RORTY, DEWEY AND THE ISSUE OF METAPHYSICS

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In what follows I will try to show how the way Rorty criticises Dewey’s metaphysics of experience and nature fits in with his own project of designing an anti-metaphysical philosophical outlook. In order to do that, first I’ll reconstruct the main points of Rorty’s criticism of Dewey’s approach (I). As a second step, I will present Rorty’s own program as an alternative attempt at the same – Deweyan – task of overcoming traditional metaphysics, one which has two basic pillars, namely, a so called ‘non-reductive physicalism’ and what I label as a ‘non-reductive linguisticism’ of his. As I will argue, it is by means of these two complementary theories that Rorty attempts to establish a certain ‘non-reductive discursive pluralism’, explicitly designed to avoid any possible metaphysical claim (II). In the concluding section of the paper, first I offer a short characterization of some further basic features of Rorty’s presented program, and also highlight – on the one hand – the main contrasting points between his and Dewey’s attempts, and – on the other – the chief arguments for Rorty’s alternative views. Finally, I call into question Rorty’s proposed solutions on several points, among them on the possibility of discarding metaphysics altogether (III).

1. Rorty on Dewey – outlines of the critique of his metaphysics

“It think that the letter of Dewey’s teaching often became a stumbling block to a grasp of their spirit.”

Richard Rorty

It is well known that Dewey, without exaggeration, was the most important figure in Rorty’s intellectual life. As we also know it, however, many admirer of Dewey would subscribe to the words of James Gouinlock, who gives voice to his worry regarding Rorty’s declared alliance as follows: „It would be a tragic irony if [the instruments Dewey recognized or conceived] were obscured in his name” (Gouinlock, 90). Although Rorty feels he remained faithful to the spirit, but not necessarily to the letter, of Dewey’s teaching, others sense in his case a betrayal of both.

One way to account for the shift from the pragmatism of Dewey to that of Rorty is to invoke the differences between the intellectual constellations, and also the challenges, of the times in which they worked, respectively. In that regard one should also enumerate all the important intellectual developments that bridged the periods of the two. An other and probably more promising way to account for that shift, however, is to attempt a reconstruction of Rorty’s interpretation of Dewey – or at least some aspects of it –, in order to clarify to an extent, from the viewpoint of Rorty, the reasons for his adopting differing means to the supposedly similar goals. In this part of my paper I’ll attempt to take this latter approach.
It is characteristic, indeed, that in his interpretation of Dewey Rorty applies a particularly sharp distinction between letter and spirit, talk and project – even to the point of distinguishing between an ‘actual’ and a ‘hypothetical’ Dewey –, and attempts to evaluate the former according to the estimated historical success or failure of the latter, the project as it is envisioned by him. Among the most important aspects of that project, „one may well feel – Rorty writes –, is that [Dewey] used philosophy […] as an instrument of social change” (1982b, 74). In Dewey’s case, such notion of philosophy entails a desperate confrontation with the philosophical tradition in the sense of a therapeutic treatment of it, but also, an attempt to maintain philosophy in the form of a reinvented, nondualistic, ‘empirical metaphysics’, that of experience and nature.

The conception of ‘philosophy as an instrument for social change’, no doubt, deeply captures Rorty’s imagination, and he regards it as „the best thing about Dewey” (1982b, 74). The therapeutic approach to traditional philosophy – necessitated by the fact that its dualistic notions imply pseudo-problems –, is also, as a means to the project, wholeheartedly welcomed by Rorty. His doubts arise, however, as soon as the attempt at reconstructing metaphysics emerges. Rorty goes beyond Santayana’s complaint according to which „»naturalistic metaphysics« is a contradiction in terms”, and summarizes the young Dewey’s notion of ‘philosophy as psychology’ (from the 1880s) in order to show on that example what the original motives for, and the significance ascribed to, such a project of ‘redesciring experience’ were for Dewey.

„Psychology is the completed method of philosophy”, writes Dewey at that time, because „it treats of experience in its absolute totality”, and not only some one aspect of it (as the physical evolutionists) or from some points beyond it (as the empirical psychologists) (quoted by Rorty in 1982b, 78; my italics – M. Ny.). Psychology is supposed to be the science of man whose nature – being self-conscious, and therefore an „individualized universe” – is the only possible material of philosophy. As such a totality, „no dualism in it, or in ways of regarding it, is tenable”, Dewey claims (quoted by Rorty, 1982b, 78). Thus, psychology should be able to provide a nondualistic account of human experience by capturing its ‘generic traits’ in their totality. It is to yield a kind of metaphysics – a radical empiricist and naturalistic kind – of temporal experience and nature.

