

Comparing Bismarck's policies with those of Castlereagh and Palmerston and Evaluating Roosevelt's World War II policy

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Összefoglalás

Négy államférfi

A cikk két részre oszlik, és két nagy történelmi időszak politikusairól szól: az európai nemzetállamok és a nagy gyarmatbirodalmak formálódásának idejéről, azaz a 19. század elejéről, és a 20. század vérvízváros II világháborújának koráról, ha úgy tetszik a modern globalizmus kialakulásának körülményeiről. A politikusok közül az egyik német, s van egy angol, egy ír és egy amerikai. Egészen más kihívásokkal szembesültek, sikereik és kudarcaik, életsorsuk is különböző volt. De talán még a mának szóló tanulsággal is szolgálhatnak azoknak, akik tudnak a történelemből tanulni.

Comparing Bismarck's policies with those of Castlereagh and Palmerston

After the Congress of Vienna, no war took place among the Great Powers in Europe for forty years. *Lord Castlereagh* was the British Foreign Secretary who negotiated on Great Britain's behalf. He submitted the Pitt Plan to the Parliament and also attached the original design to show the similarity. As a result of the implementation of the Pitt Plan a general balance of power was easy to develop. He was on the opinion that "*the continued excesses of France may, no doubt, yet drive Europe...to a measure of dismemberment...(but) let the Allies then take his further chance of securing that repose which all the Powers of Europe so much require, with thee assurance that if disappointed...they will again take up arms, not only with commanding positions in their hands, but with that moral force which can alone keep such a confederacy together...*"¹ The relationship between the balance of powers and a shared sense of legitimacy was expressed in the Quadruple Alliance and the Holy Alliance documents. Metternich, however, saw an opportunity in the Holy Alliance to commit the Tsar to sustain legitimate rule, he called the Holy Alliance a "*piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense*".² The Concert of Europe implied that nations should settle matters affecting overall stability by consensus. In Lord Castlereagh's view, the only way to follow could be a strong Central Europe, which is the prerequisite of European stability. He was prepared to resist only overt attacks and only if they threatened the equilibrium, like in the question of Russia. He believed that "*when the Territorial Balance of Europe is disturbed...Britain can interfere with effect but Britain is the last Government in Europe; which can be expected, or can venture to commit Herself on any question of an abstract character...*"³ In his opinion, when danger menaces the system of Europe, the British should be in their place and he was sure that his country could not and would not act upon abstract and speculative principles of precaution. He proposed to soften disagreements by meetings and congresses. It would be important to forge a consensus on the issues confronting Europe, but the British Cabinet made its reserve quite evident, and Lord Castlereagh was dispatched because of the politics of

¹ Memorandum of Lord Castlereagh, August 12, 1815, in C. K. Webster, ed., *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815* pp.361-62.

² Quoted in Asa-Briggs, *The Age of Improvement 1783-1867*, p. 345.

³ Lord Castlereagh's Confidential State Paper, May 5, 1820, in Sir A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, eds., *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919*, vol. II, (1815-66), p. 632.

the British Cabinet "has always been not to interfere except in great emergencies and then with commanding force."⁴ The diplomacy of Great Britain's Congress was found compatible with its objectives only once: during the Greek Revolution of 1821. Britain did not hesitate to act having interpreted the Tzar's intention to protect the catholic population of the collapsing Ottoman Empire as Russia's first step to invade Egypt.

"The question of Turkey is of a totally different character and one which in England we regard not as a theoretical but a practical consideration."⁵

The appeal to the Alliance demonstrated internal brittleness. He was "like a great lover of music who is at church; he wishes to applaud but dare not."^{6, 7}

The politician wanted to convince Great Britain to participate in a system of European congress; in his opinion the danger of new aggression could be avoided if the country joined some permanent European forum that could deal with threats before they develop into crises. After that⁸, the Cabinet rebuffed to let him attend any further European congresses, however, to his mind, international order could only be protected by the activity of all key members of the international community and their respective countries.

