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Lask, Lukács, Heidegger: the problem of irrationality and the theory of categories

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Emil Lask scarcely ranks among the widely known philosophers of our century. His work, H. Sommerhäuser wrote on the occasion of his ninetieth birthday, 'has remained practically without any aftermath'.¹ The number of studies dedicated to his thought has remained relatively small up to our own time. This claim about the lack of influence, however, may also be understood in terms of the lack of an explicit or direct influence, and it may admit some kind of an indirect, more subtle and hidden impact.

Indeed, it is not insignificant that we find appreciation and acknowledgement of Lask's work in Lukács' History and Class Consciousness and in Heidegger's Being and Time—two of the most influential philosophical works of our century. Lukács praised Lask for having perceived 'most clearly and uncompromisingly' what he came to regard as one of the ultimate problems of philosophical system-building (namely that 'irrational' matter reaches into the form and thus into the structure of the system), and called him, therefore, 'the most ingenious and coherent among the modern neo-Kantians'.² Lask was the only one outside the phenomenological school, Heidegger claimed in his turn, who took up Husserl's Logical Investigations in a positive sense and did not limit himself, in critically rethinking Husserl's theory of truth, to what was said in the first volume of Husserl's work.³

What History and Class Consciousness and Being and Time have in common is their attempt to overcome the dominating epistemological tradition of the day, i.e., they attempt to transcend it within the framework of a historical (Lukács) or an ontological (Heidegger) perspective. Their positive references to Lask are thus significant on their own account. But the significance of such references increases if we realize that, precisely in virtue of their attempt at a break, Heidegger and Lukács display little generosity or acknowledgement toward their spiritual
ancestors (those whose ‘bourgeois’ thinking makes them unable to grasp the ‘totality’, or the metaphysical tradition sunk into oblivion of Being). The fact that in two of the most influential philosophical works of our century, both extremely critical of their contemporaries, the work of Lask is positively referred to allows us to view the claim concerning Lask’s lack of influence in new light. Since apart from Lask there is, as far as I can see, no other philosopher both Lukács and Heidegger quote with acknowledgement, and, further, in works of theirs preceding their magnum opus the name of Lask turns up with a certain frequency – so much so that we even find one Laskian passage quoted significantly by both (II, 333). This fact occasions a comparative study of Lukács and Heidegger with an eye to the way they confronted – adopted, criticized or developed – Laskian themes. In what follows I wish to offer a contribution to such a study. An attempt will be made to show Laskian influences and parallels (1) in Lukács’ development up to and including History and Class Consciousness, and (2) in Heidegger’s development up to and including Being and Time. The discussion of the Laskian influences and parallels will be preceded in both cases by a short sketch of the development of the philosopher in question (Lukács, viz. Heidegger) in order to make visible the philosophical perspective in which the confrontation with Lask took place, and to better situate the respective convergences or divergences. I will conclude the paper by comparing more directly Lukács and Heidegger with regard to (and also beyond) their relation to Lask.xv

I Lukács and Lask

1.1 Lukács and the quest for system

‘The system is a structure of mastering the totality [Gesamtbewältigungsgefü,], an all-comprising unity’, writes Lask in one of his unpublished fragments bearing the title of ‘Die philosophische systematik’ (III, 253). Roughly at the same time, during World War I, in his similarly unpublished fragmentary Heidelberg Aesthetics Lukács complained about the ‘inevitable difficulty’ of having to centre his discussion of strictly aesthetic problems around questions pertaining to philosophical systematization (Systematization), without having a chance to pose, let alone to answer, the problem of the system itself. The difficulty springs from the fact that it is equally impossible to clarify any one philosophical problem without assigning it the systematic connection within the whole, and, conversely, to treat the problem of the philosophical system prior to posing particular philosophical problems.xvi Any one question, however, once formulated, already anticipates or points to some sort of a system, within which alone it finds its proper ‘methodic home’.xvii

Lukács’ development from the essays of the early 1910s up to History and Class Consciousness can, I think, be aptly characterized by his quest for the system. The sort of all-encompassing unity Lask speaks of, the horizon of the system, was provided for him in History and Class Consciousness, within the frame of a Hegelian systematics, by the concept of history. Until this solution was found Lukács had a long way to go. He began as a literary critic, interested in the ‘axiology and philosophy of history of the works of art’ rather than in their precise critical appraisal.xviii One of the main themes of Lukács’ first collection of essays, Soul and Form (1910), is the relation between art and life; more precisely, life as it appears in works of art, and works of art in so far as they are destined to embrace an a priori limited material or content. A basic dilemma which Lukács faces at this point is this. Works of art are of utmost importance in man’s life; they have, however, no ‘life’. This must be so, for the approach of the work of art to life is to deprive it of its distinctive character, i.e., form. The concept of form provides the criterion to split reality into two distinct spheres. On the one hand, there is the domain of works of art – a world of lucid forms, endowed with absolute validity and meaning; and on the other, there is common, everyday life – a world completely opaque and confused, without any proper intelligibility. Within this distinction, history is, of course, situated in the sphere of everyday life. Indeed, Lukács has only contemptuous and scornful words for it. In what is generally called ‘history’, he writes, ‘something is because it is, and as it is’. History is a domain characterized by ‘the unselective power of that which exists just because it exists’.xix ‘Yet there is an order concealed in the world of history’, but it is ‘the undefinable order of a carpet or a dance; to interpret its meaning seems impossible, and it is still less possible to give up trying to interpret it.xx

Whether possible or not, Lukács in any case did not give up trying to interpret it. He did so until he thought he found the longed-for interpretation and meaning in a historicist reading of Hegel, elaborated in History and Class Consciousness. Before coming to this point, it is important to see that there is concealed in Lukács’ above dilemma a methodological problem. Indeed, once the essential sources of our knowledge of history (and of the world, in general) are provided by different cultural products – works of philosophy, literature, religion, arts – to speak of the ‘historicity’ of such products comes menacingly close to relativism or scepticism. What is valid should be eternally valid, Lukács seems to suggest in a way similar to Husserl.xx for to speak of temporary validity, apart from its logical absurdity, would imply a falling back into the chaotic, formless domain of everyday life, characterized by the lack of any norms whatsoever. Still, the way in which change – a succession or perhaps even a development – is possible in the eternal sphere of forms calls for an explanation; for that there is, empirically, such a change can hardly be
denied. Or, put in Hegelian terms, how is 'the historicity of timeless Absolute Spirit' possible? 'How is it possible that the arts, religion and philosophy have a history at all?'. This question, and the perspective connected to it, is likely to have been suggested to Lukács by Lask, who some years before, in his *Antrittsvorlesung* on Hegel, had formulated the question: 'How does it come about that the eternal, that which is not susceptible to change, the timeless world of thought, has a history?' (I, 344ff.).

Parallel to and in addition to the Platonic vision of forms indicated here, there was in Lukács, however, from the very beginning, another way to face the same problems – an approach that may be called sociological–historical, and was represented by works such as the *History of the Development of Modern Drama* and *The Theory of the Novel*. The latter work is based on the assumption that the novel as a genre, with its characteristically unhappy heroes in its centre, does not belong in the domain of the eternal forms, but is rather to be explained *geschichtsp hilosophisch*, that is, as a product of a certain historical period.

Lukács' sensitivity to the problematic suggested by the early twentieth-century cultural crisis, as well as the very form of his early production (the essay-character), may well be seen as parallel to contemporary developments in German philosophy, especially in *Lebensphilosophie*. These developments challenged the systematic character of philosophy by opposing the 'irrationality' of life to philosophy itself. The clearest and sharpest formulation of the fact that scientific questions and problems of life belong to quite different domains was provided by Wittgenstein somewhat later. But in any case, a major dilemma presented itself to early twentieth-century German philosophy in terms of an either-or: philosophers could either insist upon the systematic (or 'scientific') character of philosophy, its claim to universal validity, as it was handed down by predominantly epistemology-oriented neo-Kantianism, thereby running the risk of making philosophy, in the face of urgent problems, ever more irrelevant for life of making it a sterile academic activity. Or philosophers could choose to dramatically enunciate the 'irrationality of life', thereby vehemently rejecting systematic (or 'scientific') philosophy with its claim to eternal validity. The alternative is quite clearly articulated by Husserl, who joins in the defence of 'philosophy as strict science' with a sharp criticism of both historicism and the philosophy striving to enunciate a world view (*Weltschauungsp hilosophie*).