Now, it was only the term ‘psychology’, but not the very ‘philosophical method’ designated by it, that vanished later on according to Rorty. Whatever the actual designation was, the underlying idea of such a method went beyond the therapeutic approach of pointing out the cultural genesis of traditional dualisms, and consisted basically in the rather constructive attempt to give nondualistic accounts of phenomena, i. e. to find ‘continuities between lower and higher processes’. Obviously, both of these sides of Dewey’s project were equally prompted by his two heroes, Hegel and Darwin. As it seems, however, Dewey saw no difficulty in bracketing both of them under the one rubric of ‘evolutionary thought’, even though their respectively idealist-spiritualist, and empiricist-naturalist features differ considerably. One can disregard these differences only if one dissolves both spirit and nature in the one and perpetual process of ‘evolving’. Dewey’s attempt at developing his metaphysics of experience and nature is just such a project in Rorty’s eyes, a project of constructing something very reminiscent of the early project of panpsychism, which should merge somehow ‘nature’ and ‘spirit’, via acknowledging differences only in degree, throughout.

The way Rorty reacts to this point is very instructive regarding his own project: if it is a kind of panpsychism which is „to bridge the gap between experience and nature, we begin to feel that something has gone wrong. For notions like »experience,« »consciousness,« and »thought« were originally invoked to contrast something that varied independently of nature with nature itself. The philosophically interesting sense – the only sense relevant to epistemology – of experience is one that goes back to ta phainomena rather than to empeiria, to a realm that
might well be »out of touch« with nature because it could vary while nature remained the
same and remain the same when nature varied. Much of Dewey’s work was a desperate,
futile attempt to get rid of the phainomena versus ontós onta, appearance versus true
reality, distinction, and to replace it with a distinction of degree between less organized
and directed and more organized and directed empeiria” (1995a, 6).

What Rorty misses above all in Dewey’s conception, then, is some way of maintaining a
distinction between ‘phainomena’ and ‘empeiria’, that is, some sense of a discontinuity between
the realm ’that might well be „out of touch” with nature’, on the one hand, and the realm of the
experience of nature itself, on the other. It is very important that we realize: this is just as much a
point which a historicist wants to make, as it is one which a natural scientist wants to make –
even if with opposit intentions. For – as Rorty formulates it – historicism means „the doctrine
that there is no relation of »closeness of fit« between language and the world: no image of the
world projected by language is more or less representative of the way the world really is than any
other.” In turn, by scientism he means „the doctrine that natural science is privileged above other
areas of culture, that something about natural science puts it in closer touch with reality than any
other human activity” (1995a, 3-4). While the historicist wants that her „being „out of touch”
with nature” be justified, the natural scientist mostly wants to maintain her claim for having a
privileged access to ‘reality’.

2. Rorty’s anti-metaphysical program

In what follows, I’d like to show in what sense can we regard Rorty’s overall philosophy as one
explicitely designed to avoid any possible metaphysical claim. His strategy rests on two basic
pillars, one being his so called ‘non-reductive physicalism’, and the other being what we can
label as a ‘non-reductive linguisticism’. Accordingly, I will proceed by discussing these two
aspects of Rorty’s anti-metaphysical project, followed by a short discussion of how that project
itself relates to the issue of metaphysics.

2.1. Non-reductive physicalism

‘Non-reductive physicalism’ is the view according to which the physicalist account of the
‘world’ (including human beings and all of their relations) is perfectly compatible with mentalist
accounts of it (without regarding the latter to be ‘metaphorical’, or unscientific, that is, a second
class truth-candidate). Rorty – following Davidson’s lead – defines the „»physicalist« as
someone who is prepared to say that every event can be described in micro-structural terms, a
description which mentiones only elementary particles, and can be explained by reference to
other events so described. This applies, e.g., to the events which are Mozart composing a melody
or Euclid seeing how to prove a theorem” (1991, 114). His point – as I take it – is that to be a
physicalist involves commitment only to the universal applicability of a kind of description of
the world, but no commitment whatsoever to any metaphysical claim as a supposed ground for
her commitment to that kind of description. It amounts to saying that a physicalist description is
in principle always possible, but it is never meant to be exclusive. Similarly, he defines anti-
reductionism as the doctrine according to which „»reduction« is a relation merely between
linguistic items, not among ontological categories” (1991, 115). As he argues, no reduction is
able to show that „X’s [ontological categories] are nothing but Y’s [ontological categories]”
(1991, 115), i.e., that a given set of such categories is in no respect other than a different kind of
such categories. Reduction on this account is a possible and even occasionally necessary relation
between linguistic entities (like in the case of translations), but has no sense beyond that order.
Anti-reductionism, therefore, is a refusal of 'reduction' in an ontological sense (which would amount to annexation, or elimination).

