A profound study of the reception of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant

Violetta L. Waibel (ed.)

Detours
Approaches to Immanuel Kant in Vienna, in Austria, and in Eastern Europe
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“Detours” explores the reception of Kant’s works in Vienna, Austria and Eastern Europe from a historical point of view and focuses on six topics: Kant and Censorship, Kant and Karl Leonhard Reinhold, who was the first Kantian born in Vienna and became a precursor for German and Austrian Kant reception in Jena, Kant and Eastern Europe, Kant and his Poets, Kant and Phenomenology and Kant and the Vienna Circle. In this way, the ambivalent perception of Kant in Austria becomes clearer: on the one hand Kant was censored and criticized harshly but on the other hand Kant’s philosophy was studied actively in the “underground”.

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Detours

Approaches to Immanuel Kant in Vienna, in Austria, and in Eastern Europe

In collaboration with Max Brinnich, Sophie Gerber, and Philipp Schaller

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refers to Hegel und Schelling. He had a very accurate understanding of the principles of Kant’s critical philosophy, and was able to formulate the role of German idealism as against the “dogmatic slumber”. He described himself as a representative of synthetism.

Mózes Székely taught at the Unitarian college. In 1843 he published his Metaphysik [Metaphysics], which refers mainly to the Kant supporter Fries, and Hegel. In this context it should be noted that considerable research has been done on the manuals and textbooks that were familiar in educational circles (Krug, Fries, Baumeister) and their Hungarian variants. It is however important to address this issue from some sort of basic consensus, which would require comprehensive research into the extent to which these books were known, read and used. Yet at present it is estimated that there are only fifteen researchers fully engaged in the subject of Hungarian philosophical history.

The final two steps in this process confirm the aspiration towards a separate path of development for philosophy written in Hungarian in Transylvania, which at that time meant the ambition to form its own specific system. Philosophy would finally have gained access to a public audience, and found its way into the salons. However a different path was imposed on it for the next thirty years as a consequence of the Hungarian liberation struggle of 1848–49 and the Transylvanian civil war (as a result of which the Strassburg am Mieresch college again ceased to exist).

In summary, therefore, the renewal of Hungarian philosophy in the spirit of Kant (in Transylvania as elsewhere), in terms of both content and Hungarian terminology and language, related to modernisation in a general context, beyond the domain of philosophy alone. It also reflected Protestant moral spirituality. All this formed a century-long generic bond linking Hungarian education and book publishing to German Enlightenment philosophy, scientific institutions, and the German language.

Translated by John Jamieson

József Rozgonyi’s Critique of Kant by Béla Mester

József Rozgonyi (1786–1823) is one of the leading figures in Hungarian philosophy at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. In multiple respects his life and work can be seen as spanning changes of epoch and historical transitions. He began his student years before the French Revolution, but wrote most of his works in the latter years of the Napoleonic wars and first years of the Holy Alliance. In the Hungarian historical context this was the time of the reforms of Joseph II and the eventful ensuing decades. In terms of Hungarian culture, it was
the end of the Enlightenment period, just before the age of Romanticism. Within the history of philosophy, Rozgonyi's student years and productive period coincide with the emergence of a growing number of critics of Kant and the beginnings of the debate among the first generations of his German adherents. The "Kant debate" was also taking place in Hungary. Another remarkable feature of Rozgonyi's works is that he was the last leading Hungarian thinker to write his most important works in Latin, even though he was already a participant in Hungarian polemics and debates. His Latin and Hungarian works were addressed to different audiences – the former to European academic philosophers and the latter rather to the educated general public. Accordingly the two bodies of work also differ in terms of scope, style and thematic content. The shorter Hungarian texts are polemical writings on moral philosophy, whereas the Latin writings are mainly systemological essays on the theory of cognition. His oeuvre clearly spans a transition between periods in the history of Hungary, although exactly when the change occurred is difficult to pinpoint because of insufficient research, and contradictory views of the age in the Hungarian historical and cultural tradition. Daily life and material conditions were becoming ever more refined, yet the philosophical culture that was still strong in the 17th century was declining, book imports were banned, censorship by the (Catholic) church was stricter than it had ever been, and the ability of Hungarians to attend universities in western Europe was severely restricted. This may be highlighted by Rozgonyi's own "peregrination" as a student, insofar as he succeeded in renewing this tradition towards the end of the 18th century, in order to undertake his own studies.