Lukács, however, for all his susceptibility to the tragic or irrational character of life, did not give up the quest for a 'system'. The posthumously published Heidelberg manuscripts, written during the war, show him engaged in an attempt to embed his aesthetic investigations into the frame of a larger philosophical system. Lukács distinguished here between two kinds of systematization. The first is characterized, in the Kantian, or rather neo-Kantian fashion, by the total autonomy of the different spheres of theory, ethics, metaphysics and aesthetics. The other, by contrast, although not blind to the specific differences of the different spheres, tries to find a common ground or substratum which can comprehend the various spheres as a whole. This may be 'culture', or even Hegel's 'Spirit'. It is significant that Lukács, from a typically neo-Kantian perspective, rejects the Hegelian view of systematization. For Lukács, the homogenization of the different spheres seems to abolish the autonomy and the specific form of objectuality (*Gegenständlichkeit*, form) of the different spheres – a result which is incompatible with his attempt to lay the foundation for an autonomous aesthetics.

In *History and Class Consciousness* Lukács moves to the Hegelian form of systematization. His appropriation of Hegel's perspective is based upon a reinterpretation of German Idealism and Hegel's dialectics – a reinterpretation in which 'history' emerges as the central interpretive category. This, as Lukács understands it, is not equivalent to a kind of development, change or progress, coming about within the frame of previously established or posited (and as such timeless and ahistorical) values or norms – as the neo-Kantians conceive it. 'History' – he writes – 'does not merely unfold within the terrain of validity mapped out by these forms... it does not resolve itself into the evolution of contents... On the contrary, history is precisely the history of these forms.' Or, as he puts this point later, history is 'the history of the unceasing overthrow of the forms of objectuality that shape the life of man'. The concept of history so interpreted constitutes the axis of Lukács' analyses – it is the all-encompassing horizon destined to function as the organizing principle of the system he was striving for. It is important to see that Lukács attempts to show the emergence of this concept in the midst of the evolution of modern philosophy and of German Idealism in particular. He suggests that it is just such a concept of history that the unsolved difficulties and contradictions of German Idealism point to or call for. When, in his reconstruction of modern philosophy, he claims that it is the distinct feature of Classical German philosophy to have given conceptual elaboration to the new substance, now appearing for the first time, in which the basic order and connection of things are to be found, namely history, it is precisely this concept of history that he has in mind. Indeed, he identifies 'the problem of history' with the 'change [Wenden] of the real contents'. And Lukács views this as a problem with which modern rationalistic thought could not cope.

More particularly, Lukács' reading of modern philosophy and of German Idealism is articulated along the lines of two antinomies. What is at stake is the possibility of an all-encompassing rationalistic philosophical system. Earlier forms of rationalism, Lukács claims, had all been just partial systems: they explored a sector of reality with rational means and
left the others in their intangible irrationality. What is unprecedented in modern rationalism is its endeavor to permeate the totality of being— to construct an all-encompassing philosophical system. Whereas the correlation with the principle of irrationality created no special problem for forms of rationalism conceived as partial systems, it becomes crucial for modern rationalism in virtue of its tendency to grasp the totality: 'it erodes and dissolves the whole system.'21 What erodes and dissolves the system are essentially the two antinomies. The first is the problem of matter (in a logical-methodological sense), the problem of the content of those forms with the aid of which 'we' know . . . the world'; in other words, this problem leads to the impossibility of penetrating any datum with the aid of rational concepts or of deriving them from such concepts. The second antinomy concerns 'the question of totality', i.e., it concerns 'those ultimate objects of knowledge which are needed to round off the partial systems into a totality'— problems treated by Kant in his transcendental dialectic (the soul, the world and God).22 Although it appears that we have to do here with two quite different problems, two different aspects of Kant's concept of the thing-in-itself, upon closer examination we see

that the two quite distinct delimiting functions of the thing-in-itself [viz., the impossibility of grasping the totality with the aid of the conceptual framework provided by partial systems of rationalism, and the irrationality of individual concept-contents (einzelle Begriffsinhalte)] are but two sides of the same problem.23

Now since modern philosophy, in conformity with Kant's Copernican turn, no longer tends to consider the world in terms of something that has arisen independently of the knowing subject (e.g., as a creation of God), but rather as its own product,24 there arises the demand for a system established by means of a deduction of the world from the subject—a demand compromised in its fulfillment by the irrational character of the givenness of concept-contents.25 The greatness of German Idealism consists in taking up this challenge: Hegel's dialectic, in particular, represents a response to this problem situation. His concept of an identical subject-object is destined to come to grips with the problem of the irrationality of the given. Such a unity is assumed in order to make intelligible—i.e., to deduce, to elucidate—the impenetrability of the given, as a product of its creative activity. To fulfill this requirement it is necessary to develop 'a conception of form oriented towards the concrete content of its material substratum',26 The unfolding of the activity of the identical subject-object conceived in terms of a material-oriented form must finally be understood as history—history as the change of the forms of objectuality. Under such a perspective, both antinomies are

transcended, the whole of reality (viz., the totality) becomes transparent, and the impenetrable givenness (the irrationality of matter, viz., the concept-contents) simply disappears.27

1.2 Laskian influences
This short sketch of the philosophical development of the young Lukács, together with a survey of some of the major themes of History and Class Consciousness, puts us in a position to focus upon Laskian influences.28 Lukács' Hegelian perspective seems to be contrary to Lask's; however, if we understand 'influence' in a broader sense, namely in the sense that a philosopher may take over certain conceptual schemes, analytic tools, etc., from another philosopher, without necessarily retaining their original context, then it may be justified to speak of Lask's influence upon Lukács. The following discussion will begin with and focus upon the concept of irrationality.

If we search for the origins of some of the central concepts Lukács applies in his exposition and analysis of what he considers to be the basic antinomies of modern philosophy, we should realize that Lukács derives his central concept of irrationality from neo-Kantian philosophy and, in particular, from Lask. Indeed, irrationality as a distinct philosophical problem emerged in late nineteenth-century German philosophy.29 In Rickert the term serves to denote individual or empirical reality (in contradistinction to rational and general concepts), and further, since history falls for him under the concept of individuality, it also denotes history.30 Lask takes up the concept in Rickert's sense31 and gives it a thorough elaboration.

Among the variety of meanings it assumes in his logical theory, two are particularly important. 'Irrationality' denotes, first, that which is simply non-rational, a-logical, alien to logos—just any non-logical content in contradistinction to logical content. 'Irrationality', in a second and more important respect, means the impenetrability of the material—the impossibility for it to be totally permeated by logical forms. On Lask's view, what characterizes the relation between form and material is that logical form encompasses, as it were, the material and lends it theoretical lucidity, meaning—without, however, wholly penetrating it, let alone, creating it. Irrationality in this sense means the impossibility of total rationalization. The 'irrational', in the first sense, is everything except the logical component (Gehalt); in the second, however, it is everything, including the logical component in so far as this also may be in the position of 'material' (cf. II, 74–7).

Given the second (and for him characteristic) sense of irrationality, Lask departs from Rickert in an important respect, and indeed criticizes him. Irrationality, he argues, cannot be understood in terms of individuality, just as rationality is not equivalent to generality or universality.
Individual reality is also enclosed and clothed by rational form and is, therefore, in a sense ‘rational’. And conversely, the general is ‘irrational’, in so far as it is itself impenetrable when in the position of the material. What is irrational is not the individual sensuous-intuitive component of reality, but the sensuous-intuitive component as such (II, 78). Everything and anything may be enclosed by rational forms (even rational forms themselves), but nothing can be wholly permeated by them (II, 221).

Lask’s doctrine of form and material springs from, and is a conceptual development of, his earlier distinction between ‘analytic’ and ‘emanative’ logic. For the former, reality proper is always empirical; the concept is only an artificial product of thinking from which the particular existence can never be deduced, but is, in relation to it, ‘accidental’ or ‘irrational’. The second, by contrast, attributes higher reality to the concept, and pretends to deduce particular reality from it (cf. I, 30, 41ff., 61ff.). The main representatives of the two logics are Kant and Hegel. It is evident that Lask’s own logical theory of form and matter, as well as of irrationality, has been conceived with an eye to ‘analytic logic’. But Lask concedes significantly that if there were a solution of the problem of irrationality it could only be provided by Hegel. ‘Irrationality’ – he writes – ‘can be overcome, if and only if one may admit the possibility of dialectically changing concepts’ (I, 72). However, he adds that he does not believe in the possibility of concepts of this sort.

Lukács, by contrast, came to believe in such concepts. It was apropos the above passage that he called Lask ‘the most ingenious and coherent among the modern neo-Kantians’. That the neo-Kantians more or less rejected Hegel, whereas Lukács opted for him, is relatively unimportant at this point; more important are the following two points.

First, Lukács perceived what he came to consider as the ‘antinomies’ of modern philosophical thought through Lask’s doctrines of irrationality and of form/material. His interpretation of modern philosophy relies for its central conceptual means – but not, of course, for its consequences – upon (partly re-interpreted) Laskian doctrines.

