

**The Malta Summit of 1989 from Hungarian Perspective:  
Related Sources after 25 Years**

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## **1989: Hungary and the changes in Eastern Europe**

**by Csaba Békés**

Up until 1989, vitally no one had expected that the developments in Eastern Europe could lead to the total collapse of communism in the foreseeable future. The fate of this region was routinely subordinated to Western relations with Moscow, and the main consideration for Western politicians interested in the success of perestroika was ensuring the security interests of the Soviet Union, and they viewed the maintenance of the Eastern European status quo as its primary guarantee. Although on moral grounds they did support developments pointing toward a democratic transition in these countries and the opposition movements fighting for this course, maintaining stability at any cost was of primary importance. This position was not only motivated by concern about the potential Soviet reaction, but also by the worry that the total collapse of the Eastern European countries on the verge of economic bankruptcy might result in social explosions, ethnic conflicts, etc., which would have a negative influence on Western Europe as well. Such conflicts would endanger the process of integration, and more importantly, they would jeopardize the stability of the entire continent.

In the spring of 1989, when President George H.W. Bush took office, a turn of historical importance was beginning to emerge in Eastern Europe. At the beginning of February, roundtable talks between the government and the now legally-acknowledged Solidarity movement began in Poland. By April they came to an agreement, and the first “semi-free” elections could be held in June, resulting in a sweeping victory for the opposition, which won most of the open seats.. In Hungary, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party accepted at its February 10-11 meeting the introduction of a multiparty system, and it also adopted the position that the 1956 events in Hungary constituted a popular uprising and not a counter-revolution.

Assessing this from the American viewpoint, the most important factor was that these events, which would have seemed unbelievable even a year before, took place without any Soviet retribution, or even any sign of disapproval. In the spring of 1989, the Bush administration began to accustom itself to the idea that the old American dream originated by President Eisenhower was about to come true: the peaceful *self-liberation* of Eastern Europe under

Soviet approval. All that was needed for success was for the United States, and Western Europe in general, to give the Soviet Union – as far as it was possible – the opportunity for a dignified withdrawal from the region.<sup>1</sup> In reality, in 1989–90 US policy vis-à-vis the transition was not just neutral, but time to time Washington explicitly urged leaders – especially those of Poland and Hungary – to be moderate and slow down the process of political transition. All this was meant to support Gorbachev’s reforms and his position in the Soviet Union by not exacerbating his situation in the Warsaw Pact states.

At the December 1989 summit in Malta, Bush outlined the essence of his policy to Gorbachev in very clear terms:

“I hope you noticed that while the changes in Eastern Europe have been going on, the United States has not engaged in condescending declarations aimed at damaging [the prestige of] the Soviet Union. There are people in the United States who accuse me of being too cautious. It is true, I am a prudent man, but I’m not a coward, and my Administration will seek to avoid doing anything that would damage your position in the world. But I was insistently advised to do something of that sort – to climb the Berlin Wall and to make broad declarations. My Administration, however is avoiding these steps, we are in favor of reserved behavior.”<sup>2</sup>

Looking at the same issue from a non-superpower view, since the end of the 1970s Hungarian foreign policy had enjoyed a kind of special, relatively independent status. One important aspect of this special status was that it enabled Hungary to develop intensive economic and political relations with Western states precisely during those years when, due in part to the gradual alienation in the late 1970s and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, East-West relations at the superpower level were at a low unprecedented since the early 1960s.

Hungary’s increasing use of Western credit initially appeared advantageous to the Soviet Union as well, since it indirectly removed burdens from the Soviet economy while János

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<sup>1</sup> On US policy concerning Eastern Europe, see: M.R. Beschloss, S. Talbott: *At the Highest Levels*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1993; Robert L. Hutchings: *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War. An Insider’s Account of US Policy in Europe, 1989-1992*, The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington DC, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, London, 1997; George Bush, Brent Scowcroft: *A World Transformed*. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1998; Tom Blanton: US policies and the revolutions of 1989. In: Tom Blanton, Svetlana Savranskaya, Vladimir Zubok (Eds.) *Masterpieces of history. The peaceful end of the Cold War in Europe, 1989*, Budapest–NewYork, CEU Press, 2010.

<sup>2</sup> Soviet transcript of the Malta meeting, December 2 and 3, 1989. In: *Ibid.* 627.

Kádár himself guaranteed unquestionable political loyalty to Moscow. Thus in the beginning of the 1980s Hungary gradually became the number one favorite in the eyes of the West as the most presentable country of the Eastern bloc.

After Gorbachev entered the scene, the situation changed in as much as the Soviet leadership took over the role as the primary promoter of dialogue between East and West. Nevertheless, a new turn in the Hungarian foreign policy – just as in the transition within the country – took place in 1988. This turn had nothing to do with the removal of Kádár or with the party conference in May, however, but rather with the significant positive changes taking place on the international political stage. This was the time when a new concept was being outlined which could possibly give Hungary the role as a bridge in East–West relations based on a new world order of cooperation. This was the context Hungary found itself in during the years of the transition of international politics.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> For a detailed analysis see my study *Back to Europe. The International Context of the Political Transition in Hungary, 1988–1990* In: Andras Bozóki [ed.], *The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy*. Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2002. 237–272. ([http://www.rev.hu/portal/page/portal/rev/tanulmanyok/rendszervaltás/roundtable\\_bekes](http://www.rev.hu/portal/page/portal/rev/tanulmanyok/rendszervaltás/roundtable_bekes)) on which this introduction is also based on. For an updated comprehensive history of the political transition in Hungary see: Csaba Békés–Melinda Kalmár: *Political transition in Hungary and the end of the Cold War, 1988 – 1991*. In: Mark Kramer (ed.) *The Fate of Communist Regimes, 1989–1991*. The Harvard Cold War Book Series. (forthcoming: 2015).

## **Hungary at the time of the Bush-Gorbachev meeting on Malta**

**by Béla Révész**

1989 was a year of transformation. The collapse of communism shook not only the Eastern European countries but had a significant influence on world politics as a whole. While assessing the extremely rapid pace of historical events in Europe and in the wider world, it seems that less attention has been directed to the summit of the Presidents of the two world powers, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev which took place in December 1989. It has been said that this is due to a lack of proper information, and this is also the reason for the speculation about certain 'secret agreements' and false reports over 'concealed protocols' which have spread since then in increasing number. Others regard Malta simply as a social event, or a friendly meeting since participating parties indeed stressed the 'unofficial' character of the negotiations that took place on Saturday and Sunday, December 2 and 3. In his opening sentences Gorbachev even noted to his counterpart, "This meeting is perhaps a prelude to an official conference with you." Yet, there are others who have regarded Malta as a final break with the so called Brezhnev Doctrine and the slogan 'Yalta – Malta' sounded good. Finally, there are opinions according to which Moscow simply got rid of its satellites, hurling its former allies to the West.

Almost the only specific information heard at the joint press conference on Sunday noon was the instruction of the Presidents to their state secretaries as leaders of the arms limitation talks, in which the ministers were called upon to speed up the negotiations. It was decided that in June 1990 they would sign the strategic arms limitation START treaty. Reflecting upon a question regarding the Brezhnev Doctrine, Gorbachev replied that every country would independently decide on its own fate. "The changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," he stressed, "are results of historical changes, and the course of these changes has to be welcomed." In this respect the headline of the next day's *Daily Telegraph* has often been quoted: "The Cold War ended yesterday at 12:45 P.M." But it was already suspected that the two Presidents were discussing more serious questions during their negotiations which lasted for some eight hours. It cannot be by accident that the American President flew immediately to Brussels from Malta, where he briefed the leaders of the NATO countries. Likewise, Gorbachev was also expected on the very next day to arrive in Moscow for a meeting with the representatives of the Warsaw Pact member countries.

Despite much vagueness, written sources published in the last two decades do document with increasing reliability the events at Malta. The total historical picture, however, which needs to be put together from many sources, is still fragmented. In relation to Hungary and the history of the Warsaw Pact leaders' summit on 4 December, 1989, this e-Dossier contains some interesting documents which came to light from Rezső Nyers' papers handed over to the Hungarian National Archives (*Magyar Országos Levéltár*) in 2005. Throughout the decades prior to 1989, Nyers' name had been linked to the reform struggles within the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP). In 1987 he was elected chair the Reform Committee of the Hungarian Parliament, and in 1988 became the member of the Politburo of the HSWP and a state minister. On top of that, in June 1989 he was elected as head of the HSWP and became a member of its newly set up four-member Political Executive Committee. When in October, 1989 the HSWP declared its own dissolution and the birth of the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) was announced, he was elected as the head of the new party. It was in this latter role that he travelled to Moscow to participate at the summit of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact members states on 4 December, 1989, along with Prime Minister Miklós Németh and Under Secretary of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ferenc Somogyi. This e-Dossier features three accounts from the direct participants of the Moscow event: Nyers's own handwritten account, his typed records for Prime Minister Németh, and Ferenc Somogyi's written briefing for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Another source is Mátyás Szűrös's contemporary letter which is worth noting in relation to the actual composition of the Hungarian delegation in Moscow. Szűrös, a long-standing party member was elected President of the Hungarian Parliament in March 1989. Since the country lacked a President, he became the provisional President of the republic when it was declared on 23 October, 1989. In those days he was a member of the HSP, the successor party of the HSWP. Dated 30 November, 1989, Szűrös sent a letter to Prime Minister Miklós Németh in which he complained about a 'bad conciliation.' In his letter, among others, he referred to not being sufficiently informed regarding the Warsaw Pact, because as the President he was supposed to be the supreme commander of the Army. He wrote that "it was not proper either that in the 'diplomacys' of the Warsaw Pact, the competencies of the Hungarian state and party are mixed up once again." As an example he mentioned those who would be participating at the scheduled Moscow briefing in December 1989. Being less relevant to our



main topic, Mátyás Szűrös's letter is not published here, but it is an interesting nuance that, according to the evidence, provisional President Szűrös would have liked to swap places with the HSP party chief Nyers in the delegation.