This paper will briefly describe Rozgonyi's life and work, focusing on his intellectual motivation, his works and the German and Hungarian debates on philosophy taking place at the time. The ongoing impact of his opinions on 19th century thought will be touched on at the end of the paper. Any detailed discussion of his works would be beyond the scope of this contribution, which is confined to a summary of Rozgonyi's life and an outline of the philosophical cultural and historical context.

A Life Journey: Utrecht, Oxford, Göttingen and Sárospatak

József Rozgonyi was born into an intellectual family from the city of Sárospatak in north-eastern Hungary. His grandfather and an uncle had both been professors at Sárospatak Reformed Church College, an institution with a long and honourable tradition. The young man's talents quickly became evident, and he left to study abroad, funded partly by his own income as a "teacher" and partly by his inheritance from his grandfather. However attending a foreign university
was scarcely possible for a Protestant in Hungary without connections at court, because since the time of Maria Theresia’s rule the granting of authority for Hungarian subjects to attend a foreign university had been at the monarch’s personal discretion, and permission was particularly difficult for Protestants to obtain. He therefore had to choose between the universities in the Hapsburg monarchy, opting for the University of Vienna. It is reported that Joseph II sought a personal meeting with the young man as an outstanding student, at which Rozgonyi supposedly convinced the Emperor to allow him and all Hungarian subjects in future to travel to study in western Europe, although this was probably intended as a symbolic gesture towards Hungary.

In going abroad to study, Rozgonyi was continuing the Hungarian tradition of the *peregrinatio academica* that had been abruptly terminated at the beginning of the century. He first went to Utrecht, which had traditionally been a destination for Hungarian students abroad. It was here that János Pósaházi (1628–1686) completed his degree on the anti-Cartesians, before becoming one of the leading professors at Sárospatak College, as its most prominent professor of philosophy before Rozgonyi himself. Rozgonyi spent four years in Utrecht attending the lectures of Professor Hennert (1739–1813), Professor of Mathematics and Physics at the university. Hennert had explored the world of Scottish thought in the 18th century and was familiar with the debates in that country, and he shared the opinions of Reid and Beattie, as opponents of Hume, on the *common sense* school. Rozgonyi duly absorbed his teacher’s views, and remained true to this position, as demonstrated by his subsequent critique of Kant. Following his years of study, he also completed a term at Oxford University. During his years as a student he may also have attended universities in England, France and Switzerland, but this cannot be conclusively documented. Nor has it been possible to establish from where he learned of the events of the French Revolution. We know that he enrolled at the University of Göttingen in November 1789, where he became familiar with the various interpretations of Kantian philosophy and the associated debates in Germany. In order to undertake further studies of Kant, his homeward journey included a detour of a few months to attend the lectures of Reinhold in Jena and Jakob in Halle. He then hurriedly returned home, as he himself records.

The reason for this haste was his appointment to a position at the classical secondary school (*Gymnasium*) in Losonc, Upper Hungary (now Lučenec, Slovakia). Rozgonyi taught here from 1791 to 1797, and it was here that he produced his critique of Kant[12] – which was to become the subject of considerable public debate – in its final form. For a considerable period this remained his only published work. On the retirement of his former friend István Szentgyörgyi in 1796, Rozgonyi was appointed Professor of Philosophy at Sárospatak College, a position he held for the rest of his life. Apart from his inaugural
lecture, here too for a long time he wrote virtually nothing, and busied himself with the publication of his deceased colleague’s papers. Further works by Rozgonyi appeared only in 1813–1822, and it was not until shortly before his death that his more significant works of wider scope saw the light of day. Hence his active life may conveniently be divided into two phases, the first of which comprised his critique of Kant and in-depth research, while the second produced his longer works and what can be seen as his spiritual testament. His silence in terms of publications in the period between these two phases may be attributed partly to the lack of printing presses in Sárospatak, and partly to censorship restrictions during the Napoleonic wars. This long period of inactivity had an impact on his later philosophy; while he attempted to take up his writing activities at the point where he had left them off, the systemological focus of the debate on Kant’s ideas in both Germany and Hungary had moved on in the interim, and to some extent he had to adapt the content of his writings to the new context.

