THE IDEAS OF THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

Suppressed and Victorious
1956–1999
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OF THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION,
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To a hero of 1956
SÁNDOR TARASZOVICS
(1931 - 2000)
International Staff, not to be found in the national archives of NATO member states and secret until quite recently, are used in the present paper for the first time to find answers to the questions presented above. The minutes of debates in the NATO Council and other forums of the Organization reveal changes in the individual members’ standpoints and their interplay in connection with the Hungarian revolt and the Kádár regime that established itself in the wake of the Soviet intervention. The comprehensive analyses prepared by the individual committees and by the central administration of NATO—with a view also to NATO’s multi-stage mechanism of decision-making based on consensus—reveal the special synthesis of Western ideas concerning the questions of the day. The relevant documents of the NATO Desk of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially the reports of the French and the Belgian ambassadors to NATO, offer important details about the treatment of the Hungarian question in NATO circles.

Before proceeding to survey NATO attitudes to the Hungarian revolution on the basis of this rich and substantial source material, let us briefly examine the questions on which the Organization focused in 1956–1957, the mechanism of its decision-making concerning Eastern Europe, and the antecedents of NATO policy toward Hungary during the revolution.

In the mid-1950s, NATO still had to face the problems of a divided Germany, Soviet expansion in the Near East and in the Third World in general, and the threat posed by Soviet economic and military potential. Western decision makers continued to regard the intentions of Khrushchev’s Soviet Union concerning the West as aggressive. As will be seen below, they proved to be right. As a reply to these challenges, the NATO Council decided, at its ministerial meeting in May 1956, that it would extend the Organization’s activities beyond the military sphere, and thus promote unity, solidarity, and cooperation among the member states.
The recommendations of the so-called Committee of Three were approved at the NATO ministerial meeting of December 1956. It was emphasized there that it was very important to hold intensive talks on all problems that could be detrimental to the Organization. The declaration of unity and solidarity was especially important in a period when the Suez crisis had led to a confrontation between France and the United Kingdom on the one hand and the United States on the other.

By adopting the report of the Committee of Three, the North Atlantic Council gave a new impetus to consultations among the member states concerning all aspects of the East–West relationship. The Council that had worked in Paris as a permanent institution since 1952, and was the highest forum of consultation and decision-making, dealt extensively with developments in Eastern Europe in the autumn of 1956. Teams of experts prepared reports for the Council. One of them specialized in the military, political, and economic conditions of the Soviet satellites and made reports on them beginning in 1951; another dealt with trends in Soviet policy since 1952. After 1957 onwards, their functions were taken over by the Political Committee formed as a result of a proposal of the Committee of Three. It discussed almost all aspects of the Hungarian question. The reports of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations and the team working on a comparative analysis of economic tendencies in NATO states and the Soviet Union also served to help the North Atlantic Council to form its opinion. Also, the Political Division of the International Staff supported and coordinated the activities of the North Atlantic Council. Preliminary studies prepared by the diplomatic bodies of the individual countries, and the talks of invited experts, played an important role in analyzing the situation in Eastern Europe. The general aim of this work was to reach a consensus in harmony with NATO principles of decision making. The military aspect of events in Hungary was covered by the executive agency of the Military Committee, the Standing Group. (The normal function of the Military Committee was to make recommendations to the Council in times of peace.)

In order to understand the Western response to the crisis in Hungary in 1956, it is worth becoming acquainted with the opinion of the competent organs of NATO about the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe prior to the Hungarian revolution, and with the standpoint and attitude the member states were to assume in the case of a crisis.

The tension between the Western and the Eastern bloc slackened considerably in the wake of the more flexible and rational foreign policy of the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death in 1953 and the beginning of the policy of détente and peaceful coexistence. However, NATO analysts pointed out that this did not involve a change in the basic intentions of the Soviet Union: “The Soviet leaders see international affairs in terms of a struggle for domination between the Communist and the ‘Capitalist’ worlds. They continue their unremitting efforts to promote the ascendancy of the Communist world and to weaken its opponents,” a document reads. NATO experts gathered from the speeches at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 that the Soviet standpoint regarding the West remained practically unchanged. The aims the Soviets still wanted to achieve were the dissolution of NATO and the European Union, the withdrawal of NATO forces from their bases in Europe, and the prevention of West Germany’s effective participation in the Western alliance. In fact, they wanted the whole of Germany to belong to the Soviet bloc. The Soviet policy of détente served merely to throw the West off its guard, experts believed. What was new in Soviet diplomacy after Stalin was merely more civilized methods and a shift of geopolitical emphasis. The earlier rigid isolation was replaced by a readiness for discussions, the claim to build economic and cultural relations with Western countries, especially with the
United States, and a return to traditional methods of diplomacy. Although Western Europe was still the target area for Moscow, the Soviet leadership, respecting the European status quo and the realities of the nuclear age, temporarily renounced further expansion in the region and shifted the focus of their activities to the developing countries of Africa and Asia, especially the Near East. Soviet penetration there took place mostly by means of economic support and propaganda. Western analysts found its prospects dangerous even though it involved other means of expansion. The growing Soviet economic potential threatened a military one as well.\textsuperscript{13}

Western diplomacy had precise information about the process of liberalization beginning in the East European satellites after Stalin’s death. As regards Hungary, a sudden acceleration of development was counted on.\textsuperscript{14} At the same time, Western experts believed that the so-called de-Stalinization initiated by Moscow and the thaw that ensued would not shake Soviet rule in Eastern Europe. They maintained that the policy of peaceful coexistence did not involve the slackening of Soviet control over Eastern Europe at all, however hard the Kremlin tried to present its allies as independent states.\textsuperscript{15} As for a possible crisis, NATO experts were convinced that “the Soviet government” was “ready to take the necessary economic, political, and military measures to maintain its control over the bloc.”\textsuperscript{16}

The opposition of the Eastern and Western military blocs, and the risk of a nuclear war in the case of a violation of the European spheres of interest limited the NATO countries’ ability to influence developments in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{17} Although they wished to express their sympathy for the process of liberalization in Eastern Europe, the team analyzing trends in Soviet policy and the so-called thaw in Eastern Europe on the eve of the Hungarian revolution concluded the following: “As we are not prepared to use force to liberate them, we should not encourage futile rebellions on their part.”\textsuperscript{18}

This report, the aim of which was to promote a more active NATO policy toward the satellites and to prepare for a meeting of NATO foreign ministers planned for the middle of December 1956, was discussed by the NATO Council on October 24, the day after the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution. According to documents made available to the present author, the meeting did not deal with events in Budapest, that peaceful demonstration of students at the Technical University, the shooting at demonstrators, the armed uprising, and the first Soviet intervention. The ambassadors to NATO merely expounded the earlier standpoint of their governments. Some representatives established that the study on thaw in Eastern Europe did not sufficiently underline the role of Titoism in the region. They emphasized the point also that the resolution of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, acknowledging the possibility of different roads leading to Socialism, had shaken the satellites. Sir Christopher Steel,\textsuperscript{19} the British Permanent Representative, argued that despite the unrest in Eastern Europe, the opportunities for the satellites to shake off the Soviet yoke were limited, any such attempts being hindered by economic factors, the presence of Stalinists at all levels of administration, the subordination of the armed forces to the Soviet Union, and the former rivalry of the countries of the region.

The British ambassador did not think direct Soviet intervention likely unless the Soviet Union were invited to do so by a political faction of the country in question. Herbert Adolph Blankenhorn,\textsuperscript{20} the Permanent Representative of the German Federal Republic, warned the Western countries to be very cautious not to weaken by any ill-considered measure the positions of the new Eastern European governments that enjoyed greater mass support than their predecessors but still consisted of communists.\textsuperscript{21} From then on, caution became the key word of discussions about the Eastern European crisis in the NATO Council. The report sent by France’s NATO ambassador Alexandre Parodi\textsuperscript{22} to the French
Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the meeting of October 24 also emphasizes this element, and points out one of the main targets of the joint policy to be elaborated: "The members of the Council agreed that it would serve the interests of NATO countries if in the course of their relations with the satellites they could motivate them very cautiously to achieve greater independence from the Soviets..." It was also generally believed that greater thawing was in the interest of NATO, so it was decided at the meeting to work out a detailed NATO policy concerning Eastern Europe. The Secretary-General was invited to suggest a method for the preparation of a document by experts of the individual nations about the policy to be followed with regard to the satellites, which could be discussed at the ministerial meeting in December 1956. Accordingly, on October 27 Alberico Casardi, Deputy Secretary-General in charge of political matters, invited the governments of the member states to suggest ways of promoting liberalization in Eastern Europe. In response to this invitation, American NATO ambassador George W. Perkins emphasized, at the meeting of the Council on October 31, the point that the documents should only suggest some ideas about the common policy to be followed in the future, because the elaboration of a common line should be the task of the ministerial meeting. The usual administrative course of making reports was, however, upset by the Hungarian crisis and the Suez war that began on October 29; they were the main subjects discussed by the NATO Council in those days.

**NATO and News of the Hungarian Revolution**

The attitude of the Western allies toward the Hungarian revolution can be divided into the following three phases. The period from October 27 to November 19, 1956, was that of interpreting and discussing the often contradictory pieces of information about the revolt in Hungary, and throwing out suggestions about possible reactions of the NATO countries. The second phase, lasting until the end of December, was characterized by deeper analyses on the part of the competent NATO organs in order to be able to draw political and military conclusions concerning the Eastern European crisis. These ideas were formed into a definite concept in the third phase, that is, in the first months of 1957.

Let us have a look behind the scenes now. Let us listen to what the Permanent Representatives were talking about at the Chaillot Palace in Paris at the meetings, held ever more frequently as the young rebels of Budapest were throwing flasks filled with petrol at Soviet tanks and the mass movement was spreading to the countryside.

On October 27, 1956, the North Atlantic Council sat in private and discussed the events taking place in Hungary. The British Permanent Representative confirmed that the government of the United Kingdom, like those of the United States and France, was for convening the UN Security Council in connection with the Hungarian affair. The Permanent Representative of Norway interjected that other countries should join in support of the motion. French ambassador Parodi also favored the motion. Finally it was agreed that the countries wishing to join the motion of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States should contact the New York mission of the three countries through their UN representatives. The Italian and German Permanent Representatives suggested that the Council of the Western European Union also be involved in the decision making. The American Perkins objected, saying that it would be wrong to approach the question as a regional one, as it affected the total relationship between East and West. The Greek and Italian Permanent Representatives suggested issuing a communiqué, so that the world would know that NATO was considering the Hungarian question. The French, British, and American ambassadors protested, saying that such a communiqué would immediately be used by the Soviets to justify their intervention in Hungary. The Council accepted this argument.
In the meantime, events took a strange turn in Budapest. On October 28, Prime Minister Imre Nagy announced an armistice. At the meeting of October 30 of the NATO Council, Hungarian developments were discussed in detail, along with news of the Suez war that had broken out the previous day. The Turkish Permanent Representative maintained that there was something more than just a revolt against the Soviet Union. The Hungarians were revolting against the communist regime as such, and NATO should offer them the greatest possible help. In his government’s opinion, NATO should send the Soviet Union a note of protest. The other ambassadors thought, however, that this motion was belated, as the UN Security Council was already dealing with the problem and it had, in fact, denounced the Soviet measures already. In connection with the disquieting news about two Soviet armored divisions approaching Hungary from the direction of Romania, the NATO Permanent Representatives dealt also with the military aspect of the situation in Hungary. The following day, they received information from the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) about the movement of Soviet forces.

On November 2, 1956, the members of the NATO Council met again to discuss the ever-stranger news coming from Eastern Europe. It had, namely, come to their knowledge that the Hungarian government led by Imre Nagy had decided the previous day to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and to declare neutrality. At the beginning of the meeting, the British Permanent Representative, Sir Christopher Steel, presented the information he had received from the British ambassador about the official statement of October 30. From this document he drew the unbelievable conclusion that the Soviets did not want to interfere with the Hungarian revolution and, in fact, they considered the regimes they created to be as so fragile that they had no idea how to strengthen or restore them. Considering the possible spread of revolution to Poland and East Germany, the British speaker believed that the Soviets would soon come forward with the idea of the reunification of Germany through free elections, provided that it would be neutral and not a member of NATO. It was obviously due to the general hope that had taken possession of the British Foreign Office by then that Sir Christopher interpreted the fact that the Soviets had sent reinforcements to Hungary as a Soviet attempt merely to enter into a more favorable position when it came to bargaining with the new Hungarian government. As a matter of fact, the Soviets were preparing for their attack against Hungary, codenamed Operation Whirlwind. The Soviet presidium had decided on October 31, on Khrushchev’s initiative, to suppress the Hungarian revolt by force, in order to defend the strategic positions of the Soviet Union as a great power.

It was at this NATO meeting of November 2 that closer cooperation among member states began to take shape. The Dutch ambassador Eelco N. van Kleffens suggested that the UN discussion of the Hungarian question should be exploited in order to demonstrate the perfect unity of action among the NATO states. The Suez war had led to severe tension between the United States on the one hand and France and the United Kingdom on the other, the UN becoming one of the major scenes of discord working against Atlantic solidarity. Every Permanent Representative agreed with the Dutch motion, and the common approach to the Hungarian question remained on the agenda of the North Atlantic Council. The West German motion to coordinate relief to Hungary also met with general acceptance.

The following day, the NATO ambassadors continued to discuss Hungarian events. They even raised the question of how to react if the Nagy government turned to the West for armed support. The American and the French Permanent Representatives dismissed the idea by emphasizing the possibility of a peaceful settlement. On the basis of information received from Charles E. Bohlen, American ambassador in Moscow, Perkins thought it possible that
the Soviets and the Hungarians would form a joint commission to find a solution to the points raised by Nagy.\textsuperscript{37} Parodi said that the French military attaché in Moscow did not expect another turn in events, and regarded the sending of Soviet reinforcements to Hungary merely as a measure of precaution to prevent the rebels from killing Soviets and communists.

The united action of the NATO countries in the UN was also discussed again. Adolfo Alessandrinii, the Italian NATO Permanent Representative,\textsuperscript{38} demanded most emphatically that the allied governments instruct their UN delegations to hasten the convocation of an extraordinary general assembly in order to discuss the Hungarian question.\textsuperscript{39} Naturally, no one wanted another world war to break out, so the Italian diplomat found UN actions the only possible means of protest against Soviet measures. The Norwegian Permanent Representative Jens Boyesen\textsuperscript{40} also hoped that the UN General Assembly would denounce a possible Soviet attack, which would put political and moral pressure on Moscow. The Canadian Permanent Representative, L. Dana Wilgress,\textsuperscript{41} who had suggested that a special UN armed force be deployed in Suez, called attention to the importance of drawing a parallel between the Hungarian question and the French and British intervention in Egypt: “If the General Assembly denounces the possible Soviet attack, the moral and political weight of this measure will depend on how France and the United Kingdom receive the resolutions concerning them.”\textsuperscript{42} At that, the French NATO ambassador Parodi expounded the standpoint of his government, saying that there was no connection whatsoever between the two events. France and Britain could not be compared to the Soviets, nor the Hungarian insurgents to Gamal Abdel Nasser. He added a bitter remark that UN measures always fell on those who observed the international rules of conduct.\textsuperscript{43} As a consequence, no settlement acceptable to all was reached at the meeting of November 3.

As is well known, the second Soviet invasion of Hungary was launched at dawn, November 4, 1956. In the meantime, British and French air-raids against Egypt, the landing on November 6, and the American counter-measures increased the tension between the United States and its most important allies. Consequently, discussion of the events in Hungary and the Near East continued to go hand in hand in the NATO Council, the UN, and the world press. At the meeting on November 4, the Italian Alessandrinii emphasized the point that the Soviet Union had taken advantage of the Near East crisis and the broken unity of the West to restore its rule in Hungary, and considered, therefore, the restoration of this unity and the elaboration of a common approach a question of high priority. He believed the NATO Council to be the best scene for this process. NATO Secretary-General Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay also believed that re-establishing the unity broken by Suez was the most important issue, without which a dangerous political vacuum would arise, one that could again be exploited by the Soviets.\textsuperscript{44}

On November 5 and subsequent days, the North Atlantic Council went on discussing the possible consequences of the double crisis intensively. The American Permanent Representative said on November 5 that “under certain circumstances Russia could be forced to take the public opinion of the world into consideration. It is important, therefore, that the governments... should protest at Moscow emphatically and let their peoples express their indignation freely.”\textsuperscript{45} This idea seemed the more practicable, as public opinion in NATO countries had been shocked by the brutal aggression against Hungary. The threats in the letters sent by Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin to the British, French, and Israeli governments on November 5 also caused a great stir. At the meeting of November 6, the members of the Council made some concrete decisions. They declared anew that cooperation among the UN representatives of the NATO countries was very important. They found putting a constant pressure on the Soviet
Union desirable, by keeping certain topics (such as the sending of observers, the deployment of international forces, and humanitarian questions) continually on the agenda. They considered also the possibility of a diplomatic boycott of Moscow, and decided to keep away from ceremonies for the Soviet national holiday on November 7. The suggestion of the Italian Permanent Representative that diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union be broken off met, however, with immediate American disapproval. Blankenhorn, the West German Permanent Representative, advanced the idea of recalling the ambassadors in Moscow for consultation.\textsuperscript{46}

On November 8, the very day after János Kádár had arrived in Budapest in a Soviet tank as the head of the Hungarian "revolutionary workers’ and peasants’ government" formed by Moscow, the NATO Permanent Representatives were already considering a diplomatic boycott of the Kádár government. The Italian ambassador maintained that the Western powers should not recognize the new Hungarian government, and the Belgian Permanent Representative agreed. The decision was, however, postponed, as the presence of the embassies of the NATO countries in Budapest was not seen as automatic recognition for the time being. Several delegations called attention to the fact that both the West and the Hungarian population were interested in maintaining diplomatic missions in Hungary. However, it was urgent to decide whether the new Hungarian UN delegation, led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Imre Horváth, should be recognized or not. While the Belgian André de Staercke\textsuperscript{47} protested against the idea of UN ambassadors from NATO countries sitting at a conference table with representatives of the new Hungarian regime, the British and American speakers adopted a more moderate position. Decision was postponed in this question also.\textsuperscript{48}

About ten days later, NATO Secretary-General Lord Ismay gave a short summary of the plan of action that had crystallized during the discussions of the previous period. He said the following: the policy to be followed in the UN should be coordinated in order to exert necessary pressure on the Soviet Union; an agreement must be reached in connection with support for the Hungarian refugees and humanitarian aid for Hungary. The NATO Council asked the governments to refrain from maintaining social, cultural, and sports contacts with the Soviet Union. Perkins, the Permanent Representative of the United States, said that the United States did not intend to participate in the Soviet international fair of 1957 and had decided to suspend all cultural and technical exchange programs with the Soviets.\textsuperscript{49} This was the end of the first phase of Western reactions to the Hungarian revolution. The feverish gathering and interpreting of information led to the formulation of a program of action. The second phase was that of a deeper analysis.

\textbf{Lessons of the Hungarian Revolution for NATO}

The North Atlantic Council regularly received information about the military aspect of the East European crisis and the Hungarian revolution. Following the suppression of the revolution, the executive agency of the Military Committee, the Standing Group, prepared its first preliminary evaluative reports, presented to NATO Permanent Representatives on November 15. The analyses aimed at throwing light on the consequences for NATO of the events in Poland and Hungary, more precisely their influence on Soviet military potential. According to the report of November 5, the social unrest in Poland and Hungary reduced the strength of the Soviet bloc and the possibility of a Soviet attack on Western Europe, at least in the near future. It was presumed that the difficulties within their own camp diverted the attention of Moscow leaders. Part of their military force had to be thrown in for the sake of safety, and they could no longer rely on the Polish and Hungarian armies. The Standing Group maintained also that the possible weakening of
supply routes connecting the Soviet Union with East Germany must have weakened Soviet military potential. It was, however, seen as a potential threat for NATO that the revolts within the Soviet bloc might lead Moscow to misinterpret the situation and to take steps to divert the attention of the world.\textsuperscript{50}

The November 8 report of the Standing Group dealt with the details of the dangers ahead for NATO. Members feared that Moscow might misinterpret the reaction of the West to Soviet steps in the satellites or threats to neutral states. They thought that the Soviets were becoming increasingly aggressive, not only in Hungary but also in the Near East. They found Soviet support of Egypt especially disquieting, and believed that the Soviet Union was ready for a military intervention in the Near East.\textsuperscript{51}

On November 28, 1956, the NATO Council and the Standing Group held a joint meeting at which Lt. General Leon W. Johnson, chairman of the Standing Group, summarized the military lessons of the Hungarian crisis on the basis of the latest pieces of information from the secret services. He maintained that the brutal suppression of the Hungarian revolution had proved that the fundamental aims of Soviet foreign policy had not changed since Stalin’s death. “We are confronted with a Soviet equally ruthless and aggressive, and more prone to miscalculation. Therein lies our greatest danger. Soviet capabilities continue to increase and the risk of war through miscalculation has risen,” the general said.\textsuperscript{52}

The members of the team analyzing the tendencies of Soviet foreign policy arrived at a similar conclusion in their draft report, prepared by the middle of November 1956.\textsuperscript{53} They found that their interpretation of the intentions of the Soviet Union in foreign policy, as quoted above,\textsuperscript{54} had been borne out by events in Hungary and the Near East. They believed that the long-term goals of the Soviets continued to be world hegemony and the destruction of the “capitalist world,” and that the Soviet Union remained strong enough to increase its economic and military potential despite the Hungarian crisis. The team interpreted the Soviet reaction to the Hungarian revolution as meaning that the Soviet Union was not willing to tolerate the level of thawing that this country represented, and was ready to employ the strongest military measures to secure its rule over Eastern Europe. This was why NATO experts feared a war launched by the Soviet Union with traditional weapons. Considering the possibility of a nuclear war, they believed that the Soviet leaders were afraid of it and would refrain from embarking on such a path. A dangerous situation might arise, however, if the Soviets felt their positions in Eastern Europe threatened. Like the Standing Group report, this document called attention to the threat of a nuclear war, which might break out if the Soviet decision makers misinterpreted a critical situation. They might, for example, think that their country was being threatened. Their obsession with being encircled might strengthen this impression.

The NATO Council held a meeting for foreign ministers between December 11 and 14, 1956, one of the main topics of which was the situation in Eastern Europe and its impact on NATO. The aim was to frame a new approach to the Soviet satellites on the basis of the preparatory work of the previous weeks and the lessons drawn from events in Eastern Europe. The starting point was that the Soviets intended to maintain communist regimes in the satellites. Selwin Lloyd, British Foreign Minister, called attention to the pressure that new armed conflict might put on the West to intervene militarily to support the rebels.\textsuperscript{55} Soviet leaders had declared, during their visit to London in April 1956, that any Western interference with events in Eastern Europe would probably lead to war with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{56} Consequently, it was vital to avoid encouraging the satellites to rise against the Soviet regime, as it was impossible to give them military support. Instead, they should be encouraged to extricate themselves from their shackles gradually.\textsuperscript{57} In this regard there was no change from the period prior to the East European crisis.
Heinrich von Brentano, Foreign Minister of West Germany, emphasized the importance of caution. He said that it was not in the interest of NATO to support such dramatic events, and that his state was doing its best to exert a restraining influence on the East German population in order to avoid a catastrophe similar to that in Hungary. The members of the Council finally agreed that positive results could be expected from ever more intensive economic, political, and cultural relations with the satellites, rather than from increasing tension with the Soviet Union. They still wanted to maintain the ban on exchange programs introduced after the suppression of the Hungarian revolution. The West German Foreign Minister thought it important that the West give voice to its long-term intentions concerning the region. That is why the final communiqué included the sentence quoted above, according to which “The peoples of Eastern Europe have the right to choose their own governments freely, unaffected by external pressure and the use or threat of force, and decide for themselves the political and social order they prefer.”

Besides the reconsideration of NATO policy toward Eastern Europe, the brutal Soviet intervention in Hungary made the meeting of NATO foreign ministers come to another important conclusion, namely that the member states had to increase their unity, solidarity, and military potential in order to be able to remain an effective alliance. This idea was underlined also by Lt. General Johnson, Chairman of the Standing Group, in his report on the military aspect of the Hungarian revolution. Examining the military potential of the Soviet bloc, the experts of the Committee found, in contrast with earlier interpretations, that nothing supported the assumption that Soviet military potential had been weakened by events in Poland and Hungary. They still believed that the Soviets could not trust the armies of the satellites as before, which could, in fact, lead to a decrease in Soviet military potential. The Soviets might find it necessary to deploy military forces to defend supply routes.

Analysts still maintained that the huge Soviet army and the massive presence of tank and armored divisions on the territory of the less trustworthy satellites, as well as the merciless reaction to events in Hungary, had proved that the Soviets' capability for action was sufficient for an immediate reaction to whatever happened in the region under their rule. They found that in view of 1956 it could safely be assumed that the military potential of the Soviet bloc had increased, and that NATO forces should raise the level of their preparedness.

The reinterpretation of NATO's policy toward Eastern Europe continued at the level of the competent organs of the Organization after the conference of the foreign ministers. The most important lessons had been drawn, and the third phase of reactions to the Hungarian revolution began.

Reconsidering the theoretical framework of the problem went hand in hand with solving the practical problems raised by the suppression of the Hungarian revolution. The discussion of the Hungarian affair within the political organs of NATO in the early months of 1957 centered around three main questions: the case of the almost 200,000 refugees going to the West after the revolution, support of the destitute Hungarian population, and the attitude toward the Kádár government. While the question of the refugees could be settled satisfactorily, that of aid to Hungary raised the dilemma of how to help the Hungarian population without contributing to the stabilization of the Kádár regime. The final decision was for purely humanitarian aid.

But how should the West approach the Kádár government, which had managed to consolidate its power by increasing terror, large-scale imprisonments and executions on the one hand, and by measures to improve general conditions, such as wage increases and tax reductions on the other. Finding an answer to this question was urgent, as NATO experts found the diplomatic boycott untenable in the long run. The Hungarian authorities could force the
Western governments to take sides at any moment. They demanded, for example, that the new American ambassador to Budapest present his credentials. Three alternatives were outlined by NATO analysts as to the future of the Kádár government in their report of February 13, 1957: the regime could survive in its original form, yield to the demands of the masses, or take up the fight once again. The report prepared by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 1957 for NATO concludes the following: “The police gathering strength day by day manages to prevent open resistance, which makes it possible for the Kádár government to establish itself. This does not mean, however, that the deep-rooted resistance of the Hungarian people is over. It is rumored that a new uprising is going to break out in spring…” Jean Paul-Boncour, French Minister in Budapest, mentioned in a telegram sent to Paris on March 6, 1957, that, according to information received from the Israeli legation, the Hungarian authorities wished to provoke disturbances in the streets on March 15 (the national holiday of the 1848 revolution) in order to be able to increase repression.

As NATO believed an armed conflict in Eastern Europe to be likely, it began to work out alternative solutions to different situations that might arise in order to avoid being reduced to passivity, as it was in the autumn of 1956, when it had no action plan at all. As a result, the Political Committee of the North Atlantic Council ordered, in February 1957, an analysis of the possibility of revolutions in the satellites, with Poland and East Germany principally in mind. It was assumed that the danger of Western involvement was greatest in these countries, which might lead to a world war. “In Hungary, the odds are that the people will be prudent enough to avoid a renewal of large-scale bloodshed,” according to the analysis prepared by mid-April 1957. Soviet forces stationed in Hungary were regarded as sufficient to suppress any revolt. Under these circumstances, NATO experts found that the only attitude the West should adopt was to keep the Hungarian question in the public eye, mostly by means of propaganda through the UN. “This is an ideal topic by which to influence public opinion in the non-aligned countries,” analysts suggested.

The long-range target of the new NATO policy in Eastern Europe was to help the satellites get rid of Soviet rule and become independent and democratic states. In the short run, they merely wished to encourage a spirit of resistance. The best means for that seemed to be the creation of national communist regimes. Thus the West decided to refrain from encouraging the peoples of the satellites to employ force. “There would be no advantage to the West to incite sabotage, riots or guerrilla operations in any of the satellites. Strikes and peaceful demonstrations, if they were to occur, might play a valuable part in crystallizing popular opposition to the existing regimes in those satellites which have remained relatively quiet (Czecho-slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania).” In Hungary the encouragement of peaceful actions was out of the question.

Conclusion

It becomes obvious from what has been said about NATO’s attitude to the Hungarian revolution that it treated events in Hungary as an issue of great importance. The viewpoints on the basis of which NATO organs analyzed events in Hungary offer us an explanation for the attitude of Western foreign policy toward Eastern Europe. For example, Western experts concentrated primarily on possible changes after the Polish and Hungarian crises. It was national interest that led Western states to accept the status quo and the postwar spheres of interest. The members of the NATO Council, especially the American, British, and French Permanent Representatives, immediately ruled out all plans for action in connection with the Hungarian revolution. This restraint can be seen also in the fact that no press communiqué was issued about NATO and the Hungarian question until the middle of December 1956.
Hungarian revolution were discussed. A more definite program of action took shape only weeks after the outbreak of the revolution. During the twin crises in Hungary and Suez, the most important decisions of the Western world were made by the national governments rather than NATO. The NATO Council and its organs played an outstanding role in solving smaller strategic tasks demanding organization, such as the question of the Hungarian refugees and sending humanitarian aid to Hungary. Among recurring subjects were the prevention of Soviet interference in the Third World and the relationship of the West with the Kádár government, whereas the British–French–Israeli action against Egypt was not even mentioned before October 29.

The process of decision making about the Hungarian affair was largely determined by the governments of the member states, the NATO Council having merely consultative functions. It can be seen from the debates during the Hungarian revolution that the opinions of the American, British, and French Permanent Representatives were decisive in forming the general standpoint. Nevertheless, these ambassadors did not fully dominate the scene: the others, mainly the Italian, West German and Belgian Permanent Representatives, were also active and put forward significant motions. The International Staff performed important ancillary activities, organized work, and offered expert opinion to the Council. For example, it gave the National Delegations detailed information about the life of Imre Nagy. By contrast, organizations outside the framework of NATO, for example the Movement for Atlantic Unity (Mouvement pour l'Union Atlantique) and the Assembly of Captive European Nations failed to play a role in decision making.

As becomes clear from what has been said above, the Hungarian revolution did not bring about a considerable change in NATO policy toward Eastern Europe. The substantial elements of the idea which had been worked out by the spring of 1957—
encouraging a more independent foreign policy and a more liberal
domestic policy—had already been outlined before the Polish
and Hungarian events of 1956, as was the principle of not encour-
aging “useless revolts.” The West did not intend to give armed sup-
port, as any Western intervention would threaten a nuclear war with
the Soviet Union.

The Hungarian crisis led to a partial modification of NATO
policy toward the satellites. Due to the cruel suppression of the rev-
olution and the measures of repression on the part of the Kádár gov-
ernment, it was emphatically declared that armed uprisings were
not to be provoked or encouraged, and national communist regimes
were the best means of realizing Western ideas in the region.
Finally, the military principles of NATO were supplemented by the
idea that any revolt in the Soviet bloc endangered the security of the
NATO countries.

Last but not least, the Hungarian revolution and its suppress-
don did not bring about a considerable change in East-West rela-
tions. The decisive centers of decision making, with NATO organs
among them, carefully observed the unwritten rules of the game,
such as the sanctity of spheres of interest. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization not only refrained from directly interfering
with the Hungarian affair but also left the ideological battle in the
press to the governments of the member states. As has been men-
tioned above, the NATO Council decided in the first days of the
Hungarian revolution not to provide the public with information
about its activities. The diplomatic, economic, and cultural restric-
tions introduced as a result of the Soviet intervention in Hungary
were gradually lifted in 1957–1958 in the atmosphere of détente.

Notes

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for their help in my work at the institution.

2. Final Communiqué of the meeting of the North Atlantic Council,
held on December 11–14, 1956, paragraph 7.

3. Csaba Békés, “A brit kormány és az 1956-os magyar forradalom”
(The British Government and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956), in
Évkönyv I. 1992 (Budapest, 1992); idem, Az 1956-os magyar for-
radalom a világpoliikában. Tanulmány és válogatott dokumentumok
(The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 in International Politics. A
Study and Selected Documents) (Budapest, 1996), the American,
British, and French documents translated by the co-editor Katalin
Somlai; idem, “Az Egyesült Államok és a magyar semlegesség
1956-ban” (The United States and Hungarian Neutrality in 1956), in
Évkönyv III, 1994 (Budapest, 1994); György Litván, “Francia doku-
mentumok 1956-ról” (French Documents on 1956), in Évkönyv III,
1994 (Budapest, 1994); Gusztáv Kecskés, “Franciaország politikája
az ENSZ-ben a ‘magyar úgy’ kapcsán 1956–1963” (French UN
Policy in Connection with the Hungarian Affair, 1956–1963),
Századok, no. 5 (October 2000).

4. The documents of the NATO International Staff and the NATO mil-
itary authorities relating to the period 1949 to 1965 can at present be
studied at the NATO Archives in Brussels.

5. The members of the Committee of Three (the so-called “Three Wise
Men”) were Gaetano Martino, Halvard Lange, and Lester B. Person,
foreign ministers of Italy, Norway, and Canada respectively.

6. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Facts and Figures (The
46–47, 50.

7. For the mechanism of decision making in NATO, see The NATO
Handbook (1110 Brussels: NATO, 1998–1999), pp. 147–150; see
23. Telegram from the head of France's NATO representation to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Paris), Service des Pactes, folio 210, 50.397 (October 24, 1956).

24. The Italian Alberico Casardi was Deputy Secretary-General in charge of political affairs between 1956 and 1958, and Deputy Secretary-General between 1958 and 1962.

25. Archives of the International Staff of NATO (Brussels), C-M(56)122 (October 27, 1956).

26. George W. Perkins was the Permanent Representative of the United States in the NATO Council between 1955 and 1957.

27. Minutes of the meeting of the NATO Council on October 31, 1956. In the Archives of the International Staff of NATO, Brussels, C-R(56)57 (November 5, 1956).

28. On the basis of an agreement concluded at the clandestine talks between the United Kingdom, France, and Israel held at Sèvres on October 22–24, 1956, Israel launched an attack against Egypt on the Sinai Peninsula on October 29. The following day, the United Kingdom and France sent an ultimatum to the belligerents. They started air raids against Egypt on October 31, and landed in Egypt on November 9.

29. The present account of the private meetings of the NATO Council on October 27 and November 2, 1956, are based on French diplomatic sources: see the telegram of the head of the French NATO representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, Nations Unies et organisations internationales, folio 242, 50.408 (October 27, 1956).

30. At the request of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, the UN Security Council dealt with the Hungarian question on October 28, 1956. Some speakers denounced the Soviet intervention, but no measures were taken on the merits; in other words, no draft resolution was presented or adopted.

31. Extracts from the telegram sent by the head of the Belgian NATO representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Courrier NATO, no. 86, Archives of the Royal Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 12787/1456. "Hongrie" dossier général, November 2, 1956).

32. On November 1, 1956, the Nagy government denounced the Warsaw Pact, declared Hungary a neutral state, and turned to the UN, asking the four other Great Powers to help defend Hungarian neutrality.

34. Telegram by the head of the French NATO representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris. Service des Pactes, folio 210, 50.420 (November 2, 1956). Elco N. van Kleefens was the NATO Permanent Representative of the Netherlands between 1956 and 1958.

35. After the United Kingdom and France had entered the war between Egypt and Israel on October 31, 1956, the Americans denounced the war in public and even presented a draft resolution to the UN Security Council on October 30 demanding the immediate suspension of hostilities. Then the US Permanent Representative voted, together with the Soviet Union, against the United Kingdom and France. See Csaba Békés, Az 1956-os magyar forradalom a világpolitikában, p. 64.

36. Extract from the telegram sent by the head of the Belgian NATO representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Courrier NATO, no. 89), Archives of the Royal Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 12787/1456. "Hongrie" dossier général (November 2, 1956).

37. On November 2, 1956, the members of both the Hungarian and the Soviet delegation were appointed to negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. At noon November 3, talks began in the building of the Hungarian Parliament and continued at the headquarters of Soviet troops in Hungary at 22:00; however, on arriving there, the Hungarian delegation was arrested by the Soviets.

38. Adolfo Alessandri was the NATO Permanent Representative of Italy between 1954 and 1958.

39. The French government wanted to have the Hungarian question placed on the agenda of the extraordinary UN General Assembly meeting to discuss the Suez war as early as November 2, to divert attention from France and the United Kingdom. The French and British efforts failed, due to the American insistence on the Suez question. Finally, at the news of the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, the former managed to reach their goal on November 4. See Csaba Békés, Az 1956-os magyar forradalom a világpolitikában, pp. 64–65; Gusztáv Kecskés, "Franciaország politikája az ENSZ-ben a 'magyar ügy' kapcsán: 1956–1963" (The Policy of


40. Jens Boyesen was the NATO Permanent Representative of Norway between 1955 and 1963.

41. L. Dana Wlghress was the NATO Permanent Representative of Canada between 1953 and 1958.

42. Extract from the telegram sent by the head of the Belgian NATO representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Courrier NATO, no. 90). It was on the basis of this document that the present author managed to retrace the meeting of the NATO Council on November 3, 1956. In the Archives of the Royal Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels. 12787/1456. "Hongrie" dossier général (November 3, 1956).

43. For the relationship of the Hungarian revolution to the Suez affair see Gusztáv Kecskés, "A szuezi válság és az 1956-os magyar forradalom" (The Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956), in Denis Lefebvre, A szuezi ügy (The Suez Affair) (Budapest, 1999), postscript. The original version is Denis Lefebvre, L’Affaire de Suez (Paris, 1996).

44. Extract from the telegram sent by the head of the Belgian NATO representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Courrier NATO, no. 91). Archives of the Royal Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels. 12787/1456. "Hongrie" dossier général (November 5, 1956). Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay was NATO Secretary-General between 1952 and 1957.

45. Telegram sent by the head of the French NATO representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, Service des Pactes, folio 210, 50.430 (November 6, 1956).


47. André de Staercke was the NATO Permanent Representative of Belgium from 1952 to 1975.

49. Extract from the telegram sent by the head of the Belgian NATO representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Archives of the Royal Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels. 12787/1456. "Hongrie" dossier général (November 19, 1956).


52. Protocols of the meeting of the NATO Council on November 28, 1956, and Appendix B. Archives of NATO International Staff, Brussels, C-R(56)61 (December 1, 1956).

53. Archives of NATO International Staff, Brussels, AC/34(56)WP/12 (November 15, 1956).

54. See Note 9.

55. Hungarian insurgents went to the British Embassy several times during the revolution and demanded firearms, ammunition and other kinds of help. See Csaba Békés, “A brit kormány és az 1956-os forradalom” (Budapest, 1992), p. 25.

56. Ibid.

57. Protocols of the meeting of the NATO Council at 11:00 on December 11, 1956. Archives of NATO International Staff, Brussels, C-R(56)69 (December 11, 1956).

58. Protocols of the meeting of the NATO Council at 10:30 on December 13, 1956. Archives of NATO International Staff, Brussels, C-R(56)73 (December 13, 1956).

59. See Note 2.

60. Literal protocols of the meeting of the NATO Council at 15:30 on December 13, 1956. Archives of NATO International Staff, Brussels, CV-R(56)74 (December 13, 1956).

61. Interim report of the Political Committee to the NATO Council about relief to Hungary. Archives of NATO International Staff, Brussels, C-M(57)21 (February 15, 1957).


63. Draft of the Political Committee for a document to be prepared by the ministerial meeting of NATO about the satellites. Archives of NATO International Staff, Brussels, AC/119-WP/7 (February 13, 1957).


66. Draft by the Political Committee for the document to be prepared by the ministerial meeting of NATO about the satellites. Archives of NATO International Staff, Brussels, AC/119-WP/7 (February 13, 1957).


68. Ibid.


70. Ibid., p. 77.