Thus, the mentioned compatibility of physicalist with non-physicalist accounts is due to the fact that such accounts aspire to be only non-metaphysical descriptions of the world, accounts with no claims for representing the world as it is in itself. In turn, reductionist needs – according to which ”reduction” is a relation not merely between linguistic items, but beyond that, among ontological categories’ – prove to be metaphysical needs. In other words, to claim that entities of the non-linguistic realm stand in a ‘making true’ relation to linguistic entities is already, in itself, a metaphysical claim. It amounts to ascribing an intrinsic nature to the world, and that is „the result of the temptation to privilege some one among the many languages in which we habitually describe the world or ourselves” (1989, 6). Non-reductive physicalism implies, then, that i) the possibility of an overall physicalist description of the world is postulated; ii) the very same events can be described equally well in physicalist and non-physicalist terms, a consequence of which is that so called ’mental’ and 'physical' events are the same events under two descriptions; iii) the relation of the world to our descriptions of it is not one of making true – the world does not justify our descriptions of it.

2.2. Non-reductive linguisticism

Rorty’s views on what we may call the linguistic realm – views mostly developed, again, by appropriating Davidson’s theories – should be regarded as an attempt at redescribing the human self and language in a way compatible with non-reductive physicalism. Conceived from the standpoint of physicalism, human beings – as all other organisms – are „delimited by the contours of their body” (1991b, 121), and stand solely in a causal relation to their environment. We have, then, a distinction between causes discernible (or if not discernible, postulated) within the body and those we should postulate as outer causes. Now, we have no reason to deny in principle the possibility of accounting for the behavior of human beings – including their linguistic behavior – by explaining them with such ’inner causes’. However, there are practical reasons for preferring talk about ’mental states’ (such as beliefs, desires, moods, etc.) ascribed to humans, which are but inner causes ‘under another description’, physiological states reported and identified by means of linguistic entities (such as strings of sounds and marks). Namely, talk about mental states is like abbreviating highly complex constellations of inner causes, whereas causal explanations are practically never available in adequate detail for identifying and reporting such constellations. Accordingly, there is good reason to say that the human ’self’ consists of such ’mental states’, that it is a particular network of beliefs and desires, and this is compatible with saying that such beliefs and desires are the inner causes – in short: reasons – of the linguistic behavior of human beings. Furthermore, since that web stands in the flux of causal occurrences, it is constantly driven to „rewave itself” – in the sense of acquiring new beliefs and desires –, but that process takes place without any agency according to Rorty, simply – as he claims – „in response to stimuli” (1991b, 123). To that extent, and in accord with the physicalist view, human behavior can be accounted for without ascribing intrinsic nature to them, in any sense of the word.

Now, the seemingly harmless notion of the mentioned ’abbreviating process’ points to the emergence of languages. If Rorty is to give an account for language on the basis of non-reductionist physicalism, he has to show that the ‘not-making-it-true’ relation between world and language (or causes and reasons) can be explained merely in causal, and therefore continuous, terms. The most concise treatment of this theme we find in his Contingency book, and its central theses on the topic may perhaps be summarized as follows.

