Russian Government who solved the stalemate situation by

⁴² Потемкин, В. П. (Отв. ред.). История дипломатии. Т. 1. Библиотека внешней политики. М., Государственное социально-экономическое издательство, 1941, 418; Lane-Poole, St. The Life of The Right Honourable Stratford Canning Viscount Startford de Redcliffe. Vol. 2. London, 1888, 20.

⁴³ Потемкин, В. П., *Op. cit.*, 418–419.

⁴⁴ Hyde, H. Montgomery, Princess Lieven, London, George G. Harp and Co. Ltd., 1938, 208–210; Потемкин, В. П., *Op. cit.*, 418.

⁴⁵ Hyde, H., *Op. cit.*, 210.

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appointing Pozzo di Borgo ambassador to London.⁴⁶

In the transformation of the Anglo-Russian relations in the beginning of the 1830s, the Eastern Question and the range of problems connected to the Balkans played a crucial role, all of which by 1828–1829 generated a favourable situation for Russia. The peculiar ambition of the St Petersburg diplomacy, the aim of which was to achieve independence in the forming of the Eastern Question, and parallel to that all endeavours to maintain the Anglo-Russian alliance, seemed to fail. To keep balance between the two sides turned out to be an impossible task. At the same time, it became evident for London that the Anglo-Russian partnership could be maintained as long as the British Government was able to sustain the parity between the two leading Great Powers, along with the balance and integrity of their primary economic and political interests. A sharp change in that process was brought by the period following the Treaty of Adrianople, during which Great Britain lost its leading position within the Anglo–Russian coalition, thus becoming an external observer in the course of the Balkan events. The long-term consequence of the temporary failure of the British policy on the Great Power level was Britain's distancing itself from Russia, and parallel to that, the increasing Russophobia, which by the 1830s will become one of the main features in the Anglo-Russian relations.

⁴⁶ The Annual Register or a View of the History and Politics of the Year 1842. London, 1843, 252.

Kossuth-emigráció mindennapi élete az 1860-as-70-es években: egy Bulgáriában letelepedett magyar önkéntes irathagyatékából

Penka Peykovska

Történettudományi Intézet – BTA

Az itt közlendő források a Bolgár Nemzeti Könyvtár Történeti Levéltárából¹ származnak és a maga nemében egyedülállók, mivel az egyetlen olyan irathagyatékból valók, amely egy Bulgáriában letelepedett magyar emigráns *egész* életét felöleli. Az illető, Szilágyi György Baján született 1833-ban Szilágyi Ferenc és Csizik Terézia gyermekeként. 1859-ben gyógyszerési oklevelet szerzett a Pesti Egyetem orvosi karán. Ezután rövid ideig szolgált az osztrák hadseregben. Majd bajai „földije”, Türri István révén a forradalmi magyar emigráció soraiba került. Az 1860-as években részt vett a lengyel felkelésben, az Amerikai polgárháborúban és az olaszországi magyar légióban, így Milkovszky, Kossuth és Garibaldi harcostársa volt. A magyar forradalmi emigráció többségének lépéseit követve a szabadkőművesekhez csatlakozott.

Az olaszországi magyar légió 1866 végén bekövetkezett feloszlata után az olasz hatóságok kiadtak Szilágyi György részére egy útlevelet, amellyel Svájcba utazhatott, de ő azzal Görögországba ment. Valószínűleg szándékában állt Garibaldi fia – Ricciotti önkénteseivel támogatni a görögöket a török elleni krétai felkelésben. Az egyetlen ránk maradt anyjához írt levele Konstantinápolyból való 1867 márciusából, amelyből megtudjuk, hogy a 35 éves Szilágyi Györgyöt Görögországban

¹ Eredeti elnevezése: НКМ-БИА – Народна библиотека „Св. Св. Кирил и Методи” – Български исторически архив, tovább: BNK-TL.

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szerencsétlenség érte (kirabolták), és súlyosan megbetegedett. Akkortájt eldönthette, hogy eljött az ideje véget vetni a kockázatos és fizikailag is megterhelő katonáskodásnak és családot alapítani. Haza szeretett volna menni és több mint tíz év eltelte után újra beilleszkedni szülővárosa, Baja társadalmába. Ez nem vált be – úgy döntött, Törökországban fog maradni.

Olaszország egyesülése és az olaszországi magyar légió feloszlata után a magyar emigránsok egy része hazajött Magyarországra és megpróbálták „beépülni, elhelyezkedni” az új kiegyezési rendszerben. Mások – főleg olyanok, akik nem fogadták el azt – külföldön maradtak: Olaszországban, Franciaországban, Törökországban. Azok, akik a Balkánra kerültek, még tápláltak reményeket, hogy Magyarország teljes önállósága még elérhető, ha erőfeszítéseiket ez irányban sikeresen összeegyeztetik a balkáni népek, főleg a szlávok nemzeti felszabadító mozgalmaival, vagyis közös akcióba léphetnek Törökország és Ausztria ellen és felépíthetik a Dunai Konföderációt (amivel meg is próbálkoztak 1869-ben, amikor kitört a dalmáciai felkelés).

Szilágyi György döntésében közrejátszottak talán mind a politikai elgondolásai, mind a személyes, korával is járó gondok. Nincs közvetlen adatunk milyen volt Szilágyi György véleménye a kiegyezési tárgyalásokról, de Kossuth és Türr harcostársa lévén feltételezhetően osztozott a forradalmi magyar emigráció eszméivel. Bár azon belül számos egymástól eltérő irányzatot lehetett megkülönböztetni, külpolitikai törekvései elsősorban a nemzeti függetlenségi politika síkján vehetők szemügyre: az alkotmányos szabadság helyreállítása fegyveres erővel, Magyarország alárendelt szerepének megszüntetése. Valószínűleg Szilágyi se tűródött bele a kiegyezésbe, hiszen ez azt jelentette volna, hogy hiába harcolt és veszélyeztette életét majdnem tíz éven keresztül. Barátai leveleiben vannak utalások a '48-as párt iránti szimpátiájára vonatkozóan, amelynek vezeterei 1867–68-ban a '48-as radikális demokraták hagyományait akarták feleleveníteni. Másrészt annyi biztos, hogy gyógyszerészi karriert kezdeni az 1860-as és '70-es években Magyarországon

csak kemény feltételek és nagy anyagi áldozat mellett lehetett. Az Oszmán Birodalomban az eljárás nem volt egyszerűbb, de a szakma viszonylag új volt – éppen a század közepén jelentek meg az első gyógyszerárak, és azok közül igazán modern és európai berendezésű alig volt, így jobb lehetőségeket nyújtott a kezdő előtt, pláne ha európai egyetemről való oklevéllel is rendelkezett. Hiányzott azonban a gyakorlat, amely szükséges volt a szakmai önállósuláshoz, ezért lépett be a török hadseregbe, ahol gyógyszerészként szolgált. Már az elejétől kezdve igyekezett az 1860-as évek 2. felében, a reformalkotó Midhad pasa kormányzása alatt modernizálódó dunai vilajet nagyobb városaiba kerülni. A török hadseregben töltött másfél év után 1869 őszén otthagyta a katonaságot és ottani magyar gyógyszerész ismerősei tanácsára megtakarított pénzéből a régióban az elsők között nyitotta meg saját, modern berendezésű és európai kinézetű gyógyszerárát Sumenben (régi neve: Sumla), amelyet 1874-ben áttett Ruszébe (régi nevén: Ruszcuk) – a dunai vilajet akkori fővárosába.² Majd feleségül vett egy jómódú, városi családból származó bolgár görögkeleti, tanult leányt. Sikeres letelepedését bolgár földön segítette az 1860-as évektől kezdve a magyar közvéleményben, főleg az újságok révén egyre jobban hangoztatott magyar–török barátság, valamint a magyarok általánosan jó fogadtatása Törökországban.

90 éves mozgalmas és sokszínű életének nagyobb részét Szilágyi György Bulgáriában töltötte. Nevével találkozunk mind a sumlai és ruszei bolgárok, mind az ottani magyarok minden forradalmi, társadalmi vagy kulturális jellegű kezdeményezésében: 1870-ben az Asztalos János-féle Bolgár–Magyar Titkos Forradalmi Comité megszervezésében, a sumlai megúj-hodáskori színház előadásáiban, 1876-ban a Corvinák Törökországból Magyarországra hozatalában, 1877-ben a Csutak Kálmán-féle török magyar légió megszervezésének kísérletében, a századfordulón a bolgár gyógyszerészek szakszervezési

² A gyógyszerár Ruszéban létezett egészen 1948-ig, amikor államosításra került.

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mozgalmaiban. Tudósításokat írt magyar lapoknak a Balkánon megtörtént fontos eseményekről (és főleg az 1878– 1879-es orosz-török háborúról).

Szilágyi György irathagyatéka életciklusának különböző fázisait tükrözi; személyes iratai vagy az ő tollából származó privát levelek vagy barátai, ismerősei és kollégai által neki írt levelek. Ezekből válogattuk néhányat³; az iratok eredeti nyelvét, helyesírását megőriztük, az aláhúzott szavakat a szerző emelte ki.



Szilágyi György és felesége
Pavlina 1870-es években



Szilágyi György patikája
levelezőlapján található
címer

³ BNK-TL, F. 570, levéltári egység [tovább: l.e.] 3., 1-3. lap [tovább: l.], l.e. 28., 1-4. l., l.e. 22., 1. l., l.e. 29., 2-3. l., l.e. 37., 3. l., l.e. 46., 1-2. l.; MNL-OL, R 211., 2. t., 12. cs., 2022; R 111, II. S. 2 – 682 a., 1-4. o.

1. Magyarok készülődnek résztvenni az 1863-as lengyel felkelésben:⁴ Szilágyi György levele Türr Istvánhoz, Tulcsa, 1863. jún. 13.

Mélyen tisztelt s a honfiak által szeretett Türr tábornok úr!

Boldogtalan voltam teljes életemben
csak az egy vigasztal, hogy megnem érdemltem –
Boldogtalan leszek koporsomzártaig
csak az egy vigasztal, hogy mind messze odaig.
P[etöfi] Sándor

Adott szavamat előbb beváltani nem lehet, ha kimerítően akarom tudatni Exelentiáját mind azokról, melyek tán sorsom tekintetében érdeklik, miért csakis most nyújtottod egy kevés alkalom az körülményesebben leírhatnom.

Tulcsán 's a közel lévő falukban usquo négyszáz ember van, kik többnyire tiszték, melyek a török szolgálatot odahagyák. Magyarok csak négyen vagyunk jelenleg 's már is négyféle természetűek. Egyik zárkozott, halgatag és félénk, de mégis lagalább is Miltiádesnek képzeli magát. A másik bőbeszédű 's szüntelen oktatásokkal lép fel mely rendesen Contra úgy tünik nekem mint egy emusareus ki szüntelen a Corpus Jurist a hona alatt hordja, a harmadik egy könyelmű osztrák tiszt a Josefoktól de igen derék gyerek; a negyedik én vagyok, hogy milyen: azt egy kis együtlét a Tábornok úrral, megmutatta, melyre bírálata szükséges. Maráky volna az ötödik, de ő már tíznapok oltá nincs itt. Fizetésünk naponta 3 Piászter. Egy napra 's ebből étellel el kell látni magunkat, kivéve a szállást mely a szélmalmok szomszédságában egy faszter forma házban van hol rendesen

⁴ A januárban kitört Orosz Birodalom elleni lengyel szabadságharcban a külföldiek közül a magyarok vettek részt legnagyobb létszámban – kb. 4–500 között mozgott a magyar önkéntesek létszáma. Milkovszky Zsigmond, aki Romániában szervezte a felkelést, parancsot kapott a felkelők kormányától, hogy Konstantinápolyban csapatot szervezzen lengyel emigránsokból, majd átmenjen vele Tulceába.

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beterített szálmával a földön fekszünk. Semmink nincsen, még nem tudjuk mikor indulunk el. Rebezsgetik azt is miszerint egy Magyar Légiót van szándékuk alakítani.

Maráky Gyula e hó 3án tölem kicsikarta a Tábornok úr által írt ajánlóleveleket, 's elutazott lépéseket tenni, miután ő az olasz nyelvet gagyogja, és hogy majdán de hozzá téve azonnal tudatni fog engem a sikerről. De fájdalom még mai napig sem ír 'studat semmiről. Magam érzem tehát magam Tábornok úr, és családás írtozhatóan bánt!!!

Kérem igen szépen a Tábornok Úrat mint nemzetünk egyik legjelentősebb egyénét nemkülönben ha szabad megemlítenem földimet, ha lehetséges engem e gyehennából kiemelni.

Itt van valami Fekete nevezetű ki Aquéban a légió depojánál vala, kéri a Tábornok Urat, miszerint lenne oly kegyes az ott lévő szolgálat idejéről mint tiszt bizonyítványt adni, és otthagyt papírosaét együtt vele ha csak lehetséges minél előbb elküldeni, mit Tulcsára a Francia Consulatusra ha méltoztatnék küldeni, amitén szinte mély alázattal kérek ha Honfi kebele azok iránt még hően lobog a leghamarább engem a sorsnak e borzasztó kalapács ütési alól felmenteni ha lehetséges.

Végre mély tiszteletteljes hódolatom Exelentiad csak a papíron festett szavakban még azt tettleg bebizonyíthatom.

Mélyen tisztelve, Szilágyi György

2. Szilágyi György be akar lépni az olaszországi Magyar legióba: levele Türr Istvánhoz, Turin, 1865. aug. 21.

Nagyrabecsült Tábornok Úr!

Összejártam egész Európát, 's mint sorsüldözött Amerika vádonyaiba vándoroltam ki, miszerint kikerüljem mind azon kellemetlen pillanatokat – melyeket sorsosaim, testvéreim 's hazámfiái kéntelenek türni, (maguk hibaiért persze fájdalom ott, hol neveik a dicsőség világhírű nagytáblájára aranybetüket van felírva, 's a történelem egy újabb 's nagyobb nevezettséggel fogja megtölteni feledhetetlen lapjait, meglesz a feledékenyítés sötét mámarában fognak bujkálni majdan azok!!! – kik a

nekiek megalapított jött, a visszaélés csudar fegyverével minden jótetteket ipárokodtak megsemmisíteni, vagy meg is semmisítették.)

Összejárva két világrészt mondom, 's sokat tapasztaltam, – összejöttem emberekkel, honfiakkal, akik nem érdemlik azt!!!, – hogy a haza nagy tempolmába – imádkozva és csak tömjénezni járjanak. de össze is hozza a véletlen szerencse hazám nagyobb 's tekintélyesebb férfiainál is, akik között első helyet foglalva, Türr tábornagy úr előzékenysége, honfitársai aranyábani testvéries bánás módja – egész az önmegtágadásig.

Vegye mind azokért a honfiai tiszta kebel legmélyebb rejtekebbül származott őzinte elismerésemet még a velem tett jótettekért fogadja hálás köszönetemet, amikor hozzá kapcsolom azt, miszerint bármely tekintettbe csekély tehetségem 's ép erőmből kitelhetőkre amélyen tisztelt Tábornagy Úr, bizton számíthat. Parancsoljon 's én tenni fogok. Mély alázattal maradván a nagyrabecsült Tábornagy Úrnak, Őszinte szolgája, Szilágyi György.

3. Emigráns barátai sorsa: Csáshár Aurél⁵ levele Szilágyi Györgyhez, 1865. szept. 25.

Kedves barátom Szilágyi!

Turinból múlt hó 29[-én] kelt soraidat igaz – meglepetéssel vevém téged barátom nem is remélvén á tengeren innend jelenleg tud érni.

Soraidat tartalmán á mennyibe örültem tőled némi tudósítást vehetni úgy más részt fajdalommal tölte el; Gyurka! én téged jó szívű és „magyar embernek” ősmertelek – megbocsásd baráti bátorságom nyílt őszinteségét á midőn á jelenben ezt nem találom, 's valóban igen csodálom hogy engem bővebben megősmerni nem tanaltál miszerint ha tollam Frigyesinek⁶ egy általam oly végnélkül tisztelt hazafiak 's á

⁵ Ismeretlen.

⁶ Frigyesi Gusztáv tábornok jelentős szerepet játszott Garibaldi hadseregében.

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Legio ellen nem adtam az saját személye aránt is ha mindjárt nézet egyenlőség hiányzik is teljesen biztosítva vann. Barátom engem szégyen fűr borít á midőn magyar hontársa elleni eziket olvasok á hírlapok nyilvános terén, 's hivatásomon külinek vélem azok feszegetését bár ki aránt is – kérlek tehát szívélyesen engem soraiddal gyakran felkeresni de kisebbítő adatok megszerzéséről megkímélni.

Dolleszről⁷ nem értesz soraidban semmit pedig tudod mily nagy tisztelője vagyok, tudd meg azon barátságot 's tudásd velem körülményesen hogy létét.

Nekem barátom hála az égnek türhetőn vann dolgom, á jelenben bírok egy kaviisvállalatot ugyan azon társaságtól á mellynél mind hivatalnokszolgálatban valék, jövő tavaszon bevézgem 's már az újonnan épüendő vasút kaviisvállalat ajánlatot de bevérandó vagyok á tavasz körülményeire.

Telleghi⁸ is itten vann 20# fizetéssel megnősülvén egy kis fiat szült nője – ha bár atyai örömei napokhoz valónak köttve miután á kis gyermek hat nap múlva egy jobb életre szenderült.

Mélyen tisztelt Kossuth Lajos kormányzóúr nejeének elhunlat á „Hon” czimű hírlapból olvasám, fájdalommal tölté keblem é sokat szenvedő nemes család szomora „legyen béke hamvain az elhuntnak” 's tartsa Isten é szegény hazafit továbbra is – még szegényebb hazánknak oszlopául.

Tédeg pedig kedves Gyurkám igen kérlek hogy fel avval az emigránsi forkálásokkal ne avasd magad azon elégületlenek közzé kiket senki sorsukkal kibékíteni nem képes. Áldjon meg az ég úra, szíves üdvözetem nyilvánítását ösmerőseimnek ad át 's ne feled igaz barátod Csáshár Aurél.

⁷ Dollez Ferenc, százados, Magyar segélyszereg, 1. huszárezred parancsnoka (Dec. 1862). MOL, R 295, 3. d., 7. t., 125., 134. o.

⁸ Tellegi Károly hadnagy, Magyar segélyszereg, 1. huszárezred (Dec. 1862). MOL, R 295, 3. d., 7. t., 125., 134. o.

4. Az emigrációs központokról: Sz.Gy. levele Buszkyi Józsefhez⁹, Milano, 1866 máj. 12.

Buszkyi József, olasz, lengyel és egyiptomiai tisztnek
Mélyen tisztelt Hazánkfia Buskij Úr!

Értésünkre ésvén miszerint egy küldöttség Turinból az emigratio van készülöben hogy Genfebe menjen 's tudassák a már előre kibocsajtott aláírások következtében szándékaikkal, vagy talán még követeléseiket is, a Magyar Titkos Comitével; – E küldöttség ellen először tiltakozunk az alólírtak 's többen! – miszerint e küldöttség nem érvényes 's az illetők tudtuk nélküli aláírt neveik nem jogosították fel az illető küldöttséget, sem direct, úgy sem indirect személyeik nevében értékezeseket tartani, valamint neveikkel (persze hogy a szám nagyobb legyen élni). Ez osztrák modor, ez bitorlás, 's ellenkezik a magyar törvényekkel, [sic?].

Másodszor szerintünk nem létezik a magyar nép által megválasztott titkos Comité külhonban először azért, mert ha titokban van is azon testület, de st. kötelezettségeminden erejét megfizetni hogy a hazárvesztett 's elhagyott honfiákat fenntartani 's morális ereikben ápolni 's nemtetipozva elhagyni. Másodszor egy magyar titkos Comité eszes 's rokonszenves lett kedves hazánk szívteljes nagyrabecsült fiaiból álhat csak akiknek lelkeikben van vétve a haza fájdalma nemkülönben minden egyes polgárának neve és és tettei, annak – 's azoknak orvoslásáért lehetnek csak kün, – nempedig vérrokonait elhagyva mint a gazdatlan kutyákat, 's őket egy kény úrhatalma alá odadobni mintzoldosokat.¹⁰

Másodszor szerintünk nem létezik 's nem létezhet a magyar nép által magválasztott titkos Comité külhonban, mert ha csak úgyan [sic?] létezne úgy azok csak agitátorok a sokat szenvedett hazánk megszabadítására? Azok pedig eszes 's szív teljes honfiákból alhatnának, csak akik nem nézhették el volna már

⁹ Buszkyi József, Busky József. MOL, R 295, 3. d., 7. t., 74., 89. o.

¹⁰ A dőlt betűs szöveg ki van húzva.

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évek alta miszerint vérrokonaik a megsemmisülésnek vannak kitéve 's a demorazatio gehenájába hullanak le egyenként ahonnét a hazára nézve nagy feltámadás csak még nem is álmodható többé úgy tehát nincs Comité, 's ha van, szerintünk e keresztnevet viselhetik csak [sic!] ahova pedig is akikhez a fentnevezett küldöttség menni akar nem lehetnek azok mert ők érdem helyett Honfiak 's [sic?]. Ha pedig csak úgyan létezne most legújában egy titkos Comité, ami könnyen meglehet, azok agitátorok titokban 's nemzet felszabadításáért [sic?] úgy minden becsületes nagy úrnak sz[ent] kötelessége azt titokban tartani, 's nem országszerte híresztelni, mert aki azt teszi az Honáruló, 's a Honáruló a nemzet gyilkosa 's az ily nemzet gyilkosával a fentnevezett egy tagja sem fog értékezesekbe bocsajkozni.

Különben kikerülünk egy Prolocius Viadok is kereken kimondjuk miszerint minden becsületes [sic?] magyar ismer egy urat 's ez a *király* Victor Emanuel, a szabadság zászlóját ő már kitette, itt a helye minden menekültnek aki a háládatlanság bélyegeztetni magát nem akarja, nempedig ismét depókat alá futni 's míg az olasz vér foly addig a [sic?] kaszárnyák falaik alól dorbézolva tölteni el a napokat. Akik éles szándékokkal vannak elfoglalva (akik pedig sokan lesznek) nem mások mint vén szobrok, akikről majd ezek az utókor fog a história lapjain olvastatni, még mi jelenleg ismerni nem ismerjük.

Végre pedig tudatjuk mindenkivel akiket illet hogy [18]59 óta a szabadság zászlójai alatt harcolna bár külhonban, [sic?] magyarok meg nem [sic?] soka lenni, 's ha a rég kívánt / óhajtott idő megjövend, nem fogunk soha késni imádott hazánkért szinte kardot rantani és a csaták terén megjelenni ahol a bitorló megvásárlót zsoldosait küldjük le a pokolra urával egyetemben. *Kérjük* Így tanították bennünket a szívélyes magyar anyák imádkozni.

Kérjük a mélyen tisztelt Honfit legyen szíves az ügynevezett újan alakult komitéval ezt közölni mikor ennek mint a fennemlétezettnek.

Maradunk igaz, Hontársi, Szilágyi György, szerb, lengyel, amerikai tiszt.

5. A Magyar Segélyserég 1. huszárezredének óránkénti napi rendje július hóra.

Bologna, 1866. júl. 18.

Napok	Délelőtt <i>munkanapi</i>	Óra		Délután <i>? munka ...napi</i>	Óra	
		Tól	Ig		Tól	Ig
	Ébredő	3.30		Laktanya tisztítás	12.15	
	Hetes altiszt és tizedesek hívása	3.45		Itatás és abrakolás	2.30	
	Szakácsok	4.15		Lótisztítás	2.30	3.30
	Általános kiállítás és lőtisztítás	4.15	4.45	Nyeregszer fegyverzés és ruha tisztogatás	3.15	4.00
	Itatás és labolás	4.45		Parancs olvasás	5.30	
	Nyergelés	5.00		Kimenet	5.45	
	Gyakorlat	5.00	7.00	Takarodó	8.30	
	Lótáp kivétel	10.00		Esti felolvasás	9.00	
	Osztály jelentés	11.00		Csend	9.45	
	Étkezés	11.30		Altishti takarodó	10.00	
	Örváltás	12.00		Esti vizsga	10.15	
	Alvas	12.00	1.15			
Hétfőn	Lovagok	5.00	7.00	Gyalog gyakorlat és kard fogások és kardvágások	4.30	5.30
Kedden	Szakasz és század	5.00	7.00	Altishti iskola	4.30	5.30

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	gyakorlat					
Szerdán	Sétalovaglás	5.00	7.30	Felolvasás a különféle rendszabályokból	4.30	5.30
Csötörtök	Lóvizsga	7.00	8.00	Kardvívás az altiszteknek	4.30	5.30
Péntek	Lovagda	5.00	7.00	Iskola a táborzás és előőrsi szolgáltról	4.30	5.30
Szombat	Sétalovaglás	5.00	7.30	Málházásból iskola és apróbeli vizsga	4.30	5.30
Vasárnap	Kiállítás Isteni tiszteletre			Napi parancs felolvasás Kimenet	5.30 6.00	

*6. Szilágyi György emelkedést kér a ranglétrán: levele
Kossuth Lajoshoz, Bologna, 1866. júl. 31.*

Höen tisztelt : nagyra becsult Kormányzó Úr!

Mind honfi kérdést tevék levelemben, hogy mit tevé lennék azon válságos körülményekben, amelyek akkor adták elé makokat meglesz Tábornok Garibaldi Ezredében valék Saloban.

Nem kelle tehát váraoznóm a válaszra, mert mátt másnap a hírlapok küztölék, miszreint Kosszuth Lajos Magyarország volt kormányzója zászlója alá hívja honfijait, mégtén tudtukra adja, miszerint a szolgálati rangjaikat megadva tette hív fel mindenkit; – Ezt kétszer ismételni nem kelle a mélyen tisztelt kormányzóúrnak öszve szedve azon magyarokat kik közelemben valának oda hagyva áltárt, megígért rangot, 's siettem kedves hazám volt Kormányzójának Zászlója alá harmadmammal, meg is érkeztem Bolognába 's az első századba a huszárokhoz mint közharcos be is soroztattam; – úgyan fajdalmasan esik már mint volt századosnak a tizenkét

évi katonáskodás után ismét a közharcosi állásba visszaesni, de táplál azon remény miszerint nemeskebzü, hazánk kormányzója nem feledi azon áldozatot, amelyet az őt mindig tisztelői hoztak már akkor is, mikor kettő között volt a válasz, egy bizonyos 's egy bizonytalan, így tettem én, mit be is bizonyítottam.

Mélyen tisztelt Kormányzó úr alázatos kéréssel folyamodom miszerint lenne kegyes e tehertől felmenteni, s hogy nelegyek a mindennapiasságoknak kitéve kegyeskedjen engem is azon nagy kegyének egy miliárdnyi részében részesíteni, amelyekben már számtalan hazánkfiait részesíteni el nem feledve, s őket a Poroszországi ujjonnanformált magyar legióhoz nagy kegyének következtében elküldeni méltoztatott; – kérem tehát ha szabad reménykednem engem is azoknak sorai sorai közé soroltatni, már azon oknál fogva is, miután azon ezredekben melyekből az ujjonnanformált Legió szerveződik, Rokonim mint tiszttek szolgálnak, 's a közharcosok közt valamint az altiszttek közt a legnagyobb ismerettségem van, úgy nemkülömben a tiszttek közt is miután én szinte azon ezredekben szolgáltam, még az osztrák alatt. Ha talán pedig nem lennék eléggé ismeretes amélyen tisztelt Kormányzó úr előtt, bővebb tudomást adhat Türr Tábornok úr, valamint Reinfeld¹¹ őrnagy urak, nemkülömben ezelőtt két hóval az olasz komiszióhoz küldembe bizonyítványim másolatát, mint Osztrák, Serb, Lengyel, s Americai szolgálataimról.

Ha tehát magakegyében részesíteni engem is fogna mint lekötelezet szolgálja megnem szüntem lenni, Szilágyi György.

Még a nálam megmaradt két Bizonyítványim hiteles másolatát küldöm be a Kormányzó úrnak, a többi a Comisiónál van, mit maga a Törzstül hivatalosan Salobul küldött be Tábornok.

Lubritio. Megjegyezendő, miszerint én a rendes hadseregből mint huszár főhadnagy a parancskövetkesztében

¹¹ Reinfeld Dénes Dániel őrnagy.

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osztatomba a gyalogsághoz századosnak, a mit bizonyítványim is elége tanusítnak.

*7. Szilágyi György levele édesanyához, Constantinopol, 1867.
március 18/3.*

Kedves jó Anyám!

Tudom, hogy levelem meg fog lepni, kedves anyámat, 's tán mindent inkább hit volna mint az hogy én még életben vagyok, mert sokai a halgatásom tökéletesen hiszem hogy elég okot is adot[t] mind azokra, de hogy nem haltam meg tanú jele tehát e levél, mert holtak nyugszanak 's az élők forognak, mozognak ebbe a számár nagy világba, kivéve akik betegek mint uri magam is vagyok még, nincs igen nagy kedvök velem együt[t] ugrálgatni, – bízom kedves anyám már annak jó három hólnapja hogy folytonosan beteg vagyok, s ezt Görögországban szerzem magamnak, Athénben ugyan meg próbáltam magam gyógyíttatni 's dácára a legnagyobb költségeknek mégsem érzem jobbulásom; 's addig míg jobban nem leszek megfogadtam hogy nem írok, ez vala tehát hosszas halgatásomnak oka, – de most miután elhagyva Athént Törökországba érve jobban érzem magam, de még mindig rosszul vagyok, különösen zsebjeim a pénz hiány szörnyü betegségében szenvedek 's azt ugy éreztetik velem miszerint többször rosszul érzem magam ha rideg melységeikben mereveket keresnek kezeim néha de félre mindezekkel a Dologra: Kedves jó anyám jogy mennek a dolgok most Magyarországon [sic!] jól Ugy legyenek szívesek álást a jó barátok vagy urak által szerezni, miszerint hazamenvene ögyelegzék ide stova, mert szándékom hazamenni mihelyt egy kissé rendbe szedem a szénámat, miután meg kell vullanom hogy mindenemet Görögországban elrábolták csak mind az ujam maradtam meg csaknem mezétlen, most először tehát gondoskodnom kell öltönyökrül 's egy kevés uti költségrül akkor ez után majd láttyuk egymást.

Ime itt küldöm arcképemet mind Capitán két példányba

akkor még jobb idők voltak most nagyon rosszul álok.

Írjának azonnal levelet, amelyben mindenről tudósítsanak, ha még Matyasofszky Irini férjhez nem ment mutassák meg neki arcképemet, tisztelem.

M[Sic?] öczém leveledet azonnal küld Constantinopolba ha sok pénzed van küldj; egy jó csomót úgy mindenről.

Csokol Batyád Anyám szal egyetembe Szilágyi György Százados.

Atresem All' Illustrissimo Signor Giorgio Szilágyi Capitano in Constantinopoli.

*8. Szilágyi György panaszlevele gr. Andrássy Gyulához
Ausztria–Magyarország külügyminiszteréhez,
[Rustchuk, 1876. ápr. 22]*

Méltóságos Gróf Andrássy Gyula osztr[ák] magy[ar] Kül-
ügyér úr Ő Exellentijának Bécsben

Mélyen tisztelt Külügyér úr ő Exdelentiája!

Az alólírt Magyarország Bács megye Bajai születésű 44 éves romai katolikus okleveles gyógyszerész – több kormányok alatt mint tiszt szolgáltam, a sok viszontagságok után 1867 év elején a török hadseregbe léptem be, ahol is mint ezred gyógyszerész (kolászi) alórnagyi rangban szolgálván, de okoknál fogva megunva a rendetlenséget beadtam dimissiomat 1869 évi augusztus 24. és magamnak kevés megtakarított pénzzel gyógyszerert nyitottam ki Sumlán, később pedig azt az 1874 év augusztus havába áttettem Rustchukra. Bár a sok akadályokat melyeket elém gördítettek, dácára az itt már létező kettő gyógytárnak, tudományommal legyőztem, de nem az intrignak piszkos fegyvereit használókat, kik még mai napig is üldöznek, s amely állarczosok közé tartozik a magyar-osztrák Consulat is – fájdalom – a ki is minden kigondolhatótt felhasznál megbuktatásomra a helyett hogy védne, mert főcélja különösen ha az ügyes magyar őt becsületében megsemmisíteni és materialiter tönkre tenni.

Ennek bizonyságaul felhozom itt a már benyújtott

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panaszomat és a Constantinapoli nagy követséghez küldött leveletem 1876. d.ik április 7. ik amely panaszlevelemben az itt levő Consulatust semmivévéseért nemkülönben igazságtalanság, s a polgári és becsületjog tiprasaért, melyeket különösen a magyarok ellen használ fel vádolom, nemkülönben a bírói képtelenségéért, melyet durva gorombaság és becsületsértéssel a hivatalban eltakar, a hozzáforduló ügyesek előtt feljelen tettem és vizsgálatot kértem. Legnagyobb bűnöm tehát az hogy magyar vagyok, és mind igazán lélekkel az, az igazság útján haladok.

A mint tehát fennem felhozzám hogy gyógyszertáram Ruszcsukra tettem át anak tehát felállítására béreltem egy boltot Csorapcsieff Iván nevezetű Ruszcsuki lakostól, a boltnak két ajtája lévén az egyik az az homlokajtó mely a piacra néz ki, még a másik hátul a labororiumból nyílik egy vendéglő udvarába, amely vendéglő szinte Csorapcsieff¹² tulajdona s amely udvarban a gyógyszerektől kiürült ládákat tartottam s azokat a sepegő alá az ajtóm elé raktattam így vagy másfél hó telt el, mikor egy szeptemberi napon 1874-ben Getzó nevezetű bolgár ki a vendéglőt bérbe tarta lakatot tett ajtomra kívülről és azt becsukni akarta; én hinni nem akarván e mindenek nélküli erőszakos eljárást, őt szépszavakkal felszólítam, hogy mi idézi elő e jogtalanságot, de arra nem is válaszolt, behúzta ajtomat s a lakatot rajta megerősíteni akarta. Megjegyezendő itt hogy az ajtó nélkül nem képzelhető a gyógytár, ennek oka a ház szerkezete, melyet én nem építettem, de szerződése után béreltem ki. De a mint az ajtót felszakítottam, oroszán dühével rontot nekem a terebélyes Bulgár Getzó szolgáljával együtt, felkapván kezében egy kisebb ládát, beugrott a labororiumba és azt fejemhez dobta, csak a pillanatnyi lélekjelenlét elnemesztése, családom szerencséjére, de az én még nagyobb szerencsétlenségemre, mentett meg a haláltól, mert a felszakított ládákából a kiálló szegek, még nem lévének kiszedve

¹² Csorapcsieff Iván született Koprivsticában, 1865-től francia tanár Ruszében, tankönyveket írt.

és ha ezek fejemet érek az erős dobás által a rögtöni halált ki nem kerülhettem, de amint már fellebb említém a lélekjelenlétét elnemvesztése győzött, mert a nekem rohannó Bulgár Getzó dobását balkezemmel feltartottam, amint azt lehetett, és a jobb kézben levő ezüst preparatumot a nekem iramodott Bulgárra öntöttem, bár akaratom ellen, de csak úgy menekülhettem meg a dühös vadtól és annak szolgájától ki szinte már a küszöbömön megjelent, terebélyes markában egy nagy követ dobásra készen atrtva, és talán még birokra is kerül a sor ha „Engel” nevezetű festő aki akkor gyógyszertráramban működött közbe nem lép, akinek látására eltávozott Getzó szolgájával együtt s jajveszékelvekiáltozott hogy megmérgeztem őt légyen, e jajaveszékelésre többen kijöttek a vendégléjéből a dolog miben létezéséről tudakolodni, mit az illetőknek Getzó tetszése szerint elmesélte, és ezekből magának tanikat szerzet. Getzónak tehát nincs is törvényes tanuja mig nekem van. De miután a vaspályától sürgették a preparatumot – újra tehát tizenkét forint ezüstöt kellett felolvasztanom mert a kiöntöttből igen kevés maradt hátra – és így nem levén időm az illetőt bepanaszolni, de már másnap délután egy németül fogalmazot panaszt nyujtottam be az itt levő osztrák magyar Consulátus-hoz, (miután magyart semmi áron nem fogadnak el, és mégis magyar osztrák nevet visel a Consulátus) és azt személyesen nyujtottam át, de azt elnem fogadták. Okul azt adták hogy nincs törökkül írva, és másodszor már be vagyok panaszolva ellen fellemtől s így panaszom nem érvénye s elutasítottak.

Körülbelől eltölt tizenöt nap mikor hivattak s velem a canceláriátul a Dragomán egy idevaló spanyol izraelita „Kanetti”¹³ nevezetű, ki lekötelezetje a Bulgároknak atya kereskedése miatt s mint volt kereskedő segéd törvényeinket nem ismerve a török törvényszék előtt megjelent, itt irasbelit vettek fel törökkül persze, mit én olvasni nem tudok. Kanetti talmács jót állása mellett hogy tulajdon mondott szavaim

¹³ Kanetti Ábrahám az osztrák-magyar konzulatuson dolgozott mint tolmács.

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vannak oda feljegyezve miután Ő aláírta – én is aláírtam, mikor nem gyanítva semmi rosszat, „de majd kitűnik később!”. Eltávoztam. De csak hamar ismét hivattak és tanuimat kihallgatták. Ezek után elmúlt egy hónap, mikor ismét egy pár órát eltöltve Kanetti Dragomán kényúrralmaért minden végzés nélkül, még gyógyszeraromat magáthagyva – miután segídet nem vagyok képes jövedelmemből tartani, annélkül hogy nagyszámú családom általa ne szenvedne és így még kilencszer lettem hivatva. Még végre az idemellékelt irat „A” betűvel jegyezve bizonyítja hogy folyó évi április 5d kézbesített végzést mint ítéletet, három napi börtön 40 piaster (4 frt) pénzbeli büntetés és 80 piaster (8 frt) pőr költségekre levék elítélve, de amelyet csak a Consulatús sievez ? pőr költségnek míg a török végzésben a ruhadarabért követelik amely le lévén öntve, tehát a kézbesített „A” iratott a Consulatús talán hamissan fogalmazta, rossz akaratát irányomban érvényesítendő; Hogy pedig Kanetti (tolmács) és a Consulatús egyetértésével megbuktatásomra elejintén frigyét kötött, bizonyága a törököktől előidézett 258 és a 259 büntető § melyek után a végzés történt is, de amelyek ellenkezőleg vannak applicálva, ezek a törvény cikkek a török törvénykönyvben azt mondják, mintha én mentem volna Getzó Bulgár tulajdon házába és ott rajta sérüléseket tettem Acidumsulfuricommal, ez nem igaz, ő jött mint már fennen említém, mit tanukal is bizonyítok és nem Acidum sulfuricum hanem ezüst olvadékkal; Ezzekből kitűnik az osztr[ák] magy[ar] Consulatús élheterlensége s erőszakos igazságtalansága irányomban hogy pedig a Dragomán már ? a felvételnél bizonyosan az utasítás után melyet kapott elíteltetett a törököktől valószínűnek látszik.

A végzés megkapása után tehát f. é. Április 6d mit szinte az idemellékelt „B” betűvel jegyzett irat bizonyít, magának a „General Consulnak” irtam, a melyben őt felkértem a bent irtakra, amelyre is f. é. Április 11d válaszol kiterüleg és egészen ellenkezőleg, e vállasz az ide csatolt 502 sz.mal „B” betűvel jegyzet, újra az ellenemi összeesküvés kitűnik.

Mind ezek után tehát már láttam hogy a Consulátus tehetetlenségével párosult roszakaratának áldozatul kell esnem s miután csaknem egyedül én vagyok kit még lenyügözni nem tudtak minden erő megfeszítésük után sem, ez alkalmat bár jogtalanul felhasználták engem becsületemtől, melynek eddig őrvendtem megfosztani s kiss vagyonomtól megrabolni, miután az egész arra mutat mintha maga a Consulátus lett volna allatonban előidőzje e kellemetlen ügynek, miszerint alkalma legyen megtörni czélját érendő, mit már több szegény hazánk fiaival megtett amely ellen mindig kikeltem s a hivatalt jogtalanlansággal vádoltam.

Az elősoroltak után nem marad hátra más út reám és szenvedő hontársaimra nézve, mint Exelentiájához mély alázattal esedezni, miszerint Kegyeskedjen igazságos lelkével az Osztr. Magy. Consulátust az igazság útján rendre utasítani, nem különben egy általános revisiot legkegyelmesebben elrendelni méltóztatnék, arra pedig ha lehetséges egy lelkiismeretes magyar embert kiszemelni és akkor Exelentiája ki nemzeteket tud kibékelteni, oly dolgokat fog hallani mely unicum a maga nemében, de ilyeneket csak osztrák hivatalnokoktól lehet várni kik még mindig Andrási Gróf arczképét a bitófa allatt logni látják és ha őt nem legalább vérrokonit odafelléptetni igyekeznek, még ha ez nem sikerülne legalább becsületőktől megfosztani s materialiter őket tönkre tenni főczéllül tűzték ki, hogy mindezek után hívei maradhassanak a „Bach”tól örökölt jóltetteknek. És sikerült áldozataikat dicső „Hajnu”juknak bemutatthassák mely nemes érdem jelet s legnagyobb magyarfalónak arany sarkantyút is hozzá adnak, díjúl peddig sok éve nemes küzdelmekért „Geheimer Ministerial Rath”nak választják s Bécsbe felhivják, ezekből kiválasztják újra a legnagyobb magyarfalót és ezt kinevezik aztán követségbe a magyarokkal egyezni. Jaj neked szegény nemzetem! Hogy pedig még micsoda metamorphosissokon kel keresztül menned aztán még az Isten sem tudja, de legyünk készen arra miszerint osztrák birak előtt áll a magyar, el is

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volt az, el is van, el is lesz az itélve.

Az idemellékelt végzés után tehát a három napi börtönt ki kell állnom, de bocsáson meg Exelentiája én mint büntelen csak az erőszaknak fogok engedni, még biztos vagyok benne hogy azt is rajtam véghez viszi az osztr. magy. Consulátus judási örömmel s ekkor gyógytáram be kell csukni, mert nincs ki helyettesítsen ami egész gyógytáramnak jövőjét megsemmisíti, amiért én becsületben s anyagilag tönkre vagyok téve. Ezért apró gyermekeim nevében az Isten, a törvény és az emberiség előtt felelősé teszem a Consulátust.

Mély alázattal folyamodom tehát Exelentiájához a Magyarok Iosuéhez ki a békés szabadság fényesen sütő napját kedves sokat szenvedet szép hazánk felett mig mindig ragyogásában fenntartani képes, ne feledkedjen el rólunk sem kik még mindig a kényuralom bilincseibe fűzve annak durva ostorcsapásait fajdalmassan érzük Consulátusunktul, kegyeskedjen azon éltett adó napnak csak egy parányi sugárát is ide hozzánk átbocsajtani hogy a sötétség poklát megvilágítsak. Legyen Exellentiája nekünk második Krisztusunk száljon le hozzánk a miért esdünk és szabadítson meg bennünket a Bach órdőgeitől.

Exellentiájának alázatos tisztelője

Kelt Rustschukon, Bulgáriába 1876d év április 22dkén

Szilágyi György oklev. gyógyszerész

*9. Nagy Miklós lapszerkesztő meghívja Szilágyi Györgyöt
„Vasárnapi Újság” és „Politikai Újdonságok” tudósítójának,
levele hozzá, Budapest, 1876. júl. 17.*

Igen tisztelt honfitárs!

Tisztelt uram!

F. évi július 5.én kelt becses soraira betegségem miatt most és csak massal iratva válaszolhatok, pedig becses igéretét szíves készséggel fogadom s ohajtanám, ha azt mielőbb valósulna látnám a magyar hírlapolvasó közönség érdeklődésének kielégítésére.

Bátor vagyok Uraságodat bizadalmas tisztelettel felkérni, hogy ruszcsuki helyi hangulatról, ottani mozgalmakról, helyi és harci hírekről s a környéken folyó eseményekről – akár a bolgár lázadásra, akár a szerbek ellen folyó háborúra vonatkozzanak, – lapjainkat a „Vasárnapi Újságot” és „Politikai Újdonságokat” értesíteni szíveskedjék. Bármily változatos tarkasságú tudósításokat is szívesen veszünk, mert az u.n. hivatalos hírek távsürgönyök útján is megküldetnek Budapesti magyar lapjainknak s inkább a részletekre vonatkozó jellemző leírásoknak vagyunk hiányában. A nép és a nagy közönség érzülete, hangulata szintén sikeres tárgy volna, nemkülönben az orosz ügynökök kezeinek titkos machinatia azon a vidéken, a népfajok s a keresztény és muhamedán lakosok összehabosítására.

Ha a „Vasárnapi Újságban” eddig meg nem jelent nevezetességek arczképei közül a fővezér Abdul Kerim s még egy-két főbb török notabilitás, vagy a szerbek részéről Alimpics s még egy-két jelentékenyebb egyén arczképe az ottani keverkedésekben fotográphiában megkapható volna: nagyon le volnék kötekezve, ha ilyen öt-hat képet költségemre részemre megküldeni szíveskedjén.

Amint egészségem engedni fogja, már a lapok szállásának is utána fogok nézni s amennyiben a Bécs útján történt megrendelés következtében a szállítás körül bármi késedelem vagy akadály forogna fenn: azt igyekezni fogok elhárítani.

Szíves ígéretért előre is köszönetet mondva s annak beváltását reménybe őszinte üdvözlettel maradok.

Tekintettel uraságodnak tisztelő honfitársa, a „Vasárnapi Újság” és „Politikai Újdonságok” szerkesztője, Egyetem tér, 2. szám.

*10. Az Egyetértés c. Függetlenség-párti lap munkatársa,
Lukáts Gyula meghívja Szilágyi Györgyöt tudósítónak, levele
hozzá, Budapest, 1877. máj. 7.*

Mélyentisztelt Szilágyi úr!

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Ruszcukban időzésem alkalmával Ön szíves volt ígéretet tenni, hogy becses leveleit azután az „Egyetértés” számára küldi el, azon lap számára, mely Kossuth nagyfotosságú leveleit szokta kapni s mely egyedül áll összeköttetésben a nagy hazafival, s emellett egyedüli napi lapja az ellenzéknek, tehát egyedül küzd Magyarország függetlenségeért.

Természetesnek is találom, hogy Ön mint a ki velünk együtt az 1848iki magasztos elvek alapján áll, azon pártot fogja szellemi munkásságával támogatni, melyhez Ön is tartozik, s így biztos vagyok abban, hogy Öntől igen sok s érdekes levelet kapunk a mostani háborús dolgokat, melyeket Ön eddig a kormánypárti lapoknak szokott megküldeni.

Becsés tudósításait Csavolszky Lajos¹⁴ úrhoz (országgyűlési képviselő) mint az „Egyetértés” felelős szerkesztőjéhez tessék címezni, s egyúttal tudassa velünk, mely cím alatt küldjük Önnek a kifizetett példányt, valamint az említett á.bicés könyvet is, melyet a török küldöttekkel¹⁵ azért nem küldhettem, miután ezek nem Ruszcuk felé vették útjukat.

Azonnali válaszáat, s gyakori tudósításait remélve maradtam, tisztelője, Lukáts Gyula.

11. Utasítás a török Magyar-Legio toborzására kiküldött tiszturak és altisztek miheztartása végett, Sumla, 1877. jún. 1.

I. Csak oly egyén fogadható fel ki önként jelentkezik, ép, egészséges és 20 évnél nem fiatalabb, 40 évnél pedig nem idősebb.

II. A hazai törvények megsértése kikerülhetése végett szigorúan megtiltatik az olyan egyének felvétele is: kik osztrák-magyarhonban a katona kötelezettség alóli végképpeni

¹⁴ Csavolszky Lajos (1838–1909) – újságíró is, az „Egyetértés” c. folyóirat szerkesztő-tulajdonosa.

¹⁵ Tahir bey vezette küldöttségről van szó, amely a Corvinákat kísérte Budapestre 1877. április 25-én és odafelé Ruszcukon keresztül ment; Lukáts Gyulát pedig (Szalay Imrével együtt) Ruszcukba küldték a delegációt vendégül látni.

felmetésüket, hiteles okmánnyal bizonyítani nem képesek.

III. Minden családfő jó eleve értesítendő arról, hogy családja bármi néven nevezendő tagjainak öt vagy a tábort követniök soha se lesz megengedve.

Ezen utasítás szem előtti tartását a kiküldött tiszt uraknak és altiszteknek a felelőség terhe alatt komolyan ajánlom.

Kelt Sumlán 1877ik évi június hó 1.jén.

A török Magyar-Legio főparancsnoka Csutak bey¹⁶.

12. Csutak Kálmán Szilágyi Györgyhöz, Rustschuk, 1877 jún. 7.

Szilágyi György őrnagy Urnak Rustschukon

Felsőbb jóváhagyás reményében ezennél kinevezem Önt az alakulandó Magyar Legió első lovas osztály őrnagy és parancsnokává. Rangjával egybekötvelévő illetmények és rangfokozata folyóévi június hó 10.től számítandók. Mély örvendetes tudósítást azon meghagyással van szerencsém őrnagy ural közleni, hogy magát az előirt eskü letétele végett nállam 48 óra alatt személyesen jelenteni szíveskedjék.

Kelt Rustschukon 1877ik évi Junius hó 7.én.

A török Magyar-Legio főparancsnoka Csutak bey.

13. Csutak Kálmán levele Szilágyi Györgyhez, Sumla, 1877 jún. 22.

Barátom Gyuri!

Mint mindenütt it[t] is fennakadást szenvedtünk, és most megmár máig sem zsebére tudtam itt Imrét, gondolhatod, hogy mily kiadás ez, maga viselete tegnap estig csak megvolt, de tegnap este óta egy kis fordulat tapasztaltam – melyre

¹⁶ Csutak Kálmán (1820–1896) – honvédezredes, az 1848–49-es forradalom után Garibaldinál szolgált, majd Törökországba került. Az 1877–78-as orosz-török háború idejében próbált magyar legiót szervezni, amely a törökök oldalán harcolt volna, de nem sikerült Ausztria-Magyarország hivatalos semlegessége miatt, így a magyar önkéntesek a lengyel légióhoz csatlakoztak.

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bozom nem számítottam; én ma Cospoliba¹⁷ indulok, mert úgy sajtát – valamint az ügy érdeke is erősen követeli, hogy most Imrével itt mi lesz nem tudom, de tudok tőlle, hogy kedves foglalkozását folytatni fogja, melyet nem szeretnék, mivel az egy főtiszt jelleméhez alig lehet illő, de ilyenek az emberek.

Én Stambulba fogok 8. nap maradni, onnét visza Sumlára, meglehet nőmmel együtt; amint ide visszatértem, azonnal küldök neked két embert, kiket magammal fogok hozni – utánuk magam is oda fogok rándulni; a bolgárokat nem hajlandó a fővezér befogadni most még, (és én is tudok a felelőségről) de ha ha majd több magyar lesz, akkor egynehány elfog köztük szóródni; mindég a levelezések meg lettek nehéztve, amint ezt a tábori élet rendesen magával szokta hozni, tehát ez semmi okos ember előtt nem lehet feltűnő: adok azt óhajtanám, hogy a vasúti menetek ne lennének beállítva mind addig míg Stambuló vissza nem tértétek, mert bizon itt minden odáig úgy a ruha is – azért arra kérlek nézzél nekem számomra ott két jó lovat nyereg alá, szeretném ha az egyik fekete lenne, de ne legyenek olyan kicsinyek, gebékek – az árat mindég a tárgy szokta meghatározni; ha azt találtál írdál felőle nekem, s akkor visszatértem után kocsin vagy vaspályán oda fogok rándulni. Sajnálom, hogy addig lapjaidat az Egy.[edértésnek] ide el nem küldötted. Ha bármiféle levelem jönne oda azt kedjeskedjél nekem ide célbul küldeni mint azt eddig is tenni szíves voltál. Valami gróf Hegtovich írt Bécsből – volt katonatiszt, ki is a légióba felvételért kér, de Bukarestből is kaptam levelet per Triest[e] – már írtam én is via Triest[e] Brassó. Mit hallasz Vidin felől, nemmutatkozik e valami mozgás? Mert hogy már forr a dologoda haza, az látni lehet a különbféle vidékről ide érkezett levelekből. Arra felkérlek, légy szíves figyelni hogy kérjed fel Dr Eschreff¹⁸ urat miszerint a netalán oda

¹⁷ Konstantinápolyba.

¹⁸ Esref pasa – a ruszei katonai egység főparancsnoka, 1887 máj. 9-től a

jövőlevelemre lennie kegyes török nyelven felírni a nevemet, mert hamarabb megkapom mindent akadály nélkül, míg ellenben sok bajjal szokott most már járni.

Mind ez miről értesíthetek és kérésem, hogy amint Stambulból visszatérek azonnál megteszem azon kötelességemet köszönetem mellett és ha a vonat még járna, az esetben oda rándulnék nőmmel 48 órára hozzátok. Kováts itt ma nagy zavart csinált egy hírlaptudósító emberével s így poroszokkal tűzött össze – igaza van ugyan a tábor szempontjából, de ilyesmiért egy kardbajt – ma még nehezen összeegyeztethető, ámbar a dolog nem aljás természetű, de ki tehet arról, hogy a természet rendje nem ösmer ugrást.

S most kedves tiedet is üdvözölve valamint Dr Eschreff urat is – tegedet ölelve's baráti jobbotat szórítva maradtam, vültozhatlan barátod Csutak bey.

Remélem, hogy soraimat nem fogod a nyilvánosság eléibe adni, mert erre nintsen szükség.

14. Csutak Kálmán Bulgáriában akar letelepedni: levele Szilágyi Györgyhöz, Sumla, 1878. aug. 8.

Barátom Szilágyi!

Őszinte soraim ma is mint mindég viszont őszinte és baráti válaszra fog számolhatni nálad, nemcsak a közel múltban lett ösmeretségünk, hanem a jöbeni remény és talán együt[t]i lét és majdani jövő fejében is elvárom tölled mint barátomtól az ellenséges indulat közé szórcítot[t] honfitársaimból azt, minden tartózkodás és hatsó gondolat nélkül. Azért tehát kérlek légy őszinte és jól meggondolva adjál válszat nékem posta fordultával. Nem mulaszhatom itt el megjegyezni azt, hogy a hozzád menettekálábbi kérésem és kérdéseimre odaado baráti őszinteséged [sic!] bizonyára szép talajt vetne meg kedves családod jövőjének – fordítaná azt sorsa bár merve is – és ha ketten lakván egy városba, talán még is csak kellemesebb lenne

vilajet alkormányzója.

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mint egy magad – ná meg aztán az idő is teremene még valamit ott együttes akarattal számunkra, azt hiszem és remélem.

Tehát előtte [sic!] létunióból álló kérésem most következik – megjegyzem még jó előre, hogy számoltam azottani uralkodó helyzettel, de az onfenntartási ösztön szerinti szavanak hódol minden ember.

Barátom és több odavaló, de most itt tartózkodó török birtokosoktól a végre lévén felszólítva, hogy ottani birtokaik bérelését, vagy azokkal [való] elbánását válálnam el. Megmondották, hogy a te ottani helyzeted a bolgárokkal szemben néked igen megnehezítik állapotodat és ott ezt mind tudva, most tehát hozzád fordulok következő kéréssel:

I. Ha én oda mennék egy ily birtokért bevitele végett, nyújtanál-e segédkezet: arra, hogy annak által vételésben ne károsodjam? És még hogy köztünk mondva számoltam már akkor midőn ezen birtokosurakkal szóba ereszkedvén. Én részemről ösmerve magamat biztosíthatlak arról, hogy fogok tudni magamnak népszerűséget teremteni, melynek alapján hiszem és remélem, hogy boldogulni is fognánk mindketten.

II. Szíves lennél véllem tudatni, hogy mily ár lenne az? Mit mai napság azon a vidéken egy Dünüm¹⁹ szántó földért vagy erdőért adni és viszont kapni is lehetne és hogy a birtokok alája vannak-e vetve a víz áradásáinak, valamint azt is hogy lehetne ott elválálkozókatkapni?

III. Lehet-e ott lakást kapni vagy bérbe vett házakat valamelyikében lehet-e lakni_ mert én a családotúl óhajtanék adás által költözni még a hónapfolytán. Azért kérek légy őszinte lás[s]ad be előrebocsájtott soraimból azt is, hogy nem óhajtván magam egyedülboldogulni, halehet, hanem őszinte barátilag megosztani mind azt mint emberi erő és lehetséges megosztani engedne.

Tudom, hogy kedvesnőd sem veszene nóm társaságában semmit, hanem a két nő háziás működéseikben nnyújtanának fáradozásainak mellé gyarapító szikrát a jövőre – azért ne vedd

¹⁹ 1 dönüm, dülüm = 919,3 m², azaz csaknem 0,1 ha.

rossz néven ha annyiszor ismétlem azt, hogy őszinte válaszd mellettmég igazi baráti nyilatkozatra is számolok, sőt kimondom nyiltán hogy által fognam egyrészbzen felételezni oda költözésemet tehát láthatod hogy én egész őszinte ragaszkodással és baráti vonzalommal viselkedem irántad.

Elvárom ebbeli kéréseimre kölcsönös hazafi s baráti válaszodat. Hidjéd el, hogy nem lenne okod megbánni azt, hogy én, ki őszinte ember és barátod vagyok szomszéd oda lettem, mert én azon emberek egyike vagyok, ki nem óhajtok mindent magam felfalni, tehát embertársaimmal – annál inkább baráttommal megosztani örömet szoktam.

Hoz[z]ád fog menni egy Bey – e napokban, kivel én itt beszéltem, tehát értesítelek jó előre mindenről. Meglehet hogy [sic!] ott mint egyik másik birtokos megbízott kérője kültünösen tobbettehetnénk egymásnak mit egymagunkra hagyatva lehetnénk az önzés köpenye alatt. Tehát mielőtt oda mennék óhajtanom baráti válaszodat itt megvárni – melyre én sokat építék – lakásom [sic!]. Az osztrák posta levél hordója már előre is lesi baráti levelednek által adhatási kereteit számomra.

Soraim végénmiön nöm ösméretlenül is üdvözetét küldené kedveseidnek, én pedig tégedet barátiikeblemre ölve a viszontlátásig őszinte ölelő barátod, Csutak Kálmán, honvédezedes és ügyvéd.

U.i. Legyen válaszd bármilyen, de elvárom, mert megélhetési kötelesség súlya szívem csál velem – oda menni – csak hogy soraid után világosabb lenne előttem az ot[t]ani helyzet miben léte.

Ethnic Mapping on the Balkans (1840–1925): a Brief Comparative Summary of Concepts and Methods of Visualization¹

G. Demeter, Zs. Bottlik, Kr. Csaplár-Degovics²

THE ROLE OF ETHNIC MAPS IN LEGITIMIZING THE NATIONAL IDEA

The 19th century had brought about significant changes in minds and as a result of this in frontiers as well. It was the age of the national revival, culminating in the fight between the concept of state nation and nation state. As the latter was a brand new ideology, in order to legitimize its existence and aspirations linked to it, new argumentation was needed and thus new instruments to serve the arguments. Among these one can find ethnic mapping as a method of symbolic nation building. Together with the fabrication of historical past (a task left to historians) ethnic maps (a task designated to geographers) were also excellent instruments to advertise national goals and desires, as they were definitely cheaper than establishing schools, and the results of dissemination were nearly immediate. Furthermore ethnic maps could fulfill their triple function (as political advertisements, propaganda materials influencing decision-making and contributors to nation-building) without transferring extra burden on society in forms of new taxes. Ethnic maps together with books on

¹ This study has been supported by the Bolyai János Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

² Gábor Demeter and Krisztián Csaplár-Degovics – HAS RCH, Institute of History, and Zsolt Bottlik – Loránd Eötvös University, Budapest, Institute of Geography. For our maps created and mentioned in the text visit:
www.szamterkep.hu/palyazat/cikkek.zip

history could target many people including decision-makers, who – especially in practice, when i.e. delimitation of borders was the assigned task – scarcely had time to read long essays with obscure argumentation on national question; thus maps could serve official propaganda purposes well. Ethnic maps contained political message and since the human mind is inclined to rely more and more on visualised data, these maps could be considered as ancestors of modern political advertisements. Compared to books or political pamphlets, ethnic maps were considerably practical: since many information were compressed on these maps and at the same time these were very illustrative, ethnic maps could reach both illiterate masses and experts as well.

Since ethnic maps cannot be considered impartial sources, but rather as political instruments serving political goals, they very often manipulated and distorted reality. The thorough comparative study of Wilkinson (in the 1950s) revealed how the spheres of influence and the drawn ethnic boundaries gradually extended and overlapped from the 1870s' in the Balkans, when the Balkan nations tried to exploit the possibilities of ethnic mapping and data interpretation in order to legitimize their territorial aspirations. Since the numerous maps showed contradictory results not only at the level of applied ethnic terminology, but this versatility is observed regarding the territorial extent of different patches representing the nations, it was worth sketching a general evolution of ethnic mapping on the peninsula using a comparative approach.

THE PERCEPTION OF NATIONALITY IN THE BALKAN PENINSULA

Contrary to the French example, where nationalism resulted the unification of the nation and the centralisation of the state *parallel* to the consolidation of liberal thought resulting collective rights, in the Balkans the awakening of nationalism meant the revival of some kind of new tribalism opposing to

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the homogenization efforts of the imperial thought. Homogenisation and the wish for an ‘Ottoman nation’ was a new tendency in the empire invented by liberal reformers in state service, which relied on the liberal French experience. Earlier the empire tolerated diversity, but this versatility led to decreased competitiveness, although it should not have been necessary. Contrary to the French experience, nationalistic movements on the Balkans can be considered as the revolt of the exploited peripheries (and not simply of classes, so it has territorial pattern), demanding decentralization, thus enhancing separatistic tendencies.

One of the crucial points determining the outcome of the events was that the European parts of the empire were ethnically heterogeneous, and mixed. Furthermore, from the 19th century on religion was neither able to unify the masses of Slavs speaking similar dialects, nor to offer some kind of integration into the empire. The emerging competing nationalistic ideas were of regional and particular character and could mobilize only parts of the Slavdom and the region. The recognition of Christians as equal citizens of the Ottoman state (1856) happened too late, as it almost coincided with the birth of the modern nationalistic ideas in the region (based on language)³ and in the neighboring small states. And finally, changes took place very quickly. The appearance of nationalism created new fault lines within the population, such as religion or social status did so earlier instead of unification. The several types and layers of identities were overprinting each other, creating a chaos in minds, appearing in arbitrarily alternating arguments when dreaming about the boundaries of the state (physical geographical, economic, historical and ethnic reasoning, balance of power in the Balkans), representing the political opportunism of the elite. This, the rivalry between the three notions (the conservative-religious, that denied the role of nations concerning both Moslems and

³ The map by Šafarik or Boué based on linguistic differences preceded this act.

Christians; the loyal–liberal, that tried to create some kind of supranational identity overprinting religious and regional differences by offering equal political rights, 'citizenship'; and the tribal–nationalistic–separatistic–revolutionary), and an upsurge for social changes which was exploited by national movements (IMRO) were key elements of the unrest. An outer threat, the appearance of the small states also occurred as these were carriers and transmitters of the competing nationalistic ideas, and the aspirations of the small states and nations certainly did overlap, that enhanced instability further.

Beyond territorial overlaps, the definitions of the nations did also overlap and both inclusive and exclusive character of the different nationalistic ideas meant threat to other movements. Greeks considered Greek a different set of people: their inclusive nation-definition was bound to orthodox religion (*orthodox = Greek*; later modified to *patriarchist = Greek* after the secession of exarchists and the de facto independence of Serbs), and not to language. Serbs also used inclusive terms when defining the Serbian nation (bound to linguistic terms overwriting religious differences, when they incorporated Bosniaks and Croats; or when they considered Patriarchist Slavs as Serbs – according to the alternating arguments and categories many people could be incorporated into the Serbian nation). Even the Bulgarians religious-exclusive (bound to the limits of the Exarchate) nation-definition was given up quickly, and turned into inclusive–linguistic one (patriarchist Slavs in Macedonia, Moslem Bulgarian-speaking Pomaks were included into the nation).

While the national identity of western nations is often confined to states and borders, considering citizens equal member of the society regardless of the religion, spoken language, etc. (at least officially), in Central-East-Europe and in the Balkans citizenship is not a synonym for nationality. Serb and Serbian are different terms, the former is bound to the ethnicity, the second to the state (citizenship). Here, the

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ideal state is a nation state that should incorporate the majority of those speaking the same language, contrary to the state-nation (citizenship nation) identity. Identity on the Balkans is a complex phenomenon and its elements cannot be described or substituted by the western term 'regional identities'. The deconstruction of identity to its elements is really challenging in the Balkans, and since many ethnic maps tend to illustrate only one dimension of the identity, these distort reality (*Tab. 1*).

Tab. 1. Correspondence-table of nations, languages and religions.

Nation	Catholics	Orthodox exarchist	Orthodox patriarchists	Moslems
Ottoman Turks			'Gagauz'	
Albanians				
Greek				
Serbs	'Croatsians'	'Macedo-Slavs'		'Bosniaks'
Bulgarians	'Chiprovci'	'Macedonian Bulgars'	'Macedonians'	'Pomaks'
Croatians				
Bosniaks				

Dark background indicates dominant feature, light-gray colour indicates subordinate feature. Columns represent the Ottoman and Greek point of view of 'nationality' based on religion, while rows represent the ideas of Young Turks, Prizren League, Bulgarians, etc. based on linguistic features. Such a correspondence table was used by the Austrian cartographers unifying the two views.

The primary identity-bearing dimension is often based on collective cultural experience, like the collective memory on medieval states, that were transformed to serve the new ideology, or the different language and religious denominations, ethnographic features (like celebrating the *Slava* or the abundance of *fis* as tribal category among Albanians and Montenegrins), that both could be cohesive, integrating forces

of a nation. Unfortunately these widespread phenomena do not coincide with languages and state borders, thus one feature is often not enough to circumscribe a nation. Language can serve as a distinctive feature in the case of the Albanian nation, but the latter is divided regarding religion, and Moslem Albanians had tight relations with other heterogeneous Moslem groups on the Balkans speaking Slavic or Turkish. Religion has distinctive character in the case of Croatians, Bosniaks and Serbians speaking almost the same language. Furthermore, most of the southern Slavs are part of a continuum of dialects, where the differences of the spoken language between neighboring groups are negligible (i.e. Serb-Bulgarian relation), and thus the delimitation of the nation is not simple. Sometimes differences in social status are also remarkable (Serbs – Bosniaks). The position of Hellenes was also special: although their language is remarkably different from that of the Slavs and Albanians: since the Greek Orthodox Church enjoyed special privileges as being the only Orthodox Church since 1767, they were able to exert influence on the surrounding non-Greek speaking territories. That's why in 1913 Greece wanted to draw the Albanian-Greek border in present day Central-Albania: a large group of orthodox Albanians were living in middle-Albania around Berat, together with Moslems. Religious minority groups speaking the language of the majority could also be mentioned (Pomaks, Torbesh, Gorans).

*CHANGES OF APPROACHES IN THE ETHNIC
MAPPING OF THE BALKANS (1840–1925)*

As ideas on the determinants of national consciousness evolved and changed, so did mapping. The primarily composed religious maps were soon overshadowed by maps where linguistic categories became predominant (1). Nevertheless, as language is not the only determinative feature in the Balkans, the opponents of this theory created their counter-maps based on other features. Four of these are worth mentioning. (2)

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Ethnic maps based on religion did not disappear. (3) Complex classifications, using two or more features (religion+language) appeared. (4) Abstract maps using the ambiguous-obscure categories of 'historical arguments' and 'cultural affiliation' (which are difficult to define or circumscribe) appeared. (5) Finally maps illustrating the differences and transitions of dialects complicated the situation further. Practically this meant, that very often mixed categories were used in the legend of maps (Greek orthodox vs. Serb; Muslim vs. Bulgarian), transition zones and cross-hatching appeared together with the punctual delimitation of patches, etc.

One of the first ethnic map *based on linguistic categories* was created by a Slav. Šafaryk was professor at the Servian Lyceum of Novi Sad (then in Hungary) for a period of 14 years. His map (1842) does not go into details; his merit, however, consists in his being the first who very exactly delimited the Bulgarians from their neighbours – the Servians, Rumanians, Greeks, and Albanians. According to Šafaryk nearly the whole of Macedonia, the region of Niš, the whole of Dobrudja, and even a part of Bessarabia are inhabited by Bulgarians. Kosovo is Serbian with the exception of the surrounding of Ipek. In the south it gave plenty of space to Greeks, and Muslims appear only as isolated patches.

Ami Boué, French of origin, was the first well-prepared man for scientific research who explored the Balkan Peninsula from 1836–1838.⁴ His effort to separate Albanian tribes based on religion and dialects is remarkable, but this map contains major mistakes – the Albanian ethnos extends to the Bay of Arta in Greece, and the Ottomans are underrepresented in Macedonia, which has been challenged by scientists, who considered the whole map unreliable owing to these mistakes. Compared to Šafarik's view the map of Boué (1840) indicates less Greeks in Thrace and more Albanians in Kosovo and

⁴ Boué, A. *La Turquie d'Europe*. Paris, 1840 (4 volumes) and Boué, A. *Recueil d'Itinéraires dans la Turquie d'Europe*. Vienna, 1854. Vol. 1–2.

indicates vlachs in the Pindos Mts. This map also underestimates Turkish/Muslim abundance in North-East-Bulgaria and in Thrace.

Both maps were very important for the Bulgarian revisionists (the maps of Ishirkov and Ivanov are based on this point of view). The same is true for the map of *Guillaume Lejean*,⁵ although he indicated small Serbian patches around Ohrid, confirming their existence using historical arguments (in the 9th century the whole area was Slavic to Durazzo; a local saint (Jovan Vladislav of Duklja) was well-known for Serbs, and was executed by a Bulgarian ruler in the 11th c., the neighboring patriarchate of Ipek was a 'Serbian' one).⁶ He committed a serious mistake: the southern limits of the Albanian nation were erroneous.

Compared to Boué, *Petermann*'s map of 1854⁷ (created for officers participating in the Crimean War) limits the abundance of Albanians to present-day Albania, leaving most of Kosovo to Slavs, and accepts that Thrace is inhabited by Greeks.⁸

Although the Austrian doctor and mayor of Prague, *Josef Müller* published travel notes in 1844, where he regarded the Slavic population of Macedonia as Serbian (supported by Šafarik in his views), prior to 1878 (the occupation of Bosnia) Serbian foreign policy did not question the ethnic affinities of territories south of the Šar Planina, and even acknowledged

⁵ Guillaume Lejean (1828–1871) was one of the most studious French explorers. Twice he travelled in European Turkey (1857–1858 and 1867–1869), as appointed French Vice-Consul. The purpose of his enterprise, undertaken by order of the French Government, was to prepare a map of European Turkey; Lejean's early death prevented the completion of this work; he succeeded, however, to publish very important geographical and ethnological essays. Lejean, G. *Ethnographie de la Turquie d'Europe par G. Lejean*. Gotha, Justus Perthes, 1861.

⁶ This rather meant Orthodox Slavic (not Greek) that time.

⁷ <http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/collections/maps/ethnographic/>

⁸ The later map of *Petermann and Habenicht* also underestimated the presence of Ottomans in Macedonia.

the fact that Bulgarian is spoken in Macedonia.⁹ In the map of *Davidović* nor the Sanjak of Novipazar neither Kosovo was described as Serb. The fact that his work has been published *at the expense* of the Servian State and that it was translated in French means, that his work was bearing the full approval of the Servian Government of that time. Macedonia, but also the towns Niš, Leskovac, Vranja, Pirot were also situated outside the boundaries of the Serbian race.

The map of *Desjardins* (1853), professor in Serbia represents the realm of the Servian language just as the scientists, who had not been influenced by Pan-Serbianism, did think in the middle of the century. The map was based on *Davidović's* work confining Serbians into the limited area north of Šar Planina.¹⁰ The Serbian newspaper, *Srbske Narodne Novine* (Year IV, pp. 138 and 141-43, May 4 and 7, 1841), described the towns of Niš, Leskovac, Pirot, and Vranja as lying in Bulgaria, and styles their inhabitants Bulgarians. But it is questionable, whether the inhabitants were real ethnic Bulgarians or were classified as Bulgarians owing to the fact, that the above mentioned territory was located in Tuna vilayet together with other Bulgarian lands.¹¹

⁹ Müller was the western founder of the *arnautaši* thesis, that many Serbs were Islamized and later assimilated by Albanians in the Peć district. However his source was the Orthodox metropolitan in Prizren. Malcolm, N. Kosovo. A Short History. Papermac, 1998, 198–199.

¹⁰ If this map had been published before 1833, the Timok river-basin would not have been added to the “by Servians inhabited districts” and “in which the Servian language is spoken”, because Turkey left this basin to the Servian Principality only in 1833 and still many Romanians lived there.

¹¹ According to the Serbian authors *Janković and Gruić*, the following districts were deemed Serbian: (i) The Voivodina (Banat, Syrmia, and Batchka); (2) Slavonia; (3) Dalmatia; (4) Istria; (5) Ragusa (Dubrovnik); (6) Cattaro; (7) Montenegro; (8) Metohia; (9) Bosnia; (10) Herzegovina; (11) Serbia (then a principality). (See “Slaves du Sud” by the above authors, published in Paris, 1853). About the middle of the nineteenth century the Serbian Government dispatched *S. Verković*, one of its officials, on a tour of

The map of *Hahn*, Greek consul is a sketch map from 1861, where settlements along the Bulgarian and Serbian language border are marked by letters A, B, S referring to the spoken language of the majority. According to the map the Bulgarian dwelling-places predominate in the Morava basin from the source of the stream to Niš, also appearing in the basins of the rivers Sitniza and Neredimka in Kosovo, and not a single Serbian dwelling-place is marked South of the Morava. The map has been perfected by his travel companion, *F. Zach*,¹² at that time director of the Serbian Military Academy, thus it shows the opinion of official Serbia that time, even satisfying Vuk Karadžić's ideas.¹³ *Pypin and Spasović* (1879) assigned to the Serbs Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Dalmatia, part of Istria, Slavonia, Synnia, Batchka, Banat, but not Macedonia.¹⁴ This attitude of Serbians is emphasized not only by contemporary Bulgarian scholars, or revisionists, who collected the evidence from travelogues,¹⁵ but admitted by Wilkinson as well.¹⁶

investigation through Macedonia and Old Serbia. In 1860, soon after his return, Verkovitch published 335 national songs collected from various places throughout Macedonia under the title "National Songs of the Bulgarian Macedonians." The author was candid enough to fix the Shar Mountains as the ethnographic boundary between the Bulgarians and the Serbians. See: Misheff, D. *The Truth about Macedonia*. Berne, 1917.

¹² Zach was also of Czech origin and became a general of Serbian troops in 1876 in the war against the Ottoman Empire, but failed to capture the Sanjak of Novipazar and Kosovo.

¹³ See: *The Correspondence of Wuk Karadjitsch*. Belgrad 1907–1912. 6 Vols. Vuk Karadjitch (1814) regarded the language of the Macedonians as Bulgarian. The wife of the later Serb minister to England, Mme. Mijatović, in her *History of Modern Serbia*, described the Niš revolt of 1842 as a "rebellion of Bulgarian peasants." See: Tsanoff, R. *Bulgaria's Case*. – *The Journal of Race Development*. Vol. 8, No. 3, January, 1918.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Misheff, D., *Op. cit.* See detailed:

Ubicini: Divided by the Balkans, the Bulgarians touch the Black Sea and the Archipelago through Burgas and Salonica; they extend on the west as far as Albania and reach the Danube on the north from Fet-Islam (Kladovo) to

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Silistra. L'Empire Ottoman par H. Ubcini. Paris, 1854, 634.

V. Grigorovitch: The villages between Salonica and Enidje-Vardar are inhabited chiefly by Bulgarians. The villages in the districts of Enidje-Vardar, Voden, Lerin, Bitolia, as well as those between Bitolia and Ochrida, are inhabited exclusively by Bulgarians, intermingled here and there with Koutzo-Wallachs and Turks. Esquisse de voyage dans la Turquie d'Europe, par V. Grigorovitch, Moscou, 1840, 107–109.

Hilferding: Shar Mountain stops the further movement of the Serbian element and serves as a frontier line between Serbians and Bulgarians. The latter have crossed the South–Eastern mountains and occupied Macedonia and part of Albania. Oeuvres completes Hilferding. Vol. III, 141.

Pouqueville: In the valley of Prespa there are about 46 Bulgarian villages. In the district of Ressen are 26 Bulgarian villages. The river Drin with its right bank, forms at this distance the dividing line between the Bulgarian language and that of the Shkipetari-Gheghi Albanians. I entered the country of the Bulgarians, and I was obliged to use the few Slavic words I had picked up during my sejour in Ragusa. Pouqueville, T. Voyage de la Grece. Paris, 1826, Vol. II, 517, Vol. III, 59, 71, and 73.

Boué: The Bulgarians compose the main kernel of the population of Macedonia, with the exception of the south-western part, from Costour (Castoria) and Bistritza. The mountains between the basin of Lerin (Florin) and Costour (Castoria), between Cagliari and Satishta, between Ostrovo and Ber (Berea) and between Voden and Niegoush, separate the country where only Bulgarian is spoken, from that in the south, where the Greek is the language of the peasants. Boué, A., La Turquie d'Europe. Paris, 1840, Vol. 11, 5.

Cyprien Robert: This people in reality constitutes the main kernel of the population of Macedonia – from the mountain lines between Cagliari, Satishta, Ostrovo, and Ber (Berea) as far as the valleys of Niegoush and Voden; only south of this line is to be found the Greek peasant. Les Slaves de Turquie, par Cyprien Robert. Paris, 1844, Vol. II, 230.

Lejean: To-day the Bulgarian people is almost bounded by the Danube, the river Timok, with a line passing by the towns of Nish, Prizren, Ochrida, Niegoush, Salonica, Adrianople and Sozopol, the Black Sea and Burgas. The Bulgarians occupy almost the whole of Macedonia and their compact mass gradually pushes the Greeks to the sea, where the latter hold their ground in a narrow strip of land between Platamona and Kolakia... From the Struma to the Maritza the Greek territory forms a very narrow zone inhabited by seamen and fishermen, while the Bulgarian, pre-eminently agriculturist, occupies the heights that dominate the sea coast. Lejean, G. Ethnographie de la Turquie d'Europe. 1861, 12–29.