The Works of József Rozgonyi

Rozgonyi’s first published text, under the title *Dubia de Initii transscendentalis idealismi Kantiani, ad viros clarissimos Jacob et Reinhold*, expresses his doubts regarding Kantian philosophy. The work, which appeared in 1792, is structured in the form of questions put to Reinhold and Jacob by a young thinker who has just completed his university degree. As he states in the introduction, Rozgonyi had attended the lectures of Reinhold and Jacob in order to become acquainted with the German interpretations of critical philosophy from Germany’s two greatest experts ("optimata, duumviri").

According to the author, in Jena and Halle there had been no opportunity, apart from attending the lectures themselves, to engage in any lengthy discussions with the two professors, although both Reinhold and Jacob had said they would be happy to respond to written questions. However Rozgonyi set his questions and doubts down in the form of an entire booklet, which he even published ("for greater ease of legibility", he claimed). So now he was waiting for an answer to his tract, which he expected to be a public one. These questions “from a humble student” were in fact ironical. He had attended the lectures not as a student, but as a colleague (himself being two or three years older than the professors). The tract may have been entitled *Dubia*, but in fact it was a polemic. It set out to interpret the *Critique of Pure Reason* and to explore and elucidate its unclear passages on the basis of the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the interpretations of Reinhold and Jacob, described as “proven experts” on Kant, and to point out the passages that still remained obscure. The “unclear passages” were
in fact theses that Rozgonyi understood perfectly clearly, but of which he was not convinced either by Kant’s arguments or those of the “duumviri”, and did not expect to become so convinced in the future. Rozgonyi’s own philosophical position is indicated by a quotation in English preceding his own Latin text – in itself unusual for an analysis of Kant – which was taken from Beattie’s An Essay on the Immutability of Truth: “All sound reasoning must ultimately rest on the principles of common sense, that is, on principles intuitively certain, or intuitively probable; and consequently that common sense is the ultimate judge of truth to which reason must continually act in subordination.” James Beattie (1735–1803) was a Scottish philosopher and supporter of the “common sense” philosophy of Thomas Reid. This motto of the Scottish philosopher expresses the key role played by common sense in human cognition, and Rozgonyi constructed his critique of Kant specifically on this principle. His slim volume
3. új szakasz – 13. lap

Fig. 4: József Rozgonyi, Dubitum de Initii transcendentalis idealismi Kantianti, ad viros clarissimos Jacob et Reinhold, preface in the form of a letter to Jacob and Reinhold (1792)

(“opusculum meum”) provides a reconstruction of the sequence of Kant’s thinking, to which he appends his critique. This text, which can be regarded as part of the anti-Kantian initial position in the Kant debate in Hungary, actually expresses considerable respect for Kant’s merits, and his great achievement of “sweeping out the Augean stables and bringing about a Newtonian revolution in philosophy”,17 The foreword refers to “unclear passages”,18 that can only be elucidated by the best (“optimi”) interpreters of Kant. But these passages are actually the fundamentals of Kant’s philosophy: the questions of space and time, causality, and the possibility of a priori synthetic judgements. While the details of his arguments cannot be considered here, the quality of Rozgonyi’s thinking on all the issues raised is clearly evident. In each case he traces Kant’s ideas back to 17th–18th century views, particularly those of the Scottish Enlightenment, i.e.
the debate taking place in that country in the mid to late 18th century, and formulates his own positions essentially within this Scottish context. Accordingly he argues that (1) Kant’s concept of causality can be traced back to the equivalent in Hume; (2) the problems of Hume’s concept of causality are best outlined by the critique of Thomas Reid; (3) in Rozgonyi’s opinion Reid was right and Hume was wrong; (4) Rozgonyi accepts Reid’s views, and believes that he (Rozgonyi) is right and Kant is wrong.