In his view, security was collective; if any nation was victimized, in the end, all would become victims and Britain had an interest in the balance of power and the preservation of peace;⁹ he thought that the best way to defend it was by organizing resistance to violations of peace.⁹ He wanted but was not able to bring his country into a system of collective security (Castlereagh was out with the entire thrust of modern British foreign policy. He left no legacy; no British statesman has used Castlereagh as a model. Castlereagh himself had set forth the British position in a state paper of May 5, 1820. He affirmed, was an alliance for the "liberation of a great proportion of the Continent of Europe from the military dominion of France. ... It never was, however, intended as a Union for Government of the World or for the Superintendence of the International Affairs of other States."¹⁰)¹⁰, could see no way to reconcile his convictions with his domestic necessities, and as a last step he committed suicide.

"...it is necessary to say goodbye to Europe; you and I alone know it and have saved it; no one after me understands the affairs of the Continent."¹¹

To summarize Kissinger's opinion, it is quite obvious that his successors did not understand the Continent's affairs nearly as well as he had, but they had a surer grasp of the British interest that they could pursue with more extraordinary skills and persistence than he had. His immediate successor, George Canning, called for a policy of "neutral in word and deed"; his guiding principle was that national interest was incompatible with permanent engagement in the affairs of Europe.

"... let us not, in foolish spirit of romance, suppose that we alone could regenerate Europe." ... "Intimately connected as we are with the system of Europe, it does not follow that we are therefore called upon to mix ourselves on every occasion, with a restless and meddling activity, in the concerns of the nations which surround us" he said.¹²

⁴ Viscount Castlereagh, Correspondence, Dispatches and Other Papers, 12 vols., edited by his brother, the Marquess of Londonderry, vol. XII, p. 394.

⁵ Quoted in Sir Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 2 vols., vol. II, p. 366.

⁶ Quoted in Briggs, Age of Improvement, p. 346.

⁷ Metternich his self found comfort from Castlereagh's obvious personal sympathy for his objectives.

⁸ the first conference at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818

⁹ Quoted from Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy, p. 90.

¹⁰ Quoted from Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy, p. 91.

¹¹ Castlereagh said at his last interview with the King p. 91.

¹² Quoted from Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy, p. 95.

In 1856 Palmerston gave the British definition of national interest as follows,

"When people ask me for what is called a policy, the only answer is that we mean to do what may seem to be best, upon each occasion as it arises, making the Interest of Our Country one's guiding principle."¹³

Defining the phrase 'national interest' he said, "We have no eternal allies and no permanent enemies... our interests are eternal, and those interests it is our duty to follow."¹⁴ He also spelled out what Great Britain would resist by force of arms, and why it would not resist purely domestic changes:

"...the general principle is to observe in changes which other nations chose to make in constitution and form of government... England has...no business to interfere by force of arms...But an attempt of nations to seize and appropriate to itself territory which belongs to an other one...this can lead to a derangement of the existing Balance of Power...also can create danger to other Powers...therefore, the British Government holds itself at full liberty to resist..."¹⁵

Great Britain the 'Perfidious Albion' – unsentimental persistence and self-centred determination

When Great Britain's *ad hoc* allies went beyond what the country considered appropriate, it switched sides or organized new coalitions against other allies in defence of the equilibrium. Like upon Belgium's secession from Holland in 1830, first France was threatened with war if attempted to dominate the new state, later it was offered an alliance in order to guarantee Belgium's independence. The apogee of British influence was reached in the nineteenth century. Great Britain's politics was neither interventionist nor non-interventionist, she only wanted to defend the balance of power, so it was neither a revisionist power nor a bulwark of the Viennese order. Her style was relentlessly pragmatic based on a fixed principle, and her role was to protect the balance of power that is, in Kissinger's view, to support the weaker against the stronger in general. In Palmerston's time it became an immutable principle that needed no theoretical defence. In order to protect the balance of power the politics that achieved the goal was followed. At the time of the Revolution of 1848, Austria was threatened by disintegration and Palmerston tried to prevent it. In time, the most important goal had become to prevent Russia from occupying the Dardanelles, so Austria was not a key element in British policy any more. This is why Great Britain was just standing by when Austria was defeated by Piedmont and Prussia. Before WWI the British policy was dominated by the fear of Germany, and Britain thought that Austria had become Germany's ally for the first time. In Palmerston's opinion, an activist policy had to be demonstrated. For nearly thirty years, Palmerston was the principal architect of Great Britain's foreign policy, his pragmatic style described in his words is as follows,