In fact, in Moscow Miklós Németh's preference was something else than participating at the Warsaw Pact leaders' meeting. The WP conference offered the Hungarian Prime Minister a good opportunity to have bilateral discussions on the most urgent economic issues with his Soviet counterpart. During his negotiations with Nikolai Ryzhkov he reminded the Soviet side (not for the first time) that in the system of the Hungarian–Soviet economic cooperation a quick recovery of the balance of payment was needed. This was an urgent issue for him due to Hungary's switch-over to the Dollar clearing system. This is why the Prime Minister focused on the economic issues during the press conference held after the Hungarian delegation returned home, while it was Nyers who summed up the events that happened at the meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders. Nyers said that Gorbachev had informed the representatives of the WP countries about his trip to Italy, as well as about the topics raised at Malta, and the essence of their negotiations with President Bush. He also mentioned that since the Soviet Union had sent a note earlier to member states on its own position at Malta, the results of the summit can be compared with these earlier positions.<sup>4</sup> The head of the HSP sensed that Gorbachev was satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations as they facilitated the exchange of political views and endorsed learning how the other side thought. The continuity of dialogue was maintained and mutual contacts would continue in the future. The fact that Prime Minister Németh was mostly involved in economic negotiations while in Moscow explains why Nyers sent him a short written note on 6 December about Gorbachev's briefing for the Warsaw Pact leaders.

The press – not only in Hungary – did not find many interesting features in the information given by Gorbachev in Moscow. They much preferred Gorbachev and his wife's four-day-long visit to Italy prior to the meeting at Malta which resulted in signing of some 21 bilateral and inter-governmental treaties. The Gorbachevs' visit to the Vatican was indeed a sort of a sensation. Especially popular was Pope John Paul's promise that the Holy See would endorse the reform efforts of perestroika with its tools. Beyond this, however, what really drew the attention of the press after the December 4 meeting in Moscow was the news that the Warsaw

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<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately, no document relating to this pre-Malta Soviet position has been found in Hungarian archives so far.

Pact member state representatives issued a joint declaration condemning their 1968 Czechoslovakian intervention. As their communiqué stated: “The intervention of our armies in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was an interference in the country’s inner policy which should be condemned. This unlawful act had broken the process of the democratic development in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and had permanent negative consequences.” The Soviet government drafted a separate condemnation, in Hungary this had already happened in the middle of August. Romania, however, which in 1968 had not joined the action, did not participate among the signatories of the joint declaration.

Many minutes, notes, official reports and documents with quite a high degree of accuracy are now available regarding the agenda of the negotiations at Malta. One important topic, however, was not mentioned at the time: the question of the European nuclear systems. Apparently it was not due to secretiveness, but this question was consciously avoided at the meeting by the presidents. According to a seemingly reliable account by Anatoly S. Chernyaev, an adviser to Gorbachev on foreign affairs, the word ‘atom’ was raised during the Malta meeting only in one single context, namely when President Bush mentioned it in relation of Lybia saying that chemical weapons made there ‘are the atomic bomb of the poor.’ Ignoring this topic is all the more apparent in that German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl was explicitly referring to this question on November 18, 1989 when he wrote a letter to President Bush over the situation in Eastern Europe and on the prospects of the Malta meeting:

“On the NATO summit [*on 29–30 May, 1989*], which dealt with the control of the military forces and the general roadmap of disarmament, we took a clear position both on nuclear deterrence and the short range nuclear systems of the land forces. There we outlined an exact line for the negotiations regarding this matter. We must repeatedly signal to General Secretary Gorbachev that the existing great superiority of the East [*Block*] in this field should be unilaterally abolished, for later this decision would make negotiations easier.”<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s letter to President George Bush on the situation in Eastern Europe and the prospects of the Malta meeting (November 28, 1989). Special collection of the German Federal Archives. Papers of the Office of the Federal Chancellor 212-30101 B 136/29806 Bd. 22.

In Eastern Europe, the absence of the nuclear question at Malta went unnoticed, for the matter of stationing nuclear warheads in the region was known only from certain unconfirmed rumors. Even the political leaders of the countries involved had barely any reliable information about this issue. Then what is the explanation that neither Western leaders nor Chancellor Kohl himself were forcing this question? Probably some intelligence reports came in with the news that, not long before the Malta meeting, nuclear warheads were transferred from Eastern Europe to Soviet bases. If this had been semi-official or leaked information, then President Bush would have surely signaled his positive attitude to the matter, at least in a short reference. The fact that neither President Bush raised this question nor was Chancellor Kohl's demand passed on points to the 'talkative silence' between the two presidents. The rather secretive nature of nuclear warheads in Eastern Europe gives the documents published in this e-Dossier an exciting historical context.

The Eastern European 'atom scandal' broke at the beginning of the 1990s in the midst of withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the region. Some information became public that, in sharp contrast to the semi-official standpoint, the Soviet Army was stationing its nuclear arsenal not only in Czechoslovakia and the GDR but in Poland and Hungary too. "The Soviet troops stationed in Poland do not possess nuclear weaponry." This was how the Polish government commissioner in charge of the Soviet troops' withdrawal attempted to deny the news in April 1991. This was, however, disproved by Victor P. Dubynin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces in Poland when he admitted: the Soviet Union had indeed stationed nuclear warheads in Poland up until mid-1990. In Eastern Europe, there were rocket units, and thus there were nuclear warheads too. But in the first half of 1990 they were all transferred back to the Soviet Union – as the general added. The news from Poland stirred up the Hungarian public, and voices demanding a clarification of the situation in Hungary strengthened.

Some clear confirmation comes from Miklós Németh's papers, in particular from some of his Russian language documents that were discovered recently. These papers – which are undated but with high probability were written in early December 1989 – confirm what had earlier been suspected by researchers: (i) the Soviet Union between 1969/1970 and 1989 was indeed stationing nuclear warheads on the territory of Hungary; (ii) the locality of that 'independent maintenance-technical base' where the nuclear gear was stationed was situated at the Upper

Balaton region, nearby Tótvázsony; (iii) the nuclear warheads were removed from this base between 22 and 24 November, 1989, i.e. indeed just a few days before the Presidents' meeting at Malta. The relevant part of the original Russian-language memorandum that was handed over to Prime Minister Németh by the Soviet ambassador Boris I. Stukalin reads as follows below (in brackets you can find Miklós Németh's own written remarks on the document, while abbreviation 'IMTB' stands for 'independent maintenance-technical base'):

*3. About the nuclear warheads. In accordance with the intergovernmental agreement between the USSR and Hungary, in the years of 1969/1970 nuclear warheads were deployed at the independent maintenance-technical base [IMTB] [number] 1542 (Tótvázsony – area of Lake Balaton) for the Hungarian Peoples' Army and the Southern Group of Soviet Armed Forces. The same agreement had stated that all IMTB facilities and buildings as the property of Hungary would be put at the temporary disposal of the Soviet military units which are responsible for the completeness of these projects. In 1989 a decision was made on the removal of the nuclear warheads from the IMTB No 1542 to the territory of the USSR. Tasks related to the removal of the warheads were accomplished between November 24 and 26 of the current year. Presently, there are no nuclear warheads at the IMTB. ("1989: withdrawn (resolution!) withdrawn on Nov. 24-26! Presently there are no warheads there." Note by Miklós Németh) Specifically as IMTB No 1542 is concerned, in case of an agreement with the Hungarian side it could be withdrawn from the territory of Hungary in the 1990s. (Handwritten note here by Miklós Németh: "Unit No 15-42 will be withdrawn in 1990. I agree." <sup>6</sup>*

The 1989 decision over transferring nuclear warheads back to the Soviet Union obviously affected not only Hungary but other bases with similar function in the Warsaw Pact countries too. Thus what chancellor Kohl had not known on November 28, 1989 that may have been shared with him a week later – perhaps by President Bush. Gorbachev, however, considered the conveyed nukes as such a confident matter that he did not intend to share it even with the members of the leading body of the Warsaw Pact. Mainly because *these* representatives of the WP countries were not at all *those* representatives he used to meet before, i.e. not the earlier

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<sup>6</sup> Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (MNL OL), [Hungarian National Archive–State Archive], XIX-A-2-at. Box 7.

faithful communist leadership was present in Moscow. For instance, in the Polish delegation, Tadeusz Mazowiecki sat next to President Wojciech Jaruzelski; in fact, Mazowiecki as leader of the expert group of the Solidarity trade union movement had been interned for one year by General Jaruzelski during the state of emergency in Poland. Yet during the WP meeting in Moscow, there was one single reference to the nuclear warheads when at a certain point Gorbachev referred to the “Akhromeyev formula.” In the 19 April, 1989 issue of the Soviet *Pravda*, Marshal Sergey F. Akhromeyev, earlier the Soviet chief of the General Staff and later military adviser to Gorbachev, proposed a radical reduction of all sorts of theater nuclear weapons and consequently their total liquidation. By December 1989, however, political decisions went beyond earlier theoretical considerations.

All things considered, reinforcement of goodwill took place at Malta. No formal agreements were born there, thus there was no decision ‘over the new partitioning of the world’ either. Nothing of the sort was even needed. The announcement about “the end of the Cold War” itself meant an indirect admission that the Soviet Union had lost it – although in reality, the Cold War ended only in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc and the Soviet Union.

[Translated by Barnabás Vajda and Karl P. Benziger]

## Hungary and international politics in 1989

### A selected chronology<sup>7</sup>

**25 January:** Ferenc Kárpáti, Minister of Defense, says one Soviet armored division and one training regiment will be withdrawn from Hungary in the first half of the year, and in the second half a vertical assault battalion and a fighter plane regiment will be removed.

**3 March:** Vladimir Shemyatjenko, Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the European Economic Commission, says in his interview given to the paper *Le Soir* in Brussels: the Soviet measures taken in 1956 and 1968 rested on legal grounds. He expresses his hopes, however, that such events and situations will not occur in the future again.

**5 March:** Foreign minister Péter Várkonyi conducts negotiations separately with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevarnadze and American Secretary of State James Baker.

**5 June:** Foreign Minister Gyula Horn states nothing can justify the bloodshed in Beijing. Many political and social organizations condemn the bloodshed in Beijing in a communiqué and warns that political conflicts should not be settled by force of arms in Hungary. There are demonstrations in front of the Chinese embassy in Budapest.

**29 June:** Jevgeniy Ambarutsev publishes an essay on the occasion of the Imre Nagy funeral in *Moskovskie Novosti*. In it he stresses: "Though Imre Nagy was convicted by a Hungarian court in Budapest, it is unquestionably our sin, the sin of our leader at that time, Khrushchev."

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<sup>7</sup> This chronology is an excerpt from the following publication: *Political Transition in Hungary, 1987-1990. Chronology of Events* Compiled by Tibor BECK, Edited by Csaba BÉKÉS and Miklós VÖRÖS. Contributions to the chronology were made by Sándor HORVÁTH, Pál GERMUSKA, Balázs MAJTÉNYI, Karola VÁGYI mrs NÉMETH, István SIMON, Eszter Zsófia TÓTH, © National Security Archive, Washington DC Cold War History Research Center, Budapest, 1956 Institute, Budapest, 1999. The complete chronology is available at: [www.coldwar.hu](http://www.coldwar.hu)

**11 July:** George H.W. Bush, President of the United States of America arrives in Budapest. In the course of the day 4 Hungarian-American joint venture company contracts are signed.

**12 July:** George H.W. Bush makes a promise in Budapest that he will urge for effective economic help for Hungary at international forums, in the first place at the upcoming summit meeting in Paris. The US president suggests that the Congress should establish a \$25 million fund to support the acceleration of private business in Hungary, and furthermore, in case the Hungarian Parliament passes the bill on emigration, trade restrictions on Hungary should be lifted.

**25 July:** In Moscow, Mikhail Gorbachev, Rezső Nyers and Károly Grósz agree to continue negotiations on the further withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary. They also agree that under appropriate international circumstances the reduction of troops may lead to a complete withdrawal of armed forces.

**10 September:** The Council of Ministers announces that as of midnight on September 11, East German citizens are allowed to leave Hungary for Western countries as well. The next three days over 12 thousand people take the best of this opportunity.

**26 October:** US President George H.W. Bush signs the decision on the basis of which Hungary is granted the status of a most favored nation for a longer period of time.

**27 October:** Gyula Horn announces at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Warsaw that Hungary will make even more efforts in the future to follow its own course of foreign policy independent of its membership in the organization.

**11 November:** The Italian, Yugoslav, Austrian and Hungarian foreign ministers negotiate in Budapest on the possibility of more intensive cooperation in the Alps-Adriatic-Danube region.

**29 November:** Prime Minister Miklós Németh assures the defense ministers of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Budapest that Hungary will continue to be a member of the Eastern European military alliance, but he also stresses that the alliance needs to be modernized.

**2-3 December:** President George H.W. Bush and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev meet aboard a ship on the shores of Malta.

**3-4 December:** President H.W. Bush briefs NATO Heads of State and Governments on the US–Soviet summit. Among others, he meets Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Laeken, near Brussels. During the talks the Chancellor has an impression, as he states in his diary, that a “turning point had taken place” in the US policy regarding the German reunification.

**4 December:** The Hungarian State Secretary of the Ministry of Finance says, in the presence of members of the Parliament, that the reserves of the country have reached a minimum which would result in declaring insolvency of the country if the Parliament fails to pass the act on the budget. The International Monetary Fund expects Hungary to radically reduce its deficit in the balance of trade in 1990, otherwise it will not grant further credits to the country.

**21 December:** The Parliament pronounces its dissolution effective of 16 January, 1990. The representatives pass the 1990 budget act. On the same day defense minister Ferenc Kárpáti announces further withdrawal of Soviet troops.



**Introduction to the documents**  
**by Barnabás Vajda**

The following brief collection of primary sources, that are published here for the first time, shed light on the reactions of the top Hungarian political leaders right after the summit of President George H.W. Bush and Chairman M. Gorbachev off the shores of Malta, on December 2-3, 1989.

In the first part of this e-Dossier, readers will find two letters by Rezső Nyers, then President of the Hungarian Socialist Party. First, the unofficial hand-written notes he took during a briefing by M. Gorbachev at a Soviet Bloc summit in Moscow on 4 December, just a day after the meeting with President Bush. The second document by Nyers is an official report he compiled about the Malta meeting some time later, on 6 December, in order to inform Prime Minister Miklós Németh. For the sake of clarity, we publish Rezső Nyers's manuscript in three versions: as an original scan (Document I/1-A), as a line-to-line full document Hungarian transcription (Document I/1-B), and as an edited English translation text (Document I/1-C).

The second part of our collection consists of two more documents, both originating from the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is no doubt that both documents: a report written by Deputy Foreign Minister Ferenc Somogyi about the meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact, as well as a telegram sent by the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow about V.M. Falin's briefing about the Malta meeting provide valuable and almost immediate reactions inside Hungarian diplomatic circles as a consequence of the overwhelming influence of the Malta meeting.

All documents published here have been translated into English, and to our best knowledge none of them have been previously published.

Our contribution, entitled "The Malta Summit of 1989 from Hungarian Perspective: Related Sources after 25 Years" should certainly be considered in the wider context of international research that has been done so far regarding East European transitions in 1989 in general, and

the Malta meeting in particular. There were several publications that served as inspirations for us:

Anatolij Chernaev's notes on the Malta meeting were first published in parts in English in *The End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989: New Thinking and New Evidence. A Compendium of Declassified Documents Prepared for a Critical Oral History Conference organized by the National Security Archive*, Washington D.C., Musgrove, Georgia, (USA) May 1–3, 1998.

A longer but still not full version was published in the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* no. 12-13 (Fall/Winter 2001), pp. 229-241.

The document was finally published *in toto* in *Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989*, ed. by Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas S. Blanton, and V. M. Zubok (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010).

The American records of the meeting were made available in Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinzon, *The Malta Summit and US–Soviet Relations: Testing the Waters Amidst Stormy Seas. New Insights from American Archives*, Cold War International History Project e-Dossier No. 40. (<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-malta-summit-and-us-soviet-relations-testing-the-waters-amidst-stormy-seas>)

We decided to publish this brief but original collection of documents because no report on this important Warsaw Pact meeting has been published to date.

No document on Gorbachev's briefing on the Malta summit was included in the recent excellent volume publishing many international documents on the transition in the Soviet Bloc as well, c.f. *Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989*, ed. by Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas S. Blanton, and V. M. Zubok (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010).

Nor had they been included in publications concerning earlier international research programs by the National Security Archive in Washington DC.

Similarly, they had not been included in major international online publication projects like the Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP) Publication Series. (Washington D.C./Zurich.) See especially the records of the Party leaders (WP Political Consultative Committee). [http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/publications/php\\_collseries.cfm](http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/publications/php_collseries.cfm).

We also understand that there has been a very significant output of primary sources in the Hungarian language, all partially concerning the times preceding and/or around December 1989. Just to name the most important of them is the fundamental collections of documents:

*Rendszerváltozás Magyarországon 1989–1990. Dokumentumok.* [Political Transition in Hungary, 1989–1990]. Békés Csaba, Malcolm Byrne, Kalmár Melinda, Ripp Zoltán, Vörös Miklós, (Eds.). National Security Archive, Hidegháború-történeti Kutatóközpont, 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 1999; *Gorbacsov tárgyalásai magyar vezetőkkel. Dokumentumok az egykori SZKP és MSZMP archívumaiból 1985–1991* (Eds. János Rainer M. and Magdolna Baráth. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 2000).

*Sub Clausula 1989. Dokumentumok a politikai rendszerváltozás történetéhez* [Documents on the history of the political transition], Gábor Máthé (et al. Eds.) Magyar Közlöny, Budapest, 2009.

*A Páneurópai Piknik és határáttörés húsz év távlatából* [The Pan-European picnic and the penetration of the border – Twenty years later, György Gyarmati (Ed.), L’ Harmattan Kiadó, Budapest, 2010, including contributions by Sándor Szakály, Ignác Romsics, László Borhi, Krisztina Slachta, András Oplatka, Imre Tóth, György Gyarmati, Ernő Deák, and Gert Tschögl.

The above mentioned sources, however, are all in Hungarian, thus not accessible for most researchers abroad. The documents in this e-Dossier were also not yet available for other major publications of translated documents, such as:

*Political Transition in Hungary, 1989–1990.* Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, Melinda Kalmár, Zoltán Ripp, and Miklós Vörös (Eds.). Documents compiled by Magda Baráth, Csaba Békés, Melinda Kalmár, Gusztáv Kecskés, Zoltán Ripp, Béla Révész, Éva Standeisky, Miklós Vörös. National Security Archive, Cold War History Research Center, 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 1999.

<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/political-transition-hungary-1989-1990>)

As both the Soviet and American minutes of the Malta meeting are now available, the documents published in this e-Dossier shed new light mostly on the Eastern perception of the event, i.e. how Gorbachev presented and interpreted his talks with Bush to the Soviet Bloc leaders. Besides discussing the summit he gave a detailed report on his recent visit to Italy and the Vatican that was “a success beyond all expectations” and evaluated the prospects of improving bilateral relations very highly: they agreed on establishing diplomatic relations

between the Soviet Union and the Vatican, moreover, the Pope was invited to Moscow and accepted the invitation. In addition, the documents also reveal how these negotiations were seen in one of the leading reformer states of the Soviet Bloc in the midst of the transition from Communist rule to democracy.

*[The documents published in this CWIHP e-Dossier have been compiled and published by Béla Révész, Csaba Békés and Barnabás Vajda, and they were translated by Karl P. Benziger, Laura Deal and Barnabás Vajda.]*

**I/1-A.**

Városi Szociális pörök és állami vezetőknek  
tanácskozás

Munkács, 1988. december 4.

gyakori:

Nagy jelentőséget tulajdonítunk - új szabványok  
Folytatásunk együttműködésének  
Már, eddig nem történtek semmilyen  
Országunk megismerését szolgálja

Nagy felelősség hárul ránk

Viharszél idején élünk

Megőrzésünk hirtelen megváltozik

Eldöntött, helyesen a választásunk irányát

Áttelel információkat adjunk - Dajkának

Ne legyen félreértés köztünk

Ne rússunk le az események mögött

Éledelemből, anyagiabbá váljon az együttműködésünk

Ferencvárosi Vell egy szervezetet szervezünk  
helyzetéről

Magyar Országos  
Levelező

Országospi látogatásról beszámoló

Országospi látogatás a gazdasági-politikai kapcsolatokról

Elsőként jelent meg a nyugati piacok, majd a  
első lépésben

303

Cybernetics:

Litropatis fupomtalatri magyru jöl  
Ar olan usp udoveli, a szamony is alapja  
a jo' lapewlatulek

Arnyalatnyi elteriesek az unak (Antoni  
elrotelerttoisq kutubrideseje)

A helsinki jolyamat uj szamokan nu midsep  
(Helsinki 4.)

Olasor artoz ventrevor adunak, lemmi

20 egermeny alcarada - Kovos kutubridese

leszeles gendrogo's kutubridese

Norokomina elleni harc

Könyvzeti veszedelmek

Gendrogo'si eppittumilode's irant kovoseu  
nagy eppeterte's

Olasor kungyalja 1880-ben az europai  
allamok verstromel eszveitelével

Magyar Országos  
Leveletár

Földtön tegepi - ferete tegepi ompe  
eppittumilode'set orgalmuamir

Andriotti's:

Kövel-belet's (Antoni'sen libruum)

ke'le'set ipen artozom vetitelertel

II. Frans-Pal papival valo' talalko's

Tartalmas volt a talalko's

Europai s' vilaghelyzetrol is szo' volt

Papa ferisei hasznolok a miemunkol 50H

305  
Kérem a következőket: 1. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 2. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 3. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 4. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 5. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 6. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 7. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 8. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 9. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 10. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát.

Köszönettel a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 11. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 12. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 13. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 14. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 15. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 16. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 17. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 18. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 19. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 20. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát.

22  
Köszönettel a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 21. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 22. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 23. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 24. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 25. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 26. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 27. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 28. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 29. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 30. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát.

31  
Köszönettel a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 31. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 32. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 33. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 34. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 35. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 36. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 37. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 38. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 39. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát, 40. a fentebb említett iratok másolatát.

Egyéb:

Kardet (Busta):

1, Gyandariji kioldesdel kardte  
Siinte corit bima kereskedelem an utobbi  
erebbe!

El Drehtladas jelesi

- Fudrom-Vandit klaurula Jeloldasit  
elfognyalja
- Nem allendit mudi a nemzetini bor-  
venetelben nlo' orvjet resoritelt

2, Kantonai politikai kioldes  
Konatutw

- (Hutepini fejjovetel  
Simison 10% m cor Neuti vidolpa-  
hato!  
Hz martomn ala'itnto!

USA jmslat:

SU 6, 7 eren orvota  
USA 8, 0 " "

- Deugeri flottinil megsemmisiteu a  
mudle'is fejjovetel  
(Stalholi, sarmya sabito' hite) egyite-  
sen: SU alliszont]

- Hapjomanyo fejjovet tereu  
1980-ben ala'itni (Helvicki ki)

Egyeb:

Nemond fejjovetel, hanem a lob-  
simot is cor Neuteu!

Nem solott vilant an OSA

Arms mintre cor Neute, (300. eren 12)

USA 6' SU orviteu? Er nem pi'

Magyar - Eur. (Kuplan, Finncor. etc.) <sup>296</sup> kismunda

Magyar Országos  
Levélár



Egyéb események:

Havlatemperárási rendszer elindult - Nyitva  
 a V. Következőre USA támogatással!

- Vegyi fegyver - kérdés  
 Tehát a VF 80%-ának felhasználásával, az  
 USA elhagyja a "biológiai fegyverek" fej-  
 lesztését  
 VF-er 24%-ának engedélyezése az USA-  
 részéről! Ez nem globális megismerés!  
 Szükség megjelenni az atomerő közf. - u:  
 az újított központi közf. - u  
 Kiszármazás: tenger stb.)  
 Kétféle min. mintján foglalkozni vele  
 interakcióban!

Megállapítás: 1990. június 2. felelően megap-  
 tani a követendő irányt!

3, Közép-Amerikai kérdés

Nicaragua (Több mint, mint az USA-ban)  
 Kétféle fegyverrel segít a for. exportját  
 Szeg az USA birtoklásának emelése  
 országban

Egyéb esemény: Nic. állam vezetése a szűrt (fegyver)  
 szállításban S. Salvadorban

Bush + USA vezetői

4, Ökológiai problémák

Bush: Forrás problémák, számos új meg-  
 dalom - Földi háború és más 304

Magyar Országos Levéltár

Gorbacsov:

5.) Európai helyzet;  
Rádnyonkettő's Buol-t a véleményezés  
az embernek.

Sorozat felvétel:

- Háború utáni időszak a béké megőrzéséért  
de nem az emelés!

Fegyverkezés nem áll be!

Konfrontációs politika visszéjét  
népszerű Európában!

USA-ban nem, de a szovjet &  
indoktrinációs politika beáll!

Európa egyetemes a nyugati, a félremond  
alappja? Bush elmondása,

de sorjait és ellenkező irány

Gorbacsov figyelmeztetés Bush-nak!

El adja pontotok a for. - t?

Európai Egyesült Államok?

Helsinki folyamat mellett Dönsen  
hitet tette!

Egyetemes:

Natonai tömböket politikai kérdésekre  
névelni!

NDK kérdése:

Gorbacsov: Hatalom szétosztás  
Két német állam

USA: Egyetemes, nem a német kérdéssel,  
de nem szabad eldönteni! 398

Magyar Országos  
Levélár

Gyórfassor: Konföderáció' ellen! Megfontolja a kőművel!

(Körös kutató, kőművel, jószág)

Köhl világházi céljál elvált be a gondolat!

V.G. a védelmi elváltat kőművelk emítáris!

NATO oldali stutépín:

V. napom ellemtámadás muddesin  
előzővel!

Er igazán nem védelmi elváltat

Fülp szeptéri góccsól vitéstől

Regionális konfliktusok

1) Afganisztán! EU körös professiót  
szeptélt

Bush: Elváltat an elváltat  
Nadrisillatit rendom kőművelben  
főeditt

EU: Kőművelk kőművelk elváltat  
nemváltat (kőművel) konferenciát  
Szeptélt világházi

2) Kőművel

Konstitúción elváltat a EU se-  
rept!

USA szeptélt is kőművelk  
Kőművel is!

Yraell elváltat szeptélt (Bush  
kőművelk)

Andreas:

Muddesin szeptélt szeptélt kő-  
művelk! Kőművelk elváltat  
szeptélt!

Bush elváltat a EU kőművelk ismét 399

Magyar Országos  
Levélár

Gorbucor: Bush a járólta a magyar tulajdonát!  
 Gorbucor ezt várta!  
 Fruto, a fúnduor legyen önállója!

Örösképeben:  
 Nagyját megerte, a VPA részével Kelet-  
 Európa iránt!

Bush eiderlődött a Baltikum területi rendezésé-  
 iránt!  
 Azt várta, hogy bevéssék rendezését!

Gorbucor:  
 Egyszer szövetségével dolgozni a Karabli-  
 terület, a Baltikum, Ulster & Quebec  
 kérdéseiben!

A támaszkodásom részletek:

Szovjetunió részéről:  
 Gorbucor, Rizinov, Fikrolov, Levandundre

Csehszlovákia:  
 Urbanek, Adamec, ??

Magyarország: Nyers, Kémeth M., Somogyi F.

NDK: Mudrow, Kreis, ??

Leipzig: Farnseldi, Maccicci, Radovici

Románia: Ceausescu, Dascalu, ??

Bulgária: Mladenov, Minintchev, ??

Felhasználók: Mladenov, Nyers, Mudrow, Farnseldi, Ceausescu,  
 Urbanek

400

Magyar Országos  
Levélár

Magyar Országos Levéltár

A Thomas Berni ügy: Kora nyilatkozat az 1968-as esztendőben Berni ügyben  
Inkább a bíróságnak!

Magyarországi Köztársaság (1968-as) elnöke  
Ezerédesi igazságügy miniszter  
Kert állam - Nem befolyásolható -  
Kert nem az állam szervezete, hanem az állampolgár!  
Állam - az országunk!  
Lejárt - képzés korszak!  
Képzésnek is az államnak!  
Sokszor az állampolgár, de nem az államunk  
Köztársaságunk felépítéséhez

**I/1-B. Rezső Nyers's handwritten notes on Gorbachev's briefing on the Malta summit at the meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders in Moscow on December 4, 1989**

Line-to-Line Full-Text Hungarian Transcription

**Source:** Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (MNL OL), [Hungarian National Archive–State Archive], „A Varsói Szerződés párt- és állami vezetők tanácskozása Moszkvában 1989. december. 4. Nyers Rezső iratai. Kéziratok jegyzet. MNL OL M-KS 288. f. 66. d. 28. ő. e.”

**Physical extent:** 9 pieces of A/4 folio, according to the MOL's numbering pp. 393-401.

Varsói Szerződés párt és állami vezetőinek  
tanácskozása  
Moszkva, 1989. december 4.

[1. (MOL számozása szerint: 393.) oldal]

Gorbacsov:

Nagyon jelentős időszak – Új szakasz  
Folytassuk együttműködésünket  
Más, érdemibb kontaktusokat fenntartani  
Országaink megerősödését szolgálja  
Nagy felelősség hárul ránk  
Viharos időket élünk  
Megőrizni higgadtságunkat  
Előrelátni, helyesen a változások irányát  
Hiteles információkat adjunk-kapjunk  
Ne legyen félreértés köztünk

Ne késsünk le az események mögött  
Élénkebbé, nyitottabbá váljon az együttműkö-  
désünk  
*Tervezni kell egy eszmecserét országaink  
helyzetéről*

*Olaszországi látogatásról beszámoló*

Olaszország érdekelt a gazdasági-politikai kap-  
csolatokról [*sic!*]  
Elsőnek jelentek meg a szovjet piacon, most is  
erősen törekednek

[2. (394.) oldal]

Gorbacsov:

Látogatás tapasztalatai nagyon jók  
Az olasz nép üdvözli, a kormány is akarja  
a jó kapcsolatokat  
Árnyalatnyi eltérések vannak (katonai  
elkötelezettség különbözősége)  
*A helsinki folyamat új szakaszára van szükség.*  
(Helsinki II.)

Olaszok aktív résztvevők akarnak lenni

20 egyezmény aláírása – Közös kutatások  
Leszerelés gazdasági hatásai  
Narkománia elleni harc  
Környezeti veszedelmek  
Gazdasági együttműködés iránt közösen  
nagy egyetértés  
*Olaszok támogatják 1990-ben az európai  
államok vezetőinek részvételével*

Földközi tengeri - Fekete tengeri országok  
együttműködését szorgalmazzák

Andreotti:  
Közel-keleti (különösen Libanon)  
kérdését igen aktívan vetették fel

*II. János–Pál [ sic! ] pápával való találkozó*

Tartalmas volt a találkozó  
Európai és Világhelyzetről is szó volt  
Pápa tézisei hasonlóak a mieinkről

[3. (395.) oldal]

Gorbacsov: Óriási erő ez, mert 700 millió hívő katolikus  
Pápa támogatja a Peresztrojkát

*Nem támogatja sehol a destabilizációt*

??

*Kapcsolatokat (diplomáciai) visszaállítják!*

Pápát meghívták! Elfogadta!

Időt megválasztani jól, nem erőltetve

SzU-beli katolikusok dolgát felvetette a Pápa

Szovjet részről: minden egyházzal jó viszony

Ha megegyeznek a pravoszláv egyházzal,

a SzU nem akadályozza

Nem szabad ebből politikai kérdést

csinálni!

Politika és Erkölc harmonizálása:

Felvállalni az általános emberi értékeket!

*Bush elnökkel való találkozás*

Kezdeményezés az USA elnökétől eredt!

*Igazolást kellett kapni: az USA részéről adott a  
folyamatosság!*

Bush kezdetben lelassító taktikai magatartást

tanúsított a SzU felé, majd európai [sic!]



Két találkozó küldöttséggel, két találkozó  
    négyszemközt! 8 óra tiszta idő  
Időjárás: Hadihajóról polgári hajóra  
Nyugodt, jó légkör, vádaskodás nélkül, közben  
    az éles kérdéseket nem kerülték meg  
    Reagen stílusától eltért!  
    Nem volt semmi kioktató jellege

[4. (396.) oldal]

Gorbacsov:

Kezdet (Bush):

1) Gazdasági kérdésekkel kezdte

    Szinte csak búzakereskedelem az utóbbi  
    években!

Előrehaladás jelei

- Jackson–Vanik klauzula feloldását  
elfogadják
- Nem ellenzik már a nemzetközi szer-  
vezetekben való szovjet részvételt

2) Katonai politikai kérdések

Konstruktív

- Stratégiai fegyverzetek

Júniusra 50%-os csökkentés kidolgoz-  
ható!

    Hamarosan aláírható!

USA javaslat:

    SzU 6,5 ezer rakéta

    USA 8,0 “ ”

- Tengeri flottánál megsemmisíteni a  
nukleáris fegyvereket  
(taktikai, szárnyasrakétákkal együtte-  
sen: SzU álláspont)

- Hagyományos fegyverzet terén

1990-ben aláírni (Helsinki II.)

Gorbacsov:

Nemcsak fegyverzetet, hanem a létszámot is csökkenteni!

Nem adott választ az USA

Azonos szintre csökkentés (300 ezer fő)

USA és SzU szinten? Ez nem jó

Nyugat-Eur. (Anglia, Franciaor. stb.) kimaradna

[5. (397.) oldal]

Gorbacsov:

Haditengerészeti rendezés elakadt - Nyitva

SzU körülvéve USA támaszpontokkal!

- Vegyifegyver-kérdés

Terv a VF 80%-ának felszámolásáról, ha USA elhagyná a „bináris fegyverek” fejlesztését

VF-ek 2%-ához ragaszkodnak az USA részéről! Ez nem globális megszüntetés

SzU kész megjelenni az ottawai konf.-n:

nyitott égbolt konf.-n

Kiszélesíteni: tenger stb.)

Külügymin. szintjén foglalkozni vele intenzíven!

*Megállapodás: 1990. június 2. felében megtartani a következő csúcsot!*

3) Közép-Amerikai kérdés

Nicaragua (Több párt, mint az USA-ban)

Kuba fegyverrel segíti a forr. exportját  
Nagy az USA bizalmatlansága ezzel a két  
    országgal szemben  
Gorbacsov: Nic. nem vesz részt a repülő (fegyver)  
    szállításban S. Salvadorban (sic!)  
Bush: USA résztvesz

#### 4) Ökológiai probléma

Bush: Sok probléma, számos ok az aggodalomra  
Fehér Házban lesz terv

[6. (398.) oldal]

Gorbacsov:

#### 5) Európai helyzet:

Rákényszerítették Bush-t a véleményére  
az emberek.

Szovjet felvetés:

- Háború utáni időszak a béke megóvása  
de nagy ára van ennek!  
Fegyverkezés nem vált be!

*Konfrontációs politika vereséget szenvedett Európában!*

USA-ban vannak, akik szerint a hidegháborús politika bevált!

*Európa egyesítése a nyugati értékrend alapján?*

Bush elgondolása,

de szovjet éles ellenvélemény *Gorbacsov figyelmeztetése Bush-nak:*

El akarja pusztítani a Szu.-t?

Európai Egyesült Államok?

*Helsinki folyamat mellett közösen*

*hitet tettek!*

Egyetértés:

Katonai tömböket politikai kérdé-

sekre orientálni!

NDK kérdése:

Gorbacsov: határok sérthetetlenek

Két német állam

USA: Egyetért, számol a német érzelmekkel,  
de nem szabad erőltetni

[7. (399.) oldal]

Gorbacsov:

*Konföderáció ellen! Megbontja a tömböket!*

(Közös külügy, hadügy, pénzügy)

Kohl választási célból dobta be a gondolatot!

*VSz a védelmi doktrínát támogatja ezután is!*

NATO eddigi stratégia:

5. napon ellentámadás nukleáris  
eszközökkel!

Ez igazában nem védelmi doktrína

Fülöp szigeteki puccsról vitáztak.

*Regionális konfliktusok*

1) Afganisztán! SzU közös erőfeszítést  
sürgött

Bush: Elvesztették az érdeklődésüket  
Nadzsibullah rendszer kérdésében  
tévedett

SzU: Koalíciós kormány érdekében  
nemzetközi (közös) konferenciát  
Szabad választásokat

2) Közel-kelet

Konstruktívnak értékelték a SzU szerepét!

USA szerepe is konstruktív  
Arafaté is!

Izraellel nehézségek vannak (Bush panaszkodott)

Andreotti:

Mindkét részről sok ajándék Izraelnek! Követelni érte ellenszolgáltatást!

Bush érdeklődött a SzU átalakítása iránt

[8. (400.) oldal]

Gorbacsov:

Bush ajánlotta a magántulajdont!

Gorbacsov ezt vitatta!

Fontos: a termelőnek legyen önállósága!

Összességében:

Nagyobb megértés az USA részéről Kelet-Európa iránt!

Bush érdeklődött a Baltikumi kérdések rendezése iránt!

Azt kérte, hogy békésen rendezzék!

Gorbacsov:

Egységes szabványokkal dolgozni a Karabah-terület, a Baltikum, Ulster és Quebec kérdésében!

A tanácskozáson résztvettek:

Szovjetunió részéről:

Gorbacsov, Rizskov, Jakovlev, Sevardnadze

Csehszlovákia:

Urbanek, Adamec, ??

Magyarország:

Nyers, Németh M., Somogyi F.

NDK:

Mudrow, Krenz, ??

Lengyel: Jaruzelski, Mazowiecki, Rakovski

Román: Ceausescu, Dascalescu, ??

Bulgária: Mladenov, Miniszterelnök, ??

Felszólaltak: Mladenov, Nyers, Mudrow, Jaruzelski, Ceausescu,  
Urbanek

[9.(401.) oldal]

Gorbacsov:

Koncepciónk felelősségteljes

Tömböket fel kell számolni, de nem egyoldalúan

Nyugatról is ezt tanácsolják

Lépésről lépésre tovább!

Január 9-re meghívni!

*Két német állam szerződéses kapcsolatot létesítsen!*

Két állam – nem konfederáció –

Erősödő együttműködés

Csehszlovákiai beavatkozás (1968-as) elítélése

A tanácskozás végén:

Közös nyilatkozat az 1968-as

csehszlovákiai beavatkozás

hibás voltáról!

## **I/1-C. Rezső Nyers's handwritten notes on the Bush-Gorbachev meeting on Malta from December 4, 1989**

Edited Full-Text English Transcription

Conference of the Party and State leaders of the Warsaw Treaty  
Moscow, December 4, 1989

Gorbachev: [*It's a*] Very important period – New era. Let's continue our cooperation. To keep up other, meritorious contacts. [*It*] Serves to strengthen our countries. Great responsibility falls on us. We live in stormy times. We should keep our soberness. We should foresee rightly the direction of change. We should give and obtain trustworthy information. Let there be no misunderstandings among us. Let's not fall behind events. Let our cooperation become more lively and more open. An exchange of views must be planned on the situation of our countries.

[*Gorbachev's*] Report on the visit in Italy. Italy is interested in economic-political relations. They [*the Italians*] have appeared first on the Soviet market, [*and they*] strongly intend to stay now too. Gorbachev: The visit [*to Italy*] was very good. Good relations are welcomed by the Italian people, [*and*] the government wants it too. There are slight differences (differences of military engagements). A new phase of the Helsinki process is needed (Helsinki II). The Italians want to be active participants.

Signing of 20 agreements – Joint research [projects]. Economic effects of disarmament. Fight against narcomania [*i.e. drug addiction*]. Environmental perils. Strong mutual agreement toward economic cooperation. The Italians support [the convening of a conference] with the participation of leaders of European states in 1990... [*unfinished sentence*] They [*the Italians*] press for the cooperation of Mediterranean – Black Sea countries. [*Giulio*] Andreotti: Raised the question of the Middle East (especially of Lebanon) very actively.

[*Gorbachev:*] Meeting with Pope John–Paul II. (sic!) The meeting was substantive. There was some talk of the European and World situation too. The Pope's views are similar to ours. Gorbachev: This is a huge power, for [*there are*] 700 million Catholic believers. The Pope supports perestroika. He does not support destabilization. Diplomatic relations will be

reestablished! The Pope was invited! He accepted it! The time [*of the meeting with the Pope*] should be well chosen, [*but*] not forcefully.<sup>8</sup> The Pope raised the issue of Catholics in the USSR. From the Soviet side: good relations with all churches. If [*the Vatican*] makes an agreement with the Eastern Orthodox Church, [*then*] the USSR will not hinder it. We must not make a political question out of this! Harmonizing Politics and Ethics: Let's support general human values!

Meeting with President Bush. The initiative arose from the President of the USA. [*For Gorbachev*] It was important to get a confirmation [*that*] the USA wants continuity!

At the beginning, Bush followed slowing down behavior and tactics toward the USSR, then European... [*unfinished sentence*]. Two meetings with delegation, two meetings one-on-one. 8 hours net time. Weather: From a battleship to a civilian ship. Calm, good atmosphere, without accusations, meanwhile they [*the participants*] did not avoid sharp questions. It differed from Reagan's style! It did not have an instructive character.

Gorbachev: Beginning (Bush):

1) He began with economic questions. [*There was*] Mostly only grain trade in recent years! Signs of progress. They accepted the lifting of the Jackson–Vanik clause. They don't oppose any more Soviet participation in international organizations.

2) Military political questions. Constructive. - Strategic arms. A 50% reduction can be worked out by June! Can be signed soon! USA proposition: USSR 6,5 thousand missiles. USA 8,0 [*thousand missiles*]. To destroy the nuclear weapons at the naval fleet, (along with tactical cruise missiles: USSR position). On the issue of conventional weaponry. In 1990 to sign (Helsinki II.). Gorbachev: To reduce not only weaponry, but the amount of [*military*] personnel too! The USA did not give a reply. Reduction to the identical level (300 thousand men). USA and USSR on [*the same*] level? This is not good. West Eur.[*ope*] (England, France, etc.) would be left out.

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<sup>8</sup> Eventually no such visit took place until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December, 1991 and Pope John Paul II never visited Moscow.



Gorbachev: Naval forces settlement is stuck – [*This question is still*] Open. USSR is surrounded by USA [*military*] bases! - Question of Chemical Weapons [CW]. Plan about 80% liquidation of CWs, if the USA stopped developing “binary weapons.” From the USA side, they stick to 2% of CWs! This is not abolition on a global scale. USSR ready to attend the Ottawa conf.[*erence*]: on Open Sky conf. Let’s make it wider: sea, etc.) To deal with it intensively at the level of the Foreign Min.[*isters*]! Agreement: To keep the next summit in the 2nd half of June 1990!

3) Central America question: Nicaragua. ([*There are*] More parties [*there*] than in the USA.) Cuba helps the export of rev.[*olution*] with weapons. Much distrust by the USA toward these two countries. Gorbachev: Nic.[*aragua*] is not involved in the transport of airplanes (weapons) to S. [*El*] Salvador. Bush: USA does participate.

4) Ecological problem: Bush: [*There are*] Many problems, numerous reasons to worry – there will be a White House plan [*unfinished sentence*].

Gorbachev: 5) European situation: Bush was forced by the opinion of the people. The Soviets raised: - The post-war period [*has been about*] the protection of peace, but it has had a big price! Arming did not work! [*The strategy of*] Confrontational policy has suffered a defeat in Europe! In the USA there are those who think the Cold War policy has worked! Unification of Europe based on western values? [*It was*] Bush’s idea, but [*there was*] sharp Soviet counter-opinion. Gorbachev’s warning to Bush: Does he want to destroy the USSR? United States of Europe? Both declared support for the Helsinki process! Agreement: To orient military blocks on political questions!

[*On the*] Question of the GDR [*German Democratic Republic*]: (Gorbachev: borders are inviolable. Two German states. The USA: Agrees, takes German sentiments into account, but it must not be forced.

Gorbachev: Opposes [*a German*] confederation! It would disrupt the blocks! (Joint foreign policy, defense, finance.) The idea was thrown in by Kohl for election purposes!

The WT [Warsaw Treaty] supports the defense doctrine from now on too! [The] NATO's strategy [has been] so far: On the 5th day counterattack with nuclear weapons! In reality this is not a defense doctrine.

They debated about the coup in the Philippines.

Regional conflicts:

1) Afghanistan! USSR urges mutual efforts. Bush: Lost their interest. Was wrong about Najibullah's regime. USSR: (Joint) international conference in favor of a coalition government.

Free elections.

2) Middle East: They rated the role of the USSR as constructive. USA's role is constructive too. [Yasser] Arafat's too! There are difficulties with Israel. (Bush was complaining.) [Giulio] Andreotti: Both sides have given many gifts to Israel! To demand compensation for them!

Bush was interested in the transformation of the USSR. Gorbachev: Bush recommended private ownership! Gorbachev disputed this! Important: let the producing units [i.e. factories] have independence!

In total: Greater understanding toward Eastern Europe from the side of the USA! Bush was interested in the settlement of the Baltic question! He asked for a peaceful settlement! Gorbachev: We should work with uniform rules regarding the question of the Karabah region, the Baltics, Ulster, and Quebec!

Gorbachev: Our conceptions are responsible. Blocks have to be eliminated, but not unilaterally. This has been recommended by the West too. Step by step further! Invite [him] for January 9! The two German states should establish a contractual relationship!

Two [German] states – not a confederation. – Cooperation gaining strength.

Condemnation of Czechoslovakian intervention (1968).

At the end of the conference: Joint declaration on the wrongfulness of the 1968 Czechoslovakian intervention!

Participated at the conference<sup>9</sup>:

On the part of Soviet Union: [Mikhail Sergeevich] Gorbachev, [Nikolai Ivanovich] Ryzhkov, [Alexsander Nikolaevich] Jakovlev [Yakovlev], [Eduard] Sevardnadze [Shevardnadze]

Czechoslovakai: [Karel] Urbanek [Urbánek], [Ladislav] Adamec, ?? [two question marks in the original manuscript]

Hungary: Nyers [Rezső], Németh M.[iklós], Somogyi F.[erenc]

DDR: [Hans] Mudrow [Modrow], [Egon] Krenz, ?? [two question marks in the original manuscript]

Polish: [Wojciech] Jaruzelski, [Tadeusz] Mazowiecki [Mazowiecki], [Mieczyslaw] Rakowski [Rakowski]

Roman[ian]: [Nicolae] Ceausescu, [Constantine] Dascalescu, ?? [two question marks in the original manuscript]

Bulgaria: [Petar Toshev] Mladenov, Prime Minister ?? [two question marks in the original manuscript]

Rose to speak: Mladenov, Nyers, Mudrow, Jaruzelski, Ceausescu, Urbanek

(Obtained by Béla Révész. Transcribed by Renáta Marosi. English translation by Barnabás Vajda and Laura Deal. Edited by Barnabás Vajda)

## **I/2. Rezső Nyers's typed notes to Miklós Németh on Gorbachev's briefing about the Malta meeting from December 6, 1989**

Edited Full-Text English Transcription

**Source:** Feljegyzés a Minisztertanácsnak a Varsói Szerződés tagállamai vezetőinek tanácskozásáról. 1989. december 6. Nyers Rezső az MSZP elnöke. Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár

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<sup>9</sup> In the original handwritten notes the list of participant appears not as the final section, so in the translation it was rearranged by the editors.

Országos Levéltára, MNL OL Németh Miklós Minisztertanács (MT) elnöke iratai, XIX-A-2-at. 2. d. Records for Miklós Németh, Chairman of the Council of Ministers at the conference of the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty Member States. December 6, 1989. Written by Rezső Nyers, President of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP). Hungarian National Archive (Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára) Hungarian National Archive–State Archive, MNL OL: Files of Miklós Németh, Chairman of the Council of Ministers (MT), XIX-A-2-at. 2. d.

At the unofficial conference of the Warsaw Treaty [*country leaders*] on December 4 [1989], participants from the Soviet side were Mikhail Gorbachev, Secretary General of the CPSU, USSR; Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Nikolai [*Ivanovich*] Ryzhkov, Prime Minister; and [*Alexsander Nikolaevich*] Yakovlev, Chief Adviser to Gorbachev. Hungary was represented by Prime Minister Miklós Németh, Minister of State Rezső Nyers, and Ferenc Somogyi, Under Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

At the opening of the conference Gorbachev said: the course of the changes must be foreseen, thus the [*socialist*] countries should give each other real information. There should be a conference organized between the socialist countries to help the exchange of views. After this, he touched upon his negotiations in Italy, and said: with his [*Italian*] counterparts they agreed that there should be another Helsinki agreement. On his meeting with the Pope he said: “In relation to the world situation, the Pope’s theses are similar to ours, the Holy Father supports the perestroika, and does not support destabilization. We invited the Pope to Moscow.”

Talking about the meeting in Malta he said that the initiative came from President [*George*] Bush who wanted to justify that on the side of the USA there is a demand for upholding the continuous relations. He [*Gorbachev*] considered it important to stress that the atmosphere of the talks was calm, good, and without accusations. Bush’s tone, in contrast to [*Ronald*] Reagan’s [*style*], was not patronizing. On the European situation, Gorbachev expressed that after the second World War peace became consolidated in the region [*of Europe*] but it had a big price: the arms race. Gorbachev drew a conclusion that the confrontational-style policy suffered a defeat in Europe, and blamed Bush for certain circles in the USA that still assert that same Cold War policy should be continued. According to Gorbachev, “we forced Bush to express his opinion; we asked him some questions. He should tell us what he wants: Does he

want to destroy the USSR? Does he want United States of Europe?" Bush replied that he conceives of the unification of Europe on the basis of Western values. Unlike him, Gorbachev argued for the model of the European House, [and] the peaceful coexistence of the two systems. Gorbachev said that at the end both of them declared support for the Helsinki process.

According to the information of the Soviet Secretary General, on Malta he stood up firmly for the existence of two German states; Bush also agreed with the inviolability of [state] borders, adding that German sentiments have to be considered, but nothing should be forced. Gorbachev explained to Bush that he is against the confederative solution. In his opinion, Chancellor [Helmut] Kohl has thrown the question of German unification to public opinion just as an election trick. Gorbachev proposed to Bush that the two German states should set up a contractual relationship, and the military blocks should be abolished.

Gorbachev said that Bush recommended to him the appearance of private ownership in the USSR, but he is against it. In his opinion the main point is that the workers should have adequate [economic] independence.

Beyond that, the Soviet Secretary General informed those present about the military limitation [talks], about the situation in Central America and the Middle East, about the regional conflicts, and about the negotiations over some ecological issues.

December 6, 1989

[Written by] Rezső Nyers, President [of the Hungarian Socialist Party]

(Obtained by Béla Révész. Transcribed by Renáta Marosi. English translation by Barnabás Vajda and Laura Deal. Edited by Barnabás Vajda)

## **II/1. Report of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [F. Somogyi] for the Council of Ministers about the meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact from December 6, 1989**

Edited Full-Text English Transcription

**Author of the source:** the document is not signed; with high probability the document was authorized by Ferenc Somogyi, Under Secretary of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who was present at the meeting in Moscow

**Original physical extent of the source:** 9 pages of typed A/4 folios

[*Hungarian*] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 004414/1989, 2062/MT. Strictly Secret! Prepared in 59 copies. Copy No. 00056.

Report to the [*Hungarian*] Council of Ministers on the Warsaw Treaty [WT] country leaders' conference.

On December 4, 1989, at Soviet initiative, the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty countries met in Moscow. On the conference, which was called in order to give information on Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Italy and the Vatican, as well as on his talks with the American President George Bush, the participants of the conference from Hungary were Rezső Nyers, president of the MSZP [*Hungarian Socialist Party*] and Prime Minister Miklós Németh. (See list of participants in the attachment.)

In his introduction, M. Gorbachev attached great significance to the meeting in Moscow which in his evaluation demonstrated the strengthening of the alliance connections [*as well as*] the continuity of the cooperation among the WT countries. He stressed the necessity of making [*mutual*] contacts on different levels inside the [*Warsaw Treaty*] alliance system even more frequent. He was expounding that amid the changes that had ensued in our countries, mutual exchange of information and thus avoiding misunderstanding is even more indispensable. Referring to the experiences of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries,

he pointed out that the dilatory political reactions to the new developments in certain cases led to such extraordinary situations that handling the [political] processes became difficult or even impossible.

Regarding his negotiations in Italy, M. Gorbachev spoke highly of Italy's constructive role in Europe, and also of the fact that this country was among the first appearing on the Soviet market with significant economic projects. Assessing his present talks as a success beyond all expectations, M. Gorbachev emphasized the utilization of military capacities for civil purposes [e.g. *making the military sector produce consumer goods*], the fight against drug addiction and environmental protection as [three] fields that offer themselves as new [prospective] cooperation possibilities. At the same time he mentioned that on the Italian side the slow tempo of the Soviet economic transformation and bureaucracy are seen as the [two] biggest obstacles in the [way of] expanding wide-ranging cooperation. He drew attention to the operational experiences of the [Italian] state sector which plays a significant role in the Italian economy, and thus it could be utilized in our countries too.

Speaking about his unusually long, [and] substantive talks with Pope John Paul II, M. Gorbachev stressed that the favorable [and] constructive atmosphere of the negotiations was a result of a long, multi-step preparation process. He put a great value to the Pope's work promoting cooperation for the sake of peace as well as view on the relationship of politics and ethics, which is very near to the Soviet thinking which is based on the primacy of universal human values. He emphasized: Pope John Paul II is supporting both perestroika and in general the changes taking place in Eastern Europe, [but] he does not identify himself in any way with any ambitions aiming at the destabilization of the region. According to the information from the Soviet leader, as the first step toward normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and the Vatican, they will mutually send to each other permanent representatives whose function will be specified later.

At the same time the Pope was given an assurance that the situation of the Catholics [living] in the Soviet Union will be resolved within the framework of the general transformation of society, [and also] on the [legal] grounds of the forthcoming laws on freedom of conscience and religion. The Soviet side proposed direct negotiations in order to solve the open questions between the Greek Catholics and Pravoslavs and it promised to respect any agreement that

would be the result of these negotiations. The Pope accepted an invitation to the Soviet Union; the date of which will be set depending on further developments.

Within the scope of detailed information given about the Soviet–American summit on Malta, M. Gorbachev – beyond the information that has already become public – made the following noteworthy statements:

In Bush's initiative [*to meet*] probably an important part was played by the pressure that had been put on him by the West European allies and significant American circles, according to whom the US administration is in a significant delay regarding the assessment of the European processes and the genuine reaction to them. The [*American*] proposal was welcomed positively from the Soviet side because on the one hand it is in their interest to continue the Soviet–American dialogue, [*and*] to support President Bush, on the other hand the meeting offered a good opportunity to get acquainted with the views of the new administration as well as to expound on Soviet expectations. Talks were open and constructive from start to finish. Bush – unlike his predecessor – did not try to give his partner a lecture. According to Soviet assessment, the present American President is prudent, cautious in his decisions, and this is indispensably a positive feature amid the present circumstances when any hurried steps could have very serious consequences.

Regarding talks on Soviet–American economic relations at the summit, M. Gorbachev's information was rather reticent. Without mentioning concrete issues, he mentioned only this: there was agreement about the opportunity for moving on [*with the economy*], however, political incentives [*to influence US*] business circles are necessary. He emphasized that the American government is ready to handle both the participation of the Soviet Union in the international economic and financial institutions as well as the question of granting it most favored nation status in a new way.

M. Gorbachev described the debate on the security, [*and*] political-military questions as very constructive, despite the fact that significant difference of standpoints in many important questions will continue. In his opinion, there are favorable prospects for holding an European summit in 1990. During the negotiations a concord was generally felt in that respect that a newer political impulse is needed for surmounting the difficulties, nevertheless the clearing-



up of the details was postponed by the two sides to the meetings of foreign ministers planned for January, further on scheduled for March, April and May [of 1990]. The difference of views seems to be particularly sharp on the question of the naval bases and on the arms deployed at sea [*tactical nuclear forces at sea*]. Regarding the latter – according to Soviet judgment – the move [*to do away with all nuclear forces at sea*] is conceivable on the basis of the [Sergey] Akhromeyev formula according to which basically all nuclear arms belonging to this category should be eliminated. The opinions drew slightly near in the question of [*the ban of*] chemical weapons, inasmuch as [*the two sides*] came to an agreement to solve the problem on a global scale, specifically regarding the possibility of proportional realization of this aim. It is worth mentioning at the same time that the Soviet side regards the adherence of the American side to the 2% final security [*strategic*] stock [*of chemical weapons*] as incompatible with the globality [*of the aim*]. Each side set great value to the so called Open Skies initiative, at the same time the Soviets pressed for further development of this proposal, [*and they pressed for*] its extension to land, sea and space.

Among the regional conflicts, most attention was given to the crisis in Central America. According to Soviet assessment, the United States represents an aggressive standpoint in this question without reason, and has prejudices towards Nicaragua. Beside this the American side – regarding Soviet steps [*that have been*] done so far as insufficient – urges energetic Soviet pressure [*on Fidel Castro and Daniel Ortega*] in order to change the policy of the Cuban and Nicaraguan leaders, and specifically in order to put a stop to the weapon deliveries [*shipping arms*] to [San] Salvador. According to M. Gorbachev's qualification, contrasts [*in this question*] seem antagonistic so far.

In connection with the question of Afghanistan, the Soviet side was offended by [*the fact*] that the United States is still raising unacceptable conditions against the efforts to create a coalitional government, [*while*] leaving out of consideration an earlier Soviet–American agreement that they would treat the problem of Afghanistan as an example of wrapping up crisis centers with political tools. Whereas both sides acknowledged its partner's efforts for searching for possibilities of settling the Middle East crisis and both of them appreciated the role of the PLO [*Palestine Liberation Organization*]. The Soviet side indicated: according to their view, the PLO has reached the limit of its possibilities, [*and*] the United States should put pressure on Israel in the interest of the compromises that are still needed. Reflecting upon

an American issue, M. Gorbachev stated that from their side there are no principal obstacles in [*the way of the*] normalization of the Soviet–Israeli relations [*to reestablish diplomatic relation broken off in 1967*], and he reinforced that they are ready for opening consulates mutually.

During the debate over the evaluation of the situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe – according to the information – G. Bush from first to last pressed for a pragmatic approach of specific questions, giving an impression that he was consciously avoiding a deep and genuine exchange of views. In spite of this, at the meeting M. Gorbachev expressed in details: these changes have to be assessed and handled in the context of the changes experienced generally in the world. He stressed that the West has to change too because the further application of the methods of the Cold War, [or] presentation of positive changes as a superiority of policy of force can have very serious consequences. Present-day changes, [*and*] the need for ending Europe’s division are objective demands. It is, however, unacceptable to achieve unity through the abolition of socialism, [*and it is similarly unacceptable to achieve it*] exclusively on the basis of Western values, [*as well as*] to replace the Brezhnev doctrine with a certain Bush doctrine. Peoples’ right to independent development [*to make their own choices*] has to be fully respected everywhere.

The American President stressed the stabilization role of the political-military alliance systems, at the same time he accepted that some essential modifications in the character of alliances in order to increase their openness, [*and*] their willingness to cooperate is [*indeed*] needed. Both sides have agreed – and according to M. Gorbachev’s assessment other NATO country leaders are of the same opinion – that the question of the abolition of military blocks, proposed by the WT [*Warsaw Treaty*], should not be handled hastily, emotionally, [*and*] one-sidedly. Similarly, withdrawal of the foreign troops stationing abroad [*military personnel deployed on foreign territory*] has to be dealt with prudently.

Regarding the German question, President Bush reaffirmed the principle of inviolability of the [*state*] borders, and the fact of the existence of two German states, but according to Soviet assessment at the summit no unambiguous American standpoint was outlined regarding this matter. M. Gorbachev at the same time resolutely refused [*Helmut*] Kohl’s confederation plan,

which – in his opinion – was proposed by the West German chancellor obviously from [pre-]electoral considerations.

President Bush unambiguously reinforced America's support for the Soviet perestroika, at the same time – according to the information – he concentrated his message basically on two topics: on the propagation of the advantages of private property, and on securing a peaceful framework for the promising developments in the Baltics and in the southern [Soviet] republics. The Soviet side stated that they regard the *degree of economic independence* of the producers as the key question over the form of property, whereas in the second issue [of the *Baltics and the southern Soviet republics*] they expect the United States to use the same standard regardless of where the problems specifically occur.

During the short remarks after the briefing [*the following was heard:*]

The word was first given to P. Mladenov who just praised the quick information, and spoke about the significance of reinforcing the cooperation;

Rezső Nyers urged the earliest possible reform of the WP, specifically he pressed for rejecting foregoing unviable methods of Comecon, and for forming fundamentally new forms of cooperation.

H. Modrow practically dealt only with the topic of German reunification – which in his wording has already appeared as a slogan in the GDR. He described the American standpoint regarding the two German states as controversial, and he stated that even from the Kohl Plan they can only accept the first four points which concern the reinforcement of contractual relations.

W. Jaruzelski also stressed the proper handling of the German question, [*and stressed*] the necessity of forming a united standpoint in this issue, because this problem – as he said: also because of the question of [*state*] borders – is of great importance for them. Beside this he urged the modernization, [*and*] reinforcement of cooperation within Comecon arguing that thus the organization would increase our influence, and would provide a reliable background for our international actions.

N. Ceausescu once again stressed the negative tendencies aggravating the international situation. He emphasized that the anti-communism of the Western countries has gained a new strength, and its effect can be sensed particularly in the countries which were liquidating socialism.

He specified the campaigns for discrediting certain [*communist*] countries and their leaders as meaningless.

He repeated his initiative for summoning a high-level conference in order to discuss some questions concerning the development of socialism and the peace policy in this very year, and he stated that Romania – yielding to the pressure of numerous countries – is even ready to host an international conference of the communist and workers' parties.

K. Urbanek stated as the most direct goal the creation of a humane, [*and*] democratic socialism in Czechoslovakia.

x x x

The participants of the conference (except for the Romanian delegation which was not directly involved in this issue) adopted a short joint declaration condemning the Czechoslovakian action [*military intervention*] of the WT in 1968.

An agreement, put forward by Bulgaria, was settled that the next-in-line council meeting of the Comecon would be held in Sophia on January 9–10, 1990.

Budapest, December 6, 1989

The list of names of the delegations participating in the conference in Moscow December 4, 1989

Bulgaria:

Petar [*Toshev*] Mladenov, Secretary General of the BCP [*Bulgarian Communist Party*],  
President of the State Council [*Head of State*]

Georgi Atanasov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers [*Prime Minister*]

Dimiter Stanisev, Secretary of the CC [*Central Committee*]

Bojko Dimitrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Czechoslovakia:

Karel Urbánek, Secretary General of the CPC [*Communist Party of Czechoslovakia*]

Ladislav Adamec, President of the Federal Government

Ondrej Saling, Secretary of the CC [*Central Committee*]

Jaromir Johannes, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Poland:

Wojciech Jaruzelski, President of the Republic [*of Poland*]

Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Chairman of the Council of Ministers [*Prime Minister*]

Mieczyslaw Rakowski, First Secretary of the CC of the PUWP [*Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party*]

Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Hungary:

Nyers Rezső, President of MSZP [*Hungarian Socialist Party*]

Németh Miklós, Chairman of the Council of Ministers [*Prime Minister*]

Somogyi Ferenc, Under Secretary of the [*Hungarian Ministry of*] Foreign Affairs

GDR:

Egon Krenz, President of the State Council [*Head of State*]

Hans Modrow, Chairman of the Council of Ministers [*Prime Minister*]

Oscar Fischer, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Romania:

Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the State Council [*Head of State*], Secretary General of the RCP [*Romanian Communist Party*]

Constantin Dascalescu, Prime Minister

Constantin Olteanu, Secretary of the CC [*Central Committee*]

The Soviet Union:

Mikhail [*Sergeyevich*] Gorbachev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Secretary General of the CPSU CC [*Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*]

Nikolai [*Ivanovich*] Ryzhkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers [*Prime Minister*]

Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Alexsander [*Nikolaevich*] Yakovlev, Secretary of the CC [*Central Committee; Chairman, International Committee*]

(Obtained by Béla Révész. English translation by Barnabás Vajda, Laura Deal and Karl P. Benziger. Edited by Barnabás Vajda)

## **II/2. Telegram of the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow about V. M. Falin's [Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU] briefing about the Malta meeting from December 11, 1989**

Edited English Transcription, with omissions in the original document marked as: (...)

**Original source:** A moszkvai magyar nagykövetség távirata Valentin M. Falinnak a máltai találkozóról adott tájékoztatójáról. 1989. december 11. Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára, MNL OL, MOL XIX-J-1-j 1989 Szovjetunió 2-00831/3. Author of the source: unknown.

Telegram sent by the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow about information presented by Valentin M. Falin on December 11, 1989 about the meeting at Malta. Department of Telecommunications of MFA [*Ministry of Hungarian Foreign Affairs*] Embassy: Moscow. "Top secret."

On December 11 [1989], V.[*alentin*] M. Falin, the Head of the International Department of the CPSU CC, USSR, gave information to the leaders of the socialist countries in Moscow on the summit at Malta. They [*the Soviet leaders*] decided to provide new information, as he said, because on the one hand there are still things that have not become public, on the other hand in the US some ideas have been presented tendentiously or even wrongly.

While reconsidering the values that have been valid until now, some unpleasant things came to light for the first time from the US, and some doubts have arisen in regard to if [*the US*] is capable of handling the problems raised by the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, Japan, and Western Europe, at a time when a devaluation of [*the United States*'] power is in progress in international politics. The US has had considerable internal economic difficulties, the national debt is huge, and it is starting to fall behind in some areas of technological and scientific advancement too.

[*George*] Bush's team considered it important and useful [*to hold*] a working-style exchange of views with the Soviet Union in order to reinforce their own positions and conclusions, and

to end those foreign-policy-related discussions which interrupted diplomatic activities, or even brought into question the efficient operation of the whole [*American*] administration. Although Bush is a liberal, non-aggressive, and balanced politician, if he could act freely he would fully exploit difficulties that perestroika inevitably entails. The situation, however, is that the US itself is awaiting a perestroika, the US cannot live in an old way anymore. The two biggest victims of the Cold War are the Soviet Union and the US. The national debt of an astronomical size is the price of America's world power ambitions, because they want to be the hegemon of the world.

The actual [*American*] government, to all appearances, has realized that it is not possible to make policy in the old way [*any more*]. This has become apparent already during the first talks of the two leaders at the Malta summit. Bush did not start to lecture the Soviet Union but he stated that the containment policy, which made the two countries adversaries and enemies, has to be supplanted. It had been typical of the atmosphere of the negotiations that the United States did not try to make [*the USSR*] feel its 'superpower-number-one' position any more, and approached the role of both great powers in a more balanced way [*than before*]. This has been a very significant positive difference in comparison with the previous summits. (...)

(...) Bush stated that the US does not want to disturb either perestroika or the analogue processes which are underway in Eastern Europe. [*Bush*] is interested in the success of perestroika. Gorbachev reflected upon this that if the position of the [*US*] administration were different, then it would get into conflict with the tenor of American society and public opinion. (...)

(...) Therefore at the Malta summit political-military questions were put in a central position. Serious, in some places rigorous, but constructive debate had taken place. Although the Americans did not agree with quite a lot of the questions raised by the Soviets, but they did not refuse them >>out of hand<< either, but held up the prospect that they would examine the Soviet arguments, conclusions and anxieties. (...)

(...) Gorbachev and Bush have agreed to sign an agreement in 1990 at the highest level on the reduction of conventional weaponry. At the same time Gorbachev proposed that they hold



Helsinki II. Bush [*however*] did not commit himself to Helsinki II. (According to Falin, [*Giulio*] Andreotti and [*Francois*] Mitterand are more inclined toward this.) (...)

(...) According to Gorbachev's assessment, the American government has not yet taken up an exact policy line for the post-Cold War era. There is a big temptation to exploit the severe changes that have been taking place in the GDR to coax one-sided and "unbalanced" concessions out of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. He even made a remark to Bush that instead of the already nonexistent Brezhnev doctrine some speak of a Bush doctrine. The components of the theoretical policy of the Soviet Union are freedom of choice, [*and*] non-interference into [*others*] internal policy. Along with this, and strictly complying with these principles, [*the USSR*] encourages political changes which aim at reinforcing democracy and the power of the people.

Bush stated that the US is faithful to the Helsinki process as well as to its principles. According to Falin, although this is quite a significant statement, it is quite general too.

Regarding the questions of German reunification, Bush's inner limits and interests became visible. It is very important that he gave a balanced evaluation of the situation. On the one hand the United States sympathizes with the profound changes which are reshaping the social structure of Eastern Europe, on the other hand [*however*] it is not interested in destabilizing the European situation. It is important to the Americans that the existence of such organizations of European stability as NATO and the Warsaw Treaty should not be questioned. The United States thus does not want to force German reunification, and the President does not intend >>to dance on the Berlin wall<<<sup>10</sup>. According to Bush, the West European allies [*of the US*] take the same position. They oppose establishing a strong, united Germany because nobody can guarantee what policy it would pursue.

Both sides agreed that the confederation proposed by [*Helmut*] Kohl is merely a slogan at the moment, [*and*] the necessary conditions for [*its*] realization have not been given. A confederation, for instance, would presume a joint military policy. The Soviet Union would not agree to a NATO-member Germany and the West would not agree to let it join the

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<sup>10</sup> "Jumping up and down at the wall" as G. Bush literally said at the Malta meeting.

Warsaw Treaty. Achieving the neutrality of Germany would be improbable too. Falin separately emphasized that such mutually close approaches were expressed during the joint press conference [at *Malta*] which had not been imaginable earlier.

The Soviet side raised the question of the modernization of military doctrines too. The WT [*Warsaw Treaty*] has already changed its own [*doctrine*] based on the concept of sufficient defense, and its structure is undergoing some changes too. The US and NATO, however, for 20 years has been based on [*the principle of*] >>rapid response<< [*i.e. flexible response*] which earmarks the use of nuclear weapons on the fifth day [*of hostilities*]. The time has come for the Westerners too, to change this. (...)

(...) Gorbachev objected that on the American side [*some actors*] actively interfere with the internal policy of the Soviet Union. Some American senators travel around and make promises in the Baltics, and some American lawmakers are dealing with Karabakh too. He asked why they don't give advice to Canada (Quebec) and England (Ulster) instead. Bush pondered upon this and expressed that the administration does not share the opinion of Congress, and [*that*] on the Soviet side these manifestations should not be viewed as official, unfriendly gestures. (...)

(...) Falin assessed that the Malta summit means a new boundary, the Cold War has essentially been ending, and [*that*] the pre-conditions are now set for forming a new level and higher quality of international relations.

(Obtained by Béla Révész. English translation by Barnabás Vajda, Laura Deal and Karl P. Benziger. Edited by Barnabás Vajda)