The discussion refers to several contemporary figures of British, and particularly Scottish, philosophy. Cited as Kant’s predecessors are not only Hume, who is often quoted in the text, but also Butler, Oswald and particularly Reid, then Beattie; from earlier thinkers, Berkeley is referred to, and from the empirical tradition, Locke, although his theory appears as if “purged” of the secondary qualities. The references to Continental European philosophy authors, including German philosophers other than Kant, are merely tangential. There are some comments on Leibniz and Wolff as founders of pre-Kantian systems. Rozgonyi also addresses Reinhold’s and Jacob’s interpretations, and with regard to the latter expresses his opinion on his critique of Mendelssohn and hence on Mendelssohn’s ideas as such.

Rozgonyi saw his main task as being to give voice to his own Scottish-informed style of thinking within the “German discourse” of the Kant debate. While Dubia was intended first and foremost as a critique of Kant rather than for the formulation of the author’s own views, from the text it is reasonably clear that the author is outlining the contours of a post-Kantian philosophy that belongs to the “common sense” school only in terms of its foundations.

Although Reinhold and Jacob did not respond to this polemic from a previously unpublished author, Dubia did not go entirely unnoticed. The work is best examined in conjunction with the review that appeared in the year following its publication19 and Rozgonyi’s reply.20 The anonymously published review thoroughly addresses Rozgonyi’s theses, claiming that the author either is not sufficiently familiar with the views of Kant under consideration, or has misunderstood them. The publisher did not offer Rozgonyi the opportunity to reply, and the identity of the reviewer, presumably a Kant supporter, was not revealed. However a particular turn of phrase in Rozgonyi’s response, later published in the introduction to the reply in a separate volume, can be understood as implying that Rozgonyi at least suspected to what circles the reviewer belonged, and may also have had an idea of the reviewer’s actual identity: “In my ‘Doubts’ booklet [in libello Dubiorum] I humbly advanced some objections to the illustrious Reinhold and Jacob, but these gentlemen remained silent. Yet in 1793 a discussion of my humble opus, couched in immoderate tone and with professorial ridicule, suddenly sprang up like an Aretalogus from a magic box.”21 Later in his reply, in a 62-page separate volume, Rozgonyi set out the reasons why the re-
viewer had been incorrect, and further developed his own critical ideas. Hence he reasserted his earlier thoughts.

Today there is little possibility of reconstructing who was the author of the review. It was probably one of the Hungarian Lutherans who in the 1790s had largely become Kant supporters. The reviewer could also have been from a group of intellectuals of institutional rank.

Rozgonyi’s philosophical canon is best evaluated against the background of the history of philosophy that he wrote for teaching courses at his university. This volume discussed the theory of cognition issues addressed by the ancient Stoics and Sceptics and contemporary compendia.22 Remarkably little attention is paid to the thinkers of the French Enlightenment, but there is a detailed discussion of Priestley, Price and the debates of the Scottish (“common sense”) philosophers, and of Reid and Hume. Anti-Kantian arguments, advanced with polished rhetoric, play an important role in the discussion. As earlier in his reply to the review of Dubia, he refers to Schulze.

Rozgonyi’s own philosophical ideas can be found in his late writings, in which he summarises the content of many years of lectures to his students. Some of this thinking as expressed in his lectures is also recorded in the lecture notes taken by Pál Almási Balogh in 1812–1813. These indicate that Rozgonyi was continuing a form of school-based philosophical tradition. However the text is generally confined to a description of the contemporary philosophy of mind, and a characterisation of the different approaches taken in this domain. Most philosophical disciplines are discussed within the context of this area of philosophy (e.g. ontology, cosmology, problems of time). A critical analysis of contemporary aesthetic ideas then leads to his critique of Kant’s aesthetics. The ideas of Rozgonyi’s anti-Kantian ally Schulze are discussed here in detail. In 1791 Rozgonyi had clearly not yet fully absorbed the content of Kant’s Critique of Judgement. And finally the third part of the work develops themes and content that would today fall within the discipline of psychology.