"The invariable principle on which England acts is to acknowledge as the organ of every nation that organ which each nation may deliberately choose to have."¹⁶

Metternich's inaccurate description with a little cynical overtone of what Great Britain really understood by the balance of power is as follows, Palmerston wanted to "make France feel the power of England, by proving to her that the Egyptian affair will ...only finish as he may wish ...without France having any right to take hand...wants to prove to the German powers that he does not need them,

¹³ Palmerston to Clarendon, July 20, 1856, quoted in Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902), p. 88.

¹⁴ Palmerston, in Briggs, Age of Improvement, p. 352.

¹⁵ Palmerston's dispatch no. 6 to the Marquis of Clanricarde p.841. Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

¹⁶ Quoted in Joel H. Wiener, ed., Great Britain: Foreign Policy and the Span of Empire 1689-1971, p. 404.

that Russia's help suffices for England...wants to keep Russia in check and drag her in his train by her permanent anxiety of seeing England draw near to France again."¹⁷

It seems quite obvious, in Kissinger's view, that in the end Great Britain only took part in one short war, the Crimean War that led to the collapse of Metternich's order.

Bismarck – The man of "blood and iron"

*"That which is imposing here on earth...has always something of the quality of the fallen angel who is beautiful but without peace, great in his conceptions and exertions but without success, proud and lonely."*¹⁸

After fifteen years of turmoil Bismarck, the man of "blood and iron", enters the scene. He based his policy on Realpolitik, "the notion that relations among states are determinate by raw power and that the mighty will prevail."¹⁹ Realpolitik is the management of foreign policy decisions by carefully calculating levels of power and matching the results up against the national self interest.²⁰ Looking for links to Palmerston I found several points in history, which are mentioned by Henry Kissinger. A good example for them is the quotation by Henry Kissinger about Palmerston, who sought some pretext to end Russia's drive toward the Straits once and for all.²¹ Within another five years after the end of the Crimean War, Bismarck would defeat Austria in a war for predominance in Germany.²² In 1864 the conflict of Schleswig-Holstein disrupted the tranquillity of Central Europe, and Palmerston was prompted to quip that only three people had ever understood the complexity of national, political and dynastic issues: "of these, one was dead, the second was in a lunatic asylum, and he himself²³ was the third one but he had forgotten it" unlike Bismarck who was not on the view of sharing Germany's leadership and who considered Prussia the most genuinely national German state. The Ministerpräsident determined to use the opportunity to begin the showdown. Napoleon was convinced of his loss and encouraged this war. Bismarck understood the tactic of Napoleon, who, in exchange for his neutrality, hoped to receive Prussian concessions. Bismarck could see through the sieve, his policy was not the question of principle but the question of benefit. The North German states merged into the North German Confederation and it came clear that the state, which had abandoned legitimacy by deposing former rulers needed only one step on the way to the unification of Germany, which way meant another crisis. Bismarck used Napoleon's posturing to bait him into declaring war on Prussia in 1870 and Prussia won quickly and decisively. He utilised the Prussian strategic opportunity and was well-positioned at the right time, *possessed an extraordinary sense of proportion, which turned power into an instrument of self-restraint.*²⁴ He saw Prussia's honour in "keeping Prussia apart from any disgraceful connection with democracy and never admitting that anything occur in Germany without Prussia's permission..."²⁵ Bismarck's attack on liberalism was implying that his country could impose its preferences arbitrary and it needed no alliances to cope with domestic subversion. Nonalignment was the functional equivalent of his policy; in his view, "the present situation forces us not to commit our-

¹⁷ In 1841 Metternich analyzed his pragmatic style with cynical admiration, Quoted from Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy p. 101.