Second, the way Lukács came to interpret Hegel’s meaning in the development of modern philosophy was clearly suggested to him by the perspective elaborated by Lask. Lukács’ reading of Hegel is neo-Kantian precisely to the extent to which, hermeneutically viewed, he derived from neo-Kantianism his pre-ontological understanding of Hegel’s meaning and achievement. Let us examine each of these points in more detail.

(1) Lukács takes over and uses Lask’s concept of irrationality primarily in the sense of the impenetrability of the material. Although he occasionally uses the term ‘contingency’, what he means by it is the contingency of the way in which forms relate to their contents, rather than the contingency of the individual. He came to be concerned with this aspect of Lask’s concept of irrationality some time before: he applied it in his Heidelberg Aesthetics and in his obituary on Lask he treated it at length. But Lukács is indebted to Lask not only for his detection of the ‘antinomies’ of philosophical thinking, but in part also for his concept of reification. Modern critical philosophy springs from the reified structure of consciousness; Lukács says at the beginning of his interpretation of modern philosophy, suggesting that the antinomies of philosophy are but secondary appearances of the all-encompassing social phenomenon of reification. However, in so far as he characterizes reification by the rationality of the forms, i.e., of the organizing principle, and the irrationality of the material, i.e., of that which is the substratum of rationalization, or by the rationality of the parts and the irrationality of the whole, it is clear that to a considerable extent he describes reification with an eye to what he will call the antinomies of philosophical thinking. In other words, though Lukács derives the antinomies of philosophical thinking from the social phenomenon of reification, he nevertheless perceives or diagnoses reification with the aid of the conceptual schemes provided by contemporary neo-Kantians.

(2) That dialectical logic was necessary to overcome the problem of irrationality is a recognition which, prior to Lukács, appears unambiguously in Lask (cf. I, 63, 201). It was also Lask who showed the strict connection between dialectics and absolute rationalism (cf. I, 66), although, of course, he rejected both. Lask and Lukács also both pointed out that ‘intuitive understanding’ is the main interpretive concept with the aid of which German Idealism can be explained in its development from Kant to Hegel. In his Fichte’s Idealism and History, Lask claims that his intention is to follow up the problem of irrationality in the development of German Idealism (I, 79); and Lukács interprets German Idealism in terms of the same problem. Lask ascribes an intermediate position to Fichte in the evolution of German Idealism (I, 83f.), and Lukács approvingly quotes this point in his obituary. In History and Class Consciousness he then proceeds to give an interpretation of Fichte in much the same terms, quoting a passage of Fichte’s he had likely come across in Lask (I, 173).

If Lask firmly rejected ‘intuitive understanding’ from the very beginning (in spite of admitting its high methodological value), Lukács had reasons of his own, long before adopting the Hegelian standpoint, to be predisposed in favour of it. Indeed, being concerned with problems of aesthetics, Lukács was particularly attentive to a concept of form no longer indifferent in relation to matter. It is in terms of this materialliche form that he had already interpreted Hegel’s concept of form in his Heidelberg Aesthetics, and the term ‘materialliche’ recurs in his obituary on Lask. Here he argues that Lask’s concept of form as ‘validity-directed-toward’ (Hingelen) must be a kind of materialliche form in
in order to fulfill the task assigned to it. In view of his interests, Lukács was likely to find the Laskian perspective, with regard to the concept of form, as an intermediate position (similar to that of Fichte) between Kant and Hegel.

Lukács, however, pursues the issue of ‘intuitive understanding’ a bit further and makes it a point of confrontation with Lask. This is worthy of particular attention for two reasons. First, because this is, as far as I can see, the only point where Lukács not only exposes or summarizes Lask’s thoughts (as is customary in an obituary, which is what, in any case, he intends to do), or implicitly applies and builds them into the frame of his own perspective (as is the case with History and Class Consciousness), but openly discusses and, although in a subtly form, attempts to criticize them. Second, because the implicit direction of Lukács’ criticism, whether tenable or not, is characteristic of his later development. Indeed one might say that with regard to his attitude towards ‘intuitive understanding’ his obituary on Lask is an important intermediate stage between the Heidelberg Aesthetics and History and Class Consciousness.

The objection Lukács develops in detail at the end of his obituary concerns the knowability of Lask’s original objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit). The objection seems, at first sight, completely out of place, for it seems to wholly ignore Lask’s logic of the categories, especially his distinction between constitutive and reflexive categories. In fact, the latter are for Lask by no means original, but only secondary, artificial (künstlich), exempt from specific object-relatedness, parasitic (see II, 140, 150, 158, 162). The same holds true of the region of judgment in relation to that of objects. Hence it seems improper to claim that reflexive categories (or the judgment) reach into the original region. Although objects are not beyond logic, Lask says explicitly, they are in any case beyond judgment (urteilstenseitig) (II, 353). The region of judgment is erected upon a breaking-up (Zerstörung) of the original objectual region (II, 364). Lukács’ objection seems, therefore, to contain an impossible demand, if not, indeed, a rudimentary misunderstanding of Lask’s basic tenets – a somewhat surprising misunderstanding, for in his previous exposition Lukács showed a fairly good familiarity with Lask’s views.

Upon closer examination, however, the problem turns out not to be that simple. To claim the knowability of the original region, writes Lukács, amounts to claiming the possibility of ‘intuitive understanding’ as its subject-correlate. This much, he adds, is also admitted by Lask, if not literally, still with regard to what he meant (dem Sinne nach). Now, if I am not mistaken, there is a passage towards the end of Die Logik der Philosophie, in which Lask comes very close to also admitting this literally: ‘That the intelligible object “belongs” to an intuitive understanding’ – he writes – ‘that to the thing-in-itself the intellectual intuition ... “corresponds” ... has never become a problem for Kant’ (II, 245f.). Since Lask’s own logical position is admittedly Kantian, ‘analytic’, this statement may be regarded as his own view on the conditions of the knowability of the original objectual region. A further implication of this statement is that in overcoming Kant, Hegel basically remained a good Kantian, in that he fully subscribed to the Kantian correlation of thing-in-itself and intuitive understanding, and only proceeded to fill in what Kant himself left empty. Lukács’ overcoming of Lask may be interpreted in the same terms. The possibility of moving beyond Lask, together with its direction, may thus be said to have been prepared and anticipated by Lask himself, although, of course, this development could not be fulfilled in Lask’s own terms. In any case, Lukács’ confrontation with Lask shows him moving from Kant to Hegel. His major concern is the possibility of a form of knowledge that can be applied to Lask’s original region over and above subjectivity – a concern that may help understand his later predisposition in favour of Hegel.

1.3 The development of ‘irrationality’ in Lukács

In order to complete our treatment of Lukács’ adoption and application of Lask’s concept of irrationality, I will briefly discuss the shifts of meaning it undergoes in Lukács. For Lukács irrationality has a totally negative meaning, whereas in Lask (and in neo-Kantianism in general) it has important positive aspects. It is precisely such positive aspects that Lukács not only does not adopt, but overlooks or even ignores. As mentioned above, he takes up the concept in its meaning as the impenetrability of the material, and even where he speaks of ‘contingency’ he does so with regard to the relation of form to matter, in terms of ‘intelligible contingency’. But for Rickert and Lask ‘contingency’, as well as ‘irrationality’, primarily referred to the individual; ‘irrationality’ denoted above all empirical, individual and (last but not least) historical reality, which resists being completely dissolved in general concepts. This dimension of the term ‘irrationality’ is lost in Lukács. Even before his adoption of the Hegelian standpoint of totality, there were other reasons why he defended Kantianism. He was primarily concerned with the autonomy of the different spheres of positing (Satzung) (of theory, ethics, etc.). It was the suppression of these, rather than of individual reality, that made him reluctant to adopt the Hegelian systematization of philosophy.

However, this does not mean that he was not concerned with the problem of subjectivity or individuality; in a sense the contrary is true. But what he was concerned with was not so much the defence of subjectivity, but rather, so to speak, its trans-substantiation. In several important respects the reasons are historical. Germany had a long cultural tradition to look back upon which the rapidly growing industrial
civilization, together with the increasing influence of the natural sciences, threatened to destroy. In this context the neo-Kantian doctrine of irrationality may be interpreted as a defence of subjectivity — i.e., as a defence of irreducible historical individuality in the face of the generalizing conceptual schemes characteristic of the natural sciences which lack upon particular reality as an exemplar of a general concept rather than a unique, irreplaceable individual. Hungary, however, was underdeveloped from both social and cultural points of view. Life, as Lukács perceived it, is an anarchy of light and dark; empirical individuality is but a bunch of obscure and confused inclinations, the domain of arbitrariness. Lukács' characterization of it anticipates in some important respects Heidegger's description of das Man. These considerations may contribute to explaining why Lukács' concern for subjectivity predominantly took the form of a concern for its redemption or trans-substantiation rather than for its defence with regard to how it simply is — and why he overlooked, or remained insensitive to, an important aspect of the neo-Kantian doctrine of irrationality, i.e., 'the doctrine of the logical irrationality of the individual' (I, 27).

For Lask, the irrationality of the individual stands in direct connection to his value; indeed irrationality alone permits one to view the individual as a value in itself (see I, 192ff., 226). Lask speaks of a 'pathos of irrationality' (I, 227). Irrationality is, in this sense, a necessary precondition of practical, historical activity (I, 154). This element in Lask's doctrine (as well as in neo-Kantianism in general) may also supply a reason for the rejection of Hegel. 'Emanative' logic tends to overlook the individual, Lask says (I, 97), and the extent to which a Hegelian sort of system implies this consequence appears unambiguously in the following passage of History and Class Consciousness: 'The conscious desire for the realm of freedom... must entail the renunciation of individual freedom. It implies the conscious subordination of the self to the collective will.'

Further, whereas Lask sees in the Kantian perspective of 'analytic logic' important positive features (though he occasionally admits negative ones too), Lukács shifts the accent to a negative aspect, suggested to him by Lask — namely, that 'analytic logic', and its abstract consideration of values, implies an atomization of social institutions (I, 19, 68; see also I, 343 and II, 418). In this respect, Lask readily grants Hegel the merit of having made this point, but at the same time he suggests that Hegel erred by immediately transforming his reflection on the philosophy of culture into a purely logical theory. Lask's main argument is that while one can reasonably speak of the scission of a cultural totality, one cannot speak of an atomization of the logical sphere unless one hypothesizes the notion — as Hegel does (I, 68). In this respect, Lukács joins Hegel and thereby exposes himself to Lask's critique. His devastating criticism of capitalist 'atomization', 'isolation', etc., in History and Class Consciousness, became directly connected to, and expresses itself in, a criticism of what Lask calls 'analytic logic'. In this way Lukács anticipated a dubious tradition, later to assume extreme aspects (e.g., the fight against capitalism by suppressing formal logic).

II Heidegger and Lask

2.1 Introduction

In some of its basic intentions the young Heidegger's itinerary can be viewed as running parallel to that of Lukács. In addition to his perception of the ever more aggravating cultural crisis, the sense of the 'irrationality of life',29 we find in him just as strongly as in Lukács, if not more strongly indeed, the quest for systematic philosophy. I will briefly characterize his fundamental philosophical efforts leading up to Being and Time in 1927, by viewing him as attempting to unify the so-called 'irrationalistic' or 'existentialist' or 'historicist' problematic (which permeated European culture at that time and was represented by thinkers like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, Spengler and Simmel), with the Husserlian ideal of 'philosophy as strict science'. Finally, in Heidegger we also find a sense of dissatisfaction with the epistemological mode of philosophizing, and an early orientation towards, and confrontation with, Hegel.31

Brought up in the scholastic tradition, but highly attentive to the contemporary transcendental-logical trends in philosophy represented by neo-Kantianism and phenomenology, Heidegger had as early as his doctoral dissertation and his Habilitationsschrift (published in 1914 and 1916 respectively) outlined the programme of renewing the metaphysical tradition within the framework of an explicit elaboration of the Being-question. His appropriation of the modern epistemological-logical tradition was conditioned from the very beginning by his endeavour to arrive at metaphysical conclusions; doing pure logic, or epistemology, indispensable as it might be as a preparatory step, was seen by him as futile when conceived as an aim in itself.32

The systematic exposition and elaboration of the Being-question which Heidegger offered in Being and Time in terms of a fundamental ontology conceived as existential analytic, relies for its basic project upon insights derived from Heidegger's more than ten-year-long confrontation with the history of Western philosophy. This may be characterized as insights into (1) the correlation of Being and logos throughout Western philosophy (viz., the metaphysical orientation of the logical-epistemological tradition, and the logical orientation of traditional ontology), (2) the functioning of the logos of the 'subject' as the 'ground' or 'place' of the ontological problematic properly so-called and (3) logic as the theoretical
comportment par excellence. Given these three recognitions, a thematization of the being of the subject in a deeper way than that provided by the tradition – one capable of showing epistemological comportment as a derived mode of being – offered a possible operative basis for posing and working-out the Being-question.

The metaphysical tradition from Aristotle on had developed theories of being in terms of objective presence; for Heidegger, this was a result of the fact that the tradition had gained access to Being from within the conceptual horizon provided by the theological attitude. Recognizing that this comportment was far from being the original mode of being of human existence was, however, an insight which required the prior unification of the Husserlian perspective of philosophy as 'strict science' with the anti-metaphysical, existentialist tradition.33 Contrary however to the tendency of thinkers like, e.g., Pascal, Kierkegaard, Dilthey or Nietzsche, to combine turning toward factual-historical human existence with turning away from metaphysics, and thus totally rejecting systematic thinking, Heidegger's appropriation of the problematic of factual-historical life was conceived from the very beginning as a point of departure for the renewal of metaphysics. The posing and working-out of the Being-question belongs to what Heidegger calls 'fundamental ontology'. This, according to the above considerations, takes its point of departure from a thematization of the being of the subject – a discipline named 'existential analytic'. The appropriation of, and the confrontation with, epistemology and Husserlian phenomenology, and the attempt to radically examine the whole metaphysical tradition through the assimilation of the 'irrationalistic' problematic, are fused in Heidegger's efforts to gain a new ground for a renewal of metaphysics.54

2.2 Lask and Heidegger

In the formation of his ontological perspective Heidegger repeatedly confronted Lask's works beginning with the early essay 'Neuere Forschungen über Logik' (1912).55 My discussion of their relation will focus upon some basic themes: the theory of categories, the nature of truth, meaning (Sinn), the ontological difference, philosophy and the sciences, Lask's original region and Heidegger's Being, and, finally, the conception of man.

(1) The Theory of Categories. Heidegger's early quest for an ontological problematic proper centres, understandably enough, around what has been handed down by the tradition under the heading of the doctrine of categories (Kategorienlehre). The history of philosophy may, in a sense, Heidegger approvingly quotes Eduard von Hartmann in his Habilitationsschrift, be understood as the history of the doctrine of categories.56 Heidegger, however, is dissatisfied with the traditional doctrine of cat-

gories. This theory, in fact, centres around the ten Aristotelian categories. One of the main points his whole investigation wishes to make, Heidegger says explicitly in his Habilitationsschrift, is that the Aristotelian categories are not equivalent to the categories as such; they refer to no more than a certain class of a certain domain of reality.57 Far from applying to every and any object of knowledge, traditional categories denote only 'natural' reality – a recognition which Duns Scotus was already aware of.58 The point Heidegger suggests here is that the traditional theory of categories is 'blind' to spheres of reality other than the natural – first of all to the sphere of 'logic' which Heidegger (following the neo-Kantians and Husserl) would like to mark off as sharply as possible from both 'natural' and 'psychological' realities. The task Heidegger outlines is, then, an expansion, i.e., a radical re-elaboration of the doctrine of categories – one capable of doing justice to all the different domains of reality in their own right (even to history), without suppressing any of them or reducing some to others (as contemporary 'naturalism' and 'psychologism' threatened to do). In light of Heidegger's later development we may say that this is exactly what Being and Time will attempt to do under the name of 'existential analytic'. 'What is logic?' – this is one of the young Heidegger's first questions in 1912, and the Habilitationsschrift makes an important further step by claiming that it is not possible to see logic and its problems in the right perspective unless one seeks a 'translogical', i.e., metaphysical context for its understanding. In Being and Time we read, finally: 'the "logic" of the logos has its roots in the existential analytic of Dasein'.59

Now it is important to realize that Heidegger's quest for a new foundation for the doctrine of categories takes shape in constant confrontation with Lask's works. For Lask, Kant provided the categories for the knowledge of natural reality. Indeed, logic and the theory of science have confined themselves up to our own time to doing justice to the natural sciences, i.e., to an elaboration and explanation of the way we come to know natural reality. When, however, contemporary anti-psychologism (neo-Kantianism and phenomenology) comes to hold complete autonomy in the sphere of 'validity' (over against the realm of natural reality), it is time logic, or the doctrine of categories, justifies this development by exploring the categories of philosophical knowledge itself. Lask explicitly suggests an 'expansion [Erweiterung] of the concept of the categories' (II, 22f.; see also II, 88, 237) – which he regards as a question of 'life and death' for philosophy (II, 89). In his review article, Heidegger pays special attention to Lask's search for a doctrine of categories able to embrace the whole of what can be thought.60

In his historical sketch Lask significantly anticipates Heidegger's judgment concerning Aristotle's categories – namely, that they were conceived with a view toward empirical reality and then transposed to the
sphere of the non-empirical (II, 225; see also II, 178). From the point of view of a new metaphysics, Lask understands his own efforts as a kind of preparatory work: if beyond the sensible or empirical reality there is a non-sensible or metaphysical domain, then we should develop adequate categories in order to have proper access to it. The delimitation of the different spheres can only be carried out by metaphysics (II, 270) — a point with which Heidegger fully agrees.

Lask understands Kant’s Copernican achievement to the effect that ‘being’ has ceased to be a trans-logical concept and has entered the domain of transcendental logic (II, 27ff.). For Heidegger, too, being and logic are in strict correlation: being pertains to the sphere of logic. However, for reasons shown above, he came to understand logic in terms of existential analytic. This may then be seen as a polemical radicalization of Kant’s replacement of traditional ontology, namely the transcendental analytic of pure intellect. In the light of Being and Time, we can say that Heidegger radicalizes Lask’s critique of the traditional doctrine of categories. Lask’s main objection to it was that it was a logic of the ‘lower tier’ — that is, it was dominated by the logic of the sensible domain of reality (II, 178), or by a naive transposition of the latter onto the domain of non-empirical reality (II, 225, 237). Heidegger radicalizes Lask in that through the assimilation of the ‘irrationalistic’ problematic he proceeds to undermine the bases of Lask’s ‘two world theory’, i.e., of the Platonic distinction between sensible and non-sensible reality. For Heidegger, this distinction springs from man’s theoretical relation to the world — a major reason why his analytic offers ‘existentials’ rather than ‘categories’. An all-encompassing doctrine of categories becomes for Heidegger impossible precisely in so far as he comes to interpret ‘categories’ as determinations of beings other than man. The fact that ‘categories’ had an all-encompassing meaning in traditional ontology may be explained by the tendency of Greek ontology to gain access to Being on the level of (and in terms of) what turns up within the world. Although Heidegger came to drop the term, he nevertheless took up Lask’s attempt to give an all-encompassing theory of categories. He did so by transforming it into his project of fundamental ontology.

Heidegger’s strategy of dismissing the foundation of traditional metaphysics, i.e., of the ‘two world theory’, parallels his reading of the history of metaphysics, and exhibits the adoption of some important Laskian themes — themes which Lask derived from Fichte’s distinction between philosophy and life (see, e.g., II, 194, 201). Our way of thinking and speaking, Lask remarks significantly, is considerably conditioned by Greek intellectualism, according to which the non-sensible domain is accessible only to the intellect — or even appears as an intelligible realm in itself. The proper relation to transcendental reality was accordingly held to be a knowing attitude. ‘The intellectualism of the Greeks’ significantly influenced Christian thinking. This, in its turn, did not remain unaffected by ‘the theoretization of the transcendent sphere’ (II, 203). ‘All the terms which antiquity coined to denote the non-sensible and supra-sensible domain bear witness to their origin from the theoretical sphere’ (II, 203). The ‘intellectualistic prejudice’ gives preference to ‘thinking’ in gaining access to the non-sensible; ‘faith’ is understood in a negative sense mainly owing to the intellectualistic distinction between ‘knowledge’ and ‘faith’ (II, 204f.). The ‘theoretization of a-theoretical comportment’ also further affects all those distinctions we usually make between, e.g., ‘theoretical and practical’, logical and intuitive’, ‘theoretical and aesthetic’, and ‘scientific and religious’ knowledge (II, 208; see also III, 235).

These considerations are significant not only on their own account, but because they are important anticipations of some essential features of Heidegger’s perspective. First, Heidegger’s way of tracing the development of Western metaphysics shows considerable parallels with the considerations of Lask noted above. Heidegger, too, maintains that (Christian) thinking took over the conceptual apparatus of Greek metaphysics in order to obtain a systematic character, and that this appropriation was fatal from both philosophical and religious points of view: Greek ontology was given a one-sided and superficial interpretation, and religious comportment was constrained into a conceptual scheme incompatible with the lively Christian experience of life. Modern philosophy, then, from Descartes on, offers no new development. Second, the basic contention that underlies Heidegger’s whole undertaking in Being and Time is that, parallel to the Greeks’ access to Being in terms of presence, runs the theory of man in terms of animal rationale. His attempt, then, consists in inquiring into the horizon of the traditional philosophies’ access to Being and in showing this access to be rooted in, and dependent upon, man’s theoretical comportment. The existential analytic disengages itself from the traditional view of man as a rational animal, and together with the rational–irrational distinction, explores dimensions of man’s being underlying theoretical comportment, in order to thus gain a new ground for the Being-question. From this point of view, Being and Time may be said to carry out the programme suggested by Lask. The categories (the ‘existentials’) Heidegger develops (e.g., Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, Gewissen, etc.), do not rely upon traditional metaphysical or intellectualistic distinctions.

(2) Truth. Throughout his philosophical itinerary Heidegger considered Being and truth to be in reciprocal connection. ‘Philosophy has always connected truth to Being’, he wrote in Being and Time, and he strengthened the link so much as to come later to speak of truth rather than the meaning of Being. Among the manifold sources in which he may have come across this connection, Aristotle and Husserl likely played the
primary role. However, we should also point out that this connection occurs in Lask: in his evaluation of Kant’s Copernican achievement, Lask comes to interpret ‘Being’ with ‘in truth’ (II, 69; see II, 29).

Parallel to Heidegger’s attempt to connect truth and Being, is his claim that the judgment (proposition) is not the original ‘place’ of truth, but is a derivative, secondary phenomenon. This claim fits well into the general perspective of Being and Time, in so far as it proposes to penetrate behind theoretical comportment and show it as a non-original relation one may have to the world. In his Doctrine of Judgment, Lask’s main thesis is that ‘in the comprehensive structure of logical phenomena the judgment belongs to the secondary, non-objectual region’ (II, 288). In fact ‘judgment is to be driven out of the domain of transcendental logic’ (II, 289). The theory of judgment Lask wishes to elaborate will show the derivation of judgment from more original phenomena (II, 295) – from an original objectual region which is over and above any opposition. This conception implies that truth loses its primary meaning of ‘correspondence with’, i.e., it obtains this meaning only in a derivative sense (see, e.g., II, 388ff., 395, 399). Lask’s conception attracted Heidegger’s attention in his Habilitationsschrift; on the one hand, Heidegger thought it could provide a context within which to pose metaphysical problems, and, on the other hand, he thought that this conception made the problem of the ‘application of the categories’ meaningless. Immediately after stating this, Heidegger drew a conclusion which clearly indicated the path he was to take in the following decade: ‘The theoretical [erkennnisstheoretische] subject does not grasp either the metaphysically most relevant meaning of Spirit, or – still less – its full content.

This point may also explain Heidegger’s positive reference to Lask in Being and Time. In his treatment of the concept of truth, Heidegger was well on the way to discarding the epistemological, viz., subjectivistic, perspective. What he was concerned with were the presuppositions of the traditional conception of truth as ‘correspondence’ between judgment and thing – a conception which Husserl reformulated in terms of the adequacy between intentional acts and their fulfilment. The point Heidegger next makes and elaborates in detail is that in order for Husserl’s ‘identification’ to be possible certain ontological presuppositions must come into play – namely, the Being-in-the-world of Dasein, its disclosedness. What Heidegger probably meant by saying that Lask was the only one outside the phenomenological school who ‘positively took up’ Husserl’s Logical Investigations (with special regard for those investigations concerning ‘evidence and truth’) was that in a similar way to his own endeavour, Lask too was attempting to transcend the subjective-epistemological region. Heidegger, however, noted that Lask’s Logic of Philosophy was influenced by Husserl’s distinction between sensuous and categorial intuition. Though cryptic in many ways, this remark may be interpreted (especially after the publication of some of Heidegger’s Marburg lecture courses) in the following way. In enunciating the programme of a logic of philosophy (see II, 23), Lask productively developed and applied Husserl’s conception of a categorial intuition. The latter was interpreted by Heidegger as providing access to the categorial sphere and as underlying all kinds of everyday perception and experience. Now, what Lask proposed to undertake – namely, to bring philosophy to self-awareness (II, 23) – may well have been understood by Heidegger as a significant development of Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition, precisely to the same extent to which he himself fully subscribed to the latter in his programme of philosophy’s gaining awareness of itself. Existential analytic, for example, is to centre around Dasein because it is ‘the condition of possibility of all ontologies’. It is, further, due to the discovery of categorial intuition that Heidegger proceeded to identify phenomenology and ontology. Ultimately, Heidegger came to understand Husserl’s categorial intuition not only as an adequate method for penetrating the region of categories, but also as a vague, pre-conceptual understanding of Being.

(3) Meaning (Sinn). In addition to the correlation Being-truth, Lask anticipates Heidegger’s understanding of the relation between meaning and Being. ‘The representative [nachbildliche] region’, writes Lask, ‘is not the region of meaning, but only one region of it. The simple original structure of the authentic structural elements . . . appears as the original image of meaning’ (II, 393). ‘Every logic of meaning has so far been a logic of non-objectual meaning, whereby “meaning” – e.g., of the judgment – is usually conceived as being in opposition to the “object”’ (II, 292). Similarly, for Heidegger Being and meaning, viz., Being and the meaning of Being, are not to be separated. When we understand something, he argues, what we understand is not ‘meaning’ but the being, viz., Being. Thus, when we search for the meaning of Being we do not seek something “behind” Being, but Being itself, in so far as it enters into the scope of understanding proper to Dasein.

(4) Ontological difference. In the distinction between the sensible and the non-sensible spheres, i.e., the spheres of being and validity, it is important to realize, Lask writes, that the very predicates which serve to designate the sensible sphere – e.g., Being – lie outside the sensible sphere. It is not the domain of Being (Seinsgebiet) but beings alone (das Seiende) – i.e., that which falls under the category of Being (Sein) – that constitutes the domain of what lies outside the sphere of validity. The being of beings belongs already to that which is valid, to that which is non-being (Das Sein des Seienden gehört schon zum Geltenden, somit zum Nicht-Seienden) (II, 46; see also II, 393).

The way Heidegger came to understand what he called ‘ontological
difference' shows significant similarities to Lask's preceding considerations. For Heidegger Being is, on the one hand, Being of a being (Sein vom Seienden) - i.e., it does not lie in a domain over and above beings, it is not a kind of highest being. Though strictly linked to beings, Being is, on the other hand, not a being: 'the Being of beings is not itself a being.' To overlook this difference is for Heidegger to overlook the ontological problematic proper; and conversely, to recognize it is to identify the theme of ontology. If one approaches Being in the dimension of beings it can only appear as a non-being; i.e., no-thing - a major reason Heidegger discussed the problem of Being in terms of 'nothing' in his What is Metaphysics?

Heidegger's stress upon the importance of the ontological difference in identifying the ontological problematic proper allows us to bring to light a further parallel with Lask with regard to their understanding of the relation between philosophy and the sciences.

(5) Philosophy and the sciences. For Heidegger, ontology is concerned with Being; it is, as he puts it in the twenties, the science of Being. The sciences, by contrast, address themselves to particular beings; they completely ignore the ontological difference. There are, however, no beings without Being. With regard to them, Being is the 'Aptiort'. In order to understand beings we must always already have understood Being - possess what Heidegger calls a vague pre-ontological understanding of Being. Philosophy or ontology is in this sense a necessary foundation of sciences; these obtain their sense only in becoming rooted in philosophy. The discipline called to fulfill this task is fundamental ontology, but the young Heidegger also uses the terms 'productive logic' or 'original logic'.

For Lask, philosophy is Urwissenschaft (III, 240; see III, 31). The empirical sciences are 'half-sciences'; their knowledge is incomplete, 'without foundation' (III, 240). The sensible data which the natural sciences treat is a residuum alien to meaning (bedeutungsfremder Rest). In life, however, no 'pure nature' is given (III, 242). For Heidegger also 'nature' is an 'innerworldly' being, which emerges from a shift in attitude. Lask maintains that 'nature' does not spring simply from the 'generalizing' method characteristic of the natural sciences - as Rickert claims it does - but it springs rather from a 'certain way of consideration' (Betrachtungsweise). Nature is the unintelligible (Undeutbare) plus pure theoretical objectivity (III, 243). This characterization anticipates Heidegger's claim that understanding and interpretation are not to be modelled upon a particular kind of understanding - one which consists in 'grasping the present-at-hand in its essential unintelligibility [Unverständlichkeit]. Lask's observations about the essential tendency of the natural sciences to master the world (III, 246) also point to some characteristic features of the perspective of the late Heidegger.

(6) Lask's original region and Heidegger's Being. Given Lask's theses that the object is in itself meaning (II, 43), and that the original objectual region is over and above opposition and judgment (II, 374), it is clear enough that human understanding cannot know the original region, or formulate or say what that meaning is. The 'truths in themselves' discovered by Bolzano and Husserl are for Lask still laden with subjectivity, i.e., unable to reach up into the genuinely transcendent sphere. Although they are independent of subjectivity, they nevertheless appear only in and by the subject's efforts to attain something independent of itself - and in this sense they are dependent on it. 'Genuine transcendence is however a state of meaning prior to any contact with subjectivity' (II, 425). If meaning, in common usage, is understood as 'meaning of', then we should limit its application to the secondary region (II, 394). For with regard to the original region, the designation 'meaning of' is completely out of place (II, 394; see II, 34).

Analogous considerations may provide an explanation for the incompleteness of Being and Time, i.e., Heidegger's full project to elaborate the meaning of Being. Following the passage cited above concerning the correlation between Being and the meaning of Being, Heidegger significantly added: 'The meaning of Being can never be brought into opposition with beings, or with Being as "ground" of beings, for "ground" in its turn becomes accessible only as meaning, be it the abyss [Abgrund] of meaninglessness'. The meaning of Being emerging from the abyss of meaninglessness must evidently be - to use Lask's term - beyond opposition. It should, if it is to be all-encompassing, somehow indicate its own origin, i.e., the abyss it emerges from (the lethe-dimension of aletheia). This, however, far from being said, can only be pointed towards.

(7) The conception of man. In Lask and Heidegger (especially the late Heidegger) we find conceptions of man which show significant parallels. Their conceptions contain a double image and a double evaluation of man. Both conceptions hold up a kind of passivity as a paradigm, while human activity, if not condemned, is still regarded as negative or futile. Lask's interpretation of Kant's Copernican achievement clearly displays this feature. Since for Lask the sphere of logic is far wider than that of subjectivity, the transcendental-objectual sphere transcends subjectivity. Hence, knowledge becomes 'plain dedication' (Hingabe) to the object (cf. II, 85, 396). Hingabe as a positive and emphatic characterization of human activity points in the same direction as Heidegger's term Gelassenheit. (A term Lask also uses is Realisierungsstätte (III, 96; see also III, 156) - one which might well turn up in Heidegger's vocabulary.)
In contrast, when man is active he simply intervenes in a destructive manner in the structure of meaning (cf. II, 416), brings about its artificial complication. The questions man copes with cannot be solved simply because they are not genuine problems. The subject is striving for solutions to problems which owe their existence to nothing else than its own destructive activity. Its activity and knowledge are based upon a forgetting of not only the original but also of the secondary region (cf. II, 427, 447). With regard to Heidegger, it is enough to call to mind such “positive” determinations, his characterization of man in terms of the ‘shepherd’ or ‘neighbour’ of Being. As to the ‘active’, i.e., negative sense, we might recall some passages from ‘The essence of truth’. Rather than turning to Being man mostly turns to beings (a breaking-up of Lask’s original region, we might be tempted to say), and since man is forgetful of Being and, particularly, the element of hiddenness contained in the essence of truth, he fills up his everyday activity with wandering from one being to another, arranging and re-arranging them, mainly looking for satisfaction.

III Lask, Lukács, Heidegger

We undertook the confrontation of Lukács and Lask, as well as Heidegger and Lask, with the intention of not only finding similarities or parallels between their thought, but also in an attempt to show how Lukács’ and Heidegger’s confrontation with Lask influenced their philosophical development, helping them enter into full possession of their specific philosophical problematic. Are there, we may ask now, any conclusions to be drawn from Lask’s influences upon both thinkers with regard to parallels between Lukács’ and Heidegger’s Denkwege? Why did both Lukács and Heidegger, in the midst of devastating criticisms of their contemporaries, give positive acknowledgement to Lask?

Both Lukács and Heidegger were, as has been seen, striving for a ‘system’. Deeply affected by the crisis of early twentieth-century European culture and highly critical of the epistemological-centred philosophy of the day, both turned to the ‘concrete’, to ‘life’, and were proceeding towards a refoundation of philosophy – one accompanied for them by the hope in a cultural revival. Accordingly, both became engaged, although Heidegger only for a short time, in politics. Though in different ways, both of them could rightly view upon Lask’s achievement as an anticipation of what they were searching for.

For Lukács, Lask’s significance consisted in clearly bringing to light, and uncompromisingly spelling out the ultimate difficulties which philosophical system-building had to face if it were ever to construct a ‘system’. These difficulties, together with the set of problems common to the epistemological tradition, Lukács came to understand in terms of ‘antinomies’ to be explained, in their turn, as reflections of a historical process of reification culminating in, but not restricted to, the age of capitalism. The overcoming of these antinomies, as well as the development of the ‘system’, could not, therefore, pertain solely to the domain of philosophy – indeed, philosophy itself had to be transcended.

Heidegger understood Lask’s logical works as a preparation of a new metaphysics, as paving the way for posing metaphysical problems – an understanding not wholly alien to Lask himself (cf. II, 270). The task of the logician was, for Lask, to engage in a critique of pure logos, rather than of reason (III, 141) – and that is what Heidegger was doing all his life. Heidegger’s recognition of the forgetting of the Being-question by European metaphysics, and his subsequent efforts to elaborate and answer it within the frame of systematic philosophy, led him ultimately to the insight that this task was not to be met by the conceptual means provided by European metaphysics. Indeed, metaphysics is indebted for its existence and development to the oblivion of Being. This is, then, an epoch of Being, a Geschick. To set aside this oblivion cannot, for good reasons, be the task of thinking. The late Heidegger, accordingly, no longer calls his thinking philosophy.

The context in which the following passage from Lask turns up in Lukács and Heidegger shows each of them engaged with their own problematic. The passage is this: “The real “subject” is . . . the material, the real “predicate” is the “category”!” (II, 333). Lukács found this significant for he thought he could perceive in it a radical abandonment or reversal of the formal logical treatment of judgment. He was also attentive to the fact that Lask found his principium individuationis in the material. In History and Class Consciousness, however, he came to view the same state of affairs – namely that the material penetrates into the realm of forms in a negative sense, as a sign of the impossibility of an all-encompassing system, and came, therefore, to defend the Hegelian logic of concepts in motion.

Heidegger quoted the above passage in order to show how Duns Scotus anticipated the modern theory of judgment. The reason he repeatedly laid stress on this aspect of Lask’s theory (he had already discussed it in his review of new developments in logic) may be seen in his predisposition in favour of an object-oriented interpretation of knowledge and judgment – an anticipation of his endeavour to connect logos and Being, logic and ontology. ‘One must unite objectivism and Copernicanism’, wrote Lask in an appendix to The Logic of Philosophy (II, 277), and Heidegger attempted to do the same by consciously applying, rather than merely ignoring (as did contemporary neo-Scholastics), the ‘subjectivistic’, epistemological tradition of modern philosophy in his re-appraisal of the ontological problematic. It is against the background of his
endeavour to derive ontological conclusions from Husserlian phenomenology, and ultimately to connect Husserl to Aristotle that Lask’s work assumed importance for the young Heidegger.101

Given their anti-epistemological attitude, both Lukács and Heidegger viewed some typically neo-Kantian epistemological problems (such as the problem of the ‘application of the categories’) with suspicion as problems to be dissolved rather than to be met on their own terms. But Lukács did so with an eye to Hegel, whereas for Heidegger the Hegelian identification of thinking with Being, the conception of ‘absolute knowledge’, was untenable with regard to the basic ontological constitution of Dasein.102 This is also the point where the two depart. It is, interestingly enough, in the midst of a further parallel that they do so – namely, the fact that moving away from the epistemological tradition both came across, and highly appreciated, the problem of history.103 But for Lukács’ Hegelian perspective, history had a subject (if not Hegel’s Weltgeist, then class consciousness) – a subject which, once revealed, was to consummate history. In a sense history constitutes the horizon of Heidegger’s system too. But it does so in terms of the historicity of finite Dasein, the historicity of the Being-question, as well as of the questioner. It is precisely in this sense that history makes ‘absolute knowledge’, i.e., an ultimate philosophical system, impossible. It is a horizon – or better, a background – which remains forever in the background.104

Lukács thought he had found a solution to the problem of irrationality in the Hegelian sort of rationality – rationality and full transparency of the identical subject–object conceived as history. He came to view Hegel’s dialectical logic as the paradigm of rationality. In his The Destruction of Reason he considered, therefore, all contrary positions, inclusive of that of Heidegger, as irrationalistic. His attempt to trace the development of contemporary philosophy in terms of his distinction between rationalism and irrationalism became oblivious of the origin of this distinction. While well aware, in History and Class Consciousness, of the historical problem situation, i.e., the historicity, of the concept of rationalism (‘the concept of “rationalism” must not be employed as an ahistorical abstraction’,105 he wrote), this awareness gradually disappeared later. The thesis of an absolute, viz. dialectical-historical rationality had come to lose its own historical conditionality.

Heidegger did not reply to Lukács’ classification of his thought in terms of irrationalism. For what might have been an answer of his, the following passages may provide some hints. By the separation of logos and physis in Greek philosophy begins the reciprocal correlation of “rationalism and irrationalism”... Irrationalism is but the evident weakness and complete failure of rationalism, and, therefore, itself a kind of rationalism.”106 “There is no such thing as “dialectics”... Dialectics is wholly dependent on the matter itself... One cannot... pursue the renewal of Hegel’s philosophy and at the same time push aside... his christology and doctrine of the trinity.”107 “As long as the ratio and the rational... are still to be questioned the talk about irrationalism remains rootless.”108

Notes

Bibliographical remark: bibliographical references to Lask’s works occur in the text itself with parentheses: first the volume number and then the page number(s) of the Gesammelte Schriften edition of his works, 3 vols, ed. E. Herrigel (Tübingen: Mohr, 1923) are referred to.


3 M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (SZ), 15th edn (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1979), p. 218. In a lecture course held in the Summer semester of 1919, the text of which has recently been published, Heidegger claimed that Lask was ‘one of the most powerful [stärksten] philosophical personalities of the time’, adding how much he owed to him (M. Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, Gesamtausgabe (GA) 56–7, ed. B. Hêmbischel (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1987), p. 180). Lask was the only one, he specified the following Winter semester (1919/20) in terms anticipating the previously cited formulation of Being and Time, to have grasped Husserl’s idea of pure logic. (I have drawn on Franz Joseph Brecht’s Nachschrift of this course, with the title: Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology. I am grateful to Friedrich Hagemann of the Hegel archives of Bochum, who allowed me to use his transcription of the Brecht Nachschrift.)


6 Ibid., p. 71.


9 Ibid., p. 167.


13 See, e.g., Rickett’s *Die Philosophie des Lebens, Darstellung und Kritik der philosophischen Modesträumungen unserer Zeit* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1920), the second edition of which he dedicated, significantly, to the ‘life of philosophy’. Rickett understands his critique of Lebensphilosophie as a defence of the systematic, conceptual character of philosophy.

14 On the intellectual climate of pre- and post-war Germany see H.-G. Gadamer, ‘Heidegger’s later philosophy’, in *idem, Philosophical Hermeneutics*, tr. and ed. by D. E. Linge (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 213ff. System-philosophy was considerably disregarded already by Nietzsche (see M. Heidegger, *Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*, ed. H. Feick (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1971), pp. 28f.). Ditthey, in much more cautious terms and in a slightly modified perspective (i.e., putting the accent on the historical character of philosophy), also expressed fundamental doubts about the possibility of metaphysics conceived of in terms of a universally valid philosophical system. See his *Das Wesen der Philosophie*, ed. O. Poggeler (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), pp. 86ff. The Kirkegaard revival, with special regard to his devastating critique of the philosophical system (i.e., Hegel) also contributed to stressing the alternative. In his essay on Kirkegaard, Lukács himself wrote that ‘Kirkegaard’s honesty’ was ‘to see everything as being sharply distinct from everything else, system from life’ (*Soul and Form*, p. 32).


18 ibid., p. 186 (p. 321).

19 See ibid., p. 143 (p. 258).

20 ibid., p. 144 (p. 259).

21 ibid., p. 114 (pp. 214ff.). That the idea of a ‘philosophical system’ is the product of modern philosophy is a thesis held later by Heidegger too: see *Schellings Abhandlung*, pp. 32ff.

22 Cf. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, pp. 115ff. (pp. 215f.).

23 ibid., p. 116 (p. 218).


25 ibid., p. 117 (p. 220).

26 ibid., p. 137 (p. 249).

27 For a more detailed discussion of the interpretation of German Idealism in *History and Class Consciousness* see my article ‘L’interpretazione della filosofia classica tedesca in “Storia e coscienza di classe”: Discorsi, Richerche di storia della filosofia’, 9 (1989), pp. 41-60. For an attempt to connect the perspective of *History and Class Consciousness* to Lukács’ later work I may refer to my paper ‘Lukács and the filosofia contemporanea: Il problema della ragione’, *Giornale di Metaphisica*, 10 (1989), pp. 269-98.

28 Biographically, the Lukács-Lask relation is rather unexplored, but it seems that there was a rather strict and friendly connection between them, although...
43 In his obituary Lukács gave much prominence to this point – see ‘Emil Lask’, p. 555.
44 Hegel, Atom, p. 153.
45 See note 4 above. Heidegger’s concern for individuality is here closer to the Lukácsian sort. He too seems to urge a transsubstantiation (if we may use this term) of the individual (see, e.g., Vom Wesen des Grundes, in Wegmarken, GA 9, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), p. 162, and Schellings Abhandlung, p. 198), rather than a defence of it (this would be for him a defence of das Man (see, e.g., Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, GA 26, ed. K. Held (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), p. 21; Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit, GA 29, ed. F. W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1983), pp. 243ff, 254ff.))
Due to the deepening of the European cultural crisis, and his negative appraisal of the Weimar Republic, Heidegger probably saw nothing worthy of being defended any longer. Rather, a new beginning was required (an ‘anderer Anfang’, as he came to call it in the 1930s). The parallel with Lukács, however, does not hold in an important respect. Heidegger’s conception of Dassein, in virtue of its basic constitution (especially Jeneinheit), is still closer to a ‘defence of subjectivity’ than Lukács’ Hegelian sort of class consciousness. And Dassein cannot never arrive at a fully transparent knowledge or a complete mastery of Being.
46 We should remark, however, that by adopting a theory of knowledge as Hingabe or plain dedication, Lask seems later to have in part abandoned the standpoint in terms of which we contrast him here with Lukács.
47 See also Rickert, Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, p. 464: ‘If the future were object of our knowledge we would never be object of our will. In a world which had become entirely rational, nobody would be able to act’. He observes later that ‘only as long as we fail to grasp the world metaphysically . . . is history possible’ (ibid., p. 579).
48 For Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, p. 315 (p. 480); see also p. 193 (p. 332).
49 Later, however, Lask came to speak of a breaking up of the original objectual region (see, e.g., II, 363f.). To this extent his earlier criticism of Hegel may also, in part, be brought to bear upon his own position.
51 Cf. Frühe Schriften, pp. 410f.: ‘Die Philosophie des lebendigen Geistes . . . steht von der grossen Aufgabe einer prinzipiellen Auseinandersetzung . . . mit Hegel.' In this context see also Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, p. 97, where much the same terms occur: ‘Dann stehen wir mit der Front gegen Hegel, d.h. von einer der schwierigsten Auseinandersetzungen’, and ibid., p. 135. Finally, see Heidegger, Ontologie (Herme neonik der Faktizität), GA 63, ed. K. Bröcker-Olmanns (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1988), p. 59.
52 See Heidegger, Frühe Schriften, pp. 186f., 200, 403, 415.
53 For the term ‘anti-metaphysical’ see O. Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (Püllingen: Neske, 1963), p. 28.
55 See Frühe Schriften, pp. 24ff., 32ff. On Lask’s significance see also ibid., pp. 56, 61f.
57 ibid., p. 211. See also pp. 286ff.
58 ibid., pp. 287f.
59 ibid., pp. 18, 405f.; SZ, p. 160.
60 See Frühe Schriften, p. 24.
61 ibid., p. 406.
62 See also Heidegger, ibid., p. 24.
64 Cf. Heidegger’s discussion of the emergence of the concept of metaphysics in Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, pp. 56ff., especially p. 66.
67 Cf. SZ, p. 211.; Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, p. 175; Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, p. 64; Einführung in die Metaphysik, p. 143.
68 See SZ, pp. 25, 48.
69 For Heidegger's understanding of 'Sorge' and for his undermining of the 'theoretical-practical' distinction see SZ, pp. 57, 59, 69, 193, and later, e.g., Brief über den Humanismus, Wegmarken, p. 358. Lask had already written that, 'The completely atheoretical attitude is an abstraction' (II, 186), and moreover, in 1919, Heidegger said: 'The predominance of the theoretical must be broken, but not in such a way that one proclaims [now] a primacy of the practical.' In this attempt Heidegger referred to Lask in highly positive terms in his lectures held that year, which have now become accessible within his complete works (after the original version of this essay was finished). Lask was the first in the history of human culture to see the problem of the theoretical, Heidegger said at one point (cf. M. Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, pp. 59, 87f.; see on this point also T. Kiesl, 'Das Entstehen des Begriffsfeldes „Faktizität“ im Frühwerk Heideggers', Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften, 4 (1996/7), p. 96). See also Heidegger's considerations of 'the unjustified predominance of the theoretical exactly within the essentially atheoretical sphere', in Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, p. 89.

Following a suggestion of Lucien Goldmann's, Gadamer has recently claimed that certain passages of Lukács' Heidelberg manuscripts, possibly under the impact of Lask's anti-idealist turn and his reception of American pragmatism, show the influence of the latter (even with regard to terminology), and come close to Heidegger's analysis of the environing world in Being and Time (cf. Gadamer, Erinnern an Heideggers Anfänge, Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften, 4 (1996/7), p. 24). Following up on Gadamer's hints we see that Lukács does in fact characterize what he calls Erlebniswirklichkeit as a 'world of pragmatism', and if we search for Heideggerian parallels or anticipations, the following passage might prove useful: 'Das „Denken“ der Erlebniswirklichkeit ist ... nichts anderes, als der Versuch, sich der Wirklichkeit der dem handelnden „ganzen Menschen“ gegenüberstehenden, bemühenden oder fördernden Gehinde zu bemächtigen' (Lukács, Heidelberger Ästhetik, pp. 29, 31). The '„Denken“ der Erlebniswirklichkeit', so characterized (and not terminologically emphasized), shows obvious parallels to Heidegger's Umsicht, namely in so far as 'der gebrauchshänternde Umgang ist ... einheit, er hat seine eigene Sichtart, die das Hantieren führt und ihm seine spezifische Sicherheit verleiht ... die Umsicht' (SZ, p. 69). What the '„Denken“ der Erlebniswirklichkeit' and 'Umsicht' have in common is, characteristicall, that neither of them is the application of already existing theoretical knowledge (Lukács, Heidelberger Ästhetik, p. 31).

Ein kontemplatives 'Denken' ist auf dem Niveau der Erlebniswirklichkeit per definitionem unmöglich, denn durch den Akt des simplen Meinens ist die Erlebniswirklichkeit aufgehoben. ... Daneben bleibt aber zweifellos die Tat-sache bestehen, dass aus der Erlebnistotalität des „ganzen Menschen“ das Denken doch nicht ausgeschaltet werden kann.

And Heidegger, SZ, p. 69:

Das 'praktische' Verhalten ist nicht 'atheoretisch' im Sinne der Sichtlosigkeit, und sein Unterschied gegen das theoretische Verhalten liegt nicht nur darin,

dass hier betrachtet und dort gehandelt wird, und dass das Handeln, um nicht blind zu bleiben, theoretisches Erkennen anwendet.

70 SZ, p. 212.
72 Cf. SZ, pp. 214ff.
75 ibid., p. 407.
76 See Heidegger's reference to chap. V of Husserl's Sixth Investigation (SZ, p. 218).
77 Cf. Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, pp. 64, 97.
78 SZ, p. 13. Deriving the concept of Vorhandenheit from Dasein's relating to the world, Heidegger actually shows the origin of a basic category traditional ontology applied in its description of the world (see §16).
79 Cf. Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, p. 98.
81 Cf. SZ, pp. 151ff.
82 SZ, p. 6. See also pp. 4, 9, and Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, p. 22.
84 Cf. 'Zur Seinsfrage', Wegmarken, p. 418. Furthermore, Heidegger sharply distinguishes between what he understands by Sein from an abstract generality which the tradition has come to interpret as Sein. This he names Seinsendheit – that which is common to all beings (house, man, horse, stone, God), in so far as they are (cf. Nietzsche, vol. II, p. 211). In an interesting consideration Lask seems to anticipate this concept of Heidegger's too. He argues that the highest generality is the most abstract, for it denotes a pure content – that which is common to all beings. It seems to designate being (das Seiende) rather than the category of Being (Kategorie des Seins) (III, 152).
85 Cf. Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, p. 22.
86 ibid., p. 27.
87 Cf. SZ, para. 3, his remarks in the Summer semester of 1926 (quoted by F. Volpi, 'Heidegger e la storia del pensiero greco: Figure e problemi del corso del semestre estivo 1926 sui „Concetti fondamentali della filosofia antica“', Helenian, 1–2 (1986), p. 229), and Nietzsche, vol. I, pp. 372ff.
88 Cf. Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, pp. 2ff.; SZ, p. 10. An early variant of this, turning up in 1921/2, and delimited against formal logic, is eigentliche Logik, echte 'Logik' (cf. M. Heidegger, Phaenomenologische Interpretationen der Einleitung zum Codex Manesse).

106 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 211 (see also p. 114 (pp. 213f.)).

107 Einführung in die Metaphysik*, p. 136.


103 See *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, p. 217: 'The being of the subject consists not only in its knowing itself [Sichwissen].'