However, later Cvijić and Belić argued, that Boué, Lejean and Desjardins had not known Slavic languages enough to make distinctions correctly.¹⁷ From this critique evolved a new branch of ethnic mapping that used dialects and grammatical phenomena instead of languages (the Serbian *Belić*, the Czech *Niederle*, the French *Chataigneau* in 1924), and another branch that focussed on ethnographic features. The Serbian *Verković* was among the first, who classified nations based on folklore and considered Slavs as Bulgarians in Macedonia, the result of which was challenged later by Cvijić using the same method (focusing on folkloristic elements). The preponderance of ethnic maps based on language as distinctive feature forced even *Kiepert*, a master of language-based ethnic mapping and the expert of Berlin Congress to revise his former ideas, and he turned to cultural traditions and historical affinity when created a completely new map. This looked similar to the map of *Synvet* and *Stanford* and confirmed the Greek stance over the peninsula (North Macedonia was still indicated as Bulgarian). Overexaggeration of language as the sole determinative factor made the Austrian cartographers elaborate the complex method (re-introducing religion as a factor again) that will dominate Austrian cartography for 30 years, as a counterstep to the domination of purist approach. This resulted in the multiplication of categories, thus formerly transparent maps became more and more fragmented.

¹⁶ Wilkinson, H. R. *Maps and Politics. A Review of the Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia.* Liverpool Univ. Press, 1951.

¹⁷ Incompetent according to Cvijić are Ami Boué, Johann von Hahn, Mackenzie and Irby and others who define the extent of the Bulgarian population in Bulgaria and in Moravia — because they themselves were not acquainted with a single Slavic language. Ethnographical maps by Lejean, Kiepert and others lack value. Victor Grigorovich, who declared in his journal “Outline of Journey through European Turkey.” Kazan, 1847, that in Macedonia he met always Bulgarian, is also incompetent according to Serbs. Misheff, D., Op. cit.

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The Bulgarophile map of *Irby and Mackenzie* (1867) did not differ from the earlier ones in its content.¹⁸ Their book was translated into Serbian by the well-known Serbian statesman and academician Ćedomil Mijatović who also served several times as Serbian minister and as Serbian ambassador in London. Mijatović did not object that Macedonia and the district of Niš are shown as Bulgarian. But this map is only a reproduction of Lejean's and *Fröhlich's* map, and not based on separate studies.¹⁹ However, it is much more reliable regarding Albanians in Kosovo and Turks in Dobrudja compared to the previously mentioned maps. Their merit is that they drew the attention of Gladstone and the British on the Balkan Peninsula, while earlier maps served as basis for Count Ignatiev to argue for the necessity of Greater Bulgaria. However, it is not evident, that the Powers of Europe were based on the principle of nationality: both England and Germany had national minorities. Ignatiev simply wanted to create a great and Russophile state (unlike Serbia that time), under cover of promoting national goals. It was merely a good pretext that maps indicated a more or less homogeneous Slavic territory that could be used as a springboard for Russian presence on the Balkans. For Austria (which was also not a homogeneous nation state) not only the principle of nationality was dangerous, but the Russian orientation of a large state. Therefore their interest was to create many competing small states, and the task of Austrian ethnic mapping was to support this idea. The British reaction to Greater Bulgaria was the

¹⁸ Almost the whole of Macedonia (to the west reaching the river Černi Drin and to the South-west – the mountain Gramos), the whole district of Niš, Dobrudja and a part of southern Bessarabia are included in the boundaries of the Bulgarian people

¹⁹ The map of *Eliséé Reclus* is also a compilation of Lejean, Felix Kanitz and Karl Czoernig, probably with scientific impartiality. It shows the southern boundary of the Albanian nation more or less precisely, but supposes many Greeks in Thrace.

propagation of Greek standpoint, while Austria-Hungary elaborated the complex ethnic maps to prove the heterogeneity of Macedonia, and later accepted that Macedonia was inhabited by Serbs (as Gopčević claimed). This effort was supported by scientific instruments: the map of Gopčević had the greatest resolution of all maps created up to then. The British solved the problem by giving up the purely linguistic approach, which then seemed to favour the Bulgarian cause.

Many maps were merely compilations from previous works. The map of the Bohemian *Erben* in 1868 was based on Šafarik, Czoernigg, Lejean and Mirković thus was quite conventional, and definitely not genuine.²⁰ However, at one point it defied the tradition of the lineation Boué-Lejean-Irby and described the situation in Kosovo in favour of the Serbs. (Although even the map based on the Serbian census in 1924 admitted that Albanians constituted the majority of the region). The last map did so was published 15 years before by Petermann. Erben also drew the ethnic boundary of Albanians erroneously in in Epiros.

His predecessor, *Mirkovich* had one innovation: the Muslim zone in NE-Bulgaria, which was formerly indicated as a homogeneous patch was dismembered and depicted as a mixed region, furthermore he expanded the boundaries of the Bulgarian nation in Thrace over Adrianople. This was another Bulgarophile map serving as the basis of the Slavic Congress in 1867.²¹ Of course this map later was sharply criticised by

²⁰ Jaromir Erben (1811–1870), was a good authority on Slavic language, history and mythology, but his map “Mapa Slovanského Světa” is not original.

²¹ The “Slavic Exhibition” had been arranged at the instigation of the Russian Slavophiles in Moscow and a Russian ethnographic map of all the Slavic races, entitled “Ethnological Map of the Slavic Peoples” was created. This map was approved by all delegates present, and up to 1877 it appeared in three editions. Unfortunately, he accepted Boué’s idea, that Albanians are abundant west of the Pindos Mts. down to the Gulf of Arta, for which the map was labelled unreliable regarding other contents, ethnic boundaries as well. (He indicated too many Bulgarians in Thrace as well). The map of

Cvijić because of the unfavourable situation for the Serbs. The predominance of Slavs in these maps was owing to the activity of the Croatian professor, *Bradaška*, who drew the attention to the fact that Ottoman censuses count Muslim Slavs and Muslim Albanians together with Turks, and without them the Muslim supremacy of numbers and patches was illusory. His approach was adopted in the maps of Petermann, then followed by *Kiepert*²² (and *Sax*), who illustrated mixed Bulgarian-Turkish and Bulgarian-Albanian contact zones rough-and-ready with cross-hatching instead of patches: this resulted in the predominance of Bulgarians over other nationalities. Another specific feature of this map is that it also coloured sparsely inhabited and uninhabited areas, enlarging the territorial extent of patches. Up to Sax (1877/78) everybody indicated Macedonia relatively homogeneous, without significant Muslim settling (even the map created by *Ravenstein* after 1878 did so).²³

Kiepert's work was based on the data of Sax, Jireček, Kanitz, Bradaška, Jakšić and the map of Lejean and Hahn. Although his map became famous as the one used at Berlin it received serious criticism by the Hungarian geographer Béla Erődi early in 1876 (in *Földrajzi Közlemények – Geographical Bulletin*). Erődi claimed that there were many mistakes in the map. According to Erődi's thesis in the case of Muslims

prince *Cherkassky* from 1877 used the above mentioned sources beside the map of Hahn, Dejardin, Erben, etc. when proposing the creation of Greater Bulgaria that was even bigger than Bulgaria proposed at San Stefano.

²² Heinrich Kiepert (1818–1899) became famous as a youngster after his “Atlas von Hellas” (1846), he afterwards published the maps of Asia Minor and Palestine working on the spot. His map of the Balkans corrects many mistakes of former ethnological maps by indicating Turkish and Albanese dwelling-places.

²³ Ernst Georg Ravenstein (30 December 1834 – 13 March 1913) was a German-English geographer-cartographer and promoter of physical exercise. As a geographer he was less of a traveller than a researcher; his studies led mainly in the direction of cartography and the history of geography. He was in the service of the Topographical Department of the British War Office for 20 years (1855–75).

religion is still a stonger tie than ethnicity defined by spoken language: a Bosniak or Pomak would rather choose the Ottoman Empire and Turks (considering them as their real compatriots) instead of their Slavic speaking brothers. Thus, the over-emphasis of language as the main determinant of ethnicity in Kiepert's map leads to the diminishing of the Muslim character of the Empire. In his opinion the map on Crete in Petermanns Mitteilungen from 1866 is a good example of creating ethnic maps, as it indicates religious differences as well. Cross-hatching, applied by Kiepert also fell under criticism as it does not illustrate ethnic proportions in the applied way, not to mention, that Kiepert forgot to indicate 309 thousand Muslim Bosniaks, 250 thousand Circassians between Niš and Kosova (not even indicating them by hatching), 485 thousand Muslims of Macedonia (many were incorporated into a Slavic ethnic group based on their spoken language), 124 thousand Moslems in the Vilayet of Selanik and the same amount in Yanya, as separate sub-groups in his map.²⁴ Thus, Kiepert's map was to pro-Slavic according to the Hungarian scholar.

The first reaction of the British to the map of Kiepert (used at the Berlin Congress) was a map published by the British *Stanford* based on the work of *Joannis Gennadios*, which redrew the ethnic pattern of the peninsula according to Greek interests in order to hinder the justification of Greater Bulgaria (nevertheless it was still anti-Turkish confirming Greek claims over Ottoman territories). This attitude was repeated later at *Nikolaidis* (1899), *Phokas Cosmetatos* and *Colocotronis* (1919), and even Kiepert revised his views. The basic thesis of these maps was that Bulgarophone patriarchists and orthodox Albanians are Greek indeed (in contradiction to Boué's map, where the territory to the Gulf of Arta was

²⁴ He even mentions, that a part of Hungary in the map (Torda county) was indicated as homogeneous Romanian not mentioning the Hungarians of Aranyosszék (Rimetea-Torockó).

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considered Albanian in Epirus). *Stanford* maintained the statement, that the urban population of Macedonia was entirely Greek, whereas the peasantry was of mixed, Bulgarian-Greek origin and had Greek consciousness, but had not yet mastered the Greek language. The map of the French *Bianconi* (1877) was also pro-Greek, therefore they are worth comparing with our pie-chart maps created from the British and French data from that very year, which emphasized the predominance of Slavic element. These two maps contradict to the standpoint of *Stanford* and *Bianconi* (they even considered Bitola-Monastir Greek).

Greeks claimed that Macedonia had always been inhabited by Greeks, but Bulgarian barbarians, after invading the country, have enforced their language upon them,²⁵ but the theory of Bulgarian-speaking Greeks was challenged by the Bulgarian compilation of maps created by *Zlatarski* and *Ishirkov* for Kaiser Wilhelm in 1917, later used as argument at the Neuilly Peace Treaty.²⁶ From methodological aspect one

²⁵ *“Is it possible, asked the Bulgarians, that uncultivated people impose a barbarian language upon a cultured nation speaking the language of Socrates and Demosthenes? ‘In the course of five centuries the Turks have not succeeded to enforce their language on those nations that have been subjugated by them in Europe, not even on those Christians that have gone over to the Mohamedan faith; and all the world knows that the Mohamedan Greeks of Epirus speak Greek, the Mohamedan Servians of Bosnia and Herzegovina speak Servian’.”* Die Bulgaren in ihren historischen, ethnographischen und politischen Grenzen by *Ishirkoff & Zlatarski*. Preface by *D. Rizoff*.

²⁶ It is the so-called *Rizov Atlas* in *Wilkinson’s* work. http://www.promacedonia.org/en/dr/index_en.html; The Bulgarians replied with citing statistics, that prove Bulgarian preponderance over Greeks (however forgot to mention the numbers of Muslims). In 1877 *Teploff* published a comparative table of the Christian population of Macedonia. In 26 of the 46 Macedonian kazas *Teploff* found 940.000 Bulgars and 2616 Greeks. *Rittich’s* statistics published in *St. Petersburg* in 1885, pointed out that Macedonia had 59.833 Greeks against 1.121.288 Bulgars. *Gaston Routier* in 1903 estimated the Greeks in Macedonia to be 322.000 as compared with 1.136.000 Bulgars. According to Turkish statistics, published in *Le Temps* in

should mention the pro-Greek map of *Synvet* (a French professor of the Ottoman Lyceum of Constantinople) from 1877, where the Greek-Bulgarian language boundary is veiled by the hatch symbolising the (underestimated) Muslims. The southern, orthodox Albanian territories are indicated as Greek, such as the coast of the Black Sea. Nevertheless, the map of Gennadios and Stanford is in contradiction with the estimation of the Pro-Bulgarian *Laveleye* (La Peninsule de Balkans).

If these maps are compared to the other two pie-chart maps created from the data of the Patriarchate the similarity to the patch maps published by Bianconi and Stanford is evident.

1905, there are in Macedonia 270.000 Greeks against 1.210.000 Bulgars. Meyer's *Grosses Konversations-Lexikon* finds, on the basis of Peucker's statistics, 240.000 Greeks in Macedonia against 1.355.000 Slavs. *La Grande Encyclopédie* states that the Greeks in Macedonia number 266.000, against 1.000.000 Slavs. According to Brancoff's statistics, Macedonia has 190.047, Greeks against 1.172.136 Bulgars, of whom 897.160 recognized the religious authority of the Bulgarian Exarch.

Further works stating Bulgarian predominance: Brancoff, D. *La Macédoine et sa population chrétienne* (Paris, 1905); Brailsford, H. N. *Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future*. London, 1906. Three kazas (Karaferia, Nasselitch, and Athos) are mainly Greek: 34.194 Greeks, 9924 Bulgars. One, Salonica has 33.120 Bulgars against 37.265 Greeks. But, in fifteen kazas the Bulgars predominate (Ochrida, Monastir, Fiorina, Kailiari, Kastoria, Dolna-Reka, Petrich, Demir-Hissar, Vodena, Melnik, Ghevgheli, Lagadina, Serres, Zihna, and Drama), with 76.668 Greeks against 512.426 Bulgars. The remaining twenty-two kapas of Macedonia are purely Bulgar (Kukush, Doiran, Enidje-Vardar, Tikvesh, Strumitsa, Razlog, Gorna-Djumaia, Nevrokop, Uskub, Veles, Tetovo, Kumanovo, Kratovo, Kotchana, Shtip, Radovish, Prechovo, Egri-Palanka, Prilep, Pechtchevo, Dibra, Kitchevo): 390 Greeks, 616,046 Bulgars. Other works: Ubinini, Hilferding, Leake, Kanitz, Tozer, Lamouche, Edmund Spencer, Schafarik, and Leon Dominian's recent book on *Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe*. Brancoff refers to Hahn, Griesebach, Heuschling, Mackenzie and Irby, Roberts, Petermann, Muller, Dumont, Florinsky, Golubintzki, Obroucheff, Makoucheff, Boudilovitch, Stein, Kolb, Circou, Bouch, Weigand, Milukoff, Bérard, Choublier, Bashmakoff. Not one of these authorities is a Bulgar. So likewise testify Edmund Spencer, Evans, Jagitch, Niederle, René Pinon, Laveleye (1888).

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It is also clear why the Muslims were indicated by cross-hatching on these maps instead of patches with real territorial extent – the conscription of the Greek Patriarchate simply neglected the Muslims and their numbers were given only at sanjak level, instead of kaza level; Greeks focussed on the Greek-Bulgarian rivalry and proportions instead.

Tab. 2. The population (in thousands) of Macedonia according to Laveleye and Rittich cca. 1868.

vilaet	Bulgarian	Greek	Ottoman
Saloniki, 11 kazas	302	30	96
Seres, 8 kazas	232	29	107
Skopje, 7 kazas	209	0	77
Bitola, 7 kazas	381	1	80
altogether	1124	60	360

This counteroffensive of pro-Greeks against ethnic mapping based on language forced Kiepert to change his mind and create his 'ethnocratic' new map for the peninsula based on several factors that play role in the formation of national consciousness like historical past, religion, physical geographical boundaries and economic sphere of interests (1878). Eastern Rumelia became the part of the Greek sphere of influence together with South Macedonia, while North Macedonia remained Bulgarian.

The Austrian *Sax* (diplomat, consul in Ruse and Adrianople) was also driven not only by scientific approach, when he turned against the biased linguistic approach and decided to indicate the combination of religion and language at the same time as determinative features of national identity.²⁷ Based on the works of Boué, Lejean, von Hahn, Kanitz and Kiepert his goal (beyond elaborating a new method) was to undermine the

²⁷ Together with Baron Karl von Kraus they applied a new method to illustrate the complexity of Balkan identities by using terminology referring to religion and language at the same time.

legitimacy of efforts pursuing the creation of Greater Bulgaria, which was against the interest of Austria-Hungary (and Serbia). His categorization created 7 other Slavic groups beyond Bulgarians and Serbs. By creating the group of Muslim Slavs, he successfully isolated Bosnian Serbs from Kossowar Serbs and Montenegrins from Serbia, furthermore his hatching applied for Turks proved the ethnic diversity of Macedonia, although he still acknowledged Macedonian Slavs as Bulgars.²⁸

Thus, the first Austrian ethnic map of the Balkans available for publicity was of excellent quality (the geographer Kanitz published ethnic data at settlement level, and Elek Fényes²⁹ on vilayet level in 1854, their ethnic map itself was not prepared), but definitely not impartial.

Prior to the activity Cvijić western maps did not tend to indicate Slavs living in Macedonia as Serbs or Macedonian Slavs: *Brailsford* in 1906 acknowledged Bulgarian character of Macedonian Slavs,³⁰ the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* in 1911 did too. Even early Serbian official maps (Davidović, Dejardin, 1853, Hahn-Zach, 1861)³¹ did not question the Bulgarian character of Macedonian Slavs. The only exception was – surprisingly – another Austrian subject (although Serbian of origin): Spiridon Gopčević in 1889.

The reason of the gradual change in the qualification of Macedonian Slavs on Austrian maps is mainly of political character. Prior to 1878 Austria-Hungary accepted Macedonian Slavs as ‘Bulgarians’, but the threat of San Stefano that a Greater Bulgaria might cut Austria from the Aegean forced

²⁸ Ethnographische Karte der europäischen Türkei und ihrer Dependenzien zur Zeit des Beginns des Krieges von 1877 von Karl Sax, K. und K. Österreich-ungarischer Konsul in Adrianopel.

²⁹ Fényes E. A Török Birodalom leírása statistikai és geographiai tekintetben. Pest, 1854.

³⁰ Brailsford, H. N. Macedonia. Its Races and Their Future. London, 1906.

³¹ See: Die Bulgaren in ihren historischen, ethnographischen und politischen Grenzen... Op. cit.

politicians to change their mind. Furthermore, Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia in 1878 redirected Serbia's ambitions towards Macedonia. The secret Austrian–Serbian treaty of 1881 gave free hand for Serbia regarding propagandistic activity in Macedonia in order to compensate the disillusioned ally. Soon Serbian episcopates were established with Ottoman consent to weaken Bulgarian propaganda. The map of Sax was a prelude to this change with its “ethnic salad”, culminating in the activity of Gopčević (1889). But even prior to that, Serbian pretensions started to grow. The map of *Miloš Milojević* from the period of Ottoman–Serbian war in 1877³² illustrates the Serbian dreams about a Greater Serbia in case of victory, that included not only Bulgarian territories (where Serbian was spoken according to the legend), but Albania and Macedonia as well. This plan is a direct descendant of *Garašanin's* dream of the first Balkan League, in which a Yugoslavian state including Bulgaria was proposed, at first based on the principle of parity and equality,³³ but later all Bulgarians were considered Serbs.

Yet the greatest contribution to the Serbian cause (prior to

³² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milo%C5%A1_Milojevi%C4%87. Milojević was a teacher in Belgrade, who organized a school for Kosovo Serbs and refugees, whom later he led in fight against Ottomans. In 1872 he claimed that all Geg Albanians were Albanized Serbs, but this theory was challenged by Stojan Novaković. Even Cvijić called him a propagandist, but later he used his theory in some of his maps.

³³ In 1867 negotiations were initiated between the Serbian Government and Bulgarian patriots of Bucharest, where a memorandum was drawn up and dispatched to the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Garašanin, advocating a close union with Serbia. An agreement between the Bulgarians and the Serbian Government was finally reached according to which a federal Yugoslav State was to be created, incorporating all Bulgaria and Serbia. The term Bulgaria was explicitly explained as designating Bulgaria proper, Thrace, and Macedonia. Garašanin replied on May 22, 1867, that he fully agreed to the Bulgarian propositions. According to the Serbian paper, Vidov Dan (No. 38, March 29, 1862), the Bulgarian national frontiers extended from the Danube to the Aegean, and from the Black Sea to the lower Morava and the Black Drin.

Cvijić) was made by the Serbian-Austrian astronomer and historian *Spiridon Gopčević* (also known as Leo Brenner).³⁴ Both his argumentation and map was admirable: (1) in his opinion maps of non-Slavic cartographers are not authentic, since they are unable to feel the difference between dialects (this argumentation reappears at Cvijić); (2) the resolution of their maps is bad (under 1:500 000), they did not use settlement-level approach, but if they had done so, this would have resulted the same errors, since their topographic basemaps were full of mistakes (he corrected the Austrian topographic maps at 2000 sites). Since this map was printed in German as well, it could influence not only Serbian nationalists, but western politicians and scientists.³⁵ If we add to this, that the creation of this map coincided with the 500th anniversary of the first battle of Kosovo Polje (1389) and was in strong correlation with the renewal of the Austrian alliance treaty of 1881 with Serbia, it became clear why it considered the Slavs of Macedonia and Kosovo as Serbs. Gopčević further argued that the name *Bugari* (Bulgarians) used by the Slavic population of Macedonia to refer to themselves actually meant only ‘reayah’ – peasant Christians – and in no case had affiliations to the Bulgarian ethnicity.

When Austria-Hungary had once again established good relations with Bulgaria during the Stambolov government after the Russian–Bulgarian debate and the Serb–Bulgarian war of 1885, it again accepted the idea, that Macedonian Slavs are Bulgarians, and maps were created taking this into consideration (see the map of *Meinhard*, Geographische

³⁴ <http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/collections/maps/ethnographic/>

³⁵ Beyond the scientific merit of correcting the location of many places one should not forget, that Gopčević’s book was translated to German on the cost of Belgrade (and definitely served as an instrument for Serbian claims over Macedonia, related to the secret treaty concluded with Austria-Hungary in 1881), and he considered Albanians of Kosovo and even Gegs as Albanized Serbs. Thus under the mask of accuracy, he was able to hint the ideas of Milojević.

Rundschau). After the deterioration of Austrian–Bulgarian relations owing to the Russian–Bulgarian appeasement after the fall of the Stambolov-government in the mid-1890s, and the secret Serb-Bulgarian agreement on Macedonia in 1897, Austria-Hungary once again tried to decrease the Bulgarian influence over Macedonia by denying its Bulgarian character, in order to secure the way to the Aegean. This implicitly meant that Austria-Hungary once again refused to consider Slavs of Macedonia as ‘Bulgarians’ on ethnic maps. This point of view was also adopted by Hungarian general and school maps at the turn of the century (1897).

Since Serbia also became untrustworthy by that period (1903 – coup d’etat), Austrian military circles wanted to reach Saloniki through the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, thus the concept of the autonomous Macedonia of Count Andrassy (1876–1877) reappeared in 1896–1897. This Macedonia would have been an Austrian satellite-state, as indicated in the map of Calice, ambassador at Constantinople, or by Beck, then chief of staff. That’s the reason why ethnic maps created to support the Mürzsteg process (1903) indicated again Macedonian Slavs beyond Struma river and not Bulgarians.

The work of Gopčević was further developed by the linguist *Aleksandar Belić*. Belić labeled the local dialects of Macedonia and the Šop dialect along the periphery of Serbia as Serbian, claiming that the Serbian nation extends to W-Bulgaria as well. These linguistic researches later served as basis for Cvijić to redraw his map according to the growing Serbian aspirations. Less extreme than Gopčević, Cvijić and Belić claimed that ‘only’ the Slavs in northern Macedonia were Serbian, whereas those of southern Macedonia were identified as “Macedonian Slavs”, an amorphous Slavic mass that was neither Bulgarian, nor Serbian, but could turn out either Bulgarian or Serbian, if the respective people were to rule the region.

“Bulgaromania” still prevailed after 1878: Bulgarian pre-

ponderance is observable in the maps of the Serbian(!) *Verković* (1889) and of the Russian *Zarjanko* (1890).³⁶ Contrary to this the map provided by the Serbian High School at Belgrade in 1891 claimed that Macedonia was Serb and homogeneous. Albanians in Kosovo and even N-Albania were indicated only by hatching revealing the Serbian aspirations towards the Adriatic. Another interesting change is observable in the map of *Zarjanko*: contrary to the previous maps (like *Sax*), the boundary of the Bulgarian nation coincides with the state border towards Serbia (Niš and Pirot are considered as Serbs), while in the map of the Serbian High School, people in Sofia and its surroundings speaks Serbian!

The German *Weigand* (1895) gave more space to Greeks compared to *Kiepert* in Epirus around Delvino and Konica, but shrinks their territory in the region of Vodena-Edessa in favour of Bulgar-Slavs (this modification is accepted later by everyone except Greek cartographers). As a response to this map the Greek *Nikolaidis* created another one in which the Greek settlement area reaches Bitola, and Bulgarians are limited to

³⁶ The Map of the “Slavic Peoples” edited by *N. C. Zarjanko* and published by *V. V. Komarov*, is the work of the Slavic beneficent Society of Petrograd. It was designed under the control of the professors of slavistic who were members of the society. The authors used the researches of well-known scientists, like *Grigorovich*, *Hilferding* and *Teplov* (who for a long time was an official of the Russian Embassy at Constantinople), and the rich material found in the Russian Foreign Office, in the Russian Embassies at Constantinople and at Vienna, and at the Russian General-Staff. This map contains important corrections compared to the former Russian map of 1867, chiefly relating to the expansion of the Bulgarians in South-Thracia, Deli-Orman, and in the Dobrudja; it is similar to Russian map by *A. F. Rittich* “Map of the West- and Southern Slavs” published in Petrograd. On the appearance of the map, *G. Simić*, at that time Serbian Ambassador at Petrograd, protested against the designation of Macedonia as a Bulgarian country in the map. The Slavic beneficent Society was forced to publish a second edition on which the Bulgarian colouring of Macedonia had been removed and substituted by “Macedonic-Slavs”, but forgot to indicate them with a different colour. See: *Die Bulgaren ... Op. cit.*

the eastern confines of Macedonia (to the present border of Bulgaria). All the other Slavs were considered Serbs regardless of religion. This was the greatest cession to Serbs ever by a non-Slav. Another “merit” of this map that it limits the area of Macedonia, which makes it easier for cartographers to ‘prove’ the domination of Slavs or Greeks, as Moslems of Thrace and Albanians do not spoil the picture. In this case it meant that Nikolaidis successfully proved the dominance of Greeks over the Slavdom divided into 4 sub-groups (Serbs, Bulgars, mixed Albanian-Slav zone, hellenized Slavs around Bitola).

In that very year (1899) a map was created for the same territory by the Austrian *Meinhard* (director of the Bulgarian railway in Sofia), which showed Bulgarian preponderance in Macedonia defying Nikolaides’s statement. Serbs were indicated by hatching with uncertain territorial extent. The repudiation of Gopčević’s heritage was not only the result of the author’s pro-Bulgarian sentiments, but also owing to the deterioration of Austrian–Serbian relations. This map is very similar to that of the Bulgarian *Kančov* released in 1900, which became widespread after the Bulgarophile Russian politician Pavel Miliukov had published it in his atlas. Both maps were relying on the material of the Exarchate and the settlement level dot-map of the commercial agencies (1901).

Similar methods to ours (diagrams) were used by *Brankov* in 1905 who used kaza-level data to illustrate not only the ethnic proportions in Macedonia (of course with Bulgarian dominance) but their absolute numbers as well. The ethnic distribution of students in elementary schools was also illustrated in maps using the same method. The main differences between our method and his standpoint were that he used only 4 categories (while we relied on the double classification of Sax), Brankov did not indicate the Moslems (constituting 33-50% of the population according to different estimations) at all, resulting in a more homogeneous map. *Brailsford*’s map from 1906 was even more favourable for the

Bulgarian cause, since a foreigner MP, member of the Bulgarophile pressure group of the Balkan Committee acknowledged the Bulgarian ethnic character of Macedonia (and significantly decreased the territories inhabited by Turks, compared even to Kančov's map.³⁷ This was the high-tide of pro-Bulgarian sentiments (owing to the Macedonian reform movement, 1903–1908, which encouraged the Powers to elaborate several plans).

The technique of visualisation applied by *Sax* (the double criteria of ethnicity) prevailed after the Mürzsteg agreement (1903) in Austrian cartography. In order to promote the practical realisation of this agreement and to enhance knowledge on the coexistence of different nations, a huge work was carried out by Austrian agents at the turn of the century, who collected and sorted data on religion, ethnicity and finally once again put them on maps. Numeric data can be found at HHStA, Wien in Nachlass Szapáry and among the reports of Consul *August Kral*,³⁸ and several patch maps created based on settlement level maps of Bulgarian origin (like the map of Bitola vilayet, from the turn of the century)³⁹ are deposited at the Kartensammlung (without detailed description).⁴⁰ The latter were fit to the same projection system and redrawn in order to create a GIS-aided database⁴¹ to make data comparable, while

³⁷ Wilkinson, Op. cit., 140.

³⁸ ÖStA, HHStA, AB XIX/84. Nachlass Kral, K2. and ÖStA HHStA, Nachlass Szapáry, Kt. 3 b.

³⁹ Nationalitätenkarte der Europäischen Türkei cca. 1900
Etnographische Karte Vilajet Bitola (Monastir, 1901)
Religionskarte: Kosovo, Saloniki, Scutari, Janina, Monastir vilajeten.
Christliche Schulen in Makedonien um 1900

⁴⁰ Some of the maps were published by Teodora Toleva in her book in 2012. (Толева, Т. Влиянието на Австро-Унгария за създаването на албанската нация, 1896–1908. С., 2012, 540–544), but in such a bad resolution, that neither the legend, nor settlement names can be read.

⁴¹ This process included the georeferencing of data (fitting map-parts together, eliminating distortion, creating a common projection system,

based on the data of consul *Kral* a new pie-chart map was created, taking population number into consideration as well as indicating the proportion of different ethnicities. One difference is evident compared to Sax: Austrians decided to use the category of Macedonian Slavs (beyond Bulgarians and Serbians). They constituted the majority of Macedonia. This was not the first case that Austria-Hungary refused to acknowledge Macedonia as Bulgarian (or Serbian). A school atlas from 1897 also indicated Macedonian Slavs separately from Bulgarian and Serbian nations.

The term “Macedonian Slavs” was used by scholars and publicists in three general meanings: (1) as a politically convenient term to define the Slavs of Macedonia without offending Serbian and Bulgarian nationalism; (2) as a distinct group of Slavs different from both Serbs and Bulgarians, yet closer to the Bulgarians and having predominantly Bulgarian ethnical and political affinities (Austrian point of view); (3) as a distinct group of Slavs different from both Serbs and Bulgarians having no developed national consciousness and no fast ethnical and political affinities (according to the definition of Cvijić).⁴²

legend and reference unit /kazas/ for the maps) in order to obtain good resolution. This was followed by digitising (redrawing entities in Arc View 8.0) and database building (assigning qualitative and quantitative data to patches/kazas as entities), enabling us to carry out an analysis of the map-series from 1877–1903 regarding ethnic changes.

⁴² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_history_of_Macedonia. In 1888 Kuzman Šapkarev in a letter to the Bulgarian Marin Drinov sharply criticized the word ‘Makedonci’, as it was imposed to his nation by outsiders instead of the used Bugari. But other ideologists in Macedonia, like Misirkov or Čupovski in St. Petersburg between 1912–1918 advocated that the Slavs of Macedonia should take a separate way from the Bulgarians and the Bulgarian language. Misirkov considered that the term "Macedonian" should be used to define the whole Slavic population of Macedonia. He used the dialect of Bitola just to emphasize the distance to the official Bulgarian language which was based on the Varna dialect, and argued, that the label Bulgarian was given by foreigners to his nation. But soon he became a supporter of Bulgarian propaganda, and again became the propagator of the

Independent sources in Europe between 1878 and 1918 generally tended to view the Slavic population of Macedonia in two ways: as Bulgarians and as Macedonian Slavs, but never as Serbians. The German scholar Gustav Weigand was one of the most prominent representatives of the first trend with the books *Ethnography of Macedonia* (1924, written in 1919) and partially with *The Aromanians* (1905). Brailsford in 1906 defined the dialect of Macedonia as neither Serbian nor Bulgarian, yet closer to the second one and used synonymously the terms “Macedonian Slavs” and “Bulgarians”, the “Slavic language” and the “Bulgarian language.” Practically all western scholars (with the exception of the mentioned Austro-Hungarians) before 1915 admitted, that the affinities of the majority tied Macedonians to the Bulgarian cause. In 1914 the Carnegie Commission report states that the Serbs and Greeks classified the Slavs of Macedonia as a distinct group, “Slav–Macedonians” for political purposes and this term is “political euphemism” designed to conceal the existence of Bulgarians in Macedonia.⁴³

The Czech *Niederle* (1910) tried to solve uncertainties of mapping ethnic boundaries by indicating the distribution of dialects (šop, kaj, je, e) and other grammatic phenomena (but he refrained from classifying dialects into languages, he used the same colour for all Slavs as Cvijić did in his first map in 1906). The same method was used by *Belić*, who – contrary to *Niederle* – decided to classify the dialects regarding their distance from Serbian. He considered Macedonia and Bulgaria to River Isker as the home of Serbian-speaking dialects. Their late epigon, the French *Chateigneau* used *e, je, šop*, West-Bulgarian and Macedonian as categories in his map in 1924.

The Italian *Amadori-Virgilli* (1908) described only South-Macedonia (settlement level map). Muslim territories reached their greatest extent in his map (later the Romanian

Macedonian nation after 1920.

⁴³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_history_of_Macedonia

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Atanasiu produced a similar one), because the Italian grouped together Pomaks, Albanians and Ottomans. He also considered Greek orthodoxy as one category integrating numerous part-archist Slavs and Albanians into this category. The remainder of Slavs was grouped into schismatic exarchists and Serbomans just to weaken the representation of Slavic element in the map. He considered religion as determinative element of ethnicity. So he used mixed categories (mixing religious categories with linguistic), and in doing this, his map was similar to that of the Greek Nikolaidis. Another Italian, *Barbarich* produced an ethnic map of Albania in 1905, with very realistic language borders in the north, but very rough in the south.

The cartography of the most influential Serbian geographer, *Cvijić* went through several stages. In his first map from 1906 he refrained from classifying Slavs further (he used one colour), but he indicated the preponderance of Slavs in Kosovo and even in North Albania. This could not be acceptable trustworthy, because in this region the dominant religion was Catholic, and Catholic Serbs were very rare. The reason of this misinterpretation could be that he (as Rezső Milleker or Rezső Havass in Hungary) wanted to create a propagator of Serbian geopolitical goals from geography. The area in question coincided with the Serbian railway plans (never realized) to reach the Adriatic, binding Russia, Romania and Serbia together in order to mitigate the pressure of the customs war with Austria-Hungary and to increase the independence of the state by finding new markets for Serbian products expelled from the Austrian markets (the date of the map coincided with the year of the “pig war”). The reaction of Austria-Hungary was the elaboration of the so-called Sanjak-railway plan in 1908. Surprisingly *Cvijić* did not indicate any Muslim Slavs in the Sanjak of Novipazar, which is a great intrepidity after the map of Sax.

His second map from 1909 separates Macedonian Slavs from Bulgarians, leaving the surrounding of Skopje to Serbs.

In Kosovo Albanians are indicated only by hatching,⁴⁴ similarly to the transition zone between Macedonian Slavs and Albanians or Bulgarians towards Greeks (Vlora–Monastir line). In his map from 1912 he reveals the aspirations of Serbia towards Albania and the Adriatic coast by indicating the proposed Pristina-Prizren-Durazzo and Dibra-Durazzo railway lines and delimiting the sphere of influence of Adriatic trade on the Priština-Skopje-Veles-Monastir line. These areas create an economic unit, therefore should be incorporated into the same state. As the result of this, his third ethnic map created in 1913 did not consider Albanian as dominant nation even in North Albania. While he used patches in the periphery (Kosovo), the core areas of the Albanian nation are indicated by hatching. So, from methodical aspects this map is untenable (the category of Albanian-speaking Orthodox Serbs also illustrates this). This ethnic map reveals the geopolitical aims of Serbia, and reflects the secret convention with the Greeks on the dismemberment of Macedonia in 1913 against Bulgarian desires. The supposed boundaries of the Bulgarian nation not surprisingly coincided with the demarcation line between forces (Vardar–line), which was proposed as preliminary border for Bulgaria. The map of the Greek *Soteriadis* (1918) even refused to offer this small territorial compensation for Bulgaria, for him everybody living in Macedonia (beyond the Bulgarian border in 1912) is Macedonian Slav. The map of *Nikolaidis* (1899) went through a similar modification (1914), since Greek claims on southern Albania had to be justified too. So the orthodox population was indicated as Greek up to the Devoli river and Lake Ohrid (316 thousand Greeks and only

⁴⁴ The reason probably might be that Cvijić recognised the mimicry of local people which resulted dual identity in order to respond the challenges (oppression) of the central government and local landlords. Therefore he often use category of ‘Albanized Serb’ reflecting this fluid and quickly changing identity (orthodox Slavs dressed as Muslims, wearing the Albanian white hat to avoid harassment of tax-collectors, etc.). This might deceive travellers.

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154 thousand Turks – the entente soon offered these territories for Greece if it activates itself in WWI). Thrace was indicated as Turkish–Greek mixed territory, indicating 500 thousand Turks, 400 thousand Greeks and only 100 thousand Bulgarians.⁴⁵ The last map of Cvijić in 1918 was similar to the one published in 1913 showing further Serbian aspirations on Vidin, which is indicated as Serb, while Vraca and Kjustendil are mixed, and the Macedonian-Bulgarian language boundary shifted from the Vardar-Struma watershed towards the Struma river.

When disseminating his new theory on Macedonian Slavs Cvijić could rely on the previous results of the Austrian mapping – as we mentioned. Scientific correctness was not characteristic for Cvijić's opportunistic mapping. Although in the English magazine "Review of Reviews" in October 1912 Cvijić claimed only the northern burroughs of the Skopje district (the towns Skopje, Kumanovo and Tetovo) with a small part of Northwest-Macedonia (the towns Debar and Struga), coinciding with the demarcation line drawn in the secret treaty of 1912 between Serbs and Bulgarians, within few months he changed his mind. After the victorious invasion of Serbian troops against Ottomans, in March 1913 he published another ethnographic map in the German journal "Petermanns geographische Mitteilungen" in which nearly one half of Macedonia was marked by the blue Serbian colour; and the rest of the Slavs (excepting the inhabitants of the east-frontier identified as Bulgarians) was proclaimed as "Macedonian Slavs".

The map of the Bulgarian Ishirkov and Ivanov reflected the same old Bulgarian views indicating Macedonia and Niš as Bulgarian regions. But at least the distribution of Muslims was

⁴⁵ As the entente offered S–Albania to Italy and Thrace to Bulgaria as well, Greeks hesitated. Venizelos himself offered Kavala for the Bulgarians and the entente offered the Enos–Midia line to Bulgaria, but Serbia refrained from handing over Macedonia to Bulgaria even if the acquired Bosnia (only the 1912 division plan was approved by Pašić). The deal thus failed.

correct. The sources were those foreigners, whom Cvijić indicated untrustworthy: Griesebach, Pouqueville, Kanitz, Boué and von Hahn from among the travellers. Enehholm and Obruchev from the Russians and Lejean, Irby-Mackenzie, Mirkovic and Petermann from the cartographers (the same maps appeared in the so-called “Rizov Atlas”). Their main advantage was their impartiality, as most of them were not influenced by national rivalries. Even the opinion of the cartographer of the United Nations, the Lithuanian *Gabrys* agreed with the above mentioned views. The map of the Italian *Dardano* from 1916 accepted the Bulgarian stance, although the two nations were enemies in WWI. Many of the British historians J. A. R. Mariott, Arnold Toynbee and the map of *Neville Forbes* from 1915 considered even Skopje as Bulgarian. In order to defend Serbian interests (as the ally of Britain) the ethnic pattern of Kosovo was indicated only roughly, and the category of “Albanophone Greeks” was also used. Even plans compensating Albania with Ipek did exist (*Barnes*). Contrary to all these, the Serbian *Županić* indicated all Macedonian Slavs as Serbs (as did Gopčević a generation ago). The map of the *French Ministry of War* from 1915 refused the Serbian and Greek aspirations in Albania, but indicated Macedonian Slavs in Macedonia, like the map of the Englishman Stanford did so in 1917 (south from Skopje indicated as Serbian to the Vardar river, where it changed to Bulgarian). Taylor also recognized 3 nations in Macedonia. Seton–Watson finally accepted the arguments of Cvijić and described Macedonian Slavs as ethnically neutral people. The gradual shift of standpoints and the military superiority of the entente were indicated by the map of *Gross*⁴⁶ and of the *headquarters* that both claimed Skopje to be Serbian contrary to Neville Forbes. The French argued that Niš was the part of the exarchate when it was attached to Serbia in 1878 and noone (including the local


⁴⁶ Races of Eastern Europe by Alexander Gross, published in The Daily Telegraph, 1918.

people) objected against this decision (Gallois).

After WWI even the German maps published in Leipzig 1924 (referring to the situation in 1912–1918) recognised the existence of Macedonian nation, such as that of the Albanians in Greece, and indicated the šop dialect separately. Another German map from that period coloured the area of Macedonia and Eastern Serbia as Bulgarian. By 1933 their standpoint became a bit sophisticated, indicating Macedonia as mixed area, and the territorial extent of other national minorities was decreasing in Greece. The last German map from 1940 used hatching combined with percentage values (line width) – this method was inefficient to delimit ethnic areas. The French map from 1918, *Carte ethnographique de l'Europe centrale et des états Balkaniques* used transient colours and cross-hatch instead of patches with explicit borders on the Balkans, while in the case of Hungarians and Romanians this method veiling the uncertainty of statistics and interpretation of identities was not used. The overestimation of Pindos Vlachs can be seen in the map of the two Romanians *Densusianu and Atanasiu* in 1919, the latter extremely exaggerated the territorial distribution of Turks.


Significant ethnic changes took place in Greece after 1923 and that once again created a revival of ethnic mapping. According to A. Angelopoulos, published in the *Journal of Balkan Studies*, Greek Macedonia's national makeup in 1913 was 44.2% Greek, 38.9% Muslim, 8.7% Bulgarian and 8.2% others, which is definitely small proportion for Bulgarians, probably equaling only with the number exarchists. But two decades later this percentage value became reality. Although hundreds of thousand Greek refugees from Asia Minor settled down in Macedonia and Thrace, the northern part of Greek-Macedonia was then characterized by population decrease, which meant that hundreds of thousand 'Macedonians' were expatriated. According to Greek statistical data only the district of Florina showed Slavic majority in 1925 (34/59 thousand)

and their proportion was high only around Granitsa (22/48).



Schulze-Jena's map from the last years of Ottoman rule, published in 1927 cited by Wilkinson, *Op. cit.*, 251.

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Hasluck's map from 1930 showing the situation in 1923, cited by Wilkinson, *Op. cit.*, 253.

Вопросы болгаро-венгерских отношений в личном архиве Стефата Стамболова

Десислава Костадинова

Институт за исторически изследвания – БАН

До настоящего времени отношения между Болгарией и Венгрией были объектом разных наших исследователей еще со времени эпохи болгарского Возрождения. Интерес к ним возрос после образования болгарского государства после окончания русско-турецкой войны 1877–78 гг. и не стихает до наших дней.¹

В процессе исследования различных аспектов двусторонних отношений особое внимание, в первую очередь, уделяется базе источников. Что касается изучения политических отношений между двумя странами, то в этом случае первостепенное значение имеют документы, сохранившиеся в Болгарии в архивах отдельных политических формаций.

Каждый, кто занимался изучением документальной базы архивов болгарских политических партий, образовавшихся после Освобождения, знает, что она исключительно бедна. Большая часть архивов политических партий не сохранилась в надлежащем для изучения виде, что не позволяет исследователям достоверно судить об их организационной структуре, месте возникновения и роли той или иной партии в общественной и политической жизни страны. Этот пробел, в известной степени, можно восполнить сведениями, тем или

¹ Подробнее о достижениях болгарского венгероведения в эти периоды см.: Пейковска, П. Българо-унгарски научни взаимоотношения (XIX – средата на XX в.). С., 2005, с. 86–90, 154–156; Пейковска, П. Историческата унгаристика в България – развитие и постижения. – В: Преводът и унгарската култура. С., 2011, 66–83.

иным образом сохранившимися в личных архивах руководителей политических партий, вопреки сложным превратностям времени.

Вышеупомянутая констатация в полной мере относится и к Народно-либеральной (Стамболовской) партии, лидером которой был Стефан Стамболов, возникшей после драматических событий, связанных со свержением с престола первого избранного князя Болгарии Александра I Баттенберга, в результате переворота, организованного группой болгарских офицеров в ночь с 8-го на 9-ое августа 1886 года.²

Как известно, одним из наиболее значимых последствий, вызванных этим, явился разрыв отношений между Стефаном Стамболовым, бывшим в тот период председателем IV Народного собрания, с председателем Совета министров Петко Каравеловым, верным последователем которого вплоть до этих событий был Ст. Стамболов.³

Известно также, что увлеченный разгоревшимися внутривнутриполитическими баталиями, теперь уже бывший руководитель парламента решил найти опору в некоей формации, какими были ячейки, именовавшие себя «България за себе си» [«Болгария для самой себя»], имевшие в большей степени общественный, нежели политический характер.⁴ Убедившись в ненадежности этих структур в качестве серьезной опоры Регентства, Ст. Стамболов принял решение создать свою политическую формацию с привлечением в ней той части бывших членов старой Либеральной партии, которая уже отказалась следовать за своими политическими лидерами – Драганом

² Куманов, М. Политически партии, организации и движения в България и техните лидери (1879–1949). С., 1991, 14–21.

³ Подробнее об этих событиях см.: Попов, Р. България на кръстопът. Регентството, 1886–1887. С., 1991.

⁴ Подробнее см.: Попов, Р. Дружинките „България за себе си“ (1886–1887). – ИПР, 1991, № 11, 21–41.

Цанковым и Петко Каравеловым.⁵

Жизнь Стамболова, также как и других его собратьев-общественников, была исключительно напряженной. Так как он активно участвовал в национально-революционном движении в 70-е годы XIX века, его жизнь неоднократно висела на волоске. После неуспеха Старозагорского восстания (1875 г.) и Апрельского восстания (1876 г.) единственным спасением для Ст. Стамболова стала соседняя Румыния. Именно поэтому объявление Русско-турецкой войны 1877–1878 гг. застало его в Бухаресте в качестве члена Болгарского центрального благотворительного общества.⁶

Известно также, что будучи крайне недовольным решениями, принятыми Берлинским конгрессом 1878 года, по силе которых Македония и Одринские территории снова оставались в пределах Османской империи, Ст. Стамболов включился в качестве одного из главных организаторов в осуществление Кресненско–Разложского восстания 1878–1879 гг.⁷

После неуспеха для бывшего бунтаря спокойные дни так и не наступили. Избранный депутатом II Народного собрания он постоянно в движении между его родным городом и столицей. После государственного переворота 27 апреля 1881 года Стамболов не прекращает свою активную политическую деятельность. В целом ряде статей и стихотворений он выражает свое отрицательное отношение к так называемому Режиму полномочий, установленному Князем.⁸

⁵ *Подробнее см.:* Стоянов, Ив. Либералната партия в Княжество България (1879–1886). С., 1989.

⁶ *Подробнее см.:* Маринов, Д. Стефан Стамболов и новейшата ни история. (Летописни бележки). С., 1909.

⁷ *Подробнее см.:* Дойнов, Д. Кресненско-Разложкото въстание (1878–1879). С., 1979.

⁸ *Подробнее об этих событиях см.:* Димитров, И. Държавният преврат на 27 април 1881 г. и борбата на Либералната партия против него. – Год. СУ – Философско-исторически факултет, 1963, т. 56, № 3, 189–289;

В отличие от Петко Каравелова, Петко Рачова Славейкова и других членов Либеральной партии, он не эмигрирует из Княжества, а остается жить в своем родном городе, где, однако, находится под постоянным надзором властей.

Спокойствие для Ст. Стамболова не наступило и после падения Режима полномочий в сентябре 1883 года. Его внимание в этот момент привлекала борьба внутри самой Либеральной партии между обособившимися в ней двумя отдельными течениями – «умеренными», во главе которых стоял Драган Цанков, занимавший в то время пост премьер-министра, и «крайними», которыми руководил Петко Каравелов. Желание Ст. Стамболова всеми силами противостоять назревающему расколу в партии, единомышленником которой он был с самого начала ее существования, снова заставляет его постоянно курсировать между Тырново и Софией, чтобы хоть как-то содействовать предотвращению острой вражды между руководителями партии, к которым он питал почтительное уважение.

После того, как Ст. Стамболов в июне 1884 года был избран председателем IV Народного собрания, он окончательно переехал жить в Софию, но жил все еще по-старому, как «хыш» (т. е. профессиональный революционер). А так как собственным домом он не обзавелся, проживал или в гостиницах или в случайно нанятых квартирах один или с друзьями.

Точно также Стамболов продолжал жить и после того, как он был назначен одним из трёх регентов Болгарии (1886–1887 гг.). О своем собственном очаге он задумался только тогда, когда решил обзавестись семьей. Причем, произошло это совсем случайно. Как известно, после отречения от престола Александра I Баттенберга (в августе 1886 года) III Великое народное собрание избрало в конце июня 1887 года новым болгарским властителем принца

Димитров, И. Режимът на пълномощията и борбата против него. – Год. СУ – Идеологически катедри, 1965, т. 58, 299–387.

Фердинанда Саксбургготского. В качестве одного из регентов Болгарии Ст. Стамболов вошел в состав делегации, которая должна была встретить будущего главу государства уже на границе Княжества. Поскольку принц должен был прибыть кораблем, торжественная встреча произошла на берегу Дуная, недалеко от города Видина.

Известно также, что новый князь пожелал продолжить свое путешествие по Дунаю и после Видина. По пути следования княжеского кортежа было сделано несколько кратких остановок в более крупных населенных местах, в том числе, и в городе Свиштове, где местные власти по этому случаю организовали торжественную встречу князя. Но тут произошло нечто необычайное: молодая особа прочитала приветствие от лица местных властей на отличном немецком языке. Князь, естественно, был приятно удивлен, а Стамболов – чрезвычайно изумлен не только произнесенным ею приветствием, но и необыкновенной физической красотой девушки. И хотя в то время ему было уже более тридцати лет, что по понятиям того времени означало „старый холостяк”, он влюбился в эту молодую и ничего подозревающую девушку из Видина, города на берегу Дуная.

После того, как отшумели страсти, связанные с церемонией принятия присяги новым болгарским князем, и после назначения им Стамболова премьер-министром, Ст. Стамболов заинтересовался судьбой девушки из Свиштова и узнал, что она происходит из видного и уважаемого рода в городе, получила хорошее образование в Вене, чем и объяснялось ее отличное знание немецкого языка.

Все эти дополнительные сведения еще более усилили интерес Ст. Стамболова к своей избраннице, и он принял решение жениться на ней. В данном случае не потребовалось много усилий. Действительно, разница в годах была немалая (13 лет), но зато общественный статус Стамболова был очень высок – до того, как он был назначен министром-председателем, он уже исполнял должность

председателя Народного собрания и регента.

Бракосочетание состоялось в мае 1888 года. С этого момента начинается новый этап жизненного пути Стамболова. Поликсена (так звали молодую девушку) оказалась не только любящей супругой, но и исключительно ценным сотрудником своего мужа. Оценивая и понимая его высокое положение как общественного, политического и государственного деятеля, она решила, в первую очередь, сохранить те документы, которые отражали его деятельность в период до и после Освобождения Болгарии. На первый взгляд может показаться странным, но первым ее шагом в этом отношении было желание собрать и сохранить поздравительные телеграммы, полученные ею и Стамболовым по случаю помолвки и свадьбы не только от близких и родственников, но и от политических друзей и единомышленников ее супруга со всей страны. В последующие годы г-жа Стамболова старательно собирала все поздравительные телеграммы, которые ее супруг получал по случаю его именин – 27 декабря, а также приветствия по другим поводам – рождественским и пасхальным праздникам.

Вряд ли сама Поликсена Стамболова понимала, собирая телеграммы и поздравительные открытки, какую большую услугу она оказала исторической науке. Для нее лично эти документы имели значение, скорее всего, как семейный архив, который она позднее завещала бы своим детям и внукам, чтобы они помнили и знали, каким человеком был их отец и дед.

Что касается историков, то для них эти документы важны с совершенно другой точки зрения, так как за традиционными поводами поздравлений по случаю помолвки, свадьбы и именин можно обнаружить важные и ценные сведения о лицах, институциях и событиях, о которых в настоящее время невозможно найти какие-либо данные в других источниках.

Следует отметить еще одну очень важную деталь: свое

заботливое и внимательное отношение к „семейной” документации Поликсена Стамболова смогла передать и своему супругу. Каждый, кто по тому или иному поводу занимался Личным архивом Ст. Стамболова, не мог не заметить сделанные им пометки на десятках документов, предоставленных им во временное пользование друзьям или подчиненным: *«Господин (имя), прошу Вас вернуть мне письмо после того, как прочитаете.»*

Благодаря заботе обоих супругов за время недолгой совместной жизни был собран довольно объемный архив документов и материалов. Пока Ст. Стамболов был жив, он лично заботился о сохранении архива, что было совсем естественно, так как собранные им документы служили ему в его повседневной деятельности независимо от того, был ли он у власти или находился в оппозиции. После гибели Стамболова эту ответственность взяла на себя Поликсена. Архив продолжал храниться в доме Стамболовых, так как он не был предназначен для общественного пользования. К нему допускались лишь некоторые, совсем немногие близкие семье люди или политические друзья и единомышленники ее покойного супруга. Среди таких счастливых был и Симеон Радев, использовавший документы и материалы архива Стамболова при написании своего известного двухтомного сочинения «Строители современной Болгарии», не упоминая, однако, об этом конкретно. Было ли это сделано по личной просьбе самой Поликсены или нет, предстоит еще выяснить в будущем.

Мы позволили себе это отклонение, так как речь идет об одном из самых больших личных архивов, принадлежавших видному общественному и политическому деятелю, каким был Стамболов. Разумеется, в наших архивохранилищах имеются личные архивы и ряда других наших общественных, политических и государственных деятелей, таких, как Иван Евстратиев Гешов, д-р Стоян Данев, д-р Васил Радославов, Григор Димитров Начович и др. Но все

эти архивные ценности, в отличие от архива Ст. Стамболова, все еще не опубликованы, и их богатство известно лишь небольшому узкому кругу исследователей болгарской новой истории, а не широкой общественности в Болгарии.

Следует уточнить еще одно обстоятельство: в опубликованных 20 томах Личного архива Стамболова содержится только та часть документальных материалов, которые сохраняются в Научном архиве Болгарской академии наук. Другая часть документов сохраняется в Болгарском историческом архиве Национальной библиотеки им. Св. св. Кирилла и Мефодия. Немалое количество документов, связанных с личностью Стефана Стамболова – адресованных ему или полученных от него, находится в уцелевших архивах, принадлежавших его политическим друзьям и единомышленникам, таким как Иван Андонов и др. Эти материалы также ждут своей публикации. Будущее покажет, когда и как это произойдет.

Вряд ли требуется подчеркивать, что объемный Личный архив лидера Народно-либеральной партии содержит документы и материалы, затрагивающие исключительно широкий круг вопросов, связанных с болгарской историей. Среди них есть и такие, которые в той или иной степени касаются болгаро-венгерских отношений второй половины XIX века. Это время, когда после 1867 года Венгрия вошла в состав новосформированной Двойной монархии со статусом, равным Австрии. По этой причине Венгрия не находилась в подчиненном положении в отношении Вены, в отличие от других народов и этносов – чехов, словаков и западных и южных славян – сербов (живущих за пределами Сербии), хорватов, словенцев и пр.⁹

В хронологическом порядке документальные материалы, хранящиеся в Личном архиве Стамболова и связанные с Венгрией, можно разделить на четыре главных периода:

⁹ Подробнее см.: Мишев, Р. История на Австро-Унгария (1867–1918). Велико Търново, 2005.

первый – с 1876 года до освобождения Болгарии от Османского ига в 1878 году, второй – со времени Освобождения до избрания Ст. Стамболова председателем IV Народного собрания (1878–1884 гг.), третий – деятельность Ст. Стамболова в качестве регента (1886–1887 гг.) и председателя Совета министров Болгарии (1887–1894 гг.) и четвертый – с момента перехода Ст. Стамболова в оппозицию до его убийства (1894–1895 гг.).

Ограниченные рамки настоящего сообщения не позволяют нам полностью раскрыть и проанализировать содержание включенных в рассматриваемый нами архив документов и материалов в соответствии с периодами, обособленными выше. Поэтому мы обратим особое внимание лишь на те из них, которые непосредственно затрагивают вопросы, связанные с двусторонними отношениями Болгарии и Венгрии после Освобождения и, в первую очередь, в тот период, когда Ст. Стамболов был у власти в качестве регента и министра-председателя.

Естественно, что в этом отношении особое место отводится материалам, относящимся к наиболее значимым личностям в Дуалистической монархии, таких как император Франц Иосиф I и руководители австро-венгерской дипломатии и министры иностранных дел граф Дьюла (или Гьюла) Андраши, Хайнрих Хаймерле и Густав Калноки. Большой интерес представляет шифрованная телеграмма от имени князя Фердинанда из Вены 15 мая 1892 года лично Стефану Стамболову. В ней Кобург сообщает: *«Лично, тайно, только для Вас. Сегодня в 12 часов был принят Его Величеством в военной униформе. Его Величество благоволил поздравить меня с большими успехами нашего государства и очень лестно высказался о Вас. Он выразил надежду на дальнейшее укрепление (нашей) армии, которая в настоящее время является первой среди армий балканских стран.»*¹⁰

¹⁰ Стефан Стамболов. Личен архив. Писма, телеграми, рапорти, записки.

Для специалистов, исследующих двусторонние отношения, этот документ особенно важен, так как отражает факт встречи болгарского князя с австро-венгерским императором всего лишь несколько дней спустя после того, как в сводке Военного министерства в Вене от 11 мая 1892 года рассматривался вопрос о состоянии болгарской армии – ее численности и боеспособности, на базе результатов военных маневров, проведенных в Княжестве в предшествующем 1891 году. Австро-венгерские эксперты пришли к выводу, что на тот момент: «Болгария располагает организационно способными войсками в количестве 100.000 человек – на первой линии, и до 200.000 человек – на первой и второй линиях и *может считаться самой значительной военной силой на Балканском полуострове, наряду с Турцией.*»¹¹

Для Дунайской империи Болгария имела особое значение как страна с наиболее благоприятным географическим положением на полуострове и как фактор, на который следует обращать особое внимание в процессе борьбы ее с Россией за влияние в таком исключительно важном и невралгическом районе Европы.

Что же касается слов, сказанных в адрес самого Стефана Стамболова, то не следует удивляться по этому поводу, так как в Вене никогда не скрывали своих симпатий в отношении его политики конфронтации с Россией, которая продолжилась с неослабевающей силой и после разрыва дипломатических отношений между двумя странами в ноябре 1886 года. После отречения короля Милана от сербского престола в 1889 году, болгарский министр-председатель стал самым стабильным фактором, способствующим укреплению австро-венгерского влияния на Балканах, что не могло не радовать управляющих в Вене и в Будапеште.

Съст.: М. Куманов и Д. Иванов. С., 2003, Т. XVI, 239.

¹¹ См.: Мишев, Р. Австро-Унгария и България 1879–1894. Политически отношения. С., 1988, 259.

Документов, касающихся первого министра иностранных дел Двойной империи – графа Андраши, в Личном архиве Стамболова совсем немного. И это не случайно, так как граф Андраши возглавлял австро-венгерскую дипломатию с 1867 до 1879 года, после чего продолжил свою политическую деятельность, но уже в качестве менее значимого фактора.¹²

Оба документа, связанных с личностью графа Андраши, относятся ко времени Берлинского конгресса 1878 года, когда вместе с лордом Биконсфийльдом и Отто Бисмарком он стал одним из инициаторов и творцов вышеупомянутого международного форума, приведшего к разделению на части только что освободившегося от Османского ига болгарского государства. В первом документе – секретном рапорте болгарского дипломатического агента в Белграде от 12 ноября 1878 года министру иностранных дел идет речь о Боснии и Герцеговине – двух областях, расположенных в западной части Балкан, которые тот же Конгресс позволил Австро-Венгрии оккупировать еще в 1878 году. Эта оккупация, по мнению графа Калноки, была продиктована только внешними соображениями, связанными с укреплением юго-западной границы империи, в то время как в ходе конгресса в Берлине граф Андраши указывал и на ряд внутривосточных причин, в частности, возвращение беженцев с их территорий.¹³

Второй документ – статья Димо Кьорчева, бывшего радослависта, который после окончания Первой мировой войны стал одним из лидеров Национал-либеральной партии, в состав которой входила и Народно-либеральная (Стамболовистская) партия.¹⁴ В статье автор высказывает мысль,

¹² *Подробнее см.:* Каменов, П. Граф Андраши и Балканите, 1867–1890. С., 2001, 8–24.

¹³ Стефан Стамболов. Личен архив..., т. XV (2003), 479.

¹⁴ Краткие биографические данные о нем, см.: Куманов, М. Политически партии, организации и движения в България и техните лидери (1879–1949).

подтверждающую мнение о графе как об одном из главных виновников, подвергших Сан-Стефанский договор 1878 года ревизии и, в конечном счете, похоронивших договор.

Что касается сведений о Хайнрихе фон Хаймерле, то такие документы в архиве отсутствуют. И это неудивительно, так как он руководил австро-венгерской дипломатией в течение довольно короткого времени – с 1879 по 1881 год и запомнился в истории другой своей деятельностью – созданием Союза трех императоров (Германии, Австро-Венгрии и России), Двойного союза между Германией и Австро-Венгрией, преобразованного позднее в тройной, а также подписанием тайного австро-сербского договора 1881 года, поставившего соседнее Болгарии западное государство в полную зависимость от Дунайской империи.¹⁵

Наибольшее внимание из всех министров иностранных дел Австро-Венгрии уделено графу Густаву Калноки, который, как и граф Дьюла Андраши, был венгром по происхождению. Он возглавлял австро-венгерскую дипломатию с 1881 по 1895 год в тот отрезок времени, который, фактически, совпадает с периодом деятельности Стамболова как политика, находящегося у власти, так и оппозиционера в Болгарии после Освобождения.¹⁶

Включенные в Личный архив Стамболова документы и материалы, охватывают довольно широкий круг вопросов, связанных с личностью высшего австро-венгерского дипломата. Среди них, по нашему мнению, следует особо выделить два документа: первый – отношение графа Густава Калноки к избранию нового князя Болгарии после отречения князя Александра I Баттенберга от престола в 1886 году, и второй документ, касающийся признания князя Фердинанда законным болгарским правителем.

С., 1991, 188–189.

¹⁵ Мишев, Р. Хабсбургският орел над Балканите. Велико Търново, 1992, 11–12.

¹⁶ Мишев, Р. Указ.соч., 12 и далее.

По первому документу существует достаточно много материалов и публикаций, как болгарских, так и иностранных авторов, изучавших эпоху Стамболова. В его Личном архиве обнаружено несколько документов, проливающих обильный свет на позицию графа Калноки в связи с решением княжеского вопроса в Болгарии. Один из них – телеграмма д-ра Константина Стоилова, одного из трех членов болгарской делегации, на которую была возложена миссия выбора в Европе кандидата на болгарский престол.¹⁷ В телеграмме были затронуты три вопроса, первым из которых был выбор нового болгарского князя: *«Сегодня состоялась аудиенция у Калноки, которая продолжалась полтора часа»...* и *«которой мы остались удовлетворены. Калноки похвалил правительство за то, что оно сумело сохранить порядок в Болгарии. Он поддерживает политику в отношении Болгарии, представленную делегацией».*¹⁸ *Он осознает, что Россия находится в безвыходном положении по отношению к нам, но думает, что после отъезда Каулбарса¹⁹ существует дотанта (возможность – пр. авт.), которая откроет дорогу к достижению соглашения о том, что после того, как отпадет кандидатура Мингрели,²⁰ появится возможность о начале перегово-*

¹⁷ Подробнее см.: Радев, С. Строители на съвременна България (до периода трех регентов Болгарии, назначенных 10 декабря по новому стилю – пр. авт.) 1886 г.

¹⁸ Идет речь о делегациях, составленных из австрийских и венгерских парламентаристов, перед которыми министр иностранных дел и другие ответственные факторы Дунайской империи делали доклады по важнейшим вопросам её внутренней и внешней политики – см.: Мишев, Р. Указ. соч., 37.

¹⁹ Высокопоставленный русский военный деятель и дипломат, на которого Санкт-Петербургом была возложена задача предотвратить созыв III Великого народного собрания, которое должно было избрать следующего кандидата на болгарский престол, после отречения от престола князя Александра I Баттенберга (пр. авт.).

²⁰ Грузинский князь, которого русский император Александр III предложил в качестве князя Болгарии.

воров о другом князе. Мы спросили (его), если мы сами найдем князя, и он согласится прийти, будет ли он иметь поддержку? Он ответил, что австрийское правительство примет любого князя, которого изберет болгарский народ, и добавил, что и по этому вопросу необходимо действовать в рамках Берлинского договора.»²¹

Из лаконичного текста документа становится ясно, что он относится ко времени начала активной закулисной деятельности, связанной с решением болгарского княжеского вопроса, в тот момент, когда надежды князя Александра I Баттенберга на возможность повторно занять княжеский престол рухнули, и были предприняты первые действия, целью которых стала замена его другим немецко-австрийским принцем в лице Фердинанда Сакс-Кобургготского.²² И что еще более важно: для Вены совсем не малозначимым было, кто именно восцарится на болгарском престоле, поскольку от этого, в значительной степени, зависело бы то, какая из Великих сил и в какой степени с его помощью будет иметь доминирующее влияние в Болгарии. В то же время граф Калноки дал понять, что в процессе решения вопроса о выборе нового правителя в Софии необходимо учитывать положения Берлинского конгресса, четко прописывающие, что выбор князя должен состояться только при согласии всех Великих сил, подписавших этот договор.

Мы специально остановились на данном факте, так как из целого ряда событий, следовавших затем, становится ясно, что это условие стало камнем преткновения для князя Фердинанда: по причине отказа России признать его в качестве правителя Болгарии, этого не смогли сделать и остальные Великие силы. Это привело к тому, что решение вопроса затянулось почти на целое десятилетие и

²¹ Ст. Стамболов. Личен архив..., т. I (1997), 194.

²² Подробнее см.: Мишев, Р. Аферата Филип Валдапфел или изборът на Фердинанд Сакс Кобургготски на българския престол – 1887 г. – В: Мишев, Р., цит. соч., 1992, 33–50.

свершилось ценой больших жертв со стороны Кобурга, самой существенной из которых стал переход престолонаследника князя Бориса Тырновского из католического в восточноправославное вероисповедание.

Гораздо больший интерес представляет для нас письмо болгарского дипломатического агента в Царьграде (Истамбуле), датированное 4 октября 1889 года, адресованное министру иностранных дел и вероисповеданий, которое проливает свет на один из наиболее значимых и важных вопросов – признание князя Фердинанда законным болгарским князем. До последнего времени в исторической литературе преобладало мнение, что в первые годы после избрания на престол новый болгарский правитель князь Фердинанд предоставил руководство государством своему первому министру – всесильному министру-председателю Стефану Стамболову, и что вместо того, чтобы управлять страной, предпочитал путешествовать по стране, наслаждаясь ее красотами. Такая ситуация продолжалась до начала 90-х годов XIX века, когда князь Фердинанд принял решение обзавестись семьей и положить основы своей династии. Текст письма болгарского дипломата, датируемый осенью 1882 года, свидетельствует о том, что вопрос о признании князя законным болгарским правителем заботил Кобурга и ранее. Во вторых, документ свидетельствует, что в этом направлении ему активно содействовала и австро-венгерская дипломатия в лице ее руководителя. Вот что докладывает в том же письме болгарский дипломат из столицы Османской империи: *«В настоящее время располагаю возможностью сообщить Вам точные и обстоятельные сведения по вопросу о признании Его Царского Высочества. Инициатива возбуждения этого вопроса в последнее время принадлежит самому графу Калноки.»* Далее дипломат продолжает: *«В ходе одной из встреч турецкого посла в Вене Саадула Паши с графом Калноки, последний задал вопрос послу:*

„Что Вы думаете делать с Болгарией, и каковы намерения Высокой Порты по этому вопросу?» «Посол ответил, что лучшее, что можно сделать (*tant se qu'il u a de tecurr a faise*) по болгарскому вопросу – поддерживать (*maintenire*) статус-кво.» На что конт (граф – пр. авт.) Калноки возразил, что по его мнению, поддержание статус-кво не самый лучший способ решения вопроса: болгары, сказал граф Калноки, очень терпеливы (*patients*) и необходимо, чтобы сюзеренный двор подумал о том, как урегулировать (*regulasation*) положение Болгарии, в противном случае, добавил граф Калноки, если болгары сами примут какое-то решение, которое может и не быть приятно сюзеренному двору, последний не должен пугаться.²³

Так как австро-венгерский министр не мог не отдавать себе отчета, что сам факт рассмотрения этого вопроса непосредственно касается положения Берлинского договора 1878 года, то дипломатические круги в Вене придерживались мнения, что он не мог предпринять такого рискованного шага «*без знания и согласия Берлинского кабинета.*»²⁴

Реакция управляющих в Истанбуле по этому вопросу оказалась весьма неожиданной: вместо того, чтобы выразить протест, Великий визирь не только полностью одобрил предложение австро-венгерского министра иностранных дел, но и горячо убеждал султана «действовать в духе слов конта Калноки.»²⁵

Развитие дальнейших событий показало, что, несмотря на выраженную Высокой портой готовность удовлетворить предложения Вены, на практике этого не случилось и весь процесс затянулся еще на целые семь лет, вплоть до начала 1896 года, когда не только сам граф Калноки уже не был министром иностранных дел Дунайской империи, но и в Болгарии создалась другая внутривнутриполитическая обстановка –

²³ См.: Ст. Стамболов. Личен архив..., т. II (1997), 327–328.

²⁴ Ст. Стамболов. Указ. соч., 328.

²⁵ Ст. Стамболов. Указ. соч., 328.

после падения кабинета Ст. Стамболова в мае 1894 года, управление страны перешло в руки „народняшкого” правительства, во главе встал д-р К. Стоилов.

Также в связи с болгаро-венгерскими отношениями значение имеет и вопрос о взаимоотношениях Ст. Стамболова с дипломатическими представителями Дунайской империи, обязанности которых в то время в Софии исполняли Рудольф Кевенхюллер-Меч, Рудигер Бигелебен Миске²⁶ и Стефан фон Буриан. Первый из них занимал этот пост с 1879 по 1881 год, второй – с 1881 по 1886 год, а третий – с 1886 по 1895 год.²⁷

О Рудольфе Кевенхюллере-Меч, исполнявшем с 1881 по 1886 год должность дипломатического представителя в Белграде и снискавшим себе печальную славу тем, что после победоносных сражений болгарских войск против сербской армии во время Сербско-болгарской войны 1885 года, он прибыл в ставку болгарского князя в Пироте и в ультимативной форме приказал остановить дальнейшее наступление армии.²⁸ В Личном архиве Стамболова отсутствуют документальные материалы, подтверждающие данный эпизод.

Удивительно, однако, что в Архиве нет документов, в которых фигурирует Рудигер Бигелебен Миске, если учесть указанный выше факт, что он пребывал в Княжестве довольно длительное время. Зато в наличии имеется большое изобилие сведений, в которых упоминается Стефан Буриан, что связано с двумя обстоятельствами. Во-первых с тем, что он, в отличие от своего предшественника, занимал пост дипломата в Софии достаточно продолжительное время, и, во-вторых, являлся представителем одной из Великих сил, пытавшейся занять доминирующее положение во внутренинеполитической жизни Княжества в первой половине 80-х

²⁶ Более известный под именем Бигелебен (пр. авт.)

²⁷ См.: Матеева, М. История на дипломатическите отношения на България. С., 2005, 530.

²⁸ Подробнее см.: Мишев, Р., цит. соч., 1988, 160.

годов XIX века. Остановимся, однако, лишь на тех сведениях, в которых содержатся факты, характеризующие отношения Стефана Стамболова и Стефана Буриана в тот период, когда Стамболов был регентом и министром-председателем. В связи с этим стоит обратить внимание на запись, сделанную лично самим Стамболовым в «Дневнике», который он вел в период 1886-1887 гг. 9 октября 1886 года он записал: *«После полудня посетил меня австрийский агентин [Буриан], которому я пожаловался, что не только не вижу действительной поддержки со стороны Европы, но, к тому же, Европейские силы не дают разрешения своим агентам приехать в Тырново (в связи с открытием в этом городе III Великого народного собрания, задачей которого было избрание нового правителя Болгарии – пр.авт.). Еще я сказал ему, что по дошедшим до нас слухам, уже было достигнуто согласие между тремя империями по болгарскому вопросу и, что согласие состоит в том, что Россия не будет оккупировать Болгарию, а Германия и Австрия не признают Регентство и предоставят России инициативу по выбору болгарского князя. (Буриан) сказал мне, что это неправда. Такого соглашения нет. Что касается того, что агенты не приехали в Тырново, то причиной тому – само болгарское правительство, которое сообщило, что в Тырново будут проводиться только проверки (результатов проведения выборов в разных избирательных околиях страны – пр. авт.) и может видоизмениться Регентство, но об избрании князя ничего им не было сказано. (Буриан) еще сказал мне, что Австрия считает наши выборы (абсолютно) внутренним делом и признает право Великого народного собрания вынести решение об их законности и действительности.»*²⁹

Содержание документа недвусмысленно подтверждает, что для регента Ст. Стамболова австро-венгерский дипломатический представитель был самым близким лицом между иностранными консулами в Софии, и что Стамбо-

²⁹ Ст. Стамболов. Личен архив..., т. I (1997), 151.

лов позволял себе делиться с ним самыми большими тревогами Регентства накануне созыва III Великого народного собрания, призванного избрать нового правителя Болгарии. В то время внутривластная обстановка в Княжестве крайне обострилась из-за реакции России, которая выступила против созыва III Великого народного собрания, считая его незаконным, из чего вытекало, что она не признает избрание нового болгарского князя. Одобрение, которое получил Ст. Стамболов со стороны австро-венгерского дипломата, стало, по существу, основной причиной, которая вдохнула Регентству смелость созвать уже избранное к тому времени III Великое народное собрание осенью 1886 года, несмотря на категорическое несогласие России начать процедуру избрания нового правителя Болгарии.³⁰

В Личном архиве Ст. Стамболова обнаруживаем еще один важный факт, свидетельствующий об авторитете Стефана Буриана среди управляющей верхушки в Софии. Речь идет о судьбе майора Коста Паницы – военного деятеля, который прославился во время проведения «Соединисткой акции» (Объединения Болгарии) 1885 года как один из самых доверенных соратников Захария Стоянова, а впоследствии, во время Сербско-болгарской войны 1885 года, как один из командиров, пришедших на помощь болгарским партизанским отрядам. В отличие от большинства болгарских офицеров, он не только не одобрял кандидатуру принца Фердинанда на пост болгарского правителя, но и предпринял попытку заставить князя покинуть Болгарию. В январе 1890 года заговор был раскрыт, а Коста Паница предстал перед военным судом, был приговорен к смертной казни и расстрелян.³¹

В письме Димитра Петкова – ближайшего соратника

³⁰ *Подробнее см.:* Попов, Р. Болгария на кръстопът..., 245 и далее.

³¹ *Подробнее см.:* Марков, Г. Покушения, насилие и политика в Болгария (1878–1947). С., 2003, 22.

Стамболова,³² от 19 июня 1890 года по поводу процесса против Паницы сообщается следующее: «*Расстрел Паницы испугал всех офицеров. Ходят как в воду опущенные. Вчера г-н Странски³³ говорил г-ну Тончеву³⁴ в городском саду, что все это неслыханное варварство, и что мы скомпрометировали себя перед Европой. В частном разговоре со мной он сказал, что все это произошло по требованию г-на Буриана и князя.*»³⁵ Известно, что майор Коста Паница поддерживал тесные связи не только с Захарием Стояновым, но и с самим Стефаном Стамболовым. Рожденные в одном и том же городе, они знали друг друга еще с детских лет. Мог ли Стамболов, при других обстоятельствах, спасти Паницу от смертной казни – вопрос, о котором остается только гадать. Когда, однако, налицо было решение двух факторов сильнее его – Стефана Буриана и князя Фердинанда, независимо от того, имел ли Стефан Стамболов такое намерение, выполнить его он бы не смог.

Дипломатический представитель Габсбургской монархии был одним из первых иностранных дипломатов, информированных новым правительством, которое возглавил д-р К. Стоилов, об изменениях в правительстве Болгарии, произошедших 18–19 мая 1894. Фактически, Буриан стал непосредственным свидетелем событий, случившихся в Софии. Какой была его реакция на свержение правительства Ст. Стамболова остается неизвестным, так как такие документы в Личном архиве лидера Народно-либеральной партии отсутствуют. Этот вопрос, к сожалению, остался незатронутым в цитируемой нами монографии Р. Мишева,

³² *Подробнее о нем см.:* Попов, Ж. Бурният живот на Димитър Петков. С., 1998.

³³ Министр иностранных дел и вероизповеданий. Подробнее о нем см.: Ташев, Т. Министрите на България, 1879–1999. С., 1999, 447–448.

³⁴ Министр юстиции. Подробнее о нем см.: Кацарова, Р. Димитър Тончев – общественик, политик и партиен лидер. Пловдив, 2011 (*нр. авт.*).

³⁵ *См.:* Ст. Стамболов. Личен архив..., т. III (1997), 274.

посвященной австро-венгерско-болгарским отношениям.³⁶

Последним крупным событием, отраженным в Личном архиве Стамболова, стало покушение на него в начале июля 1885 года и последовавшая за тем его смерть. Физическая расправа с бывшим министром-председателем и лидером одной из правых политических партий в стране привлекла внимание всей европейской общественности. Об этом свидетельствуют десятки статей, сообщений и пр. в самых влиятельных английских, французских, испанских, итальянских и др. изданиях. Печатные издания Австро-Венгрии также не обошли молчанием факт покушения.

Благодаря личной инициативе Поликсены Стамболовой, которая, при отсутствии современной размножительной техники, наняла специальную французскую фирму, обеспечившую огромное количество вырезок из множества европейских газет. Все документальные свидетельства Поликсены заботливо сохранила в архиве своего супруга. Благодаря М. Куманову и Д. Иванову, эти ценные материалы изданы отдельным томом, как составная часть 20-томного издания Личного архива Стамболова, и находятся в расположении не только исследователей, но всех тех, которые интересуются эпохой Стамболова.

В коллекции Поликсены Стамболовой нашли место ряд публикаций, помещенных в печатных органах Дунайской империи. Одним из первых, кто выразил свое отношение к покушению на жизнь Стефана Стамболова был Ивождняк Важди Габор, принимавший участие в чине поручика в революционных событиях 1848–1849 гг. В телеграмме, отправленной на имя бывшего министра-председателя 18 июля 1885 года (по новому стилю), старый воин пишет: *«Такой известный и знаменитый своим характером государственный деятель как Ваше Превосходительство, не заслуживает столь подлой судьбы только за то, что так горячо и искренне любит свое Отечество и что имеет в*

³⁶ См.: Мишев, Р. Указ.соч., 1988, 284.

*жизни единственную цель – истинную независимость и свободу каждого болгарского гражданина ... »*³⁷

После смерти Ст. Стамболова его заместителю Димитру Петкову свою соболезновательную телеграмму, также датированную 18 июля 1885 года, направил и проф. Штраус из Будапешта, в которой сообщил, что все венгерские газеты поместили сообщение о трагической гибели болгарского государственного деятеля.³⁸

Среди тех, кто прислал соболезнования Поликсене Стамболовой, телеграмма от графини Хартенау – супруги скончавшегося незадолго до того князя Александра I Баттенберга. Перенесение тленных останков князя Баттенберга в Софию по его завещанию стало возможным, в частности, благодаря заступничеству Ст. Стамболова перед мнительным Кобургом.³⁹

В одной из наиболее влиятельных венгерских газет того времени – «Budapesti Hirlap» [«Будапешти хирлап»] было напечатано малоизвестное интервью княгини Клементины – матери князя Фердинанда, в котором по поводу убийства Стамболова сказано: *«Выдать заграничный паспорт Стамболову было невозможно до тех пор, пока болгарская делегация не вернется из России в Болгарию. Выехав один раз за границу, Стамболов мог сделать такие заявления, которые воспрепятствовали бы выполнению задач болгарской делегации; нельзя было допустить, чтобы один человек, каким бы патриотом и государственным деятелем он ни был, препятствовал бы тем политическим действиям государства, от которых зависело бы положение государства в Европе.»*⁴⁰

Так как данный документ имеет исключительно важное значение, необходим хотя бы краткий комментарий к

³⁷ Ст. Стамболов. Личен архив..., т. IX (2002), 222.

³⁸ Ст. Стамболов. Указ. соч., 233.

³⁹ Ст. Стамболов. Указ. соч., 237.

⁴⁰ Ст. Стамболов. Указ. соч., 432.

тексту. Во-первых, он свидетельствует о прямом вмешательстве старой княгини во внутривластную жизнь страны. Из ряда биографических сведений о Кобурге известно, что единственным бесспорным авторитетом в кругу ближайшего окружения князя в Софии, с мнением которого он соглашался, была его мать, которая после избрания Фердинанда на болгарский престол вместе с ним переехала жить в Болгарию, где и оставалась до конца своей жизни (1907 г.).

Во-вторых, после того, как лишился власти, Стамболов подал прошение правительству д-ра К. Стоилова, пришедшего ему на смену, с просьбой выдать ему международный паспорт для лечения за границей (появились первые признаки диабета – *пр. авт.*). Под предлогом того, что была сформирована специальная парламентская анкетная комиссия, целью которой являлось расследование злоупотреблений, допущенных членами его кабинета министров, в удовлетворении его просьбы было отказано. После отказа Стамболов обратился лично к князю, но и с его стороны не получил никакого содействия. Фердинанд не привел никаких объяснений, но вышеприведенного пассажира в интервью его матери становится ясно, что в данном случае присутствовали соображения чисто политического характера – опасения относительно тех возможных действий, которые мог бы предпринять в Европе бывший премьер-министр, что могло бы, в свою очередь, создать угрозу не только для кабинета К. Стоилова, но и для самого Фердинанда в качестве главы государства.

Что касается вышеупомянутой в интервью делегации, в случае идет речь о делегации, возглавляемой председателем VIII Народного собрания Теодором Теодоровым, душой которой, однако, был митрополит Климент Тырновский, чьей официальной миссией было возложить венок на гроб скончавшегося незадолго до того русского императора Александра III, а в сущности – встретиться с новым русским

самодержцем Николаем II и выпросить у него согласие на признание Кобурга законным правителем Болгарии.⁴¹

Из фактов, приведенных выше, становится ясно, что Личный архив Ст. Стамболова, сохраняемый в Научном архиве Болгарской академии наук, содержит немало документальных свидетельств о болгаро-венгерских отношениях. Большинство из них, по той или иной причине, неизвестны или мало изучены. Использование этих материалов в научно-исследовательской работе может в немалой степени содействовать более глубокому пониманию целого ряда вопросов двусторонних отношений, в чем и состоит их значимость.

⁴¹ Подробнее см.: История на българите. Т. IV. Българската дипломация от древността до наши дни. С., 2003, 277–278.

Scandalous Horse Purchase of the British Army in Hungary during the Anglo–Boer War

Gábor Szabó-Zsoldos

University of Debrecen

The Anglo–Boer War or South African War (Tweede Vrijheidsoorlog) (1899–1902) is considered from several aspects as the first modern war. This was the first where the British soldiers wore khaki uniforms and beside the British Isles, the other parts of the Empire contributed in the fight against the Boer republics (Oranje Free State, Transvaal). Australian, Canadian and New Zealander troops took part in the battles apart from the British regiments. Furthermore, the use of trench warfare, the impact of the media on the moral of the homeland as well as gathering the civilians to concentration camps anticipated the characteristics of the great wars of the 20th century. Moreover the Anglo–Boer War meant a clash of ideologies, struggle between the British imperialism and the Afrikaner nationalism.

Although directly only the members, parts of the British Empire (or British World System) and the Boer republics participated in the Anglo–Boer War, indirectly numerous other countries were involved in that conflict in many ways. It is true especially in case of the Boer side of the war. At the first stage it is necessary to notice the pro-Boer foreign volunteers who travelled from different parts of the World (but mostly Europe) to South Africa in order to support the cause of Orange Free State and the Transvaal. More than 6000 Dutch, Belgian, German, French, American, Irish, Russian, Swedish, Italian, Polish men, among them twelve Hungarians grasped rifle and fought together with the Boer commandos against the khakis (the nickname of the British soldiers during the Anglo–Boer War). Not the

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pro-Boer volunteers meant the only connection between the Anglo–Boer War and the non-belligerent countries. Both Great Britain and the Boer republics attempted to build commercial relations with other countries or take advantage of those which had already existed before 1899. The reason was simple: purchase weapons and raw materials for war purposes. Austria-Hungary was no exception. The British Army as well as the agents of the Boers in Europe intended to obtain different articles from the territory of the dual monarchy. The British were interested at most in one of the Hungarian products: horses.

The present article aims basically to review the sources concerned with the horse purchases of the British Army in Hungary during the Anglo–Boer War. No scholarly research dealt with that issue before, thus, this paper represents the first results of the first stage of a new examination. In addition, the Hungarian aspects of the Anglo–Boer War have been superficially studied by the Hungarian and foreign scholars as well.

HUNGARIAN ASPECTS OF THE ANGLO–BOER WAR

The various points of connection between Hungary and the Anglo–Boer War can be divided into five groups.

First of all, as it has been already mentioned, few Hungarians took part actively in the war. The bulk of them, twelve exactly, chose the Boers while only four Hungarians served as a British soldier in South Africa 1899–1902. They meant the closest relation between the South African war events and Hungary.

To the second class belong the official and semi-official political connections between Austria-Hungary, the Hungarian political authorities and the belligerents as well as the way how the representatives of the Hungarian Parliament interpreted the Anglo–Boer War. Furthermore it is worth to notice that Hungary was mentioned and topic of disputes in relation with the war in the debates of the bicameral British Parliament too (third category).

The next division consists of the economic and commercial

relations, such as the British horse purchases which stand at the centre of the present article.

Tremendous amount of news, articles, reports, comments were published in the Hungarian newspapers. A specific Hungarian narrative, interpretation of the Anglo–Boer War can be identified through the study of these materials. Namely, the pro-Boer Hungarian journalism (the most of the said columns were pro-Boer) paralleled the Boers with the Hungarian freedom fighters of 1848–49¹ as well as Lajos Kossuth was compared with Paul Kruger.² Regarding the contemporary Hungarian public opinion it is necessary to highlight that four books were published in Hungarian on the Anglo–Boer War during the years 1899–1902. Three of them were written by Hungarian pro-Boer volunteers (Károly Bulyovszky³, Vilmos Simon⁴, Lajos Szigethy⁵), while the last one is a collection of Theodore Duka's pro-British writings.⁶

At last but not at least the Anglo-Boer War inspired few outstanding Hungarian poets and novelists such as Endre Ady⁷ and Dezső Kosztolányi.⁸

CONNECTION BETWEEN THE ANGLO–BOER WAR AND HUNGARY FROM THE ASPECT OF ECONOMY

As it has been emphasized, both of Great Britain and the Boer

¹ A burok Világosa. – Debreczeni Ujság, 5 (73) 1901, 1.

² Krüger Európai útja. – Vasárnapi Ujság, 47 (50) 1900, 832.

³ Bulyovszky, K. Boer–angol tűzben. Bp., 1901.

⁴ Simon, V. A búr szabadságharcz. Bp., 1901.

⁵ Szigethy, L. Búr földön. Sopron, 1901.

⁶ Duka, T. Levelek a boer–angol háborúról. Bp., 1901.

⁷ Ady, E. Búrok. – In: Láng, J., P. Schweitzer (Eds.). Ady Endre összes versei. Vol. 2. Bp., 1982, 471.

⁸ Kosztolányi, D. Ó, búrok, ha én most csak húszéves lennék. – In: Réz, P. (Ed.) Kosztolányi Dezső összes versei. Bratislava, 1989, 441; Kosztolányi Dezső: Öreg pap. – In: Réz, P. (Ed.) Kosztolányi Dezső összes novellái. Vol. II. Szeged, 2002, 325–327.

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republics desired to establish commercial relations with non-belligerent countries mainly in order to purchase different articles than ship them to South Africa and implement these goods in the battlefields against the enemy.

The agents of the Boers as well as the leadership of the British Army were aware the advantageous position of Hungary in the field of agriculture. Documents prove that, apart from the Mannlicher rifles and other types of guns, pads⁹, both of the British Army and the Boers¹⁰ were interested in obtaining Hungarian horses. While only a few data have been found yet about the Boer attempts, the conditions of the British purchases are easier to study.

The British Army in line with the great losses suffered by the Boers in the battlefields and the escalation of the war, desperately sought for horse suppliers. The qualities of the Hungarian horses were well-known in Europe so it could be one of the reasons of the British choice, but of course there were other factors behind that decision. According to the sources, one can state that the lobby and the offer of the Austro-Hungarian horse merchants were better than the others.

In Britain six men played key role in the purchase of the Hungarian horses: Mr. Lewison – British businessman, Captain Hartigan – ex-Army Veterinary Officer (retired from the Service in 1881), Colonel St Quintin – Remount officer of the Imperial Yeomanry Committee, Colonel Maclean – Imperial Yeomanry Inspector, Captain Webb – Maclean's Veterinary Officer, and Colonel Willan – Inspector.

There were two Hungarian horse businesses of the British Army. Two British military organisations obtained cobs from Hungary: the Imperial Yeomanry Committee and the Government Remount Department. Although these purchases needed to be examined and reviewed separately, similarities can be

⁹ The National Archives [hereafter NA], FO 120/766. C. Thornton to Sir H. Rumbold, 27.02.1900.

¹⁰ NA, FO 120/768C. Thornton to Sir N. Howard, 21.02.1900, NA: FO 120/766; Sir H. Rumbold to Sir H. Howard, 22.02.1900.

easily found between them. Two of the mentioned British, Lewison and Colonel Maclean as well as Hauser a horse merchant from Austria-Hungary were involved in both of the transactions. Hauser was one of the most influential horse dealers in Austria-Hungary. As Lieutenant-Colonel John Hotham, officer of the Imperial Yeomanry said, Hauser had “*more capital than anybody there ... and if you want to buy horses quickly you want a big dealer with capital.*”¹¹ Harold Spencer, the author of *A History of British Cavalry IV*, and the British officers quoted in the said book found important to highlight that Hauser was Jewish and the horse trade in Austria-Hungary was dominated mainly by Jews.¹² Apart from the capital he possessed, the system of sub-dealers concentrated in Hauser’s hand was the key of the success of the Austro-Hungarian merchant. Namely Hauser was in connection with numerous minor horse-dealers and breeders, moreover he employed agents in all over Austria-Hungary.¹³ This was how Hauser could buy and sell horses in a great number quickly.

In the Imperial Yeomanry the case went under the control of Colonel St. Quintin. Captain Hartigan recommended “*Mr. Lewison, who obtained a contract [...] for the supply of Hungarian cobs*”¹⁴ for the Army as an excellent contact for obtaining horses. Lewison made two contracts with the Imperial Yeomanry. The first one was concluded in January 1900 about 1500 cobs, then a month later the second one, about 2300 cobs. The horses were inspected and selected by Colonel Maclean and Captain Webb.¹⁵

The contracts of the Government Remount Department are more complicated ones. Until April 1900 the Department was

¹¹ Marquess of Anglesey. *A History of British Cavalry*. Vol. IV. London, 1986, 313.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, 313-314.

¹⁴ NA, WO 32/8757, 3. Report of the Committee on Horse Purchase in Austro-Hungary, together with Minutes of Evidence and Appendices, 1902, [Cd. 882].

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

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not interested in the possibility of purchasing horses in Austria-Hungary. Maclean awakened the attention of the leaders of the Governmental Remount Department about the Hungarian cobs. They trusted in Maclean and followed his suggestions. Thus similar to the Imperial Yeomanry, Hauser's horses were chosen again. If they were good enough for Maclean, the Hungarian cobs could be suitable for the Government as well – that was the main reason why Hauser was the contractor in this case once more.¹⁶ Contrary to the purchase of the Imperial Yeomanry, the Government acquainted few hundreds of cobs from other merchants, for instance Mr. Ludwig von Foglár from Budapest. The main reason of this difference between the two cases can be traced back for that the Government was criticized because of the lack of the competition and the monopole position of Hauser.¹⁷ The Government Remount Department similar to the Imperial Yeomanry concluded two contracts with Hauser. The first contract was for 7000 cavalry and artillery horses, while the second one was for 5346 cobs for the Mounted Infantry.¹⁸

In South Africa problems occurred with the Hungarian horses. The cobs as it revealed in the frontlines were not suitable for the South African conditions and perished rapidly in a great number after the shipping. It caused a huge scandal in different stages of the British public opinion and the press. The British journals and few politicians generated huge debates within and outside of the walls of the British Parliament. The horse purchases of the British Army were disputed not only in the British Isles but in Hungary too. The Hungarian press and public opinion reflected for the scandal and the members of the Hungarian parliament debated this issue as well.

The sources concerned with horse purchases of the British Army in Hungary can be classified into several groups.

¹⁶ Ibid., 5.

¹⁷ Ibid., 6.

¹⁸ Ibid., 5.

Regarding their type, there are official and non-official documents, governmental and parliamentary sources, moreover it is necessary to emphasize the importance of the press in this case. Furthermore these materials can be classified by language: English or Hungarian documents. In this present case the said documents are categorized according to their nature.

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Among the materials created by officials it is necessary to highlight the *Report of the Committee on Horse Purchase in Austro-Hungary, together with Minutes of Evidence and Appendices*. The said Blue book is the most important source of this issue and it is rich in data. The document can be divided into two parts. The first is the report itself; to the second one belong the appendices.

The document was edited and created by the parliamentary committee emerged for the investigating the circumstances of the British horse purchases in Austria-Hungary. The Committee was set in order to “*examine certain allegations as to bribes given to British officers in relation to the purchase of horses in Austro-Hungary, made by Sir Blundell Maple, M.P.*”¹⁹ Sir Blundell Maple proposed the investigation of the horse purchases in July 1901 in the Parliament and in other spheres of publicity as well. According to the report, Blundell’s main motive was to draw attention to several anomalies around these businesses. He was convinced that the price and the quality of the said cobs, moreover the role of the British Army officers and the process, practice how the horses were chosen for service in South Africa were extremely problematic. The members of the Committee were: Charles H. E. Welby, W. Kenyon Slaney, Charles E. Hobhouse, Evan Charteris and J. H. Ward secretary. Although the said politicians did their job enthusiastically, they found it important to make it clear even

¹⁹ Ibid., 2.

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in the first sentences of the report, that the Committee found regretful Sir Blundell Maple's activity in this issue. They considered the Maple's speeches and proposal as "*direct attacks on the honour and integrity of British officers*"²⁰

Beside the allegations about the officers were taking bribes, the said body focused mainly on two problematic issues:

1, the contracts afforded an unjustifiably large margin of profit to the contractor;

2, and "*that the contractor supplied very cheap and very bad horses which were not fit for military service and ought not to have passed the inspectors.*"²¹

The report describes accurately how the purchases happened. In case of the first point the Committee found it problematic that Lewison and Captain Hartigan who recommended the Hungarian contract for the British Army obtained a considerable sum of money through the contracts. For the Imperial Yeomanry the price of the cobs was in the first contract 33*l.* 16*s.* 8*d.*, while in case of the second purchase one horse cost 26*l.* Lewison paid 22*l.* to Hauser per cobs which means that his income in the whole business was 111.000*l.* As a reward for the assistance Lewison gave Hartigan "*a commission of 2½ per cent. on his contracts.*"²² This fact perhaps could explain the motives of Captain Hartigan.

The Government Remount Department by the terms of the first contract paid 30*l.* for a cavalry horse and 35*l.* for an artillery cob. The price of the horses decreased in case of the second purchase for 20*l.* horse. According to Colonel Willan's calculation the cost of transporting one cob from the place of purchase to Fiume could cost 4*l.* to 5*l.* and regarding that Hauser paid 8*l.* to 12*l.* for a horse, his profit per cob was around 3*l.* to 7*l.*²³

²⁰ Ibid., 3.

²¹ Ibid., 4.

²² Ibid., 3.

²³ For instance Colonel Willan in February 1901 chose 300 cobs in about

At the end of the report situate the general observations and the evaluation made by the Committee. One can have the impression that the said body grasped every possible chance to emphasize: the British officers and the Army were not responsible for these problems and they were absolutely innocent. Despite the fact that the inspectors and the veterinary officers examined several hundred of horses within few hours, the Committee was convinced that this was not for instance Colonel Willan's or Colonel Hotham's fault, rather the circumstances and the heavy pressure under they were expected to work induced them to pass as swiftly as possible the horses.

Although the members of the Committee highlighted that in case of such an urgent and *"unforeseen emergency, there is no ground for very serious criticism"*, they made few recommendations. First of all they took a question: how could the Imperial Yeomanry and the Government Remount Department be so badly and uninformed? These bodies and the responsible officers should have made more attempts to get proper information from Colonel Wardrop, the British Military Attaché at Vienna. Moreover it was the Remount Department's task to inspect systematically the horse suppliers of the British Army in peace time in order to avoid the problems similar as occurred in case of the horse purchases in Austria-Hungary. These were the recom-

four hours. Colonel Willan's summary illustrates well the said circumstances: *"On one occasion I passed 500 cobs under the following circumstances. I had three horse ships due to arrive at Fiume as follows: — S.S. 'Hurona' on Febr. 19th, S.S. 'Raeburn' on February 26th, and 'Beacon Grange' on March 1st. I passed the whole of the 'Hurona's' and 'Raeburn's' cobs and wen to Fiume, intending to embark the cobs on the 'Hurona' on Febr. 19th and 20th, and return to Szabadka and pass the 'Beacon Grange' cobs returning to Fiume in time to embark the cobs on the 'Raeburn' on Febr. 27th, but the 'Hurona' was six days behind time, and was then not ready to take her horses on board. On 25th the 'Raeburn' came in, and I embarked her cobs on that day and 26th, and the 'Hurona's' on the 27th and 28th. I then returned to Szabadka, where by working all day on March 2nd I passed 500 cobs and 120 the following morning to complete the 'Beacon Grange's' complement."* Ibid., 6–7.

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mendations made by the Committee for the Secretary of State.²⁴

Concerning the involved officers the report remarks that there was a crucial element obstructed their work: the lack of “*knowledge of the language spoken in the horse-breeding districts of Hungary.*”²⁵ Apart from them for the Committee there was another person who was not to blame in the issue: Hauser, who only wanted to have as huge profit as possible.²⁶

Regarding the Appendices and Minutes of Evidence one can conclude that the Committee gathered a large amount of evidences and spared no time and energy for collecting these documents and questioning the involved officers, politicians and businessmen. While the Report takes 8 pages the Appendices and Minutes of Evidence 61 which proves the enthusiasm of the Committee.

The Appendices consists of seventeen letters, five declarations, five notarial acts and notarial documents as well as Mihály Juhász’s (one of the Hungarian witnesses) deposition and a passage from the “*Vadasz-es Verseney-Laf*” (*Vadász- és Versenylap*). The most of the collected documents were created by Hungarian horse merchants. These materials were written originally in Hungarian or German and then translated for English. The appendices contain interesting data about the circumstances of passing the horses. The statement of Mr. Friederich Kuster illustrates the said conditions and describes the process of choosing the cobs: “*Under Webb, the delivery (approval) at the first went with difficulty, but towards the end of his time it went more easily. Under Hartigan it went much easier still, if only because during the deliveries Hartigan drank every day about two bottles of brandy. The same horses which had been rejected at first were always brought forward again, and were then passed. Horse with defective eyes were*

²⁴ Ibid., 7.

²⁵ Ibid., 8.

²⁶ Ibid., 5.

brought forward dull days and passed."²⁷

The Committee called between 12th July and 26th July 1901 twelve witnesses. Most of them were British officers involved in the Horse purchases. First of all the members of the Committee took questions for Sir John Blundell Maple, M. P. who proposed the investigation, then came the officers of the Imperial Yeomanry and the Government Remount Department and Mr. Ludwig von Foglár from Budapest. One can notice that even high-ranking army leaders for instance Major-General Truman, the Inspector-General of Remounts or Viscount Valentia, Adjutant-General of the Imperial Yeomanry were expected to appear before the Committee.

Among the official and parliamentary papers there is another type of sources, namely the Hansard's Parliamentary Debates which are incredibly important in this case because of mainly two reasons. First of all, the emergence of the said Committee was result of parliamentary disputes. Furthermore, as one of the most controversial issues around the British Army's supply during the Anglo-Boer War, through examining the debates one can get picture about the place and role of the Hungarian horse purchases in the contemporary British political discussions.

The fact that the Hungarian horses were matter of debates sixty times between July 1900 and August 1904 may prove that it was an important topic for the British MPs. Among these politicians several famous ones can be found, for instance David Lloyd George or Winston Churchill. The former was the first who mentioned the Hungarian horses in the House of Commons during the Anglo-Boer War. Lloyd-George was incredibly active in the debates on the war, especially the concentration camps. He criticized the Government because of purchasing horses in Hungary and obtaining goods from outside of Britain and the British Empire: *"I remember perfectly well the great cry at the last General Election was 'Support Home Industries', and the Government, and above all, the Minister who got to his party*

²⁷ Ibid., 13.

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into power on the prohibition of foreign bushes, is now engaged in the task of restoring British prestige with guns made in Germany, soldiers fed on French vegetables and South American meat, Hungarian horses provided with American saddles, and foreign fodder carried by Spanish mules."²⁸

Winston Churchill was not content fully with the result of the Committee's investigation and recommended further examination of Captain Hartigan. Although he did not intend to find scapegoats in this issue, found some aspects of the horse purchases more than strange: "*It was often said that if any commercial firm conducted its business in the way the affairs of the British Empire were conducted, it would be in the Bankruptcy Court within twelve months. In his [Churchill's] opinion, however, a lunatic asylum rather than the Bankruptcy Court would be its destination. That was the kind of thing that had been happening in Austria-Hungary.*"²⁹

Apart from Lloyd-George and Winston Churchill, the most active participants of these debates were Sir Blundell Maple, Henry Labouchere, William Brodrick and two members of the Committee, Sir Charles Hobhouse and Sir Charles Welby.

The issue of the horse purchases were disputed in the Hungarian body of legislation as well. The representatives of the opposition grasped this chance to attack the Government for permitting the British to obtain cobs in Hungary for the cruel war waged on (in line with their interpretation) the small and brave Boer nation. The said politicians accused the Government and the Prime Minister, Kálmán Széll with treachery of the ideals of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence, 1848–49. According to their arguments the cause of the Boers was same as the Hungarians had had fifty years before. Thus "*Hungary feels empathy if a small nation fights for independence.*"³⁰ Károly Schmidt, who was one of

²⁸ Lloyd George in Commons, 25.07.1900, Vol. 86, 1210.

²⁹ Churchill in Commons, 31.01.1902, Vol. 102, 124.

³⁰ Károly Schmidt in the lower chamber of the Hungarian Parliament, 11.12.1901,

the most active MPs in these verbal attacks, asked the Prime Minister whether the Government had possessed any information about the British horse purchases or not. Kálmán Széll said that they had not cared with these businesses because they had found nothing problematic in them.³¹ In comparison with the British Parliamentary Debates the issue of the horse purchases appeared only few times in the discussions of the Hungarian Parliament.

At last but not at least there is another group of the official sources: correspondence between the Foreign Office and the consuls, attachés delegated to Austria-Hungary. This is a tremendous bunch of documents in which numerous letters can be found about the horse purchases in Hungary. The Registers³² created by the Foreign Office in order to the classification of the different types of the letters and telegrams makes the research easier among these documents which are kept in the National Archives, United Kingdom.

The most of the said eleven despatches were addressed to Colonel Wardrop, the British Military Attaché at Vienna and Conway Thornton, British Consul in Budapest. Although the documents have not been systematically examined and studied, few interesting data have been revealed. For instance Sir Horace Rumbold (British Ambassador to Vienna) informed the Prime Minister (Lord Salisbury) about the confidential consultations with the representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government about the planned horse purchase of the British Army in Hungary. The Austro-Hungarians made it clear it would be

<http://www3.arcanum.hu/onap/opt/a090302.htm?v=pdf&q=WRD%3D%28b%FAr%20h%E1bor%FA%29&s=ORT&m=7&a=rec> (25.10.2010, 0:04)

³¹ Kálmán Széll in the lower chamber of the Hungarian Parliament, 11.12.1901, <http://www3.arcanum.hu/onap/opt/a090302.htm?v=pdf&q=WRD%3D%28b%FAr%20h%E1bor%FA%29&s=SORT&m=7&a=rec> (25.10.2010, 0:50)

³² Register to the Correspondence, NA: FO 122/17; Register to the Correspondence, NA: FO 122/18.

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wise if the British could do it in secret: *“The Govt. have given me a private and friendly hint through the Foreign Office here that, although they would be glad if we could procure horses for South Africa in Hungary, they are anxious we should purchase them quietly and, if possible, without mentioning the fact that the question of a breach of neutrality may be raised as the Anglophobe press have already mentioned the matter.”*³³

The British were content with the Less than two months later (6th March 1900) Lord Salisbury instructed Rumbold to express the thanks of the British Government towards the Austro-Hungarian Government. The reason was the successful horse purchase which was not obstructed by the authorities of the dual monarchy: *“I have to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency’s despatch no. 15 Africa of the 22nd ultimo respecting the purchase of horses in Hungary for the use of the British troops in South Africa and I have to request you to express confidentially to Count Goluchowski the thanks of Her Majesty’s Government for the friendly attitude which has been maintained in the matter by the Austro-Hungarian Authorities.”*³⁴

NON-OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

The issue of the horse obtaining of the British Army appeared in the foreign press as well. The British journalists and the public opinion picked up the story, the scandalous purchases in Hungary.

Few articles can be found within the columns of *The Times* which are concerned with these cases. The dispute taken place in the volumes of *The Times* issued during the autumn of 1902 was emerged by the debates in the British Parliament (*The Times* regularly published passages from the Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates). The key figure of these clashes was a reader of the journal who wrote several articles about this topic under the name “Hungarian”. The identity of the said author is still unknown.

³³ NA, FO 120/763. Sir H. Rumbold to Lord Salisbury, 22.01.1900.

³⁴ NA, FO 120/762. Salisbury to Sir H. Rumbold, 6.03.1900.

One can suppose that he could be Theodore Duka. Duka was the most influential and most active pro-British public figure. He was well-known in Britain and Hungary as well and served in the British Army thus he could still have contacts in the War Office in 1902. Furthermore Duka published numerous writings and a book by which he attempted to moderate the domination of the pro-Boer attitude in Hungary. Nevertheless this is only a theory and cannot be proved by the sources yet.

The Hungarian protected the well-deserved reputation of the Hungarian warhorses twice in *The Times*. The author visited Lord Roberts twice in order to appeal in the General for the groundless and pointless blame of the cobs bred in Hungary. Furthermore another aspect was emphasized as well, namely the Hungarian argued that the British should not forget that the Hungarian journalism was the only which did not commit itself on the Boer side of the war. The articles of the Hungarian resulted debates in the columns of *The Times*.³⁵

Not only the British newspapers but even *The New York Times* reported the scandal around the horse business. The correspondent of the American journal informed the readers about the mentioned debate of the Hungarian Prime Minister, Kálmán Széll and the pro-Boer opposition in the lower chamber of the Hungarian Parliament on 11th December 1901: *“In the Diet to-day a demand was made that the shipment of horses from Hungary to South Africa be stopped, on the ground that it constituted a violation of Hungarian neutrality. The Premier, Koloman de Szell, declared, in reply, that the question whether, in international law, horses were as war material and to supply them constituted a violation of neutrality, had never yet been decided, hence the Government had not stopped and did not intend to stop the traffic.”*³⁶

³⁵ The Times, 26.08.1902, 7; The War Office and Hungarian Horses. - The Times, 27.08.1902, 4; The War Office and Hungarian Horses. - The Times, 29.08.1902, 5; The Remount Inquiry. - The Times, 21.10.1902, 8.

³⁶ Hungary and the Boer War, Shipment of Horses for the British Not to be

*Scandalous Horse Purchase of the British Army in
Hungary during the Anglo-Boer War*

CONCLUSIONS

One can conclude that the horse obtaining of the British Army in Hungary, 1899–1902 is an incredibly important aspect of the economic relations between the Anglo–Boer War and Hungary. The amount of the documents concerned with the said issue may prove that.

It is necessary to emphasize the present article represents only the first results of a new research and offers no more than a short description of the gathered sources. Nevertheless collecting of further sources is inevitable in widening the scope of the study. There are two groups of the sources which are crucial in this case: records of the Imperial Yeomanry and the Govern- ment Remount Department; and private papers of Sir John Blundell Maple and the private documents of those who were involved in the business or the scandal. Moreover, apart from the archival records, further columns, articles could be important as well.

The most interesting questions which could be answered in case of the examination of the said sources are:

1, What was the connection between Sir Blundell Maple and the Hungarian horse merchants who were mostly excluded from the business?

2, Why Sir Blundell Maple proposed the investigation?

3, Why was the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury involved in this issue?

Beside of the listed issues other aspects of the British horse purchases needed to be detailed, for instance the exact number of the Hungarian cobs which were transported to South Africa or the motivations and the Austro-Hungarian Government in these cases.

Bulgarians through the Eyes of Hungarian Photographers – Hungarians in Bulgaria through the Eyes of Bulgarian Photographers (1850–1940)

Chavdar Vetov

Institute for Historical Studies – BAS

Photographic materials offer information that can hardly be found in textual documents. That is why photographs are valuable documents for research of the past. Because of the lagging of Bulgarian lands from the industrial development of Central and Western Europe and the lack of a developed bourgeois society, the first photographers in the region were foreigners. Most of them came from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy and France. Many Bulgarians traveling abroad or living in exile had preserved their images in the photographic studios of European masters.

Hungarian archaeologist and ethnographer Felix Kanitz¹ came to the Bulgarian lands for research purposes. His archive contains photographs of Bulgarian cities, monasteries, male and female folk costumes. It is believed that some of these materials were his work.² Kanitz also collected various photographs of the participants in the Bulgarian revolutionary movement taken by Anastas Karastoyanov, Károly Pap Szathmáry (Carol Popp de Szathmary), Thomas and Nicholas Hitrov, Nikifor Minkov, Ivan Dospevski and others. He kept

¹ See: Documentary Heritage of Felix Kanitz Preserved at the BAS. Simeonova, R., D. Atanasova, G. Yoncheva, D. Ilieva, Ts. Velichkova; – In: Demeter, G., P. Peykovska (Eds.). *Regions, Borders, Societies, identities in Central and Southeast Europe, 17th–21st Centuries*. Sofia–Bp., 2013, 141–148.

² See: Боев, П. *Фотографско изкуство в България, 1856–1944 г. С.*, 1983. с. 14.

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an archive of photographs and sketches of industrial sites, roads, bridges, cars, carts, etc.; photographs and reproductions of battle scenes; portraits of Felix Kanitz himself, alone and with other people, of Kuncho Angelov, Exarch Antim I, Avxenti Veleshki, Ilarion Makariopolski, Nicolas Voyvodov, Hadji Dimitar, Stefan Karadja and Vasil Stransky (1868), Sava Katrafilov (1876), Angel Kunchev (1871), Karshovski, P. Hitov, Ilyu Markov, G. S. Rakovski (1867), Philip Totyu and others.

Hungarian painter, lithographer and photographer Károly Pap Szathmáry was born in 1812 in the Hungarian town of Colojvar (today Cluj, Romania) and died in 1887 in Bucharest. His pursuits in photography started in 1848. He held the position of court photographer of Prince Cuza and later of king Carol I. Szathmary opened a studio in Bucharest in 1850. In 1854, during the Crimean War, he went to the front and captured moments from the battles between the Ottoman and Russian armies.

In 1877 he was again at the line of battle, having joined the Romanian troops fighting on Bulgarian lands in the Russian–Turkish War. He created a large number of pictures (mainly painted) of the hostilities; painted the locals – peasants, artisans, merchants etc. In his studio in Bucharest he photographed many a Bulgarian revolutionaries. Szathmary photographs are stored in the collection “Portraits and photographs” of the Bulgarian Historic Archive of the National Library, the Scientific Archive of the Institute of Historic Studies, the Scientific Archive of the BAS and other repositories.

There is a photography in the collection of “Portraits and photographs”, dated 1868, of Alexander Vasilev, revolutionary and a member of the Hadji Dimitar and Stefan Karadja detachments. He is full-length, in an uniform and with weapons. The inscription on one of the copies indicates that Vassilev was the secretary in the detachment of Hadji Dimitar.

The same collection contains a picture from 1862 of Branislav Veleshki, who fought in the First Bulgarian Legion and in the Liberation War. In 1867 Szathmary took pictures of

two chetniks from the detachment of Panayot Hitov: Gannie Krayat and Captain Ivan. He also made copies of two photographs of the revolutionary, educationalist and affiliate of Levski, Angel Kunchev. One of the portraits³ shows Kunchev in Serbian military uniform and the original picture was taken by A. Stojanovic from Belgrade around 1868.

The other copy⁴ is made after the original picture by Thomas Hitrov, where Angel Kunchev is in plain clothes (Pics. 1, 2). The collection the original copy by Szathmary of a picture of the Bulgarian national liberation movement ideologist – Vasil Levski (Pic. 3)⁵. The original photography was taken in Bucharest around the year 1868–69, and shows Levski in military uniform. The same photographer is also the author of Hadji Dimitar's images⁶ and other photographs of Bulgarian revolutionaries. Another photograph⁷ shows Dagobert Englender – the captain of the Radetsky ship (built in Buda). The Austro-Hungarian captain had a huge role during the entering of the Botev's cheta in Bulgarian lands.

Part of the visual documents related to the Bulgarian revolutionary movement were taken by the Austro-Hungarian

³ St St Cyril and Methodius National Library, "Portraits and Photos" Collection, a.u. № С 70.

⁴ Ibid. a.u. № С 68. Also at the Scientific Archive of the Institute for Historical Studies – BAS, a. u. № I 499.

⁵ Scientific Archive of the Institute of Historic Studies – BAS, a. u. № III 292. And also in St St Cyril and Methodius National Library. "Portraits and Photos" Collection, a.u. № С II 188. About this picture see: Йонков, Хр. Седемте снимки на Апостола. – В. Поглед, 1987, № 7/1319 (16.02.). Дойчев, Л. Няколко заблуди около Васил Левски. – В. Ден, II, № 554 (19.02.1942). Попов, Ж. Без сън, без покой. Книга за Васил Левски. С., 1986, 112. Йонков, Хр., Ст. Йонкова. Васил Левски и българската национална революция. С., 1987, 191. Васил Левски. Документален летопис, 1837–1873. С., 1987, 75.

⁶ Scientific Archive of the Institute of Historic Studies – BAS, a. u. № I 629. And also in St St Cyril and Methodius National Library. "Portraits and Photos" Collection, a.u. № С 115.

⁷ Scientific Archive of the Institute of Historic Studies – BAS, a. u. № № II–1.

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photographer from Budapest Josef Habshid, who worked in Ruse; Armin Elias, who was a photographer in Plovdiv, and Károly Koller (Carl Cohler) in Sofia. Their works can be found in the collection “Portraits and photographs” at the National Library.

A photograph⁸ by an unknown author shows the Hungarian revolutionary Mihály Sáfány sitting, surrounded by the other members of the Shumen’s orchestra holding their musical instruments. Shumen’s state archive (f. 824K, inv. 1, AU 105, l. 1) also Sáfány’s portrait. The image is dated around the year of 1850. Another photograph from the same fund (inv. 1 AU 278, l. 1) shows a group of full-length figures, one of which is of Mihály Sáfány. One can also see the Shumen notable Atanas Popov.

The collection “Portraits and photographs” a picture of Mihály Sáfány (a. u. C III 522) from a later period (Pic. 4): in full size and civilian clothing with the string orchestra of the Bulgarian School for Boys “Dr. Petar Beron” in Edirne in 1901, where he was a teacher at that time. He is surrounded by students, holding musical instrument. There is an attached text with biographical data for students.

The collection “Portraits and photographs” offers information and photographs of people and events from the post Liberation era and the first decades of the twentieth century. Some of them are the work of the Hungarian photographer Károly Koller. He took a photograph of Olimpi Panov (Pic. 5)⁹, also of Stefan Stambolov¹⁰ (Pics. 6, 7).


Due to the late industrial development of the Bulgarian

⁸ The picture is dated around 1851 and is stored in the Regional State Archive in Shumen, f. 33K, in the “Archangel Michael” Community Centre.

⁹ St St Cyril and Methodius National Library. “Portraits and Photos” Collection, a.u. № C V 109.

¹⁰ Scientific Archive of the Institute of Historic Studies – BAS, a. u. № III 299. Also in St St Cyril and Methodius National Library. “Portraits and Photos” Collection, a.u. № C V 493

society, the technical innovations were brought by West Europeans. The European masters taught Bulgarians the new representational method called *photography*. Some of them were of Hungarian origin. The pictures taken by Hungarian photographers locally and outside the Bulgarian lands provide us information about revolutionaries and the political and cultural history of the era before and after the Liberation. They also offer information about Hungarian presence in the Bulgarian lands. Over time, these photographs became important evidence for the history of the Bulgarian society in the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century.



Pic. 1. Angel Kunchev.



Pic. 2. The back of the photography.

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Pic. 3. Vasil Levski.




Pic. 4. Mihály Sáfrány.



Pic. 5. Olimpi Panov.



Pic. 6. Stefan Stambolov.



Pic. 7. The back of photography with the logo of the Cohler's studio.

The Bulgarian Participation in the Third Balkan War According to Austro-Hungarian Sources¹

Krisztián Csaplár-Degovics

Research Centre for the Humanities, Institute of History – HAS

The war that broke out in the autumn of 1913 against Serbia in Albanian territories, the so-called Third Balkan War as contemporary journalists referred to it, has remained largely unknown to historiography. The reason for this is that, apart from Georgi Georgiev who published a few studies on the subject in the *Makedonski Pregled*,² not one researcher has ever investigated this topic at the level of archival sources. Even the Serbian and Albanian historiography turned a blind eye to the problem,³ which is the more surprising considering

¹ The elaboration of this paper has been funded by the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD).

² Георгиев, Г. Спомени на Евгим Янкулов за Балканските войни и Охридско–дебърското въстание (1912–1913 г.). – МПр, 36, 2013, № 4, 119–129; the same, Бежанският въпрос в Албания и българската хуманитарна акция през 1913 г. – МПр, 35, 2012, № 1, 39–67; the same, Началото на модерната албанска държава, видяно от един български дипломат. – In: Peykovska, P., G. Demeter (Eds.). Bulgaria and Hungary at War, 1912–1918. Вр.–Sofia, 2013, 69–82.

³ Recently Bernard Lory has dealt with the topic. See the publications of Ćorović, Vl. Istorija Jugoslavije. Beograd, 1933, 660–665; Arbansko–južnoslavenski odnosi – In: Krleža, M. (Ed.). Enciklopedija Jugoslavije. Vol. I. Zagreb, 1955, 158; Đuđev, Br., B. Grafenauer, J. Tadić (Eds.). Historija naroda Jugoslavije. Vol. I–II. Zagreb, 1953–1959; Perović, Br. (Ed.). Prvi balkanski rat 1912–1913. Prva i treća knjiga. Operacije srpske vojske. Beograd, 1959–1960; Ratković, B. Prvi balkanski rat 1912–1913. Druga knjiga, Beograd, 1959; Krasnići, M. Savremene društveno-geografske

the fact that Balkan historiographies and the historical memory of the peninsula's nations keep track of all the real or assumed offences and all the wars in which the blood of patriots had been shed. In this war the Albanians alone lost 20–25.000 people,⁴ that is, as many as they had lost in the first two

promene na Kosovu i Metohiji. Priština, 1963; Hadri, A. Nacionalni pokret albanskog naroda od tridesetih godina XIX. veka do kraja 1912. Iz istorije Albanaca. Beograd, 1969; Rahimi, Š. Albanci u borbi za nacionalnu emancipaciju. – Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis, 1970, N 1–2; Kosovo pod turskom vlašću – Kosova nën pushtetin turk. – In: Veljković, L. Kosovo, 129–177, especially 164–167; Slijepčević, D. Srpsko–arbanski odnosi kroz vekove sa posebnim svrtnom na novije vreme. Minih, 1974, 243–275; Slijepčević, D. Über die serbisch–albanischen Beziehungen im 19. Jahrhundert 1–2. – Shëjzat, 1973, N 9–12, and 1974, N 1–10; Mikić, D. The Albanians and Serbia during the Balkan Wars. – In: Király B. K., D. Djordjević (Eds.). East Central European Society, 165–197, 186–190; Horvat, Br. Oslobođenje kao okupacija. – In: Horvat, Br. Kosovsko pitanje: Drugo dopunjeno izdanje. Zagreb, 1989, 56–62; Stojanov, P. Makedonija vo vremeto na balkanskite i prvata svetska vojna (1912–1918). Skopje, 1969; Buda, Al., St. Pollo, (Red. përgj.), Historia e Shqipërisë, vëll. 1–3. Tiranë, 1959; Puto, Ar. Pavarësia shqiptare dhe diplomacia e fuqive të mëdha (1912–1914). Tiranë, 1978; Luarasi, S. Ismail Qemali. Jeta dhe Vepra. Tirane, 1962; Xoxi, K. Ismail Qemali. Tiranë, 1983; Murzaku, Th. Politika e Serbisë kundrejt Shqipërisë gjatë Luftës Ballkanike 1912–13. Tirana, 1987; Borozan, Đ. J., N. B. Popović. (Eds.), Kosovo i Metohija u velikoalbanskim planovima 1878–2000. Beograd, 2002; Vojvodić, M., R. Samardžić (Eds.). Srbija u međunarodnim odnosima krajem XIX i početkom XX veka. Beograd, 1988; Mitrović, A. (Ed.). Istorija srpskog naroda. Vol. 6/1–2. Beograd, 2000; Bataković, D. T. Nova istorija srpskog naroda. Beograd –Lausanne, 2000, 240–245; Stojančević, Vl. (Ed.). Srbija i Albanci u XIX i početkom XX veka. Beograd, 1990; Djukić, Sl. Razmena zarobljenika između Srbije i Bugarske 1913. godine – prilog istraživanju. – Vojno-istorijski glasnik, 2008, N 1, 144–150; Borozan, Đ. J. Jugoslavija i Albanija u XX vijeku. – Istorija 20. veka, 17, 1999, N 1–2, 9–20; Stanković, Đ. J. Nikola Pašić i albansko pitanje 1914–1917. – Istorija 20. veka, 18, 2000, N 1, 9–28; Avramovski, Ž. Granice Kraljevine SHS-s Albanijom. – Istorija 20. veka, 10, 1992, N 1–2, 35–50, and Jovanović, Vl. Suzbijanje kačaka na Kosovu i Metohiji 1912–1929. – Vojno-istorijski glasnik, 2009, N 1, 32–55.

⁴ Boeck, K. Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg. Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan. München, 1996, 110.

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Balkan wars. The human casualties of the Bulgarian civil population also reached thousands. In spite of all, with the exception of Georgiev's above mentioned researches,⁵ no thorough historical investigation has been conducted to explore the casualties this armed conflict.

All that is known about the war is based on Serbian or Yugoslavian publications which borrowed their theses from the contemporary Serbian diplomatic statements. These theses stipulate that the attack was launched in September 1913 by the then independent Albania against those Middle-Balkan territories which, during the first two Balkan wars, had been occupied (and on 7 September, 1913 annexed) by Serbia. The attack was the brainchild of the Vlorë Provisional Government, or, to be more exact, of Ismail Qemali. The troops had been drilled by Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian officers and were armed partly by Austria-Hungary.

The Albanians broke through the Serbian border defence at three different locations, but only two of the attacks proved successful. The strike against Gjakova failed, but between the 22 and 27 September the attackers occupied the towns of Debar and Ohrid with the help of local insurgents Albanians. Serbia, entitled to protect its sovereignty, mobilised its army and in the last week of September the country launched a counter-attack. By the end of the month Serbian troops had expelled the "insurgents" from their country and the first two weeks of October already witnessed the occupation of Middle and Northern Albania by the Serbian army. It was the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum on 18 October 1913 that brought the occupation to an end. And that is, more or less, all we know about this war based on Serbian literature.⁶

However, by consulting certain archival sources in Vienna,

⁵ Георгиев, Г. Новооткрит документ за българско-албанското въстание от 1913 г. – МПР, 33, 2010, № 2, 135–149.

⁶ Krleža, Op. cit., 158; Ćorović, Vl., Op. cit., 660–665 and Bataković, D., Op. cit., 240–245.

we may be able to clarify the Albanians' role in the war, the underlying motives, the social groups and military leaders involved and the articulated intentions.⁷ Questions regarding the Bulgarian participation can only be partially clarified, therefore this presentation aims to be a summary which may complement Georgiev's findings with the Austro-Hungarian sources and inspire further research.⁸

Albania had the following motives for the war: 1. in accordance with the resolutions of the London conference Albania included only half of the Albanian-populated areas of the region;⁹ 2. Bulgaria was defeated in the Balkan War II so nothing could prevent Serbia from annexing territories in the Middle-Balkans and having long-term aspirations for the region;¹⁰ 3. Serbian troops were stationed in an independent

⁷ See the most important Austrian sources about the war: ÖHHStA PA XII. Türkei, Kt. 414–415, 417–424; and Kriegsarchiv Wien (KA), Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät (MKSM), Kt. 1093, Kt. 1095 and 1107; KA Militärkanzlei Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand (MKFF), Hauptreihe Kt. 105–108, Sonderreihe Kt. 192–193.

⁸ Csaplár-Degovics, Kr. *The Forgotten Third Balkan War. A Research Desideratum and a Challenge for the Historian.* – In: Sela, Ylber (Ed.), *The Balkans Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow. On behalf of the 100 Wars 1912–2002.* Saarbrücken, 2013, 59–77.

⁹ About the Southern border of Albania see: Crampton, R. J. *The Hollow Détente. Anglo–German Relations in the Balkans 1911–1914.* London, 1979, 112–113; Krause, Al. G. *Das Problem der albanischen Unabhängigkeit in den Jahren 1908–14.* Phil. Diss., Wien, 1970, 249; Chekrezi, C. A. *Albania. Past and Present.* New York, 1919, 94–100; Puto, A., Op. cit., 227–261; Löhr, H. Chr. *Die albanische Frage. Konferenzdiplomatie und Nationalbildung im Vorfeld des Ersten Weltkrieges unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Außenpolitik.* Phil. Diss., Bonn, 1992, 118–134. About the Northern borderline see: Bartl, P. *Albanien.* München, 1995, 137–143; Crampton, R., Op. cit., 75–96; Helmreich, E. Chr. *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912–1913.* Cambridge, 1938, 281–310; Puto, A., Op. cit., 162–227; Chekrezi, C. A., Op. cit. 90–94. and Löhr, H. Chr., Op. cit., 78–101.

¹⁰ Hodel, R. J. *Albanien – Aufzeichnungen von zwei Reisen 1913/1927.* Zürich, 1927, s.t., 6; Ćorović, Vl., Op. cit., 204–205 and Boeck, K., Op. cit., 134.

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Albania; 4. in the regions it had annexed Serbia introduced ruthless military administration;¹¹ and last but not least 5. approximately 120.000 refugees deluged to Albanian territories from the annexed regions (Albanians and Bulgarians, Muslims and Christians alike).¹² The idea of an armed resistance first occurred to the Albanian chieftains and military leaders who had fled into Albania from the Middle-Balkans (Bajram Curri, Isa Boletini, Hysni Curri, Elez Isufi).¹³ They however failed to win to their cause either the Albanian power centres (with the Vlora Provisional Government among their number), or the friendly Austria-Hungary. The former meant that August 1913 marked the onset of a long-term disconnection between Albanian and the Kosovar Albanian aspirations. Regarding the latter I would only like to note here that the Ballhausplatz tried to dissuade the Kosovar and Macedonian Albanian leaders from launching an assault.¹⁴ We may conclude that there had been only one political group that was willing to support a war against Serbia, and it was none other than the VMRO. Why?

The idea of a Bulgarian-Albanian cooperation naturally

¹¹ Martinović, Sr. Qëndrimi i ushtrisë serbe ndaj shqiptarëve në viset e pushtuara në vitet 1912–13. – In: Gjurmime Albanologjike – seria e shkencave historike, 7, 1977, 247–278, especially 253–256, 259; Tucović, D. Srbija i Arbanija. Jedan prilog kritici zavojevačke politike srpske buržoazije. Beograd–Zagreb, 1946, 98–100.

¹² Csaplár-Degovics, Kr. Az 1913-as shkodrai osztrák–magyar humanitárius akció. – In: Bertényi, Iván Jr., G. Richly, El. Géra (Eds.). „Taníts minket úgy számlálni napjainkat... Tanulmányok a 70 éves Kósa László tiszteletére. Bp., 2012, 99–112.

¹³ ÖHHStA PA XII/421/6f, Letter of Rudnay to Berchtold, Durazzo, 16.05.1913, No. 157; Report of Lejhanec to Berchtold, Valona, 27.05.1913, No. 48; Marinensektion, Konfidentielle Nachrichten, Valona, 18.06.1913, Res.Nr. 441/K.D; secret instruction to 1. Heimroth (Üsküb), 2. Kral (Saloniki) and 3. Mérey (Rome), Wien, 28.05.1913, Nr. 2481–2483, 1–2 and No. 37.F, 1–2.

¹⁴ ÖHHStA PA XII/421/6f, Letter of Rudnay to Berchtold, Durazzo, 16.05.1913, No. 157; telegram of Berchtold to Rudnay, Wien, 23.05.1913, No. 24; anonymous report to the joint Minister of Finance, Sarajevo, 29.05.1913, Zl: 816/Pr.B.H; KA Nachlässe, B 1450 – Nachlass Conrad von Hötzendorf, Akt. 84/222, Letter of Spaitz to Conrad, Wien, 28.05.1913, Geh. Nr. 179.

occured to the Bulgarians as well. Kolušev, Bulgarian envoy in Cetinje informed Ismail Qemali in June 1913 about an impending Bulgarian–Serbian war, and invited the Albanians to participate. He offered Debar as compensation, but, as he emphasized it was also not impossible for Albania to annex the town of Skopje (“*I would rather have it belong to the Albanians than to the Serbs*”). Qemali answered that he could send as many as 100,000 soldiers but he had not enough weapons at his disposal. Kolušev considered sufficient an army of 40.000 fighters, but he believed that arms should be provided by Austria-Hungary.¹⁵

In early July, 1913 Jane Sandansky arrived in Vlora with the aim of starting negotiations with the Albanian Government.¹⁶ Austro-Hungarian archival sources seem to suggest that Sandansky had no authorisation from the Bulgarian government. The one fact we know for certain from Austrian sources is that prior to his leave he had met a number of high-ranking military officers in Sofia, while his exact mission and its background are shrouded in mystery. We may assume, however, that the trip to Vlora was the Voivode’s own initiative with a view of concluding some kind of military agreement. What may have facilitated such an agreement was the fact that Sandansky, as one of the leaders of the VMRO’s left wing, had been a trustworthy ally of the Young Turks since 1906, while Ismail Qemali had earlier been one of the most prominent leaders of the Young Turk party. This may explain why the Macedonian leader thought that Qemali would be open to the idea of a military cooperation.¹⁷

¹⁵ Boeck, K., Op. cit., 107. and Bataković, D. T. Serbian Government and Esad-Pasha Toptani / Srpska vlada i Esad-pasa Toptani. – In: Mitrović, A. (Ed.). Serbs and Albanians in the 20th Century / Srbi i Albanci u XX. veku. Beograd, 1991, 63; ÖHHStA PA XII/421/60, pro domo notice of the joint Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Wien, 19.06.1913, No. 2943.

¹⁶ Elsie, R. (Hrsg.). Leo Freundlich. Die Albanische Korrespondenz. Agenturmeldungen aus Krisenzeiten Juni 1913 bis August 1914. München, 2012, 34–35, 42, 44.

¹⁷ Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici kraljevine Srbije (1903–1914). Knjiga 6,

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Qemali eventually refused to provide political support to Sandansky, but the Macedonian successfully approached Hasan Prishtina, a Kosovar minister of the government. Sandansky argued that an Albanian–Bulgarian joint effort may spark a successful revolt against Serbia. He convinced Prishtina, and the two returned to Sofia together.¹⁸

Defying the will of the Vlorë Government, the Albanian minister in Sofia intended to conclude an anti-Serbian pact between Bulgaria and Albania. The negotiations broke down as the participating Bulgarian statesmen (Salabashev, Kolushev, Nachovich and Danev) only started to seriously consider the idea of a joint war effort when the Balkan War II had practically ended (22–23 July). By then, however, Hasan Prishtina had already left Sofia. (After this point Sandansky no longer had any influence over the war events.)

We may conclude that even though the Bulgarian and the Albanian government showed willingness to start negotiations regarding the Serbian issue, in reality it was only certain isolated political powers outside Bulgaria and Albania that actively sought to engage in an armed conflict with Serbia.

What was, then, the true role that Bulgaria played in the assault? Following Sandansky's visit in Vlorë, other Bulgarian personalities appeared in Albania in September 1913. Once again, these new arrivals contacted the Provisional Government, but this

sveska 3 (1/14 juli – 31. decembar / 13. januar 1914). Pripedio: Dzhambazovski, Kl., D. Lukač. Urednik: Vasa Čubrilović. Beograd, 1983, 614, telegram of Šaponjić to Pašić, Bitola, 22.06./05.07.1913, no pov. br. 4502., 627–628; and 512. telegram of Putnik to the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Skopje, 12/25.06.1913, o.br. 7195., 563; Demeter, G. Bolgár kísérletek az elszigetelés elkerülésére a második Balkán-háború előestéjén. – In: Történeti tanulmányok: a Kossuth Lajos Tudományegyetem Történelmi Intézetének kiadványa. 13. köt., Debrecen, 2005, KLTE, 135–157, and Деметер, Г. Опитите на България да избегне изолацията в навечерието на Междусъюзническата война. – ИПр, 2012, 5–6, 3–33.

¹⁸ Cana, Z. Marrëdhëniet serbo-shqiptare 1912–1915. – In: Gjurmime Albanologjike – seria e shkencave historike, 19. Prishtinë 1989, 285.

time the Albanian Premier banished them from Vlora.¹⁹ Instead of leaving for Bulgaria, the Comitadjis then contacted the refugees who had come from around Lake Ohrid (mainly from the Ohrid and Struga region) and were staying around Elbasan.

The first such personality to appear in Albania whose name is known was a certain first lieutenant Markov, officer of the Bulgarian army. On 2 September 1913 he sent a telegram from Durrës to the Bulgarian high command in Sofia, but the reason for his stay and the content of the telegram have so far remained unknown. What is known, however, is that Markov arrived to Albania with a number of fellow officers and approached Durrës via Vlora. (The Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also notified of his telegram. It is almost certain that Esat Pasha, who further on still had access to the port town's telegraph office and thus to confidential state correspondence, disclosed the information to Beograd.)²⁰ Since the name Markov does not surface later in the sources, it is to be assumed that he had returned to Bulgaria before the attack.²¹

Markov's fellow passengers reached Elbasan in mid-September. Serbian and Austro-Hungarian sources identify them as follows: Voivodes Milan Matov, Stefan Hodo, Petâr Chaulev, Krsta Trajchev and Petâr Randljov. All of them were well-known leaders of the right wing of the VMRO, and fought in the

¹⁹ Myftiu, K. (përkthyer). Miku i madh i shqiptarëve. Aubrey Herbert dhe krijimi i Shqipërisë së sotme. Ditarë dhe letra 1904–1923. Përgatitur nga Bejtullah Destani dhe Jason Tomes me parathenie te Noel Malcolm. Tiranë, 2012, 166.

²⁰ KA Nachlässe, B 648 – Nachlass Essad Pascha, Kt. 1., Pallium „P I“.

²¹ ÖHHStA PA XII/449/23a, telegrams of Storck, Belgrad, 22.09.1913. (No. 3852.) and 25.09.1913. (No. 4409); verbal note of the Serbian Embassy in Viena to the Ballhausplatz, Viena, 29/16.9.1913., without No.; and telegram of Bilinski, Saloniki, 28.9.1913., No. 4869.; Dzhambazovski (pripedio), Dokumenti o spoljnoy politici 6/3, 337. circular note of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior to the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrad, 28/15.09.1913., without pov.br. [arrived in the ministry under pov.br. 6207.], 376.; and Cana, Z., Op. cit., 287.

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Bulgarian army as officers during the First Balkan War, which is why contemporary Serbian diplomacy refers to them as “Bulgarian agents”. The Voivodes set up a troop of 300 in Elbasan without delay and also expected another band under the lead of Pop-Hristo. These two VMRO units joined forces with the Albanians who had left Elbasan for Lake Ohrid on 24 September.²² The column rounded the lake from the south via Pogradec. The news of the advancing troops sparked off a number of uprisings around Lakes Ohrid and Prespa. Led by Chaulev, the known Bulgarian cheta leader, the attackers occupied Ohrid on 27 September.

A few days earlier on 22 September, another column under the lead of Isa Boletini had taken Debar. After the Serbian troops had withdrawn, the leader, Elez Jusufi ordered to set up a local municipality body which, a few days later, was transformed into a provisional government. According to the archival data of Branko Horvat, local Bulgarian leaders who had participated in the fights also joined this government. They aimed to create a supranational government for the first time since 1903, which was expected to represent the Macedonian interests (Horvat’s sources, however, do not specify what these interest were exactly). Sensing the instability of their situation, the Albanian members of the government telegraphed the Vlora Provisional Government on more than occasion on 23 and 25 September, requesting diplomatic and military assistance. In the meantime some of Boletini’s forces were marching on in the direction of Gostivar and Struga (Ohrid, Resen) where they joined Chaulev’s troops.²³

²² ÖHHStA PA XII/449/23a, Report of Zitkovszky to Berchtold, Monastir, 28.09.1913., No. 120.; verbal note of the Serbian Embassy in Vienna to the Ballhausplatz, Wien, 29/16.09.1913., without No., 5; Dzhambazovski, Kl. (pripedio), Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici 6/3, 337. circular note of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior to the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beograd, 28/15.09.1913., without pov.br. [arrived in the ministry under pov.br. 6207.], 377–378.; Bataković, D., Serbian government and Esad-Pasha, 63. and Boeck, Op. cit., 107.

²³ ÖHHStA PA XII/449/23a, telegrams of Storck, Belgrad, 22.09.1913, No.

Upon receiving news of the victories, the population of the annexed territories started to revolt against the Serbian rule. The anti-Serbian Slavs between the Black Drin and Treska also rose up along with the Albanians: according to Serbian sources, the local Bulgarians also participated in the occupation of Debar.²⁴ While however in today's West-Macedonia the troops mostly comprised Albanians, the uprisings in the Struga and Ohrid region were more Bulgarian in character, even though the local Albanian leaders joined them. The fall of Ohrid triggered a number of minor, isolated revolts among the Bulgarian population of the annexed territories (Kričova, Kjuštendil, Kičevo, Radovište, Mitrovica).²⁵ Presumably, the

3852 and 24.09.1913, No. 4238; telegram of Jehlitschka, Üsküb, 23.09.1913, No. 4080; report of the Evidenzbureau, 24.09.1913, Evb.Nr. 4143; KA MKSM, Kt. 1095, report of the Evidenzbureau, Belgrad, 23.09.1913, Evb.Nr. 4143.; KA MKFF, Kt.192, report of the Evidenzbureau, 24.09.1913, zu 4143; Gooch, G. P., H. Temperley (Eds.). *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914. Volume 10.1.* London, His Majesty's Office, 1936, No.4. Dayrell Crackanorpe to Grey, Belgrade, 09.09.1913, F.O. 41565/30271/13/44. (No. 203.), 3–4. and No.15. Dayrell Crackanorpe to Grey, Belgrade, 23.09.1913., F.O. 43538/30271/13/44. (No. 218.), 11; Dzhambazovski, Kl. (pripedio), Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici 6/3, 313. summary report of the Serbian Ministry of Interior (written by Todorović) to the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beograd, 23.09.1913, without pov.br. and date [arrived in the ministry under pov.br. 6078.] 357–358; and Löhr, H. Chr. *Die Gründung Albaniens. Wilhelm zu Wied und die Balkan-Diplomatie der Großmächte 1912–1914.* Frankfurt a.M., 2010, 130.

²⁴ ÖHHSStA PA XII/449/23a, telegram of Hornbostel, Tirana, 25.09.1913, No. 4351; instructions of Berchtold to the Austro–Hungarian ambassadors, 26.09.1913, (e.g. to Flotownak in Berlin, No. 654.); and an anonymous telegram, Üsküb, 26.09.1913, No. 4608.

²⁵ ÖHHSStA PA XII/449/23a, report of Storck to Berchtold, Belgrad, 03.10.1913, No. 204 D, Appendix: report of an authorised consular agent (anonymous) to Berchtold, Mitrovitza, 29.09.1913, No. 53/p. and telegram of Umlauf, Mitrovitza, 02.10.1913, No. 506; telegram of Jehlitschka, Üsküb, 27.9.1913, No. 4761.; telegram of Kohlruss, Prizren, 27.9.1913, No. 4787; telegram of Zitkowsky, Monastir, 27.09.1913, No. 5075; and report of the Austro–Hungarian military attaché in Belgrade (Gellinek) to Conrad, Res.Nr. 299; Keßler, Otto, *Der Balkanbrand 1912/13.* Bd. 2. Leipzig, 1913, 353.

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headcount of the irregular Albanian and Bulgarian forces fighting against the Serbs peaked at 15–20.000 on 27–28 September.²⁶

On 29 September, equipped with the weapons, ammunition and batteries they had captured in Debar, Boletini's troops continued to advance towards Gostivar and Kičevo, while those fighting in the Ohrid and Struga region clashed with the Serbian soldiers approaching from Resen. The fortunes of war changed on 30 September, when the Serbian army launched a counter-offensive and captured Žirovnica. The Albanians abandoned Gostivar and Debar and withdrew into Albania. Few days later the Bulgarians surrendered Ohrid to the Serbians.²⁷

Serbian military responses to the Albanian-Bulgarian uprising and assault were exceptionally severe. By 2 October the Serbian army had crushed most of the uprisings in the annexed territories and established secure supply lines. By the time the mobilisation of four divisions had been completed, the garrisons along the Bulgarian border had been fortified and fully manned regiments were ready to be deployed.²⁸

²⁶ ÖHHStA PA XII/449/23a, aide memoire of the Serbian Embassy in Vienna to the Ballhausplatz, 29.09.1913, without No., 5. and 9; report of the Austro-Hungarian military attaché in Belgrade (Gellinek) to Conrad, 27.09.1913, Res.Nr. 299; report of Zitkovszky to Berchtold, Monastir, 28.09.1913, No. 120; telegram of Lejhanec, Valona, 28.09.1913, No. 4914. and telegram of Zitkovszky, Monastir, 09.10.1913, No. 2139; ÖHHStA PA XII/450/23d, report of the Evidenzbureau, 01.10.1913, Res.No. 4300/1; Kotini, Dhimitër (Red.), Qeveria e Përkohëshme e Vlorës dhe veprimtaria e saj – nëndor 1912 – janar 1914. Tiranë, 1963, Drejtoria e Përgjithëshme të Arkivave Shtetërore, Nr. 273, 199; Nr. 275, 200.

²⁷ ÖHHStA PA XII/449/23a, telegram of Zitkovszky, Monastir, 29.09.1913, No. 5183; and report of Jehlitschka to Berchtold, Üsküb, 29.09.1913, No. 125.

²⁸ ÖHHStA PA XII/449/23a, telegram of Jehlitschka, Üsküb, 02.10.1913, No. 460; report of Storck to Berchtold, Belgrad, 03.10.1913, No. 207 B; telegram of Storck, Belgrad, 03.10.1913, No. 666. and telegram of Jehlitschka, Üsküb, 03.10.1913, No. 671; ÖHHStA PA XII/450/23b, report of the Evidenzbureau, Evb.Res.Nr. 4300/6, 02.10.1913; KA MKSM, Kt.1095, 18–1/2–37 de 1913, report of the Evidenzbureau, Belgrad, 01.10.1913, Evb.Nr. 4279; Kodra, Masar, Relacionet e Dibrës e të rrethinave të saj me Qeverinë e Vlorës dhe me fuqitë e

The main body of the Serbian army cross the Black Drin on 3 October. Following the recapture of Ohrid on 2 October, the left wing was busy “consolidating” the region for days. Centres of armed resistance were eliminated, and while Chaulev’s 6.000 Albanian-Bulgarian troops were forced to retreat towards Struga, the Serbian forces, having given chase to another retreating band, reached the Qafa e Thanës Pass on the left shore of the lake via Pogradec. This Pass was the eastern gate of Middle-Albania.²⁹ The continuous deluge of the Serbian irregular troops marked the outset of the retribution in the Albanian and Bulgarian villages along Lake Ohrid and the Black Drin.³⁰

A terrible massacre ensued.³¹ Although no Serbian archival sources have been published on the subject, there was a Serbian eye-witness, an army officer who had participated in the Albanian invasions in the autumn of 1912 and in October 1913. Dimitrije Tucović, one of the founders of the Serbian social democracy, advanced as far as Elbasan in the autumn of 1913. A politician of the opposition, he kept sending his accounts from the warzone to Beograd, and his letters were duly published in the newspaper of the social democrats, the *Radničke novine*.³² His reports radically differed from the information published in the loyalist papers. Tucović strongly

médha. – In: Studime Historike, 1997/1–4, 129. and Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, Aus meiner Dienstzeit. 1906–1918. Bd. 3. Wien–Leipzig–München, 1922, 454–462, 465–466, and 469–474.

²⁹ ÖHHStA PA XII/449/23a, report of Zitkowszky to Berchtold, Monastir, 04.10.1913, No. 122; KA MKFF, Kt.192/Balkankrise II, report of the Evidenzbureau, 6.10.1913, Evb.Nr. 4300/6 res; Kotini (red.), Qeveria e Përkohëshme e Vlorës, Nr. 309, 220; and Kodra, Relacionet e Dibrës, 130.

³⁰ ÖHHStA PA XII/449/23a, telegram of Jehlitschka, Üsküb, 8.10.1913, No. 1897.

³¹ Durham, E. M. Die slawische Gefahr. Zwanzig Jahre Balkanerinnerungen. Deutsch herausgegeben von Hermann Lutz. Stuttgart, 1922, Lutz, 303. and Boeck, K., Op. cit., 108.

³² See „Krvna osveta soldateska” and „Crnagorski ves”. – *Radničke novine*, 09.10.1913, and 22.10.1913; Leo Freundlich. Die Albanische Korrespondenz, 211.

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opposed Pašić's chauvinistic and illusionary politics, and he stressed that at the outbreak of the uprising the Serbian political elite considered the insurgents, i.e. the Albanians as convicts to be ruthlessly exterminated. The army followed those orders in a beastly manner;³³ but I do not wish to elaborate on this now. Georgiev published long and detailed statistics in his abovementioned works on the villages that fell victims and the human casualties, and I hope to complement his information with data found in the Vienna sources.

What role did *Bulgaria* play in the events of September 1913 at the side of the VMRO? Presumably, not a very significant one. It was Belgrade that feared that Sofia might take advantage of the Albanian attacks and attempt to take revenge on Serbia for the Bulgarian defeat in the Balkan War II. All the more so, because the war tension at the time between Greece and Turkey would have probably prevented Athens from lending a helping hand to Serbia. That might explain why Pašić ordered all Serbian envoys to spare no efforts and call the attention of the great powers to the presence of the Bulgarian officers among the enemy troops. The Premier wanted to maintain the dreaded possibility that the Albanian assaults might trigger another all-Balkan conflict. He proved to be right in believing that all great powers wanted to avoid such a conflict.³⁴

³³ „I kada je buna izbila, vlada je preko zastupnika ministra spoljašnjih dela izjavila da će Arbanasi biti „primerno kažnjeni“, buržoaska štampa je tražila istrebljenje bez milosti, a vojska je izvršavala. Arbanska sela, iz kojih su ljudi bili blagovremeno izbegli, behu pretvorena u zgarišta. To behu u isto vreme varvarski krematorijumi u kojima je sagorelo stotinama živih žena i deca. I dokle su ustanici zarobljene srpske oficire i vojnike razoružavali i puštali, dotle srpska soldateska nije štedela ni njihovu decu, žene i bolesne. [...] Još se jednom potvrdilo da je narobna pobuna najprimitivnijih plemena uvek humanija od prakse stajaće vojske koju moderna država protiv pobune upotrebljava.” Tucović, D., Op. cit., 107–108.

³⁴ Dzhambazovski, Kl. (pripedio), Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici 6/3, 334. telegram of Dučić to the Serbian MInistry of Foreign Affairs, Rom, 28/15.09.1913, pov.br. 66, 375; 336. report of Nenadić to the Serbian

Even though Bulgaria followed the updates on the events with sympathy, in all probabilities the “Bulgarian” participation meant nothing more than the involvement of the right wing of the VMRO. Despite the fact that certain četa leaders as former officers of the Bulgarian army sent telegrams to Sofia, the Bulgarian government provided no official support to the cause. (It however cannot be ruled out, that the Bulgarian high command or certain individuals in the army supported some actions of the VMRO with ammunition and money.) Members of the Bulgarian government primarily obtained information about the war events from the envoys of Serbia and the Monarchy, while the Sofia papers (eg. *Kambana*, *Jutro*, *Dnevnik*, *Večernja pošta*) regarded the Beograd and the Vienna press as their primary source of information. According to the official Bulgarian stance the war had broken out as a consequence of the actions of the VMRO. The contemporary Austro-Hungarian consular reports and the published Serbian sources also suggest that Beograd was well aware of the Bulgarian stance. Some of the Serb diplomats (eg. Nenadić Sofia envoy) were also apt to interpret the events as the product of a local Bulgarian-Albanian cooperation. Unfortunately it remains unclear from Austrian sources what political capital the right wing of the VMRO hoped to gain by participating in the uprising.³⁵

By and large this is the picture that the Austro-Hungarian sources allowed to reconstruct.³⁶ From the research of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia, 28/15.09.1913, pov.br. 333, 376; and 348. report of Jovanović to the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (to Spalajković), Beč, 01.10/18.09.1913, pov.br. 424, 385–386.

³⁵ ÖHHStA PA XII/449/23a, report of Tarnowski to Berchtold, 30.09.1913, No. 61–B; and report of Jehlitschka to Berchtold, Üsküb, 29.09.1913, No. 125; Dzhambazovski, Kl. (pripedio), Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici 6/3, 331. report of Nenadić to the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia, 27/14.09.1913, pov.br. 329, 371–372; Boeck, K., Von den Balkankriegen, 107.

³⁶ ÖHHStA PA XII/449/23a, instruction of Berchtold to the Austro-Hungarian ambassadors (e.g. to Flotow in Berlin 26.9.1913, No. 654); anonymous

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relevant Sofia sources I expect nothing less than to find answers as to the motives of Sandansky's July visit and the political aspirations of the VMRO military leaders. Finding sources about the operation of the Debar municipality between 22–29 September would also be a considerably useful achievement, as such sources might shed light on the circumstances under which the idea of a supranational Macedonian government after 1903 occurred once again.

telegram, Üsküb, 26.09.1913, No. 4608; telegram of Jehlitschka, Üsküb, 27.9.1913, No. 4761; and report of Zitkovszky to Berchtold, Monastir, 28.09.1913, No. 120; KA MKSM, Kt. 1095, 18–1/2–35 de 1913, report of the Evidenzbureau, Belgrad, 23.09.1913, Evb.Nr. 4143. and 18–1/2–37 de 1913, report of the Evidenzbureau, Belgrad, 01.10.1913, Evb.Nr. 4279; KA MKFF, Kt.192/Balkankrise II, report of the Austro–Hungarian military attaché to Conrad, Belgrad, 02.10.1913, Evb.Nr. 4302. (Res.Nr. 308); Dzhambazovski, Kl. (pripedio), Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici 6/3, 313. summary report of the Serbian Ministry of Interior (written by Todorović) to the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrad, 23/10.09.1913, without pov.br. [arrived in the ministry under pov.br. 6078], 357–358.

Serbia and the “Albanian Question” in 1912–1913 – a Re-reading of Published Triple Entente Sources

Krisztián Csaplár-Degovics

Research Centre for the Humanities, Institute of History – HAS

“If one tells them that they will provoke an European war they shrug their shoulders & say that Austria [,] not they [,] will be responsible if there is war, that Austria is merely trying to suppress them & ... although they may suffer considerably in a war with Austria & may lose they have gained they will 'die fighting'. This phrase has become a sort of mania with them.”

(Paget to Nicolson, Belgrad, 7.10.1912, private; quoted by: Thomas G. OTTE, *The Foreign Office Mind*. Cambridge 2011. 371)

“Servia will some day set Europe by the ears and bring about a universal war on the Continent...[T]he Serbs may lose their heads and do something aggressive against the Dual Monarchy which will compel the latter to put the screws on Servia... [The situation] may be compared to a certain extent to the trouble we had to suffer through the hostile attitude formally assumed against us by the Transvaal Republic under the guiding hand of Germany. It will be lucky if Europe succeeds in avoiding a war as a result of the present crisis.”

(Cartwright to Nicolson, Vienna, 31.1.1913, FO 800/363; quoted by Thomas G. OTTE, *The Foreign Office Mind*, 372.)

“In handicrafts class, the children made small Serbian flags and coloured them in. In arithmetic, these flags were pinned to the blackboard in rows of ten which helped the pupils to count

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by tens. ... In numeration, the pupils were asked to write and read out the numbers expressing the surface areas of European countries. These exercises helped the children to express the area of France and its population as a multiple of that of Serbia. Some thoughts were written up on the blackboard about our faithful allies: ‘I am learning to love Serbia, I am learning to remember her history and her long struggle. I write ‘Long Live Serbia’ which is defending her independence and her freedom. I want to help the little Serbians, I am making my small offering.’ ... Prints were handed round and examined. ...”

(The celebration of ‘Serbian Day’ in France on 26 March 1915 according of Yves Racine. Quoted by Jean Jacques BECKER: *The Great War and the French People*, Leamington 1985. 157)¹

The main ambition of the present study is to draw attention to the fact that besides the Great Powers it was the small nationstates of the Balkans that could be held indirectly accountable for the outbreak of World War I. It does not mean, of course, that both groups of states carry the same weight of responsibility. This paper aims to stress that it was the Balkans and its nationstates that played the role of a catalyst in the outbreak of the Great War, as it was in this region that the balance between the great powers ceased to exist.

The primary goal of this presentation is to re-read certain published archive sources (document compilations and memoirs)² of the Triple Entente Powers and by doing so I

¹ I would like to thank my friend, Péter Bihari for collecting the mottos.