In the version of the lectures that appeared a few years after their delivery,23 emphasis is given to the content on the philosophy of mind. The sections devoted to aesthetics are curtailed or have disappeared altogether, with aesthetic phenomena used solely as illustration material on the philosophy of mind.

The other work published within Rozgonyi’s lifetime was a “philosophy of right”, in Latin.24 This short work, intended for use as a textbook, sets out more than a philosophy of right as we would understand it today. The basis on which some of the issues are addressed includes the rudiments of economics according to Adam Smith. Most interesting from the perspective of Rozgonyi’s attitude towards Kant are the chapters in which extensive sections are devoted to examining and critiquing Kant’s views of natural right.

A close look at the title page of the last two works in Latin provides an
overview of the author’s planned philosophical oeuvre, even if the system he envisaged never fully materialised. The left side reads as follows: A) De vero. Pars I. Psychologia empirica et rationalis; B) De bono. Pars I. Jus Naturae.

The question of why he did not proceed with De bono (on what is good) is difficult to answer satisfactorily. While Rozgonyi did engage in the philosophical discussion of ethical questions, he was not capable of properly formulating them from a systematic standpoint (consequentialism, eudemonism). He was convinced that Kant’s formalism, which he rejected, needed to be broken down in the context of the analysis of private and common goods, but ethics could not legitimately stand as a sovereign discipline in this area.

Rozgonyi and Schulze in the Context of the Kant Debate in Germany and Hungary

Following the unfavourable reception of Dubia and Rozgonyi’s long silence thereafter, he was delighted to discover the writings of Gottlob Ernst Schulze, which he continued to regard as important and fundamental for the rest of his life. He particularly prized Schulze’s anonymously published work Aenesidemus.25 Rozgonyi’s first mention of Schulze comes only in 1816 in his Responsio, so it is difficult to know whether he became aware of Aenesidemus immediately after the publication of its first edition, or not until 20 years later. Irrespective of when he discovered the work, however, Rozgonyi was delighted to have found an unhoped-for ally in the anti-Kant debate. From this time on he invoked Schulze’s sceptical standpoint as a corroboration of his own, “common sense”-based critique of Kant. There are in fact differences between the two thinkers’ views, however, on matters of considerable importance, such as probabilism. Apart from a certain similarity in their train of thought, the commonality between them lies solely in their efforts to trace the problems addressed by Kant back to Hume, but in different ways and with different aims.26 All of Rozgonyi’s later works contain multiple references to Schulze, but this does not denote any real parallels in their manner of thinking: in Rozgonyi’s De vero and in his summaries of the history of philosophy the Göttingen professor is described as having delivered a “mortal wound” to Kantianism in German culture, whereas the only discussion of Schulze’s own positive philosophical contributions is to be found in a marginal area of Rozgonyi’s philosophical endeavours, in the field of aesthetics.

In April 1817 Rozgonyi, through one of his students, sent copies of all his philosophical works published so far to the University of Göttingen. Schulze responded with a letter, expressing his delight at the presence of anti-Kantian fellow combatants even in Hungary. Rozgonyi immediately had his letter pub-
lished in the Hungarian press, in Hungarian translation. His next work, *Aphorismi psychologiae*, was actually dedicated and sent to Schulze, and an anonymous, but favourable, review duly appeared in Göttingen. Some historians of philosophy maintain the review was written by Schulze himself. Rozgonyi later published the "Schulze letter" and a further letter reflecting on the work in a separate volume, along with the letter of thanks from the University of Göttingen librarian.

Rozgonyi was clearly anxious to have his anti-Kantian position within Hungary confirmed by Schulze's prestige and the reputation of Göttingen as a centre of learning. But he was also aiming to situate his own ("common sensed"-based) theory of cognition and critique of Kant in a philosophical milieu that he saw as sufficiently far removed from the English tradition. His efforts to become involved in the contemporary philosophical debate in Germany yielded a modest, but visible, harvest. The exchange of correspondence with academic colleagues was followed by a favourable review of his most important volume, and most of his works were ordered and held in the largest German libraries.

Rozgonyi's critique of Kant and the Hungarian translation of the "Schulze letter" had a marked impact on Hungarian philosophy in particular. In the history of the country's philosophy Rozgonyi is now seen as the spokesperson of the anti-Kant side in the debate on Kant in Hungary in the years between 1792 and 1822 (into which he was drawn essentially against his will) as the main opponent of the Kantians, particularly István Márton (1760–1831). And just as the Kant debate in Hungary began with Rozgonyi's *Dubia*, it ended with his last work, published in 1822. There had been only insignificant changes in Rozgonyi's philosophical views over this time, during which a succession of interlocutors had come and gone. In 1810 he was asked, as the director of the College's publishing house, to assess a Kantian-oriented manuscript in a compendium. In his report, which appeared in print, he summarised, with regard to Kantian ethics, everything that he had previously said about the topic in his gnoseological writings. His arguments consisted essentially of a critique of Kant's view of man, and a defence of the material view of ethics against Kant's formalism.

In 1817 a positive review of Rozgonyi's critique appeared in the periodical *Tudományos Gyűjtemény*, the journal in which he had published the first translation of the Schulze letter. This periodical was read by the general public as well as the academic community, and accordingly Rozgonyi now became a well-known author. The work best known to the public was "A pap és a doctor" [*The Priest and the Doctor*], even though it appeared anonymously. The work adopts a pamphlet style, but after the introduction Rozgonyi takes up his philosophical arguments in a more serious vein. In the arguments he advances against Kant, he addresses two aspects that show significant parallels with later developments in Hungarian and English philosophy. In the course of his investigation of Kant's
maxims and in defence of his own eudemonistic position, Rozgonyi argues that in his derivation of moral duties even Kant himself was not able to avoid consequentialism, or certain consequentialist principles. Rozgonyi’s arguments are almost identical to those of John Stuart Mill, in his critique of Kant in *Utilitarianism*. The reference to the laws of probability, which Rozgonyi believed were also applicable to moral judgements, is not surprising in the light of his familiarity with “common sense” philosophy.

In this popular work of a thinker mainly concerned with the philosophy of mind there is only one passage that can be linked to political events of the time. To illustrate the contrast between action on the basis of probability and action based on mere possibilities (*probabilitas et possibilitas*), a disabused Rozgonyi writes as follows: “To proceed merely on the basis of possibility is to proceed as Kant did. At the time of the *French war* he wrote a *short text* on perpetual peace, in which he enlists the then French republic as the foundation of perpetual peace, which will always *defend* that peace. Accordingly he believed that peace would now exist for ever. However the great French republic perished soon after, *being* transformed into an appalling bourgeois society, and so ended the hope of perpetual peace.”31 This historical reference in Rozgonyi’s critique of Kant is then broadened into a critique of all the illusions of Continental Enlightenment regarding the French Revolution, without any need to move closer to Romanticism or to apologise. Among his Kantian opponents there were however some who equated Kant’s ideas on perpetual peace with the Holy Alliance, and tried to make them acceptable in this distorted sense.32

The Legacy of Rozgonyi’s Philosophy in Hungarian Thought

*Rozgonyi’s critique of Kant* had an indirect impact on later Hungarian philosophy, in the form of some distinctive modifications to Kantianism in Hungary. The Hungarian philosophers coming after Rozgonyi endeavoured, on the basis of, or in parallel with, his critique, to orient themselves towards approaches that in their view had already resisted critical philosophy in the way the philosopher of Sárospatak had done. One such direction of philosophical thought was that of Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843), who exerted a particularly strong impact on Hungarian philosophy. The most comprehensive discussion of the Hungarian Friesians to date is that of András Mészáros.33 The thinking of the Friesians fulfils the tenets of Rozgonyi’s critique of Kant in several respects. Schulze’s critique of Kant is known to have had a major influence on Fries. And during the student years of Hungarian Friesians, it was Rozgonyi’s parallel critique of Kant that in many ways paved the way for their alignment with Fries’s approach.

It is also interesting to observe the later reception of the “common sense”
philosophers, as Rozgonyi’s preferred thinkers, since they were partly the foundation of his critique of Kant. The most influential representative of their reception in Hungary was Gusztáv Szontagh (1793–1858), who can be seen as the originator of “Hungarian harmonistics”. He and his philosophical orientation can be regarded as part of Rozgonyi’s philosophical legacy by virtue of the constant references to Scottish philosophy in his numerous reviews of works by Hungarian philosophers. His thought was focused (although he was insufficiently aware of this) on bringing the Scottish school ever closer to Kant. He marks the beginning of an effort that characterised the whole of the 19th century in Hungarian philosophy, namely to reconcile the more or less utilitarian ethical view in political philosophy with Kant’s ethics. In the 1850s and some years later this led to results that display a degree of similarity with American pragmatism, and prepared the way for the reception of John Stuart Mill in Hungary in the 19th century, and for similar efforts on the part of Károly Böhm (1846–1911) and his followers in social philosophy.34

Translated by John Jamieson

Károly Böhm – System Building and Value Theory
by Imre Ungvári-Zrínyi

Károly Böhm (Karl Boehm), was a Neo-Kantian philosopher and one of the most prominent figures in Hungarian philosophy at the turn of the 19th century. He was the author of the first fully-fledged philosophical system written in Hungarian and was born on the 17 September 1846 in Besztercebánya (Banská Bystrica/Neusohl) in the county of Zólyom in the Kingdom of Hungary. His parents were Gottlieb Böhm, a farrier and Anna Zsufay.

Böhm, before becoming a student at the Theological Faculty of Pozsony, (Bratislava/Pressburg) attended the Besztercebánya Evangelical Gymnasium and the Evangelical Lyceum of Pozsony between 1852 and 1865. After his graduation he attended various courses in German universities studying philosophy and theology. During the period 1867–1869, at the University of Göttingen, he attended the courses of such well-known professors of that period, as Rudolf Hermann Lotze (teaching Psychology) – who is considered “a key figure in the philosophy of the second half of the nineteenth century, influencing practically all the leading philosophical schools of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, including the Neo-Kantians”.35 He also attended courses given by the proto Neo-Kantian evangelical theologian Albrecht Ritschl (teaching dogmatics) and Heinrich Ritter (teaching history of modern philos-
11 Cf. Sándor Karácsony, A magyar észjárás [The Hungarian Mentality]. Budapest 1985, 415–416: “From the Real Being he returns to the Practical Being which he gives meaning to. This is an Asian philosophy and appears to be slightly simplified from the viewpoint of the subjective and complicated systems and methods of European philosophy but it is merely descriptive: objective and primitive”.

12 József Rozgonyi, Dubia de initiis transcendentalis idealismi Kantiani, ad viros clarissimos Jacob et Reinhold. Pestini 1792, 152.


15 Rozgonyi, Dubia [n. 12], 14.


17 Rozgonyi, Dubia [n. 12], 150–151.

18 Rozgonyi, Dubia [n. 12], 6.


21 Rozgonyi, Responsio [n. 20], 6.


31 Rozgonyi, A 'pap és a' doctor a' sínlődő Kánt körül [In. 30], 84.


34 The above text is a shortened version of my study in Hungarian: Béla Mester, Magyar felvilágosodás – német vagy skót? Rozgonyi József Kant-kritikája, in: Ludassy Mária (ed.), A felvilágosodás díjai és árnai. Budapest 2007, 393–446; the study received funding support from the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA K 104643).


37 Imre Kajlós, Dr. Böhm Károly életé és munkássága [The Life and Work of Dr. Böhm Károly]. Besztercebánya 1913, 177.

38 Károly Böhm, A nem tudatosnak philosophiája [The Philosophy of the Unconscious], in: Ellenőr 1873, 122–125.