Rorty sets out to show that language can be sufficiently characterized in terms of „sheer contingency”, as being a „product of time and chance” (1989, 22). At the same time, the
contingency of language is expressed also by saying that „human languages are human creations” (1989, 5). Since Rorty obviously maintains that „the world is out there, […] it is not our creation” (1989, 5) indeed, language should be conceived not only as a product of a creative initiative of ours amidst circumstances of not our creations, but also, as a product exhibiting considerable variability in a relative independence from the circumstances defining us. A possible way to account for the creative initiative of ours is to say – with Rorty – that languages are in fact tools, efficient inventions created solely for coping with future occurrences of the world and the behavior of other humans. A possible way to account for the variability of that tool, in turn, is to insist – with Rorty – that in the case of language ‘coping’ with the environment means exclusively predicting it, and by no means representing or expressing, or in any other sense being adequate to it. Furthermore, the prerequisite of regarding languages as man-made tools for prediction alone is that one should do away with the supposition that either the World, or the human Self, or ‘language as such’, had ‘intrinsic natures’ to be represented, expressed, or mastered. That move amounts to showing that not only reality and the human self – those had already been shown –, but the linguistic relations between them, language ‘itself’, too, can be accounted for in bleakly mechanical terms. Only if this last point has successfully been shown, can Rorty claim with reason that „languages are made rather than found” (1989, 7).

It is Davidson’s theory on language as the „production and »literalization« of metaphors” (1991b, 124), which is to accomplish this task, according to Rorty. As we noted above, the human self can be regarded as a web of beliefs and desires which constantly reweaves itself ‘in response to stimuli’. In one respect, there is of course only one kind of stimuli, namely, the physical kind. Yet, in an other respect, it makes sense to talk about two times two versions of them, distinguishing between causal and intended ones, on the one hand, and familiar and unfamiliar ones, on the other. Namely, „the continual reweaving of systems of beliefs and desires […] is made necessary by the acquisition of new beliefs and desires” – says Rorty –, either by being „caused to occur in human beings by […] events in the World” (when, e.g., on opening the door one says: ‘its raining’), or „by the invention of »successful« metaphors” (1991b, 120).

Metaphors, on this view, are but unfamiliar – and to that extent: utterly meaningless – strings of noises or marks made intentionally by humans. As opposed to the familiar ones, unfamiliar stimuli give occasion to modify the familiar network of our beliefs, occasion to reweave our vocabulary, the language-game we have so far played. Whenever we incorporate an intentional usage of noises and marks previously unfamiliar to us, we do so by using it for redescribing some part of reality, and thereby we render a place for it in the language game we had been playing. In this process, what has previously been unfamiliar acquires meaning – the metaphor becomes literalized. Thus, within the circle of intentionally produced stimuli, the contrasts between what is meaningful and meaningless, literal and metaphorical, familiar and unfamiliar, are coextensive.

Furthermore, trying to communicate with one another involves that we participate in an exchange of more or less familiar and unfamiliar strings of physical items, and that the parties mutually make an effort to develop tentative theories about the expected behavior of the others concerned in the process. Davidson labels such a tentative theory as ‘a passing theory’. It is a theory in the sense that it consists of projected hypotheses, i.e. „guesses about what [others] will do under what circumstances” (1989, 14), and it is a „passing” one in the sense that it is to be corrected perpetually. Successfull communication might occur whenever the passing theories of the parties „come more or less to coincide” (1989, 14). As Davidson formulates the point, all „two people need, if they are to understand one another through speech, is the ability to converge on passing theories from utterance to utterance” (quoted by Rorty, 1989, 14).

This account of communication does away with the notion of language as an entity, and accounts for it by introducing the thoroughly naturalistic distinction between familiar and
unfamiliar uses of noises and marks – which is to replace the traditional distinction between conventional and unconventional use of them, too. As Davidson says:

„there are no rules for arriving at passing theories that work. […] There is no more chance of regularizing, or teaching, this process than there is of regularizing or teaching the process of creating new theories to cope with new data – for that is what this process involves. / There is no such thing as a language […]. We should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate by appeal to conventions“ (Davidson 1986, 446).

Such an account aims at accomplishing both, giving a physicalist view of language, and showing the contingency of language. It is a physicalist view inasmuch as it claims to be able to answer all questions regarding the relation between language and non-language in purely causal terms. In turn, it shows the contingency of language by pointing out that, strictly speaking, it is a consequence of that physicalist account itself that we should drop the very idea according to which language would stand in any non-causal, say representational, relation with non-language. For language on this view is not a unity that could stand in such relation, not a set of rules or a sum total of vocabularies or both, has no ‘nature’ of its own, ultimately, it is not a medium in any sense between humans and their environment. To that extent, „human languages are human creations” – as Rorty says (1989, 5) –, and they are being created in a wholly contingent manner.