² Memoirs consulted: Grey, E. *Twenty-five Years 1892–1916*. London, 1925, 260–274; Sasonoff, Sergej D. *Sechs schwere Jahre*. Berlin, 1927, 81–108; Poincaré, R. *Memoiren*. *Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges 1912–1913*. Dresden, 1928, 370–536. Collections of resources consulted: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch. *British Documents on the Origin of the War 1898–1914*. Vol. 10/1: *The Near East on the Eve of the War*. London, 1936; Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch. *Die Britischen Amtlichen Dokumente*, Bd. 9,1, Berlin–Leipzig, 1934; Duka, V. *Dokumente britanike për Shqipërinë dhe shqiptarët* (janar –

endeavour to call attention to the fact that no investigation of the events leading to the war may be complete without a thorough research of the Balkan wars. In the case of Serbia the rediscovery of the mentioned sources is all the more important since, due to their unpleasant nature, several pieces of the historic information had not been integrated in the Serbian national canon. (Had this information been made part of the canon, the Serbian historiography would assume a more critical approach towards the national history, of which there are no hints, whatsoever).³

The re-reading of these sources is further justified by the fact that the Serbian historiography refuses to interpret the Albanian question as part of the universal prehistory of the

dhjetor 1914). Völl. I. Tiranë, 2012; Siebert, B. *Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Entente politik der Vorkriegsjahre*. Band 2. Berlin–Leipzig, 1921; Hoetzsch, O. *Die Internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus*. Dokumente aus den Archiven der Zarischen und der Provisorischen Regierung. Berlin, 1942. Reihe 3 / Band 4/1.; Stieve, F. *Der Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis 1911–1914*. Aus den Geheimakten der Russischen Staatsarchive. Band 3. Berlin, 1924.

³ The following publications by no means cover the whole scholarly spectrum of recent years, but they amply demonstrate the present perspective of the Serbian historiography. They all share an obliviousness to the memoirs even though they use published Triple Entente resources; they, in part, present the Austrohungarian–Serbian relations only by an introduction of the various concepts of the Monarchy’s general staff – although the Serbian general staff’s designs as to the Monarchy would also appear worthy of investigation; they do not emphasize the conflict between Powers and Serbia regarding Albania. Bjelajac, M. 1914–2014 zašto revizija. Beograd, 2014; Mitrović, A. *Prodor na Balkan*. Beograd, 2011, 151–152, 174, 240, 247; Mitrović, A. *Les intérêts français en Serbie à la veille de la Première Guerre mondiale*. – In: Bataković, D. *La Serbie et la France*. Belgrade, 2010, 231–250 and Živojinović, D. *Kralj Petar Karadorđević*. Beograd, 2009, 501–502 and 509–510 (these are the pages on which Albania is mentioned). Unfortunately, Rastović’s collection of studies also fails to present the whole Albania image of the British or as the British perceived the Serbian–Albanian relations in 1912–1913. Rastović, A. *Englezi i Balkan 1837–1914*. Beograd, 2015, 126–140.

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World War; rather, it views these issues as a separate phase of the Austrohungarian–Serbian conflict, even though it was all the Great Powers, and not the Monarchy alone, that Serbia came into conflict with over the organization of Albania in 1912–1913. The Triple Entente sources may also shed light on why the Albanian crises of 1912–1913 failed to bring about the outbreak of the war, although these proved to be far more grievous than the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.

In this paper I endeavour to investigate through the prism of the Albanian question how the Entente diplomats regarded Serbia. I wish to narrow down the investigation in time to the autumn events of 1912 and 1913 and in space to the coastal region of Albania. (Considering that the above sources only sporadically relate the events taking place in the autumn of 1913 I found it indispensable to complement the event history of the Albanian-Macedonian–Serbian war with Austro-Hungarian and Serbian sources.) My goal is to demonstrate how Serbia took an active part in accelerating the events that led to the outbreak of the World War.⁴ According to my hypothesis, this theory could be further supported by similar case studies that focus on the Romanian, Greek, Bulgarian and Ottoman contribution to the pre-war events.

It is important to note that the present study is not a historical work in the classical sense, as it seeks not to explore one question from many different points of view: it focuses merely on the published Triple Entente sources, does not apply a critical approach regarding the memoirs and consults with

⁴ Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić was also well aware of this. The only reason he did not accuse the infamous Black Hand and Colonel Apis of contributing to the outbreak of the World War at the 1917 Salonika show trial was that by such accusations he would have admitted to Serbia's role in the events, as well. See: Hornyák Á. „Aki kirobbantotta az első világháborút”. Dragutin Dimitrijević–Apis koncepciója pere. – In: Gyarmati Gy., I. Lengvári, A. Pók, J. Vonyó (Eds.). Bűnbak minden időben. Bűnbakok a magyar és az egyetemes történelemben. Pécs–Budapest, 2013, 207–216. In his study Bjelajac critically refuses this interpretation (and calls it arbitrary).

the available secondary literature to a limited extent only. My aim is to reconstruct a partial historical picture relying on one group of sources. The study is to be seen as a single question, that is: how much longer is it possible for the Serbian historiography to sustain its traditional narrative about the outbreak of World War I, if many of its major statements (the most prominent of which being that Serbia was but the victim of an aggressive Austro-Hungarian foreign policy) can be refuted with opposing evidence from contemporary Triple Entente sources.

I do not dispute the righteousness of the contemporary Serbian aspirations in this study, nor do I question the national grievances that Serbia wished to avenge in 1912–1913 on the Ottoman Empire. I do not doubt that the Austro-Hungarian occupation and annexation of Bosnia Herzegovina left little choice for the Serbian foreign policy and that Serbia and the activists of the Serbian nation-building (eg. in Bosnia Herzegovina) felt threatened by the Monarchy. It is not my intention to shift the main responsibility on the countries of the Balkan in connection with the outbreak of the war.

AUTUMN, 1912

The peace in Europe was based on the careful balance of the great power systems, which, by the advent of the Balkan wars, had become rather fragile. It was becoming increasingly difficult to harmonize the interests within and without the various alliances, while more and more crises emerged, which, a decade before, would not have put to the test the capacity of the ‘concerto’ performed by the Great Powers. The leading European powers had to invest more and more energy in tackling their mutual and proliferating conflicts of interests. Although they could not grasp the true dimensions of the problem, they were well aware that the failure to compromise might bring about a great war of previously unheard of proportions. By the early 1910s, the international diplomacy

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had often voiced the view that a war among the Great Powers had to be avoided, and the “international peace” was to be protected at all cost.

The outbreak and the events of the 1912–1913 Balkan wars caught the Great Powers by surprise. It was only then that they realized that the states of the peninsula had become independent factors in the international foreign policy. They also recognized that the foreign policy of these states posed on the international peace a threat no smaller than the conflicts of the Great Powers, the diplomats of which were growing increasingly desperate as they comprehended that the nation states of the Balkan would stop at nothing to attain their national goals and were even prepared to risk the outbreak of a world war. For years, the diplomacy of the Great Powers did nothing more than try to manage a series of crises that emerged in connection with a war they did not start – and the crisis management was about to fall through.

The Triple Entente and the First Balkan War

The formerly more or less flexible cooperation among the great power alliances showed signs of breaking up before 1912 already. In any other region of the Earth the Great Powers could strike compromises, but the Balkan peninsula proved to be impossible to handle. Of the Triple Entente powers only Russia held direct interests there, while Great Britain and France had none. The two latter could only lose with a conflict broken out in the region; they had nothing to win, no advantages to gain. As a partial problem of the Eastern Question, the peninsula carried only secondary significance for them. Thus, prior to 1912, Great Britain aspired only to maintain the cooperation of the Great Powers in Southeast Europe, while France pursued a low-key diplomacy on the peninsula (although the Parisian economic circles enjoyed complete freedom in performing their activities in the region). According to the memoirs of Edward Grey, the cooperation on

the Balkans disintegrated in three major steps: in 1908 the annexation (“disturbance”), in 1910 the war of Tripoli (“shock”) prompted the Adriatic Powers to abandon the unspoken agreements; the final blow, however, came from the small nation states of the Balkan. According to Grey it was the Balkan Allies that dealt the fatal blow on the status quo and also on how the Eastern Question had been handled until then.⁵

Since the Great Powers were unable to exert influence on the nation states of the Balkan, the European diplomacy required the Ottoman Empire to make certain concessions hoping that it would suffice to resolve the conflict. After these plans had fallen through, the First Balkan War broke out in October, 1912. The foreign ministries of the Great Powers were filled with anguish, as they were clearly aware that if the status quo fell apart, then all the Great Powers concerned would be compelled to react which would automatically strain the already delicate relations within their alliances. Therefore Vienna and Saint Petersburg – after their own fashion – left no stone unturned in their attempt to localise the armed conflict and prevent territorial changes. (Although the two Great Powers did not negotiate their vision of how to manage the conflict, at that very moment and in that respect they trusted one another.⁶) The Great Powers eventually decided on a policy of non-intervention: they waited not only until the combat ended but also for the results of the negotiations between the warring parties (London, Bucharest). It is rather telling as to how much they wished to avoid coming into conflict with one another.⁷

⁵ Grey, E., *Op. cit.*, 260 and Reuter, P. *Die Balkanpolitik des französischen Imperialismus 1911–1914*. Frankfurt–New York, 1979, 295.

⁶ Report of the Russian Ambassador of Vienna to Sasonoff, Vienna, 02/05.08.1912, 536. – In: Siebert, B., *Op. cit.* To the question see also: Sasonoff, S. D. *Op. cit.*, 83–84.

⁷ Grey, E., *Op. cit.*, 263 and Russische Vorsichtsmaßnahmen zum Schutze seiner Interessen [Russian measures to save her own interests], 538–550. – In: Siebert, B., *Op. cit.*

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Quite naturally, the unexpected major victories of the Balkan Allies caused an upheaval in the relations of the Triple Entente powers. London and Paris did everything to prevent Saint Petersburg from interfering with arms in the war. Grey proposed that a *stand* be adopted by all the Great Powers, while his French colleague put forward the idea of organising a *conference* with all the Powers participating. On behalf of France that had previously taken on a passive role in the region, Poincaré attempted to lay down the foundation for future arrangement. He suggested that each and every great power release a statement in which they forego any claim for compensation. It was easy for him to say, since France, as mentioned above, had no direct interests on the peninsula.⁸

The only thing that mattered to Grey at the end of October 1912 was that the Triple Entente stand united; he thought it was unnecessary to work out concrete proposals. Obviously, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs at this point still believed that the status quo in some form could be sustained.⁹

The more and more active French Ministry of Foreign Affairs firmly demanded to be informed by the Russian diplomacy about the contents of the treaties of the Balkan Alliance, with special regard to the Serbian-Bulgarian agreements. By this, France wished to press Russia to discontinue its independent Balkan policy and to liaise its further activity with Great Britain and France. Saint Petersburg denied knowledge of all the relating treaties and in October declined to answer its ally's queries, which in turn caused disturbance and misunderstandings in the French–Russian diplomatic communication.¹⁰

⁸ Sasonoff, S. D., Op. cit., 85 and Nr. 93. Report of Izvolsky to Sasonoff, Paris, 17/30.10.1912, 101. – In: Hoetzsch, O., Op. cit.

⁹ Private letter of Benckendorff to Sasonoff, London, 09/22.10.1912, 556 and Nr. 269. Telegram of Benckendorff to Sasonoff, London, 08/21.10.1912, 553. – In: Siebert, B., Op. cit.

¹⁰ Poincaré, R. Op. cit., 386 and 391; Nr. 268. Telegram of Benckendorff to Sasonoff, London, 08/21.10.1912, 552; to the question see also: 557–562. –

After it had become clear that the redelineation of state borders was unavoidable on the peninsula, Paris had a new concern: they were uncertain as to how Austria-Hungary would regard the Serbian territorial gain. The French diplomats assumed that the Monarchy would aggressively demand compensation, and that was why Poincaré expected the Great Powers to declare that they held no direct interests (“*désintéressement*”) in connection with the conflict, that is they forego any territorial compensation. (It is once again important to emphasize that France had no territorial interests on the peninsula.) As his proposal had been turned down by both the Ballhausplatz and Wilhelmstrasse, the Triple Entente Powers nurtured unwarranted suspicions that the Monarchy was indeed preparing for territorial gains. France therefore launched a rather vigorous diplomatic offensive and appealed to her allies not to approve of any territorial gain of the Great Powers on the peninsula. As the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 fundamentally questioned the credibility of Austria-Hungary, both Great Britain and Russia agreed with the French proposal.

Although the Russian diplomacy had undoubtedly strong ties with its Balkan allies, the relations between Vienna and Saint Petersburg were characterised by mutual solidarity until September–October, 1912. The two countries, just like all the other Great Powers, were aware that if the Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests could be harmonized in the region then peace on the Balkans might be just a few steps away. Even Sasonoff himself believed in mid-October that a tighter cooperation with the Monarchy might be the key to solving the problems in the region and tried to evade the new initiatives of the French diplomacy while looking to make a separate agreement with London.¹¹

Due to the military victories of the Balkan allies, once again

In: Siebert, B., Op. cit.

¹¹ Nr. 267. Telegram of Benckendorff to Sasonoff, London, 8/21.10.1912, 551–552, 551. – In: Siebert, B., Op. cit.

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the redelineation of the borders had been put on the agenda. This posed two rather serious problems for the Triple Entente powers: on the one hand the control over the straits had been jeopardized, while on the other hand they had to prepare themselves for the Monarchy’s attempts to protect its direct interests on the peninsula. Negotiations soon followed between Paris, London and Saint Petersburg with a view to finding solutions to both problems and to preventing the outbreak of a war in Europe at the same time. Interestingly enough, the issue of the straits proved to be the less challenging one, since all the Great Powers insisted on observing the agreements already extant and that these strategic points remain under Ottoman authority. With regard to the Monarchy, however, the foreign ministries were more pessimistic, because on the coastal regions of Albania the clash of the Austro-Hungarian and the Serbian interests seemed inevitable.¹²

The Triple Entente and the Albanian Question

As the intervention of the Great Powers became necessary, the Triple Entente states announced that along with a number of other issues, the settlement of the future of the coastal Albania fell within the Great Powers’ scope of duties. The Triple Entente denied the victorious Balkan states the possibility of autonomous decision in all issues that could potentially spark off conflicts between the Great Powers. Albania was problematic not only because of the conflict of the Great Powers’ interests, but also because Serbia and Greece aspired to partition the region.¹³

In the late autumn of 1912 the Greek diplomacy concen-

¹² Nr. 36. Telegram of Sasonoff to Izvolsky, St. Petersburg, 10/23.10.1912, 35–36; Nr. 89. Report of Benckendorff to Sasonoff, London, 17/30.10.1912, 98; Nr. 110. Telegram of Izvolsky to Sasonoff, Paris, 19.10/01.11.1912, 120, and Nr. 118. Instruction of Sasonoff to the Russian ambassadors, St Petersburg, 20.10/02.11.1912, 128–129. – In: Hoetzsch, O., Op. cit.; and Sasonoff, S. D., Op. cit., 85–87.

¹³ Grey, E., Op. cit., 264 and 266.

trated its efforts on the islands of the Aegean Sea, the geographical Macedonia and Thrace; it was only in the winter of 1913 that the Greek government focused its foreign political activities on Albania, or "Epirus" to be more exact. All this meant that in the last months of 1912 the Entente powers primarily had to prevent Serbia, intoxicated with her previous military victories,¹⁴ from coming into conflict with the Adriatic Powers i.e. with Austria-Hungary and Italy. (The possibility that Russia might interfere with such a war on the side of Belgrade filled Paris and London with anxiety.) In connection with coastal Albania, the Monarchy was not the only interested party: Vienna and Rome had an effective agreement to keep any third party away from the Eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea even at the cost of war. Even though Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia were all aware that the Monarchy and Italy had been liaising for years or decades about the future of the Albanian territories on the Adriatic coastline, the four powers had only limited knowledge as to the exact content of the negotiations.¹⁵ Or, if they had any information, it carried little significance for them, as they regarded the geographical Albania with no interest. The arrangement later changed for two reasons. Firstly, it was the Albanian political aspirations that served as the final trigger event for the outbreak of the First Balkan War. Secondly, by 1912 the Italian and Austro-Hungarian relations had become so tense (for other reasons) that the Triple Entente powers feared if the two allies are "left alone" in Albania with the task of managing the creation of the new state, then they would sooner or later be engaged in an armed clash.

So, for the first time in modern history, Albania found itself in the focus of all the Great Powers' attention. In order to work out the adequate diplomatic steps to counter the plans of

¹⁴ Grey, E., *Op. cit.*, 264.

¹⁵ Nr. 676. Letter of confidence of Sasonoff to Krupenski, St. Petersburg, 18/31.10.1912, 482–483. – In: Siebert, B., *Op. cit.* and Poincaré, R. *Op. cit.*, 469.

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Vienna and Rome, the Triple Entente Powers needed to gain information about the two Great Powers' agreements on Albania, and on the two countries' interests in this part of the world, which, considering its general conditions could as well be in Africa or Asia.¹⁶ It was necessary because no player in the region would have been capable of averting a joint Austro-Hungarian and Italian military action.¹⁷

What lay down the foundation for the great powers to compromise over Albania was that in November the Parisian diplomats finally understood that Austria-Hungary had no aspirations whatsoever to expand and that Vienna did not oppose the Serbian territorial gain in general, but only protested against Serbia acquiring an exit port to the Adriatic Sea. From then on, France supported that Albania become a territorial entity according to international laws as well. A further sign of the French readiness to compromise was that after the Ballhausplatz agreed on creating a joint presence of the Great Powers in Albania, Poincaré gave the green light so the Great Powers could affirm the autonomous nature of the new state (on November 28th 1912. in Vlora the Albanians already proclaimed the autonomous Albania).¹⁸

The threat of a possible European war, an armed clash of the Great Powers dominated the background negotiations. Every minor shift in foreign policy, no matter how insignificant, prompted the member states of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance to give serious consideration to the conditions under which the *casus foederis* had to come into play; the question was how far they could support their Great Power allies without sparking off a great war.

¹⁶ Jaray, G. *L'Albanie inconnue*. Paris, 1913, quoted by: Wendel, H. *Süd-osteuropäische Fragen*. Berlin, 1918, 120.

¹⁷ Poincaré, R. *Op. cit.*, 268.

¹⁸ Reuter, P., *Op. cit.*, 297.

Serbia and the Albanian Coastline

As early as their first military victories in October, the Balkan Allies started liaising about the borders along which they planned to partition the liberated territories, with the coastal Albania. Hartwig's reports revealed to the diplomats of Saint Petersburg that Serbia had laid claims on Northern Albania (including the port towns of Shëngjin, Lezha and Durrës) partly for historical reasons but mainly out of economic necessity. Serbia expected that the acquisition of port towns would boost foreign trade and secure the economic independence of the country. At this point Belgrade anticipated that Shkodër and part of the sanjak would come under Montenegrin control, while the territories south of the Shkumbi river would belong to Greece. According to the memoirs of Sasonoff and the published Russian sources, the Serbian political elite and the general staff were prepared to defend with weapons, if need be, those territories which they had been planning to occupy.¹⁹

Although Belgrade was well aware that the Monarchy would make every effort to counter the Serbian expansion on the Adriatic, the government decided to put all their eggs in one basket, and between November 7th and 10th in Berlin they announced concepts that were far bolder than the ones presented in October. The Serbian delegation in the German capitol formally communicated that their country laid claims on the whole of Albania and on the Ottoman Adriatic as well. It also indicated that the negotiations of the Balkan allies had not been without certain disagreements over the partition of Albania.²⁰

Great Britain received the same information from the Pašić government. State Secretary for Foreign Affairs explicated to

¹⁹ Nr. 207. Telegram of Hartwig to Sasonoff, Belgrade, 27.10/09.11.1912, 217. – In: Hoetzsch, O., Op. cit.; Sasonoff, S. D., Op. cit., 88–89.

²⁰ Nr. 178. Telegram of Kinderlen-Wächter to Pourtalés, Berlin, 25.10/07.11.1912, 191–192; Nr. 187. Telegram of Grey to Buchanan, London, 26.10/08.11.1912, 198 and Nr. 209. Telegram of Giers to Sasonoff, Cetinje, 27.10/09.11.1912, 218. – In: Hoetzsch, O., Op. cit.

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the British envoy in Belgrade that having a sea port is a matter of life and death for Serbia, and the sheer magnitude of the blood sacrifice they had shed to acquire such a treasure, simply forbade the country to give up on it now. While the Foreign Office left the Serbian claims unanswered, the diplomats of the Wilhelmstrasse declared that they only found the idea of a Serbian port in the Adriatic acceptable if the Monarchy could build railway to Salonika in return.²¹

The journalists, columnists and historians of the age interpreted the controversies about the Serbian port mainly along the conflict of economic interests; however, truth be told, the Albanian ports carried very little economic significance in the era. Durrës, the biggest of the Albanian ports boasted nothing more than a 20-metre long wooden pier with 4–5-metre deep water underneath it, at best. The sizeable freight vessels could not even have been steered into the bay without being stranded. The number of the store-houses had not increased for decades, making it impossible to store large amount of cargo. Besides, everywhere along the coast, vast, many-kilometre-wide malaria-ridden swamps expanded. Carefully constructed roads or railways were also lacking in Albania, therefore goods shipped in from the sea in big quantities were impossible to be transported further into the inland.²²

One may choose any economic index to demonstrate the economic insignificance of Durrës. As early as the mid-19th century, the Romanian towns of Brăila and Galați had a population and geographical features very similar to those of Durrës. Yet, when comparing the export data, it turns out that in the two Romanian port towns in 1850 *the grain trade alone generated a turnover four to six times higher than the total*

²¹ No. 101. Report of Paget to Grey, Belgrad, 2.11.1912, 131 and No. 141. Letter of Grey to Goschen, 06.11.1912, 169–170. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, Op. cit., 1934.

²² Csaplár-Degovics, K., *Az albán nemzetévtől kezdetei (1878–1913). A Rilindja és az államalapítás korszaka*. Budapest, 2010, 87–91.

output of Durrës in 1912. (The huge difference between the turnover data can be proved with import data and with statistics about the cargo volume and the number and quality of the vessels visiting the port.)²³

Table 1. Total export value generated by grain trade in Brăila and Galați in 1845.

	1845
Brăila	13.1 million francs
Galați	8 million francs

Table 2. Total export data in Durrës in 1912–1913.

	1912	1913
Durrës	1.5 million francs	2 million francs

As to the conditions of the roads, it is rather telling, if one brings to mind how the Serbian troops reached Shkodër, the town that they were to besiege. They had to be transported by train from Prizren to Bitola and then to Salonika, then shipped around the Peloponnese and finally landed near the Montenegrin shore, because it was still faster and more simple than crossing the mountains from Prizren and covering the 150–200 kilometres as the crow flies.²⁴

²³ Sources of export data: Notice sur l'état agricole et commercial de la cote orientale de la mer Noire. Annales du commerce extérieur. Paris, 1847, 22–23; Albanien. Wirtschaftliche Verhältnisse 1913. Berichte der k.u.k. österreichisch-ungarischen Konsularämter in Skutari, Durazzo und Valona. Wien, 1915, 29 and Demeter, G., A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom. I. kötet: Társadalmi és gazdasági átalakulások a 18. század végétől a 20. század elejéig. Budapest, 2014, 143–162.

²⁴ The mountainous terrain hindered railway construction. Between the two World Wars, Yugoslavia still did not commence building a railway line connecting Central and Southern Serbia with the Montenegrin coastline. Bíró L., A jugoszláv állam 1918–1939. Budapest, 2010, 178–181.

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The Triple Entente and the Question of the Serbian Coastline

The future fate of Albania augured to pose challenges for the Triple Entente from many aspects. As both the Monarchy and Serbia remained firm in their position, by November 1912 it had become clear that the two alliances of Great Powers would confront on the Eastern Adriatic in a previously unprecedented way. It was also obvious that any agreement, partial solution or plan concerning Albania would automatically affect all disputed territories of the Balkans, such as the islands of the Marmara and the Aegean Sea, Thrace, etc. (The logic of the negotiations was simple: if one Great Power agreed not to stick to its guns in connection with an Albanian issue, the other in return was expected to make concessions about the control over the Aegean islands, for example.)²⁵

It did not improve the situation either, that the Serbian government, taking for granted the support of the Triple Entente powers, issued more and more self-confident and warlike statements to provoke Austria-Hungary, formally a Great Power.²⁶ The diplomats of the Ballhausplatz also communicated that they would prevent any related Serbian attempt of occupying the Albanian seacoast. Vienna still had no territorial claims. From November on, they promoted “the Balkans belong to the Balkanese” principle and countered the Serbian claims with the concept of creating an “independent” Albania. The member states of the Triple Alliance stood united on the matter in the last weeks of 1912 (all the more so, since the Serbian troops were already heading to the coast during the negotiations).²⁷ As Sasonoff put it in his memoirs: “The creation of Albania had become some kind of dogma for Vienna and Rome”.²⁸

²⁵ Sasonoff, S. D., *Op. cit.*, 90 and 93.

²⁶ Poincaré, R., *Op. cit.*, 467 and 490.

²⁷ Nr. 188. Telegram of Izvolsky to Sasonoff, Paris, 26.10/08.11.1912, 199 and Nr. 199. Telegram of Izvolsky to Sasonoff, Paris, 27.10/09.11.1912, 208–209. In: Hoetzsch, O., *Op. cit.*

²⁸ Nr. 2461. Telegram of Sasonoff to Benckendorff, St. Petersburg,

According to the published Triple Entente sources, Paris still appeared to fear that Vienna, under the veil of diplomacy, nurtured hopes of territorial expansion. Poincaré regarded these fears verified when, at the turn of October and November. Vienna and Belgrade started a series of talks with a view to creating a customs union. What triggered the unrest of the French was that the previously rash and tense diplomatic relations seemed to be followed by a short pause during these talks, and Paris simply had no access to any information regarding the developments of the Serbian and Austro-Hungarian relations. Russian diplomatic sources reveal that the French Premier communicated his concerns to Saint Petersburg on more than one occasion.²⁹

The Parisian diplomats finally concluded that they would support the idea of the Serbs having access to an economic exit port in the Adriatic. With this, they hoped to satisfy both the Serbian demands and the Russian interests and at the same time wished to put the Monarchy at ease; furthermore they believed that this arrangement will help to avoid a big war in Europe.

In accordance with unpublished French proposals, the concept of the "Serbian economic exit to the Adriatic Sea" involved the following deals: 1. the Monarchy cannot expand on the Balkan peninsula; 2. Serbia shall be provided with a neutral railway connection to one of the Adriatic ports; 3. in the event of an armed conflict between Serbia and Austro-Hungary (out of Vienna's fault) then France would support

23.10./05.11.1912, 572–573 and Nr. 2526. Telegram of Sasonoff to Hartwig, St. Petersburg, 29.10. /11.11.1912, 578–579. – In: Siebert, B., *Op. cit.*; No. 141. Letter of Grey to Goschen, 06.11.1912, 169–170. – In: Temperley, H.–Gooch, G. P., *Op. cit.*, 1934; Poincaré, R., *Op. cit.*, 465 and Sasonoff, S. D. *Op. cit.*, 93.

²⁹ Nr. 140. Letter of Poincaré to Izvolsky, Paris, 22.10/4.11.1912, 149; Nr. 143. Telegram of Izvolsky to Sasonoff, Paris, 22.10/4.11.1912, 152 and Nr. 177. Letter of Izvolsky to Sasonoff, Paris, 25.10/07.11.1912, 188–190. In: Hoetzsch, O., *Op. cit.*

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Belgrade. In mid-November Poincaré launched a diplomatic campaign to secure the consent of the Great Powers to enforce the first two points, if necessary. He urged the Triple Entente to assume a united standpoint on these matters (preferably based on the French proposals), and requested all the Great Powers to sign a joint protocol (protocole de désintéressement) that they had no desire to expand in Southeast Europe (désintéressement territorial).³⁰

However, effectuating the joint protocol was not without difficulties. This was, to no little extent, due to the confusion that characterized the communication between the Triple Entente member states. To be more specific, Russia, similarly to Austria-Hungary, reserved the right to pursue independent policy towards the Ottoman Empire without having first liaised the agenda with her Great Power allies. As Vienna started individual talks with Belgrade on the matter of the customs union, Saint Petersburg also sustained the possibility of a sovereign agreement with Istanbul. This had a rather discouraging effect on London and Paris and cast doubt on the reliability of Russia as their ally.³¹

The British foreign policy wished to alleviate the tension and sought to belittle the significance of the Serbian demands. On the one hand Grey showed understanding of the Serbian economic necessities and held it quite natural that the Great

³⁰ Berchtold was willing to sign the protocol after a minor legal amendment: he wished to substitute the expression '*désintéressement territorial*' with '*désintéressement absolu*', which, in the interpretation of the Ballhausplatz, would have been an even more categorical phrasing in comparison with the French proposal. What Poincaré saw in this amendment, however, was that the Monarchy still had not abandoned the idea of a possible expansion. Nr. 200. Telegram of Izvolsky to Sasonoff, Paris, 27.10/09.11.1912, 209–210. – In: Hoetzsch, O., Op. cit.; Private letter of Poincaré to Izvolsky, Paris, 22.10 /04.11.1912, 576–577. – In: Siebert, B., Op. cit.; No. 165. Private letter of Cartwright to Nicolson, Vienna, 08.11.1912, 193–194. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, Op. cit., 1934.

³¹ Poincaré, R., Op. cit., 484 and 536.

Powers take Belgrade's sacrifices into consideration after the war. On the other hand he wanted to harmonize the Serbian aspirations with the Austro-Hungarian interests in order to prevent the outbreak of a new war. All in all, the Foreign Office trusted that neither Belgrade nor Saint Petersburg would put Vienna in the corner. It is conceivable that Grey expected the Russian-Serbian interest alliance to show self-restraint and present a compromise solution.³²

Grey's calculation was not unfounded. It was indeed in the interest of Russia that Serbia expand to the west without Austria-Hungary overreacting. Sasonoff in November already reconciled himself with the idea of an autonomous Albania, therefore, from his point of view also, the creation of the new state and the Serbian demands for an Adriatic port were connecting issues. But, since Serbia firmly opposed the concept of an independent Albania, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs warned the Belgrade government against their overambitious plans and the possible dangers these plans implied. At the same time, Sasonoff asked his opposite number in Austria-Hungary to take into consideration the fact that having an Adriatic port is indispensable for Serbia. Unfortunately it has so far remained unknown whether or not Saint Petersburg or any other Ministry of Foreign Affairs was aware that it was just as indispensable for the Monarchy to keep the Serbian economic interests away from the would-be independent Albania.³³

Sasonoff also promoted the consensus by calling upon Italy to persuade the Monarchy of the necessity of a Serbian Adriatic port. The Russian Minister argued that if the Serbian

³² No. 145. Letter of Grey to Buchanan, 7.11.1912, 174 and No. 165. Private letter of Cartwright to Nicolson, Vienna, 8.11.1912, 194. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, *Op. cit.*, 1934; Poincaré, R., *Op. cit.*, 470.

³³ Nr. 126. Telegram of Nekludov to Sasonoff, Sofia, 20.10/01.11.1912, 136. – In: Hoetzsch, O., *Op. cit.*; Nr. 2461. Telegram of Sasonoff to Benckendorff, St. Petersburg, 23.10/05.11.1912, 572–573. – In: Siebert, B., *Op. cit.*; Sasonoff, S. D., *Op. cit.*, 89 and 93.

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claims were not satisfied, it might create a dangerous atmosphere, in which, among other things, the Balkan War might continue. Sasonoff tried to reassure Vienna through Rome that the Monarchy need not be concerned about Serbia becoming a sea power. In return, the Entente powers were going to grant without delay the requested autonomy for the whole Albanian coast, and also promised not to disregard the Austro-Hungarian economic interests.³⁴

However, in November 1912 the Consulta absolutely refused the Russian appeal. According to Krupenski, the Russian ambassador in Rome, the Consulta did not give much thought to the question of the Serbian port. San Giuliano thought that Serbia was more likely to be given a port on the Aegean Sea, or that the dispute could be settled by a commercial and customs union between Serbia and Montenegro. But when the Triple Entente increased the pressure on him, San Giuliano left no doubt: what mattered most to Italy was that its agreements concluded with the Monarchy about Albania shall be not infringed. Not only did these agreements keep third parties away from Albania, but they protected Italy from the expansive aspirations of the Monarchy as well. Rome wanted to keep Vienna away from Albania no less than it wanted to keep Belgrade away. As for the future of Albania, Rome agreed with and supported the opinion of the Balkan Allies and Poincaré that "the Balkans belong to the Balkanese". Consequently, the general settlement of the situation, in that particular part of the peninsula also, was to build on the principle of nationality. Accordingly, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed not only Saint Petersburg but also London: the Serbian claims infringe the Albanian nationality principle; the Albanians are the enemies

³⁴ Nr. 183. Telegram of Sasonoff to Krupenski, St. Petersburg, 16.10/08.11.1912, 195. – In: Hoetzsch, O., *Op. cit.*; and Nr. 2500. Telegram of Sasonoff to Krupenski, St. Petersburg, 26.10/08.11.1912, 574–575. – In: Siebert, B., *Op. cit.*

of the Serbs, therefore they would for ever revolt against Belgrade. Only by creating an independent Albania where Serbia had no rights whatsoever, was it possible to consolidate the political scene on the peninsula. San Giuliano warned the Triple Entente: if the problems were not to be solved peacefully and a war ensued, then Italy would join on the side of Austria-Hungary and against Serbia. (It is possible that Italy received a similar mediation proposal from France too, because in the reply of the Italian Foreign Ministry was a hint, that the 1902 Barrère-Prinetti Accord did not apply in Albania.) All in all, the Triple Alliance supported the demands of Vienna and was preparing for an armed conflict.³⁵

The Triple Entente members did not wish to engage in war over a Serbian port in the Adriatic. All the less so, because Tittoni, Italian ambassador in Paris informed them, as mentioned above, that Austria-Hungary did not oppose a Serbian expansion in the central Balkans; the Monarchy simply did not want her southern neighbour to gain access to the Adriatic Sea. To put it differently, Vienna was willing to liaise about the control over such Albanian-inhabited towns as Peja/Peć/Ipek or Prizren. Paris then sought to make direct compromises with the Great Powers, that is, was willing to observe the Austro-Hungarian interests in coastal Albania.³⁶ The French Foreign Ministry informed its allies as well as Belgrade of this decision. Poincaré believed if Serbia, after all this, would still insisted on gaining a port in Albania, then she was to fight a war alone with the Triple Alliance (the mechanism of the decision-making was identical with that of

³⁵ Nr. 202. Telegram of Krupenski to Sasonoff, Rome, 27.10/09.11.1912, 211. – In: Hoetzsch, O., *Op. cit.*; Nr. 376. Telegramm of Izvolsky to Sasonoff, Paris, 07/20.11.1912, 590. – In: Siebert, B., *Op. cit.*; No. 164. Letter of Grey to Rodd, London, 08.11.1912, 192. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, *Op. cit.*, 1934 and Poincaré, R., *Op. cit.*, 468.

³⁶ Nr. 376. Telegram of Izvolsky to Sasonoff, Paris, 07/20.11.1912, 589–590. – In: Siebert, B., *Op. cit.*; Reuter, P., *Op. cit.*, 297.

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the 1913 Shkodër Crisis).³⁷

Saint Petersburg sought to resolve matters in a similar fashion. In his telegram of 11 November, 1912 Sasonoff informed Hartwig, the Belgrade minister, that France and Russia absolutely agreed on the above matter. What is more, the Russian Foreign Ministry cautioned Serbia that if it did not reconsider its designs that infringed the interests of the Adriatic Powers, *it would risk losing the diplomatic support of the Triple Entente*. To put it differently: Belgrade was left with no choice but to accept that the Great Powers were to create a coastal Albanian state. Accordingly, the Serbs had to relinquish the plan to occupy a port by force and had to withdraw their troops that were marching towards the Adriatic. In return Sasonoff offered to take every step necessary for Belgrade to receive some kind of economic compensation in the new Albanian state.³⁸

*The Diplomatic Efforts of the Triple Entente to Moderate the
Serbian Territorial Demands*

Although the Triple Entente members would have preferred a compromise solution among the Great Powers, they had no desire to estrange Serbia. The diplomatic objective of the Triple Entente was that Serbia relinquish the representation of certain interests to the benefit of Paris, London and Saint Petersburg. In Serbia, however, the government, the military and public were all intoxicated with the victories, and much to Sasonoff’s dismay, in mid-November they regarded the issue of the Adriatic port as a question of prestige.³⁹ The Triple Entente members thus launched a separate diplomatic action with the purpose of making Serbia exercise self-restraint and

³⁷ Poincaré, R., Op. cit., 490.

³⁸ Nr. 2526. Telegram of Sasonoff to Hartwig, St. Petersburg, 29.10/11.11.1912, 579. – In: Siebert, B., Op. cit.

³⁹ Sasonoff, S. D., Op. cit., 90.

preventing the Serbian army from invading the Eastern coast of the Adriatic, as it could have triggered unforeseeable consequences.

In the first two weeks of November it was mainly the Russian diplomats loyal to Sasonoff who aspired to persuade the Serbian government to abandon its causes. They were rather hard put. The Russian public was beyond doubt pro-Serbian and, due to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they nurtured irrevocably hostile sentiments towards Austria-Hungary. According to the memoirs of Sasonoff, what constituted the difficulty of the task was that at the same time Saint Petersburg had to encourage the Serbian aspirations and promote self-restraint in the Pašić government. Assuming the moral responsibility of an elder brother, Sasonoff cautioned Serbia against the dangers that might have a disastrous influence on the future of the country. The internal correspondence of the Foreign Office reveals that before November 16th Russia firmly communicated to Belgrade that the Triple Entente members were not to support the current aspirations of the Serbian government.⁴⁰

The friendly Russian warnings were dispatched to Belgrade to no avail. It was “with stormy impatience” (stürmische Ungeduld) that the Serbian government discarded the advice received, and continued its former all-or-nothing policy. It is true, though, that Sasonoff subsequently admitted that Pašić would have faced grave difficulties had he attempted to calm the enthusiastic and intoxicated public of Serbia.⁴¹ (Not to mention the fact that the Serbian army would not have necessarily obeyed a behest forbidding them from invading the Adriatic.) Therefore the Russian diplomacy called upon their allies to confirm via their respective embassies in Belgrade: concerning her current Adriatic policy, Serbia shall

⁴⁰ No. 213. Letter of Bertie to Grey, Paris, 16.11.1912, 253. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, Op. cit., 1934 and Sasonoff, S. D., Op. cit., 94, 96 and 99.

⁴¹ Sasonoff, S. D., Op. cit., 96–98.

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not count on the support of the Triple Entente. British ambassador Paget did so on November 2nd. In a conversation with state secretary Jovanović, the British diplomat explicated that London was aware that while Serbia stressed her desire for a convention with Austria-Hungary, the Pašić government had no real intent to do so. Paget also admitted knowledge of Serbian agents provoking unrest in the Monarchy in spite of the country's loudly communicated desires for peaceful settlement with Austria-Hungary. (Paget believed that this proved to be the genuine cause of the hostility.)⁴²

Between November 9th and 12th Sasonoff once again appealed to the Foreign Ministries of the Triple Alliance to make attempts at moderating the Serbian claims in Belgrade. In order to secure the peace among the Great Powers, the Russian Foreign Minister informed his allies that Russia, in principle, would not be opposed to the following arrangement: Serbia was to receive an Adriatic port *only if the Danube Monarchy was to be provided with one on the Aegean Sea*. As Belgrade would clearly reject the proposal, Sasonoff feared that "the Serbs would lose their heads" and would act accordingly. This would eventually lead to war between Vienna and Belgrade, out of which Russia could not keep out, either.⁴³

In his memoirs Poincaré also acknowledged that Sasonoff called upon London and Paris to admonish the Serbs to "remain sober". In Sasonoff's opinion Belgrade simply refused to give serious consideration to the Russian warnings, which were rather straightforward: the Balkan allies were not to partition the European parts of Turkey without observing the Austro-Hungarian and Italian interests.⁴⁴ Even though Poincaré failed to understand why the Russians needed the help of the

⁴² No. 101. Report of Paget to Grey, Belgrad, 02.11.1912, 131. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, Op. cit., 1934.

⁴³ Nr. 197. Telegram of Buchanan to Grey, St. Petersburg, 27.10/9.11.1912, 206. – In: Hoetzsch, O., Op. cit.

⁴⁴ Poincaré, R., Op. cit., 476.

French diplomats (was the French support to be used as a “shield” or as a “threat”?), he nevertheless ordered his diplomats to comply with Sasonoff’s request.⁴⁵

The united diplomatic offensive of the Triple Entente triggered surprise and bewilderment not only in Belgrade but also in the Serbian diplomatic circles. One tenet of Pašić’s all-or-nothing policy was the trust he vested in the Triple Entente and their diplomatic support. What is more, the Serbian foreign policy dared to pursue such ambitious aspirations only because – allegedly – it was fuelled by Russia’s unconditional encouragement. It all came to light when the Serbian envoy in Berlin conversed with German Foreign Minister Alfred von Kinderlen-Wächter (around November 6–8th, 1912). As it was also in Germany’s interest to prevent a war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, the German politician requested the envoy to account for the irresponsible Adriatic policy of Serbia. Miloš Bogičević Serbian envoy responded that the Serbian aspirations were not only supported, but formerly had even been approved by Russia. When Kinderlen inquired into what it was exactly that the Russian Foreign Ministry approved, the Serbian diplomat replied “the acquisition of the whole Albania”. As this concept gravely contradicted Sasonoff’s views communicated recently, the Wilhelmstrasse turned to London and Paris in order for the statement to be either confirmed or refuted. (It is important to note that the tone of the German Foreign Ministry’s note was not at all warlike. Kinderlen himself phrased that Bogičević’s statement met with criticism in Berlin. According to the German State Secretary, the approval might not have been granted by the Russian Foreign Ministry, *rather the Russian minister at Belgrade might have communicated in a misunderstandable manner.*⁴⁶)

Bogičević’s statement generated perplexity in both Paris

⁴⁵ Poincaré, R., Op. cit., 475–476, 480 and 491.

⁴⁶ Nr. 187. Telegram of Grey to Buchanan, London, 26.10/8.11.1912, 198–199. – In: Hoetzsch, O., Op. cit.

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and London, and without much delay both Foreign Ministries openly asked Sasonoff via the respective Russian embassies whether Russia indeed made such communication that the whole Albania was to fall on Serbia or it was only Hartwig, the Russian minister at Belgrade who acted on his own. In Saint Petersburg the Russian Foreign Minister responded to the query in person. British ambassador Buchanan reported on November 9th, 1912 that Sasonoff reiterated his former stand: on the one hand he sought to prevent the issue of the Serbian Adriatic port from escalating, on the other hand, however, he stressed that the question was to be resolved by a conference of the Great Powers. Sasonoff also added that he had never emboldened Serbia to seize the whole Albania, neither had he ordered Hartwig to do so. Also, he had never given Hartwig such orders as to entice the Serbian government with the promise of an Albanian port. Sasonoff, however, admitted that to Hartwig, the policy of the Russian government might have appeared to have been “indirectly” encouraging such aspirations.⁴⁷

The situation described above did not result from an accidental misunderstanding, as Russia had been pursuing a foreign policy of ambiguity for years. To put it differently, there were two rivalling trends in the Russian foreign policy, and it was no longer possible to discretely contain the rivalry within the walls of the Russian Foreign Ministry. One trend was represented by Sasonoff, who forged his concepts in order to maintain peace among the Great Powers. He was primarily supported by such Russian diplomats who were related to the aristocratic circles in Europe. One of his most prominent supporters was the Russian ambassador at London, Alexander Benckendorff, son-in-law to Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky and Count Albert von Mensdorff, the former being the German, the

⁴⁷ Nr. 197. Telegram of Buchanan to Grey, St. Petersburg, 27.10/09.11.1912, 206–207; and to the question see also *ibid.* Nr. 189. Telegram of Izvolsky to Sasonoff, Paris, 26.10/8.11.1912, 200. – In: Hoetzsch, O., *Op. cit.*

latter the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at London. The other trend may be described as a more militant and aggressive, pragmatic lobby group, the members of which were violent opponents of Germany and Austria-Hungary, backed by a smaller group of ardent pan-Slavists.

The most prominent and symbolic figure of the pragmatic foreign policy was Alexander Petrovich Iswolski, Foreign Minister from 1906 to 1910 and ambassador in Paris between 1910 and 1917.⁴⁸ The most well-known representative of the pan-Slavists was Nikolai Genrikhovich Hartwig, Russia's minister at Belgrade. The fact that *on more than one occasion he pursued a course independent of the official direction of the Russian foreign policy*, yet he was never displaced, demonstrates the power of his lobby group. In the aftermath of the annexation, he gained a decisive influence over the Serbian Foreign Ministry. As a fervent pan-Slav sympathizer, he pressed for reconciliation between Serbia and Bulgaria, the two countries which had previously been waging an informal war in Macedonia. He was also a key figure in the formation of the Serbian-Bulgarian alliance in 1912. His most important aspiration was to form bonds as close as possible between Serbia and Russia, therefore it caught him by surprise that the alliance had slipped out of Russian control. Hartwig was a law unto himself and many of his initiatives and political ploys were not backed by Sasonoff. In 1912–1914 Hartwig more than once interpreted “rather individually” the instructions he received from Saint Petersburg in delicate situations, and Sasonoff was often compelled to go into awkward explanations because of his subordinate's actions and communications. One such explanation became due after the above cited communications made by Bogičević.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Demeter, G. *Kisállami törekvések és nagyhatalmi érdekek a Balkán-háborúk idején (1912–1913)*. Bp., 2007, 60–63.

⁴⁹ Boeckh, K. *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg. Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan*. München, 1996,

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The incident sparked animated correspondence within the Russian diplomatic circles. Hartwig wrote a letter of excuse from Belgrade, while Swerbejew ambassador at Berlin reported that Kinderlen had showed him alleged Russian communications from Belgrade, according to which "Serbia is the outpost of Russia on the Balkans", "Bosnia and Herzegovina shall fall on Serbia", and "Romania is entitled to acquire Transsylvania". In response to the indictments, the Russian ambassador said that Hartwig could not even possibly think about such issues.⁵⁰

In a letter to Sasonoff, the Russian ambassador at London warned the Russian Foreign Minister of certain risks his colleagues had failed to mention. Although Benckendorff had no doubts as to the patriotism and loyalty of Hartwig, he opined that the political manoeuvres of the Belgrade minister might give off an impression of the Russian Foreign Ministry representing two, absolutely contradictory directions. A group of London ambassadors in a series of friendly, private conversations brought it to Benckendorff's attention that Hartwig's overtly anti-Austrohungarian and pro-Serbian policy and the fact that it was being tolerated by Saint Petersburg might indicate to some that Russia meant to lend weight to this line of policy as well, that is, the country was ready to risk a war. Even though Benckendorff did his best to refute these allegations, he also noted in his report that regarding the matter "it is easy to refute, but rather hard to convince" his colleagues. The ambassador also hinted that both directions of foreign policy were represented among his colleagues at the Russian Embassy in London, and they did not hide their sentiments at all ("Ich stopfe meinen Kollegen, so gut ich kann,

25, 29–30, 32 and 131; Demeter, G., Op. cit., 99–100.

⁵⁰ Nr. 222. Telegram of Hartwig to Sasonoff, Belgrade, 29.10/11.11.1912, 228 and Nr. 236. Letter of Sverbejev to Sasonoff, Berlin, 31.10/13.11.1912, 241. – In: Hoetzsch, O., Op. cit.

den Mund.”)...⁵¹

Consequently, Sasonoff had only one means left to restrain Hartwig and to put a hold on his independent policy: he threatened to dispose him. Russia’s allies in the Triple Entente and most of all the influential diplomats loyal to the Russian Foreign Minister might have urged him to do so.⁵²

To avoid further misunderstandings, Sasonoff sent concrete and detailed instructions to Belgrade in which he ordered Hartwig to represent the *official* Russian stand on the issue of the Serbian coastline.⁵³ As point of departure Sasonoff wrote that the Serbian aspirations in the Adriatic had caused serious concerns in Russia. Although Saint Petersburg was still willing to provide diplomatic support to the Serbian cause *after liaising and establishing a common platform on the issue with London and Paris*, the Triple Entente members understood that the Triple Alliance countries unanimously agreed: Serbia was to be denied access to coastal Albania. Thus all players needed to exercise utmost caution lest the situation escalated into a war in Europe, which was also the reason why the representatives of Serbia abroad had to choose their words carefully.

Alas, the Berlin envoy hit an inappropriate tone when conversing with the German Foreign Minister. Bogičević asserted that the Balkan Allies had already worked out their designs on the future partition of Albania and not only Bulgaria but also Russia had approved Serbia gaining an outlet in the Adriatic. Sasonoff, however, stressed that the effective and relevant conventions between Serbia and Bulgaria contained no obligations whatsoever for the latter to provide military support for the former with respect to the Adriatic port.

⁵¹ Nr. 262. Letter of Benckendorff to Sasonoff, London, 03/16.11.1912, 265. – In: Hoetzsch, O., Op. cit.

⁵² Nr. 262. Letter of Benckendorff Sasonoff, London, 03.16/11.1912, 265. – In: Hoetzsch, O., Op. cit.; Boeckh, K., Op. cit., 131.

⁵³ Nr. 195. Telegram of Sasonoff to Hartwig, St. Petersburg, 27.10/09.11.1912, 204–205. – In: Hoetzsch, O., Op. cit.

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Therefore the Serbian troops marching towards Durrës indicated an escalation which might bring about dangerous consequences. Considering the above, Sasonoff gave instructions to Hartwig to caution Pašić: “the Serbs are not to encumber the situation in which we shall act as their advocate”.

In order to reward the Serbian government for the required self-restraint, Sasonoff also added that the national goals may remain unchanged, only the means to achieve those goals needed to be altered. The objective was to strengthen Serbia’s economic independence by, for example, granting her an outlet to the Adriatic – whatever an ‘outlet’ might have meant. (The ‘outlet’ meant either obtaining a coastal band, *or constructing a railway to a port town on condition that the Monarchy was to receive a similar transit railway to transport goods to Salonika*). If Serbia relinquished the idea of appropriating an Adriatic port, then Russia promised to make every effort to minimize the expansion of Albanian territories towards the inland.

If the Serbian government was determined to pursue their current policy, they risked losing all, that they had earlier gained by such huge sacrifices and that they had never even dared to dream of, to Austria-Hungary protecting her own interests in the region. That is, it was Serbia’s own interest to exercise self-restraint.

The Triple Entente Allies probably also received a copy of this note, because Sasonoff made no mention in it of Hartwig and his role in the events. It is obvious, however, from his private letter to Hartwig dispatched on 10 November, that Sasonoff held his minister at Belgrade responsible for the escalation of the diplomatic tension. In this letter Sasonoff warned the much too independent minister in the following fashion: *“They attribute to you the cathegoric promise that you allegedly made in the name of Russia to Servia and according to which she can be certain of our support in any*

case, concerning the dispute over the Adriatic outlet. I feel obliged to request, out of necessity, that, under the present heated circumstances, you exercise utmost discretion when conversing with Serbian politicians.” And to rein in Hartwig, he finished the letter as follows: “The government announces His Majesty’s clearly expressed will that a peaceful settlement of the present dispute shall be desirable and appropriate”. (It remains a question, however, whether Sasonoff could only control the representatives of the rivalling foreign policy by referencing the Tsar’s authority.)⁵⁴

The Serbian occupation of Durrës

Serbia paid no heed to the warnings and threats of the Great Powers. Every day, Serbian troops drew nearer and nearer to the Adriatic. This was the very moment when the Albanian question, or rather the necessity to create Albania, became one of the most crucial points on the Great Powers’ agenda. In the diplomatic circles of the Triple Entente certain precipitancy could be observed because they were unsure of the Monarchy’s reactions in the event of Serbia occupying the coast. Surprisingly enough, the uncertainties did not increase the tension between the alliances, rather eased the situation. Firstly, the Russian diplomacy sent unequivocal despatches to the Triple Alliance members, confirming that Saint Petersburg would not stand behind the Serbian design to seize an Adriatic port. At the advent of the occupation of the port town Hartwig obeyed Sasonoff’s strict orders and cautioned Pašić on more than one occasion.⁵⁵ Secondly, the Foreign Office again assumed an active role in the events. Grey instructed his envoy at Belgrade to warn again the Serbian government about the

⁵⁴ Nr. 212. Telegram of Sasonoff to Hartwig, St. Petersburg, 28.10/10.11.1912, 221. – In: Hoetzsch, O., Op. cit.

⁵⁵ Nr. 266. Telegram of Sasonoff to the Russian ambassadors, St Petersburg, 04/17.11.1912, 269 and Nr. 274. Telegram of Hartwig to Sasonoff, Belgrade, 04/17.11.1912, 275. – In: Hoetzsch, O., Op. cit.

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British stand and bring it to the Serbs' attention that London believed the Ballhausplatz sought to achieve a peaceful settlement (that is, in the event of an Austro-Hungarian-Serbian war, they would hold Belgrade responsible). Later he told Mensdorff, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in London that an invasion was not considered by the Brits as appropriate means to settle the dispute. Although the British government regarded the Serbian economic aspirations with understanding, they believed that all the relevant resolutions were to be made by the Great Powers.⁵⁶ Thirdly, the Ballhausplatz also made friendly gestures towards the Triple Entente members.

Even so, Pašić declined to yield. The Serbian government, the public and the press were in complete accord that Serbia had to insist on securing an Adriatic outlet. What is more, according to Hartwig's report the Serbian military circles revealed that *they were ready to fight a war with the Monarchy over the port town.*⁵⁷

The die had been cast once and for all: on November 24th, 1912, one day before the occupation of the long sought-after Durrës, Pašić gave a confident statement to the London *Times*. As he worded, Serbia laid claim to the coastal band between Lezha and Durrës and the hinterland behind, marked out by the towns of Lezha, Gjakova, Durrës and Ohrid. According to a report by Benckendorff, Russian ambassador at London, Nicolson, State Secretary of Foreign Affairs responded to the news of Pašić's statement that it had been made “at a particularly inconvenient time” and in circumstances “not quite fortunate”.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ No. 190. Letter of Grey to Paget, London, 13.11.1912, 229; No. 193. Letter of Grey to Cartwright, London, 13.11.1912, 231–232 and No. 270. Report of Buchanan to Grey, St. Petersburg, 25.11.1912, 312. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, Op. cit., 1934.

⁵⁷ Nr. 317. Telegram of Hartwig to Sasonoff, Belgrade, 09/22.11.1912, 316. – In: Hoetzsch, O., Op. cit.

⁵⁸ Nr. 336. Telegram of Benckendorff to Sasonoff, London, 12/25.11.1912,

Fiat Albania!

The occupation of Durrës by Serbia was the last step in a series of events that resulted in a scenario that the Great Powers wished but failed to prevent in the previous one month and a half. The Adriatic gains of Serbia compelled the Monarchy to react and the domino effect threatened to culminate in a great war in Europe. In late November 1912, however, the Foreign Ministries of the Great Powers were still able to take deliberate decisions.

Following the occupation of Durrës, the Austro-Hungarian ambassadors delegated to the Triple Entente member states contacted the respective governments and announced that Austria-Hungary was still strongly opposed to the Serbian presence in the Adriatic and was prepared to wage a war. In the last days of November the Italian ambassadors followed suit and confirmed that Rome was ready to support her ally, but it was the German reaction that gave the final push to Paris, Saint Petersburg and London. German financial circles and other political and military lobbies revealed to the Berlin Government that they held inevitable the impending war between Serbia and Austro-Hungary. The German general staff therefore worked out a mobilization plan, while on November 2nd, 1912 Bethmann-Hollweg delivered a warlike speech in the Parliament in which he clearly sided with Vienna. The tone of the Chancellor's speech made Grey "nonplussed" and filled the British public with great anxiety.⁵⁹

331. – In: Hoetzsch, O., Op. cit.

⁵⁹ Nr. 338. Telegram of Izvolsky to Sasonoff, Paris, 12/25.11.1912, 332; Nr. 340. Telegram of Sverbejev to Sasonoff, Berlin, 12/25.11.1912, 334; Nr. 420. Telegram of Benckendorff to Sasonoff, London, 21.11/04.12.1912, 410 and Nr. 421. Letter of Benckendorff to Sasonoff, London, 21.11/4.12.1912, 410–412. – In: Hoetzsch, O., Op. cit.; Nr. 333. Telegram of Benckendorff to Sasonoff, London, 11/24.11.1912, 594. – In: Siebert, B., Op. cit.; No. 176. Report of Paget to Grey, Belgrad, 11.11.1912, 213. – In: Temperley,

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In order to avoid further escalation of the problem, the French and Russian Foreign Ministries announced: the creation of Albania might no longer be procrastinated. It also meant that the question was to be resolved at an international conference of the Great Powers without the participation of the Balkan nation states.⁶⁰

Following the occupation of Durrës the Triple Entente members started liasing about Albania and the Serbian Adriatic port with a view to identifying the exact goal they wished to achieve at the prospective conference. The first challenge was how to persuade Serbia to deter to the Great Powers on the resolution. After the occupation of the port town Pašić allegedly refused to accede until finding out about Bethmann-Hollweg’s parliamentary speech. The Russian Foreign Ministry kept to their former promise according to which if Serbia makes concessions in her Adriatic designs, then Russia would make her best efforts to both satisfy Serbian economic claims and press for such eastern borders of the new state that are the most advantageous to Serbia. Accordingly, in the first days of September already, Saint Petersburg notified her allies of her proposal about the new borders, which is also corroborated by the fact that on December 3rd, 1912, Grey remonstrated in person to Benckendorff concerning the Russian plans. The British Foreign Minister informed Buchanan, British ambassador at Saint Petersburg that, while in favour of a Serbian railway connection to Durrës to be built under international control, he found the idea of Albania being created in a narrow coastal band only utterly unacceptable.⁶¹

Neither did Great Britain support unconditionally the Russian concepts of the port town. London sought to find a

H.–Gooch, G. P., *Op. cit.*, 1934.

⁶⁰ Siebert, B., *Op. cit.* 599–614.

⁶¹ No. 320. Letter of Grey to Buchanan, London, 03.12.1912, 371 and No. 291. Report of Buchanan to Grey, St. Petersburg, 27.11.1912, 339. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, *Op. cit.*, 1934.

solution of *realpolitik* that was on the verge of being acceptable for the Adriatic Powers. It was necessary, because the Foreign Office understood that Italy, although open for negotiations, was not willing to abandon her agreements with Austria-Hungary concerning Albania. Therefore in early December Grey proposed to create a “a neutral port” where “neutral” was to be defined by a conference of the Great Powers. It shows that Great Britain indeed wanted to find a solution with the participation of all the Great Powers.⁶²

The Austrohungarian-Serbian relations remained neuralgic. Prior to convening the international conference, the Triple Entente once more attempted to moderate the demands of Vienna and Belgrade. The diplomats of the Triple Entente pressed Pašić to accept the idea of the autonomous Albania and to give up on Durrës, while they expected Vienna to allow some room for the Serbian economic interests.⁶³

This latter was, however, an unrealistic expectation from many aspects. Such compromise would have resulted in a great loss of prestige for the Monarchy, which as a Great Power could not have afforded to yield to a small nation-state in such an important strategic question. It must be also noted, that the moves of the Serbian army did not facilitate the approximation of points of view either: it occupied Durrës disregarding the warnings of the six Great Powers (1); committed atrocities during the Balkan war against Albanian Catholics (murders, violent conversions, destruction of buildings, murders of Catholic priests and monks)⁶⁴ (2); the

⁶² Nr. 333. Telegram of Benckendorff to Sasonoff, London, 11/24.11.1912, 594; and *ibid.* 595–598. – In: Siebert, B., *Op. cit.*

⁶³ Nr. 368. Letter of Sasonoff to Izvolsky, Paris, 15/28.11.1912, 357. – In: Hoetzsch, O., *Op. cit.*

⁶⁴ Since the early 17th century, the Monarchy had functioned as the cult protector of the Catholics living in the Ottoman Empire, with clearly defined protectoral rights. Consequently, Austria-Hungary could not have let pass the atrocities against Catholics and their buildings of worship without a loss of prestige, even though the international legal background had become

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Serbian troops marching into Prizren disregarded every relevant international conventions and displayed brutal conduct on the premises of the local Austro-Hungarian consulate (3).

This latter incident was unprecedented: as consul of Prizren, Czech-born Oskar Prochaska kept in contact with the local Albanians throughout the war (just as the British consulate did in Bitola). Serbian troops occupied the town on October 30th. Under the pretext that they had been shot at from the roof of the Consulate, they, breaking all diplomatic rules, invaded Austro-Hungarian territory and demanded that all weapons be handed over. They beat the consul, kidnapped and tortured him for days in all conceivable ways. It is possible that the unfortunate diplomat had even been castrated. At the end of November he was released a broken man, and the Ballhausplatz did everything to hush up the matter to avoid further dire loss of prestige. The news, however, spread like wildfire in diplomatic circles and soon received public attention also. The leak of the Prochaska story dealt a grievous blow on the high Pan-Slavic thought in Bohemia.⁶⁵

Finally the Triple Entente understood that if they were to side with any one of the two parties, their most important goals were to keep the peace and maintain cooperation between the Great Powers; thus they left the question of the Serbian port unaddressed until the conference. London also proposed finding a reasonable solution with regard to delineating the borders of Albania without, however, offering any concrete concepts.⁶⁶

In the first week of December Pašić called upon Russia to mediate between Serbia and the Great Powers. Sasonoff consented with the condition that Belgrade accepts that the final decision would be taken not by the Triple Entente but all six Great Powers. It was not until the first weeks of December

somewhat dubious.

⁶⁵ Kann, R. *Die Prochaska-Affäre vom Herbst 1912*. Wien, 1977.

⁶⁶ No. 224. Letter of Grey to Buchanan, London, 18.11.1912, 264–265. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, *Op. cit.*, 1934.

that Pašić came to understand that none of the Great Powers wished to risk a war for the Serbian national interests, that is, in the event of a clash, the Serbian army would have to face the power of the Triple Alliance alone. Hartwig reported that the Serbian government assumed a more conciliatory tone, but refused to abandon its designs on the Adriatic.⁶⁷

Pašić through Saint Petersburg attempted to lay down conditions in return for deterring to the Great Powers. On December 3rd, Hartwig reported to Sasonoff, that the Serbian Premier *absolutely and utterly* abandoned his initial plan to seize Albanian territories (1). The Russian diplomat also revealed that Serbia and her Balkan Allies would not oppose to the creation of an independent Albania – they merely ask for it to be created under the Sultan’s sovereignty rather than as an Austro-Hungarian protectorate (2). By the right of the victor, Belgrade will demand the coastal band expanding from Durrës to the new Montenegrin borders (sic!) (3). As this was bound to trigger protests from Austria-Hungary, the Serbian government would appeal to Russia to find a solution that allowed Serbia access to said coastal band without consigning Serbia to economic dependence on the Monarchy (4). If option (4) could not be realized, then Serbia was ready to *expropriate* a minor coastal band between Durrës and Kap Rodoni (sic!) (5). This minor coastal band in the interpretation of the Serbian government meant a great deal more as a vital interest (“Lebensinteresse”), than obtaining any right to a neutral port (6).⁶⁸

Obviously, these conditions did not facilitate a compromise and were naturally refused by the governments of the Triple Entente. The British envoy at Belgrade earlier dubbed this political style “stubborn” and “foolhardy”, mainly because by

⁶⁷ Nr. 318. Telegram of Hartwig to Sasonoff, Belgrade, 09/22.11.1912, 316 and Nr. 363. Telegram of Hartwig to Sasonoff, Belgrade, 14/27.11.1912, 351–352. – In: Hoetzsch, O., Op. cit.; Poincaré, R., Op. cit., 511 and 520.

⁶⁸ Nr. 409. Report of Hartwig to Sasonoff, Belgrade, 20.11/3.12.1912, 402–403. – In: Hoetzsch, O., Op. cit.

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this, Serbia herself sought the possibility of starting a separate war with Austria-Hungary.⁶⁹

Dispensing with any theatricality, the London conference commenced on December 17th, 1912. Since 1878 it had been the first time that the six Great Powers were forced to negotiate a European issue of utmost importance on the highest level, and the occasion marked the last joint performance of the famous “European concerto”. Representatives of the Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire were also present, but they had no right to contribute to the negotiations.

Basically, the Russian(-French) and the Austrohungarian (-Italian) were the two opposing parties. England and Germany assumed more neutral roles somewhere between being an ally and an intermediary. Ambassadors Paul Cambon (France), Count Alexander Benckendorff (Russia), Marquis Guglielmo Imperiali (Italy), Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky (Germany), Count Albert von Mensdorff (Austria-Hungary) and British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey congregated on December 17th in Court of St. James, the venue of the conference. The diplomats gathered for tea in a rather homely atmosphere (Mensdorff, Lichnowsky and Benckendorff were all sons-in-law) and during the informal conversation, in accordance with Vienna’s claims, they resolved to create an autonomous Albania under the Sultan’s sovereignty *and* under the Great Powers’ protectorate [sic!]. They also decided that Serbia was to receive some concessions and a neutral railway connection under European control to an Albanian port town. The Serbian army was obligated to withdraw from the coast, otherwise they might be object to an Austro-Hungarian attack. The negotiating parties agreed not to write proceedings and not to comment to the Press.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ No. 313. Private letter of Paget to Grey, Belgrad, 30.11.1912, 365. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, Op. cit., 1934.

⁷⁰ About the resolutions of the first day of the conference see No. 4944. Telegram of Mensdorff, London, 17.12.1912, 147–149. – In: Srbik, H.,

A few days after the London resolution, on December 21st Raymond Poincaré delivered a speech in the French Senate and gave a lengthy account on the current foreign political directions. The Premier did not question the right of the Albanians to statehood.⁷¹

THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE AUTUMN, 1913

At the London conference the Russian-Austrohungarian conflicts of interest were observed rather than the French-Austrohungarian ones when resolving the issue of Albania and of the Serbian Adriatic port. The Monarchy sought to create a “viable” new state along ethnic borders, preferably, while Russia kept to her promise to Belgrade and was to minimize the territory of the new country. As both parties took an ever more rigid stand, the alliances pursued an increasingly united policy which in turn increasingly hindered cooperation between the Great Powers. In the spring of 1913, the Balkan allies resumed their operations, which further influenced the outcome of the conference, as the situation in the Balkans was subject to changes on a daily basis.

Compromise was reached when the Great Powers resolved not to delineate borders but to decide which towns were to be ceded to the interested parties. Step by step, Austria-Hungary relinquished the towns of Peja/Peć/Ipek, Djakova/Gjakova, Prizren and Debar for the benefit of Serbia, while in return Russia agreed that Shkodër and the coastline be the unpartitioned parts of Albania as well as Korça and Gjirokastra in the South. According to the resolutions of June 1913, the delineation of the borders fell on the locally operating boundary commissions.

L.Bittner, A. Pribram, and Übersberger, H. Österreich–Ungarns Außenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914. Band 5, Wien–Leipzig, 1930, and Hiller, G. Die Entwicklung des österreichisch-serbischen Gegensatzes 1908–1914. Halle, 1934, 58.

⁷¹ Poincaré, R. Op. cit., 532; to the question see also *ibid.* 521 and 529.

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However, the spring of 1913 seemed not a bit less tense than the autumn of the previous year, when Montenegro turned the siege of Shkodër into a question of prestige. Even though the Great Powers resolved that the town would be given to Albania, the siege proceeded with success and on April 24th the town fell to the Montenegrin forces. The resistance of the Montenegrin ruler sparked off another major crisis in Europe. The joint fleet of the Great Powers appeared off the coast of the small Slav state and the headstrong commander of the international naval force, Admiral Cecil Burney almost ordered landing operations. The “Scutari Crisis” as the contemporaries referred to it could have triggered a new war – this time with the involvement of the Great Powers.

The First Balkan War formally ended with the London Peace Treaty on May 30th, 1913. After that, Serbia’s focus shifted from the Adriatic, as she had to defend her new gains in a new war, this time against Bulgaria, a former ally. As a result of the Second Balkan War, Serbian power could be stabilized in the Middle Balkans.

The Serbia government and Pašić never gave up on their aspirations to obtain an Adriatic port. Although the London compromises were the results of the final efforts of the Great Power diplomacy, i.e. the conference marked the last occasion when international peace could be saved via direct negotiations, Belgrade still believed that the “London borders” could be modified,⁷² in spite of the fact that all six Great Powers clearly communicated to the Serbian government: the borders had been delineated and nothing could change that. (To put it differently, Belgrade failed to understand that Serbia

⁷² On September 22nd 1913, Spalajković informed the Austro-Hungarian embassy at Belgrade of the following: „...die in den Londoner Konferenzen festgesetzte Grenze könne Serbien jedoch aus strategischen Gründen überhaupt nie akzeptieren!” ÖHHStA PA XII/449/23a, No. 194 A–E. Report of Storck to Berchtold, Belgrade, 22.09.1913 and No. 3852. Telegram of Storck, Belgrade, 22.09.1913.

was not opposed to Austria-Hungary but to all the Great Powers with respect to the Albanian issue.)⁷³

*Autumn, 1913: Joint Albanian-Macedonian Attack against Serbia*⁷⁴

As a direct consequence of the annexation of the Middle-Balkans and the introduction of Serbian military administration, Albanian and Macedonian forces launched a joint assault against Serbia from Albanian territories in the autumn of 1913.

The independent Albania did not include all Albanian ethnical territories, and the new state had to face with several internal and external difficulties. From Kosovo and Macedonia around 120.000 Albanian and Macedonian refugees fled to the country, whom the Provisional Government in Vlora failed to take care of. After months of idle waiting and increasing hardships, many of the refugees attempted to return home in September, 1913. The assault was conceived by the VMRO that aspired to create an autonomous Macedonia; the Albanian leaders of the Middle Balkans sought to “liberate” their territories from the Serbian occupation. Unfortunately, nothing more is known about the political background of the attack.

⁷³ Nr. 120. Telegram of Stevanović to Tadić, 20.04./03.05.1913, 208. – In: Lukač, D. Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici kraljevine Srbije (1903–1914). Knjiga 6/ Sveska 2, Beograd, 1981.

⁷⁴ Lory, B. La guerre après la guerre. Le mouvement insurrectionnel albano-Macédonien de septembre–octobre 1913. – In: Horel, C. Les guerres balkaniques (1912–1913). Conflicts, enjeux, mémoires. Bruxelles, 2014, 85–104; Georgiev, G. Novootkrit dokument za bălgaro-albanskoto vâstanie ot 1913g. – Makedonski Pregled, 33 N 2, 2010, 135–148; Георгиев, Г. Бежанският въпрос в Албания и българската хуманитарна акция през 1913 г. – МПр, 33 N 1, 2012, 39–66; Csaplár-Degovics K., G. Demeter. Albanian-Bulgarian Relations during the Balkan Wars and the Albanian-Macedonian Uprising (Third Balkan War, 1913). – In: Meta, B. 100 Years of Independence: Speeches of the International Scientific Conference. Tirana, 2014, 271–290 and Csaplár-Degovics, K. A harmadik Balkán-háború története. Manuscript, 2013, 91.

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In the region of Gjakova, Prizren and Debar they launched an attack against the Serbian troops defending the new borders. Out of the three attacks, only the one led by Isa Boletini against Debar was efficacious: in September, 1913 his troops successfully invaded today’s West-Macedonia and set out for Skopje along the Vardar. The irregular forces of the right wing of the VMRO, having fought in the Ohrid and Struga region also took part in the insurgency. The Serbian government did not take the situation lightly and ordered partial mobilization. The Serbian army of 50.000 troops did not take long to defeat the advancing Albanians, and during their counterattack they once again attempted to secure a port on the Adriatic. That is, the retributory army crossed the borders set in London. The total invasion of Albania was prevented by the ultimatum of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 18th October, 1913.

*The Outbreak of the War from the Triple Entente’s
Point-of-View*

In the weeks preceeding the outbreak of the war, Belgrade certainly had a sense of the imminent danger from the other side of the border, although what it was *exactly* and who organized it may not have been clear to the Serbian government. (Unpublished Austro-Hungarian archive sources suggest, however, that the general staff of the III. Serbian army stationed in the area were better informed.) Contemporary Serbian interpretation of the war hints that the events caught Pašić by surprise or that he had no access to information either. It would have been inconceivable earlier that Belgrade reacted to an event of such impact only a week later! (Fights broke out on September 20th–21st, and Belgrade published the official Serbian stand on September 26th–27th.)⁷⁵

According to the official communication, the Adriatic

⁷⁵ Csaplár-Degovics, K., Op. cit., 50.

Powers were also responsible for the attack.⁷⁶ (Based on Viennese sources this statement can be clearly refuted and dismissed.)⁷⁷ The grounds of the accusations might have been a proposal by Rome to Vienna of which the Serbian Foreign Ministry was notified in mid-September. Rome had proposed to Vienna that the Adriatic Powers each send a military unit for the defense of the Northern Border Commission. According to British reports, the Serbian government assumed the military officers of the two Great Powers were already at the border when the proposal was made and they were believed to have assisted the attackers.⁷⁸

The British Embassy in Belgrade gave accounts of other occurrences as well. On the one hand, they confirmed in their

⁷⁶ ÖHHStA PA XII/449/23a, Aid-memoire of Jovanović to Berchtold, Vienna, 29/16.09.1913, 1–10. 337. Cirkularia of the Serbian ministry of internal affairs to the Serbian ministry of foreign affairs, Belgrade, 28/15.09.1913, 376–378. In: Džambazovski, K. Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici kraljevine Srbije (1903–1914), Knjiga 6/ Sveska 3. Beograd, 1983; Keßler, O. Der Balkanbrand 1912/13. Band 2. Leipzig, 1913, 347.

⁷⁷ The Monarchy had been aware since mid-May, 1913, that certain Kosovar Albanian politicians and gang leaders, provoked by the Serbian military administration and the planned borders, had been considering to incite riots and war against Serbia. The likelihood of a violent settlement was increased by the concerns of the Kosovar leaders that the Ballhausplatz would not be able to forestall the partition of the Albanian-inhabited territories. At the same time they (e.g. Bajram Curri) assumed that Austria-Hungary would actively provide assistance in the event of an Albanian military enterprise. The k.u.k. diplomats, however, referred to the London conference and refused to send weapons or ammunition to the displeased Kosovars. In its effort to avoid the dire consequences of an Albanian assault, the Ballhausplatz even sought to *dissuade* the Kosovar leaders from attacking the Serbs. ÖHHStA PA XII/421/6f, No. 157. Letter of Rudnay to Berchtold, Durazzo, 16.05.1913; *ibid.* Telegram of Berchtold to Rudnay, Vienna, 23.05.1913, No. 24; Anonymous report to Burian, Sarajevo, 29.05.1913, ZI: 816/Pr.B.H.; KA Nachlässe, B 1450, Akt. 84/222, Geh. Nr.179. Letter of Spaits to Conrad, Vienna, 28.05.1913.

⁷⁸ No. 8. Report of Crackanthorpe to Grey, Belgrade, 12/15.09.1913, 6–7. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, Op. cit., 1934.

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reports that, contrary to the communications of Pašić, the Serbian troops had never withdrawn from Albanian territories, that is, they were stationed on foreign lands ignoring the borders established at the London conference. On the other hand their accounts revealed how the Serbian military administration kept on provoking the Albanian tribes within and without the country. As London was anxious that this kind of policy might result in armed confrontations, the Foreign Office authorized its Belgrade envoy to liaise with his colleagues in order to exercise joint pressure on the Serbian government to facilitate troop withdrawals.⁷⁹

The Serbian envoy at Saint Petersburg reported in mid-September that the Russian Foreign Ministry was prepared to support Serbian claims in Albania. At the same time the Russians warned Belgrade to withdraw troops from Northern Albania and to exercise extreme caution regarding their actions in the country. France did not comment on the mid-September news; they might not have had information about the Albanian and Macedonian preparations.⁸⁰

The Russian diplomacy did not formulate an official standpoint for days after the Albanian attack had been launched. Saint Petersburg supported the Serbian measures taken in self-defence and regarded it as natural if, as part of the counter-offensive, Serbia temporarily occupied strategic points. Accounts of conversations between Austro-Hungarian and Russian diplomats seem to suggest that the latter were not even aware what exactly had taken place on the Albanian-Serbian border in the last week of September. Was it the independent Albania that launched an attack, or did the

⁷⁹ No. 6. Reports of Crackanthorpe to Grey, Belgrade, 10/15.09.1913, 5–6 and 12/15.09.1913, 6–7; No. 7. Letter of Grey to Crackanthorpe, London, 12.09.1913, 6. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, Op. cit., 1934.

⁸⁰ No. 9. Report of Crackanthorpe to Grey, Belgrade, 13.09.1913, 7–8. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, Op. cit., 1934 and 303. Telegram of Tadić to Pašić, St. Petersburg, 07/20.09.1913, 349–350. – In: Džambazovski, K., Op. cit.

Albanians of the Middle Balkans rise, or was it a completely different affair? Who was, after all, in power in Albania? Considering the fact that the Russian diplomacy gained information from Belgrade (which was successfully misinformed by the Albanian “strong man”, Esat Pasha), the diplomats in Saint Petersburg did not have the answers to these questions, therefore they did not wish to join any joint action of the Great Powers.⁸¹

The Austro-Hungarian embassy at Saint Petersburg finally succeeded in convincing the Russians that the war had not been started by the autonomous Albania but by Central Albanian refugees. Ambassador Czernin assured Deputy Foreign Minister Neratov that Vienna did not doubt Serbia’s rights to act in self-defence; at the same time it was Belgrade that provoked the attack by certain political, administrative and military decisions. Czernin argued that Albania had simply not been disposed to attack, as the Great Powers had not yet organized the country: she had no borders, no ruler, not even her own gendarmerie. To put it differently: if there was no Albanian state to speak of, then it could not have launched an attack, either. The Russian and Austro-Hungarian diplomacy finally agreed on September 29th–30th that they would expect Belgrade to respect the London resolutions regarding the borders of Albania.⁸²

Russia failed to act fully in the spirit of this agreement in the last days of September. Based in the report of Tadić, envoy at Saint Petersburg, the Russian Foreign Ministry accepted that in Serbia’s view Bulgarian officers also participated in the

⁸¹ ÖHHStA PA XII/449/23a, Reports of Storck to Berchtold, Belgrade, 21.09.1913, No. 193. and 22.09.1913, No. 194 A–E; *ibid.* No. 4256. Telegram of Czernin, St Petersburg, 24.09.1913 and No. 35 C. Report of Czernin to Berchtold, St Petersburg, 14/27.09.1913; 332. Report of Tadić to Spalajković, St Petersburg, 27/14.09.1913, 372–374. – In: Džambazovski, K., *Op. cit.*

⁸² ÖHHStA PA XII/449/23a, No. 12. Telegram of Czernin, St Petersburg, 30.09.1913.

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assault (the Voivodes leading the abovementioned VMRO-troops), but refused to believe that the assault had been an Austrian enterprise. Furthermore, Neratov informed Tadić that Russia would regard with benevolence all measures taken in self-defence, but recommended caution and prudence for Serbia. Russia also requested Pašić not to travel to Europe but to handle the situation from home. *In return, Belgrade received a promise that Russia would diplomatically support the modification of the borders* – that is, Russia was prepared to unilaterally breach the agreements that had been so hard to reach in London. (It is also important to note that by giving an ultimatum on October 18th, the Monarchy also violated an essential compromise according to which the Great Powers would always negotiate before taking any action on the Balkans. It is true, however, that the ultimatum was to lessen the dire consequences of a genocide and a humanitarian catastrophe.)⁸³

Published Russian sources also reveal why the Russian Foreign Ministry recommended caution and prudence to Serbia. Spaljković, Serbian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs explicated to Strandmann, Russian diplomat at Belgrade that the Serbs would have liked to push the Serbian-Albanian border westward, and to make the remainder of Albania a Serbophile rather than an Austrophile country. To this end, the Serbian government had already directly interfered in the Albanian home affairs and conducted negotiations with Esat Pasha. Upon hearing this information, Strandmann warned

⁸³ Nr. 1059. Telegram of Neratov to Benckendorff, St. Petersburg, 14/27.09.1913, 292 and Nr. 1067. Telegram of Neratov to Izvol'sky, St. Petersburg, 17/30.09.1913, 295. – In: Stieve, F., Op. cit.; Nr. 855. Telegram of Neratov to Benckendorff, St. Petersburg, 14/27.09.1913, 439. – In: Boghitchewitsch, M. Die auswärtige Politik Serbiens 1903–1914. Band 2. Berlin, 1928. 332. Report of Tadić to Spaljković, St. Petersburg, 27/14.09.1913, 372–374. – In: Džambazovski, K., Op. cit.

Spalajkovićot to observe the London resolutions.⁸⁴

France had even less information than Russia, as both the Foreign Ministry and the press referred to news from Belgrade or from Saint Petersburg. Maurice Paléologue, General Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, had barely returned from his vacation when the first reports of the clashes were placed on his desk, on top of the files that had been piling up for weeks. Between September 24th and 27th he on more than one occasion summoned the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Paris and requested information. It took lengthy conversations to convince Paleologue that most of the news in the press had been false: for example, the Monarchy had never sent military officers to Albania with the aim of organizing actions against Serbia.

Foreign Minister Poincaré refused to fully accept that the confrontations had been provoked by Belgrade, but he could at least be persuaded to insist on the borders delineated by the Conference of Ambassadors. After September 25th, Paris also showed willingness to make a joint démarche with the other Great Powers. The leader of the French diplomacy communicated the decision in person to Pašić, who was making an attempt in Rambouillet to obtain diplomatic support for the intervention against Albania. The procrastination of the French had an economic reason: Paris feared that exerting too much pressure on Belgrade might cause a disturbance in the redemption of the loans given to Serbia.⁸⁵

Of the Triple Entente members it was Britain that first

⁸⁴ Nr. 854. Report of Strandmann to Sasonoff, St. Petersburg, 12/25.09.1913, 438–439. – In: Boghitschewitsch, M., Op. cit.

⁸⁵ ÖHHSStA PA XII/449/23a, Telegrams of Szécseny, Paris, 24.09.1913, No. 4243; 25.09.1913, No. 4597; 27.09.1913, No. 4726; and *ibid.* Reports of Szécsen to Berchtold, Paris, 27.09.1913, without No. and 30.09.1913, No. 91–B; *ibid.* Telegrams of Storck to Berchtold, Belgrade, 27.09.1913, No. 4801 and 27.09.1913, No. 4801. And see also: Nr. 1066. Letter of Neratov to Benckendorff, St Petersburg, 30/17.09.1913, 294–295. – In: Stieve, F., Op. cit.

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reacted in the affirmative to the diplomatic queries of the Ballhausplatz. At the moment of the Albanian attack London was primarily preoccupied with the increasingly tense opposition between the Greek and the Turks. To be more exact, the Foreign Ministry was concerned that a Serbian counteroffensive might further encumber the relations of the two South-Balkan states which might trigger a new all-Balkanian conflict (Germany also shared such concerns). On September 24th the Foreign Ministry informed the other Great Powers and Belgrade of their decision to insist on the London borders and that they were ready to send officers as parts of an international commission to the Albanian-Serbian border.⁸⁶ British sources also reveal that the Foreign Office regarded the fact that the Serbian troops had never left the North Albanian territories (even though the London resolutions had compelled them to withdraw during the summer) as a major cause of the conflict. However, it is also clear that at the end of September the Triple Entente members increasingly discussed in their correspondence the Monarchy's role in the conflict management. Both the Brits and the Russians considered it "suspicious" that of all the Great Powers the Ballhausplatz was the most well-informed about the region and that Austria-Hungary unilaterally increased her political pressure on Belgrade in order to bring the fights to an end.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ ÖHStA PA XII/449/23a, Telegrams of Storck, Belgrade, 21.09.1913, No. 3709 and 24.09.1913, No. 4237; *ibid.* No. 195 A–D. Report of Storck to Berchtold, Belgrade, 23.09.1913; *ibid.* Telegram of Trauttmansdorf, London, 1913.09.26., No. 98/19.; No. 23. private letter of Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, 27.09.1913, 18–20 and No. 29. report of Granville to Grey, Berlin, 02.10.1913, 22–23. – In: Temperley, H.–Gooch, G. P., 1936, *Op. cit.*; 332. Report of Tadić to Spalajković, St. Petersburg, 27/14.09.1913, 372–374 and 369. Report of Borđević to Pašić, London, 26.9.1913, 402–404. – In: Džambazovski, K., *Op. cit.*

⁸⁷ „*He [Grey] considers attitude of Austria suspicious.*” No. 16. Report of O'Beirne to Grey, St Petersburg, 23.09.1913, 11–12; to the question see also

The Serbian Occupation of Northern Albania and the Triple Entente

In the first week of October 1913, the Serbian diplomacy concentrated its efforts on trying to prevent the Great Powers' joint protest against the Serbian troops crossing the border. Serbian envoys efficaciously argued at the various foreign governments that their army crossed the Black Drin only temporarily and merely in defence of the borders and they also emphasized that the sole responsibility for the escalation lay with the Albanian government in Vlorë. The diplomats claimed that Belgrade had been seeking to end the conflict as soon as possible but to this end they should first contact the internationally recognized government of Albania. Once this government was set up and consolidated the internal relations of the new Albanian state, Serbia would clarify the conflicts and withdraw her troops stationed on Albanian territories. The carefully coordinated action of the diplomats succeeded in deterring the Great Powers from a joint *démarche* in Belgrade.⁸⁸ After a spell of hesitation, Saint Petersburg and Paris had responded in the negative, therefore the joint *démarche* proposed by Italy never took place.⁸⁹ France and Russia opined that the previous, friendly warnings would be sufficient for Belgrade to end the conflict. They were wrong.⁹⁰

ibid. No. 13. Report of Crackanthorpe to Grey, Belgrade, 21.09.1913, 10. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, Op. cit., 1934.

⁸⁸ ÖHHStA PA XII/449/23a, Telegrams of Storck to Berchtold, Belgrade, 01.10.1913, No. 224 and 02.10.1913, No. 339.

⁸⁹ Nr. 8766. Report of Storck to Berchtold, Belgrade, 01.10.1913, 388–390. – In: Srbik, H., L. Bittner, A. Pribram, A. Übersberger, H., Op. cit., Band 7, Nr. 1066. Letter of Neratov to Benckendorff, St. Petersburg, 30/17.09.1913, 294–295. – In: Stieve, F., Op. cit.

⁹⁰ Upon the request of the Monarchy, Romania also presented a note of protest regarding the Albanian–Serbian conflict. ÖHHStA PA XII/449/23a, No. 1140. Telegram of Berchtold to Ambrózy, Vienna, 01.10.1913 and No.

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However, the Triple Entente Powers were far from taking a united stand. While Belgrade could count on the general support of the Russian and French diplomacy, neither state wished to wage a war for the Serbian cause.⁹¹ In fact, finally Great Britain overtly sided with Austria-Hungary in the question of the border war. The Foreign Office insisted that the borders delineated at the London conference be respected and expressed disapproval over the Balkan states ignoring the Great Powers’ resolutions without consequences. When in mid-October the Serbs continued to invade areas of the independent Albania, Dayrell Crackanthorpe, British envoy at Belgrade contacted his Austro-Hungarian opposite number. The envoy informed his colleague of the official standpoint of the Brits and argued that in his opinion Serbian troops would not leave Albania and therefore the Monarchy had to assume a more resolute attitude. In spite of the fact that Crackanthorpe proposed no concrete steps to be taken and that Grey himself found the idea of an ultimatum unnecessary and impossible, it is almost certain that *the Ballhausplatz regarded the statements of the British envoy as tokens of the good-willed support of the British government.*⁹² In the meantime, Paris

136. Telegram of Haymerle to Berchtold, Sinaia, 01.10.1913. Nr. 8617. Report of Storck to Berchtold, Belgrade, 13.09.1913, 294–295; Nr. 8618. Report of Storck to Berchtold, Belgrade, 13.09.1913, 294–296; Nr. 8635. Report of Storck to Berchtold, Belgrade, 15.09.1913, 304 and Nr. 8646. Telegram of Czernin, St. Petersburg, 16.09.1913, 309. – In: Srbik, H., L. Bittner, A. Pribram, Übersberger, H., Op. cit., Band 7.

⁹¹ Apart from the direct support of the Russians, Pašić could also rely on Italy, which was apparently understanding towards Serbian aspirations. Nr. 8849. Report of Ambrózy to Berchtold, Rome, 16.10.1913, 452–453 and Nr. 8857. Report of Czernin to Berchtold, St. Petersburg, 17.10.1913, 459–460. – In: Srbik, H.– Bittner, L.–Pribram, A.–Übersberger, H., Op. cit., Band 7.

⁹² ÖHStA PA XII/451/25a, No. 3524. Telegram of Czernin to Berchtold, St. Petersburg, 17.10.1913 and No. 482. Circularia of Berchtold to the Austro-Hungarian ambassadors, 17.10.1913. No. 38. Letter of Goschen to Grey, Berlin, 16.10.1913, 32–33. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, 1936, Op.

urged Belgrade not to provoke Austria-Hungary any longer and withdraw troops from Albania in return for which France promised to grant the state loan Serbia had been long expecting to receive.⁹³

Another hint of the disagreements between the Great Powers might be that until October 18th, Paris and Saint Petersburg emphasized: Serbia had so far fairly observed the London resolutions. Great Britain, however, did not share the opinion of her allies.⁹⁴

*The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum of 18 October, 1913
and the Triple Entente*

Since Serbia still refused to pay heed to the warnings (only in October, Serbia was cautioned three times by the Ballhausplatz), at noon, on October 18th, Austria-Hungary presented an ultimatum to the Serbian government, requesting a pullout from Albania within 8 days, otherwise the Monarchy would declare war on Serbia. By the ultimatum the Ballhausplatz sought to restore its prestige as a Great Power in the peninsula.⁹⁵

cit; Übersberger, H. Zur Vorkriegsgeschichte Serbiens. – Berliner Monatshefte, 11, 1933, N 1, 44.

⁹³ Nr. 1093. Telegram of Izvolsky to Neratov, Paris, 18.05.10.1913, 313 and Nr. 1101. Letter of Izvolsky to Sasonoff, Paris, 23/10.10.1913, 318–319. – In: Stieve, F., Op. cit.

⁹⁴ Nr. 1095. Telegram of Neratov to Benckendorff, St Petersburg, 05/18.10.1913, 313–315. – In: Stieve, F., Op. cit.; Nr. 25. Telegram of O’Beirne to Grey, St Petersburg, 6.10.1913, 128–129; Nr. 64. Letter of Grey to Cartwright, London, 13.10.1913, 158 and Nr. 86. Report of Goschen to Grey, Berlin, 17.10.1913, 173. – In: Duka, V., Op. cit.

⁹⁵ ÖHHSStA PA XII/451/25a, Pro domo Nr. 4940. Daily report, Vienna, 18.10.1913 and No.1221. Telegramdraft of Berchtold to Ambrózy, Vienna, 18.10.1913. ÖHHSStA PA XIX/Nachlass Berchtold, Kt. 4, Bd. 4/II, 18.10.1913, 98–99; KA Nachlässe, B 1450, Akt. 90, 592/K.d.M. Aide memoire of the Ballhausplatz to Conrad, Vienna, 18.10.1913, and Res.Nr. 324. Report of Gellinek to Conrad, Belgrade, 18.10.1913; Rappaport, A.,

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Russia informed the Austro-Hungarian embassy at Saint Petersburg that she would accept Serbia's answer to the ultimatum, but Neratov also communicated to the Austro-Hungarian and German embassies that while Russia values and respects the London borders, the evacuation of the Serbian troops might take longer than requested. The diplomat also appeared willing to assist in the acceleration of the frontier delineation and in facilitating the formation of Albania. Beyond that, the Russian diplomacy had no other designs.⁹⁶

Paris regarded the ultimatum as a rather unfortunate solution and did not hesitate to express disapproval. Furthermore, based on his information, Poincaré still believed that the Monarchy had arranged or at least encouraged the Albanian assault.⁹⁷ Only when, in order to avoid misunderstandings, on October 19th the Austro-Hungarian ambassador presented the copies of the Austro-Hungarian consular reports on the attack, did the Foreign Minister change his attitude towards the question. Poincaré then promised to call upon Serbia to “exercise moderation”.

The Foreign Office understood and accepted the *goals* but disapproved the *form* of the ultimatum. For nearly two weeks Grey communicated through various channels that Great Britain would have supported a joint action of the Great Powers. He opined that the arbitrary action of the Monarchy could be interpreted as a confrontation between Vienna and the other

Albaniens Werdegang. – Berliner Monatshefte, 5, 1927, 840; Hiller, G., Op. cit., 77.

⁹⁶ Nr. 8866–8867. Reports of Czernin to Berchtold, St. Petersburg, 18.10.1913, 464–466. – In: Srbik, H., L. Bittner, L., A. Pribram, A., H. Übersberger, Op. cit., Band 7. Nr. 14177. Report of Lucius to Jagow, St Petersburg, 19.10.1913, 399. – In: Thimme, F., J. Lepsius, A. Mendelsohn-Bartholdy. Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914. Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes. Band 36. Berlin, 1926. Nr. 1095. Telegram of Neratov to Benckendorff, St. Petersburg, 05/18.10.1913, 313–315. – In: Stieve, F., Op. cit.

⁹⁷ Poincaré, R. Op. cit., 457–458.

Great Powers which of course proved injurious to the common prestige of the said Powers.⁹⁸

The Ballhausplatz responded through the British embassy in Vienna and the Austro-Hungarian embassy in London. Berchtold said that considering the situation along the Albanian-Serbian border and the fact that Serbia had been the aggressor, there simply was no other means to avoid further casualties and time delays (during the second Serbian occupation, tens of thousands civilians fell victim to the hostile forces). Vienna stressed that there remained no other diplomatic means they could resort to.⁹⁹ It is also noteworthy that the British protests subsided following Sasonoff's negotiation with Hugh O'Beirne, British ambassador at Saint Petersburg on 26 October. Sasonoff proposed that, as to Triple Entente, the members should consider the Serbian-Albanian war as settled, partly because, contrary to the previous information of the Entente, *Russia believed that Serbia was, to a considerable extent, responsibly for the outbreak of the armed conflict.*¹⁰⁰

On October 19th, the British envoy at Belgrade contacted

⁹⁸ Nr. 8884. Daily report: visit of Cartwright, Vienna, 20.10.1913, 478. – In: Srbik, H., L. Bittner, A. Pribram, H. Übersberger, Op. cit., Band 7; No. 43. Letter of Grey to Goschen, London, 18.10.1913, 36–37 and No. 48. Letter of Grey to Goschen, London, 20.10.1913, 41. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, 1936, Op. cit.

⁹⁹ ÖHHStA PA XII/451/25a, Daily reports, 20.10.1913, Pro domo Nr. 4985; 20.10.1913, without No. and 22.10.1913, No. 8321. *ibid.* XIX/Nachlass Berchtold, Kt. 4, Bd. 4/II, 19.10.1913, 101–102. KA Nachlässe, B 1450, Akt. 90, Aide memoirs of the Ballhausplatz to Conrad, Vienna, 20.10.1913, Geh. Nr. 236 and 21.10.1913, Geh. Nr. 238; No. 51. Letter of Grey to Cartwright, London, 22.10.1913, 44–45. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, 1936, Op. cit; Boeckh, K., Op. cit., 109; Hiller, G., Op. cit., 78; Löhr, H. Die Gründung Albaniens. Wilhelm zu Wied und die Balkan-Diplomatie der Großmächte 1912–1914. Frankfurt a.M., 2010, 139 and 141.

¹⁰⁰ No. 56. Report of O'Beirne to Grey, St. Petersburg, 28.10/03.11.1913, 49. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, 1936, Op. cit.

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Pašić and informed him that even though the members of the Triple Entente disapproved of the ultimatum, they did not wish to provide military support to Serbia. Thus it became clear that no significant protest was to be expected of either Russia or France against the ultimatum, and consequently the Serbian government ordered the pullout on October 19th. The following day they informed the embassies of the Great Powers in Belgrade of their decision (they also proposed another minor modification of the borders to the representatives of the Triple Entente). Belgrade agreed to withdraw the Serbian troops within 8 days and to respect the London borders. According to British diplomatic reports, however, the Serbian military party probably did not share the government's disposition to come to an agreement with the Great Powers.¹⁰¹

*Epilogue: Convergence between Serbia
and the Triple Entente*

As the Serbian troops were evacuating the country, state-building processes commenced in Albania. This was the very moment that marked the collapse of the Great Powers' cooperation. On the one hand, the Triple Entente Powers did not participate very fervently in the organizational tasks of the new state, as their main interest was to "keep an eye" on Austria-Hungary and Italy.¹⁰² On the other hand, the Adriatic

¹⁰¹ ÖHHSStA PA XII/451/25a, No. 224 A–B. Report of Storck to Berchtold, Belgrade, 20.10.1913. About the response of the Serbian government, see also ÖHHSStA PA XII/451/25a, No. 3899. Telegram of Storck to Berchtold, Belgrade, 20.10.1913; *ibid.* XIX/Nachlass Berchtold, Kt. 4, Bd. 4/II, 20.10.1913, 101–103. KA Nachlässe, B 1450, Akt. 90, Geh. Nr. 238. Aide memoirs of the Ballhausplatz to Conrad, Vienna, 21.10.1913. No. 44–45. Reports of Crackanthorpe to Grey, Belgrade, 18.10.1913, 37–38 and 19.10.1913, 39. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, 1936, *Op. cit.*

¹⁰² *"They [the Great Powers in London; CsDK] had prevented acute differences between the Great Powers and he thought that they would be the*

Powers pursued an increasingly independent policy in Albania. An unsuccessful coup attempt by the Young Turks resulted in a complete loss of trust among the Great Powers and a terminal deterioration of the Austrohungarian-Italian relations ensued (in part, due to the disagreements over the Albanian policy and partly because of other issues).¹⁰³ The above developments brought about two significant consequences from the point-of-view of the present study: firstly, the Triple Entente Powers started negotiations to unilaterally withdraw from the Albanian International Commissions;¹⁰⁴ secondly, Italy continued to forge closer ties with Great Britain while reducing her commitments within the Triple Alliance.¹⁰⁵

These proceedings created a whole new scene not only for the Serbs but for all the nation-states of the Balkan. The role

best means of preventing isolated action such as that of Austria and Italy in the matter of Albania." No. 74. Report of O'Beirne to Grey, St. Petersburg, 05.11.1913, 62. To the question see also *ibid.* No. 79. Private letter of Bertie to Grey, Paris, 11.11.1913, 66–67. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, 1936, *Op. cit.*; Nr. 228. Telegram of Grey to O'Beirne, London, 04.11.1913, 285–286; Nr. 233. Telegram of O'Beirne to Grey, St. Petersburg, 05.11.1913, 291–292 and Nr. 315. Report of O'Beirne to Grey, St. Petersburg, 10.11.1913, 370. – In: Duka, V., *Op. cit.*

¹⁰³ Nr. 261. Letter of Grey to Bertie, London, 08.11.1913, 318; Nr. 296. Report of Lamb to Grey, Valona, 05.11.1913, 353; Nr. 320. Telegram of Grey to Russell, London, 17.11.1913, 376; Nr. 326. Telegram of Russell to Grey, Vienna, 18.11.1913, 383; Nr. 333. Telegram of Bertie to Grey, Paris, 19.11.1913, 388; Nr. 378. Report of Lamb to Grey, Valona, 22.11.1913, 429–430. – In: Duka, V., *Op. cit.*

¹⁰⁴ No. 69. Report of O'Beirne to Grey, St. Petersburg, 02.11.1913, 59. – In: Temperley, H., G. P. Gooch, 1936, *Op. cit.*; Nr. 228. Telegram of Grey to O'Beirne, London, 04.11.1913, 285–286; Nr. 233. Telegram of O'Beirne to Grey, St Petersburg, 05.11.1913, 291–292; Nr. 315. Report of O'Beirne to Grey, St Petersburg, 10.11.1913, 371–372 and Nr. 335. Telegram of O'Beirne to Grey, St. Petersburg, 19.11.1913, 388. – In: Duka, V., *Op. cit.*

¹⁰⁵ Nr. 229. Letter of Grey to Dering, London, 4.11.1913, 286–287 and Nr. 269. Report of Crackanthorpe to Grey, Belgrade, 30.11.1913, 322. – In: Duka, V., *Op. cit.*

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the various Balkan states had played in 1912 and 1913 had become an utterly insignificant issue. The Great Power system of the 19th century had irrevocably failed and collapsed. The states of the Balkan peninsula recognized the errors inherent in the system and the newly gained latitude, and promptly took advantage of the opportunities. Once they had chosen sides in the alliance network of the Great Powers, all that remained was to find a pretext to start the First World War.

Der königlich-ungarisches St. Stephans-Orden (1764–2014)¹

Attila Pandula

The University of Loránd Eötvös – Budapest

Mit dem Namen Maria Theresias, der grossen Monarchin des 18. Jahrhunderts, sind mehrere wichtige, Ungarn betreffende Entscheidungen verbunden.

In der Reihe ihrer Verordnungen wurde die Stiftung des St. Stephans-Ordens als die vielleicht populärste angesehen. Am Landtag des Jahres 1741 hatte der Abt zu Dömölk Odó Koptik OSB (1692–1755) bereits die Errichtung eines adeligen Ritterordens vom hl. Stephan vorgeschlagen.² Die Ordenszeichen (als Wasserzeichen) sind bekannt schon seit 1745.³

Auf den Ratschlag Graf Franz Esterházy's beschäftigte sich die Monarchin 1760 mit dem Plan eines zivilen Verdienstordens nach dem Muster des im Jahre 1757 gegründeten Militär-Maria Theresien-Ordens. Die Anerkennung der Verdienste wollte man mit dem Namen des ersten apostolischen Königs, Stephan des Heiligen, verbinden. Im Auftrag der Königin wurde ein aus 25 Punkten bestehender Patententwurf in französischer Sprache verfasst, der vom damaligen Hofkammerpräsidenten Graf Rudolf Chotek überprüft wurde. Dieser äusserte seine bis ins Detail gehende Meinung über den Entwurf, wobei er in wesentlichen Punkten Einwendungen erhob. Franz Stephan

¹ Stiftungsjubiläum.

² Horváth M. Magyarország történelme. Bd. 7. Bp., 1873, 348. Anm. Nr. 1.

³ Pandula A. Régi magyar vízjelek és a falerisztika. – In: Nemzetközi papír- és vízjeltörténeti kongresszus. (Bp., 3–5.05.2010). Országos Széchenyi Könyvtár. 71–78, 74. Wasserzeichen Nr. III. /1.

von Lothringen, der Gemahl Maria Theresias, und gewisse konservative Kreise des Hofes waren gegen die Stiftung eines neuen Ordens, denn sie fürchteten eine Statusänderung des Ordens vom Goldenen Vlies und des Militär-Maria Theresien-Ordens. Die Herrscherin hat vorerst auf die Verwirklichung des Vorhabens verzichtet.

Die Siebenjährige Krieg stürzte das Habsburgerreich in eine schwierige wirtschaftliche Lage. Es stellte sich die Frage, ob Ungarn einen Teil der Staatsschuld übernehmen werde. Die Königin wollte die Ständeversammlung einberufen, welche zum letzten Mal im Jahre 1751 getagt hatte. Abermals wurde Esterházy, der seit 1762 das Amt des ungarischen Hofkanzlers innehatte, eine entscheidende Rolle zuteil. Seiner Ansicht nach konnte man mit der Stiftung des St. Stephans-Ordens auf die einberufenen ungarischen Stände einen günstigen Einfluss ausüben. Da die Eröffnung der Versammlung auf den 17 Juli 1764 festgesetzt worden war, wurde die Ordensstiftung als sehr dringend erachtet. Der seit Jahren ruhende Plan wurde schnell wieder hervorgeholt. Darauf basierend, fasste Graf Esterházy seine Ideen zusammen, arbeitete bald die Ordensstatuten in lateinischer (Amtsprache in Ungarn) und deutscher Sprache aus und legte die Pläne am 30.01.1764. seiner Monarchin vor.

Maria Theresia hat die Vor schläge mit Notizien versehen, und sie dann, zusammen mit den unverändert gebliebenen, und mit ihrem königlichen „Placet“ gezeichneten Statuten am Kanzler Kaunitz weitergegeben. Letzterer fügte in zwei Punkten in Details Bemerkungen hinzu. Danach beschäftigte sich wieder Graf Esterházy mit dem Thema, der die von Kaunitz vorgeschlagenen Veränderungen im allgemeinen annahm, und nach einigen Wochen der Königin Vorschläge für Eidesformel und die Promotionen vorlegte.⁴

⁴ Fleischer Gy. A Szt. István Rend alapítása és a rendalapítás képzőművészeti ábrázolásai. – In: A bécsi gróf Klebelsberg Kunó Magyar Történetkutató Intézet Évkönyve, 3. Bp., 1933, 243–245.

Esterházy's Unterbreitung vom 20.02.1764 ist erhalten,⁵ vom selber Tag datiert ein Handschreiben Maria Theresias, in dem sie ihn zum Ordenskanzler ernennet.⁶

Inzwischen wurde über die ersten auszuzeichnenden Personen diskutiert. Esterházy hatte seine Kandidaten in einem Vorschlag vom 26 März genannt. Er bezog sich bloss auf ungarische Edelleute, wobei er betonte, dass er sich nur für die Erwägung derer Verdienste als kompetent fühle. Im Falle der seitens Österreichs in Betracht kommenden Herren hat Esterházy Anregungen jeder Art vorsichtig abgelehnt. Er erwähnte allerdings, dass, seinen Kenntnissen gemäss, inzwischen Graf Friedrich von Hatzfeldt persönlich, Graf Johannes Wendelin von Paar dagegen schriftlich die Königin um die Auszeichnung mit dem Grosskreuz des Ordens gebeten hatte.

In anderer Hinsicht wurden gleichfalls Vorbereitungen getroffen: Man beauftragte das staatliche Münzamt mit der Herstellung der Ordenszeichen. Da der Orden noch über kein Vermögen verfügte, wurden die Kosten – auf Antrag des Grafen Kaunitz – aus der Privatschatulle der Königin gedeckt. Dem Schatzmeister des Ordens gab man den Befehl, die Festgewänder verfertigen zu lassen. Deren Zahl wurden nach den Ordensstufen, dem Wunsch der Königin gedeckt. Dem Schatzmeister des Ordens gab man den Befehl, die Festgewänder verfertigen zu lassen. Deren Zahl wurde nach den Ordensstufen, dem Wunsch der Königin entsprechend, mit je 15 Stück bestimmt. Daraus kann man folgern, dass sie von dem neuen Orden nur ebensoviele Dekorationen zu verleihen gedachte.⁷ Die Zahl der Auszeichnungen wurde erst knapp vor der ersten Promotion gewissermassen erhöht.⁸ Bekannt ist ein

⁵ MNL OL, P1058, Archiv des St. Stephans-Ordens, Fasc. 1. No. 2. Wien, 20.02.1764.

⁶ Ibid., No. 4, Wien, 20.02.1764.

⁷ Fleischer, Gy., Op. cit., 245–246.

⁸ MNL OL, P1058, Fasc. 1. No. 16. Liste der bei ersten Gelegenheit ausgezeichneten Personen, mit den angeklebten, handschriftlichen Bemerkungen

an der Königin gerichteter Brief Esterházy's, in welchem er – dem Bericht des Schatzmeister Christoph Niczky entsprechend – die Kosten der Ordensstiftung zusammenstellte. Die Summe betrug 63.309 Gulden und 29 Kreuzer.⁹

Der Orden wurde vom ungarischen Adel und von bestimmten österreichischen Kreisen mit grösser Begeisterung aufgenommen, während er bei anderen Gruppen gemischte Gefühle hervorrief. Das Haupt der Gegenpartei war Franz Stephan von Lothringen selbst, der sich – wie schon gesagt – um das Ansehen und die Privilegien des Ordens vom Goldenen Vlies sorgte.¹⁰

In der neuen Stiftung spielte Graf Franz Esterházy eine hervorragende Rolle, dieser Umstand wurde auch von den Zeitgenossen anerkannt. So enthält beispielsweise das Tagebuch des Fürsten Johann-Josef Khevenhüller-Metsch dementsprechende Aufzeichnungen.¹¹

Am 5–6.05.1764 kam es zu den Festlichkeiten der Ordensstiftung und den ersten Promotionen, welche, dem Zeitgeist entsprechend, mit barockem Pomp begangen wurden. Angesichts des betont ungarischen Charakters des Ordens erschien die Stifterin dazu in ungarischer (Ordens) Tracht, und in ihrem Gefolge befanden sich ausschliesslich ungarische Edelleute. Während dieser repräsentativen Ereignisse hatte auch die ungarische Leibgarde eine bedeutende Rolle zu erfüllen.¹²

Merkwürdigerweise wurde damals betont, dass Maria Theresia einen aus dem Zeitalter Stephans der Heiligen

Maria Theresias. Ohne Datum.

⁹ Ibid., No. 14, Wien, 12.06.1764.

¹⁰ Müller, H., A. Theobald, *auray – Einen anderen will ich nicht. (Unvereinbarkeitsbestimmungen am Beispiel „österreichischer“ Ritter- und Verdienstorden. – In: Barock – Blütezeit der europäischer Ritterorden. Ausstellung Schallaburg 29.04.–29.10.2000 (Schriftleitung: Dikowitsch, H., G. Stangler, J. Stolzer) St. Pölten, 2000. (Katalog des Niederösterreichischen Landesmuseums – Neue Folge 430, 41–51.*

¹¹ Maria Theresia als Königin von Ungarn. Schloss Halbturn 15.05.–26.10.1980. Mraz, G., G. Schlag (Eds.), – Eisenstadt, 1980, 171, Nr. 75.

¹² Fleischer, Gy., *Op. cit.*, 247–250.

stammenden Orden erneuert habe. Dies wird sogar in der Einleitung der Ordensstatuten hervorgehoben. Eine dementsprechende Inschrift ist auch auf beiden Seiten einer aus Anlass der Ordensstiftung geprägten Medaille zu lesen. Da aber die geistlichen Ritterorden – selbst die bekanntesten – viel später gestiftet wurden, und die Zeit der Stiftung weltlicher Ritterorden in das 14. und 15. Jahrhundert fällt, kann das nur als Legende betrachtet werden.

*„Dem k. k. Haupt Münz Amt wegen zu dem neu errichten Sancti Stephani Ordens, gefertigt und die gelieferten 60 St. Golden und 200 St. Silbernen Ordens Medailes, wellen der Fond hierzu noch ohnvermögend ist, ohne consequens die betragnis für dieses Mahl... 3040 fl.“*¹³

Der erste Grossmeister des St. Stephans-Ordens war die Stifterin selbst. Dies wahrte aber nur kurze Zeit. Am 18.08.1765 starb ihr Gemahl, auf den sie die Grossmeisterwürden des Ordens vom Goldenen Vlies und des Militär-Maria Theresien-Ordens übertragen hatte. Nun entschied sie, das Grossmeistertum des St. Stephans-Ordens ihrem Sohn Joseph zu übergeben.¹⁴

Der St. Stephans-Ordens hatte seit seiner Stiftung wie damals üblich drei Klassen: Grosskreuz, Komturkreuz und Kleinkreuz (Ritterkreuz). Franz Joseph I. stiftete am 23.03.1908 eine sogenannte Kleindekoration zum Grosskreuz,¹⁵ Karl IV. (I.) am 23.02.1918 eine solche zum Komturkreuz.¹⁶

¹³ Fleischer, J. Das kunsthistorische Material der geheimen Kammerzählamtbücher in den staatlichen Archiven Wiens von 1705 bis 1790. Wien, 1932, 83. Reg. 225.

¹⁴ MNL OL, P1058. Archiv des St. Stephans-Ordens, Fasc. 1. No. 32. Unterbreitung des Grafen Esterházy über die Übertragung der Grossmeisterwürde, mit eigenhandigen Bemerkungen Maria Theresias. Wien, 21.09.1765; Ebenda: Fasc. 1, Nr. 33. Unterbreitung desselben Ordenskanzlers an Kaiser Joseph II, mit dessen eigenhandigen Bemerkungen. Wien, 25.09.1765.

¹⁵ Mericka, V. Orden und Ehrenzeichen der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie. Wien–München, 1974, 60.

¹⁶ Mericka, V., Op. cit., 64.

DIE ORDENSINSIGNIEN

Die Ordensinsignien sind in den bei der Ordensstiftung veröffentlichten Statuten genau beschrieben und dargestellt. Ihre offizielle Form wurde auch später mehrmals publiziert. Folgende Gruppen sind zu unterscheiden: 1. Grosskreuz, 2. Grosskreuz mit Brillanten, 3. Ordenskette (Kollane) zum Grosskreuz, 4. Stern zum Grosskreuz (A, gestickt, – später – B, metal), 5. Stern zum Grosskreuz mit Brillanten, 6. Kleindekoration zum Grosskreuz, 7. Komturkreuz, 8. Komturkreuz mit Brillanten, 9. Kleindekoration zum Komturkreuz, 10. Kleinkreuz, 11. Miniaturen, 12. Halbminiaturen, 13. Bandstreifen.

Die Ordenszeichen stellen eine eigenartige Mischung von Motiven dar, die sich zum Teil auf die ordensstiftende Monarchin, zum Teil auf den heiligen Schutzpatron beziehen. Die Ordenskette besteht aus den folgenden Motiven: der stilisierten, barocken Form der ungarische Königskrone (25 mal), SS als Monogramm für „Sanctus Stephanus“ (13 mal), MT für „Maria Theresia“ (12 mal). Das Mittelglied der Kette ist dagegen aus einem durchbrochenen Medaillon, das aus goldenen Wölkchen besteht, gebildet, mit einem hufeisenförmigen Band mit der Inschrift STRINGIT AMORE in der Mitte: im Hufeisen wiederum ein Adler mit rechtgekehrtem Haupt. An diesem Glied wird das Kleinod befestigt.

Das Zeichen des Ordens ist ein goldgerändertes, in seinen Kreuzarmen wellenförmig abgerundetes, grün emailliertes Kreuz. Es hängt an der stilisierten Barockform der ungarischen Krone. Im roten Mittelmedaillon der Vorderseite steht auf einem grünen Dreihügel eine goldene offene Blatterkrone, aus der ein weisses Doppelkreuz hervorragt. Neben diesem Motiv sind links bzw. Rechts die goldenen Buchstaben M und T (für Maria Theresia) angebracht: auf dem goldgeränderten, weiss emaillierten Ring ist die Devise *Publicum Meritorum Praemium* zu lesen. Auf dem Mittelmedaillon der Rückseite steht auf weissem Grund: Sto./Strl./Ap. – „Sancto Stephano Regi Apostolico“. Ein goldgeränderter, grün emaillierter

Lorbeerkreuz umschliesst diese goldene Inschrift. Die Insignien der verschiedenen Ordensklassen sind Aussehen identisch, ihre Grösse dagegen ist unterschiedlich.

Auf dem Ordensstern erscheint wieder das Mittelmedaillon der Kreuze, doch ist hier im Kreisring – an Stelle der Schrift – ein Lorbeerkranz in farbigem Email zu sehen. Das Band des St. Stephans-Ordens ist rot, mit breiten grünen Streifen am Rande.¹⁷

VERLEIHUNGSPRAXIS IM WANDEL DER ZEITEN

Mit dem St. Stephans-Orden wurden nur Männer ausgezeichnet. Das entsprach dem internationalen Usus, da für Frauen durch längere Zeit lediglich eigene Damenorden zugänglich waren. Diesbezüglich ist nur eine einzige Ausnahme bekannt: Maria Theresia, die Ordensstifterin.

Zur Praxis der Verleihung im Inland ist grundsätzlich festzustellen: Die Auszeichnung wurde überwiegend für Zivilverdienste verliehen. In grosser Zahl dekorierte man staatliche Würdeträger, hohe Beamte, Vertreter des diplomatischen Korps. Auch Juristen in führender Position wurde der Orden zuteil. Besonders ab Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts wurde es üblich, die Vertreter der Wissenschaft und der Künste mit dem Kleinkreuz auszuzeichnen. Bei der Geistlichkeit kamen nur die Spitzen der Hierarchie in Frage. Der jeweilige Erzbischof von Esztergom (Gran) war als Grosskreuzritter stets Ordensmitglied, und als Ordensprelat verwaltete er die kirchlichen Angelegenheiten des Ordens.

Es ist leicht ersichtlich, dass es nur selten zu einer differenzierten Anerkennung von Verdiensten – was die Verleihung eines Ordens bedeuten sollte – kam. Infolge der höchst komplizierten Auszeichnungssystems des Habsburgerreiches hatten selbst Mitglieder der Elite erst am Ende ihrer

¹⁷ Über die Ordenszeichen (neuestens) Pandula, A. *A Magyar királyi Szt. István Rend (1764–1918, 1938–1945) és a Magyar Szt. István Rend (2011–)*, im Druck.

Laufbahn nur das Kleinkreuz erhalten. Es gab auch viele, die es nie erwarben, obwohl sie im Besitz anderer hoher Auszeichnungen waren. Dagegen finden sich Personen, die angesichts ihrer hohen Stellung schon von vornherein eine Stufe des St. Stephans-Ordens erhielten. Als Ausnahme ist es zu betrachten, wenn eine Person verschiedene Klassen des Ordens verliehen bekam. Zum Inhaber aller drei Klassen wurden nur sieben Ordensritter. Jedenfalls kann man feststellen, dass der St. Stephans-Orden in ziemlich grosser Zahl an ungarische Persönlichkeiten verliehen wurde, wodurch die Vertreter anderer Länder des Habsburgerreiches in den Hintergrund gedrängt wurden.

Bei Durchsicht der Angaben über die ausländischen Ordensinhaber kann man feststellen, dass die verschiedenen Klassen des Ordens – besonders das Grosskreuz – erst seit Beginn der Napoleonischen Kriege in grösserer Zahl an fremde Staatsangehörige verliehen wurden. Die Verleihungen sind stets auf Grund aussenpolitischer Interessen der Habsburgermonarchie erfolgt. Ab der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts geschah es immer öfter, dass das Grosskreuz mit protokollarischem Charakter entweder fremden Herrschern oder den Mitglieder fremder Herrscherhäuser überreicht wurde. Die meisten Stephans-Orden haben Vertreter von Russland, Frankreich, Spanien und Italien erhalten. Wenn man allerdings die Ritter der verschiedenen deutschen Staaten zusammennimmt, überwiegt deren Zahl.

DIE BULGARISCHEN ORDENSCRITTEN

Ferdinand I. Zar von Bulgarien, Fürst von Sachsen-Coburg-Koháry. Ferdinand I. geboren Wien, den 26.02.1861, gestorben 1948 in Coburg. Vermählt in erster Ehe mit Marie Luise, Fürstin von Bulgarien, geborene Prinzessin von Bourbon Parma 1893. Vermählt in zweiter Ehe mit Eleonore, Prinzessin Reuss (jüngere Linie) 28.02.1908.

Kinder aus erster Ehe: Boris, Erbprinz von Bulgarien, 18.01.1894, Kyryll, Prinz von Preslav, 5.11.1895, Prinzessin

Eudisie Auguste, 5.01.1898, Prinzessin Nadeschda 18.01.1899 Begründete 1887 das bis 1947 regierende “Haus Sachsen-Coburg-Koháry in Bulgarien.”¹⁸ Vermählt in dritter (nicht standesmassiger) Ehe mit Alzbeta Brezaková.¹⁹

Auf dem von den europäischen Grossmächten einberufenen “Berliner Kongress” zur Verordnung der politischen Verhältnisse auf dem Balkan wurde dann im Sommer 1878 ein Fürstentum Bulgarien errichtet. Dessen erster, 1879 berufene Fürst Alexander von Battenberg, wurde aber bereits durch eine Verschwörung wieder gestürzt.

Zu ihrem neuen Landesherrn wählten die Bulgaren im Jahre 1887 nun den Prinzen Ferdinand von Sachsen-Coburg-Koháry, der die ihm angebotene Krone annahm und am 14.08.1887 als Ferdinand I. Fürst von Bulgarien, sein Amt antrat. Am 8.10.1908 erklärte er dann die nummehr volle Unabhängigkeit der Landes von der Türken und liess sich zum Zar von Bulgarien ausrufen.

Im Zeit des Ersten Weltkrieges (1915–1918) er stand an der Spitze der bulgarische Armee (er war das Oberste Kriegsherr). Er war (auch) Marschall von Bulgarien.²⁰

Für der Eintritt Bulgariens an der Seite Deutschland und Österreich–Ungarn in den Ersten Weltkrieg, und die erlittene Kriegsniederlage übernahm er die politische Verantwortung und dankte am 3.10.1918 zugunsten seines Sohnes Boris ab.

Die nachfolgenden Jahren bis zu seinem Tod im Herbst 1948 verbrachte er in Coburg, wo er in Burgas-Schlösslein un der Zaren-Ville am Hofgarten wohnte und nur noch seinen

¹⁸ Pandula A. I. Ferdinánd bolgár cár rendjelei és kitüntetései. – In: Demeter, G., P. Peykovska (Eds.). Political, Social, Economic and Cultural Elites in the Central and Easteuropean States in Modernity and Post Modernity. Sofia–Bp., 2010, 58–83. (weilers: Pandula: I. Ferdinánd)

¹⁹ Hlodák, P. Slachtické rody Koháry a Coburg. Kalinovo, 2009, 190–192, 226–227. (Genealogisches Tafeln).

²⁰ Димитров, Б. Войните на България за национално обединение, 1885, 1912–1913, 1915–1918, 1939–1945. С., 2010, 98–165.

naturwissenschaftlichen Neigungen lebte.²¹

In dieser Lebensphase war er oft in Tschechoslowakei liegende (uralte) Familienguten. Er war sehr grosser Jäger,²² Reisender,²³ Tourist²⁴ usw. Er war (im hohen Alter) in verschiedenen Zeitpunkte (1929, 1931, 1933) auf Jagdexpeditionen im Afrika.²⁵ Er und seine Söhne pflegten sehr gute Kontakte²⁶ mit slowakischem Staatspräsident Jozef Tiso und leitende slowakischen politischen Kreisen.²⁷ In der Coburg-Koháryschen Familiengruft unter des katholischen St. Augustin Kirche am Hofgarten zu Coburg hat er eine würdige letzte Ruhestätte gefunden.²⁸

Ferdinand war im ganzen Leben Hochdekoriert. Vom jüngeren Jahren bis hohem Alter.²⁹ Er hat (mindestens) 120 in- und ausländische Orden- und Ehrenzeichen erhalten. Aus Österreich–Ungarn war er besonders höchst dekoriert. Orden vom Goldenen Vliess (1911) Militär Maria Theresien Orden – Grosskreuz (1917). Militär Verdienst Kreuz I. Klasse (1915) Bronzene Jubiläums Erinnerungsmedaille für die Bewaffnete Macht (1898).³⁰

Ferdinand und der königlich ungarische St.

²¹ Pandula, A., I. Ferdinand, Op. cit., 59–61.

²² Petrikovic, E. Jelenie trofeje v zbierkach múzea vo Sv. Antone. – In: Zbornik múzea vo Svätom Antona. Ročník XVII. Banska Bystrica 2006, 273–277.

²³ Kuchtová, O. Cár Ferdinand Coburg – cestovateľ, turista. – In: Zbornik múzea vo Svätom Antona. Ročník XVII. Banska Bystrica, 2006, 87–95.

²⁴ Kuchtová, O. Sitno v kontexte slovenskej a európejskej turistiky. – In: Zbornik múzea vo Svätom Antona. Ročník XVII. Banska Bystrica, 2006, 147–155.

²⁵ Hlodák, P., Op. cit., 175–203.

²⁶ Ebenda, 200–203.

²⁷ Korásek, M., J. Kozák. Slovenské vyznamenania a odznaky, 1938–1945. 20–24.

²⁸ Hlodák, P., Op. cit., 214–215, ebenda Fotos.

²⁹ Z. B. am 13.03.1941 bekam er vom Staatspräsident Jozef Tiso das Grosskreuz mit der Kollane des neubegründeten slowakisches Pribina–Orden. Ferdinand war damals 80 Jahre alt. Vgl. Dazu Korásek, M., J. Kozák, Op. cit., 35.

³⁰ Pandula, I. Ferdinand, Op. cit., 69–71.

Stephans-Orden.

Ferdinand (als Fürst von Bulgarien) erhält am 26. September 1899 den Grosskreuz des St. Stephan-Ordens.³¹ Franz Joseph hat mit folgenden Worten dieses Orden verlieht: „*Lieber Graf Széchenyi. Ich verleihe Seiner Königlichen Hoheit dem Fürsten Ferdinand von Bulgarien, das Grosskreuz meinen St. Stephans Ordens*“. ³² Franz Joseph I. hat die Insignien für Ferdinand persönlich übergeben.³³ Dabei fehlt ein Verpflichtungsschein (mit einer eigenhändigen Unterschrift Ferdinands) über Rückerstattung des Ordenszeichen.

Ferdinand gehört zur inländischen Ordenrittern. Er bekam die folgenden Insignien: 1. Grosskreuz (auf dem Schulterband), 2. Ordenskette (Kollane) zum Grosskreuz, 3. Stern zum Grosskreuz.

Nach einigen Jahren später, am 23.03.1908 Franz Joseph I. stiftete eine sogenannte Kleindekoration zum Grosskreuz.³⁴ „*Seine kaiserliche und Apostolisch königliche Majestät haben im Zusammenhange mit der die Einführung einer neuen Feldadjustierung betreffenden Verfügungen mit Allerhöchstem Handschreiben vom 23.03.1908. für gewisse Faller eine besondere Tragart des Grosskreuzes des Ordens des heiligen Apostolischen Königs Stephan durch die Angehörigen der Wehrmacht anzuordnen geruht.*“

Demnach ist im Felde und bei Manövern statt des Sternes in der Regel und zwar auf der linken Brustseite das Kleinkreuz an einem dem Bande des Grosskreuzes in einer Farbenzusammenstellung entsprechend, schmalen, im Dreieck konfektionierten Bande mit dem in der Mitte des Bandes fest angebrachten auf 20 mm Durchmesser verjüngten Sterne des Ordens zu tragen. Diese neue Dekoration, welche die Beziehung „Kleine Dekoration“ zu führen hat, kann auch bei

³¹ MNL OL, P1058. Archiv des St. Stephans Ordens, Fasc. 24. (1898–1903) – 35/1899.

³² Ibid., Allerhöchste Handschreiben. Wien, 26.09.1899.

³³ Ibid., Auf dem Aktendeckel. Ministeriums des Aussern. Ohne Datum.

³⁴ Ibid., Fasc. 25. (1904–909) – 26/1908.

anderen Anlässen, wie im kleiner Dienste, ausser Dienst u.s. w. jedoch nur zur Uniform der Wehrmacht getragen werden.³⁵

Bei erster Verleihung die Insignien „Kleine Dekoration“ erhalten 37 (uniformtragende) Persönlichkeiten. Neben einige Erzherzöge und Generäle, fremden Herrscher und Mitglieder fremder Herrscherhäuser.³⁶ Dabei ist (unter Nummer 26) „*Seine königl. Hoheit Ferdinand I. Fürst v. Bulgarien, Herzog von Sachsen-Coburg und Gotha*“.³⁷

Preis für eine „Kleine Dekoration“ (nach Vorschrift mit Band und Etui) auf Kreuzen (bei amtliche Hersteller) C. F. Rothe und Neffe in Wien, 166 Krone.³⁸ Verschiedene Fotos zeigen Ferdinand I. als (Stephan) Ordensträger. (Auch im k. u. k. Militär Uniformen, im bulgarischen Militäruniformen usw.).

Nach dem Tode Franz Josephs I. und die Regierungsantritt König (Kaiser) Karls am 21.11.1916 wurde, vor allem von massgeblichen ungarischen Kreisen eine baldige Königskronung in Budapest gefordert. Auf jeden Fall erfolgte die Entscheidung König Karls, sich zum apostolischen König von Ungarn krönen zu lassen, bereits wenige Tage nach seinem Regierungsantritt. Karl wurde am 30.12.1916 in Budapest gekrönt. Dabei war Ferdinand I. König von Bulgarien.³⁹ Er war nicht eingeladen (wegen Kriegsfall), aber er wollte unbedingt dabei sein.⁴⁰ Ferdinand war der einzige (verbündete) ausländisch Herrscher dabei. Dafür bekam er am 20.01.1917 (als „Protokollgeschenk“) zu seinem 1899 verliehenen Grosskreuz die Brillanten.⁴¹ Alle Dokumente sind auf ungarisch. König Karl schrieb folgendes: „*Kedves báró*

³⁵ Ibid., Intimationsschreiben.

³⁶ Ibid., 1908. Verleihungsliste. Ohne Datum.

³⁷ Ebenda.

³⁸ Ibid., Rechnung. C. F. Rothe und Neffe in Wien (Kohlmarkt 7), 08.03.1908.

³⁹ Koronázási Album. Bp., 1917. z. B. 36. Illustration.

⁴⁰ Ebenda, 38.

⁴¹ MNL OL, P1058. Archiv des St. Stephans Ordens, Fasc. 27. (1914–1917) /1917. Auf dem Aktendeckel. Allerhöchste Entscheidung. Baden, 20.01.1917.

Roszner! Ő Felségének a Bolgárok Királyának, Magyarország és Horvát-Szlavon-Dalmátországok Apostoli Királyává történt megkoronáztatásomon való jelenlétének maradandó emlékéül, Szent István-rendem nagykeresztjéhez a gyémántokat adományozom, miről Önt oly megjegyzéssel értesítem, hogy főkamárásomat egyidejűleg kellően utasítom."⁴²

Verschiedene Fotos zeigen Ferdinand I. als (Stephan Ordens) Brillantenträger. (Auch im k. u. k. Militär Uniformen).

BORIS UND DER KÖNIGORIS UND DER KÖNIGLICH UNGARISCHE ST. STEPHANS-ORDEN

Boris (Erbprinz von Bulgarien) ist am 18.01.1894 geboren. Er war im Weltkrieg mit Ihrem Vater (1915–1918). Ferdinand dankte am 3.10.1918 zugunsten seines Sohnes Boris ab. Er ist verheiratet im Jahre 1930 mit der italienischen Königstochter, Prinzessin Johanne von Savoya. Die Kinder aus dieser Ehe waren: Simeon (Erbprinz von Bulgarien) (1937–), Prinzessin Mariae Luise (1933–).⁴³ Er war König von Bulgarien zwischen 1918–1943. Er hat sehr gute Beziehungen mit Deutschland (nach 1933) und mit dem Slowakischen Staat (nach 1939). Er ist am 28 August 1943 gestorben.

Auch Boris war im ganzen Leben Hochdekoriert. Vom jüngeren Jahren bis Lebensende. Er hat 98 in- und ausländische Orden und Ehrenzeichen.⁴⁴ Am 19.06.1941 bekam er vom Staatspräsident Joseph Tiso das Grosskreuz des neubegründeten slowakisches Pribina Ordens⁴⁵ Boris war Inhaber des Ungarisches Verdienstorden Grosskreuz mit Kollane und Ungarisches Verdienstorden mit Heiligen Krone Grosskreuz.⁴⁶

Er besitzte z. B. die folgende Orden und Ehrenzeichen.

⁴² Ibid., Allerhöchste Handschreiben. Baden 20.01.1917.

⁴³ Hlodak, P., Op. cit., 226–227. Genealogisches Tafeln.

⁴⁴ Nationales Heeresmuseum – Sofia, 2006, 191–194, ebenda Illustrationen.

⁴⁵ Korásek, M., J. Kozák, Op. cit., 36.

⁴⁶ Dr. A. Pandula Privatarchív (Bp.), Beirókönyvek. 19.04.–30.05.2012, 104–110.

Bulgarien: Heilige Kyrill und Method Orden. (Grosskreuz Kollane). Luftwaffe Ehrenzeichen. *Belgien:* Leopold Orden (Grosskreuz). *Frankreich:* Orden der Ehrenlegion (Grosskreuz). *Griechenland:* Erlösen Orden (Grosskreuz). *Grossbritannien:* Viktoria Orden (Grosskreuz Kollane). *Polen:* Weiße Adler Orden (Grosskreuz). *Rumanien:* König Karl Orden (Grosskreuz Kollane). *Bayern:* Hausorden Heilige Hubertus (Grosskreuz). *Preussen:* Schwarze Adlerorden (Grosskreuz). Hohenzoller Hausorden (Grosskreuz). *Sachsen:* Sachsen Ernestinische Hausorden (Grosskreuz Kollane). *Württemberg:* Kronen Orden (Grosskreuz). *Parma:* Heilige Ludwig Orden (Grosskreuz). Konstantinische Hausorden (Grosskreuz Kollane). *Sizilien:* Heilige Januarius Orden (Grosskreuz).⁴⁷

Boris hat (als Kronprinz von Bulgarien) am 21.01.1912 den Sankt Stefan Orden erhalten.⁴⁸ Alle Dokumente sind auf ungarisch. Franz Joseph I. schrieb folgendes: „*Boris bolgár koronahercezeg Ő királyi Fenségének Szent István-rendem nagykeresztjét adományozom, miről Házam és a külügyek közös ministerével együtt leendő további eljárás végett ezennel értesítem.*”⁴⁹

Boris (als ausländisches Ordenritter) hat die folgende Insignien erhalten: 1. Grosskreuz (auf dem Schulterband). 2. Stern zum Grosskreuz.⁵⁰ Boris (als St. Stephans-Ordensritter) als zeitgenössisches Fotografie bisher ist unbekannt geworden. Die originalen Ordensinsignien heutzutage sind im Sofia im „Nationalen Voennoisztoriceszki Muzej”.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Ebenda, 133–150.

⁴⁸ MNL OL, P1058. Archiv des St. Stephans Ordens, Fasc. 26. (1910–1913) – 5/1912. Auf dem Aktendeckel. Wien, 21.01.1912.

⁴⁹ Ibid., Allerhöchste Entscheidung. Wien, 21.01.1912.

⁵⁰ Ibid., Auf dem Aktendeckel. Jan. 1912.

⁵¹ Recht herzlichen Dank für die kollegiale Unterstützung für Direktorin Yordanka Toteva (Nationalen Voennoisztoricheski Muzej) bei der wissenschaftlichen Forschungen im Sofia (2012).

Bulgarische Orden, Ehrenzeichen, Medaillen, Verleihungen an Staatsbürgern Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg (1914–1918)

Attila Pandula

The University of Loránd Eötvös – Budapest

Die Quellen

Das Material liegt im Ungarischen Staatsarchiv, unter dem Signatur K21 (Archiv des kgl. ung. Ministeriums am Allerhöchsten Hoflager). Unter dem Titel „Durchschnittliches Aktenmaterial“ aus der erforschten Zeitepoche (1914–1918) sind die folgenden Fasziceln vorhanden:

1. (1914) Fasziceln 276–284, Akt. 2950;
2. (1915) Fasziceln 285–291, Akt. 1–2600;
3. (1916) Fasziceln 292–296, Akt. 201–2449;
4. (1917) Fasziceln 297–304, Akt. 1–2837;
5. (1918) Fasziceln 305–311, Akt. 28–3039.

Dieses sehr wertvolles Material gilt bisher praktisch als unerforscht. Unter anderem befinden sich darunter die Allerhöchsten Aufnahmebewilligungen aus der Zeit (1914–1918). Dabe die verliehenen bulgarischen Orden, Auszeichnungen, Ehrenzeichen und Medaillen. Die verliehenen Ehrungen sind die folgenden:

I. Sankt Alexander Orden (Siftungsjahr 1879)¹: Die vorkommenden Ordensklassen: 1. Großkreuz mit Schwertern; 2. Großkreuz; 3. I. Klasse; 4. Großoffizierkreuz; 5. Kommendeurkreuz mit Brillanten; 6. Kommandeurkreuz; 7. Offizierskreuz; 8. Ritterkreuz.

¹ Петров, Т. Българските ордени и медали. С., 2002, 80–96.

Bulgarische Orden, Ehrenzeichen, Medaillen, Verleihungen an Staatsbürgern Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg (1914–1918)

II. Nationales Zivilverdienstorden (Stiftungsjahr 1891)²: 1. Großkreuz mit Brillanten; 2. Großkreuz; 3. Großoffizierskreuz; 4. Kommandeurkreuz; 5. Offizierskreuz; 6. Ritterkreuz mit der Krone; 7. Ritterkreuz; 8. 6. Klasse/A. – Silbernes Zivilehrenkreuz mit der Krone; 9. 6. Klasse/B. – Silbernes Zivil Ehrenkreuz; 10. Silberne Zivilehren-Medaille (2. Klasse/B); 11. Bronzene Zivilehren-Medaille mit der Krone (3. Klasse/A); 12. Bronzene Zivilehren-Medaille (3. Klasse/B).

III. Nationales Militärverdienstorden (Stiftungsjahr 1900)³: 1. Kommandeurkreuz; 2. 6. Klasse (Militärverdienstkreuz auf dem Bande der Tapferkeitsmedaille); 3. 6. Klasse (Militärverdienstkreuz).

IV. Rotkreuzdekorationen (Stiftungsjahr 1886)⁴: 1. Rotkreuzdekoration 1. Klasse; 2. Rotkreuzdekoration 2. Klasse.

V. Rotkreuzehrenmedaille (Stiftungsjahr 1918.)⁵: 1. Goldene Ehrenmedaille; 2. Silberne Ehrenmedaille.

Die Verleihungspraxis

Zuerst wurden die oberwähnten Verdienste während der Balkankriege verlieht. Ein Beispiel dazu: Dr. Milan Figarten (Chefartz aus Zagreb) hat die Rotkreuzdekoration 2. Klasse für seine Verdienste im Balkankriege erhalten.⁶

„Laut Mitteilung der kgl. bulgarischen Gesandtschaft hat Seine Majestät der König von Bulgarien dem Oberstuhlsrichter in Orsova, Andor von Pophradsky und dem Oberkontrollär der kgl. ung. Staatsbahnen Edmund Wiesinger, ferner dem Bankdirektor in Orsova, Moritz Nobel, dem Artz in Orsova, Theodor Schwartz und dem Agenten Bernhard Pitte das

² Ibid., 102–109.

³ Ibid., 110–117.

⁴ Ibid., 124–125.

⁵ Ibid., 175–176.

⁶ MNL OL, Kir. Személye Körüli Magyar Minisztérium iratai. 283. Fasc. – Kralj. Minister Hrvats. Slavon Dalmat. 387/el. Bp., 24.07.1914.

Ritterkreuz der Zivilverdienstorden verliehen.”⁷

Zar Ferdinand I., aus der Dynastie von Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha-Koháry, spielte eine sehr interessante spezielle Rolle bei der Gesellschaftsleben Österreich–Ungarns, bzw. Ungarns. Unter anderem er war der höchste Ehrengast bei Begräbnis Kaisers und Königs Franz Joseph der I.

„Dieselbe Allerhöchste Bewilligung wurde dem in Wien I. Tagetoffstraße 2. wohnhaften und nach Jászberény, Komitat Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok heimatortszuständigen Quardian, der P. p. Kapuziner in Wien P. Andreas Csák, hinsichtlich des Kommandeurkreuzes des königlich bulgarisches Zivielverdienstordens, erteilt.”⁸

Auch bei des budapester Krönungsfestes im Jahre 1916 war Zar Ferdinand der höchste teilnehmende Ehrengast.

Weilbischof Antal Nemes, der Budaer Burgpropst, hat mit diesem Zusammenhang das Kommandeurkreuz, mit Brillanten des Sankt Alexander Ordens im Jahre 1917 erhalten.⁹

Ebenda hat das Grosskreuz dieses Ordens (im Jahre 1917) Graf Béla Széchenyi, der Kronhüter erhalten.¹⁰

Der Obersthofmeister Ihrer Majestät der Kaiserin und

⁷ Ibid., 288. Fasc. (1914) – 10.2065/1. – K.u.k. Ministerium der kaiserl. und königl. Hauses und des Außern. Wien, den 5.12.1914. Kgl. bulgarische Auszeichnungen. Zur Note 2.1411. vom 26.06.1914.

⁸ Ibid., 309. Fasc. (1918) – 1956/1918. Külföldi rendjelek és kitüntetések elfogadásához és engedélyezéséhez legfelsőbb Elhatározás tárgyában. K.u.k. Ministerium des kaiserl. und königl. Hauses und des Außern. –50.892/1. – Fremde Auszeichnungen, Allerhöchste Annahmewilligung. Wien, 04.07.1918.

⁹ Ibid., 302. Fasc. (1917) – 1.2051/1917. A BÜM, Nemes A. címzetes püspök, a koronázó templom apátplébánosának felségfolyamodványát küldi, melybe a nevezett a neki adományozott bolgár Szent Sándor-rend középkeresztjének a gyémántokkal elfogadhassa és viselhesse. Ibid., A m. kir. BÜM – 31.220. sz./eln. – Dr. Nemes A. püspök, a koronázó templom apátplébánosa felségfolyamodványa. (A Bolgár királyi Szt. Sándor-rend középkeresztje a gyémántokkal.) Bp., 23.09.1917.

¹⁰ Ibid., Fasc. 302. – 1615/917. Jegyzék. – Nr. 4. Ő Felsége a Kir. Személye Körüli Magyar Minisztérium Nr. 633.

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Staatsbürgern Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg (1914–1918)*

Königin Alexander Graf Esterházy hat das (außenordentlich selten verliehene) bulgarische Sankt Alexander Ordens I. Klasse erhalten.¹¹

Graf Sándor Apponyi, ein bedeutender Politiker, mehrfache Minister war während mehr als 50 Jahren Parlamentsabgeordnete des Staates Jászberény.

Im Jászberény diente, als Husarenkapitän, Ferdinand Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha-Koháry. Apponyi und Ferdinand pflegten eine sehr enge (tiefe) lebenslange Freundschaft.

Zar Ferdinand I. hat seinen Freund mehrfach mit höchsten bulgarischen Orden und Auszeichnungen dekoriert (bei einer Zivilpersönlichkeit ist es sehr selten). Er hat auch den Sankt Alexander Ordens Großkreuz mit Schwertern erhalten.¹²

Im Jahre 1916 dekorierte Ferdinand I. Apponyi mit der Rotkreuzdekoration I. Klasse.¹³

Seine Frau (geboren als Gräfin Klotild von Mensdorff) hat im Jahre 1917 die Rotkreuzdekoration I. Klasse erhalten.¹⁴

Zar Ferdinand I. hat eine außerordentlich gute Beziehung mit hohen ungarischen geistlichen Würdeträgern. Unter anderem dekorierte er Graf Vilmos Batthyány (Bischof von Nyitra) im Jahre 1917 mit dem Großkreuz mit Brillanten des Nationales Zivilverdienstordens.¹⁵

Im Jahre 1916 erhielt Lajos Illetsko (Prister im Poprad) den Sankt Alexanders Ordens Ritterkreuz.¹⁶

¹¹ Ibid., 310. Fasc. Nr. 2239/1918. Főudvarmesteri Hivatal megkeresése. – Sr. K.u.K. Apost. Majestat Obersthofmesiteramt ad 2309. Wien, am 5.08.1918.

¹² MNL OL, K148. BÜM Levéltár – Eln. ir. Fasc. 550 (1917) 2. t. Kitüntetés-, nemesség-, címadományozás. Eln. 2.69. – Jegyzék, 1967/1917. sz.

¹³ MNL OL, K21. Ő Felsége a Kir. Személye Körüli M. Min. iratai. 296. Fasc. 2157/1916. – Bécs, 03.12.1916.

¹⁴ MNL OL, K148. BÜM Levéltár – Eln. ir. Fasc. 550 (1917) 2. t. – Kitüntetés-, nemesség-, címadományozás. Eln. 2.69. – Jegyzék, 1967/1917. sz.

¹⁵ MNL OL, K21. Ő Felsége a Kir. Személye Körüli M. Min. iratai. Fasc. 302–1615/917. Jegyzék Nr. 22. BÜM 9584. Eln. (744.)

¹⁶ Ibid., Fasc. 309. – 1878/1918. – Vallás- és Közoktatásügyi Min. iratai. Illetsko

Ferdinand dekorierte verschiedene Persönlichkeiten, die bei seinen, im Königreich Ungarn liegenden Güten mitwirkten.¹⁷ Unter anderem dekorierte er mit dem Ritterkreuz mit Krone des Bulgarischen Nationalzivilverdienstordens dem Stuhlrichter Árpád Kajaba. Er lebte und wirkte im Koháryháza.¹⁸

István Podhradzsky wirkte als wirtschaftlicher Schäfer auf dem Grund von Hontszentantal. Im 1917 erhielt er Offizierskreuz dieses Ordens.¹⁹

Der ehemalige Richter im Sztrecena, Márton Resovszky erhielt im Jahre 1917 die Bulgarische Silberne Medaille.

Das Kommandeurkreuz des Sankt Alexander Ordens erhielt der im Munkács lebende Hofrat János Nedeczky (im Jahre 1917).²⁰

Der Direktor der Balkanbankfiliale in Pleven (Bulgarien), Berthold Duschnitz (Staatsbürger Ungarns), erhielt im Jahre 1916 das Ritterkreuz des Bulgarischen Nationalzivilverdienstordens.²¹

L. poprádi esperes plébános bolgár rendjel viselhetése tárgyában. Ebenda. – Elnökség (Prasidium) Nr. 6225/1918. – Illetsko L. poprádi esperes- plébános felségfolyamodványa. (Bp., 21.07.1918).

¹⁷ Vgl. Dazu: Pandula A. I. Ferdinánd bolgár cár rendjelei és kitüntetései. – In.: Demeter, G., P. Peykovska (Eds.). Political, Social, Economic and Cultural Elites in the Central and East European States in Modernity and Post-Modernity. Sofia–Bp., 2010, 59–60.

¹⁸ MNL OL, K21. Ő Felsége a Kir. Személye Körüli M. Min. iratai. Fasc. 309, Nr. 1873/1918. Kajaba Á. koháryházai községi jegyző bolgár rendjel elfogadhatása és viselhetése iránti kérése. Ebenda. M. kir. BÜM, Nr. 5161/Eln. 2. – Kajaba Á. koháryházai községi jegyző felségfolyamodványa. – Bp., 25.06.1918.

¹⁹ Ibid. Fasc. 302, Nr. 1614/ 1917. KÜM. Több magyar állampolgár bolgár rendjel viselhetése tb. Jegyzék Nr. 1014/1917. Nr. 2. BÜM – 10766./eln. (798) – Podhradzsky István szentantali gazdasági főintéző.

²⁰ Ibid., Fasc. 302. – Nr. 2054/1917. KÜM. Több külföldi kitüntetés elfogadhatása és viselhetése tárgyában. K.u.k. Ministerium des kaiserl. und königl. Hauses und., Nr. 84.766/1. Fremde Auszeichnungen. Wien, am 21.09.1917, Nr. 2054/1917. Jegyzék. BÜM. Nr. 17.379/Pras. Nr. 1259.

²¹ Ibid., Fasc. 296, Nr. 2280/1916. KÜM, Több magyar állampolgárnak külhoni rendjel viselhetése tárgyában. K.u.k. Ministerium des kaiserl. und

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Der Handelsagent Bernát Pitte war seit 1915 im Besitz des Ritterkreuzes des bulgarischen Nationalverdienstordens.²²

Einige ungarische Persönlichkeiten erhielten Ehrungen für Verdienste bei Fernmeldewesen. József Liptai (Oberoffizier bei der Kgl. ung. Post- und Fernmeldewesen) erhielt im Jahre 1917 das Ritterkreuz mit der Krone des bulgarischen Nationalzivilverdienstordens.²³ Sándor Lévai (Oberaufseher 2. Klasse bei Fernmeldewesen) erhielt im Jahre 1918 die Bulgarische Bronzenehrenmedaille mit der Krone (3. Klasse).²⁴ Mihály Tóth (Arbeiter bei Fernmeldewesen) war seit 1918 Inhaber der Bulgarischen Bronzenehrenmedaille (3. Klasse).²⁵

Andere Personen erhielten bulgarische Auszeichnungen für die Verdienste bei der Grenzpolizei: unter anderem János Boros, ein im Temesvár lebender Zivilabgeordnete bei kgl. ung. Grenzpolizei, bekam im Jahre 1917 das Ritterkreuz des Bulgarischen Nationalzivilverdienstordens.²⁶

Man muss es betonen, daß vor allem die Vertreter des

königl. Hauses und., Wien, am 12.12.1916, Nr. 120053/1. Resolvierter alleruntertanigster Annahmebeitrag. An des kgl. ung. Ministerium am Allerhöchsten Hoflager in Wien. Jegyzék a 2280/1916. sz. Nr. 4. BÜM. Nr. 31.085/Pras. (1848).

²² Ibid., Fasc. 283. Kereskedelemügyi magyar kir. miniszter. Nr. 12.009/Pras. Pitte Bernát felségfolyamodványa. Bp., 12.05.1915.

²³ Ibid., Fasc. 302, Nr. 1614/1917. KÜM. Több magyar állampolgár bolgár rendjel viselése tárgyában. K.u.k. Ministerium des kaiserl. Und., Nr. 57.184/1 (1917). Fremdlandische Ordensauszeichnungen. Jegyzék. 1014/1917, Nr. 1. Kereskedelmi miniszter. 8889/el. (1917).

²⁴ Ibid., Fasc. 309. 1956/1918. KÜM. Külföldi rendjelek elfogadásához és viselhetéséhez engedélyek. K.u.k. Ministerium des kaiserl. und königl. Hauses und., Nr. 50.892/1. Fremde Auszeichnungen, Allerhöchste Annamebewilligung. Wien, am 4.07.1918, 1956/1918. Jegyzék Nr. 3.7.368/1918, 776/1918.

²⁵ Ibid., Jegyzék Nr. 4, 7.368/1918, 776/1918.

²⁶ Ibid., Fasc. 302. – KÜM. Több magyar állampolgár bolgár rendjel viselése tárgyában. K.u.k. Ministerium des kaiserl. und königl. Hauses und., Nr. 57.184/1 (1917) Fremdlandische Ordensauszeichnungen. Jegyzék. 928/1917. sz. Br. 3. BÜM. Nr. 13.808/Pras. (946).

Verkehrswesens, in der erforschten Zeitepoche, Ehrungen erhielt haben.

Für Verdienste bei Eisenbahnwesen waren auch mehrere bulgarische Ehrungen in dieser Zeit. Generaldirektor (des priv. kaiserl. königl. Bahnlinie Kaschau-Oderberg) Ministerialrat Garibaldi Pulszky war seit 1916 im Besitz des Großkreuzes des Bulgarischen Nationalzivilverdienstordens.²⁷

Die Eisenbahn-Oberingenieure bei der Kaschauer-Oderberger Bahn, Adolf Pilat und József Piláts bekamen im Jahre 1915 das Ritterkreuz des bulgarischen Nationalzivilverdienst-Ordens.²⁸

Bei der Schifffahrt waren auch mehrere Verleihungen bekannt geworden:

“Die kgl. bulgarische Gesandtschaft hat auftragsgemäss die h. c. Vermittlung angesprochen, zum die Erfahrung zu bringen, ob gegen die beabsichtigete Verleihungen einer kgl. bulgarischen Auszeichnung an die nachbenannten Funktionere des kgl. ung. Fluss und Seefahrts Aktien Gesellschaft, und zwar an den Direktors Moritz Domony von Domany, an den Direktor Karl Végh von Dior, an den Generalinspektor und Prokurenisten Rudolf Mendé sowie an die Inspektoren Dr. Béla von Nikolits und Julius Merkner unsererseits ein Anstand obwalten würde und welcher Orden und Ordensgrad der Stellung der Genannten ernstprechend ware.”²⁹

²⁷ Ibid., Fasc. 296. Nr. 2308/1916. – KÜM. Külhoni rendjelek viselhetésének tárgyában. K.u.k. Ministerium des kaiserl. und königl. Hauses und., Nr. 111581/1. Resolvierter Vortrag. (An das kgl. ung. Ministerium den Allerhöchster Hoflager. Wien, am 11.12.1916, Jegyzék. 1381/1916. sz. Nr. 10. Kereskedelmi miniszter. Nr. 33456/Pras. (1716).

²⁸ Ibid., Fasc. 296. Kereskedelmügyi m. kir. minister. Nr. 15. 110/Pras. Pilát A. felségfolyamodványa. Bp., 16.06.1915. und Ibid., Fasc. 291. Nr. 2106/1915. – K.u.k. Ministerium des kaiserl. und königl. Hauses und..., Nr. 80233/1. Reserviertes Ordensvortrag. (An das kgl. ung. Ministerium an Allerhöchster Hoflager) Wien, am 10.09.1915, Jegyzék 1488/1915. sz. Nr. 5. Kereskedelmi miniszter. Nr. 15.110/Pras., Ebenda Nr. 1427/1915.

²⁹ Ibid., Fasc. 296. – Nr. 2116/1916. KÜM bolgár kitüntetések tárgyában.

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Das Großoffizierskreuz des Sankt Alexander Ordens war Direktor Dr. Moritz Domony von Domany (Minsiterialrat) verliehen worden.³⁰

Direktor (Hofrat) Károly Végh war im Besitz des Großoffizierskreuzes des bulgarischen Nationalzivilverdienst Ordens. Er war (auch) Inhaber der Rotkreuzdekoration 1. Klasse.³¹

Generalinspektor und Prokmister (königlicher Rat und stellvertretender Direktor) Rudolf Mende erhielt das Großoffizierskreuz des Sankt Alexander Ordens. Er erhielt ebenso die Rotkreuzdekoration 1. Klasse.³²

Inspektor Béla Nikolits bekam den Großoffizierskreuz des Bulgarischen Nationalzivilverdienst-Ordens. Er war im Besitz der Rotkreuz Dekoration 1. Klasse.³³

Mit Großoffizierskreuz des Bulgarischen Zivilverdienst-Ordens war Inspektor Julius Merkner ausgezeichnet worden.³⁴

Generalinspektor Ernő Roeszler erhielt der Rotkreuz Dekoration 1. Klasse.³⁵

Stellvertretender Direktor und ung. königl. Rat, Jenő György bekam Rotkreuz Dekoration 2. Klasse.³⁶

Beamter Nándor Zeller hatte der Rotkreuzdekoration 1. Klasse erhalten.³⁷

Ebenda: Kereskedelemügyi m. kir. miniszter. Nr. 42530/Pras., K.u.k. Ministerium des kaiserl. und königl. Hauses und., Nr. 114.010/1. – Wien, am 20.11.1916.

³⁰ Ibid., Fasc. 310, Nr. 2087/1918. A Magyar királyi folyam- és tengerhajózási r. társaság több alkalmazottjának kérése külföldi érdemrendek viselhetése és elfogadhatás miatt. (Másolat a 24.923/eln. sz.) – Magyar kir. Folyam- és Tengerhajózási Részvénytársaság. Kimutatás külföldi kitüntetésekről, Nr. 1.

³¹ Ebenda Nr. 2.

³² Ebenda Nr. 3.

³³ Ebenda Nr. 6.

³⁴ Ebenda Nr. 9.

³⁵ Ebenda Nr. 4.

³⁶ Ebenda Nr. 5.

³⁷ Ebenda Nr. 19.

Schifskapitän Oszkár Dömötörffy war im Besitz der Rotkreuzehrenmedaille 2. Klasse (Silberne Ehrenmedaille).³⁸

Steuermann Sándor Zsurkán erhielt den 6. Klasse des Bulgarischen Nationalmilitärverdienstordens (am Band der Tapferkeitsmedaille).³⁹

³⁸ Ebenda Nr. 23.

³⁹ Ebenda Nr. 24.

Ungarn in den ökonomischen Plänen Deutschlands 1920–1932 (nach Dokumenten des Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchivs, München)

Maria Koleva

Institut für Historische Forschung – BAW

Die Beschlüsse der Siegermächte auf der Friedenskonferenz in Paris hatten einen entscheidenden Einfluß über die Entwicklung der ökonomischen und politischen Verhältnissen zwischen den europäischen Ländern in der Nachkriegszeit. In starkem Maße betrifft dies auch die Gestaltung der beiderseitigen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Ungarn.

Das Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges stellte Deutschland vor einem schweren Anfang in seiner europäischen Politik und im einzelnen in seiner Politik gegenüber Ungarn. Besiegt und isoliert, belastet mit schweren finanziellen Verpflichtungen, territorial verkleinert, innennpolitisch von Unruhen zerrissen, verlor es seine Stellung als europäische Großmacht auf der Rechnung der Siegermächte, vor allem zu Gunsten Frankreichs. Auf diesem Hintergrund formierte sich der Gegensatz zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich als Hauptgegensatz in Europa nach Ende des Krieges, was die Entwicklung der politischen und ökonomischen Beziehungen zwischen den europäischen Staaten beeinflusste.

Deutschland stand vor der Notwendigkeit neue Wege in der Beziehungen gegenüber der europäischen Staaten zu gehen, um seine verlorengegangene Stellung in Europa wiederherzustellen. Dies galt im besonderen für die zukünftigen Beziehungen zu dem ebenfalls besiegten Ungarn, das schwere Verluste nach dem Krieg

hinnehmen musste.

Nach dem Vertrag von Trianon (4 Juni 1920) verlor es fast zwei Drittel seines Territoriums und damit wertvolle Rohstoffvorkommen an Eisenerz, Holz, Kohle, sowie alle seinen Vorkommen an Erdöl, Kupfer, Gold, Silber und Salz. Eine weitere Belastung für die ruinierte ungarische Wirtschaft waren auch die Reparationszahlungen, die im Laufe von 33 Jahren bezahlt werden sollten. Auch die Verkleinerung des Heeres wirkte negativ auf die Nachkriegsentwicklung des Landes aus.

Aus diesem Grund brauchte Ungarn dringend Rohstoffe, um die ungarische Wirtschaft schnell zu beleben. Erheblich änderte sich nach dem Weltkrieg auch die Wirtschaftsstruktur des Landes, wobei es sich zur Förderung der einheimischen Industrieproduktion orientierte, mit Übergewicht der Leichtindustrie. Der enge Inlandsmarkt bewirkte dabei die Notwendigkeit sichere Auslandsmärkte zu suchen, um die ökonomischen Pläne realisieren zu können. In dieser Situation war Ungarn auf das Ausland in stärkerem Maße angewiesen und fiel in größerer Abhängigkeit von den entwickelten Industriestaaten. Andererseits haben die enormen Kriegsverluste große Unzufriedenheit unter der Bevölkerung ausgelöst und riefen den ungarischen Revisionismus hervor, der in der ganzen Zwischenkriegsperiode Leitmotiv der ungarischen Außenpolitik war.¹

Auf diesem Hintergrund, als Folge des zerstörten Wirtschaftslebens und der innenstaatlichen Instabilität, waren nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg die ökonomischen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Ungarn für kurze Zeit paralysiert. In Deutschland wurde die neue politische Situation in Europa bzw. die Lage Ungarns realistisch eingeschätzt und man hielt sich von aktiven Handlungen zurück. Die deutsche Politik gegenüber Südosteuropa

¹ Teichova, A. Kleinstaaten im Spannungsfeld der Großmächte. Wirtschaft und Politik in Mittel- und Südosteuropa in der Zwischenkriegszeit. München 1988, 19–20; Riemenschneider, M. Die deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik gegenüber Ungarn 1933–1944. Ein Beitrag zur Interdependenz von Wirtschaft und Politik unter dem Nationalsozialismus. Frankfurt a. M., 1987, 33.

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bzw. Ungarn fügt sich auf diese Weise in die außenpolitische Konzeption der maßgebenden Schichten in der Politik und Wirtschaft 1918/1919 ein, die nach der Meinung des deutschen Wissenschaftlers Hans-Jürgen Schröder zum Ziel hatten *“durch die Stärkung der ökonomischen Position Deutschlands, die Grundlage für eine aktive Außen- und Revisionspolitik zu schaffen.”*²

Abgesehen von ihrem verwandten Nachkriegsschicksal verschlechterten sich sogar die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Ungarn nach dem Krieg. Ausschlaggebend dafür war das Verhältnis Ungarn zu Frankreich bzw. zu Kleiner Entente, sowie die revolutionäre Stimmung innerhalb des Landes. Dies führte zu einer bedeutenden Verringerung des deutschen Interesses zu Ungarn. Aufschlußreich dafür ist eine Aufzeichnung von Ministerialdirektor Köpke (Auswärtiges Amt), die er als *“ein Schlüsseldokument für die deutsche Ungarnpolitik”* bezeichnete und die die politische Leitlinie gegenüber Ungarn auf folgende Weise markierte:

“Die Lage Ungarns und die Bedenken, die ungarischerseits gegen den Abschluß eines deutsch-tschechoslowakischen Schiedsvertages geltend gemacht werden könnten, zeigen, dass im Verhältnis zwischen Deutschland und Ungarn das ungarische Interesse derartig überwiegt, dass die deutsche Politik auch schwere Belastungen ihres Verhältnisses zu Ungarn wagen darf, ohne die eigenen Interessen zu gefährden. Deutschland sieht sich hinsichtlich der Balkan- und Orientpolitik für die nächste Zeit darauf beschränkt, rein wirtschaftliche Ziele mit friedlichen Mitteln zu verfolgen. Damit hat Ungarn seine frühere Bedeutung, die es als ein in die Balkan- und Orientsphäre hineinreichender Staat für die deutsche Politik gehabt hat, so sehr der Schmerz Ungarns über die Verstümmelung des alten ungarischen Reiches bei uns geteilt und verstanden wird, kaum ein unmittelbares Interesse an den

² Tonch, H. Wirtschaft und Politik auf dem Balkan. Untersuchung zu den deutsch-rumänischen Beziehungen in der Weimarer Republik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Weltwirtschaftskrise. Fr./M./Bern/New York 1984, 50.

Regenerationsbestrebungen Ungarns. “ So als Staat, der in dem Balkan- und Orientsgebiet eingeschlossen war, verlor Ungarn weitgehend seine vorherige Bedeutung für die Nachkriegspolitik der Weimarer Republik. Das bedeutete, dass man in Deutschland die Nachkriegssituation realistisch einschätzte und im besonderen “*daß die ungarische Freundschaft letztlich auf der Hoffnung aufbaute, bei einem Konflikt auf Deutschland rechnen zu können.*”³

Als Ergebnis davon wirkte diese Ausgangslage nach dem Krieg entscheidend auf die Gestaltung der beiderseitigen Beziehungen in den ersten Nachkriegsjahren aus. Der Beginn der ökonomischen Annäherung zwischen beiden Ländern wurde schon im Jahre 1920 gelegt, noch vor der Unterzeichnung des Trianon Vertrages. Auf Anregung der ungarischen Seite begannen Ende Mai 1920 Besprechungen “*über eine vorläufige Regelung der rechtlichen Grundlagen der zwischenstaatlichen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen*“, genauer über den Abschluß eines Wirtschaftsabkommens. Obwohl Ungarn auf eine Steigerung der Ausfuhr nach Deutschland drängte, beabsichtigte das Auswärtige Amt zuvor einige strittigen Fragen des beiderseitigen Wirtschaftsverkehrs zu regeln und strebte im wesentlichen folgendes an:

“1. Dass der Vertragszolltarif wegfällt, so dass beide Teile tarifarisch freie Hand haben;

2. Dass beide Vertragsteile sich gegenseitige Meistbegünstigung zugestehen;

3. *Dass die Verkehrslage geregelt werde.*”

Im einzelnen verlangte und beharrte die deutsche Seite auf eine Zentralisierung der Einfuhr mit Ungarn, um die Schieber fernzuhalten und strebte daran, dass eine Privatgesellschaft gegründet werden muss, die für Getreide, Wolle und andere Produkte zuständig ist. Diese Gesellschaft sollte die deutsche Einfuhr leiten und regeln, ohne aber eine Monopolstellung zu haben und ohne als ein reines Monopol zu funktionieren. Die

³ Höpfner, H.-P., Deutsche Südosteuropapolitik in der Weimarer Republik. Fr. a. M., 1983, 224.

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Einfuhr musste nur *“unter vorzugsweiser kompensationsweiser Berücksichtigung“* der Gesellschaft geregelt werden. Außerdem waren die entscheidenden Faktoren im Reichsernährungsministerium gegenüber der Einfuhr von ungarischen Obst und Gemüse freundlich eingestellt, da bisher diese Einfuhr wegen schlechter Verkehrsverhältnissen nicht möglich war. Die deutschen Wirtschaftsexperten berücksichtigten auch einige Bedingungen zu stellen, um die deutsche Industrie vor übermäßiger Anstieg der ungarischen Einfuhr zu schützen.⁴

Als Ergebnis der Verhandlungen wurde am 1. Juni 1920 das *“Provisorische Abkommen zwischen der Deutschen und Königlichen Ungarischen Regierung zur Regelung ihrer beiderseitigen wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen“* unterzeichnet. Nach diesem Vertrag garantierten sich die beiden Vertragsseiten wechselseitige Meistbegünstigung, ohne aber feste Zolltarifabreden zu vereinbaren. Damit sicherte sich Deutschland Zollermäßigungen, die Ungarn auch anderen Staaten gewährte. Deutscherseits wurden Ungarn die niedrigsten Agrarzölle eingeräumt, wobei es das Recht hatte, die Ausfuhr bestimmter ungarischen Waren durch administrativen Maßnahmen einzuschränken oder sogar zu verbieten. Aufgrund der veterinären Bestimmungen z.B. wurde die Ausfuhr von ungarischen Vieh und Tierprodukte stark eingeschränkt und somit praktisch gestoppt. Abgesehen davon, dass die deutsche Seite keine Interesse an die Regelung dieser Fragen zeigte, stieg in den nächsten Jahren der zwischenstaatliche Handelsaustausch. Nach der Schätzung der deutschen Wirtschaftsexperten war das deutsch-ungarische Wirtschaftsabkommen *“ganz“* befriedigend.⁵

Am 7. August 1920 wurde in Budapest die Deutsch-ungarische Handelskammer gegründet. In diesem Zusammenhang berichtete Graf Fürstenberg (seit 1912 als Generalkonsul und seit 1920 deutscher Gesandten in Budapest) folgendes: *“Immerhin konnte bei dieser Gelegenheit beobachtet werden, dass trotz des z. Z. in Ungarn herrschenden französischen Kurses,*

⁴ BayHStA, MA 100885, dok. v. 25.05.1920.

⁵ BayHStA, MA100884, dok. v. 17.04.1923.

*bei den maßgebenden Männern für Deutschland viel Sympatie und Interesse vorhanden ist.*⁶

In der Folgezeit entstanden jedoch ernsthafte Probleme in der Entwicklung des beiderseitigen Handelsaustausches. Die von der ungarischen Regierung eingeführten Verbote für die Einfuhr bestimmter Waren erschwerten ernst den Absatz deutscher Waren in Ungarn. Dazu kamen auch die neu entstandenen Komplikationen bei der Bezahlung der Einfuhr, weil Ungarn die Einfuhr in Kronen statt in Devisen bezahlte, was den Zugang der Importeure zu den transferierten Finanzmitteln erschwerte und komplizierte.⁷ Auf Veranlassung des Reichswirtschaftsministeriums, das über diese Lage informiert war, führte das Auswärtige Amt Besprechungen zwischen Wirtschaftsexperten beider Länder durch, um die strittigen Fragen zu klären. Deutscherseits waren die Vertreter des Reichswirtschaftsministeriums, des Auswärtigen Amtes und des Preußischen Handelsministeriums der Meinung, dass die damalige politische Situation (Meisbegünstigung in den Friedensverträgen bis 10. Januar 1925) nicht geeignet war eine Einleitung von neuen Wirtschaftsverhandlungen einzuführen. Alle entstandenen Probleme sollten danach im diplomatischen Wege geklärt werden.⁸ Aus diesem Grund entwickelten sich die zwischenstaatlichen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen bis 10. Januar 1925 zögernd.

Erst Ende 1925 war bekannt, dass bald deutsch-ungarische Verhandlungen über einen Handelsvertrag beginnen werden. Deshalb haben die Wirtschaftsexperten Deutschlands im Dezember 1925 empfohlen, dass man bei den bevorstehenden deutsch-ungarischen Handelsvertragsverhandlungen *“besonderes Gewicht“* auf die Getreide- und Mehlzölle legen muss, und zum Schutze des heimischen Brotgetreidebaues und des heimischen Mühlengewerbes *“mit allem Nachdruck“* *“unbedingt“* dahin wirken muss, an den autonomen Zollsätzen als Mindestsätze

⁶ BayHStA, MA 100884, dok. v. 08.08.1920.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

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festzuhalten. Im wesentlichen bestand die Getreideeinfuhr aus Ungarn aus Weizen und Roggen. Während im Jahre 1924 die Einfuhr von Weizen auf 91 019 dz betrug, erhöhte sie sich nur in den Monaten von Januar bis August 1925 bereits auf 76 769 dz. Die Einfuhr des Roggens stieg in der genannten Periode nicht so erheblich, während die Mehleinfuhr im Jahre 1925 „ganz gewaltig“ gestiegen war. Deshalb beabsichtigte die deutsche Seite bei den kommenden Handelsvertragsverhandlungen mit Ungarn dahin zu wirken, dass bei Weizen und Roggen bzw. bei Weizen- und Roggenmehl an den autonomen Zollsätze als Mindestsätze festzuhalten, um die heimische Brotgetreideproduktion zu schützen. Besonderes Interesse bei der Tierzucht und die ungarische Einfuhr aus Schlachtschweine und Schlachtochsen zeigte dabei vor allem die bayerische Landwirtschaft. Die ungarische Einfuhr von Tieren (Schweinfleisch), die billiger als die deutschen waren, übte einen Druck auf die deutschen Schlachtviehpreise insofern, als sie den Absatz der minderen Qualitäten deutsches Fleisches „erheblich“ erschwerte.⁹

Trotz aller Probleme zeigte der Außenhandelsaustausch zwischen Deutschland und Ungarn im Jahre 1925 sowohl bei der Einfuhr als auch bei der Ausfuhr die größte Steigerung. Deutschland hatte deshalb nach 1925 kein Interesse an einem „vollständigen“ Handelsvertrag, mit dem die Zolltariffragen geregelt werden. Deutschland bestätigte seinen Platz als dritten wichtigsten Handelspartner Ungarns, nach Österreich und der Tschechoslowakei. Nach „Ungarischen Statistischen Revue“ erhöhte sich die ungarische Ausfuhr von 575.0 Millionen Goldkronen (1924) auf 700.1 Millionen Goldkronen (1925) und die ungarische Einfuhr von 702.8 Millionen Goldkronen (1924) auf 739.7 Millionen Goldkronen (1925). Die Steigerung der Ausfuhr war vor allem auf die erhöhte Ausfuhr landwirtschaftlicher Erzeugnisse zurückzuführen, während die Zunahme der Einfuhr auf die Steigerung der Rohstoffeinfuhr entfiel. In Prozenten, nach Ländern, zeigt die

⁹ BayHStA, MA 100884, dok. v. 03.12.1925.

Entwicklung bei Deutschland eine Erhöhung bei der Einfuhr von 12.53 % (1924) auf 15.02 % (1925), und bei der Ausfuhr von 7.90 % (1924) auf 9.92 % (1925). In gleichem Zeitraum verringerte sich prozentuell der Anteil Österreichs und der Tschechoslowakei, und Deutschland tauchte am dritten Platz in der ungarischen Außenhandelsstatistik auf.¹⁰

Diese entscheidende Wende in den Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Ländern trat folglich im Zusammenhang mit der veränderten politisch-ökonomischen Situation im Jahre 1925 ein. Am 10. Januar fielen die handelspolitischen Restriktionen des Versailler Vertrages ab. Inzwischen, nach der Unterzeichnung des Dawes-Plans im August 1924 wurde die Regelung des deutschen Reparationsproblems von politischer auf die ökonomische Ebene umgeleitet, was zu einem Aufschwung der deutschen Wirtschaft führte. In dieser Situation, orientierte sich die deutsche Handelspolitik in der Zeit zwischen dem Dawes-Plan und dem deutsch-österreichischen Zollunion-Projekt (1931) auf eine bedeutende Steigerung der Ausfuhr. Diese Sachlage erwies sich von entscheidender Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der Beziehungen Deutschlands zu Ungarn in den nächsten Jahren.

Schon im Oktober 1925 entschloß die deutsche Seite Verhandlungen über den Anschluß eines Handelsvertrags mit Ungarn zu beginnen. Einen besonderen Gewicht legte man dabei erneut auf die Getreide- und Mehlzölle. Das Ziel dabei war die heimischen Brotgetreideproduzenten und des heimischen Mühlengewerbes zu schützen, da schon in den ersten Monaten des Jahres 1925 die Einfuhr *“ganz gewaltig gestiegen“* war, und da *“die Getreideeinfuhr aus Ungarn in der Hauptsache auf Weizen und Roggen entfällt.“*¹¹

Diese Entwicklung der ungarischen Ausfuhr war eine Folge der Handelspolitik Ungarns. Mit dem Ziel die Außenhandelsbeziehungen zu aktivieren und somit die Haushaltseinnahmen ab 1. Januar 1925 zu erhöhen, hat

¹⁰ BayHStA, MA 100884, dok. v. 15.03.1926.

¹¹ BayHStA MA 100884, doc. v. 03.12.1925.

Ungarn alle Verbote für die Einfuhrwaren aufgehoben. In dieser Richtung war auch die Errichtung eines Exportbüros der Budapester Handelskammer im Februar 1926. Es sollte folgende Tätigkeitszweige umfassen:

“1. Nachweis ungarischer Bezugsquellen für ausländische Firmen, Ermittlung von Absatzmöglichkeiten für ungarische Firmen im Auslande. Zolltarifauskünfte.

Zu diesem Zweck beabsichtigt die Handelskammer besondere Auslands- Korrespondenten anzuwerben, über die sie bisher nicht verfügte.

2. Wirtschaftlichen Nachrichtendienst und zwar

a) Versorgung des Auslands, insbesondere ausländischer Fachzeitschriften und Zeitungen, mit Nachrichten über das ungarische Wirtschaftsleben,

b) Versorgung der ungarischen Geschäftswelt mit Nachrichten über das Ausland.“¹²

Parallel dazu begannen zu dieser Zeit Verhandlungen über den Abschluß von Handelsabkommen auch mit anderen Staaten, um gegen die deutschen agrarprotektionistischen Maßnahmen entgegenzuwirken, zunächst mit Österreich und der Tschechoslowakei und später auch mit Jugoslawien. Die Verhandlungen schleppten aber und dauerten mehr als ein Jahr. Der Vertrag mit Österreich wurde am 27. Februar 1926 abgeschlossen, und dieser mit der Tschechoslowakei erst im August 1926. In diesem Zusammenhang berichtete aus Budapest Levetzov (Deutsche Gesandtschaft) über die Lage folgendes: *“Nach mehr als einjährigen sehr schweren Verhandlungen ist das ungarisch-österreichische Handelsabkommen am 27. v. Mts. (M. K. – Februar) paraphiert worden. Das Abkommen ist ein Tarifvertrag, in welchem Ungarn an Österreich bei etwa 440 Positionen Ermäßigungen bzw. Bindungen zugesteht, während Österreich an Ungarn Vergünstigungen für etwa 140 Positionen einräumt..., ...dass auch die ungarische Industrie trotz aller Bedenken im einzelnen dem Vertragsabschluß zustimmt... Die*

¹² BayHStA, MA 100884, dok. v. 26.02.1926.

Frage, ob die Ungarische Regierung nach Abschluß des österreichischen Vertrages zunächst mit der Tschechoslowakei oder Deutschland verhandeln sollte, hat auf diese Weise ihre Lösung gefunden. Der Schritt der tschechoslowakischen Regierung erklärt es, warum die französische Regierung bei den französisch-ungarischen Verhandlungen auf die Einräumung von Vergünstigungen für eine große Anzahl von Erzeugnissen bestanden hat, die die französische Industrie gar nicht oder in nur sehr geringem Maße, dagegen in sehr wesentlichem Maße die tschechoslowakische Industrie interessieren. Offenbar hat es sich hier um ein zwischen Prag und Paris abgekartetes Spiel gehandelt. Für Ungarn ist die Lage insofern unbequem, als die Tschechei sich mit Rücksicht auf den ungarisch-französischen Vertrag mit einem reinen Meistbegünstigungsabkommen begnügen könnte, während die ungarischen Interessen den Abschluß eines Tarifabkommens fordern, das der ungarischen Landwirtschaft den Absatz ihrer Erzeugnisse in der Tschechei ermöglicht.“¹³

Schwieriger entwickelten sich die Handelsbeziehungen mit Frankreich. Nach der Unterzeichnung des ungarisch-französischen Handelsvertrages trat *“ein starkes Anschwellen der Einfuhr französischer Waren“* nur im zweiten Vierteljahr 1926 ein, was *„steigende Beunruhigung“* innerhalb der ungarischen Industrie hervorrief. Infolgedessen forderte sie *“dringend eine Revision“* des Vertrages, da die Interessen der ungarischen Seideindustrie, der Chemischen- und die Gummiindustrie *“stark geschädigt“* waren.¹⁴ In diesem Sinne ist die Verschiebung der Verhandlungen mit Deutschland zu verstehen, die Ende des Jahres 1926 durchgeführt werden sollten, immenhin blieben sie aus.¹⁵

Selbstverständlich gab es auch Probleme im beiderseitigen

¹³ BayHStA, MA 100884, doc. v. 01.03.1926; doc. v. 01.03.1926; dok. v. 11.08.1926.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ BayHStA, MA 100884, dok. v. 11.08.1926.

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deutsch-ungarischen Handelsaustausch. Im März 1926 teilte die Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Budapest über *“erhebliche Verluste,”* die eine Reihe deutscher Firmen erlitten haben, die Waren nach Ungarn ausführten mit. Die deutschen Firmen waren geschädigt, weil sich die ungarischen Besteller der Übernahme von zugesandten Waren unter *“nichtigen Vorwänden”* verweigerten und die Waren wurden dadurch bei öffentlichen Versteigerungen *“weit unter den Selbstkosten”* verkauft.¹⁶

Im April 1926 verstärkte sich die ungarische Interesse an intensiveren Beziehungen mit Deutschland. Zu dieser Zeit plante der ungarische Landwirtschaftliche Verband *“Das Dorf”* eine Studienreise einer aus 52 Personen bestehenden ungarischen Delegation nach Deutschland durchzuführen. Mitglieder der Gesellschaft waren prominente Vertreter der ungarischen Wirtschaft und verschiedener landwirtschaftlichen Organisationen sowie Abgeordnete der ungarischen Nationalversammlung. Der Zweck der Reise war *“die hochentwickelte Kultur der deutschen Landwirtschaft und deren vorbildliche praktische und wissenschaftliche Einrichtungen kennenzulernen, sowie die Beziehungen zwischen den deutschen und ungarischen landwirtschaftlichen Berufsstände durch persönliche Fühlungnahme und unmittelbaren Gedankenaustausch enger zu gestalten.”*¹⁷

Negative Einstellung und Unzufriedenheit unter der ungarischen Öffentlichkeit gegenüber Deutschland entstanden erneut im September 1927. Zugrunde lag die deutsche wirtschaftliche Aktivität zu den ungarischen Nachbarn. Zu dieser Zeit hatte Deutschland einen Zollvertrag mit Jugislawien abgeschlossen und außerdem führte es Verhandlungen mit der Tschechoslowakei und Rumänien über den Abschluß wirtschaftlicher Abkommen. Deshalb fühlte sich Ungarn zollpolitisch eingekreist und schätzte die entstandene Situation

¹⁶ Ibid., dok. v. 11.03.1926.

¹⁷ Ibid., dok. v. 13.04.1926.

als ein *“sonderbarer Krieg.”*¹⁸

Im Jahre 1928 führten Vertreter des Auswärtigen Amtes Besprechungen mit Ungarn über den Abschluß eines Handelsvertrags mit Meisbegünstigungsklausel, die aber erfolglos waren. In Berlin hatte man 1928 kein Interesse an erfolgreichen wirtschaftlichen Vereinbarungen mit Ungarn und man erwartete die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung während der Weltwirtschaftskrise, um günstigere Bedingungen für den deutschen Export nach Ungarn vereinbaren zu können. Bis 1931 weichen die zuständigen deutschen Stellen alle ungarischen Forderungen für Besprechungen aus. Erst 1931 im Rahmen der deutschen Politik der Präferenzen für die südosteuropäischen Länder begannen konkrete deutsch-ungarische Handelsvertragsverhandlungen. Das deutsche Interesse zu Ungarn verstärkte sich zu dieser Zeit im Zusammenhang mit der Agrarblockbestrebungen in Südosteuropa.¹⁹ Am 18. Juli 1931 r. kam der Handelsvertrag mit Ungarn zustande, später wurde auch ein Clearingabkommen abgeschlossen. Nach den Bedingungen des Abkommens war vorgesehen, im Fall eines Zahlungsüberschusses für eine der Vertragsseiten, man gewährt der anderen Seite einen Kredit, eine Praxis, die auch später angewendet wurde und die im wesentlichen zu einer beträchtlichen Intensivierung des beiderseitigen Handelsaustausches beigetragen hat. Auf diese Weise wurde die Ausfuhr landwirtschaftlicher Erzeugnissen nach Deutschland gefördert.

Der deutsche Anteil am ungarischen Export war im Jahre 1923 6,2 % und 1932 schon 15,2 %. Ungarn exportierte nach Deutschland vor allem Getreide (überwiegend Weizen), Fleisch- und Fleischprodukten, Wolle und Eier, Geflügel, Federn.²⁰

Somit erreichte Deutschland das Ziel seiner Wirtschaftspolitik gegenüber Ungarn nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg, und

¹⁸ BayHStA, MA 100885, dok. v. 29. 09.1927.

¹⁹ Höpfner, H.-P., Op. cit., 246–249.

²⁰ Ibid., 242.

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zwar im ungarischen Export landwirtschaftlicher Erzeugnissen eine Vorrangstellung zu erringen. Diese Sachlage erwies sich von entscheidender Bedeutung für die Entwicklung des Wirtschaftsverhältnisses zwischen den beiden Wirtschaftspartnern in den 30-er Jahren, das eine weitere Intensivierung erfuhr.

The Macedonian Issue between Spring 1921 and 9 June 1923 – through the Eyes of Hungarian Diplomacy in Sofia

Csaba Zsebők

Sándor Wekerle Business College – Budapest

Intentions of the Bulgarian prime-minister Aleksandar Stamboliyski, to establish good neighbourly relations met serious internal resistance. Since Stamboliyski tried to accept that Vardar Macedonia had been lost for Bulgaria, similarly to Aegean Macedonia ruled by the Greeks, he strived to build proper bilateral relations with the State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. He did not merely do this for a peaceful environment, but because that was how he deemed it feasible for parts of Macedonia belonging to the Serbs to achieve the status of independent autonomy, which could have been an important milestone for a South Slavic federation, much desired by Stamboliyski, to be brought into being later. This concept, though, made the Agrarian Union, functioning as a governing party, and its ruler come into conflict with a decisive part of the Bulgarian public that proved to be in favour of territorial revision. Due to this foreign and neighbourhood policy the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) became one of the biggest foes of Stamboliyski, and took up a key role in home affairs of post war Bulgaria. One after the other, organisations of the formely unstabilised assembly recovered in 1919. At that time, its policy was determined by two main trends or factions, which seemingly cooperated for a few more years, but soon turned against each other. The right wing emerged as stronger. This faction positioned itself as autonomist, though through achieving autonomy it would have incorporated

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Macedonia into Bulgaria. This ‘autonomist’ faction favouring a big Bulgaria had two decisive leaders between the end of World War I and the middle of the 1920s, namely Todor Aleksandrov and lieutenant general Aleksandar Protogerov.¹ The other faction or the left wing defining itself as federalist thought of autonomy as a necessary step for a real self-rule and a multiethnic type of independent Macedonian state. Two of its leaders, Filip Atanasov and Nikola Yurukov are to be mentioned here.² The latter faction, that is the federalist one, gradually got into a consolidated relationship with Stamboliyski’s government, unlike the autonomists, since Atanasov and his followers wanted to reach their goals by legal and not by revolutionary means. A common platform like that had not been obvious before, which was discussed in a Hungarian foreign affairs document in May 1921³ saying that Atanasov and his followers themselves confessed that they had not had any relationship with the Stamboliyski government back then. Nevertheless, the federalist influence was losing power. It was happening because after the lost wars at least one hundred thousand people – others cite several hundreds of thousand – fled from their Macedonian “fellows” who were ruled by foreign power. Most of them settled down in Pirin Macedonia that belonged to Bulgaria bordering on the South Slavic kingdom, thus this south-western frontier became the stronghold of the autonomist IMRO, especially in respect of the fact that it even took over certain state functions, as the organisation via its armed men took over administration of justice and launched special taxes. Autonomist chetas (companies) recruited from its own army of thousands of soldiers committed more and more terrorist actions on the other side of the Serb-Bulgarian border. The unhidden aim of the cheta movement was to cause continuous unease and

¹ About their careers see: Добринов, Д. Тодор Александров. С., 1994.

² About them see: Петров, П. (Ed.). Македонија – историја и политическа судбал Т. 2. С., 1998, 106.

³ MNL OL, K64-1925-16/a-171/10 res. 01.05.1921.

destabilisation through provocation and terrorist attacks in Vardar Macedonia, thus stopping Yugoslavian rule and state operations from getting established. By December 1921 all this was also threatening Vardar Macedonia and authorities to be settled there from the direction of Albania. According to a Hungarian embassy report⁴ of the time from Sofia, Sándor Kiss⁵ a royal Hungarian chargé informed Miklós Bánffy foreign minister without delay that via his confidential men he had received the following information: Italian agents were working on influencing IMRO to organise a general uprising in Southwest Macedonia ASAP. Thus they could help Albanians, suggesting that this movement was completely independent of Bulgarians and it would only be a general internal uprising. This latter part made sense from the perspective of the Stamboliyski government's foreign policy. Nevertheless, the Hungarian embassy chargé deemed the leaders of IMRO to be willing to start a general uprising, though only under certain conditions.⁶ On the one hand, if Italy got into conflict with Yugoslavia for any reason, and on the other hand, if the government in Rome provided the already armed sixty thousand rebels with moral and financial support. Sándor Kiss thinks this would mean quite a lot of money and smuggling some artillery supply. He stresses, though, that the position of the Italian government concerning these conditions is still unknown.⁷ The autonomist wing of IMRO got financial support from the

⁴ MNL OL, K64-1925-16/a-420 pol./1921, Macedonian affairs, Sofia, 05.12.1921. From June 1921 there was an embassy in Sofia serving Hungarian diplomacy. See: Гърдев, К. България и Унгария, 1923-1941. С., 1988, 14.

⁵ Sándor Nemeskéri-Kiss was a member of the Hungarian peace delegation visiting Paris, led by Albert Apponyi in 1920. A descendant of a landowner family, he was an economic correspondent, an imperial and royal chamberlain and led the Hungarian embassy in Sofia. He was appointed leader of the Hungarian embassy in Helsinki in 1934. See: Пейковска, П. Спомени на унгарския дипломат Шандор Киш-Немешкери за България и българите. – ИДА, 1993, Т. 66, с. 251-257.

⁶ MNL OL, K64-1925-16/a-420 pol./1921.

⁷ Ibid.

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Bulgarian government before Stamboliyski rose to power, and from 1919 it was supported by the Italian government, which gave a new impetus to Aleksandrov and his followers to launch a series of gerilla attacks in Vardar Macedonia.⁸

In the same report of 5 December, the Hungarian chargé in Sofia underlines the fact that in a village near Veles there was a bloody incident between the Yugoslavian recruiting committee and ‘defying Bulgarian residents’. He notes that the Serb police was forced to withdraw, so regular troops were ordered out to suppress unrest in an ordinary manner as it was spreading to nearby villages. However, a lot of rebels fled, Kiss adds, stressing that the views of the revolutionary committee working in Bulgaria concerning the general uprising in Macedonia were that the movement did not only depend on the general state of foreign policy, but mainly on the events in Albania.

While IMRO was basically interested in an uprising to be set up in Vardar Macedonia in alliance with Albanians and Italians, the Stamboliyski government was trying to cooperate with Belgrade. A possible proof of this can be the previously cited Hungarian embassy report from Sofia⁹ according to which a government agent from Sofia – disguised as a journalist – will be staying in Albania, namely in Tirana, from where he can more easily contact Serbs.

Meanwhile, the relationship between Bulgarian governments run by Stamboliyski and the autonomists of IMRO became more and more stretched, especially as the latter started to play a part in home politics. To set it off, the Bulgarian agrarian federalist government supported the federalist wing of IMRO, doing it in such a way that it organised counter *chetas* for the latter under the supervision of Aleksandar Dimitrov, Interior Minister. At the same time, the government official tried to control the activity of autonomists, though with little success, because Aleksandrov and

⁸ See Georgieva, V., S. Konechni. Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Macedonia. Lanham, Md., & London, The Scarecrow Press, 1998, 138.

⁹ MNL OL, K64–1925–16/a–420 pol./1921.

Protogerov still held power in Pirin Macedonia. And autonomist *chetas* under their command killed even more of their enemies. Back in June 1921 they killed Gjorche Petrov, one of the founders of the Macedonian revolutionary movement, who was appointed a government trustee for Macedonian refugee issues by the Stamboliyski cabinet. The Interior Minister, Dimitrov was also eliminated in October 1921 by armed men of IMRO's right wing. In addition, autonomists with their activity made it harder to settle the relationship between Sofia and Belgrade.

As we saw, Bulgaria led by Stamboliyski was approaching the State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, while the particular Albanian–Macedonian alliance had hostile relations with Yugoslavs. Not only Italy, but also Hungary had loose ties with the latter alliance.

Cooperation and talks with the two factions of IMRO fit in with the Hungarian strategy of undermining the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. According to a diplomatic cable sent by the Hungarian ambassador in Sofia to the Hungarian foreign ministry on 5 February 1922, general Protogerov sent the message from Vienna that he wished to stay in Budapest at the beginning of February. Sándor Kiss wrote from Sofia that against the general's wish Atanasov, the leader of the other faction of IMRO, would also accompany him. The report says that Protogerov asked for a separate interview with the head of the foreign department in Budapest in case they would not be able to 'get rid of' Atanasov by then. Kiss was of the opinion that first they should meet with both of them, together, to be above suspicion, and then see each of them separately without them knowing about it. As he put it, he thought Atanasov had to be approached with some caution.¹⁰

In his next report¹¹ the Hungarian chargé in Sofia says that the two leaders of the rivalling factions of IMRO had

¹⁰ MNL OL, K64–1925–16/a–23/res. Sofia, 1922 II/5.

¹¹ MNL OL, K64–1925–16/a–36 pol/1922, Macedonian–Albanian Treaty, Sofia, 20.03.1922.

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successful negotiations in Albania. He writes about receiving the intelligence that the Albanian government signed a record with Protogerov and Atanasov, and two representatives of the Albanian committee. First of all, the record outlined the exact future borders of Albania and Macedonia. As for the policy to be followed in the future, in this report¹² Sándor Kiss notes that the record contains the following agreement in short: “Albania and Macedonia” enter into an offense-defence alliance, they will support each other, and in case armed intervention is needed they will give each other mutual help. Kiss noted that Stjepan Radić, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, was allegedly informed about the agreement. Mentioning Radić cannot be a mere coincidence, because his defiance of Serbs put him into the position of an alliance with IMRO, so to speak. What is more, leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party advocated the need for national self-determination, thus they would have provided it for Macedonia besides Montenegro, Vojvodina, Dalmatia and Bosnia.

Radić’s party and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation entered into a partnership agreement.¹³ The next Hungarian embassy report from Sofia¹⁴ is a witness to this, in which the chargé points it out that as far as he knows Protogerov and Atanasov managed to come to an agreement with Radić regarding a common action plan. In this report Sándor Kiss writes in connection with Radić that he had the intelligence that the Croatian politician would strive to get the majority at the next elections, but if he could not get the results in the ‘legal’ way he would turn to revolutionary tools. The Hungarian diplomat adds that during the aforementioned negotiations the Macedonians took the obligation that they would vote for candidates of the Radić party at the new elections due in May.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ See: Петров, П., Op. cit., 94.

¹⁴ MNL OL, K64–1925–16/a–37 pol./1922, Macedonian–Croatian Treaty, Sofia, 20.03.1922.

At the beginning of the summer the Hungarian embassy in Sofia gives a new insight into the operations of the revolutionary committee. According to this report, Atanasov's faction within IMRO had completely capitulated by July 1922, because it seemed they had been prohibited from interfering with Protogerov's and Aleksandrov's affairs. Sándor Kiss experienced that Atanasovians had to sit back and watch and endure the current state of affairs, because their program came to a deadlock stating that oppressors had to be fought by legal means. Their best men go over to Protogerov's and his followers' side adopting their mindset, namely that with Serbs and Greeks you cannot achieve results without violence. Yurukov and Atanasov – the latter supposedly being in Vienna – kept hiding abroad, because they got frightened of Todor Aleksandrov's menace threatening with killing them in case they interfered with their affairs, Kiss explained.¹⁵

In September 1922 the Hungarian ambassador in Sofia reported to Miklós Bánffy foreign minister¹⁶ that Italy and Bulgaria had worked for different goals: accordingly, Rome aimed to continuously worry and weaken Yugoslavia.

In Pirin Macedonia, which officially belonged to Bulgaria, there was a real war for months from the autumn of 1922: the autonomist chetas of IMRO took even bigger settlements, since they could bring out more efficient armed forces than the federalists and the Bulgarian government forces together.

In March 1923 Sándor Kiss already reports from the embassy in Sofia to the foreign minister¹⁷ in connection with Macedonian movements that the autonomist movement of "Újfold"¹⁸ (New Land) is progressing well. The same report says that the Macedonian band movements gathered strength again after the winter, and mainly targeted people settled down

¹⁵ MNL OL, K64-1925-16/a-8 pol./1922, Macedonian Affairs, Sofia, 04.07.1922.

¹⁶ MNL OL, K64-1925-16/a-124/pol. Sofia, 20.09.1922.

¹⁷ MNL OL, K64-1925-16/a-64 pol./1923, Macedonian affairs, Sofia, 18.03.1923.

¹⁸ Pirin Macedonia attached to Bulgaria.

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from Old Serbia, Banat, Bačka and Bosnia. Though their activity is not always successful because of the newly and substantially strengthened resistance of the Serb police and military forces, the rebels seem to have achieved that the government in Belgrade does not ‘get’ new volunteer settlers even in case of the most favourable promises – Sándor Kiss says.¹⁹

The tension between Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was still mainly due to the Macedonian question. The main aim of the government in Belgrade was to make inhabitants of Vardar Macedonia become Serbian. It certainly left its mark on Bulgarian home politics. Macedonians – for decades – had had a big influence on Bulgaria, where they took action from time to time against Serbian authorities operating in Vardar Macedonia. In order to reconcile relations between the two countries, settling the issue of Macedonian organisations seemed to be inevitable.

In February 1922 there was an attempted assassination against prime-minister Stamboliyski, as a result of which the prime-minister accelerated talks with Yugoslavs. The latter also became concerned with this, since Benito Mussolini’s rise to power in Italy – he became prime-minister in October 1922 – tempted Yugoslavians to revisit their former foreign policy. Anyway, the Bulgarian–Yugoslavian agreement had already been prompted by Czechoslovakia, and now it was also urged by France.²⁰

The Yugoslavian and Bulgarian governments signed the Treaty of Niš on 23 March 1923²¹, in which Bulgaria acknowledged the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes’ right to Vardar Macedonia. The parties also agreed that they would completely wipe vegetation out on both sides of their common border in the width of 100 metres so that they can prevent armed groups from

¹⁹ MNL OL, K64–1925–16/a–64 pol./1923.

²⁰ Hornyák Á. Magyar-jugoszláv diplomáciai kapcsolatok, 1918–1927. Novi Sad–Újvidék, 2004, 141.

²¹ Петров, П., Op. cit., 109.

crossing over, thus putting an end to the wave of terror in Macedonia. What is more, the Bulgarian and Yugoslavian governments also agreed in Niš that they would eliminate the chetas. IMRO autonomists took it as a declaration of war, and they allied with Bulgarian military officers who had interests in annihilating the political system favouring peasants.

However, tension had become constant by the spring of 1923 concerning the Macedonian issue. Sándor Kiss reported to Budapest at the beginning of May that coming back from his courier errand at the end of April he arrived at the burial of the architect Nikola Yurukov, who had been killed two days before.²² He reminded in his report that Yurukov and Atanasov were leaders of IMRO's federalist faction, who wanted to achieve Macedonian autonomy by legal and not by revolutionary means, and had relations with the Bulgarian government. Since the Stamboliyski leadership was characterised by the effort to come to an agreement with Belgrade, while Atanasov and his people basically got into an alliance with the government forces in Sofia, they became foes of IMRO autonomists, or the Protogerov–Aleksandrov faction. The Hungarian diplomat draws attention to the fact that although Atanasov and general Protogerov had pretended to have an agreement with each other one and a half years earlier, the two sides never stopped working against each other, and about two months earlier their relationship got really hostile. Thus, not feeling secure Filip Atanasov left for Vienna, and Yurukov was first threatened and then shot by more radical autonomists in a street of Sofia – the Hungarian diplomat underlines.

Soon enough Sándor Kiss²³ emphasises that in the first half

²² MNL OL, K64–1925–16/a–108 pol./1923, Macedonian movements in April, Sofia, 05.05.1923.

²³ MNL OL, K64–1925–16/a–121 pol./1923, Macedonian autonomist movement in the Bulgarian 'Új-föld'/New Land, Sofia, 23.05.1923.

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of May there were quite strong band wars near Nevrokop,²⁴ Petrich and Gorna Dzhumaya,²⁵ in which autonomists of IMRO got the upper hand over the "government band", i.e. the peasant guardsmen faithful to Stamboliyski.

The Hungarian embassy counsellor or chargé states at the end of this report:²⁶ there may be a lot of events before the Macedonian issue can be considered settled in Bulgaria, no matter how friendly the messages that Stamboliyski and Pašić exchange with each other are.²⁷

At that time there were less than three weeks left before the turning point on 9 June...

²⁴ Gotse Delchev today.

²⁵ Blagoevgrad today.

²⁶ MNL OL, K64-1925-16/a-121 pol./1923.

²⁷ Nikola Pašić, Serb-Croat-Slovene prime minister.

The USA and the Peace with Bulgaria after World War One

Vania Stoyanova

Institute for Historical Studies – BAS

Although geographically far from Europe, the US were (and still are) bound up with the European continent through the Atlantic Ocean and are inseparable part of the North-Atlantic community. It was exactly because of the Atlantic that the US got involved in the Napoleon wars and once again one century later they unwillingly joined the Great, by that time, European war. Their economic power and after 1917 their real and at moments decisive participation in battles gave them good reasons to pretend for a key role in establishing the post-war order in Europe. The Paris Peace Conference (January 18, 1919 – January 21, 1920) was the forum at which the US presented their intentions to take part in the recovery of the old continent. According to the American experts House and Seymour, one of the most dramatic questions to be settled by the conference was the Balkan one.¹ On its side, Bulgaria, situated in the heart of the peninsula, laying territorial claims to all its belligerent neighbors, and historically taken, even to its Balkan ally in the war – Turkey – was most directly interested in how the future state and territorial map of the Balkans would look like. All this justifies the interest to the position of Washington for settling the Balkan territorial issue after WWI.

The American delegation entered the negotiation process

¹ House, E., Ch. Seymour. What really happened at Paris. The story of the Peace Conference, 1918–1919. New York, 1921, 158; Пантев, А., П. Петков. САЩ и България по време на Първата световна война. С., 1983, 104.

following the principles expressed by President Woodrow Wilson in his famous “Fourteen Points” statement on January 8, 1919. It was provoked by the Soviets proposal for just and democratic peace with no territorial annexations. The first five points of Wilson’s statement which had been consulted neither with Great Britain nor with France concerned the basic principles of the new world order: open agreements gained through negotiations “in the public view” instead of secret diplomacy; freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war; removal of economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations; reduce of national armaments consistent with domestic safety; a free and impartial adjustment of all colonial claims. The next eight points referred to the territorial arrangements. For the Balkans they provided for (in point 11):

Evacuation of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro and restoration of all occupied territories restored; free and secure access to the sea for Serbia; relations of the several Balkan states to one another should be determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states. Point 12 asserted that the Turkish portion of the then Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which were under Turkish rule should be assured a security of life and an opportunity of autonomous development; the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

The last, 14th point, stated that a general association of nations had to be established for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.²

² Papers Related to the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1918, Supplement I, Part I, p. 15.

Wilson was not a foreign policy expert and shortly before his first inauguration in 1913 he confessed that it would be ironically if his administration should have to deal mainly with diplomacy. When events forced him to enter the war, in September 1917 he established a special study group named the 'Inquiry to investigate the contested issues and the terms of peace'. It was composed of about 150 academics, headed by the presidential advisor Colonel Edward House and supervised by Dr Sidney Mezes.³

By the end of 1917 the Inquiry submitted its first report to the Department of State. The official Memorandum of December 22, 1917 treated in eight points the borders of the European states from historical, ethnographic and economic point of view. For the Balkans, the suggested statement of peace terms said that:

"...No just or lasting settlement of the tangled problems confronting the deeply wronged peoples of the Balkans can be based upon the arbitrary treaty of Bucharest. That treaty was a product of the evil diplomacy which the peoples of the world are now determined to end. That treaty wronged every nation in the Balkans, even those which it appeared to favor, by imposing upon them all the permanent menace of war. It unquestionably tore men and women of Bulgarian loyalty from their natural allegiance. It denied to Serbia that access to the sea which she must have in order to complete her independence. Any just settlement must of course begin with the evacuation of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro by the armies of the Central Powers, and the restoration of Serbia and Montenegro. The ultimate relationship of the different Balkan nations must be based upon a fair balance of nationalistic and economic considerations, applied in a generous and inves[t]ive spirit after impartial and scientific inquiry. The meddling and intriguing of great powers must be stopped, and the efforts to attain national unity by massacre must be abandoned.

³ Джонсън, П. История на американския народ. С., 2010, 714.

It would obviously be unwise to attempt at this time to draw frontiers for the Balkan states. Certain broad considerations, however, may tentatively be kept in mind. They are in brief these: 1) that the area annexed by Rumania in the Dobrudja⁴ is almost surely Bulgarian in character and should lie returned; 2) that the boundary between Bulgaria and Turkey should be restored to the Enos–Midia line, as agreed upon at the conference of London.⁵ 3) that the south boundary of Bulgaria should be the Aegean Sea coast from Enos to the gulf of Orfano, and should leave the mouth of the Struma river in Bulgarian territory; 4) that the best access to the sea for Serbia is through Saloniki; 5) that the final disposition of Macedonia cannot be determined without further inquiry; G) that an independent Albania is almost certainly an undesirable political entity.

We are strongly of the opinion that in the last analysis economic considerations will outweigh nationalistic affiliations in the Balkans, and that a settlement which insures economic prosperity is most likely to be a lasting one”⁶.

The recommendations of the Inquiry combined two approaches – the ethnic and the economic one, the latter prevailing over nation concerns when conflict problems occurred as in the case of Dobrudja and Thrace in favor of Bulgaria. As for Macedonia, the experts were obviously aware of the complex character of the Macedonian issue which needed additional studying.⁷

During the next 1918 year teams of experts were sent all over Europe to study the local peculiarities and gather information from different sources and researches. In October 1918 a Balkan Section was formed presided by Clive Day, doctor of economic history at Yale University which had to examine the grounds for

⁴ In the Treaty of Bucharest [Footnote in the original].

⁵ And in the treaty of San Stefano [Footnote in the original].

⁶ FRUS, 1919, Vol. I, 50–51.

⁷ Пантев, А., П. Петков, Op. cit., 75.

the Balkan states territorial aspirations (with the exception of Turkey) and recommend what position the US should take. One of the main tasks of the Balkan section was to draw up drafts for a Balkan national, state and political map which had to be accepted by the Paris Peace Conference. Its experts had to find ethnographic, language, historical, cultural, economic and strategic arguments in connection with the boundaries of the Balkan states. In this respect, the records of the proceedings did not mention any division between victors and vanquished but recommended that the majority of population in each state should consist of representatives of one and the same nationality.⁸

As a result, the Inquiry furnished the US delegation for the pending peace negotiations with an impressive set of documents, full of reliable text information and maps. According to the British specialist on diplomatic history Harold Nicolson, who attended the conference, if the Versailles Treaty were drawn up by American experts only, this would have been one of the wisest and scientifically grounded peace treaties ever written.⁹

The benevolent attitude to Bulgaria demonstrated in the Memorandum cited above rested not only on the good expert knowledge of the origin of the Balkan conflicts and Bulgarian problems, but also on the information and the influence of the American missionaries who had entered the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire as early as in the beginning of the 19th century. Here they got in touch with the Bulgarians in the sphere of religious and lay education. The process of getting knowledge of each other continued in the turmoil after the April Uprising of 1876 through the American defense and sympathy to the participants in the rebellion against the Ottoman rule rendered by the American Consul General in Constantinople Eugene Schuyler as well as the support of the Act of Unification (1885) by both diplomats and missionaries who appreciated the

⁸ *Ibid.*, 106–107.

⁹ Джонсън, П., *Op. cit.*, 714.

Bulgarians as a nation who loved freedom and totally deserved it. Due to the long contacts with the Bulgarian population and impartial observations the American missionaries got to know quite well their ethnic boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula. The “Miss Stone Affair”¹⁰ increased the interest to the Bulgarian liberation cause in Macedonia, which the American missionary herself supported when she returned to the USA. The heroism of the rebels in the Ilinden–Preobrazhenie Uprising (1903) and the atrocities during its suppression provoked reaction of sympathy among the American public (well informed about the events by the missionaries in Macedonia and the Adrianople region) and gained the support of distinguished public figures and high officials.¹¹

The end of the Balkan wars presented one more opportunity for the US diplomacy to demonstrate will and equity despite its interests in the region: the US Minister Plenipotentiary to Bucharest Charles Vopicka (covering also Bulgaria for the State Department) refused to sign the Treaty of Bucharest (1913) as a protest against its unjust clauses to Bulgaria. The situation in the Balkans and Bulgaria’s isolation precipitated the Bulgarian intentions at activating the dialog with the USA. In early 1914 Bulgarian Consulate General was opened in New York. The US businessman Clayton Rockhill was appointed Consul General. Besides, the Radoslavov Cabinet decided to open a Bulgarian legation in the US capital. Stefan Panaretov, a graduate of and a lecturer at the famous Robert College in Constantinople was chosen for the position of Bulgarian Minister Plenipotentiary to Washington. He presented his credentials to President W.

¹⁰ The kidnapping for ransom of the American Protestant missionary Ellen Maria Stone and her pregnant fellow missionary friend Katerina Stefanova–Tsilka by an Internal Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Organization detachment led by the vojvoda Yane Sandanski and the sub-voivodas Hr. Chernopeev and Kr. Asenov on 21 August 1901 and their subsequent release.

¹¹ Тошкова, В. САЩ и България 1919–1989. Политически отношения. С., 2007, 9–10.

Wilson on December 10, 1914.¹²

The war put to the test Bulgarian-American relations. Consul General in New York C. Rockhill left office while in October 1915 the State Department released from service the consular agent in Sofia Dr. A. Kermekchiev who had been appointed two years before. The office was transformed into Consulate General and Dominic Murphy became the Consul-General in Sofia, the first American diplomat resident in Bulgaria. In October 1915 the State Department sent Lewis Einstein, a diplomat from the American Embassy in Istanbul, to Sofia. The observations of the American diplomats confirmed the conclusions already made by Vopicka that Bulgaria's ambitions in the war were deprived of megalomania and were limited to the revision of the Treaty of Bucharest.¹³

Although participating in opposite belligerent coalitions in the First World War, the US and Bulgaria did not sever diplomatic relations. On February 6, 1917 the Secretary of State Lansing informed the Bulgarian Government through the Consul General Murphy that the US Government assumed the friendly relations between Bulgaria and the United States would continue in spite of the necessity which had arisen for the United States to sever relations with Germany. He asked Murphy, in case of uncertainty, to convince Bulgarian authorities that it was for the mutual interest of Bulgaria and the United States to avoid the suspension of the friendly relations which had always existed between the two countries.¹⁴ Radoslavov's answer, delivered again through Murphy, was not delayed: *"I request you to declare to the Honorable Government of the United States on behalf of the Royal Government that Bulgaria intends also on her part to preserve the relations of perfect friendship that she has always been*

¹² Ibid., 14.

¹³ Пантев, А., П. Петков, *Op. cit.*, 60–61.

¹⁴ FRUS, 1917, (Supplement 2) Vol. I, p. 116.

happy to maintain with the United States”.¹⁵

Official contacts were preserved despite the German pressure over Bulgaria or the ambivalent assessments of Bulgaria's siding with the Central Powers among US politicians and public. This was mainly due to the strong pro-Bulgarian campaign carried out by American missionaries, scholars, journalists, diplomats, joined by Bulgarian public figures, who stood in defense of the Bulgarians and their motives for entering the war.¹⁶

Especially empathetic and helpful was the activity of the US Consul General to Sofia Murphy whose reports to the State Department bore not only the information of a professional diplomat but also the deep conviction that the Bulgarian people and government definitely did not want to fight with the US. In his telegram of May 10, 1917 he announced:

*“Audience with Minister for Foreign Affairs Wednesday. Received assurances that there would be no break in relations happily existing between the two countries. German-Austrian pressure is still very great but up to date has failed. Official circles in Bulgaria strongly in favor of friendly relations, public sentiment likewise. Newspaper reports of disturbances in Bulgaria entirely unfounded.”*¹⁷

The lost battle of Dobro Pole forced Malinov's government to seek termination of the Bulgarian participation in the bloodshed, according to the principles declared by W. Wilson and with the mediation of the United States. D. Murphy, together with the military attaché Archibald Walker accompanied the Bulgarian delegation for the signing of the armistice. After twice editing the answer, the Bulgarian proposal was accepted but the speed with which the armistice was signed (September 29, 1918) made the initiative pointless. This incurred criticism

¹⁵ Ibid., 138.

¹⁶ Петков П. (Ed.). С. Панаретов. Дневник 1917–1920. – ИДА, Т. 48 (1984), 259, 265–266, 273, et al.

¹⁷ FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 1, 67.

to Murphy that his hasty action could isolate the US from the settlement of peace in the Balkans.¹⁸

The armistice with Bulgaria accelerated the opening of a US diplomatic mission in Sofia. Charles Wilson was appointed Chargé d'affaires ad interim to Bulgaria. He arrived in Sofia on December 8, 1918 from Madrid to directly monitor the events in the country after the armistice. On October 24 he was specifically instructed not only to explain to the Bulgarians the US position in the war, but also to supply the State Department with more information about Bulgaria. Secretary of State Lansing explicitly indicated that he should completely avoid engaging the US government or himself with the ambitions for territorial expansion of Bulgaria, thus determining Wilson's position of a distant observer and mediator.¹⁹

Getting to know the country and the people, the US diplomat noted that all the American missionaries here were "*strongly pro-Bulgarian and strong partisans of Bulgarian territorial ambitions*".²⁰ He found out that during the war they had carried on a considerable propaganda work in the United States, especially with a view to preventing a declaration of war against Bulgaria, and that they were continuing this propaganda in a more intensely in the hope that Bulgarian aspirations for increasing their territory would be considered favorably at the Peace Conference, and especially receive the support of the American delegation.²¹

Although instructed to keep distance, Wilson transmitted thorough diplomatic channels the communications of the missionaries of the American Board, residing in Bulgaria who advocated for Bulgaria's right to present its stand before the Peace Conference. He also informed of the request of the Bulgarian Prime Minister, and the Ministers of War and Finance

¹⁸ Пантев, А., П. Петков, Op. cit., 95.

¹⁹ Тошкова, В., Op. cit., 20; NA USA 123 W 69/106.

²⁰ FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. II, 248.

²¹ Ibid., 249.

to secure permission from the US Government “*for some of the American missionaries in Bulgaria to go to Paris, officially or un-officially, to place before American and other allied public men Bulgaria's position and aspirations for increased territory.*”²²

Wilson also reported about the friendly feelings the Bulgarians cherished for the United States and their expectations to obtain from them protection of their national interests in Paris. This hope was equally shared by both politicians and people. On December 16, 1918 in a telegram to the Ambassador in France Sharp Wilson informed him about the Prime Minister's request to convey to the President of the United States, in the name of the Government of Bulgaria, and its people, congratulations upon his arrival in Europe. For the Bulgarians, the Prime minister continued, this was an event of great importance “*as Bulgaria looked to the President of the United States to save Bulgaria from annihilation*”.²³ Ten days after his arrival in Sofia, having had numerous meetings and talks, Wilson concluded: “*Every Bulgarian with whom I have spoken looks to the United States to espouse the Bulgarian cause at the Peace Conference, and states that they have the most absolute confidence in President Wilson and his theory of nationalities, which they expect will fulfill all their aspirations for territorial expansion. I have not spoken to a single Bulgarian who has not told me that no pressure could have induced Bulgaria to side with Germany if she had believed that the United States would enter the war. It is also a fact that Germany used every argument and threat to induce Bulgaria to declare war on the United States and that the latter refused even at the risk of a break with her allies.*”²⁴

The Paris Conference was the tribune where the US presented their ambitions to play a major role in the recovery of

²² Ibid.

²³ FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. II, 250.

²⁴ Ibid., 255.

the Old continent. However a difference existed between the Entente and the American concerning the arrangement of the European matters. As early as on October 2, 1918 the US mission in London informed the representatives of the Entente that the US regarded the treaties about the Balkans as a part of the general issue of the future world order. The declaration also warned that they would not approve agreements which would allow the Balkan allies of Great Britain to solely and without control arrange the territorial problems in this region. In addition, Wilson pointed out that one of the main elements of the European “new order” should be the withdrawal of the Great Powers from the Balkans.²⁵

Just after the Peace Conference was open, on January 21, 1919 the Inquiry presented “Outline of Tentative Report and Recommendation, prepared by the Intelligence Section with instructions for the President and the Plenipotentiaries”. The document, which became famous at the conference as “The Black Book”, would serve as the principle policy document for the American delegation during the negotiations. The greater part of it (79 out of 98 pages in total) was devoted to territorial issues which, together with the large collection of maps, was intended to give background and starting position for the negotiators and influence the final policy decisions in Paris.²⁶

The document proposed considerable changes of the borders in the Balkans. According to it, the Bulgarian-Romanian border had to be restored as it had been before the Second Balkan War of 1913 i.e. before the Treaty of Bucharest; Macedonia should gain autonomy or retain its pre-war status quo; Bulgaria should take the territory in Eastern Thrace to the Midia–Enos line (as recognized by the London Peace Treaty of May 1913). At the same time the report maintained the

²⁵ Тошкова, Б., *Op. cit.*, 21; Saunders, R. *In Search of Woodrow Wilson. Beliefs and Behavior*. Praeger, 1998, 181–182.

²⁶ Reisser, W. J. *The Black Book: Woodrow Wilson’s Secret Plan for Peace*. Lexington Books, 2012, 33.

territorial claims of Romania and the still unrecognized Yugoslav state towards Austria-Hungary; of the Yugoslavs – towards Italy and of Greece – towards Turkey. However, the implementation in practice of the scientific and historical conclusions of the experts in the Balkan problems proved to be quite different.²⁷

In Paris, in the name of the right of nations to self-determination, proclaimed by W. Wilson, for “their” national territories fought both victors and vanquished (assuming the latter were given an opportunity to present their stand in one way or another). In fact, the defense of the peacemakers as well as the national propaganda of the countries contending for the same area covered the entire range of arguments by which a nation state claimed their rights over certain – from the romantic view of language and religion, uniting people in a “national territory”, through the Enlightenment idea referring the integrity of the national territory rather to its security and economic viability; from the geographic determinism and the search of “natural boundaries to geopolitical concerns and the emerging fear of the spread of Bolshevism. Above them all, however, applied selectively, stood the principle of punishing the “guilty”, i.e. the vanquished, and encouraging friends – former allies and future partners. Bulgaria was among the punished.²⁸

The conclusions and recommendations of the US experts concerning Bulgaria were not taken into consideration by the 52 sub-commissions of the Peace Conference and subsequently were abandoned by the American delegation. Headed by President Wilson himself, in the course of negotiations the US

²⁷ Пантев, А., П. Петков, *Op. cit.*, 110.

²⁸ For the principles of drawing nation-state borders in Paris, see White, G. *Nation, State and Territory. Origin, Evolutions, and Relationships*. Vol. 1. Inc., 2004, 204–228; Генев, Г. П. *Ньойският договор и България*. С., 1935, 5–58. For the Bulgarian propaganda in defense of Bulgarian territorial aspirations, see Христов, Х. *България, Балканите и мирът*. С., 1984, 53–75; Илчев, И. *Родината ми – права или не!* С., 1995, 181–187.

diplomacy changed its stands and priorities. The pragmatic political approach, the shrewd diplomatic combinations and the pressure from the position of power prevailed over the declared intentions for just, backed up by scientific arguments.

The US activity towards the Balkans was motivated by their apparent disagreement (before and after they entered the war) with the economic and territorial aims of the Entente and by Wilson's ambitions to displace the old Great Powers from their positions in Europe. Partially, this idea was accomplished with the establishment of a big state of the southern Slavs as a barrier to a possible German expansion. The project for a multinational state created from the territories of Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and Macedonia was approved by the US as early as in the beginning of February 1919. Washington was the first to recognize the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. With their position on the Italian–Yugoslav controversy the US intended to outplay Great Britain and France in shaping post-war Europe and replace the old protection over the small European states and nations. Wilson's pro-Yugoslav attitude to the Adriatic issue had also the aim to neutralize the pro-Bulgarian conclusions of the Balkan section of the Inquiry which faced Belgrade's discontent. Meanwhile, the Yugoslav delegation was inclined to show certain consideration with the US on the issue of the western Bulgarian border in return for support of the Yugoslav interests in Dalmatia and especially if the US dropped the idea of autonomy for Macedonia under the mandate of a neutral state as well as the demand for a plebiscite there carried out under the control of the Great Powers.²⁹

²⁹ The Memorandum of the Balkan section of the Inquiry of March 1919 concerning the borders in the Balkans stated that Macedonia which had been a bloody battlefield for 25 years had to be given special attention if in the Balkans should be established healthy relationship. It recommended that the territory from the Shar Moutains to the present Serbian-Greek border together with Eastern Macedonia with the valley of Struma, Serres and

Discussions on the borders with Bulgaria began on 21 July 1919 and the difference in the positions of the negotiators became clear already in the Report presented to the Supreme Council by the Central Territorial Committee. On the boundary of Dobrudja, the American delegation proposed that Roumania should return to Bulgaria the territories which she had annexed by force in 1913 since she received now much more extensive territories from Austria; the Committee except for the US delegation insisted on the maintenance of the 1914 boundary.

Unanimity could not be obtained about the Southern boundary as well. Contrary to the British, French and Japanese delegations, the American and Italian delegations proposed the frontier of 1913, amended to the profit of Bulgaria by Turko-Bulgarian Treaty of 1915. The American delegation whose observations were supported by the Italian delegation, noted that Bulgaria had not acquired Western Thrace by conquest but with the voluntary consent of Greece and her allies who had the wisdom to recognize her this natural outlet to the sea. The American delegation disputed the Report of the Commission on Greek Affairs stating that the non-Moham-

Kavalla should be given to Bulgaria. Serbia might keep the territory north of the Shar Mounatains; Greece – Thessaloniki and neighboring areas, which were Slavic before 1913, but due to an exchange of population gained Greek appearance. This. According to US experts, would be the most durable and just division. Another solution, recommended by the Memorandum, was the establishment of “autonomous” part of Macedonia under the control of a no-interested elected government uninterested mandate power. The document also stated that Bulgaria should keep or recover all its territories given to it in 1878. It specifically noted that the changes of the western and northern borders were of strategic character but the change affected seriously the principle of self-determination, and re-enforced permanent enmity. As for the Thrace, analyzing different options the experts stated that in any case it would be better if Western Thrace remained in Bulgaria while there were good reasons for Eastern Thrace with the Midia–Enos line to be given to Bulgaria. – See Панчев, А., П. Перков, *Op. cit.*, 115–117.

medan population of Bulgarian Thrace was more Greek than Bulgarian and questioned the alleged preference of the Mohammedan population the majority of which spoke Bulgaria, to be under Greek rather than under Bulgarian authority. The US delegation pointed out that the lack of direct access by land to the Mediterranean would seriously compromise the economic development of Bulgaria. Even if these economic inconveniences could be overcome bitterness and resentment for the injustice committed would still remain among the Bulgarian people which would be an inevitable menace to the future peace of the world.

“Ethnographical, economic, and political arguments, as well as possession certainly supported by valid claims, all favor the maintenance of the Bulgarian boundaries as they are at the present time.

Consequently, the American delegation makes the following proposal:

“The southern boundary of Bulgaria will be that which existed after the cession by Turkey in 1915 of territory adjoining Adrianople, under the reservation of the right of the principal Allied Associated Powers to attach to the International State such part of the said territory as seems desirable.”

The Italian delegation associated itself with the conclusions of the American delegation.³⁰

Although W. Wilson refrained from denouncing directly the Bucharest Treaty, the initial statements and acts of the American delegation ignored it. Consequently, the US gradually changed their position.

For regions like Banat, Croatia, Istria, Bukovina and Dalmatia which are associated rather with Eastern and Central Europe than with the Balkans, the US diplomats managed to impose their views which only partially coincided with those of the Entente. As far as “the true” Balkans were concerned, the victory states neglected Wilson’s principle for self-determi-

³⁰ FRUS. 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. VII, 242–248.

nation which remained a priority only to scholars – ethnologists, geographers, historians, and linguists. The fate of Eastern and Western Thrace, Dobrudja, Macedonia and some sectors of the Serbian-Bulgarian border was decided in this manner. The unwillingness of the US diplomats to listen to the recommendations of the Inquiry coincided with the decreasing chances for the establishment of a Constantinople State with an American mandate over it.

In the final decisions of the Conference the American support for Bulgaria was of importance only in rejecting the Serbian aspirations for North-Western Bulgaria and in the region of Slivnitsa and Dragoman.³¹

The other decisions on the Balkan problems were taken in the same pattern of strong pressure from the Balkan victory states and their European patrons followed by partial concessions. In the end, the Paris Conference confirmed the decisions of the Bucharest Treaty of 1913.

The Thracian question from February to September 1919 was among the most controversial topics in the commissions and committees of the Conference dealing with the future Bulgarian-Greek border. According to the American experts, who obviously assumed the economic factor as dominant in settling territorial problems, the principal focus of territorial difficulty in the Balkans was Thrace, whose Eastern and Western sections affected the commercial outlets of Bulgaria in a critical way.³² Greek claims to Thrace received solid support from her former and future allies France and Britain, assisted by Japan; reserved to them was Italy as far as she has plans of her own in the Eastern Mediterranean.³³ The US position evaluated: – from accepting of the Bulgarian rights over Western Thrace based on ethnic and economic arguments and expansion of its eastern border in the Adrianople region,

³¹ Тошкова, В., *Op. cit.*, 22.

³² House, E., *Ch. Seymour*, *Op. cit.*, 173.

³³ Helmreich, P. C. *From Paris to Sevres*. Columbus, 1974, 153–154.

depending on the range of the projected by them Constantinople state (in January – March 1919), through the defense of a Bulgarian outlet to the Aegean Sea through Western Thrace³⁴ to accepting the compromise solution that Bulgaria should renounce in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights and title over the territories in Thrace which belonged to her (in September 1919) and the recognition by declaration of the American Congress of January 20, 1920 of all Greek claims over Eastern and Western Thrace.³⁵

The issue of Southern Dobrudja was solved in a similar way. Despite the US initiative for Roumania to return to Bulgaria the territory which she had taken in 1913, eventually Under-Secretary of State Frank Polk withdrew the US proposal with the warning that Dobrudja could become the cause for a new war in the Balkans.³⁶

While not at war with Bulgaria, representatives of the US at the Paris Conference Frank Polk, Under-Secretary of State, Henry White, formerly Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States at Rome and Paris and General Tasker Bliss, Military Representative of the United States on the Supreme War Council, by a decision of the Council of Five of November 3, 1919 signed the Treaty of Neuilly as a demonstration of consensus with the Allies.³⁷

On October 27, 1919 Panaretov sent a note to Secretary of State Lansing on the occasion of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, indicating the severity of its conditions and their incompatibility with the principles of Wilson. The Bulgarian Minister Plenipotentiary had no illusions that it could change anything in the treaty, but he could not help expressing at least one “moderate protest” against the false assurances that

³⁴ Трифонов, С. Българското национално-освободително движение в Тракия, 1919–1934. С., 1988, 14–15.

³⁵ Трифонов, С. Антантата в Тракия 1919–1920. С., 1989, 30, 40–45.

³⁶ Христов, Х., *Op. cit.*, 281.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 345.

Bulgaria would receive justice. In his diary he could not hide his disappointment at Wilson's fiasco and his promises about the settlement of the world problems.³⁸

The convincing scientific arguments, presented by scholars, remained helpless against the game of the career diplomats. Due to that reason Wilson quickly gave up the pro-Bulgarian recommendations of the Inquiry and Lansing and House changed their views about to which country certain Balkan territory should belong.

The Bulgarian case, in particular, showed that the US diplomacy yielded to the old European school. This was due not only to the fact that compared to it, the team of Wilson was less experienced and skillful or because after the idea of an American mandate in Constantinople failed the US had no direct territorial interests in the region. It was mainly because the majority of the participants in the Paris Peace Conference imposed the principle of punishing "the guilty", i.e. the vanquished and compensating the victors. With the U.S. Senate opposition to the Covenant of the League of Nations and the with the Congress refusal to ratify the Versailles Treaty, the US reverted to isolationism but not for long. In the big politics the end of Eurocentrism had come although in the Balkans the Old Europe had still the final word. Future would show whether the "twofold" position of the US about the Versailles Treaty (on theoretical and practical level) would foster pro-American revisionist hopes among the disappointed with the new order small states and nations or would sober down their illusions in favor of a more pragmatic and rational assessment of the reliability and prospects of one or another political alliance, and whether the US could be that possible and perspective ally.

³⁸ Панаретов, С., *Op. cit.*, 284.

Из дневника на политика Никола Мушанов: юни–юли 1942 г.

Нина Киселкова

Национален статистически институт на Р България

Никола Мушанов (1872–1951) принадлежи към генерацията на онези „строители на съвременна България”, които встъпват в българския политически живот в началото на ХХ в. (Александър Малинов, Андрей Ляпчев, Найчо Цанов). Роден е в Дряново в семейство, което се замогва след Освобождението. Бащата е търговец, буден и прозорлив човек, който има стремежа да даде на синовете си европейско образование. От тримата в това начинание успява единствено средният син Никола, който през 1893 г. завършва право в Екс-ан-Прованс, Франция.

Досегът на младия Мушанов с френската културна и демократична традиция оставя траен отпечатък върху личността му. По собствените му думи, в основата на неговите политически убеждения лежат съчиненията за солидаризма на Леон Буржоа и Шарл Жид, които сполучливо се противопоставят на социализма¹.

След като завършва следването си, той се завръща в България. През следващите години е съдия и прокурор в Стара Загора и Варна (1893–1896) и адвокат в Русе (1897–1908), където се включва в Демократическата партия, а впоследствие става един от нейните водачи. За разлика от мнозина свои съвременници, които следват политическата конюнктура, Никола Мушанов остава верен на Демократическата партия. След като през 1934 г.

¹ Мушанов, Н. Опит за автобиография. Ф. 1303К, оп. 1, а. е. 1, л. 51.

правителството на Кимон Георгиев забранява политическите партии, той се кандидатира неизменно за народен представител от опозицията.

От 1902 до 1944 г. Мушанов е избран за народен представител единадесет пъти и е сред парламентаристите с най-продължителен стаж в Народното събрание на Царство България – повече от 30 години.²

Никола Мушанов заема министерски постове в кабинета на Независимостта на Александър Малинов (1908–1910) и в още няколко правителства до края на Първата световна война. През 1922 г. заедно с други водачи на опозицията е изпратен в затвора от правителството на БЗНС. След освобождаването му остава в крилото на Демократическата партия, което не се включва в Демократическия сговор. През 1931 г. влиза в правителството на Народния блок като министър на вътрешните работи и народното здраве. След оттеглянето на Ал. Малинов от поста министър-председател, Никола Мушанов оглавява правителството и в периода 12 октомври 1931 – 19 май 1934 г. е начело на три последователни кабинета. Свален е от власт с преврата на 19 май 1934 г.

Като гражданин, политик и обществник Никола Мушанов е принципен защитник на човешките права, частната собственост и социалната справедливост. По време на Втората световна война той е сред най-изтъкнатите критици на кабинета на Б. Филев в българския парламент и последователно се противопоставя на антиеврейските мерки на правителството. Записите от неговия дневник през първите месеци на 1943 г., до сега публикувани само частично³, са един от централните извори за настроенията

² ЦДА, ф. 1303К, оп. 1, а.е. 5. (Продължение на дневника ми. Тетрадка III, запис от 1.03.1942 г.).

³ Данова, Н., Р. Аврамов (Съст.). Депортирането на евреите от Вардарска Македония, Беломорска Тракия и Пирот, март 1943 г. С., I, 2013, 771–778 (док. 365).

и информираността на българското общество по въпроса за съдбата на евреите в България и Европа и отстраняването на Димитър Пешев след инициирания от него протест срещу депортирането им от старите предели.⁴

Никола Мушанов не приема нелегалните и терористични методи на борба на комунистите против режима и отстоява идеята за общи действия на обединената опозиция за излизане на България от войната. Заради участието си като министър без портфейл в правителството на Константин Муравиев, след 9 септември 1944 г. той е осъден от Народния съд на една година затвор. През 1947 г. е интерниран в Търново. През 1951 г. е задържан в следствения арест на Държавна сигурност в София, където умира на 21 май 1951 г. при неизяснени обстоятелства.⁵

Запазеното в българските архиви документално наследство на Никола Мушанов съдържа дневници, автобиография⁶ и спомени⁷.

Дневниците са от няколко периода:

⁴ Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden durch das nationalsozialistische Deutschland 1933–1945. – In: Auftrag des Bundesarchivs, des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte München–Berlin, des Lehrstuhls für Neuere und Neueste Geschichte an der Universität Freiburg und des Lehrstuhls für die Geschichte Ostmitteleuropas am Osteuropa-Institut der Freien Universität Berlin von S. Heim, U. Herbert, M. Hollmann, H. Möller, G. Pickhan, D. Pohl, S. Walther und A. Wirsching. Bd. 13: Südosteuropa: Slowakei, Rumänien, Bulgarien. Bearb. v. Hutzelmann, B., M. Hausleitner, S. Hazan. München (*nod печат*).

⁵ Архивен масив на Комисията по досиетата, ф. 5, оп. 3, а.е. 291, л. 1–14.

⁶ „Опит за автобиография” е ръкопис от седем двустранно изписани ученически тетрадки формат по 60 листа, от които първите шест се съхраняват в ЦДА (ф. 1303К, оп. 1, а. е. 1, 2), а седмата – в Научния архив на БАН (НА–БАН, сбирка IV, оп. 1, а.е. 192.). През 1992 г. историкът Милен Куманов публикува съдържанието на седмата тетрадка (Никола Мушанов. Спомени. Дневник. Изд. „Хр. Ботев”, С., 1992, 100 с. Съст. и пояснителни бележки М. Куманов).

⁷ ЦДА, 1303К, оп. 1, а.е. 8. Съдържа план за автобиография и спомени за отделни събития и личности в българския политически живот до 9 септември 1944 г.

Дневник, воден с прекъсвания от 19 септември 1908 до 20 март 19[09]. Първата, по-голяма част от записките, е посветена на обявяване независимостта на България и обхваща събитията от 19 септември до 13 октомври 1908 г.⁸. Втората част от записките е от периода 13 ноември 1908 – 20 март 1909⁹; публикуван е изцяло през 1984 г. от Ел. Стателова и Р. Попов¹⁰.

Дневник 19–21 юни 1913 г.¹¹ Обхваща част от периода на управление на коалиционния кабинет на Прогресивно-либералната и Народната партия с премиер Стоян Данев и има за основна тема обявяването на Междусъюзническата война. По време на описваните събития Н. Мушанов е депутат от опозиционната Демократическа партия в XV ОНС.

Дневник 21 юни – 4 юли 1918 г.¹² Обхваща първите две седмици на коалиционния кабинет на Демократическата и Радикалдемократическата партия с премиер Ал. Малинов (21 юни 1918 – 17 октомври 1918), където Н. Мушанов е министър на обществените сгради, пътищата и благоустройството.

Дневници 1 януари 1942 – 27 януари 1943 г.¹³, 28 януари – 11 май 1943 г. и 31 август 1943 г. – 25 ноември 1943 г., [София]¹⁴. В този период Никола Мушанов е народен представител и един от водачите на малочислената опозиция в XXV Обикновено Народно събрание.

Дневник 17 юни – 16 септември 1947 г., София¹⁵ обхваща събитията в България от арестуването на Никола Петков до потвърждаване на смъртната му присъда.

⁸ Пак там, а.е. 3, л. 1–63.

⁹ Пак там, л. 64–87.

¹⁰ Стателова, Е., Р. Попов (Съст.). Спомени за обявяване независимостта на България 1908 г. С., 1984, 88–116.

¹¹ ЦДА, ф. 1303К, оп. 1, а.е. 3, л. 88–99.

¹² Пак там, а.е. 4, л. 1–14.

¹³ Пак там, а.е. 5. Продължение на дневника ми. Тетрадки III, IV и V.

¹⁴ Пак там, а.е. 6. Дневник. Книги VI, VII и IX.

¹⁵ Пак там, а.е. 7, л. 1–50.

В настоящата публикация са включени записи от периода 4 юни – 31 юли 1942 г.¹⁶, избран заради концентрацията на събития в един момент, когато изходът от войната е далеч и твърде неясен. Мушанов пише буквално всеки ден, като отбелязва развоя на военните действия по всички фронтове и прави коментари на случващото се в България.

Включените в публикацията записи за отделните дни са дадени в тяхната цялост. Отпадналите записи са от дни, в които Мушанов проследява единствено хода на войната.

Пунктуацията и правописът са осъвременени, но са запазени някои архаизми в изписването на думите, характерни за слога на автора, като Росия вм. Русия, Ромъния вм. Румъния, биле вм. били и др.

1942 г.

4 юни. Върнах се от Хисаря. През периода на отсъствието ми от София станаха важни събития. На 29 май съобщи се от германците, че са завършили битката при Харков успешно, като пленили над 200 хиляди руски и взели и унищожили много танкове и други материали. На 30 съобщиха, че в Либия Ромел¹⁷ започнал офанзивата си.

На 2 май е осъден и езекутиран запасният генерал Заимов. Осъден за шпионаж в полза на русите.

На 30 май Филов дойде в Хисаря, преспа и на 31 замина за Троянския манастир. Не говорих с него по политика, отбягвах даже. Той ми каза, че Камарата няма да се свика преди 15 юни.

Хайдрих, гаулайтерът на Чехия, който бе ранен, починал от раните си. Той замести фон Нойрата в Чехия, извърши много езекуции в Чехия, бе изпратен и в Париж, дето също бяха езекутирани много заложници. Вечна е истината: който нож вади, от нож умира. По случай

¹⁶ Пак там, а.е. 5. Продължение на..., л. 54–101.

¹⁷ Ервин Ромел (1891–1944) – германски фелдмаршал от Втората световна война, по това време командир на Германския африкански корпус.

смъртта на Хайдрих¹⁸ ексекутирани биле 181 чехи.

5 юни. Америка е обявила война на Ромъния, Унгария и България. В Сената войната е обявена с 66 гласа на България и със 71 на Ромъния и Унгария. Нанесохме си сами една беда, която ще почувствуваме по-късно. Защо обявихме война на Америка? Кой български интерес продиктува тази война? В Първата световна война ние воювахме, но правителството на Радославов не обяви война на Америка. Защо сега обявяваме, без да сме във война? Късогледство, което не е от полза за страната ни.

Какъвто и да е изходът на войната, Америка ще има голямо влияние по уреждането на света. Ако ли пък се случи Америка да спечели войната, тя ще командва. Англия вече няма това значение, както по-рано, и тя се спасява от Америка. Доста изскубаха перушината на английската кокошка. А и самата Америка напуска политиката на Монroe¹⁹; тя днес заявява, че не може вече да стои изолирана и се интересува за европейските работи и ще вземе дейно участие в нареждане реда в Европа. И колко можеше да ни бъде полезна Америка? Дано нямаме нужда, както в миналото, от един Мърфи²⁰!...²¹

¹⁸ Райнхард Хайдрих (1904–1942) – високопоставен нацистки служител на Третия райх, началник на Главно управление за имперска сигурност и заместник на имперския протектор на Бохемия и Моравия. Главен организатор на Холокоста, отговорен за многобройни военни престъпления и престъпления срещу човечеството. Умира на 4.06.1942 г. в Прага от последиците на преживян дни по-рано атентат. Като ответна мярка за неговата смърт германците подлагат на масови репресии чешкото население.

¹⁹ Джеймс Монро (1758–1831) – президент на САЩ (1817–1825). Името му е свързано със затвърждаване на доктрината на изолационизма във външната политика на САЩ. Терминът „изолационизъм“ често се използва и за политическата атмосфера в САЩ през 30-те години на ХХ в.

²⁰ Доминик Мърфи (1847–1930) – американски дипломат, генерален консул в София (1915–1918). Участва в сключването на Солунското примирие през септември 1918 г.

[...]

8–9 юни. Водят се ожесточени сражения при Севастопол. Изглежда, че германците искат да вземат на всяка цена Севастопол, за да нямат руски войски в тила си, ако напредват за Кавказ.

В Киренайка също се водят ожесточени сражения. Особено се хвали дейността на генерал Коениг²², елзасец, който командува френските войски. Той отблъснал десетки атаки на германо-италианските войски.

В Германия нападенията на англичаните с аероплани се увеличава[т] и ожесточава[т]. След нападението на Кьолн, на Баден с по 1000 аероплана, сега се заканват да нападнат с десет хиляди аероплана!

Много човешки жертви ще погълнат иднети летни месеци!

У нас, [през] седмицата постоянно издават смъртни присъди и затворите са препълнени от затворници.

10–11 юни. Оня ден започнал процесът на руските парашутисти, на брой 16 души.²³ Между тях имало един полковник, подполковник и капитан. Интересна ще е защитата им. Чувам, че те щели да застъпят становището, че са идвали в България за разузнавателна цел – да следят движението на германските войски. Никакъв шпионаж не са вършили, нито пък са агитирали за непокорство към властта. Какви са доказателствата срещу им – не зная. Все пак този процес може да ни донесе някаква беля за

²¹ ЦДА, ф. 1303К, оп. 1, а.е. 5. Продължение на..., л. 54–56.

²² Коениг или Кьониг, Пиер (1898–1970) – френски генерал от елзаски произход.

²³ Процесът на парашутистите (9–26.06.1942) е наказателен съдебен процес на Софийския военнополови съд срещу група от 27 български комунисти–политемигранти, изпратени с подводници и самолети от съветското разузнаване в България, за да организират въоръжена съпротива и диверсионни акции в дълбокия тил на германските войски. Делото се гледа при закрити врати. От обвиняемите 18 души са осъдени на смърт, вкл. ръководителя на групата полковник Цвятко Радойнов.

отношенията ни с Русия...

Вчера бе при мене Алтъпармаков²⁴, който напускал Битоля по заповед на министъра на вътреш[ните] работи. Заповядано му да живее в старите предели на Царството. Той смята, че македонстващи, между които Тошев и Симеон Радев, са му „подлели“ вода, а може би и адвокати, за да го премахнат от Битоля, дето имало добра клиентела. Подирих Филова и го помолих да приеме Алтъпармаков да разбере защо е пропъден от Битоля. Филов ми каза, че не може да го приеме, защото този прием може да му нанесе пакост. Каква? Не можа да ми обясни. От кого има страх – също не зная.²⁵

[...]

16 юни. В Либия и Севастопол продължават ожесточени сражения. Германците напредват, като дават много жертви.

У нас. Излезе указът за свикване XXV Народно събрание, на Четвърта извънредна сесия, за 23 юни, понеделник.

17 юни. Министър-председателят държа реч в 1½ часа с която съобщава за нови мерки по прехраната. Говори общи фрази, от които не може да се прави заключение за конкретните мерки. Впечатлението от речта не са добри.

По бойните театри сраженията продължават.²⁶

[...]

20 юни. Днес италианската опера представи „Лучия ди Ламермур“. Пяха Тито Скипа²⁷ и Карозио.²⁸ Скипа не ми хареса. Напомня ми Михайлов – Стоян – остарял. Аз останах в театъра само първите три сцени – много ми бе горещо.

Излезе указ за уволнението на Ненчо Дочев, директор

²⁴ Никола Алтъпармаков (1896–1953) – български общественик и революционер, по това време председател на Илинденското дружество в Битоля.

²⁵ ЦДА, ф. 1303К, оп. 1, а.е. 5. Продължение на..., л. 57–58.

²⁶ Пак там, л. 63.

²⁷ Тито Скипа (1889–1965) – италиански оперен певец, един от знаменитите тенори в първата половина на XX в.

²⁸ Маргерита Карозио (1908–2005) – италианска оперна певица, сопран.

на Храноизнос. Назначен е Хаджистойков. Той бе поддиректор в мое време и го уволниха. Сръчен и способен е. Но... Уволнен е и Гъбенски от търговията. Готви се прилагането на програмата за прехраната!...²⁹

[...]

Днес, 22 юни. Откриване на Четвъртата извънредна сесия на XXV Народно събрание. Нареди се дневен ред. За утрешното заседание – избор на п[од] председател, на мястото на Н. Захариев.

23 юни. Народното събрание избра с 97 гласа за п[од] председател Петър Кьосеиванов³⁰. Имало 10 бели бюлетини, 18 за П. Балкански³¹. Аз не влизах в залата да гласувам.

В болшинството роптание срещу речите на министрите по закованите цени, дори и подигравки.

Коментира се срещата на Чърчил с Рузвелт. Едно кратко съобщение гласи, че се занимават с организиране на „стратегическа офанзива“. Хигинс в една реч съобщава, че ще се нападат ожесточено под ред големите германски градове.

Севастопол още се държи.

24 юни. Във Франция Лавал е произнесъл реч пред работниците, като ги увещавал да отидат да работят в Германия. Той е заявил, че вярва в победата на Германия и че Франция трябва да се подготви да участва в новия ред на Европа.

Тази реч е остро критикувана от голистите и съюзниците.

Сраженията на Източния фронт са в разгара си. При Севастопол и Харков германците напредват.

Аз говорих в Камарата за пълномощията на Министерския [съвет] по еврейския въпрос³². Повторих почти

²⁹ ЦДА, ф. 1303К, оп. 1, а.е. 5. Продължение на..., л. 65.

³⁰ Петър Кьосеиванов (1897–1971) – адвокат, публицист, брат на политика Георги Кьосеиванов.

³¹ Петко Балкански – д-р по медицина и право, народен представител в XXIV и XXV ОНС.

³² Вероятно става дума за дебатите по законопроекта за възлагане на

онова, що говоря вече за четвърти път и порицах жестокостта и безчовечността на известни мерки: запрещаване на телефон, радио, ходене на курорт, излизане след 22 часа и др. човешки права.³³

[...]

26 юни. В Народното събрание новият министър генерал Михов говори пред Парламентарната военна комисия. Той каза, че армията относно облекло и храна е добре. Има и запаси. С въоръжение също, но има да се правят доставки от Германия, която сега не може да ги направи, защото има нужда на Източния фронт. Морала на армията свърза с морала на народа и подкани народните представители да работят в този дух. Напира много на новото възпитание, което трябва да се дава на офицерството. Началникът трябва да бъде баща на подчинените си и се отнася с тях бащински. И подчинените трябва да виждат в началника си баща. Само с такива морални връзки са възможни смели операции, каквито изисква съвременната война. Е против жестокостта, което, казва той, не е слабост. Към маловажните престъпления трябва да се отнасяме с такт и умереност. Смъртните наказания предизвикват омраза. Само за особено важни случаи може да се налага смъртно наказание. Изложението му направи добро впечатление.

Аз имах с него лична среща и говорих по-дълго. Похвалих го за възгледите му и му казах, че съм слушал от запасните офицери, които са служили в неговата армия много добри отзиви. Говорих му за смъртните присъди, които биле вече 320. Той отрече това – каза, че са по-малко. Говорих му, че стават изтезания, които позорят армията. Каза, че чувал за такива и взема мерки.

Министерския съвет да взема всички мерки за уреждане на еврейския въпрос и свързаните с него н.въпроси, внесен официално в Народното събрание от вътрешния министър П. Габровски на 23.06.1942 г. (ЦДА, ф. 173К, оп. 6, а.е. 2212, л. 1–8).

³³ Пак там, 1303К, оп. 1, а.е. 5. Продължение на..., л. 67–68.

Уверен е в победата на германците. Каза ми, че имало доказателства за разслабване у русите. Два полка били избили офицерите си. Севастопол щял да падне след 10 дни. Германците не бързали. Не искали да дават много жертви. В Либия войските не искали да се бият. И французите не се биели. Това ми направи особено впечатление, като се знае, че те особено се държаха добре под командата на генерал Коениг.³⁴

[...]

28 юни. При Мерса Матрух³⁵ в Египет е започнато голямо сражение. Ако германците победят тук, ще им се отвори пътя за Александрия. Сраженията в Либия доказват, че армията на англичаните е смесица, която не прояви бойни качества.

У нас се говори само за процеси – и военни, и граждански. Оная вечер са екзекутирали 18 души парашутисти, осъдени от военен съд. Те са били [в]се българи на съветска служба. Имало способни офицери, особено полковник Радионов³⁶ и някой инженер. Говори се, че руският представител в София бил направил протест. На мене военният министър не само че ми отрече това, но ми и каза, че русите са съобщили, че се дезинтересират от подсъдимите, защото те не са дошли в България по заповед, а са доброволци. Дано е така. Позицията на подсъдимите е била, че те са българи, но на руска служба. Дошли са по заповед на началството си да разузават движението на германските войски и дори да бъдат в помощ на българските власти, ако тези последните пожелаят. Не са агитирали никъде против българската власт, а са се предали на българската войска, когато са се срещнали с нея.

Гражданският процес е срещу бившия управител на Земледелската банка Тодоров в процеса на „Москович

³⁴ Пак там, л. 68–70.

³⁵ Мерса Матрух – пристанище на Средиземно море в Египет.

³⁶ Има се предвид Цв. Радойнов. Вж. бел. № 23.

палас”. Говори се по процеса Сузин³⁷ и за берлинския ни представител полковник Драганов и почетния ни консул Диманов. Днес се говори, че бил уволнен и Любен Цонев, заловен в контрабанда от Гестапо. Въобще: воня. Корупцията е пуснала дълбоки корени.

29–30 юни. По бойните полета германците напредват. Англичаните са атакували наново Бремен и са му нанесли големи разрушения.

В Народното събрание се внасят сериозни закони набързо. Искат да закриват Камарата наскоро.

Осъдените парашутисти са екзекутирани. Освободени са от смъртното наказание руските и малолетни българи.³⁸

3 юли. Вчера Чърчил е държал речта си по повдигнатия блам срещу му в парламента. Посочил е най-напред предимството на парламентарния режим, който позволява, народа да бъде осветляван и дири отговорност от правителството си. Признал е загубите в Либия като много важни за Англия. Говорил е, че Англия била длъжна да разхвърля силите си по много фронтове; говорил и за помощта на Русия, за разговорите с Рузвелт и въпреки днешните тежки дни той е заявил, че сегашното положение на съюзниците е много по-добро, отколкото в края на миналата година. Похвалил е усилията на Америка и грандиозния индустриален подем. Надеждите са на Америка и Русия. Камарата на общините е гласувала доверие с 475 гласа срещу 25. Стари народи, народи с традиции, които не се отчайват от поражения и не изпадат в паника. Англия е зле ударена както никогаж в историята ѝ, но страда и търпи... Надява се! Та в този гигантски двубой,

³⁷ Цви Сузин – един от малцината оцелели при катастрофата на кораба „Салвадор” в Мраморно море през декември 1940 г., при която загиват 230 души – евреи от Чехия и България на път за Палестина. Причините за трагедията стават предмет на международен спор между България и Турция.

³⁸ ЦДА, ф. 1303К, оп. 1, а.е. 5. Продължение на..., л. 71–73.

кой ли би издържал, ако не се надява? И [в]се в името на тази надежда ще се лее още много кръв и ще се причиняват разрушения, та накрая и задоволената надежда на една от силите ще е равна за загубената надежда на другата. Всички равни пред хаоса и мизерията след войната!

Вчера се закри 4-та извънредна сесия на Народното събрание Много набързо се прокараха много закони, и важни закони.

4 юли. Герmano-италианските войски са на 60–70 кил[ометра] от Александрия. Германците действуват и с оръжие, и с дипломатия. Те съобщават заедно с италианците, че са за Египет за египтяните. Те искат да създадат настроение в Египет, както и в целия Изток, че се борят за свободата и независимостта на народите и по този начин да уязвят англичаните.

Германците съобщават за пробив на Източния фронт на протежение 300 кил[ометра] между Курск и Харков.

У нас у известна част от интелигенцията, войната вече е завършена. Германците вече победиха и нашето положение е консолидирано. Победихме!... Това убеждение може да ни напакости. Вчера напр[имер] в Народното събрание, в кулоарите разправяха ми, че някои политици от кафенетата говорили сериозно, че съжелявали задето над Севастопол не било издигнато и българско знаме наедно с германското, т.е. защо не сме били обявили война на Русия, та и ние сега да сме имали дял в победата при Севастопол. Говорили също, че не е още късно да се наредим във войната!... При победи захласваме се, при несполуки – опуйчваме се... Така е у слабите, младите народи Няма здрави характери, прозорлив разсъдък, бързо решават и бързо се отчайват. Колко победи и поражения ще има да видим!...

Говори се, че днес Божилов, финансовият министър, заминал за Берлин да урежда въпроса за доставката за 12¼ милиарда лева. По гласувания кредит 1/3 се плаща при

поръчката. Тъй че още от сега ще се платят 4 милиарда, а доставките ще станат, ако станат, ще се плащат и комисионни на посредниците.³⁹

[...]

8 юли. Съобщава се, че Ромел започнал отново офанзивата си срещу Египет.

В партията на Нахас Паша⁴⁰ се появило разногласие. Изключени били членове от изпълнителния комитет.

Днес при мене беше Антонов⁴¹, нашият пълномощен министър в Стокхолм, сега отзован. Той бе много интересен и ми даде ценни сведения. Той е огорчен от отзоваването му. Мисли, че е отзован по искане на германците. На него германците не гледали с добро око, а и във външно министерство не били доволни, че давал сведения, и то често неблагоприятни, за Германия. „Англия бе далеч от Русия, но делеше боен фронт. Само относно работите в Германия имах възможност да ги зная по-добре, чрез шведите. С Колонтай⁴², руската пъл[номощна] министерша, бях в добри връзки, но не официални. Официални посещения не си правехме. Когато Идън идва в Русия, отношенията на Англия с Русия бяха много обтегнати. Тогава германското радио съобщи, че на русите било признато влияние чак до Рейн. А в същност англичаните бяха много резервирани и не признаваха дори на Русия границите от 1941 г. В Москва Идън нищо не свърши, като отложи въпроса поради отсъствието на Чърчил във Вашингтон.” Русите били много ядосани и дори можели да прибягнат до сепаративен мир. Той бил говорил с един австрийски дипломат във връзка с

³⁹ Пак там, л. 73–76.

⁴⁰ Мустафа Нахас паша (1876–1965) – египетски политик, министър-председател на Египет (1942–1944).

⁴¹ Никола Антонов (1888–1973) – български дипломат, пълномощен министър в Швеция (1939–1942).

⁴² Александра Колонтай (1872–1952) – видна представителка на съветската дипломация. Посланик на Съветския съюз в Швеция (1930–1945).

германски официозни среди, но тогава Рибентроп не давал значение на това. „После Молотов отиде в Лондон. На 26 май се сключи военният съюз между Русия и Англия. Тогава се признаха границите на Русия, но Англия спечели собствено що искаше: никакви териториални придобивки и невмешателство във вътрешния живот на държавите.” През юни бил дошел в Стокхолм фон Масов, по-после и юристконсулт при министерст[вото] на външните работи в Берлин и по въпроса за мир, но било вече късно. Англия сключила военния съюз, а казва ми Антонов, че австрийският дипломат, който бил посредник, дошел в къщата му, когато той гласял багажа си, за да отпътува като отзован. Дипломатът се зачудил и казал дори, че щял да действа пред германците да възвърнат Антонова.

Слушам Антонов и се питам не си ли дава голямо значение като счита, че можел да посредничи за мир между Русия и Германия. Той дори счита, че трябвало да го назначат в Русия за пълномощен министър да продължи делото си. Но казвам си [че] често наглед най-дребни и несериозни постъпки могат да доведат до важни решения.

Антонов мисли, че Германия е на края на силите си. Тя ще може да трае още 2–3 месеца. Зимна кампания е немислима. Германия има загуби 4–5 мил[иона] души.

Само от измръзване тя има 5–600 хиляди души. До 20 декември 1941 год. през Полша са минали 200 хил[яди] души измръзнали. Японският военен аташе, с когото бил добър приятел, му казал, че Русия може да бъде бита, но никога победена. Япония имала своя политика в Азия, тя я интересувала.

По мисията на Идън в Русия Антонов бил научил, че на Русия никогаш Англия не се съгласявала да ѝ даде карт бланш за Европа до Рейн, но даже и за Балканите. Отстъпили са били само, че Русия ще има думата за уреждане границите на балканските държави. И тогава Антонов писал в нашето министерство да се започнат преговори с

Россия и се уреди нашето положение, но никоой не го чул.

Говори ми, че откак заминал за Стокхолм, не му дали шифър и си служил с оня, който съществува от 40 години. „Нищо не можеше да бъде тайно. Всички знаеха нашия шифър.” Аз не мога да си обясня това, като зная, че шифърт се сменя почти всеки две-три години. И Антонов не може да си обясни защо не му изпратили шифър.

Като минал през Берлин, Антонов се срещнал с Драганов. В разговорите си с него разбрал, че Драганов също е убеден, че Германия ще загуби войната. И той предполагал, че Германия може да поиска мир, без да ни попита и дори да ни даде като разменна монета в преговорите си с русите.⁴³

[...]

11 юли. Божилев пристигна и тази сутрин е бил приет от Царя при когото е бил около 2 часа. Днес се появи във вестниците изявление от Божилев, в което казва: „Извън всяко съмнение е, че за в бъдеще нашето сътрудничество ще се засили още повече и в него Нова Европа ще намери своя положителен израз”.

Стоенето на Божилев при Царя два часа и даване на изявление след излизането от Двореца с такова съдържание е едно театро. Царя е искал да покаже, че се е много интересувал от визитата на Божилев в Берлин и че споделя всичко – „сътрудничеството ще намери израз в Нова Европа!...”

Думите започнаха да имат различен смисъл: сътрудничество или подчиненост, сътрудничество или изсмукване жизнените сокове на страната!...

Царя преди няколко дни е приел нашия пълномощен министър във Вашингтон – Наумов. Говорил с него дълго. Във вестниците не се съобщава за приема му. Това е заповядано на цензурата и не от друго място, а от самия дворец. Защо са тия фокуси? Кому ще нанесе вреда

⁴³ Пак там, л. 78–81.

съобщението, че Царя е приел един свой пълномощен министър идващ от Вашингтон?

Вътре в страната, особено в София, въпросът за прехраната е най-актуален. Започва да става застрашителен. От една неделя няма картофи и яйца на пазаря. Една седмица не се дава месо. Зеленчукът още скъп: 14 лева домати, 10 л[в.] фасул зелен.

Никакви права на гражданина не се зачитат. Полицията вилнее както никогам до сега. Свобода на гражданина, жилищна неприкосновеност не съществуват. Оня ден правили обиск – полицията – у Стойчо и баща му. Евреите – Враджали и други, стоят в затвора на Дирекцията на полицията вече две седмици само да ги измъчват дано дадат показания каквито желае полицията.

В съдилищата се разглеждат процеси [в]се за конспирации и при разследванията са вършени непростени инквизиционни средства.

Живее се и без хляб, и без свобода и правда. Изключителни времена, се казва, и туй то! Всичко е възможно, всяко безправие е оправдано. И престъпните инстинкти намират простор да се проявяват и то свободно! Свободата е за престъпленията и корупцията.

От Америка съобщават, че едно градче е наименувано Лидице – името на чешкото село, което е сринато със земята и жителите му избити като отмъщение за атентата срещу Хайдрих. Заради него са екзекутирани други 680 заложници, видни чехи. Колко е скъп животът на тираните! Колко невинни живота загиват за един насилник!

12, 13 юли. У нас излезе указ, с който Драганов⁴⁴ се назначава за пъл[номощен] министър в Мадрид, а Славчо Загоров⁴⁵ за пълном[ощен] министър в Берлин, Иван П.

⁴⁴ Първан Драганов (1890–1945) – български офицер, дипломат и политик, пълномощен министър в Берлин (1938–1942), а след това – до 1.06.1944 г. – в Мадрид.

⁴⁵ Проф. Славчо Загоров (1870–1970) – виден български икономист, статис-

Станчов⁴⁶ е назначен за генерален консул в Галац.

Германците са запретили на французите от окупираната зона да празнуват 14 юли, националният празник. Де Гол пък дава заповед пък в неокупирана Франция французите да празнуват 14 юли най-тържествено: да украсят къщите си с трицветни знамена, да пеят Марсилезата и се събират по площадите.

14 юли. Германците съобщават, че са взели Ворошилов и напредват. Положението на Тимошенко било много тежко.

Днес, 14 юли е националният празник на Франция и празник на свободата. Слушам Радио Лондон, отдето се предава 14 юли в миналото. Спомних си, че преди 5 години, през 1937 г., аз с жена си бяхме в Париж на изложението. На 14 юли бях в председателската ложа на „Шан-з-Елизе“ дето бяха и мароканският султан, и бившият румънски крал Карол. При мене стоеше Суриц⁴⁷, съветският амбасадор. Министър-председател е Деладие и председател на Камарата – Ерио. Ревюто бе великолепно. Франция показваше военната си мощ и бе внушително. Но в Париж бе хаос. Имаше стачка в халите и чувствувахе се едно разложение. Дали то не бе вече признак на онова разтление, което се забелязва и по-късно, през войната?

Срещнах се и с Ерио в Камарата на депутатите. Тогава му говорих за краткия разговор, който имах в София с Нойрат за спогодба между Германия и Франция. Ерио ми отговори: „Какво още могат да искат от нас германците? Аз направих, що можах: изправане на Ренани⁴⁸, премах-

тик и политик, пълномощен министър в Берлин през 1942–1944 г. След войната емигрира в Австрия, където прави впечатляваща научна кариера.

⁴⁶ Иван Д. Станчов (1897–1972) – български дипломат, консул в Галац, Румъния от 1942 до юни 1944 г.

⁴⁷ Яков Захарович Суриц (1882–1952) – съветски дипломат, пълномощен министър във Франция (1937–1940).

⁴⁸ От фр. Rhénanie – Рейнска област в Германия, в която съгласно Версайския мирен договор от 1919 г. са били разположени френски и други чужди окупационни сили, които се изтеглят окончателно от страната през

ване на репарациите. Мене французите ме считат за предател спрямо френските интереси.” Аз нямаше що да му възразявам, освен да констатирам как би се успокоил светът и как би се наредила Европа, ако двата напреднали народи биха се разбрали.

Пет години минаха! И колко светът се е променил! Днес чух по Радио Лондон да се съобщава, че японският император поздравил маршал Петен с днешния празник, празника на свободата, и спикерът каза: „Няма нужда от коментари.”

Бедна Франция! Много претегли. Но теглилата са я възродявали и тя пак ще се възроди. И за нея ще има по-светъл 14 юли...⁴⁹

[...]

19 юли. Съобщават, че [в] Лодз, Полша са екзекутирани 80 поляци, между които жени, адвокати, лекари заради убийството на четирима германци. Начинът на застрелването им бил особено жесток. Извели са хиляди поляци да присъствуват на екзекуцията. За един германец убит в бъдеще щели да биват екзекутирани 50 поляци.

Днес се обявява, че треновете към Бургас, Варна, Русе и Видин са спрени до 25 юли. Оставени са само по един влак за големите направления. Причината била, че наши вагони и локомотиви са дадени на италианците за превозване на техни войски през Сърбия, Македония за Египет. Изглежда, че Ромел има нужда от подкрепления. Затова се изпращат бързо през нас и от Солун навярно с транспортни самолети.

Говори се, че в Сърбия е хвърлен във въздуха влак, в който са загинали офицери и войници германски и няколко села пак биле жестоко наказани.

20 юли. При Воронеж русите се хвалят, че са наново преминали Дон. Взели са едно важно предмостово укреп-

1930 г.

⁴⁹ ЦДА, ф. 1303К, оп. 1, а.е. 5. Продължение на..., л. 83–87.

ление и нанесли големи загуби на маджари и германци.

Днес арестували в Дирекция на полицията Стойчо⁵⁰, Сирко Станчев⁵¹ и Хрелопанов⁵². Това ми съобщи жената на Стойчо вечерта, часът в 9½.

21 юли. Днес подирих прокурора да го попитам за арестуването на Стойчо. Той ми каза, че арестуването му е от съдебните власти. Не е във връзка с фискалните наредби, а разследва се дали не са се ползували от фалшив документ. (Документът, за който е реч, е изменение датата на прехвърляне акциите от Сузин на швейцарца). Казвам му, че не са добри усвоената от съдебните власти практика да се арестуват граждани в полицията за разследване. Арест трябва да последва само след като има данни за престъпление и съдебните власти издадат постановление за задържане. Каза ми, че това дело било много сложно, имало много спънки и трябвало да се вземе такава мярка, но щом се разследвало, ще бъдат пуснати. Искаше да ме убеди, че той знае какво е общественото положение на задържаните и за да се вземе такава мярка срещу им, трябвало до има особени съображения. Помолих го да разследва по-бързо и да ги пуснат, ако е възможно, още днес. Обеща ми.

Снощи жената на Стойчо бе много интересна с разсъжденията си. „Ами как арестуваха Сирко Станчев? Царя, Царицата и Евдокия по Коледа бяха у тях на вечеря?“ Ами

⁵⁰ Стойчо Мошанов (1892–1975) – български политик, племенник на Никола Мушанов. Завършил право в Екс-ан-Прованс, Франция. Политическата му кариера преминава през няколко партии. Депутат в XXII, XXIII и XXIV ОНС, на което е и председател. През август–септември 1944 г. пълномощник на българското правителство в Кайро за тайни преговори за примирие с англо-американците.

⁵¹ Сирко Станчев Петков (1893–1945) – български военен, адютант на Цар Борис III, народен представител в в XXIV и XXV ОНС. През 1943 г. подписва обръщението на Димитър Пешев против изселването на българските евреи.

⁵² Няма данни за лицето.

Царя си е цар, тъй вървят работите. „Ами сега нали всичко се върши от Царя, как може да допусне това?“

Истината е, че сме полицейска държава и всеки може да бъде злепоставен и изложен. Полицейските произволи са на всяка крачка и никой гражданин не е защитен от тях. Аз не защитавам никой виновен, но ако е такъв. А такъв е само оня, за който правосъдието се произнесе. Личната свобода на гражданина не е парцал, с който се бърше ботуша на всеки полицаи! А кой може да те опозори днес? Хора, които плюят или покровителствуват корупцията и гешефта в най-долна форма. Режим на безправие и произвол.⁵³

[...]

25 юли. К. Хъл⁵⁴ в Америка и Крипс⁵⁵ в Англия са държали речи, в които са говорили [в]се за бъдещето. И двамата са говорили, че след войната ще се нареди нов ред, когато ще има повече социална правда и суровинните материали няма да са привилегия само на едни.

Прави впечатление, че като че ли речите на Хъл, а по-рано и на Идън не са една случайност. Изглежда като че ли са уговорени, защото и по съдържание си приличат. За къде се отнасят? Не ще е само за техните съюзници и победени, не визират и Италия, и Германия, и Финландия.

Германците съобщават за заемаването на Ростов. Водят се кръвопролитни сражения.

Снощи Стойчо бе освободен и идва у дома. Поставени са биле тримата в три отделни стаи. Имали кревати, но

⁵³ ЦДА, ф. 1303К, оп. 1, а.е. 5. Продължение на..., л. 91–94.

⁵⁴ Кордел Хъл (1871–1955) – американски юрист и политик, държавен секретар на САЩ (1933–1944). За участието му в основаването на ООН удостоен с Нобелова награда за мир за 1945 г.

⁵⁵ Стафорд Крипс (1889–1952) – британски политик–лейбърист, пълномощен министър в Москва 1940–1942. След завръщането си във Великобритания добива огромна популярност чрез радиопредаване за усиления на Съветския съюз във войната.

през всичкото време не са им допускали да излязат вън от стаите си поне по един час. Аз не мога да разбера от къде се родиха толкова жестоки люде у нас. Защо се изтезават хората. И ако може такива средства да се употребяват срещу Стойчо, бивш Председател на Камарата, какво остана за другите обикновени граждани!

През нощта имаше тревога. Била дадена към два часа сутрината. Ние в къщи не я чухме. Но към 4½ чуваме сирената. Мислехме, че е сигнал за тревога, а то било сигнал за отбой. Ние не сме чули и спяхме. Чували се картечни изстрели и имало светлинни ракети.

Днес коментари различни. Имало ли е чужд аероплан? Ако имало, защо не хвърлил бомба? Защо е стреляно и т.н. Едни предполагат, че е бил заблуден английски аероплан, който отивал към Дража Михайлович⁵⁶, други – че е предизвикана тревога за обучение.

26 юли. Не стихват още разговорите за тревогата от миналата нощ. И всеки се чуди защо правителството не дава никакво съобщение и обяснение. Чудно е действително защо се държи гражданството в неведение. Тъй се създават много повече легенди и всевъзможни предположения, които повече тревожат. Но днешното управление не счита за нужно да осветлява народа. То е извън него, няма защо да държи сметка за него. Народът е безправен раб. Нали господстващото гледище днес е, че гражданинът е нищо, а държавата, и то представена от двеста души чиновници, е всичко!

Съобщи се, че Мусолини бил от 26 юни до 20 юли на

⁵⁶ Драголюб (Дража) Михайлович (1893–1946) – сръбски и югославски военен деец, армейски генерал. Военен аташе в югославската легация София (юни 1935 – май 1936). През Втората световна война е предводител на промонархическото и националистическо четническо движение в страната, известно като Югославска армия в отечеството. През 1942 г. е провъзгласен за военен министър от сръбско-югославското правителство в изгнание в Лондон.

Либийския фронт. Радио Лондон се подиграва, като съобщава, че Мусолини отишел в Либия да влезе триумфално в Александрия след победата на Ромел, но сега си дошел, защото пътят към Александрия бил задръстен от англичаните.

27–28 юли. В Англия и Америка се говори за втория фронт. Митинги и разни корпорации се произнасят за втори фронт. Чудно! Сега крайните и болшевиките са най-войнствени. Те искат война. Сигурно подбудата ще е, защото Съветите са в трагично положение. Новочеркасск, Ростов са превзети. Германците преминали долното течение на Дон. Кавказ е застрашен. Тревогата в съюзниците е голяма. Наистина прави впечатление, че почти никъде русите не дават пленници и се сражават упорито, отстъпвайки. Тимошенко изглежда изкусно отстъпва и изтощава противника.

Още е рано да се предсказва края на борбата на Източния фронт, но не ще бъде от полза за германците, ако ли бъдат заставени да водят още една зимна кампания.

На запад англичаните нападат жестоко германски градове. Сега участвуват вече и американци. Хамбург е нападат вече два пъти и англичаните казват: „Най-жестоки нападения от началото на войната.”

Германците започнаха да говорят, че крайокеанският бряг е укрепен най-модерно и че силите на Германия очакват офанзивата. До сега не се говореше. Навярно усетили са нещо?

29 юли. Днес в бюлетина се съобщава, че през Париж щели да минат войски за Западния фронт. Биле елитни войски, които вземали участие на Източния фронт, добре облечени и въоръжени с най-модерни оръжия.

Плашат ли се само противниците със съобщения или сме пред офанзива на Западния фронт от страна на англичани и американци, близкото бъдеще ще покаже.

Главкомандувачият английските бомбардировачи е

държал реч към германския народ, в която се съобщава, че досегашните въздушни нападения над Германия, макар и жестоки, са много малки в сравнение с ония, които тепърва ще се извършват. Денем, нощем, в хубаво време или в дъжд и сняг, постоянно що бъдат нападани германски градове.

30 юли. В отговор на речта, отправена от командувачия английските бомбардировачи, германците отговарят, че англичаните искат да убиват беззащитни деца и жени, но нека това добре запомни английският командувач, защото него държат лично отговорен.

Сраженията на Източния фронт продължават с увеличаване на ожесточението.

31 юли. Германците напредват към Кавказ. Русите държат Воронеж и Сталинград.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Пак там, л. 97–101.

Обвинители и обвиняеми с разменени роли в политическите процеси преди и след 9 септември 1944 г. (Документи от полицейските архиви и архивите на Народния съд)

Евдокия В. Петрова

През 2010 г. и началото на 2011 г. Министерството на вътрешните работи предаде в Централния държавен архив в София два огромни документални масива, а именно – архива на „Службите на картотеките и досиетата при българската полиция” за периода до 9 септември 1944 г. и документите от „Народния съд”, проведен непосредствено след тази дата. И едните, и другите са общодостъпни за използване както за научноизследователски цели, така и за цели от материално и емоционално естество, предявени от частни лица, главно потомци на участниците в събитията. Двата архивни фонда по тематика са взаимно свързани и тяхното комплексно проучване в хронологическа последователност и в причинно-следствена връзка, би подпомогнало сериозно научноизследователската дейност за този период от близкото минало.

Посочените исторически извори ни представят с имена и факти ожесточена борба, засегнала хиляди семейства и техните близки. Те съдържат богата фактология за коренната промяна на хиляди човешки съдби. Поради времевата близост на събитията от двата периода, участниците от двете страни на барикадата са едни и същи, само че след смяната на системата ролите им се разменят. Палачите стават жертви, а жертвите съдници.

Паралелното изучаване на информацията от двата

архива е от съществено значение за историческото познание, защото дава възможност събитията от близкото минало и участниците в тях да бъдат видяни от противоположни гледни точки.

В настоящата публикация обект на изучаване са събитията от въоръжената съпротива в Шуменския край и поспециално в Търговищка околия, илюстрирани чрез „персоналната история” на един от участниците в нея, партизанина Йордан Ненов Миндов – 23-годишен младеж от с. Алваново, Търговищко, видяна в документите на полицията и на седми състав на Областния народен съд – Варна.

○ Йордан Миндов произлиза от бедно семейство. Любознателен е от малък, но няма средства да учи в гимназията в града и взема изпитите си като частен ученик. Оскъдицата и лишенията, в които израства, предопределят неговото бъдеще. От ранна възраст той се увлича по комунистическите идеи и се включва активно в младежкото движение със съзнанието, че борбата, която се води срещу установения държавен и обществен строй е борба за добруването на хората от народа. През октомври 1943 г., след разкрития на полицията за конспиративната дейност в Търговищка околия, заплашен от арест, преминава в нелегалност и става партизанин.

Партизанското движение в България (1941–1944 г.), известно още като съпротивително движение, въоръжена съпротива или въоръжена борба, се организира по време на Втората световна война. В самия ден на нахлуването на германската армия в Съветския съюз – 22.06.1941 г. нелегалната Българска работническа партия (БРП) излиза с позив към българския народ, с който заклеява нападението. Два дни по-късно по директива на Коминтерна¹, тя обявява „курс на въоръжена борба” срещу войските на

¹ Димитров и Сталин, 1934–1943. Писма от съветските архиви. С., 2003, 260–261.

Третия райх и срещу българското правителство.² Този факт, както и обстоятелството, че началото на партизанското движение не е обявено, когато германските войски влизат на 1.03.1941 г. в България, а след започването на войната на Германия срещу Съветския съюз води изследователите до извода, че самото то, както изобщо и цялата дейност на комунистическата партия, са подчинени на съветските интереси.³

През първите години на обявения „курс на въоръжена борба” броят на партизаните в страната е ограничен. В Балкана излизат главно застрашени от арести партийни функционери. Промяна настъпва, когато в хода на Втората световна война хитлеристка Германия започва да търпи поражения на Източния фронт и най-вече при Сталинград февруари 1943 г.

През март–април 1943 г. ЦК на БРП(к) създава нова военна организация на съпротивителното движение – Народоосвободителната въстаническа армия (НОВА); страната е разделена на 13 въстанически оперативни зони (ВОЗ).

В края на октомври 1943 г. всички въоръжени полицейски сили, с изключение само на тайния апарат на полицията, преминават под ръководството на войската.⁴ По този начин срещу нелегалните, вече действат съвместно обединените сили на полицията – униформена и цивилна, на армията, на жандармерията и на специално сформирани местни доброволчески отряди.⁵ Задачата им е да се

² Петрова, Сл. Деветосептемврийската Социалистическа революция 1944 г. С., 1981, 95.

³ Везенков, Ал. Девети септември 1944 г. С., 2014, 75. В действителност към този момент България вече е присъединена към Тристранния пакт (Германия, Италия и Япония), но тогава не е имало реакция от страна на БРП(к).

⁴ Стателова, Е., Ст. Грънчаров. История на Нова България, 1978–1944 г. Т. III. С., 1999.

⁵ ЦДА, ф. 264К, оп. 7, а.е. 57, л. 5. Писмо на министърът на ВРНЗ до областните директори.

справят окончателно със съпротивителното движение. Извършени са голям брой арести и интернирания в концлагери, в които властта депортира противници на политиката си.⁶

С настъпването на тежките зимни условия, останали без ятаци, които да им осигуряват подслон и храна, партизаните се разпръсват на малки групички, за да се приберат в селата, но там населението – застрашено от полицейско насилие и опожаряване на къщи – започва да ги предава. Арестите и затворите са препълнени, съдебните процеси по Закона за защита на държавата са многобройни. С настъпването на пролетта партизанското движение се разраства по силата на различни обстоятелства и най-вече на указанията на Задграничното бюро на комунистическата партия в Москва. Преследването на партизани и нелегални се ожесточава до самото навечерие на смяната на властта на 9.09.1944 г.

Съпротивителното движение в Шуменския край и по-конкретно в Търговищка околия се активизира след създаването на НОВА, когато гр. Шумен става център на IX-та ВОЗ. В Шуменско, Преславско, и Омуртагско се сформират партизански чети, които по-късно се групират в партизански отряди.⁷ Към тях е и Търговищкият партизански отряд, създаден на 24.09.1943 г. край с. Лозница. За кратко време въоръжената съпротива придобива значителни размери. От своя страна репресивната машина на властта мобилизира силите си и системно прочиства района от нелегалните.

По разпореждане на ЦК на РП през есента на 1943 г. четите и отрядите от Балкана в Шуменска област предприемат саботажно-нападателни действия. Акцията на четата⁸

⁶ По-известни са Еникъой, Гонда вода, Св. Кирик, Св. Никола и др.

⁷ Шуменска област. Енциклопедия. Гл. ред. Д. Игнатовски. С., 2011, 10.

⁸ В полицейските документи термините „партизанин“, „партизански отряд“ не се употребяват. Вместо тях в обръщение са термините: „чети“, „четници“, „шумкаджии“, „разбойници“, „нелегални“.

на партизанския командир Пенчо Пенев⁹ в селата Лозница на 24.10.1943 г. и Манастирци на 28.09.1943 г. поставя началото на провала на нелегалното движение в района¹⁰.

След акцията на четата, в Търговищко са извършени масови арести. При полицейското дознание са разкрити подробности за нелегалното движение. Установени са лицата които са се укрили. Изготвен е и албум със снимките им¹¹. Между тях е и Йордан¹² Ненов Миндов, за когото полицията за пръв път научава, че е активист на младежкото комунистическо движение в селото. Направени са пълни разкрития за укривателската дейност на комунистическите функционери и за връзките им с партизанските чети в Балкана.¹³ В показанията си всички арестувани членове на РП от с. Алваново, посочват Йордан Н. Миндов като основател и отговорник за групата на РМС в селото. Дейността на младежите се е състояла в четене и разпространяване на агитационни материали, събиране на жито и други хранителни припаси за четите в Балкана, поддържане на връзка с нелегалните.¹⁴

Започналите през октомври и ноември провали на РП в Търговищка, Омуртагска и Преславска околии се дължат на акциите на нелегалните чети. Те нападат селата, изгарят общинските архиви, събират селяните и им говорят за насилствено събаряне на „днешния установен строй в страната”, изземват оръжие, пишещи машини, убиват кметове, полицаи и секретар-бирници.¹⁵ Властите замислят и

⁹ Това е Пенчо Кубадински – държавен и партиен функционер след 9.09.1944 г.

¹⁰ ЦДА, ф. 2123К, оп. 1, а.е. ОБ 643, л. 1.

¹¹ ЦДА, ф. 2123К, оп. 1, а.е. ОБ 643, л. 6–8.

¹² Името Йордан е често срещано в документите. За едно и също лице го срещаме изписано различно: като „Йордан” или „Йордан”. Предаваме го така, както е в съответния документ.

¹³ ЦДА, ф. 2123К, оп. 1, а.е. ОБ 643, л. 1–4.

¹⁴ Пак там, л. 75–86, 110, 111.

¹⁵ Пак там, л. 1.

провеждат акция от голям мащаб „за нанасяне на решителен удар за непосредственото унищожаване на нелегалните групи”, в която да се включат и „военните власти”. Тя започва на 15.12.1943 г. „с цялата четвърта Преславска дивизия и ведно с разполагаемата униформена и цивилна полиция”¹⁶. Предприема се претърсване на всички вероятни местности, където се предполага, че се укриват нелегалните. Едновременно с това са задържани и разпитани всички лица, за които има сведения, че поддържат връзки с тях или, че знаят нещо за тях.

Още в края на декември 1943 г. Държавна сигурност вече има подробни сведения за Търговищката чета. Те са получени от нелегалния Йордан Димитров Василев от с. Певец, на 19 години, който се предава, доведен от баща си при военния прокурор. Той „пръв разказва” за състава и за живота на четата, посочва кой каква длъжност заема, кои са ръководните личности, и разкрива подробности, които дотогава не са известни на властта. Освен това завежда една войскова част до мястото, където би трябвало да е четата, но землянките се оказват празни.¹⁷ Явяването на войската в Балкана, извършените арести, все по-трудното намиране на храна, предателствата стават причина четата да се разпадне и нелегалните да се разпръснат по селата на малки групи, за да изкарат зимата.¹⁸ Й. Н. Миндов е включен в група от трима партизани, заедно с Петко Станев и Минчо Иванов Минчев. Петко Станев е определен за старши. На 28.12.1943 г. те напускат землянките и успяват да стигнат до една воденица край с. Алваново и се укриват там. Но местни хора – ловджии ги виждат и въпреки обещанието че няма да ги издадат, съобщават за тях в общината.¹⁹ Кметският наместник

¹⁶ Пак там, а.е. 14028, л. 2.

¹⁷ Пак там, л. 1–11.

¹⁸ ЦДА, ф. 2124К, оп. 1, а.е. ГР 96279, л. 10–11.

¹⁹ ЦДА, ф. 2123К, оп. 1, а.е. ОБ 6667, л. 37.

изпраща радиograma до гарата в Търговище и организира група от доброволци, която повежда към воденицата. Същевременно полицията получава нареждане за бързи действия по залавянето на „шумкаджиите“. Околийският полицейски началник организира група полицаи и ги изпраща в укритието, където те стрелят, хвърлят и бомба; партизанинът Петко Станев е тежко ранен и скоро умира.²⁰ Йордан Н. Миндов и Минчо Ив. Минчев побягват през реката, но са ранени. Въпреки това успяват да се доберат до с. Макариополско и се приютяват в къщата на Цвятко Монеv – тъст на Минчо, където ги превързват, дават им храна и те си лягат. По оставените от тях в снега кървави следи обаче, полицията и войската стига до селото, правят блокада и обграждат къщата. През нощта на 30 срещу 31.12.1943 г. Цвятко Монеv отива да съобщи на кмета Минчо Панайотов, че в къщата му са дошли нелегални. Рано на разсъмване, докато спят, в къщата нахлуват полицаи и военни, арестуват ги и ги отвеждат в общината, от там – в Търговище, а след това в казармения затвор в Шумен.²¹

Въз основа на материалите от полицейското дознание и от следствието, на 26.01.1944 г., зам. прокурорът на Шуменския полеви военен съд капитан Никола Бонев представя обвинителния акт. В него той предава на съд 102 души обвиняеми за това, че са развивали в гр. Търговище и Търговищка околия комунистическа конспиративна дейност. Йордан Миндов е под № 69. Под № 73 като обвиняема е подведена и майка му Милана Ненова.²² (Вж. док. № 1).

Възражения по Обвинителния акт подават Й. Миндов, майка му и спътникът му Минчо Минчев. Двата

²⁰ Пак там л. 38.

²¹ Пак там, а.е. С14028, л. 5.

²² Пак там, ф. 2124К, оп. 1, а.е. С 104 267, т. 1, л. 19, 20.

Обвинители и обвиняеми с разменени роли в политическите процеси преди и след 9 септември 1944 г. (Документи...)

нелегални заявяват, че са искали доброволно да се предадат²³ на властта като са пратили тъста на Минчо Минчев да съобщи на полиция Дончо Пайдушев²⁴, когото посочват за свидетел.

Наказателно дело от общ характер №21/1944 г. се гледа от 14 до 29 февр. 1944 г. от Шуменския полеви военен съд в гр. Търговище и в гр. Шумен.²⁵ В протокола по делото (Вж. док. № 2) на първо място са изброени имената на подсъдимите, посочени са и членовете от ЗЗД, по които те са обвинени. Йордан Миндов е обвинен по чл. 13 от ЗЗД, който предвижда смъртно наказание за участие в нелегална чета, а майка му е обвинена по чл. 3 от ЗЗД за подпомагане на нелегални, който предвижда строг тъмничен затвор до 8 години и глоба от 30.000 до 300.000 лв.

Йордан Н. Миндов и още четирима от арестантите в казармения затвор в гр. Шумен, редовно призовани, не се явяват в съда – причината (както обявява председателят на съда) е, че предния ден са „убити при опит за бягство” и цитира служебно писмо №302 от 13.02.1944 г. на областния полицейски началник в гр. Шумен. Това дава основание на прокурора да предложи делото срещу тях да се прекрати, което и става.²⁶ То продължава да се гледа за останалите обвиняеми, но за убитите „при опит за бягство обвиняеми” повече нищо не се споменава. На 27.02.1944 г. е произнесена присъдата по делото. Майката на Й. Н. Миндов е оправдана „по недоказаност на деянието, за което е обвинена”.²⁷ (Вж. док. № 2)

²³ Пак там т. 2, л. 13, 24 и 27.

²⁴ Дончо Христов Пайдушев е получил смъртна присъда от Първи състав на областния Нар. съд – Варна (22.01.–3.02.1945 г.) за гавра с трупа на убитата партизанка Жечка Каранфилова и е екзекутиран. Вж. ЦДА, ф. 1449, оп. 1, а.е. П НС, 1405, т. 2, протокол и присъда л. 7–217.

²⁵ ЦДА, ф. 2124К, оп.1, а.е. С 104277 т. 2, л. 237–248.

²⁶ ЦДА, ф. 2124К, оп. 1, а.е. С104267, т. 2, л. 238, 239.

²⁷ Пак там, л. 264.

Документите от това дело на Шуменския полеви военен съд не са запазени в тяхната цялост. Налице е само третата част. На нейната заглавна корица има ръкописна бележка, че „I и II част са изгорели през 1944 г. при бомбардировките над София”. Поради това липсват показанията на голяма част от обвиняемите включително и тези на Й. Н. Миндов. Налице са обаче саморъчните показания на партизанина Минчо Иванов Минчев.²⁸ В тях обвиняемият пише подробно за излизането си в нелегалност, за живота в партизанския отряд и решението на щаба за разпускането му за преследването и за ареста им в с. Макариополско.

С това се изчерпва цялата информация за дейността, издирването, залавянето и гибелта на Йордан Н. Миндов. Ако се доверим само на полицейските документи ще знаем, че животът му е приключил „с куршум в гърба при опит за бягство”. В архивите на Народния съд обаче има сведения за същите събития, представени в показанията на участниците, доживели да бъдат съдени и осъдени. Информацията в тях разкрива, че от данните в полицейския архив за смъртта на Йордан Н. Миндов и на още шестима арестанти, в гората край с. Руец, вярна е само датата 12.02.1944 г.

От 5 до 29 март 1945 г. в Търговище, заседава седми състав на Варненския областен народен съд по заведеното н.о.х.д №1/1945 г. Народният обвинител Апостол Зафиров представя Обвинителния акт на 17.02.1945 г. (Вж. док. № 3) и подвежда като обвиняеми 133 души. За 14 от тях, които са на фронта, нарежда делото да бъде спряно,²⁹ 66 са посочени като „отсъстващи”, или „в неизвестност”, а

²⁸ Пак там, а.е. ГР 96279, л. 8–11. Вж. бел. 36.

²⁹ Спрените дела на мобилизираните обвиняеми остават като „висящи” до 1948 г., когато на основание Постановление №1 от 1.12. се пристъпва към приключване на следствието и има техни показания. Присъди за наложени наказания не се намериха.

трима се водят „починали“.³⁰

Обвинителният акт се състои от увод³¹ и 36 раздела. Във всеки от разделите са включени обвиняемите, участвали в отделни акции по преследване, залавяне и убийства на партизани, ятаци, нелегални, изтезания над арестанти палежи на къщи. Голям брой обвиняеми фигурират в по няколко раздела и отговарят за деянията си по съвкупност. Група от 61 обвиняеми са включени в раздел XXXVI. Те са призовани да отговарят за това, че са служили доброволно на полицията и на войската.

За преследването, нараняването и убийството на Й. Н. Миндов в група с други партизани и нелегални се отнасят раздел IV-ти и XI-ти и четири лица от раздел XXXVI.

Четвъртият раздел включва участвалите на 12.02.1944 г. в убийството на 7 партизани в гората край с. Руец. Връщайки се към полицейските архиви за случилото се на тази дата установяваме, че написаното в тях не съвпада с информацията, която се съдържа в архива на Народния съд. Оказва се, че без тези документи не бихме разкрили премълчаната от властите истина за последния ден от живота на партизанина Йордан Н. Миндов и на неговите другари, разказана най-подробно от тези, които са ги ликвидирали.³² Оказва се, че масовите разстрели „при опит за бягство“ не са извършвани по инициатива и по решение на екзекуторите, а са ставали по нареждане „от горе“. Провеждани са специални конференции с ръководните кадри на полицията и на войската, организирани са курсове и са давани конкретни инструкции как да се документират

³⁰ ЦДА, ф. 1449, оп. 1, а.е. П НС 1077, т. I, л. 55, 61, 62, 63.

³¹ Обвинителният акт от 15 стр. е на висок печат. Уводът от 3 стр. е написан в стил на силно политизирана риторика. От направената справка установихме, че уводите не са стерийотипни, а индивидуални за всеки от обвинителите.

³² ЦДА, ф. 1449, оп. 1, а.е. П НС 1080, т. 3, л. 7,8,9; 1081, т. 4, л. 7, 8, 15; 1077, т. 2, л. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 181, 203, 204; 1087, т. 10, л. 124.

убийствата и как да се съставят протоколи, които да удостоверяват, че са извършени „при опит за бягство”.

В показанията си майор Дочко Димитров Дочев, разузнавач на 3-ти армейски артилерийски полк, уверява, че за случая край с. Руец, ген. Христов³³ лично му е заповядал да се вземат от арестите на Държавна сигурност всички ятаци и заловените живи нелегални, за да бъдат разстреляни. Той обаче от своя страна наредил на началника на полицията Генчо Саваков вместо „всичките” да бъдат подбрани „само най-виновните”. Така на 12 февруари му изпратили 9 човека – между тях – две съвсем млади момчета – и той заповядал да ги върнат. Всичко, което се е случило от извеждането на деветимата арестанти от затвора рано сутринта на 12.02.1944 г., транспортирането им до мястото на екзекуцията в гората край с. Руец, разстрелът на седемте от тях, гаврата с труповете, разграбването на дрехите и вещите им и заравянето им в три гроба – в двата по двама заедно, а в третия трима заедно са описани най-изчерпателно в показанията на участниците в тази акция.³⁴

На 23.03.1945 г. Народният съд в Търговище приключва своята работа, в резултат на която, „по разум и съвест и на основание чл. 10 от Наредбата Закон за съдене от народен съд виновниците за въвличане на България в световната война срещу съюзните народи и за злодеянията свързани с нея осъжда“:

по раздел IV-ти: на смърт 8 обвиняеми, на доживотен строг тъмничен затвор 2 обвиняеми, на 1 година строг

³³ Генерал–лейтенант Никола Христов Христов, командир на Трета армия, чийто щаб към момента се намира във Варна. Убит е на 08.09.1944 г. в центъра на града от политзатворника Ангел Георгиев и секретаря на Областния комитет на БРП Ламбо Теолов, след като са били разбити врагите на Варненския затвор и лишени от свобода са го напуснали.

³⁴ Пак там, ф.1449, оп. 1, а.е. II НС 1077, т. 1, л. 63, 65, 66.

Обвинители и обвиняеми с разменени роли в политическите процеси преди и след 9 септември 1944 г. (Документи...)

тъмничен затвор 1 обвиняем и 1 оправдан;³⁵

по раздел XI–ти: на смърт 3 обвиняеми, на 15 години строг тъмничен затвор 2 обвиняеми, на 10 години строг тъмничен затвор 2 обвиняеми и 1 оправдан;

по раздел XXXVI–ти четирима обвиняеми, участвали в преследването и залавянето на Й. Н. Миндов: на смърт 1 обвиняем, на 2 години строг тъмничен затвор 1 обвиняем, на 1 година строг тъмничен затвор 2 обвиняеми.³⁶

След 9.09.1944 г. телата на убитите в гората край с. Руец седем партизани и нелегални са ексхумирани и останките им са положени в братската могила в центъра на гр. Търговище. На мястото на екзекуцията в гората е поставена паметна плоча. С. Алваново тачи паметта на Йордан Миндов. Местното читалище носи неговото име, а в центъра на селото през 1984 г. е издигнат монумент в знак на почит към неговата памет, паметта на Васил Караиванов от същото село, убит заедно с него и на загиналите във войните алвановци.

Благодарение на достъпа до Полицейския архив и Архива на Народния съд днес изследователите разполагат с два архивни масива, които са възникнали в резултат от дейността на два репресивни органа на държавната власт, оторизирани да я защитават от посегателства: политическата полиция – преди „9 септември” и Народния съд – след „9 септември”. Различното е, че обект на репресия за всеки от тях са хора с диаметрално противоположна идеология и политически убеждения. А общото – че и едните, и другите – бидейки на власт – са убедени, че изпълняват дълга си (служебен, патриотичен, граждански), макар в редица случаи с елемент на „престараване”.

Съдбата на загиналия партизанин Йордан Миндов

³⁵ ЦДА, ф. 1449, оп. 1, а.е. П НС 1077, т. I, л. 36–53.

³⁶ Смъртни наказания са наложени на обвиняемите, за които при съдебното дирене е доказано, че с употреба на оръжие или по друг начин са причинили смъртта на един или повече арестанти.

показва нагледно как извънредното съдопроизводство, политизирано и поставено в услуга на репресивния държавен апарат, не само че не води до справедливост, но допринася за задълбочаване на гражданското противопоставяне в българското общество. Преди 9 септември – като фалшифицира безогледно обстоятелствата около неговото убийство (и убийството на десетки други като него в цялата страна), а по време на Народния съд – като използва случаите на изстребление по време на съпротивата, за налагането на възможно най-строги наказания и за насаждане атмосфера на отмъстителност, непримирима омраза и ожесточение сред населението към участниците в наказателните акции на бившия режим, озовали се в много случаи не по своя воля на неправилното място и в неправилното време.

*Док. № 1. Извлечение от обвинителния акт на зам.
Военно полевия прокурор кап. Н. Иванов срещу 102 лица,
развили комунистическа конспиративна дейност в гр.
Търговище и в Търговищка околия*

Шумен, 26 януари 1944 г.

Обстоятелствата по делото са:

Комунистическата партия в България след разтурянето ѝ през 1924 г., съгласно чл. 21 от ЗЗД, продължила съществуването си нелегално и от тогава до днес не е престанала да работи между всички слоеве на обществото за постигане на своята крайна цел – насилствено завземане на властта, като за постигането ѝ си служи с въоръжени акции, насилия, терористични и предателски действия. За постигане на тая своя цел тази партия е била непрекъснато във връзка с комунистическия интернационал, от който е получавала нареждания и упътвания. Организационната си дейност комунистическата партия е проявила главно чрез своите поделения – нелегалната работническа партия (Р.П.) и работническия младежки съюз (РМС) – тоже нелегален.

След обявяването на войната между Германия и

Съветска Русия на 22.06.1941 г., комунистическата партия, заедно със своите нелегални поделения предприела усилена дейност, чрез своите ръководни органи и лица за създаване на нелегални комунистически групи и активи в обществото, работничеството, разните обществени организации, училищата и във войската. А за да бъде постигната крайната цел на партията до настъпване на благоприятния момент, ръководството наредило членовете на партията и всички нейни поделения, да се снабдят с оръжие, взривни материали и саботьорски уреди, за да може, чрез въоръжени акции да бъде насилствено завзета властта и установен комунистически строй в България.

След завършване на подготвителната дейност, която за да не бъде разкрита следвало да бъде извършена само устно, централният комитет на Комунистическата партия дал нареждане да се пристъпи към терористични действия и общепасни престъпления, в изпълнение на което комунистическите организации в страната предприели и извършили редица такива действия, а именно:

[...] ³⁷ 69. Юрдан Ненов Миндов, от с. Алваново Търговищко. В началото на 1943 г. чрез него, Пенчо Пенев е наредил до Николай Юрданов Радев за създаването група на Р.П. и Р.М.С. в с. Алваново. Николай Юрданов Радев се заел и създал групата Р.П., а създаването на групата Р.М.С. възложил на Юрдан Ненов Миндов. И двамата заработили усърдно и успешно разрешили възложената им задача.

В групата Р.М.С. в с. Алваново, на която Юрдан Ненов Миндов като създал станал и отговорник, след надлежна и систематична подготовка привлякъл като членове младежите: Колю Тодоров Гяуров, Иван Иванов Радев, Панайот

³⁷ В пропуснатия текст се споменават терористичните и саботажни акции във Варненска и Русенска област, след което започва поименно изброяването на 102-ма обвиняеми, които са развивали комунистическа конспиративна дейност в гр. Търговище и в Търговищка околия. Тук е включен само текстът, свързан с Йордан Н. Миндов.

Добрев Панайотов и Минчо Стоянов Тенев. Последният като по-възрастен отпосле преминал да членува в групата Р.П.

[...] 73. Милана Ненова Йорданова, от с. Алваново, Търговищко, макар да е знаела, че син ѝ Юрдан Ненов Миндов е деятел на Р.П. и е минал в нелегалност, не само, че на два пъти му е дала подслон, но му дала пари и храна. Към 20 ноември 1943 г. този ѝ син пристигнал една вечер в дома им, престоял до вечерта на следния ден и като си тръгнал дала му един хляб и маджун³⁸. Към 10. XII. 1943 г. дошъл си още веднаж, като при това бил придружен от още един непознат нелегален, въоръжен с пушка. Син ѝ поискал от нея 1000 лева и хляб. На втората вечер след това му пратила по 15 годишния си син Иван 860 лева и хляб.³⁹

26 януари 1944 год. гр. Шумен,

Н. Иванов, капитан – зам. военно полеви прокурор.

ЦДА, ф. 2124К оп. 1, а.е. С 104267, т. 1, л. 2, 3, 17–21.
Оригинал. Машинопис.

*Док. № 2. Извлечение от протокол на Шуменския
полеви военен съд в гр. Търговище и гр. Шумен
Н.О.Х.Д. № 21/1944 Г.*

Шумен, Търговище, 14–29 февруари 1944 год.

Днес от 14 до 29 февруари 1944 година, Шуменския полеви военен съд в гр. Търговище и гр. Шумен, в публичното си съдебно заседание в състав:

³⁸ Народно име на мармалад.

³⁹ В пропуснатия текст са изброени обвиняемите нелегални от Търговищка околия, нападенията по селата в Шуменско от групи въоръжени нелегални. Всичките 102-ма обвиняеми са подведени да отговарят по 33Д. Осемдесет от тях се съдят присъствено. За 22-ма подсъдими които са в нелегалност съдят определя делото да се гледа в тяхно отсъствие и да им се издаде отсъствена присъда.

Обвинители и обвиняеми с разменени роли в политическите процеси преди и след 9 септември 1944 г. (Документи...)

Председател: полковник Я. Бошнаков

Членове: капитан Д. Николов

Поручик Ж. Желябов при секретар А. Давидов и с участието на зам. прокурора – капитан Н. Бонев разгледа нак.[азателно] о.[бщ] х.[арактер] дело № 21/1944 година заведено по обвинението на:

[...] ⁴⁰ Милана Ненова Йорданов, ... – по чл. 3 от 3.3.3.Д. ^{41, 42}; ... , Йордан Ненов Миндов, ... – по чл. 13 ал. I от 3.3.3.Д. ⁴³ ...що се отнася за невявяването на подсъдимите:

⁴⁰ В пропуснатия текст са изброени всички обвиняеми по делото и са посочени членовете от Закона за защита на нацията по които те са подведени. Пропуснатите текстове и по-нататък, се отнасят за всички обвиняеми. Извлечението включва само текстовете отнасящи се за Йордан Н. Миндов. Майка му е била подсъдима, но е получила оправдателна присъда. ЦДА, ф. 2124К, оп. 1, а.е. 104267, т. 2, л. 264. Вж. док. № 1.

⁴¹ В полицейските документи Закона за защития на държавата – ЗЗД, се среща със съкращението 3.3.3.Д.

⁴² Чл. 3 гласи: „Който набавя средства, укрива, улеснява поддържа и подпомага със съвети или по друг начин посочените в чл. 1. организации (чл. 1. Забраняват се всякакви организации, групи или техни поделения, които проповядват или подбуждат било към насилствено завземане на властта или които за постигане на същите цели искат да си служат с престъпления, въоръжени акции, насилствени или терористически действия), наказва се със строг тъмничен затвор до 8 години и с глоба от 30.000 до 150.000, а във военно време – със смърт.

⁴³ Чл. 13 гласи: „Който напусне местожителството си и влезе или се зачисли в чета създадена и въоръжена с цел да върши престъпления против държавата или обществената сигурност, държавните или частните имущества, учреждения или съоръжения, или против живота на длъжностни или частни лица, наказва се със смърт.

Със същото наказание се наказват и лица, които укриват, дават убежище или храна или набавят други средства на членовете на подобни чети. Тези лица се освобождават от наказание, ако чрез своевременно съобщаване на властта за местопребиваването на четата или на отделни нейни членове спомогнат за тяхното залавяне.

Имотите на осъдените по този член лица, служат за обезщетение на всички вреди и загуби причинени от действия на чета или от на някой от нейните членове.

Иван Георгиев Иванов, Минчо Иванов Минчев, Атанас Иванов Вълчев, Васил Кара Иванов и Йордан Ненов Миндов,⁴⁴ председателят на съда докладва, че е получено сл[ужебно] писмо от Областния полицейски началник гр. Шумен № 302 от 13. II. т.г. от където тия подсъдими са призовани да се явят по делото, тъй като същите се намират в ареста на управлението, с което съобщава, че при опит за бягство тия подсъдими са убити... Като поиска заключението на прокурора и мнението на защитата относно гледане делото при това положение.

Прокурорът намира, че що се отнася до подсъдимите, които при опит за бягство са убити, прокурорът моли делото да се прекрати по отношение на тях, съгласно чл. 121 п. 1 от В[оенно] с[ъдебния] н[аказателен] закон.

Съдът като взе предвид, че за днешното съдебно заседание не се явява ..., а също така, че не се явяват подсъдимите: Иван Георгиев Иванов, Минчо Иванов Минчев, Атанас Иванов Вълчев, Васил Кара Иванов и Йордан Ненов Миндов, процедурата по призоваването на които също така е изпълнена, но е получено сл[ужебно] писмо от Областния полицейски началник № 302 от 13. II. 1944 г. с което съобщава, че същите при опит за бягство са убити ... що се отнася до подсъдимите които при опит за бягство са убити ще следва делото да се прекрати по отношение за тях, което и

Онзи член на четата, който се предаде на властта преди да е извършено от него или от четата деяние, което по този закон се наказва със смърт и посочи другарите си и тяхното местонахождение, се освобождава от предвидената по-горе отговорност.

Член на чета, който се предаде на властта, след като той или четата са извършили престъпно деяние или спомогне за откриването и залавянето на другите членове на четата, не може да бъде наказан повече от 15 години строг тъмничен затвор.

⁴⁴ Заедно с тях са убити Малчо Малчев и Михал Донов от гр. Търговище. Вж. док. № 3.

Обвинители и обвиняеми с разменени роли в политическите процеси преди и след 9 септември 1944 г. (Документи...)

О п р е д е л и:

2. Прекратява настоящето дело по отношение на подсъдимите: Иван Георгиев Иванов, Минчо Иванов Минчев, Атанас Иванов Вълчев, Васил Кара Иванов и Йордан Ненов Миндов.⁴⁵

Председателят на съда закри заседанието в 16 часа и 45 минути.

Председател на съда:

Полковник /п/ Я. Бошнаков

Членове капитан /п/ Д. Николов

Поручик /п/ Ж. Желябов

Секретар: А. Давидов

ЦДА, ф. 2124К, оп. 1, а.е. С 104267, т. II, л. 237, 238, 239, 241, 246, 247, 248. Оригинал. Машинопис.

Док. № 3. Извлечение от обвинителния акт на народния обвинител Апостол Зафиров

Търговище, 17.02.1945 г.

Министерство на правосъдието

Народен обвинител – Търговище

Обвинителен акт

Първият и втори състав на Народния съд в София, потвърди издадената от българския народ още на 9 септември присъда срещу гробокопачите на България.

Регенти, царедворци, министри и депутати, получиха заслуженото наказание.

Напразно се помъчиха те да се представят за невинни.

Напразно се помъчиха да оправдаят своето предателство и кървави дела с някаква „историческа необходимост“ и с

⁴⁵ Изброени са всички подсъдими и исканите за тях от прокурора срокове за наказания по ЗЗД.

това, че „вършели всичко защото мислели, че то е в интереса на българския народ”.

Народният съд напълно ги разобличи и сне маските, зад които се показаха истинските им лица на фашистки агенти. И ония от техните постъпки и деяния, които бяха скривани зад тройните врати на тайни кабинети, блеснаха с цялата си сатанинска замисъл и жестокост.

Народният съд показа, че делата на тези нямащи нищо общо с интересите на българския народ злодеи и престъпници, не са били резултат на „обикновена човешка грешка”, а резултат на един пъклен план за заличаването на България, като самостоятелна държава и превръщането на българския народ в роб и тор на Германския райх.

Народният съд смъкна маската и на техния господар – Борис – на когото само смъртта попречи да бъде на подсъдимата скамейка заедно със своите верни сътрудници и лакеи. Народният съд показа, че зад маската на демократичността, зад маската на цар „който помага да бъде извлечена затъналата в калта селска кола”, зад маската на „цар който кара локомотиви” се е криел най-верният агент на Хитлера, най-кръвожадния палач на българския народ.

И истината не можеше да бъде друга.

Защото, макар и Фердинанд да избяга след като доведе България до две национални катастрофи, след като неговото царуване коства живота на стотици хиляди българи, на неговото място остана синът му Борис у когото само името му напомняше, че има нещо общо с българския народ.

От времето на Фердинанда остана и нещо друго. Останаха отровните корени на оная дворцова клика, чийто интереси хармонираха с грабителската политика на Кайзера. От тези именно отровни корени, под нежните грижи на Бориса, израснаха и се развиха бурените – регенти, министри, царедворци и депутати – които искаха да задушат най-ценното в българския народ – обичта му към свободата, стремежът му към братското разбирателство със съседните

ни народи и любовта му към великия руски народ.

И Борис заедно със своите сътрудници – издънки на тези отровни корени – тръгна по пътя на своя баща. Тръгна на поход срещу българския народ – срещу свободата му срещу естествения му стремеж към мир и сътрудничество със Съветския съюз.

Но българският народ не беше вече такъв какъвто беше при Фердинанда. Изпитанията през време на войните, двете национални катастрофи, значително допринесоха за нарастване на политическото му съзнание. Старите прийоми за отклоняване народа от организиране, чрез организирани „от горе” партии, партийки и крилца не даваха добри резултати. Някъде отдолу, израснаха, закрепиха се и се закалиха, мощни и силни организации, чийто водачи не се подкупуваха с министерски кресла или пък ако се подаваха биваха бързо смъквани и развенчавани като народни водачи.

Бойката комунистическа партия и народният земеделски съюз бяха организации с ясно определени програми от чието осъществяване никой не можеше да ги отклони.

Борис и неговите верни сътрудници ясно осъзнаха опасността от по нататъшното развитие на тези организации. Трябваше на всяка цена и на време да се предотврати възможното по нататъшно прерастване и съгласуване дейността на тези две партии. Използвайки ловко несъгласието между работници и селяни, през юнските и септемврийски дни на 1923 г. те успяха да повалят българския народ и още веднаж да го сложат под ботуша на германския империализъм. Родната ни земя се покри с хиляди безкръстни гробове. Пещите при захарната фабрика в София погълнаха труповете на стотици най-добри народни синове. Черни забрадки покриха главите на хиляди съпруги и майки.

Твърде скоро българския народ се съвзе от този кървав удар. Нови сили и нов устрем се вляха в отново стегнатите организационни редици. В победата на руската революция, в закрепването на Съветския съюз, българският народ видя

реалния резултат от същата борба, която той беше поел.

Но враговете на народа не стояха. Те захвърлиха старите си оръжия и излязоха в открита борба. Завземането на властта от Хитлера им даде възможността да намерят в неговото лице поддръжник, който би им помогнал в случай, че българският народ се вдигне на въоръжена борба. И отново сянката на германския империализъм се надвеси над нашата земя. Терорът нарасна. Затворите не бяха достатъчни. Концлагерите никнеха като гъби. В името на Бориса съдиите издаваха смъртни присъди. Стотици българи увисваха на бесилките.

И когато през 1940 г. вестта че Съветският съюз е направил предложение за тясно сътрудничество с България заля като радостна вълна цялата ни страна, когато Борис, министри и депутати бяха затрупани с милиони писма и с хиляди резолюции за приемането на това предложение, когато българският народ мислеше, че най-после неговите управници ще тръгнат по желания от него път – те – верни агенти на Хитлера цинично отхвърлиха това братско предложение.

От този момент за целия български народ стана ясно, че България е продадена и че окончателно е закачена за кървавата колесница на Хитлера. Само след няколко месеца те оформиха това предателство, като най-верния слуга на Бориса – Филов – на 1.03.1941 г. подписа смъртната присъда на българския народ – подписа Тристранния пакт.

Не засъхнало още мастилото от подписа на Филов и германските пълчища нахлуха в нашата страна. От тук те нанесоха подъл удар в гърба на братските ни югославски и гръцки народи. След като покриха тези страни с трупове, след като ограбиха и последните им зърна от храна – Борис и неговите сътрудници, в името на „осъществяването на националните ни идеали” изпратиха български войски в Югославия и Гърция, за да пречат на техните свободолюбивни народи в справедливата им народно освободителна борба, и за да могат да помогнат в освобождаването на германски войски, тъй необходими за борбата против Съветския съюз.

За да скрият гнусността на това предателство, радио, вестници и списания; журналисти, писатели и поети го нарекоха „осъществяването на вековните стремежи на българския народ – „осъществяване на националните ни идеали”.

А когато над София, следствие на обявената на Англия и Америка „символична война” забръмчаха самолети, и хиляди и хиляди семейства трябваше всред зима да търсят къде да прислонят своите деца – същите тези предатели, скрити из Рила в удобни и сигурни скривалища, подканяха народа към търпение и вяра в „близката победа”.

Но това не им стигаше. Не можейки да хвърлят българския народ във война със Съветския съюз, не заради друго, а за това че знаеха, че той никога не би насочил оръжие срещу братския му руски народ и тогава когато последният напрягаше всичките си усилия за да спре кървавият ваял на Хитлера те – фашистките агенти у нас поставиха на разположението на Хитлера, цялото българско стопанство, всичките ни съобщителни средства и пристанища за борбата му срещу Русия и не се срамяха да казват, че България участвала в борбата „за новия ред в Европа” – но „пазела неутралитет спрямо Русия”.

Само поради безпределната обич на великия Съветски съюз към народите, върху България не беше стоварено неговото справедливо отмъщение.

През същото време, когато България беше превърната в Германска колония, когато нашите войски пречеха на народно освободителните движения в Югославия и Гърция, когато нашата страна беше отправна база на хитлеровите пълчища за Русия, българският народ, напълно ограбен от своите поробители – гол, бос и гладен, се вдигна на борба. Тая борба, която българският народ поведе се различаваше по съдържание от борбите, които бяха водени в миналото. Това беше истинска народна борба – частичката от общата борба, която Съветският съюз, заедно с великите демокрации Англия и Америка водеше срещу общия враг на човечест-

вото – фашизма.

Жертвите, които българският народ даде през 1923 г. не бяха напразни. Опитът получен и през тази кървава година послужи като съединително звено между широките народни маси.

Разрастваше се борбата. Най-смелите показаха нейния път – с оръжие в ръка срещу предателите и фашистите. Мъже и жени, младежи и девойки изгаряни от безпределна омраза към предателите на България, изгаряни от безкрайната си обич към своя ограбен и предаден народ, окриляни от подвизите на Левски, Ботев и Караджата поеха трудния геройски път на въоръжената борба.

Стените на затворите не бяха достатъчно здрави, за да удържат устрема към борбата. Телените мрежи на концлагерите се късаха. Съкратената процедура на съдилищата беше твърде бавна при отнемането живота на заловените борци. И тогава опитът на кървавото Гестапо беше изцяло приложен и в нашата страна.

Пламнаха пожари. Хиляди къщи биват запалвани. В техните пламъци, заедно с покъщнината изгаряха и обезглавените трупове на партизаните. Забиваха отсечените глави на колове, разнасяха ги из села и градове и ги носеха на своите господари и работодатели, за да им засвидетелстват готовността си да унищожат българския народ, за да получат обещаните награди. Връзваха трупове по селски и градски мегдани и насила караха народът да ги хули и плюе. Убиваха жени и деца. Безчестяха живи и мъртви девойки.

Но дойде краят.

След 23 години кървави борби с цената на потоци кръв и с помощта на храбрата Червена армия българският народ победи.

Дойде 9 септември. Ден на победа! Ден на отвоювана свобода! Ден на разплата! Главните гробокопачи и палачи на българския народ получиха заслужено наказание. Но заедно с тези князе, регенти, министри и депутати ще

трябва да отговарят и техните верни и от по-нисък ранг лакеи. Тяхната вина не е по-малка от тази на техните господари. Техните дела не са по-малко кървави от делата на работодателите им. Единствено чрез тяхната готовност да им бъдат верни сътрудници, единствено поради тяхната жажда за „отличие” и алчност за материални награди беше възможно провеждането на кървавата фашистка политика у нас. Те: офицери – фашисти, полицейски началници, околийски управители, агенти – садисти, зверовете от жандармерията, полицаи и стражари, кметове и кметски наместници, легионери, ратници и бранници, доброволни доносчици и сътрудници, биеха, грабеха, безчестяха, палеха и убиваха, с пълното съзнание за това което вършат.

От такива именно верни оръдия на фашизма и Търговищкия край беше напоен с кръвта на 33 най-добри народни синове. Бяха запалени над 20 къщи. Бяха нанесени жестоки побоища над стотици мъже, жени старци и деца и над 100 семейства интернирани.

И за да не могат те, заедно със своите господари никога вече да убиват, да палят и грабят, да режат глави, да чупят кости и забиват гвоздеи в черепите; за да не могат вече никога да пречат на стремежа на българския народ към свободата, към братското сътрудничество с великия Съветски съюз и с всички народи в света, търговищенци от града и околията, които заедно с целия български народ взеха дейно участие в борбата срещу кървавия фашизъм и дадоха свидни и скъпи жертви, викат *пред своя съд*, следните убийци, подпалвачи, побойници – садисти, агенти и доносчици, за да отговаря всеки за извършените от него престъпления. [...]

IV.⁴⁶ 1. Майор *Дочко Димитров Дочев*, бивш к[оманди]р 3. арм[ейски] арт[илерийски] полк. Шумен; 2. *Генчо Ганчев*

⁴⁶ В Обвинителния акт лицата са обединени в 36 групи според акциите, в които са участвали. Поради това някои от тях фигурират в повече групи и са съдени по съвокупност.

Саваков от гр. Русе, бивш н[ачални]к държ[авна] сиг[урност] Шумен; 3. Фелд[фебел] *Божан Кръстев Касабов* от гр. Шумен;⁴⁷ 4. Фелд[фебел] *Руси Стоянов* от гр. Шумен; 5. Подоф[ицер] *Димитър Симеонов Митев* от с. Дриново, Поповско; 6. *Слави Иванов Бянов* от с. Аксаково, Варненско;⁴⁸ 7. *Петър Вълев* от 3. арм[ейски] арт[илерийски] полк – Шумен; 8. *Алеко Торунчев*, Свиленград, разузнавач Шумен; 9. *Здравко Иванов* от гр. Шумен разузнавач Шумен; 10. *Стойко Тодоров Бойчев* от гр. Варна – разузнавач-Варна; 11. *Злати Стефанов Ганев* от гр. Шумен, разузнавач; 12. *Димитър Маринов Цачев* от с. Телиш, Луковитско, разузнавач; 13. *Йониц Цветков Гънзовиянов* от с. Ново-село, Видинско, разузнавач; 14. *Боян Борисов Давитков* от с. Тъпчилешово, Омуртагско; 15. *Миню Казанджиев* от гр. Попово, полицаи;⁴⁹ 16. *Стефан Сапунджиев* от с. Горица, Поповско;⁵⁰ 17. *Христо Златанов Христов* от с. Малко Борисово, Чирпанско⁵¹; 18. *Васил Георгиев* от с. Овчарово, Шуменско;⁵² 19. *Бончо Симеонов* от с. Новоселец Шуменско, в неизвестност; 20. *Илия Григоров* от с. Новоселец, Шуменско;⁵³ 21. *Никола Иванов Дамянов* от с. Махала, Петричко; 22. *Стоян Станков Михайлов* от с. Средня, Шуменско.

На 12 февруари 1944 г. разстреляли в гората край с. Руец, Търговищко партизаните: 1. Иван Георгиев от с. Въбел, Търговищко. 2. Малчо Малчев от гр. Търговище. 3. Атанас Иванов Вълев от с. Лиляк, Търговищко, 4. Михаил Донев от гр. Търговище. 5. Васил Караиванов от с. Алваново, Търговищко, 6. Юрдан Ненов Миндов от същото село и 7. Минчо Иванов от с. Макариопол Търговищко.

⁴⁷ Името е задраскано и срещу него ръкописно е написано: „омуртаг”.

⁴⁸ Пак същото, „шум[ен]”.

⁴⁹ Пак същото, „фронта – спираща”.

⁵⁰ Пак същото.

⁵¹ Пак същото.

⁵² Пак същото.

⁵³ Пак същото, „фронта”.

След разстрелването началникът на Държавна сигурност в гр. Шумен – Генчо Саваков е разчупил черепите на убитите партизани със шмайзерови изстрели. Трупите са били подложени на гавра и ограбени.⁵⁴ [...]

XI. 1. *Стефан Петров Гъцев*, бивш пол[ицейски] н[ачални]к гр. Търговище; 2. *Рашко Рашков Рашков* – ст[арши] полицаи, гр. Търговище, в неизвестност; 3. *Владимир Георгиев Златков* от гр. Търговище, в неизвестност⁵⁵; 4. *Борис Ганев*, полицаи, с. Алусиян, Преславско, в неизвестност⁵⁶; 5. *Кочо Михайлов Кочев* от с. Лозница, Търговищко⁵⁷; 6. *Юрдан Иванов Стоянов* от с. Г. Соколово, Търговищко; 7. *Дончо Христов Пайдушев* от гр. Търговище; 8. *Марин Илиев Данчев* от с. Радко Димитриево, Шуменско.⁵⁸

а) На 29.12.1943 г. заповядали, организирали и провели акция за залавянето или убиването партизани укриващи се в запустялата мелница на Казака край с. Алваново, Търговищко. При завързалата се ожесточена престрелка, при която били употребени от полицията много бомби, е бил убит партизанина Петко Станев от с. Буйново, Търговищко, както и тежко наранени останалите двама партизани, които успели да пробият кордона и да се укрият в с. Макариопол, Търговищко.

б) Същата група подсилена с войници, подофицери и офицери от 3[-то] тов[арно] арт[илерийско] отделение от гр. Търговище блокирали с. Макариополско и заловили живи в домът на Цветко Монева от с[ъщото] с[ело] тежко наранените при мелницата партизани: Минчо Иванов и Юрдан Ненов Миндов. При залавянето дейно участие от страна на войниците са взели: [...] 9. *Петър Гунев* от гр.

⁵⁴ Срещу имената на лицата под №№ 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 и 21 ръкописно са написани кръстчета, а срещу № 7 – въпросителна.

⁵⁵ Срещу името ръкописно е написано кръстче.

⁵⁶ Пак същото.

⁵⁷ Пак същото, въпросителна.

⁵⁸ Името е зачергано и срещу него е написано „фронта”.

Варна, от 3. тов. арт. Отделение; 10. Подоф. *Крум Иванов Стоичков* от с. Руец, Търговищко; 11. Редн. *Коста Алексиев Янков* от с. Марчино, Поповско; 12. Редн. *Йордан Михайлов Пенчев* от с. Пособина, Поповско, които нанесли над не съпротивляващите се поради тежките си рани партизани побой, с прикладите на карабините си.

Заловените партизани на 12.02.1944 г. били разстреляни.

За убийството на партизанина Петко Станев и залавянето на Минчо Юрданов⁵⁹ и Юрдан Ненов Миндов, пол[ицейският] н-к, Стефан П. Гъцев, ст[арши] пол[ицаят] Рашко Рашков, подоф[ицерът] Крум Иванов Стоичков, редн[икът] Коста Алексиев и полицаят Йордан Иванов Стоянов получили по 15.000 лв. парична награда. [...]

XXXVI. 1. Мустафа Мехмедов Чаушев от с. Ловец, Търговищко; [...] 34. Юрдан Костадинов Недовски от с. Ловец, Търговищко; 35. Цвятко Монеv от с. Макариопол, Търговищко; 36. Методи Юрданов от с. Ловец, Търговищко; [...] 56. Минчо Панайотов от с. Вардун, Търговищко.

За това, че през периода от 1.01.1941 г. до 9.09.1944 г. доброволно са служили на полицията и войската, като са събирали сведения за всички антифашистски и противофашистски прояви, предавали са ги на съответните началници, които въз основа на тези сведения предприемали акции, претърсвания, нанасяли са побоища и са извършвали интернирания. Благодарене на тези сведения враговете на народа можаха да извършат изброените в настоящия акт безчинства, мародерства, убийства, палежи и интернирания.

Извършените деяния посочени след всяка група лица в настоящия акт съставляват престъпления наказуеми по чл. 2 п.п. 7, 8 и 10 от Наредба – закон за съдене от Народен съд виновниците за въвличане България в Световната война срещу съюзните народи и за злодеянията свързани с нея, поради което и по силата на чл. чл. 4 ал. III, 5 ал. II от

⁵⁹ Името е сгрешено. Отнася се за партизанина Минчо Ив. Минчев.

Обвинители и обвиняеми с разменени роли в политическите процеси преди и след 9 септември 1944 г. (Документи...)

същия народен закон⁶⁰ от името на българския народ.

Обвинявам

Изброените в настоящият акт лица, затова, че са извършили посочените в акта престъпления и ги предавам на Народния съд в гр. Търговище за съдене наказание по чл. 2 п.п. 7, 8 и 10 от Наред[бата] закон за съдене от Народ[ния] съд и пр.

гр. Търговище 17.02.1945 г.

Народен Обвинител: Апостол Зафиров.

ЦДА, ф. 1449, оп.1, а.е. І ІНС 1077, т. 1, л. 4, 7, 8, 11, 12.
Печатно.

⁶⁰ Цитираните членове гласят: Чл. 2. наказват се с временен или доживотен строг тъмничен затвор или със смърт и глоба от пет млн. лева: П. 7. Лицата, които в страната или извън нея, във връзка с водената след 1.01.1941 г. от правителствата външна или вътрешна политика са заповядали, поощрили или извършили убийства, тежки телесни повреди, палежи, грабежи, обири и изтезания. П. 8. Лицата, които доброволно са служили и предавали на полицията, жандармерията и войската такива сведения, които са се отнасяли до безопасността или важни интереси на партизаните или други борци за народните свободи. П. 10. Лицата, които в страната или извън нея от 1.01.1941 до 9.09.1944 г. със своите действия, писания, слово или по друг начин са допринесли дейно и съществено за извършването или провеждането на горните деяния, както и за гоненията срещу евреите.

Нация – братство и единство: Изменения в югославской и сербской историографии

Ласло Биро

Институт истории Научно-исследовательского центра гуманитарных наук ВАН

На заключительных этапах Второй мировой войны в Югославии произошла радикальная смена системы.¹ Всей полнотой власти овладела Коммунистическая партия, при этом коренным образом изменилась вся внутренняя политическая структура страны. Во время вооруженных боев партизаны – следуя лозунгам Великой Французской революции (свобода, равенство, братство) – обнародовали лозунг о равноправии и сотрудничестве (братстве и единстве) живущих в Югославии народов и нацией. В ноябре 1943 года была принята новая конституция государства, в соответствии с которой Югославия стала федерацией из шести союзных республик, которые в последующие десятилетия получили всё больше автономных прав.² Между двумя мировыми войнами Югославия была унитарной, централизованной страной, тогда как новая админис-

¹ Исследование было поддержано проектом ОТКА К 101 629.

² О политической истории Югославии на русском языке см.: Никифоров, К. В. (отв. ред.), Югославия в XX веке. Очерки политической истории. Москва, 2011. Еще см.: Ramet, Sabrina P., Die drei Jugoslawien. Eine Geschichte der Staatsbildungen und ihrer Probleme. München, 2011; Sündhaussen, Holm, Istorija Srbije od 19. do 21. veka. Beograd, 2008; Balkán-kronológia, 1878–2007.

http://www.academia.edu/1887483/Balk%C3%A1n-kronol%C3%B3gia_1878-2007_.

трация была построена иначе, в соответствии с принципами федерализма. Коммунистическая партия Югославии хотела воспрепятствовать столкновениям между народами, стараясь уравновесить отношения между ними. Для достижения этой цели для отдельных народов была обеспечена автономия, однако действовал и принцип демократического централизма, позволявший центральным органам партии овладеть достаточными возможностями для того, чтобы определить вектор политического развития страны.³

НОВЫЕ ЗАДАЧИ ИСТОРИОГРАФИИ И НОВЫЙ КУРС В ИНТЕРПРЕТАЦИИ ИСТОРИИ

Перед югославской историографией⁴ в новых условиях были поставлены некоторые новые задачи: она должна была акцентировать внимание на имевших место в прошлом связях между югославскими народами, исходя из того, что

³ Об особенностях федерации в Югославии см.: Beckmann-Petey, M. *Der jugoslawische Föderalismus*. München, 1990; Juhász, J. *Föderalismus és nemzeti kérdés. Az etnoföderalizmus tapasztalatai Közép- és Kelet-Európában*. Bp., 2010.

⁴ О югославской историографии см.: Banac, I. *Historiography of the Countries of Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia*. – *The American Historical Review*, 97, 1992, N 4, 1084–1104; Stanković, Đ., Dimić, L. *Istoriografija pod nadzorom*. Beograd, 1996; Repe, B. *Jugoslovenska historiografija po drugi svetovni vojni*. – *Tokovi istorije*, 1999, N 1–4, 312–325; Dimić, L. *Jugoslovenska država i historiografija*. – *Tokovi istorije*, 1999, N 1–4, 326–339; Marković, Pr. *Istoričari i jugoslovenstvo u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji*. – *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis*, 2001, N 1–2, 151–164; Repe, B. *Between Myths and Ideology. Some Views on Slovene Contemporary Historiography*. Ljubljana, 2009; Höpken, W. *Von der Mythologisierung zur Stigmatisierung: „Krieg und Revolution“ in Jugoslawien 1941–1948 im Spiegel von Geschichtswissenschaft und historischer Publizistik*. – In: Schmidt-Hartmann, E. (Hrsg.), *Kommunismus und Osteuropa: Konzepte, Perspektiven und Interpretationen im Wandel*. München, 1994, 165–201.; Marković, Pr. J., M. Ković, N. Miličević. *Developments in Serbian Historiography*. – In: Brunnbauer, U. (Hg.). *ReWriting History. Historiography in Southeast Europe after Socialism*. Münster, 2004, 277–316.

вершиной исторического развития этих народов является социалистическая Югославия. Другая задача заключалась в том, чтобы способствовать взаимопониманию отдельных народов. По мнению руководителей страны, историография должна была следовать классовому подходу, сосредоточившись на истории классов, составляющих социальную базу нового общественного строя (то есть истории трудящихся масс – пролетариата и крестьянства). Коммунистическая партия Югославии – как и другие компартии в Восточной Европе – старалась поставить историографию на новую идеологическую основу, в новый, «правильный», идеологический контекст. Например, 28-го декабря 1947-го года Тито в Загребе на заседании Югославской академии наук и искусств задался вопросами, на которые сам же пытался дать ответы: Можем ли мы сказать, что наша история, в том виде, как нам ее преподносили, подлинная, можем ли мы сказать, что в ней нет фальсификаций? Нет, мы этого не можем утверждать. Не можем, потому что предшествующая историография находилась под влиянием господствующего класса. В ней было много фальсификаций! Мы должны непрерывно и упорно работать, чтобы показать истинную историю югославских народов.⁵

В середине 1950-х годов произошли некоторые изменения в историографии. Возобладал марксистский метод, расширилась тематика. Появились новые темы – история рабочего класса, классовая борьба, распространение социалистической мысли. С точки зрения интересов новой власти особенно важными и востребованными были события, на основе которых можно было доказать, что между югославскими народами существовали давние исторические связи, подлежащие интерпретации в положительном ключе.

Вследствие децентрализации государства культура и наука оказались прежде всего в сфере компетенции отдель-

⁵ Tito, Josip Broz. Beszédek és cikkek. III. köt. 1947. I. 1.–1948. VIII. 13. Novi Sad, 1962, 210.

ных республик. В 1960-е годы во всех 6 республиках работали институты исторических исследований и институты истории рабочего движения, функционировали исторические общества. Институциональная система историографии содействовала тому, что исторические исследования осуществлялись в рамках национальных культур отдельных народов. Существовало одно центральное историческое общество Югославии, которое издавало журнал (Югословенски историйски часопис). Однако республиканские (национальные) институты все-таки имели намного больше влияния на широкое общественное мнение народов и национальностей, чем общесоюзные общества, которые в конце 1980-х годов уже практически перестали работать.

На десятилетия путеводной звездой для историков явилась речь Тито 21-го июля 1948-го года на V-ом съезде партии. Можно сказать, что эта речь в известной мере выполняла в условиях титовской Югославии функции „краткого курса“, хотя она абсолютно не была краткой: чтение доклада продолжалось около восьми часов. Тито говорил о необходимости и неизбежности объединения югославских народов. Югославская идея провозглашалась передовой идеей, поскольку ее целью было создать югославское государство, в котором народы могут жить свободно и на основе равноправия. Однако первая или королевская Югославия не могла стать истинной родиной для этих народов, ведь в ней не существовало подлинного равноправия, государство угнетало проживавшие в нем народы. Король и господствующая элита не были склонны предоставлять национальные права хорватам и другим народам. Настоящая родина югославских народов сформировалась во время народно-освободительной борьбы под руководством Коммунистической партии Югославии. Тито считал важным фактом, что с середины 1930-х годов компартия уже не ставила перед собой задачи уничтожения югославского государства, а в 1941-ом году, накануне судьбо-

носных для страны событий, приняла решение о защите целостности государства. Партия ставила своей целью в революционной борьбе освобождение Югославии от оккупации и одновременно создание более справедливого внутреннего политического устройства. Тито в своей речи детально говорил о роли партии в организации и руководстве народно-освободительной войной. Лидер КПЮ в конце своего выступления отметил главные факторы победы: 1) правильная политика КПЮ, завоевавшая доверие югославских народов, 2) роль Советского Союза, ибо без помощи СССР, по словам Тито, не было бы возможно одержать победу над фашистами, 3) участие всех народов Югославии в освободительной борьбе.⁶

Именно слова Тито о том, что все народы Югославии боролись против общего врага, возымело наибольшее значение для дальнейших интерпретаций. Точка зрения партии поставила исследования в узкие рамки, ибо нельзя было писать и говорить о действительной судьбе и роли разных народов в войне, о взаимоотношениях между народами во время мировой войны. Существовало немало табу для историков, которые касались острых противоречий между отдельными югославскими народами в годы войны, роли династии и некоторых гражданских слоев в создании Югославии и т.д.

С самых первых лет социалистических экспериментов партия пыталась координировать исторические исследования. В рамках центрального союзного аппарата была создана идеологическая комиссия, в задачи которой входило надзирать за исследованиями и публикациями. Уже в те годы строились планы написать «общую» историю югославянских народов. В 1949 г. была создана редколлегия этого капитального синтетического труда. В соответствии с планами, этот обобщающий труд, акцентирующий внимание на общности исторических процессов и позитивных сторо-

⁶ Там же, 269–435.

нах взаимосвязей живущих в стране народов, служил бы основой для учебников. В 1953 и 1959 гг. появились первые два тома, рассматривающие период времени до начала XIX в.⁷ Третий том, посвященный истории XIX в., когда всё чаще проявлялись столкновения между разными народами, так и не был завершен. Историки разных республик не смогли договориться даже о составе его редколлегии. Острая дискуссия развернулась вокруг целого ряда основных тем будущего труда, таких как период образования югославянских наций (*narodni preporod*), взаимоотношения народов начиная с XIX в., Босния и Герцеговина в контексте истории югославянских народов, участие отдельных народов в освободительной войне и в социалистической революции.

БОРЬБА ЗА БРАТСТВО И ЕДИНСТВО (ДО СЕРЕДИНЬ 1960-Х ГОДОВ)

Как и можно было ожидать, противоречия между отдельными народами все-таки довольно скоро проявились как в политической жизни, так и в историографии. До середины 1960-х годов на разных публичных форумах партии вопрос о состоянии межнациональных отношений в стране не обсуждался, ведь согласно официальным декларациям, с помощью федерализации он был давно решен на долгий срок. В декабре 1964 г. на VIII-ом съезде СКЮ все-таки было принято решение в дальнейшем бороться с национализмом и шовинизмом. Остается до сих пор дискуссионным вопрос: планировали ли Тито и возглавляемая им партия создать единую югославскую нацию? Трудно дать однозначный ответ на этот вопрос, хотя разные выступления Тито свидетельствуют о том, что он действительно

⁷ *Istorija naroda Jugoslavije*. Knj. 1. Do početka XVI veka. Beograd, 1953, *Istorija naroda Jugoslavije*. Knj. 2. Od početka XVI do kraja XVIII veka. Beograd, 1959.

хотел форсировать сближение югославских народов на уровне культуры.⁸ Задача эта была нелегкой. Как известно, в первой (королевской) Югославии так и не удалось создать единую нацию, отдельные народы не сближались друг с другом, даже в сфере культуры, хотя король Александр Карагеоргиевич с 1930-х годов в рамках «интегрального югославизма» стремился создать и распространить общее югославское самосознание: учебники и вся система образования были унифицированы, приняты и другие меры в этих целях, однако без всякого успеха. В социалистической Югославии приблизительно до середины 60-х годов существовали более серьёзные намерения к тому, чтобы народы сближались друг с другом, культивировали общие традиции, и югославизм стал объединяющей идеологией.⁹

С середины 1960-х годов в политической и экономической жизни всё отчетливее проявлялись требования отдельных наций, в этих условиях на первый план вышли национальные аспекты в исследовании и интерпретации истории. В 1964 г. в Загребе хорватские историки в ходе дискуссии о книге «История Союза Коммунистов Югославии»¹⁰ высказали критику в связи с тем, что книга не уделяет достаточного внимания национальному вопросу. Был оспорен тезис о решающей роли сербов в апрельском восстании 1941 г. По мнению некоторых историков, хорватский национальный вопрос был решен в рамках автономной Бановины Хрватской.

⁸ Marković, Pr. J. Titova shvatanja nacionalnog i jugoslovenskog identiteta. – In: Fleck, H., I. Georg–Graovac (prired.). Dijalog povjesničara–istoričara. 2. Zagreb, 2000, 235–253.; Milosavljević, O. Titov Jugosloven – nacionalni ili državni identitet? – In: Fleck, Hans-Georg, I. Graovac. (Prired.). Dijalog povjesničara–istoričara. 7. Zagreb, 2002, 175–192.

⁹ См.: Djokić, D. (Ed.). Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea 1918–1992. London, 2003; Bíró, L. A jugoszláv állam (1918–1939). Bp., 2010.

¹⁰ Čolaković, R. i dr. Pregled istorije Saveza komunista Jugoslavije. Beograd, 1963.

Одновременно с дискуссией об этой книге по проблемам истории партии появилась работа генерал-майора Велемира Терзича о первых днях Второй мировой войны в Югославии.¹¹ Терзич дал сербский вариант интерпретации истории о распаде югославского государства. В противоположность официальному мнению, согласно которому главную ответственность за распад страны несла югославская буржуазия, он подчеркнул решающую долю ответственности хорват, особенно Хорватской крестьянской партии за крах единого государства. Хорватские историки скоро ответили на построения Терзича. Отвергая его взгляды, они ссылались на неблагоприятное положение хорватов в полититической и экономической жизни королевской Югославии.¹² Противоположность и непримиримость высказанных мнений нарушало молчаливое согласие, к которому призывала партия, подрывало официальные представления о том, что нельзя обвинять в распаде югославянского государства один из составлявших его народов.

В 1964 г. развернулась борьба с уклонами в историографии. Глава государства обвинял историков и писателей в том, что они обостряют отношения между югославскими народами и «тянут назад». Маршал критиковал историков за то, что они занимаются только историей своей нации, поднимают некорректный вопрос о том, чья история была лучше и богаче, какой народ был более великим в истории. (По мнению Тито, малые югославянские народы могут, лишь объединившись, достигнуть подлинного величия, стать единым великим народом). Лидер Югославии был недоволен тем, что в школах использовали слишком много разных учебников истории, которые – как и историки – акцентировали внимание на истории своего народа вместо

¹¹ Terzić, V. Jugoslavija u aprilskom ratu 1941. Titograd, 1963.

¹² Например: Tudman, Fr. Uzroci krize monarhističke Jugoslavije od ujedinjenja 1918. do sloma 1941. Disertacija. Zagreb, 1965; Tudman, Fr. Velike ideje, mali narodi. Zagreb, 1969.

того, чтобы показать общие традиции. Тито однозначно высказался в пользу общего учебника. Изучая историю своего народа, школьники одновременно должны познакомиться и с традициями соседних югославянских народов.¹³

*НАЦИЯ И ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ (С СЕПЕДИНЬ 1960-Х
ГОДОВ ДО СЕРЕДИНЬ 1970-Х ГОДОВ)*

Во второй половине 1960-х годов произошли события, которые принесли значительные изменения в политической и культурной жизни страны. Можно сказать, что вся история Югославии была пронизана постоянной борьбой между централизацией и децентрализацией. Во второй половине 60-х годов сторонники децентрализации одержали новые победы. В июле 1966 г. был лишен всех должностей и исключен из партии Александр Ранкович, по сути второй человек партии и самый влиятельный сторонник централизации. Он был обвинен в приверженности великодержавному централизму, назван тормозом самоуправления. Некоторые в Сербии полагали, что окружение Тито устранило человека, который представлял специфические Сербии и сербского народа и был, по словам известного писателя и политика Добрицы Чосича, «государственным символом Сербии».¹⁴

Вторая половина 60-х годов была бурным периодом, впервые за годы существования социалистической Югославии возникли политические, национальные культурные движения. В июне 1968 г. в Белграде своими акциями протеста студенты начали борьбу за демократию, против бюрократической олигархии. В ходе демонстраций нашло выражение сербское национальное самознание, проявилось недовольство положением Сербии в федерации. В Хорватии

¹³ Цитирует: Marković, Pr. J., *Istoričari i jugoslovenstvo*, Op. cit., 155–157.

¹⁴ Югославия в XX веке, Op. cit., 710–712.

и Словении студенты вышли на улицу с требованиями демократии. В Косово в разных городах произошли демонстрации албанцев. Они требовали предоставления Косову статуса республики, права на самоопределение и объединение Косово и части Македонии, где большинство жителей составляли албанцы.

Самым значительным движением той эпохи явилась «хорватская весна». Взрыв национального самосознания сопровождался активизацией деятелей культуры и политических сил. Существовавшая с XIX в. «Матица хорватская» стала в конце 1960-х годов центром, вокруг которого группировались силы, боровшиеся за национальные цели. Руководство республиканской организации СКЮ также разделяло большинство декларируемых целей. Сотрудники республиканского Института истории рабочего движения во главе с будущим лидером независимой Хорватии Ф. Туджманом стали инициаторами пересмотра истории хорватского народа, на первый план выдвигались вековое стремление хорватов к самостоятельности. Тито поддерживал реформаторские устремления молодых коммунистов (и в том числе стремление хорватов и словенцев к большей самостоятельности) до тех пор, пока оно не угрожало его власти и единству страны. В 1971 г. он уже полагал, что хорватское движение угрожает социальному строю, целостности государства и единству партии, а потому занялся «наведением порядка» в руководствах союзных республик. В конце 1971 г. было заменено хорватское руководство, а в следующие годы произошли изменения в руководствах всех других республик.

Тито одержал победу в этом споре, в начале 1970-х годов был прерван процесс демократизации, вновь установлен режим твердой руки, влияние национализма было ограничено. Вместе с тем национальные движения не были безуспешными, ведь процесс децентрализации не был приостановлен. Параллельно всем чисткам и усилению

цензуры подходила к концу конституционная реформа, начавшаяся еще в 1967–1971 гг. и завершившаяся в феврале 1974 г. принятием новой конституции. Республики в результате получили более широкие автономные права, не только на уровне культуры и социальной политики, но и на уровне экономики. Главной особенностью конституции стало еще большее сужение политических и экономических функций федерального центра за счет увеличения полномочий республик и автономных краев. Все это влияло и на югославскую историографию.

С начала 1970-х годов было опубликовано все больше книг, в которых история интерпретировалась с точки зрения отдельных народов, а не на основе принципа «братства и единства». В 1972 г. вышла книга под названием «История Югославии».¹⁵ Этот том был написан четырьмя сербскими историками. Даже само название книги вызвало недовольство, потому что до тех пор, чтобы подчеркнуть равноправие наций, составляющих федерацию, всегда говорили об истории народов Югославии. Текст книги, особенно история XIX и XX вв., был написан с точки зрения сербов, как будто история сербов была более прогрессивна, чем история других народов, а сербское крестьянское общество более демократично, нежели более сложное хорватское общество с более развитыми гражданскими элементами, по сути ставилось под сомнение и наличие у хорватов собственных традиций государственности. Хорватские историки критиковали подход сербских ученых. Долгие годы не прекращались дискуссии на страницах исторических журналов.¹⁶

¹⁵ Božić, I., S. Ćirković, M. Ekmečić, Vl. Dedijer. Istorija Jugoslavije. Beograd, 1972.

¹⁶ Например: О „Istoriji Jugoslavije”, izd. „Prosvete”, Beograd, 1972. – In: Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 5, 1973, N 2, 7–76.

*ПОСЛЕ ТИТО, В УСЛОВИЯХ РАСПАДА ИДЕОЛОГИИ
ЮГОСЛАВИЗМА (1980-Е ГОДИЬ)*

4-ого мая 1980 г. умер Тито и его смерть означала завершение долгого периода в истории Югославии. В 1980-е годы Югославия вступила в полосу экономического кризиса, при этом, как кажется, отдельные республики не были способны найти совместными усилиями общий выход из кризиса на путях федерализма, а может быть даже уже и не хотели. В конце десятилетия они искали не только самостоятельные пути дальнейшего развития, но и свое место в новом европейском политическом порядке, начавшем выкристаллизоваться в те же годы. С середины 1980-х годов опять развернулась борьба между сторонниками централизации и приверженцами децентрализации. Не вдаваясь в детали, можно сказать, что сербские политики строили планы централизации страны, тогда как западные республики считали предпочтительными менее тесные связи между республиками. В этом процессе историография в большой мере способствовала усилению национального самосознания во всех республиках. В середине 1980-х годов некоторые руководители партии осудили националистические тенденции в сфере культуры и в том числе в историографии, но республиканские руководства не смогли или не хотели этому препятствовать, более того, в определенных случаях они поддерживали националистические силы. Братство и единство уже больше не были важны. Историки сосредоточили свою энергию на изучении истории своего народа и содействовали выработке национальных программ.

В последние годы жизни Тито и сразу после его смерти стали сильнее устремления, направленные на пересмотр привычных интерпретаций истории. В сербской историографии в этом плане главнейшими вопросами считались: история королевской Югославии (и прежде

всего положение сербов в государстве), переоценка деятельности гражданского сопротивления в некоторых его формах (и в этом контексте некоторый пересмотр роли четников, чьи вооруженные отряды подчинялись королевскому правительству, находившемуся в лондонской эмиграции), судьба сербов в годы Второй мировой войны и понесенные ими жертвы; захват власти коммунистами и последовавшие за этим репрессии.¹⁷

В те же годы появились книги, которые занимались вопросами, считавшимися раньше табуированными. Во второй половине 1980-х годов некоторые смелые авторы обращаются к критическому пересмотру системы социализма в ее югославском варианте. Официальный биограф Тито Владимир Дедиер дал сигнал новым интерпретациям. В новой книге о покойном президенте страны он обратился к демифологизации Тито, некоторой переоценке его исторической роли. Дедиер писал о частной жизни Тито, задавался вопросом о роли, которую тот сыграл в 1930-е годы в аресте прежнего руководства Коммунистической партии Югославии в СССР. Дедиер упоминал о том, что в 1914 г., во время похода на Сербию, Тито служил в армии Австро–Венгрии, что могло быть воспринято сербским обществом как свидетельство его антисербских настроений. Дедиер писал о разных событиях, о которых раньше не было принято говорить, в частности, о том, что в 1941 г. в силу разных внешнеполитических причин Советский Союз не столь уж однозначно отнесся к созданию самостоятельного хорватского государства и отдельной Хорватской коммунистической партии. В книге можно было почерпнуть информацию о темных сторонах партизанской борьбы, о том, что партизаны воспринимали четников в качестве самых принципиальных своих врагов, а их уничто-

¹⁷ Marković, Pr. J. Kako (ni)smo pronašli „pravu istorijsku istinu“? Srpska historiografija posle 1991. godine. – Prispjevki za novejšo zgodovino, 44, 2004, N 2, 50–53.

жение считали едва ли не наиболее важной задачей.¹⁸

Историки, которые уже не принимали как истину в последней инстанции официальные оценки и в том числе триаду основополагающих для режима ценностей (народно-освободительная борьба, Тито, самоуправлении), начали критиковать эпоху социализма. Впервые были опубликованы работы, в которых не был оценен только с позитивной стороны сам факт захвата власти коммунистами. Воислав Коштуница и Коста Чавошки обратили внимание на многопартийную систему в Югославии. Они раскрыли судьбы разных партий, тактику компартии во время народно-освободительной борьбы и перехода к социализму. Они писали о разных гражданских партиях, их стремлениях и показывали, какими методами была уничтожена возможность перехода к демократии. Авторы уже не считали «естественным явлением» ведущую роль компартии и однопартийную систему.¹⁹ (Надо сказать, что до тех пор в югославской историографии Коммунистическая партия получала всегда положительную оценку.) С середины 1980-х годов к переоценке периода перехода к социализму обратились и другие историки.

Во второй половине 1980-х гг. предметом рассмотрения вновь становятся югославизм и роль югославского государства в истории. В этих дискуссиях в значительной мере проявились разные подходы отдельных народов к общей истории. В ходе создания так и не завершенного синтетического труда хорватский профессор Душан Биланджич обвинял сербских историков в том, что они хотят реабилитировать королевскую Югославию вместе с идеями, политическими целями и методами того времени. Развернулась дискуссия о том, какую роль сыграли разные нации

¹⁸ Dedijer, VI. Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza. Knj. I–III. Zagreb, 1980–1984.

¹⁹ Koštunica, V., K. Čavoški. Stranački pluralizam ili monizam. Društveni pokreti i politički sistem u Jugoslaviji 1944–1949. Beograd, 1983.

в социалистической революции, какие события имели этапное значение для развития югославского государства. Янко Плетерски из Словении в своей книге «Нация, Югославия и революция», например, утверждал, что в Югославии произошла не одна, как считалось раньше, а больше революций. Он обратил внимание на важность выявления как сходств, так и различий в развитии разных народов Югославии в условиях Второй мировой войны.²⁰

Хотя центральное место в книге заняла эпоха революции и социализма, автор затронул и предшествующие периоды. Плетерски выразил свое мнение, согласно которому с образованием Югославии в 1918 г. был решен только сербский вопрос. После издания книги была организована дискуссия в Центре марксизма Союза коммунистов в Белграде. Сербские историки отвергали мысль о том, что только сербский национальный вопрос был решен в Югославии, отрицая также мысль о том, что Сербия эксплуатировала другие части и народы многонациональной страны. Они склонны были возвеличивать борьбу сербов за освобождение других наций и за образование югославского государства.²¹ Разнообразие взглядов свидетельствовало о том, что историки уже в значительной степени отходили от официальной интерпретации истории. Тогдашние заседания и дискуссии представляли собой последний этап, когда историки из разных республик все еще пытались выступать как единое сообщество, искавшее общие подходы к истории страны. Последняя такая попытка была предпринята на съезде югославских историков в Приштине в 1988 г. Однако темы, выставленные на обсуждение (югославизм; сближение и объединение югославских народов: специфика югославского исторического пути) уже не вызывали большого интереса, большинство

²⁰ Pleterski, J. *Nacije, Jugoslavija, revolucija*. Beograd, 1985.

²¹ Материал заседания: *Revolucija i istoriografija*. – *Marksistička misao*, 1986, N 4, 189–263.

ведущих историков не явилось на конгресс.²² Началась новая эпоха, когда центральное место в исследованиях заняла судьбы наций, их обиды, многообразие альтернатив развития в прошлом и будущем.²³

Проблема национальной государственности и связанной с ней территории особенно волновала общественность Сербии по мере того, как страна переживала все большие экономические трудности, а угроза целостности Сербии со стороны албанского национального движения становилась все сильнее. Албанцы, прибегая к разным методам, требовали всё большей автономии, добивались того, чтобы Косово стало седьмой республикой Югославии. В 1981 г. в Косове произошли массовые беспорядки, с 1970-х годов происходил процесс миграции сербов из Косова, затронувший десятки тысяч человек. С целью обратить на себя и свои проблемы внимание, косовские сербы стали прибегать к коллективным петициям в органы власти и организовывать большие марши протеста на Белград. Таким образом, вопросы собственной национальной государственности и Косова стали центральными в сербской интеллектуальной жизни.

В мае 1985 года Сербская академия наук и искусств образовала рабочую группу, которая составила Меморандум об экономической и политической ситуации в Югославии. В Меморандуме описывались экономический и политический кризисы, охватившие страну. По мнению сербских ученых, дезинтеграция уничтожила общий рынок, вследствие нее на передний план попали интересы отдельных частей страны. Сербская экономика уступала словенской и хорватской, причем сербские эксперты были

²² Dašić, M. Deveti kongres istoričara Jugoslavije. – Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis, 23, 1981–2, 205–222. Рефераты съезда тоже в этом номере журнала.

²³ См. например: Petranović, Br., M. Zečević. Agonija dve Jugoslavije. Šabac, 1991; Petranović, Br. Jugoslovensko iskustvo srpske nacionalne integracije. Beograd, 1993.

склонны в этом обвинять экономическую политику центра. По сути меморандум обвинял коммунистическую власть в проведении антисербской политики. Согласно документу, Сербия во время Второй мировой войны оказалась не способна отстоять свои интересы. Конституция 1974 г. не способствовала интеграции сербов, которые по сути не обладают собственным целостным государством, поскольку в результате реорганизации федеральной системы территория Сербии была раздроблена на три части (Центральная Сербия и два автономного края – Воеводина и Косово).²⁴

С середины 80-х годов сербские историки начали изучать ранее табуированные темы (например, межнациональные отношения, сербские национальные программы, агрессивные акции со стороны партизан в период народно-освободительной войны, изгнание сербов из Косово). Крупный сербский политик Никола Пашич постепенно становится позитивной личностью в историографии, причем в новых исследованиях акцентировалось внимание на его сдержанном отношении к принципам югославизма и на том, что он только с учетом международной ситуации согласился с образованием Югославии. Пашич, по мнению исследователей, считал приоритетной задачей объединение сербских территорий и в своем понимании югославизма ставил интересы сербов на передний план.²⁵

Сербские историки не соглашались с тем, что за все проблемы королевской Югославии ответственность возлагалась только на сербов (в частности, сербскую буржуазию), они негативно оценивали сепаратистские намерения хорватов, считали, что соглашение Цветковича и Мачека и образование Хорватской Бановины были невыгодны для

²⁴ Меморандум был опубликован в газете Вечерне новости (Večernje novosti) в номерах 24–25. ноября 1986. См.: <http://www.helsinki.org.rs/serbian/doc/memorandum%20sanu.pdf>.

²⁵ См. например: Stanković, Đorđe Đ. Nikola Pašić i jugoslovensko pitanje. Knj. 1–2. Beograd, 1985.

сербов. По мнению некоторых сербских историков, хорваты изменявшие общей государственности, несут значительно большую ответственность за распад королевской Югославии.²⁶ В качестве новой темы историографии появилась история Сербского культурного клуба.²⁷ Членами этого общества были выдающиеся ученые и деятели культуры, а также некоторые видные политики. С 1940 г. они принимали необходимость перестройки административной системы Югославии, однако считали необходимым образовать большую сербскую единицу в новой Югославии. В состав Сербских земель, как они называли будущий административный край сербов, входили бы, кроме центральной Сербии, Воеводина, Македония, Черногория, части Боснии, то есть т.е. те территории, которые в социалистической Югославии стали союзными республиками (или, как Воеводина, автономным краем).

Новая волна исхода из Косова и боязнь уменьшения сербских территорий нашли отражение в историографии. В середине 1980-х годов снова был актуализирован вопрос об агрессии и военных преступлениях, совершенных югославскими народами в ходе веков. В 1983 г. в рамках Сербской академии наук была образована комиссия с целью изучения геноцидов, которым были подвергнуты югославские народы в XIX–XX вв.²⁸ Главной темой являлась история Независимого государства Хорватия (особенно физическое уничтожение сербов в концлагерях). Статья Василия Крестича в литературной газете «Книжевне новине» обосновала новое направление в историографии.

²⁶ Terzić, V. Slom kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941. Titograd, 1982; Đuretić, V. Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama. Beograd, 1986.

²⁷ Popvić, N. A. Srbski kulturni klub (1937–1941). – Istorija 20. veka, 7, 1989, N 1–2, 109–140.

²⁸ Bougarel, X. Od krivičnog zakona do memoranduma. Upotrebe pojma „genocid” u komunističkoj Jugoslaviji. – Političke perspektive, 1, 2011, N 2, 15–16.

По Крестичу, геноцид – постоянное явление в современной истории сербского народа. Сербский историк вывел свой тезис из идеологием хорватской политической нации.²⁹

Важной темой оказалась история сербов в Хорватии. Лидером исследований в этой области стал тот же Крестич, написавший ранее отличные книги об истории сербов в Южной Венгрии, о сербо–хорватских связях в XIX в., о сербских газетах. Перед новыми исследованиями ставилась четкая цель – доказать, что сербы сыграли значительную роль в истории Хорватии, в том числе и в революции 1848 г., и в последующие годы. Акцент делался и на том, что хорваты в XIX в. долгое время не хотели признать сербов как равноправную нацию на своих исторических землях, в хорватской политической жизни всегда существовали антисербские направления и партии, хорваты в разные эпохи принимали и крайние меры против сербов (например, массовое уничтожение сербов во время Второй мировой войны). Хорватская администрация часто мешала развитию сербской культуры (запрещение кириллицы, закрытие школ Сербской Православной Церкви).³⁰

*БОРЬБА ЗА НОВОЕ ГОСУДАРСТВО, СТОЛКНОВЕНИЯ
НАРОДОВ (ОЦЕНКИ СОБЫТИЙ
ВТОРОЙ МИРОВОЙ ВОЙНЫ)*

В интерпретации событий в Югославии во время Второй мировой войны тоже произошел коренной переворот и проблематика войны стала предметом дискуссий.³¹

²⁹ Krestić, V. O genezi genocida nad Srbima u NDH. – Književne novine, 15-го сентября 1986 года.

³⁰ Первый сборник статей: Krestić, V. (ur.). Zbornik o Srbima u Hrvatskoj. 1, 1989. В следующие годы все чаще выходили книги об истории сербов в Хорватии. См. например: Krestić, V. Istorija Srba u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji 1848–1914. Beograd, 1991.

³¹ Подробно об интерпретации истории мировой войны см.: Sindbæk, Tea, Usable History? Representations of Yugoslavia's Difficult Past from

Оценки в этой области долгое время определялись позицией Коммунистической партии. В центре внимания научных трудов 1950–60-х годов находились партизанское движение, народно-освободительная война и роль в ней коммунистической партии. В этих работах неизменно показывалось, что военные преступления совершались только захватчиками (фашистами) и коллаборантами. К числу коллаборантов, т.е. внутренних врагов, причислялись все политические и военные силы, которые хотели создать какой-либо модус вивенди с захватчиками и найти способ для относительно мирного сосуществования в условиях оккупации (например, Милан Недич и его «Правительство национального спасения» Сербии и члены администрации того периода). К ним были отнесены и все те, кто не были союзниками партизан (например, четники, солдаты королевской армии во главе с Драголюбом Михайловичем). Автор научных работ строго заботился о том, чтобы отдельные народы не были идентифицированы с политическими или военными организациями, даже в тех случаях, когда эти организации имели выраженный национальный характер. Ответственность за военные преступления никак не связывалась с национальностью и, таким образом, пропаганда не ставила особый акцент на то, что четники были сербами, а усташи хорватами. С точки зрения власти, намного важнее было подчеркнуть, что одновременно, параллельно шла народно-освободительная война и социалистическая революция, то есть борьба за новую политическую (социализм) и административную систему (федеративную страну).

В 1970-х годах историческая картина о войне стала в определенной степени более дифференцированной. Тито в одном радиоинтервью говорил, например, о том, что

1945 to 2002. Aarhus, 2012; Höpken, W. War, Memory, and Education in a Fragmented Society: The Case of Yugoslavia. – In: East European Politics and Societies, 13, 1999, N 1, 190–227.

усташи пользовались определенной поддержкой в Хорватии и там происходила упорная борьба в обществе. После этого появляются первые работы, в которых уже можно было читать не только о славных победах, но и о трудностях партизан, о разногласиях в их среде.³² Владимир Дедиер в книге «История Югославии» первый раз пользовал термин «геноцид». Он писал о том, что фашистская Германия в своих целях использовала противоречия между классами и народами Югославии. Анте Павелич, начавший уничтожение сербов и евреев в Независимом государстве Хорватия, выступал в качестве инструмента в руках немецких нацистов, однако его политика имела «отечественные корни». В хорватской политической традиции существовали направления, не признавшие сербов как нацию (например, великохорватские националисты, такие как Йосип Франк и его партия). Павелич и его сторонники старались создать однонациональную территорию не только методами ассимиляции и «культурного геноцида», но и прибегая к политике этнической чистки. С другой стороны, не только усташи, но и правое крыло сербской буржуазии во главе с Михайловичем и Недичем тоже совершило этническую чистку в Боснии и Хорватии. Книга «История Югославии» была пионерской в том смысле, что межнациональные противоречия впервые были показаны именно в форме этнических конфликтов.³³ Спустя несколько лет вышли первые работы, в которых можно было читать об агрессии против гражданского населения, об этнических чистках, и уже отдельные нации (а не социальные слои, как это было раньше) были объявлены жертвами.³⁴

³² Например: Hurem, R. Kriza narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta u Bosni i Hercegovini krajem 1941. i početkom 1942. godine. Sarajevo, 1972.

³³ Božić–Ćirković–Ekmečić–Dedijer, Istorija Jugoslavije. Op. cit., 465–470.

³⁴ Например: Čolić, Ml. Takozvana Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941. Beograd, 1973, Dedijer, Novi prilozi. Op. cit.

Во второй половине 1980-х годов некоторые прежде табуированные темы (агрессивные антисербские акции, деятельность албанских банд в Косово, изгнание сербов) стали предметом изучения в исторической литературе и оказались в центре внимания общественного мнения, получая при этом новые оценки. Этот процесс явился отклонением от официального мнения, от «принципа национальной симметричности». Начавшаяся переоценка роли четников содействовала реабилитации сербского национального подхода в историографии. С официальной позиции Союза коммунистов Югославии Д. Михайлович и участники его военных формирований считались на родине предателями, военными преступниками. Однако в новых трактовках отмечалось, что четники в первые месяцы войны выступали в качестве антифашистской силы (Петранович),³⁵ они старались уменьшить масштабы сербских жертв (Джуретич).³⁶ Джуретич, который первым из историков Югославии работал в английских архивах, раскрыл, почему и каким образом изменялось отношение англо-саксонских государств к королевским политикам (не в последнюю очередь, из-за пропаганды Советского Союза, молчавшей о страданиях сербов в Хорватии и увеличивавшей великосербский шовинизм и гегемонизм). По его мнению, западные силы изменили Югославии и в особенности сербам. Постепенно стала распространенной позиция, согласно которой вследствие угнетений, репрессий, происков внешних и внутренних врагов сербы из народов Югославии понесли самые большие убытки и потери во время второй мировой войны, именно они стали самыми большими жертвами войны.

³⁵ Petranović, Branko, *Revolucija i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji (1941–1945)*. Beograd, 1983.

³⁶ Đuretić, V. *Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama*. Knj. 1. *Između nacionalnih i ideoloških izazova*. Knj. 2. *Prestrojavanja u znaku kompromisa*. Beograd, 1985.

В 1992 г., после распада Югославии, была опубликована книга Бранко Петрановича «Сербия во Второй мировой войне». Она отразила изменения в сербской историографии, произошедшие в последние годы социализма и существования югославского государства. Капитальный труд Петрановича ставит в центр внимания интересы сербского народа. Автор исходил из того, что Сербия и Черногория пожертвовали своей независимостью ради общего государства южных славян, не получив в составе Югославии национальной по характеру административной единицы (в отличие от хорватов в соответствии с соглашением Цветковича – Мачека).

Сербское общество, сербские политические силы в основном были на стороне западных союзников, отклонив внешнюю политику правительства Цветковича, направленную на сближение с нацистской Германией. Во время войны в Сербии образовались два движения сопротивления: четники хотели сохранить статус-кво, избежав многих лишних жертв, тогда как партизаны выбрали революционный путь. Из-за различий тактики и целей сотрудничество между ними было совершенно невозможно (даже и до того, как четники встали на путь коллаборационизма в своих отношениях с захватчиками). Коммунисты были сторонниками федерации, однако и четники в последней фазе войны тоже проявили готовность преобразовать административную систему Югославии, однако при этом на всякий случай они хотели четко определить границы Сербии и создать сильную Сербию в рамках югославского государства. После Тегеранской конференции Великобритания не была способна вести эффективную политику в пользу Югославии и помогать королевскому правительству, и таким образом позволила Советскому Союзу укрепить влияние в регионе в целом. Создание федеративной системы, образование шести республик и решения Антифашистского веча народного

освобождения Югославии четники считали поражением сербского народа, поскольку сербские коммунисты не оказались достаточно влиятельной силой в руководстве партии, чтобы защищать интересы сербского народа.³⁷

В 1980-е годы в литературе опять возник вопрос о числе погибших во время Второй мировой войны. Первые данные были опубликованы в 1947 г. Чтобы обосновать свои требования в ходе дискуссии об объёме репараций на мирной конференции в Париже, югославская делегация утверждала, что в стране за годы войны умерли 1,7 миллионов людей. В том же году и Тито в своей беседе говорил о 1,7 миллионах погибших, и потом эта цифра закрепилась на долгое время в исторической литературе и в учебниках. В середине 1980-х годов два историка-демографа независимо друг от друга пришли к выводу о том, что число погибших было около миллиона, таким образом и новые демографические исследования оспаривали официальную позицию.³⁸

Напряженные межнациональные отношения с середины 1980-х годов благоприятствовали именно изучению агрессий и репрессий, на югославском пространстве развернулось противоборство, своего рода соперничество: которая из наций понесла больше жертв? Судьба сербов в Хорватии вызывала особенно острые споры. По данным Кочовича, в Хорватии умерли 125 тысяч сербов (17,4% сербского населения), а по данным Жерявича, на территории Независимого государства Хорватия (в состав которого входили части Боснии и Герцеговины) погибли 322 тысячи сербов. По мнению некоторых сербских историков, число

³⁷ Petranović, Br. Srbija u drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945. Beograd, 1992.

³⁸ Kočović, B. Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji. London, 1985; Žerjavić, Vl. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u Drugom svjetskom ratu. Zagreb, 1989.

сербских жертв было значительно больше.³⁹ Самые большие разногласия между сербскими и хорватскими историками проявились в вопросе о числе жертв в лагере смерти в Ясеноваце.⁴⁰ В докладе хорватской комиссии, составленном в 1945 г. для Нюрнбергского трибунала, отмечалось, что число погибших в лагере составляло около 500–700 тысяч человек. Долгое время эти данные фигурировали в исторических книгах, распространялись среди общественности. Согласно новым демографическим исследованиям, прежние данные о жертвах слишком сильно преувеличены, по мнению Жерявича и Кочовича, в этом лагере умерли около 80 тысяч человек. (Хорватские историки и сегодня в основном принимают эту цифру.) Сербь в конце 1980-х годов и позже по-прежнему придерживались того мнения, что в Ясеноваце лишились жизни от 700 тысяч до 1,1 миллиона человек.⁴¹ Дискуссия о лагерях смерти вышла за академические рамки, Ясеновац постепенно стал символом постоянной агрессии против сербов и геноцида сербов.

Подводя итоги, следует заметить: историческая политика в полной мере изменилась за полвека. Новая власть в Югославии в 1940–50-х годах подчеркнула важность

³⁹ Обобщенно: Geiger, Vl. Ljudski gubici Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu koje su prouzročili „okupatori i njihovi pomagači”. Brojidbeni pokazatelji (procjene, izračuni, popisi). – Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 43, 2011, N 3, 699–749.

⁴⁰ О позиция сербов см.: Miletić, A. Ustaška fabrika smrti 1941–1945. Beograd, 1988; Miletić, A. Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac, 1941–1945. Dokumenta. Knj. 1–3. Beograd, 1986; Dedijer, Vl. Vatikan i Jasenovac. Dokumenti. Beograd, 1987; Bulajić, M. Tadjman's „Jasenovac Myth”: Ustasha crimes of genocide. Belgrade, 1992; Opačić, P. (ur.), Genocid nad Srbima u dvadesetom veku. Beograd, 1992.

⁴¹ Bulajić, M. Ustaški zločini genocida i suđenje Andriji Artukoviću 1986. godine. Knj. 1–4. Beograd, 1988–1989; Bulatović, R. Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac s posebnim osvrtom na Donju Gradinu. Istorijsko-sociološka i antropološka studija. Sarajevo, 1990.

Нация – братство и единство: Изменения в югославской и сербской историографии

братства и единства югославских народов, тогда как руководители отдельных республик в конце 1980-х годов сосредоточили все свои силы на задачах своих наций (федеративные органы до тех пор практически потеряли свое значение). Историки сыграли определенную роль в общественных процессах, они и их труды формировали общество и общественное мнение в разных республиках, а существующие политические условия определили возможности научной и интеллектуальной жизни, влияя на исследования, на научный интерес и опосредованно на результаты исторических исследований.

Вечнозеленото дърво на Ласло Наги¹. Спомени²

Иван Пейковски

*По повод на 90-годишнината от рождението
на унгарския поет и преводач Ласло Наги*

„Песента не може да се окове”, „песента е сила...”

Българският песенен фолклор не е преведен в никоя друга страна така пълно, както в Унгария. Извършеното от Ласло Наги е истински културен подвиг – той превежда повече от десет хиляди стиха! Те влязоха в неговите книги с преводи на български народни песни – „Саби и цитри”, „Кръвта на соколите” и „Свещ по гори и поляни”,³ ставайки по този начин и част от унгарската култура.

Ако Бела Барток се възхищава на неравноделните бъл-

¹ Ласло Наги / Nagy László (1925–1978) е роден в село Фелшьо Исказ, Западна Унгария. Завършва гимназия в Папа. Следва няколко години живопис в Будапещенската художествена академия, след което завършва литература в Будапещенския университет „П. Пазман”. През 1949 г. получава двугодишна стипендия за България, за да учи български език и да превежда. Впоследствие подготвя три сборника с преводи на български народни песни; превежда също класическа и съвременна българска поезия. Почетен гражданин на Смолян (1976), където има и къща-музей „Ласло Наги”. Сред множеството му отличия са и наградата на българския ПЕН-клуб (1959), орден „Кирил и Методий” I степен (1969) и Международна Ботевска награда (1976). Стиховете му са преведени на 15 езика.

² Из личния архив на журналиста Ив. Пейковски, директор на Българския културно-информационен център в Будапеща от 1980 до 1984 г.

³ „Szablyák és citerák” (1950), „Solymok vére” (1960), „Erdőn, mezőn gyertya” (1975).

гарски народни песни, Ласло Наги е очарован от техните словесни образи.

Когато през 1977 г. поетът получи Международната Ботевска награда, той сравни своето дело с оса, нападнала медена пита. В случая той имаше предвид българския фолклор, българските народни песни, преведени от него на унгарски език. Метафората му е хубава, но не разкрива цялата истина. И този път Ласло Наги е твърде взискателен към себе си, защото преминалата през неговата лира българска песен стана още по-мъдра. И нейната „медена пита“ не само, че не е ограбена – тя стана още по-тежка!

Приемайки високо българско признание, нейният носител обобщи вярно това, което бе направил: „И като поет аз съм патриот, но всичко би било празно патриотарство, ако не познавам, ако не ценя духовните ценности на един друг народ, ако не познавам собствения си роден език. Подобно отношение ражда вдъхновението ми, дава основната идея и концепция на преводаческата ми дейност. По мое мнение това е един от пътищата за истинско братство между народите, за тяхната действителна и истинска свобода.”

Пред родния дом на Ласло Наги се извисява бор. Бидейки син на селянин, поетът „посадил“ още едно дърво – дървото на приятелството, неговите клони са също винаги зелени, а корените му са впити дълбоко в националната почва на българи и унгарци.

ЛЕЛЯ ЕРЖИБЕТ ВАШ – МАЙКА НА ПОЕТИ

В началото на 80-те години на Двадесетото столетие леля Ержибет Ваш живееше при дъщеря си Изабела и при своя зет Ласло Фабиан в село Девечер, а в град Айка бе другата ѝ дъщеря – Мария. Детството си тя е прекарала в селцето Нярад край Папа. На осемдесет години е дошла в Исказ. Домът, чийто праг е прекрачила като невеста на Бела Наги,

се намира извън селските дворове, край малка акациева горичка. Стопанинът го построил само две лета преди да се оженят.

Съдбата събрала Бела и Ержибет тъй неочавано, че след толкова много години тя се удивлява:

– Бях отишла при леля си на гроздобер, а лозето на Бела се намирало около пътя на планината Шомло.

– Той носеше съдове за беритбата и веднъж ми подвикна: „Госпожице, не се ли изморихте?“ Казвам му: „Още не!“ И продължавам да вървя нататък...

Наближаваше съборът на гроздоберачите. Тогава го видях отново. Този път ме покани да играем. Танцувахме веднъж – два пъти, поседнахме край маса и там си разговаряхме. Изведнъж му рекох: „Искам да си отида.“ Той пожела да ме изпрати до нашия дом, а от мама изпроси съгласие да намине отново. Възползва се твърде скоро. Дойде и вече настояваше годежът между нас да стане колкото може по-скоро. Годихме се по Коледа. Бела донесе много подаръци у дома и все говореше колко хубаво ще ни е, нямало да работя много, само къщи ще си бъда. А аз – щура, повярвах, че ще е тъй.

Вчера бе открита изложбата на Лаци – нейният син, тъй без време заминал на оня свят. Тя заради нея дойде от Девечер. Пък и да види другия си син – Ищван. Аг е неговият писателски псевдоним. И той пише стихове. Пища, както унгарците умаляват името Ищван, слуша майка си, усмихва се едва забележимо и уточнява:

– Според брат ми Лацко – баща ми е грабнал майка ми с бързината на ястреб.

На осемнайсет години момичето е още младо – зелено. Ала хората в Пустата са узрявали далеч по-рано, отколкото в градовете. Леля Ержи продължава да разказва своето житие – битие:

– Баща ми погина на трийсет и шест години – по време на Първата световна война. Останахме пет деца. Майка ми

беше на трийсет. Много ми се искаше да уча, а тъй бяхме и говорили у дома. Имах по-голям брат, а другите три деца бяха по-малки от мен. Трябваше да работя, а бях на девет годинки... Карах десетата. Баба готвеше, а ние с мама отивахме на полето. По-големият ми брат стана пастир далеч извън Искарз. Обикновено аз му носех обеду. Винаги ме беше много страх от бесни кучета. Все ми се струваше – ще изскочат изпод снопите. Все тичах с гозбата в ръце... Работех всичко на полето...

И само осем години по-късно Ержибет Ваш напуска своето родно селце Нярад и влиза в дома на своя избранник. Бела бил стопанин, прочут с хубави коне, познавали го далеко извън Искарз. Бил грижовен баща, ала и полските работи не били малко. Булката се грижела за чистотата на дома. Особено трудно било в кухнята. По тухления ѝ под постоянно се събирала прах, мърсотия и вода, кал и сняг, внасяни с резбата по ботушените подметки. А после дошли и четирите деца, които Ержибет раждала мъчително, отгоре на всичко – домакинството. И добитък...

Ищван Аг допълва не без тъга:

– С вечни мъки е продължил животът на мама... Преди да роди Лацко, тя отишла да замаже таванската стая – да го роди на чисто. Надяваше се да се успокои на старини. И тъкмо тогава почина Лаци... Не вярвам да я успокоява голямата му поезия. Още по-малко – моите литературни творения.

Леля Ержи ни връща към обикновения и безкрайно дълъг селски ден:

– Шиех гащи на Лаци, защото се късаха, когато две години подред беше пастирче. Имаше тогава шаечен плат, обикновено от него шиех дрехи на децата. Занимавах се с ръкоделие, ала все не ми оставаше време. Гледах животните – коне и свине, а лете трябваше да сме все на полето. Ставах рано – в четири часа, отивах да копая наблизу. Когато слънцето напичаше толкова много, че можех да припадна,

аз се прибирах в къщи. Нахранвах добитъка, закусвах и отивах да копая. Щом приближаваше пладне и премалявах от жегата, отново се прибирах у дома, за да наготвя. И тъй – навън-навътре... ходех да работя и по имотите на пъдаря. Сама събирах сеното от цялата му ливада. На връщане търсех гъби – трябваше да сготвя чорбица за обед. Когато се прибирах, замесвах набързо погача или варях тесто – да има нещо на софрата. След това сварявах тикви за свинете. Слагих повече – да има и за моята челяд...

И всичко това край малката рекичка Марцел. Спомените на старицата текат като нейните тихи води:

– Много обичах да чета – казва с въздишка леля Ержи. – Имахме стари книги и нямахме... време. Само в неделя следобед, след като измивах съдовете, можех да посегна към книга. И приказки разказвах на децата. Измислях ги. По този начин (тя сочи с глава Пища) винаги искаше да разказвам и да пея. Усети ли, че не разказвам добре, прекъсва ме. Понякога ме събуждаше, защото заспивах от умора. Бела беше и селски съдия и понеже нямаше общинска сграда, когато от Будапеща идваха чиновници, отсядаха у нас, в съседната стая. А Пища иска да му пея. Абе, казвам му, - какво ще си помислят хората? Ще си рекат – тази жена е полудяла – пее и нощем. А той си иска своето... Как съм издържала ли? Както казва моята Мари – човек всичко издържа! И аз тъй. Моето време ми трябва, за да разкажа какво съм преживяла. Много сме страдали, много сме изнемогвали...

Но животът в подножието на планината Бакон е носел и радост. Радостта – това са били преди всичко децата:

– Хората много обичаха Лаци, защото общуваше с всички. А колко беше скромен, милият – когато му купихме нови дрехи, не искаше да ги облече. Казваше ни: „На мен и старите са ми добри...”

Беше пастирче, горкичкият, оттам дойде и бедата. Кракът му се бе простудил, коляното му се възпали, лявото...

Беше много болен, с висока температура. Извикахме лекар, две седмици наред му слагах компреси, но не можахме да му помогнем. Имахме роднини в Папа и те намериха кола. Закарахме го в Будапеща. Там, в клиниката „Веребей” го оперираха още същата нощ. Сутринта Лаци каза, че не чувства крака си, опипваше го. Лекарите казаха – възпаление на костния мозък. Тогава Лацко беше на десет години...

А какво закалено дете беше! Преди заболяването той никога не стоеше в къщи, дори и през зимата. Сам си направи кънки. Рекичката до Исказ е малка, но когато замръзнеше, момчетата караха по цял ден кънки. Тъй си го спомням Лаци: облечен само в късо плетено палтенце и с кожена шапка, по цял ден на леда. Пращеше от здраве, детска болест не го ловеше. И да го хванеше, беше само за ден, за ден и половина.

Дойде ред да решим как да учи, защото по време на боледуването беше прекъснал учението. Яви се като частен ученик и взе изпитите за две години наведнъж. Имаше много добри бележки.

В училище беше много добър по рисуване. У дома имаше плоча за писане – тя и сега си стои – тогава такива плочи се използваша. Молеше ме да му рисувам коне. Много обичаше животните. И аз му рисувах. По-късно даваше плочата на по-големите деца да рисуват на нея коне. И те му рисуваха. Тъй започна с рисуването. Обикна го. Искаше да стане художник.

Всичко можеше да направи Лацко. На мен ми направи скара за печене. Казваше ми: „Мамо, всичко мога да направя, само да имам инструменти!” Наистина умееше много. След войната направи на брата си Пища обувки. Бяха толкова добри, че той изкара зимата с тях.

Леля Ержи си спомни изповедта на момчето, направена пред нея под открито небе, в подножието на Баконската планина:

– Веднъж пъдарят ни беше повикал да му работим.

Събирахме сено. Поседнах, облегнах се на купата да откъсна. Тогава ненадейно Лаци ми каза: „Мамо, аз ще стана поет!“ Отвърнах му: „Няма да го бъде... Как можеш ти да станеш поет?“ Ние не знаехме нищо в къщи... А той вече пишел стихове, носел ги в джоба си, без да ги показва на когото и да било. Бях му възразила, а той ме погледна отново и рече: „Мамо, аз съм вече поет...“

По-късно леля Ержи ще прочете много негови творби, някои дори ще препрочита. Тя ми каза направо – най-много обичала онези, които Лаци е писал тогава, когато е бил в Папа – през най-младите си години. Тях разбира по-добре, отколкото по-късните.

– Ако не сега, след двадесет години хората ще разберат... Аз пиша за бъдещето – отвърнал Лацко.

В тая скромна будапещенска квартира не можеше да не заговорим за България, донесла толкова много радост на поета:

– Лаци ми разказваше за България – продължава леля Ержибет. – Той казваше: „Там хората са добри, там хората са щастливи...“ Обичаше да отива в Смолян, заради чистия въздух и заради тия чисти хора. Той научи и българския език. И преводите му на български народни песни приличат на унгарските.

Веднъж слушах в будапещенския замък „Зичи“ артисти да декламираат. Тъй хубави бяха българските стихотворения и любовните народни песни – просто не ми се искаше да свършат.

Смъртта на Ласло Наги, нечакана и толкова безвременна, променя живота на Ержибет Ваш – тая силна и мъдра унгарка. Тя сама споделя с болка – не обича вече да слуша песни, застоява се само пред радиото в девечерския дом на Изабела и то само, когато предават новини или разказват някаква интересна история. Затова тя въздиша тъй жално и милно:

– Ех... Лацко да беше жив! И моят живот щеше да бъде

по-друг... Всяка сутрин, когато ставах, с плач се молах за Лаци – нямаше повече да стане, да се облече, вечер няма да легне. Щом влезе при мен Изабела, аз си слагам очилата – да не види сълзите ми. А тя: „Мамо, ти пак си плакала...” Казвам й: „Не, не съм плакала...”

Леля Ержи заплаква отново... Ласловият брат е слушал не един път този майчин плач. Той се разчувства и излезе навън – отиде по някаква работа из града. Старицата изтри сълзите си и заговаря отново – този път за живия си син:

– Тринадесет години след раждането на Лаци се роди Ищван. Лаци се радваше извънредно много, той много обикна своето братче. Дори сам му изплете шапчица. По-сетне, без да чете особено много, Ищван бе отличен ученик в Таполца. Ласло го учеше да декламира стихотворения и той завърши училището с отличие. Тогава го съветвах – Пища, ти няма да ставаш поет... Един стига у дома. Поетите са бедни хора... А той ми отвърна: „Нищо, мамо, дори да съм беден, само дано бъда щастлив!”

Това й е отредила съдбата – да бъде майка на поети!

ЯТОТО ОТ ИСКАЗ

– Такива приятели бяхме тримата, че ако в село ни срещнеха само с Ерньо Сани, хората питаха: „Какво има? Да не би Лаци да е болен?” „Защо болен?” – учудено отговаряхме ние с Ерньо. „Защото сте само двама...” От сутрин до вечер бяхме винаги заедно. Това беше толкова естествено. В хорските представи бяхме като едно ято птици.

Това ми разказа Ласло Киш от село Кьорне – недалеч от Будапеща. Там бяха и Ерньо Сани – вторият от ятото, беше и Ференц Киш⁴ – друг приятел на поета Ласло Наги от по-късните години. Горещината на току-що започващия август ни събра около масата в гостната стая на домакина. Нямаше го само третият от исказката тройка. Ако не беше

⁴ Ференц Киш (1928-1999) – унгарски литературен историк и критик.

той, ние тъй и нямаше да се съберем в Кьорне.

Ласло Киш живее в това село след женитбата си. Дядо му е бил къде по-далече – обикалял пешком по селата, за да дири работа. А три пъти стигал чак до Америка, гонен от жаждата за сполука. Един от неговите синове – Йеньо, е учил децата от Иказ. Бил е учител и на тримата неразделни приятели: Ласло Киш, Ерньо Сани и Ласло Наги – писателят, чиято втора родина става България.

Вятърът на спомените понася онова задружно детство. Ерньо Сани се връща с охота към училищните дни в Иказ – та те са изпълнени с радост:

– Иказ, по-точно Горни Иказ, беше действително малко и бедно селище със седемдесет къщи и триста жители. Всички ние – момичета и момчета, учихме заедно от първи до шести клас. По-големите въвеждаха в „а-бе-ве“-то по-малките.

Ласло Киш допълва картината на тогавашното детско безгрижие:

– Нашето приятелство съзря в средния курс на обучението, в градчето Папа. Там често се срещаме с Лаци. От 1945 до август 1946 г. почти всеки ден бяхме заедно. Тогавашно Ласло Наги съвсем не мислеше да става писател – рисуваше, занимаваше се с дърворезба...

Сега неговият стол в Кьорне е празен. Той никога няма да седне със своите приятели. Ала в лиричния си дневник „Пращам ви клонка златна“ е казал за същото време това, което сигурно би ни казал сега, ако беше сред живите: „Най-щастливите ми пролети бяха детските. Щом се мярнат пред очите ми няколко краски – зелена, жълта, червена – аз вече виждам босонога тълпа, тичаща в надпревара, и жребчето с червена лента в гривата, бягащо на свобода, уморено до смърт – то се страхува да се отпусне на неприличната моравина и аз му помагам: подгъвам коленете му и сам лягам до него и сумтим двамата като братя...”

Лаци е рисувал, дялал е дърво, любувал се е на тича-

щото в полето жребче... И зърното на поезията е кълнило в душата му. Страниците от дневника потвърждават – Ласло вече е имал и друг приятел. Твърде рано той си набавя ситхотворенията на Атила Йожеф⁵. Ако трябва да се определи българският брат на този поет, това безспорно е Христо Смирненски. Сам Лаци разказва за тази своя среща: „Декември 1941 в градчето Папа мина за мене под знака на Атила Йожеф. Сънувах го нощем. И ето – купих негова книга със стихове... Много обичах да чета денем в обора. Затова трябваше да се покатеря на яслите, от тях стигах до подпрозоречната дъска – моята маса за четене, както я наричаше баща ми. И докато, облегат на лакти до скрежните рисунки, поглъщах вълшебството, отдолу теленцето дъвчеше крачолите ми. Нищо не пречеше, настроението беше мирно, витлеемско и само отвреме навреме въздишах: защо този поет не е наистина редом с мене!”

Ето ги отново в Исказ – след ученето в Папа, след пленничеството на Ерньо. След войната. Децата са вече пораснали – вече са двадесетгодишни!

Дошло е време за истински полети.

– Веднъж Лаци ми заговори за пръв път за Атила Йожеф – спомни си Ерньо Сани.

А Ласло Киш добави:

– Много точно помня, когато ни каза: „Момчета, има един поет, когото не сме изучавали в училище, но стиховете му да прекрасни...”

По това време младите в Исказ скитат безцелно, играят карти. Ласло Наги и Ерньо Сани ги привличат в народния дом – същото, което е българското читалище.

Там им четат по-леки за разбиране стихотворения, разкази. Увличат ги в театрални представления. Лаци рисува кулисите, той поставя и пиесите. Зрителите заплащат билетите в натура – с брашно и яйца. Гладни години. Със събра-

⁵ Атила Йожеф / József Attila – 1905–1937 г.

ните средства народният дом си набавя радио и грамофон. Селските момичета и момчета се веселят. Танцуват. Само режисьорът художник седи и гледа. Той твърде често е тъжен. Веднъж се завръща с Ерньо към дома си. Хванали са се под ръка. В тогавашната майска вечер изплаква своята мъка:

– Ти си здрав Ерньо, прекрасно тануващ, а аз съм зави-
наги вързан...

Човек не може да изпита истинска радост, ако не е познал и тъгата. Понякога Лаци – поетът, се оприличава на еднокрила птица, осъзнавайки нейната трагедия – да не може да стори онова, което природата е заложила в нея. Той си представя и друго нещастие – поезия без аудитория. Същото е: „И най-великото стихотворение, ако не бъде чуто, е само еднокрила птица...”

Задъханият бяг на жребчето, стройните коне в бащиния дом, ергелето в пасищата – всичко това кара момчето да вземе молив и да рисува: коне, коне, коне... Мнозина дори мислят, че е било добър ездач, че кон го е ритнал и от това е окуцяло...

– Не е вярно – уточнява Ерньо. На кон дори не е сядал. Когато бяхме деца, конете се използваша за работа в полето, не бяха обзядвани. Болестта му дойде от друго – възпали се костният мозък на левия му крак.

Ерньо Сани говори бавно, сякаш претегля всяка своя дума:

– Нещастieto не промени характера на Лаци. Той не беше тъжно дете, а по-късно – огорчен човек. Той не промени отношението си към старото приятелство – остана му верен.

– Пазя това писмо от Лаци с обръщението „Приятелю”. Имам и ръкописи от първите му поетични опити. Каза ми: „Да не посмеете да ги печатате!” Запазих ги за себе си. Но те не са никак лоши. Трябва да са от 1945–1947-ма, а може да са и от по-рано. Аз имам и писмо от него от 30 юни 1945-та. Бях войник и попаднах в плен. Беше тръгнала

грозна мълга, че съм в лагера в Яношхаза, че не мога да се примиря с положението и искам да се самоубия. Тогава Лаци отишъл да ме търси в лагера. А мене ме бяха пленили американците, не руснаците, както смятали. В писмото Лаци ми пишеше: „Слава богу, че съдбата случайно те е хвърлила близо до нас. Стари приятелю, надявам се, че скоро отново ще си стиснем ръцете за поздрав. Ти си човек, стъпил здраво на кратата си. Не трябва да те убеждавам в това. Ти си Адам от ‘Трагедията на човека’.”

Ако не е могъл да яхне кон, Ласло Наги е яхнал своя вълшебен Пегас...

Двадесетгодишни приятелите се разделят. През 1947 г. поетът и Ерньо отиват в Будапеща. Година по-късно Ласло Наги идва в България. От родната си планина Бакон се озовава край Балкана. От Боженци отива в Смолян, за да възкликне сред родопските гори: „Щастлив съм!”

И наистина е било така. Навсякъде той чува не само сърдечни думи, но и близки до сърцето му песни, сътворени от неznайни певци. Затова сам изповядва: „Да обичаш и уважаваш себе си може и чрез другите народи!”

И поетът, излетял от своето родно селце Исказ, се залавя да пришива криле на приказните български народни песни.

Планина с планина се не среща, казва народът. А песните могат да се срещнат. Това чудо сътвори момчето – едно от неразделното исказко ято.

„ЛАСЛО НАГИ БЕШЕ ОЧАРОВАН ОТ БЪЛГАРСКИТЕ НАРОДНИ ПЕСНИ”. (Поетът Ицван Аг разказва за своя брат)

...Лаци не обичаше много да пътува. Отиде до Париж, но след една седмица се върна. Дюла Ийеш⁶ и Тибор Дери⁷ са били там и са знаели френски език. На запад не дават

⁶ Дюла Ийеш / Ilyés Gyula (1902–1983) – унгарски писател.

⁷ Тибор Дери / Déry Tibor (1894–1977) – унгарски писател.

преводач. В България беше друго, той можеше да разговаря. Не обичаше да пътува – такъв му беше характерът. Пътуването го изморяваше.

Беше веднъж в Армения и разказваше как там през годината всичко се ражда по два пъти – реколтата двойна.

Разказа и такъв епизод – искал да си дойде от България, ала закъснял за самолета. И точно този самолет паднал веднага след излитането си... Това е било отдавна, още по времето, когато бил стипендиант. И тъй останал жив по една случайност.

Той беше достъпен човек, не беше надменен. Само беше сдържан. Не се сприятеляваше с всекиго. По-късно вече и хората го изморяваха. До колкото си спомням – на младини беше веселяк.

Системата на Матиаш Ракоши⁸ напълно задължи неговото поколение. То повярва в цялата тази система. Лаци не изживя докрай трудностите, породени от нея, защото дойде в България. Когато се завърна, той мислеше, че всичко е много хубаво. Но едва тогава видя какво е положението. Помня го – започна да плаче вкъщи. Просто така: гледаше през прозореца и плачеше. Той и другите бяха поразени, защото онова, на което бяха посветили сърцата си на млади години и дори са били готови да умрат за него – сега ги беше разочаровало...

Нямахме хляб. Беше такава мизерия – просто невероятно. Баща ни нямаше толкова много земя, за да го обявят за кулак, но понеже той беше най-състоятелен, една година

⁸ Матиаш Ракоши (1892–1971) – унгарски политик, генерален секретар на ЦК на УКП, впоследствие УРП (1945–56), председател на министерския съвет на УНР (1952–53). По време на неговото управление се преминава от системата на народна демокрация към социалистическа държава, осъществява се ускорена съветизация на Унгария, съпроводена от политически репресии и култ към личността на М. Ракоши. Отстранен от власт след XX конгрес на КПСС – през юли 1956 г., емигрира в СССР и повече не се завръща в родината си.

бяхме кулаци... Тогава ни взеха и кравата, която руснаците бяха оставили.

Лаци умееше да кара коне, за да се качи на каруца и да подава снопи при жътва. Ръцете му, тялото му, бяха доста мускулести, силни. Но да оре, да сее и да върви подир конете – не можеше.

Към края на живота му болният крак стана ужасно слаб, тънък.

Той никога и с никого не се заяждаше, напротив, готов беше винаги да помогне. Това пролича особено по време на войната. Лаци с болния си крак влязъл в горящите обори да отреже въжетата на говедата и да ги спаси. Това са ми го казвали самите селяни, защото тогава не бях у дома. Когато започваха да се строят къщи, Лаци отиваше да помага – навсякъде, където има нужда. Ако някай успееше да се снабди с цигли, Лаци се качваше на покрива и вършеше доста полезна работа.

Ласло беше възхитен от красивата българска природа, от прекрасните хора, от непосредствеността и от трудолюбието им. Той беше очарован от народното творчество, от народните песни и от българската поезия. Още тогава ми спомена за българския Шандор Петьофи – Христо Ботев. Каза ми, че не само ние имаме такъв голям поет – и българите имат поет от такава величина.

Много ценеше Ботевската награда, която му беше връчена в България. Със сигурност мога да кажа – ценеше я повече, отколкото награда „Кошут“⁹. Характерно за Лаци беше и това, че не обичаше протокола. Когато получил наградата си в София, той получил предварително и текста със съпровождащо го приветствие. Прочел го, но после казваше: „Защо беше необходимо това? Та аз не за това...”

Един от най-хубавите ми спомени: лете с Лаци сядаме под кестена до портата на родния ни дом. После тоя кестен

⁹ Получава я през 1966 г.

го отсякоха – бил много голям...

Сядахме двамата и аз свирех. При тихо време в селата Чьос, Чогле, а и в Карта чуваха по-добре свирнята ми на тарогато, отколкото в нашето село Исказ.

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