¹⁸ The essence of his life with his words in a letter he had written to his then still future wife: quoted in Bismarck, Werke, vol. 14, n o.1, p. 61.

¹⁹ P. 104. Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

²⁰ http://www.everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=742249 The information in this write-up comes from Henry Kissinger's 1994 book *Diplomacy* (published by Simon & Schuster, ISBN 0-671-65991-x).

²¹ P. 93. Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

²² P. 94 Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

²³ Palmerston

²⁴ p. 121 Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

²⁵ Horst Kohl, ed., Die politischen Reden des Fürsten Bismarck, Historische-Kritische Gesamtausgabe, vol. 1, pp. 267-68.

*selves in advance of the other powers ... our relations to ... Britain ...do not furnish an obstacle to rapprochement with any of these powers. Only our relations with France require careful attention...*²⁶ In Kissinger's opinion, Bismarck asserted that power supplied its own legitimacy and he believed that a correct evaluation of power implied a doctrine of self-limitation. For him Realpolitik depended specifically on flexibility and on the ability to exploit practicable options without pressure of ideology. He also summarised his opinion by saying that Realpolitik demanded tactical flexibility. His modern concept of the universe, *as consisting of particles in flux whose impact on each other creates what is perceived as reality he also proclaimed the relativity of all belief.*²⁷ The statesman's duty is to use ideas and forces to serve national interest. Bismarck did not agree with the opinion that German unity could only be realized through liberal institutions. He relied on the unique character of Prussian institutions, rested the claim of Prussia to leadership on its strength. He urged a foreign policy to be adopted based on the correct assessment of power and his final goal was to increase influence.

*"...Policy is the art of the possible, the science of the relative."*²⁸

In his point of view, foreign policy had an almost scientific basis, making it possible to analyze national interest in terms of objective criteria. His strategy was to weaken Austria at every turn. After setting the borders that are vital to security, he conducted a prudent foreign policy targeted at stabilization. Bismarck never felt unfettered in his choice of partners and he also used domestic policy as a tool of Realpolitik. He predicted that the Crimean war had wrought a diplomatic revolution: "The day of reckoning is sure to come even if a few years pass."²⁹ His opinion was based on a new world order where *the balance of power has been entirely destroyed*³⁰. He was, however, unable to institutionalize his policies. His tragedy resided in that his capacities exceeded his society's ability to absorb them, still it is certain that his legacy left to Germany was unassailable greatness.³¹

Evaluating Roosevelt's World War II policy

*"[Roosevelt] looked upon the future with a calm eye, as if to say 'Let it come, whatever it may be, it will all be grist to our great mill. We shall turn it all to benefit.'...In a despondent world which appeared divided between wicked and fatally efficient fanatics marching to destroy, and bewildered populations on the run, unenthusiastic martyrs in a cause they could not define, he believed in his own ability, so long as he was at the controls, to stem his terrible tide. He had all the character and energy and kill of the dictators, and he was on our side."*³²

(Isaiah Berlin)

What is a great leader who was elected four times in the history of one of 'the biggest nations', The United States of America like? This question can be answered by the character of the 'tactically crafty' politician, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He was a lonely walker, his singularity sprung from his ability to discern the challenges that were not apparent to his peers; he had a significant role in democratic leadership; destiny imposed the obligation to defend democracy around the world on him.

He governed with the instrument of instinct more than analysis; *his personality* that included unscrupulousness, ruthlessness and cynicism was dominated by positive traits which are quoted above in the words of Isaiah Berlin. In Kissinger's point of view, Roosevelt's achievement was swiftness and decisiveness in interfering in order to stop Germany's threatening drive for world

²⁶ Otto von Bismarck, Die gesammelten Werke(Berlin, 1924), vol. 2. pp. 139 ff.

²⁷ Quoted in Henry Kissinger Diplomacy p. 127.

²⁸ Bismarck, Werke, vol. 1, p. 62. (September 29, 1851)

²⁹ Bismarck Werke, vol. 2, p.516 (December 8-9, 1859)

³⁰ Quoted in J. A. S. Grenville, Europe Reshaped, 1848-1878, p. 358.

³¹ Quoted from Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy p. 136.

³² Isaiah Berlin, Personal Impressions, edited by Henry Hardy, p. 26.

domination. He led America into a leadership role internationally, where the questions of war or peace, progress or stagnation depended on his vision and commitment all over the world. He was one of America's subtlest and most devious presidents.

His methods were fairly complex, he elevated objective statements, was devious in tactics, his issues were explicitly defined, and he gave rise to ambiguous sentiments when explaining the subtleties of particular events. He understood that only threat to their security can motivate Americans to support military preparedness, he needed to appeal to their idealism, he was really sensitive and shrewd in his grasp of the psychology of his nation's citizens.

He took the oath to office at a time of national uncertainty, when the whole world had been shaken by the Great Depression.

In order to describe the historical background it is necessary to enumerate the steps leading up to World War II.

After World War I, disillusionment with the results erased the gap between internationalists and isolationists to an extent. They were united over one important question; they both rejected foreign intervention within the western hemisphere and participation outside the League enforcement machinery. The gap in American thinking became apparent after the Washington Naval Conference and the Four-Power Treaty, which agreement stood on its own merits, had no close and failure to observe it had no consequence either. Debates appeared within the nation after the Vietnam Peace in 1973. The senate endorsed the Kellogg-Briand Pact as a statement of principle, it had, however, no practical implications. The balance of power has become less favourable for the wartime Allies since the end of the war. America never accepted the importance of European style diplomacy nor balance of power. The diplomacy of the United States of America was more public, ideological and juridical than the European one. After Japan seized Manchuria from China, America introduced a 'sanction of its own', worked out by Stimson in 1932, which became a gun in Roosevelt's hands. He used it in 1941 to demand that Japan withdraw from Manchuria and his other conquests. Four weeks later Roosevelt's entering the stage of history led to World War II, when on other side of the world Hitler accessed to the position of German Chancellor.

During his first term he rarely deviated from the isolationist issues; he proposed to extend the accords by calling for the abolition of all offensive weapons and by committing to permitting the use of weapons to enter the territory of others.

"... no such general agreement for the elimination of aggression or the elimination of the weapons of offensive warfare would be any value in this world unless every Nation, without exception, would enter into such an agreement by solemn obligation... It is but an extension of the challenge of Woodrow Wilson for us to propose in this newer generation that from now on war by governments shall be changed to peace by peoples."³³

His proposal was controversial in the time it came to the light; Hitler did not suffer global opprobrium. During his first term the *Road to the War*³⁴ and the participation in the World War I was explained by conspiracy, betrayal and malfeasance and to avoid the next war the Congress passed three Neutrality Acts that prohibited loans or financial assistance to belligerents, imposed an embargo on the arms of all parties and the purchases of non-military goods for cash were only allowed if transported by non-American ships.³⁵

In 1936 Roosevelt won the elections and recognised the essence of all dictators' challenge. His educational process for Americans began with the *'Quarantine Speech'* in which he warned America of the approaching peril. Its background was Japan's renewed military aggression in China and

³³ Roosevelt Address before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, December 28, 1933, in the Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 2, 1933, pp. 548-49.

³⁴ Walter Mills: *Road to the War / WWI*. /

³⁵ Ruhl J. Barlett, ed., *The Record of American Diplomacy*, pp. 572-77.

the announcement of the Berlin-Rome Axis. Roosevelt's concerns were expressed in his words as follows,

*"The peace, the freedom and the security of ninety percent of the population of the world is being jeopardized by the remaining ten percent who are threatening a breakdown of all international order and law... the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease."*³⁶

He did not say anything about what he meant by 'quarantine' but was attacked by isolationists. Two years later he described his speech as follows,

*"Unfortunately, this suggestion fell upon deaf ears - even hostile and resentful ears... It was hailed as war mongering; it was condemned as attempted intervention in foreign affairs; it was even ridiculed as a nervous search 'under the bed' for dangers of war which did not exist."*³⁷

He had a plan *"there are a lot of methods in the world that have never been tried yet ..."*³⁸ but he never explained what method he would use and spoke in rebus: *"I can't give you any clue to it. You will have to invent one. I have got one."*³⁹

The next step in his political plan was a *Fireside chat* on October 12, 1937. He tried to satisfy the needs of all three groups of his society. He underlined the commitment to peace, the significance of the forthcoming conference (The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922) and described the nations' participation in it as a sign. He was equally ambiguous about international role: *"in that period, while I learned much of what to do, I also learned much of what not to do."*⁴⁰ In his view, all his life, his goal to achieve was to help quell the pattern of aggression.

The turning point was Munich which impelled America at first politically, then materially to enter the Second World War three years later. He warned against unnamed but easily identifiable aggressors whose *"national policy adopts as a deliberate instrument the threat of war"*.⁴¹ He was of the opinion that *"If there is not general disarmament, we ourselves must continue to arm... But, until there is general abandonment of weapons capable of aggression, ordinary rules of national prudence and common sense require that we be prepared."*⁴² He suggested that a project designed to circumvent the Neutrality Acts be put forward but his scheme for the restoration of democracies' air power collapsed. In his State of the Union message he identified the aggressor as Italy, Germany and Japan. He went several steps further arguing that his security interests were no longer limited to the Monroe Doctrine and asked the dictators for assurances that no attack against thirty-one nations would be made and at the end offered American participation in a disarmament conference.

He achieved his political objective in defence of innocent victims against an evil aggressor and America assumed responsibility for the defence of Great Britain's Asian possessions against Japan. Therefore, Roosevelt had to call for a revision of the Neutrality Acts; the new dimension would be the Fourth Neutrality Act.

In February 1940, the turn and watershed was his speech in Charlottesville when he spoke about a reinforcement of their own defences. He wanted to increase the American defence budget and also challenged America to the *"arsenal of democracy"*.⁴³ He made his determination to bring about the defeat of the Nazis more explicit after proposing Lend-Lease.

Roosevelt summed up the objectives of America in the so-called *Four Freedoms*, the freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want and from fear in April, 1941. Later on, in his

³⁶ Address in Chicago, October 5, 1937, in Roosevelt, Public Papers, 1937 vol., p. 410.

³⁷ Ibid., 1939 vol., Introduction by FDR, p. xxviii.

³⁸ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 190.

³⁹ Ibid. Italics added.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Radio address to the Herald-Tribune Forum, October 26, 1938, in Roosevelt, Public Papers, 1938 vol., p. 564.

⁴² Ibid., p. 565.

⁴³ Quoted in Adler, *Isolationist Impulse*, p. 282.

radio addresses about commitment to social and economic progress, he wanted to achieve the best guarantees of peace with the help of democratic and social ideals. They were expanded into 'common principles'⁴⁴ by incorporating equal access to raw materials and cooperative efforts to improve social conditions.

In September, 1941, the Geer was torpedoed and America was at war at sea with the Axis powers⁴⁵; three years were needed to involve the isolationist America in the global World War II.

His goal was to displace Hitler, the utmost obstacle to cooperation. He completely dismissed the idea that Germany's total defeat might create a vacuum that the Soviet Union might wish to fill at the right moment. Neither did he want to support the safety measures that would prevent rivalry between triumphant allies when the war was over. He was of the opinion that Great Britain was strong enough to defend Europe without any help from America and he did not want to take part in Europe's economic reconstruction either. Roosevelt's intention was that the victorious Allies would supervise Germany's disarmament and partitioning and subject various other countries to their control without being prepared to undertake the permanent American role.⁴⁶

His concept of the Four Policemen could not be implemented because no real balance of power emerged from the war. Roosevelt forgot to make any provisions for what might happen if one of the proposed leaders refused to play his or her role. The differences between the two concepts were the implementation of the Wilsonian concept of international harmony, and Stalin's Realpolitik policy. Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt was firmly of the belief that "in the American tradition, this distrust, this dislike and even hatred of Britain..."⁴⁷ was present, while Churchill was of the opinion that the most important priority was to create a bond of friendship with America. Roosevelt did not want to discuss the aims of war during the war while Stalin wanted to make a 'tabula rasa' preferring to let the battle lines determine the political outcome afterwards. Roosevelt's opinion about the Atlantic Charter which would also include the colonial territories is that "if we are to arrive at a stable peace it must involve the development of backward countries..."⁴⁸ His view on colonialism was precedent.⁴⁹ International trusteeships for all former colonies which "ought for our own safety to be taken away from weak nations"⁵⁰ were proposed by him. He wanted to avoid that the quest for self-determination would turn into a radical struggle.

His view went along Churchill's strategy to draw the line at a landing in the Balkans, supported landing in North Africa after the conquest of the northern Mediterranean, then landing in Italy.

The second front in Normandy would come only after June, 1944, after Germany had weakened in time. He wanted to prevent German revisionist claims. The major role in shaping the post-war world was determinate to Roosevelt. The most important conferences were attached to his name, like Dumbarton Oaks, Bretton Woods, Hot Springs, Washington and Chicago.

In Kissinger's opinion it is questionable why he did not want to discuss aims of war or why he did not take the risk to disagree with Stalin, why he thought Stalin would stand by his Four Policemen strategy. The Russian Molotov agreed in principle to join the proposed arrangement. In fact, Kissinger thinks that Stalin stood to gain even more and could exploit the old adage, 'possession is nine-tenths of the law.'⁵¹ As the war drew to a close, Roosevelt became more and more irritated because of Stalin's tactics. In the view of Walter Lippmann, "The instructions everybody, who thought he could do was to outwit Stalin, which is quite a different thing."⁵²

⁴⁴ The Atlantic Charter: Official Statement on Meeting Between the President and Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, in *ibid.*, p. 314.

⁴⁵ Fireside Chat to the Nation, September 11, 1941, in *ibid.*, pp. 384-92.

⁴⁶ Quoted from Henry Kissinger: *Diplomacy* p. 396.

⁴⁷ Quoted in Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-45*, p. 324.

⁴⁸ Quoted in William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-45*, p. 121.

⁴⁹ Quoted from Henry Kissinger: *Diplomacy* p. 402.

⁵⁰ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 572.

⁵¹ Quoted from Henry Kissinger: *Diplomacy* p. 409.

⁵² Radio address to the Herald-Tribune Forum, October 26, 1938, in *Roosevelt, Public Papers, 1938 vol.*, p. 564.

His fault was relying on personal relations with Stalin and he also wanted to arrange the Bering Straits meeting. His trust and goodwill to Stalin could be seen in his action to agree to Stalin's plan to move the frontiers of Poland westward, "he hoped... that the Marshall would understand that for political reasons (next election)... he could not participate in any decision... could not publicly take part in any such arrangement at the present time." His emphasis on Stalin's goodwill was the idiosyncrasy and attitude of Americans to inherit goodness of him, "I may say that I 'got along fine' with Marshal Stalin."⁵³ Roosevelt wanted to achieve an agreement on voting procedures for the UN and Stalin's participation in the war against Japan.

In Kissinger's view, his most comprehensible decision was a secret guarantee for Moscow's predominant role in Manchuria till this war. Roosevelt considered "the results of this Conference / Yalta / as the beginnings of a permanent structure of peace"⁵⁴, so he guaranteed a sphere of influence to Stalin, which declaration Stalin described as flagrant two months later. His Four Policemen ideology enforced world peace on the basis of shared values. Not only Stalin was doubtful but America itself was unprepared to accept these ideologies. Still peace was defended on a global basis and he did manage to lead the nation out of one of the biggest historical crises.

Upon his death on April 12, 1945, he was granted the chance to catch sight of the promised land but was denied of being actually able to reach it. The war ended with an unavoidable geopolitical vacuum and the world was torn into two ideological camps.

His policy was a heady mixture of traditional American exceptionalism, Wilsonian idealism, and Roosevelt's own canny insight into the American psyche.⁵⁵ However, it was to a universal cause. It turned into an exercise of teaching America how essential it could be to the new balance of power.

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