3. The issue of metaphysics – inferences and questions

It is a consequence of this theory of language that even though there are always causes for maintaining some particular belief rather than others, these causes are never capable to justify us in holding this belief rather than other ones. For we justify a particular belief (and desire) by weaving it into the web of beliefs and desires which we are, and this means that justification is exclusively the matter of relations among beliefs and desires. This is what is expressed in the notion of a 'not-making-it-true' relation between world and languages, and it implies a sharp distinction between a realm of causality and that of justification. The distinctions with which we may refer to these two realms (e.g. 'non-intentional and intentional’) usually carry some sense of ontological impact.

Within the realm of justification, however, we have on this view two basic types of discourses, basic in the sense that they are not reducible to one another. The distinctions with which we may refer to these two types (e.g. 'naturalism and historicism’, 'physicalism and linguisticism’) are ones having rather semantic impact (as they refer to discourses).

Now, the tension inherent in both kinds of these divisions goes back – within modernity – to the one engendered by the emergence of modern natural science, namely to the conflict between the mechanical world view and the moral and religious consciousness of man. This conflict was addressed above all by Kant, and he hoped to resolve it by means of his transcendentalism, employing a distinction between phaenomena and noumena, which is but a version of the old metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality.

Rorty’s philosophy, in turn, can be regarded as a reorchestrated Kantian attempt at addressing the same conflict. It is reorchestrated in the sense that he rejects transcendentalism, and he does so primarily due to the insights delivered by historicism, and again, by the so called linguistic turn. Namely, both historicism and the claim that ‘we have knowledge of the world only under linguistic descriptions of it’ point, equally, in the direction of rejecting the appearance-reality distinction. It is important to see that this latter distinction – fundamental for

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4 Rorty quotes this passage (1989, 15) from Davidson’s 1986 article: A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs.
Kantian transcendentalism, as for all metaphysics – is one which aims at sorting out discourses according to the truth-claims they may or may not have, depending on their access to reality. However, this amounts to blurring the difference between what is of ontological and what is of purely semantic relevance – as mentioned above –, and thus, to introducing a hierarchy within the realm of discourses according to their truth-value. As opposed to this Kantian solution, and according to Rorty’s approach – which acknowledges the ontological-semantic difference, precisely in its explicit aim of maintaining ‘ontological neutrality’ –, truth is not any more a privileged property either of sentences produced in natural science, or in philosophy, but rather, it is „a property of linguistic entities” of every kind, as it is suggested by „a historicist sense of truth […] compatible with the linguistic turn” (1995a, 5). 'Being true’ is a matter of justification, and as such it belongs to the linguistic realm. „Truth is a property […] of sentences” – we read in the Contingency book (1989, 7) –, sentences of whatever kind (which is not to say, of course, that every sentence is true), and that is due to the contingency of language.

„The point of the pragmatist theory of truth”, Rorty claims, is „to provide […] a nonidealistic, historicist way of avoiding the conflict between science and the religious or moral [or historicist!] consciousness” (1995a, 4). One of the main objections of Rorty against Dewey’s metaphysics of experience and nature was that it attempted to overcome that conflict in a holistic and rather idealistic way (reminiscent of his early panpsychism). In order to satisfy the requirement of Darwinism to maintain a sense of overall continuity, that attempt deliberately blurred the gulf between body and mind, sensation and cognition, brutes and humans, by suggesting a distinction only in degree of ‘organized and directed experience’, something which is common to us and the other species, of which thinking would be only a more complex and developed form. It wanted to account for the contingency of our ideas (as parts of our evolving experience) by means of a new description of experience and nature which had to show the possibility of some kind of ‘correspondence’ or ‘agreement’ between the latter.

On Rorty’s view, „Dewey should have dropped the term experience rather than redefining it and should have looked elsewhere for continuity between us and the brutes” (1995a, 7; the second one is my italics – M. Ny.). For it is not a new conception of experience, but rather a new conception of truth – truth as not in any sense an agreement or correspondence with reality – which is in fact needed according to him, in order to maintain what is legitimate in the claims of scientism and historicism. If the task was to „marry Hegel and Darwin” (1995a, 4), it shouldn’t have been done by emphasizing their ‘evolutionary thought’, as Dewey did in a rather idealistic way, but rather, by emphasizing the historicism of Hegel and the empirical-naturalist aspect of Darwin. In order to „wed scientism and historicism”, one is better off by offering a historicist, relativist view on Darwin and the natural sciences in general, than by giving a rather scientist view on evolution and the history of ideas.

Rorty’s ‘solution’ – as we saw it – attempts to maintain both, a sense of continuity and a sense of discontinuity between language-users and non-language-users, the propositional and nonpropositional. The ‘causal continuity’ side of his solution justifies the claims of physicalism or scientism, whereas the ‘linguistic discontinuity’ side of it justifies the claims of historicism or linguisticism. A prerequisite for such a justification is, however, that both parties be considered as being ‘non-reductive’, only of ‘semantic relevance’, maintaining ‘ontological neutrality’, deprived of their explicit or implicit metaphysical charge. In order to furnish that possibility, Rorty attempts to interpret all beliefs and descriptions of the world as ‘rules for action’, tools for handling reality, standing in a non-representational and contingent relation to reality. As tools, they are to be evaluated according to their expediency alone, regarding the purposes they serve. On that account, beliefs and descriptions of the world need not be synthetized in some ‘higher’ theory, nevertheless, they may well be valid next to one another in practice, valid as expedient tools serving different purposes, purposes on a par.
Several points seem to remain problematical in Rorty’s account, however. 1) Is it possible to overcome metaphysics by means of a pragmatically handled reciprocal validity of physicalism and historicism, a validity which is dependent – eventually – on the pragmatist theory of truth as expediency? This point seems to be problematic inasmuch as the desirable ‘ontological neutrality’ is argued for by invoking a physicalist view of reality itself with which he wants to do away by rendering it non-reductive. There seems to be a circularity between how Rorty makes use of the first kind of distinction (having ‘ontological impact’) and the second kind of distinction (having ‘semantic impact’) mentioned above. Rorty, who himself called attention many times to the necessary circularity of every kind of justification, would agree, most probably. However, such a circularity means in this case that his attempt at ‘overcoming metaphysics’ by means of trying to make persuasive a non-reductive discursive pluralism is itself accounted for, partially, by means of an inevitable recurrence to metaphysics. In other words, physicalism seems to retain the status of the privileged discourse when at stake is the accountability for the possibility of such a non-reductive discursive pluralism.

2) Why does the reweaving of the web of beliefs and desires take place? Rorty’s answer was that it happens merely ’in response to stimuli’. However, there must be some kind of urge of it to ‘rewave itself’, otherwise stimuli could simply destroy the web as an organized whole. There seems to be a kind of appropriating tendency, or urge to live, etc. at work here, and that is something no mechanical account will ever be able to explain, being a contradiction in terms.

3) How do metaphors emerge? Rorty’s answer is that they happen to emerge, and they are devoid of meaning, even for the one who comes up with them. But when he talks about such things as „the constellations of causal forces which produced talk of DNA or the Big Bang as of a piece with the causal forces which produced talk of »secularization« or of »late capitalism«” (1989, 16-7), or when he speaks about cases of „creativity“ and „inspiration“ which would be on Davidson’s and his account „merely special cases of the ability of the human organism to utter meaningless sentences” (1991b, 125), or again, when he says that „we sometimes find ourselves moved to utter a sentence which, despite being prima facie false, seems illuminating and fruitful“, and describes the „successfullness” of metaphors by saying that „we find them so compelling that we try to make them candidates for belief, for literal truth” (1991b, 124; my italics – M. Ny.) – well, one is left with no choice but wonder, whether these ‘constellations of causal forces’ are not anything but ‘physicalist redescriptions of Heidegger’s notion of Being’ – the use of which term Rorty himself criticised heavily and rejected stubbornly for its manner of ‘apotheosis’ and emptiness?

To sum up: I can appreciate Rorty’s redescriptions as ‘normative judgements being relative to the purposes served’, and also the main purposes he had. However, the fact remains, that even in his case the justification itself cannot discard metaphysics. It is as if Rorty would say: ‘According to Kant, Nature had endowed man with an inclination towards Metaphysics. However, man cannot dispenses with Others, either.’ If the task is, then, to wed inclination towards metaphysics with respect for others’ metaphysics, it can be done by saying: ‘As opposed to Kant, it is not Nature, but History, which had endowed man with that inclination towards metaphysics. Therefore, and since we prefer being with Others, let’s make history via doing away with that inclination. We should simply re-name it as „the need for self-perfection”, and – having become more or less content with itself – it won’t be such an obstacle among us any more.’ But when Rorty starts to explain to us, why we should rename that inclination of ours, he cannot avoid calling it on its name – the name it received from Nature.
References:


