READING HEIDEGGER FROM THE START
Essays in His Earliest Thought
Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, editors

Reading Heidegger from the Start is devoted to the rediscovery of Heidegger's earliest thought leading up to his magnum opus of 1927, Being and Time. Using published and unpublished lectures and other recently available texts by Heidegger, the authors in this anthology retrace the development and significance of Heidegger's early interpretations of Aristotle, Husserl, St. Paul, Augustine, Luther, Kierkegaard, Dilthey, Jaspers, and Kant. In addition to the usual questions of being and time and truth and the self, contributors venture discussions of Heidegger's very first explorations of the end of philosophy and its destruction, logic and language, ethics and theology, the retrieval of primal Christianity, factic life as precursor to Dasein, the turn as re-turn, and a hermeneutic phenomenology focused on "formal indication" (the latter a hitherto unknown theme illustrated in this book).

Theodore Kisiel is Professor of Philosophy at Northern Illinois University, and he is the author of The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time. John van Buren is Assistant Professor at Fordham University, and he is the author of The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King.

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Reading Heidegger from the Start

Essays in His Earliest Thought

EDITED BY
Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren

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With the recent publication of some of Heidegger’s early Freiburg lecture courses (GA56/57, GA58, GA61, GA63), as well as of related manuscripts such as the “Natorp essay” (PIA) and the lecture on the concept of time (BZ), we have been placed in a better position to understand Heidegger’s philosophical path leading up to Being and Time (a path long closed to us by a decade of silence preceding Being and Time) and thereby to understand also this magnum opus itself. Another important early document from Heidegger’s postwar period, his unpublished extensive review of Jaspers, has been available for some time now (GA9 1–44). So has the text of Heidegger’s apparently most comprehensive and detailed confrontation with Husserl’s phenomenology on his way to Being and Time; namely, his lecture course of SS 1925 (GA20).

In the following chapter I wish to focus upon Heidegger’s hermeneutic turn, viz., his transformation of Husserl’s phenomenology into his own project of fundamental ontology, which is conceived in terms of an existential analytic as a hermeneutic of human existence. In addition to the texts referred to above, I wish also to draw occasionally upon student transcripts of some of Heidegger’s hitherto unpublished lecture courses.1

The thesis I wish to illustrate is that Heidegger’s confrontation and critique of Husserlian phenomenology ran parallel to his growing sense for hermeneutics, and was partly influenced by his encounter with the thought of some other important thinkers of the time, such as Dilthey and Jaspers. The hermeneutic transformation of phenomenology is clearly anticipated in the review of Jaspers. The historicist rejection of Husserl’s transcendental ego is likewise hardly conceivable without the influence of historicist thinkers such as Dilthey. As a matter of fact, there is a whole complex of criss-crossing influences at work in the young Heidegger’s development, each of which deserves autonomous treatment one after the other—an undertaking that necessarily falls outside the scope of this paper. I propose to focus on Heidegger’s confrontation with Husserl, and I
will refer to other influences and encounters, mostly with an eye to his absorption of the _lebensphilosophisch_-hermeneutic problematic, only insofar as this perspective makes it indispensable.

In order to delimit the hermeneutic horizon of this paper, three additional preliminary observations should be made. First: hermeneutic phenomenology as elaborated in _Being and Time_ is also ontology (i.e., not anthropology); thus, to speak of a hermeneutic transformation of phenomenology amounts to speaking of an ontological transformation of it. Husserl’s phenomenology—which confined itself to an investigation of the constituting acts of transcendental consciousness, thereby suspending assertions concerning being—is in Heidegger reoriented toward the being-question and turned into a phenomenological ontology. For Heidegger, the _Sache_, the “thing,” which phenomenology must let us see, is being. However, he transformed not only phenomenology in an ontological way, but also hermeneutics itself. Like phenomenology, hermeneutics was also given an ontological dimension that it formerly did not have. The hermeneutic turn of philosophy that Heidegger carried out implies not only the elaboration of the operation called _Verstehen_. More importantly, it implies that interpretation is no longer seen as an auxiliary discipline of the human sciences, as dealing with the rules of the interpretation of texts. Rather, it emerges as an autonomous philosophical perspective, insofar as the human being is viewed as an interpreting animal in all the modes of everyday activities and not just in the handling of classical texts in the human sciences. This obviously also holds for the activity we call philosophical research, i.e., questioning. As an interpreting animal, the human being interprets being as well, and Heidegger formulates his being-question specifically as a question of the _meaning_ of being. Phenomenology, hermeneutics, and ontology accordingly become fused in Heidegger’s elaboration of the being-question. He gave phenomenology a hermeneutic dimension, such that this hermeneutically transformed phenomenology was assigned the role of serving as fundamental ontology. This perspective emerges in virtue of a prior fusion of a number of significant influences. And some of these have not yet been mentioned, such as the Aristotelian-Scholastic, Neo-Kantian-logical, and Christian-theological influences. In the following discussion I shall exhibit a cross-section of this philosophical landscape, highlighting some influences, and eclipsing and forcing others into the background.

Second observation: a distinction must be made between carrying out the transformation and offering an explicit critical evaluation of that which is transformed. The hermeneutic-ontological transformation of Husserlian phenomenology is one thing; giving a detailed critique of Husserlian phenomenology following from (by basing itself upon) a previous transforma-

tion of it is quite a different matter. The former is obviously a presupposition of the latter. Now the first seems to have been well under way from KNS 1919 onward (or even earlier), whereas a detailed confrontation and critique of Husserl is not offered (as far as we can see today) until the lecture course of SS 1925. Obviously, Heidegger must have already worked out an autonomous stance toward Husserl—must have transformed his phenomenology—in order to gain a view on it. The transformation thus clearly has two phases. First comes the phase of the transformation proper, which may (but need not) be accompanied by important critical remarks and hints, but hardly by any extensive confrontation. After the transformation is realized, and the new perspective sufficiently consolidated, it becomes possible to give a detailed critical reconstruction of the thing transformed. In any case, one may legitimately claim that the discussion of Heidegger’s relation to and critique of Husserl cannot be restricted to the lecture course of SS 1925, while it is presumably also correct to maintain that this course contains the most mature and developed discussion of Husserl’s phenomenology on the way to _Being and Time_.

Third observation: to speak of Heidegger’s _transformation_ of Husserl’s phenomenology, insofar as this term is applied, not so much to characterize part of the history of “the phenomenological movement” but rather to describe Heidegger’s own development, must in several important respects be regarded as erroneous, or at least as ambiguous and misleading. Indeed, one’s transformation of something clearly presupposes one’s first getting hold of the thing as it is in itself in order then to modify or transform it. This way of putting things tacitly assumes that Heidegger had first appropriated phenomenology in its original, i.e., Husserlian form. But as we shall see, this is precisely not the case. His appropriation of Husserl’s phenomenology was far from being a neutral assimilation; rather, it showed from the very beginning a highly critical attitude prompted by the simultaneous assimilation of some leading motifs of life-philosophy. Appropriation and transformation (if we stick with the latter word) were apparently going on hand in hand, giving us a good example of Heidegger’s own theory of the fore-structure of understanding in _Being and Time_.

1. Proto-hermeneutic motifs in the young Heidegger’s student and academic writings

Heidegger’s first philosophical writings are embedded in, and thoroughly permeated by, the philosophical perspective of anti-psychologism common to the two prominent German philosophical schools of the day, namely, phenomenology and Neo-Kantianism. Some of the essential mo-
...was motivated by this theological background. It thereby makes understandable the rationale he had for taking sides with anti-psychologism.

In both phenomenology and Neo-Kantianism, the distinction between "psychic act" and "logical content" gave anti-psychologism the character of a Platonic two-world theory, which Heidegger would sharply criticize throughout the twenties. This criticism is in fact an integral part of his deconstruction, and thereby also transformation, of the philosophical presuppositions of both phenomenology and modern epistemological philosophy in general, a point to which we shall return in the course of this chapter. If we consider the deconstruction of the two-world theories of transcendental phenomenology and Neo-Kantian epistemology as crucial for Heidegger's hermeneutic breakthrough (and we have reasons to do so), then the zero point of this development may be seen to lie in Heidegger's early adherence to the anti-psychologistic perspective, an adherence that is not exempt from some characteristic reservations from the very beginning.

In his 1912 article on "Recent Developments in Logic," Heidegger suggests (despite his appreciation for the distinction delineated above) that "the sharp delimitation of logic against psychology is perhaps not feasible" (durchführbar). For, he argues,

It is at this point that Heidegger announces his first tentative doubt about the sharply dualistic perspective proper to anti-psychologism. This critical stance will be developed in the twenties and will underlie both his criticism of the transcendental outlook and his own autonomous perspective growing out of such criticism. It is of course not a matter of indifference, he adds immediately after the above-quoted passage, in what way psychology—or what kind of psychology—may lay claim to a relation to logic. Experimental psychology is naturally of no use here. And even introspective psychology can be relied upon only if we assume a specific compartment, namely, if attention is directed toward meanings, the sense of acts. But that is exactly what Husserl's phenomenology of consciousness aims at; it is in this sense, Heidegger concludes, that "psychology will always have a connection to philosophy" (GA 30).

Psychology conceived in terms of a phenomenology of meaning, pro-
viding an “operational basis” for logic, and remaining, in this sense, forever relevant to philosophy: we may find here the seeds for what Heidegger will come to elaborate as the hermeneutics of facticity, viz., existential analytic. Indeed “logic,” the doctrine of logos, assumed for him the meaning of theoretical comportment as such in the broadest sense. At the same time he saw traditional ontology obtaining its access to being from within the horizon provided by the theoretical attitude. Thus an ontological thematization of the being of logos, i.e., of theoretical comportment, aiming to probe into its deeper dimensions by showing it to be a derivative attitude of those beings called humans, will provide an “operational basis” for the posing of the being-question. This thematization of logos, here of the human being as that being which possesses logos, will be provided in Being and Time under the name of “existential analytic.” And, in fact, Heidegger writes in Being and Time that “the ‘logic’ of the logos is rooted in the existential analytic of Dasein,” a claim made hermeneutically plausible “by demonstrating that assertion is derived from interpretation and understanding” (SZ 160/203).

We already saw that for the young Heidegger “the logical is embedded in the psychic.” We now see that, insofar as (logical) assertion is derived from interpretation and understanding, logic later gets embedded in the existential analytic which is carried out in Being and Time. The latter is a hermeneutic radicalization (its primary structures are “understanding” and “interpretation”) of what is outlined in Heidegger’s early paper as psychology in the sense of a phenomenology as a doctrine of meaning. Psychology, so defined, “will always have a connection to philosophy.”

Both Heidegger’s dissertation and his Habilitationsschrift are permeated by the perspective of anti-psychologism. I wish to single out only a few methodological considerations here. These bear a proto-hermeneutic character in regard to the hermeneutic circle.

In his dissertation, in the midst of his criticism of psychology, Heidegger stops at one point to formulate general methodological questions. What is at issue is whether the most efficient criticism conceivable (the Husserlian sort) can ever succeed in refuting the psychologist conclusively, i.e., convincing him about the absurdity of his position. Any science can be considered, so argues Heidegger, as a questioning of a given domain of objects. The meaning of a question must first be oriented towards the object under inquiry. There are questions that cannot be answered because they are a priori incompatible with the characteristics of the object under question, so that any kind of answer one can give would be meaningless with regard to it. These are questions, e.g., about the weight of a geometrical object, that fail to be oriented towards the object, i.e., misunderstand it from the very beginning. Psychologism is a ques-

tioning of just this sort, for the characteristics of psychological objects are incompatible with those of logical objects. The psychologist does not merely misunderstand logic; he or she simply does not understand logic at all! In other words, it is not merely a matter of insufficient or false knowledge of logic; the psychologist has no knowledge of it at all! (GA 161) The psychologist can hardly be persuaded, for he or she is simply blind to logic. How can you prove to the psychologist that there is a domain called logic? No proof of any sort can be provided, because reality, that which is, can only be shown (GA 165; cf. 213).

The hermeneutic concept of preunderstanding, as well as that of the circle, are obviously at work here. Unless one has some preliminary knowledge of the object of inquiry, no science can be put into motion, no reasonable or meaningful question can be asked. Preunderstanding is a necessary prerequisite of knowledge. Preliminary acquaintance with the object and the resulting development of explicit knowledge of it constitute at the same time a circle within which alone anything like “proof” is possible. That there are limits to demonstration will then become a well-established claim of Heidegger’s throughout his career (e.g., GA61 166; SZ 229/271; GA65 13; SD 80/72). The hermeneutic logic, the mutual conditionality, of question and answer (GA61 153), as well as the formal structure of questioning in general, to be elaborated in detail in S2 of Being and Time, are not only clearly anticipated but also fairly well delineated at this point in Heidegger’s doctoral dissertation.4

II. The postwar turn

To speak about the presence of proto-hermeneutic elements in the young Heidegger’s student and academic writings is not to speak about the hermeneutic transformation of phenomenology. Although the young Heidegger seems to have been fairly familiar with Husserl’s phenomenology and to have adhered to its basic anti-psychologism without reservations, it is unclear how far he had appropriated phenomenology in its complexity by the end of the First World War. We know from an October 8, 1917, letter by Husserl to Natorp that Heidegger’s first in-depth confrontation with phenomenology (“seeking to come to grips with it”) from within”) took place near the end of the war. Last but not least, the young Heidegger can in no way be said to have had a philosophical outlook of his own. Had he not published a work with the title Being and Time in 1927, the student and academic writings would presumably be of no importance today. In other words, the significance of these early writings lies clearly in their anticipatory character.
Heidegger was to find his own voice and start the move toward *Being and Time* only after the war. Seeking to confront the leading philosophical movements, Heidegger's strategy strives to uncover what he perceives to be the common deficiencies inherent in the philosophical positions of the day—positions that often stand in sharpest opposition to each other. Epistemologically oriented scientific philosophy is criticized for not being scientific enough, life philosophy is accused of failing to grasp life itself, existential philosophy is charged with not seizing upon existence, historicism is called to account for losing sight of history, and, last but not least, phenomenology is accused of not being phenomenological enough—in the sense of being "unphenomenological." Underlying Heidegger's critiques is a new hermeneutic concept of philosophy, allowing him to develop all of these criticisms from a single intuition. The various aspects of critique later coalesce within the project of fundamental ontology into the concept of *destruction* (an integral part of the redefined phenomenological method). Unravelling the different lines of criticism would require more space than is available here, so I shall confine discussion to considerations centering around phenomenology. 3

II. 1. The Emergence of the Hermeneutic Viewpoint

It is somehow the prerogative, or perhaps the fate, of every great philosopher to rethink and redefine the concept of philosophy itself. Small wonder then that Heidegger, when he set out on his own, repeatedly reflected upon philosophy itself, reexamining its very concept and meaning. 4 That is exactly what he is doing with regard to phenomenology as well. Or, more precisely, since phenomenology provided him with the "method" for reexamining the concept of philosophy, the rethinking of philosophy became for him inseparable from coming to grips with phenomenology. While his remarks on phenomenology in the academic writings scarcely amount to more than a faithful recapitulation or exposition, the postwar observations display a tendency toward a comprehensive confrontation with its basic concepts and theoretical fundamentals. The lecture course of WS 1919–20, bearing the title *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, begins with the following characteristic sentence: "For phenomenology, the most original and decisive problem of phenomenology is phenomenology itself" (GP 10-10-19; GA58 1; see also GA9 36).

The Platonizing-*wissenschaftstheoretisch* perspective of the prewar student and academic writings quickly gives way to a radical reorientation. The new password sounds: back to life in its originality! This in turn implies a twofold claim: to go back to original experience (i.e., to gain a new access to life), and—together with it—to find appropriate means for its description, to develop a conceptuality adequate to it. One of Heidegger's basic insights is that contemporary philosophy's descriptions of everyday life, the environing world, etc., stem from and are rooted in theoretical comportment and conceptuality. They therefore fail to do justice to factual life, its comportment and the language it speaks, precisely insofar as the theoretical attitude is a derivative mode of factual life.

This endeavor bears in itself some basic characters of phenomenology. The proclamation of returning to "the things themselves" was Husserl's battle cry in his programmatic *Logos* essay. 5 It implies the suspension of traditional philosophical strategies, dismissal of authorities, and, with regard to method, the preference for description over construction. 6

Heidegger heartily welcomed this innermost tendency of phenomenology, and it may well have been that under its spell he soon proceeded to radicalize it in such a way as to turn it against itself. In fact, for Heidegger phenomenology became identical with philosophy. From this postwar period to his last years he repeatedly maintained that phenomenology was no longer a philosophical "trend," one "standpoint" among many possible others, but was, in the radicalized sense he came to give it, equivalent to the innermost possibility of philosophy itself (GA56/57 110; GA58 139, 233; GA61 187; GA63 72; PIA 247; GA19 9; GA20 184/136; GA21 32, 279f.; SZ 38/62; GA24 3/3; GA29/30 354; US 95; SD 90/82). Phenomenology was a possibility for Heidegger, not just something to be taken over in its actuality from someone, not even from Husserl. On the contrary, "Higher than actuality stands possibility. We can understand phenomenology only by seizing upon it as a possibility" (SZ 38/63).

Against phenomenology in the name of phenomenology itself: that is one way in which we might characterize Heidegger's postwar efforts to come to grips with phenomenology and with contemporary philosophy in general. Philosophy was to be renewed phenomenologically—a renewal that was to affect deeply the innermost character of phenomenology itself. 7 KNS 1919 already shows some important reservations about Husserl's actual phenomenology, as well as the outlines of another possible phenomenology. These remarks are woven into a criticism of the epistemological Neo-Kantian philosophy as such, and appear in the form of an attack against the primacy of the theoretical. Heidegger observes that the distortive representations of life and the environing world are due not simply to the prevalence of naturalism, as Husserl thought, but to the domination of the theoretical in general (GA56/57 87; see also GP 10-10-19). Heidegger here interprets Husserl's "principle of all principles" by noting that it is not at all theoretical in character, but expresses the most original attitude (Erhaltung) of life, that of remaining close to its own experiencing (GA56/57 109f.). 8 It expresses indeed a fundamental attitude (Grundhal-
rather than a scientific method. To claim that phenomenology is a standpoint would be a “mortal sin,” simply because it would restrict its possibilities. But, Heidegger immediately asks, is it not already a deviation, having the character of a hidden theory, to turn the sphere of living experience into something given? (GA56/57 111; cf. GA58 221) This doubt is one of the first signs of Heidegger’s basic dissatisfaction with Husserlian phenomenology, which will lead up to the grandiose critique of SS 1925. Here Husserl will be charged with the unphenomenological attitude of dogmatism with respect to nothing less than the delimiting of the field of research of phenomenology itself to transcendental consciousness (GA20 159/115, 178/128). The world of lived experience knows of no such duality between object and knowledge.

In 1921–22 Heidegger suggests, proceeding along much the same lines, that phenomenological constitution is not necessarily tied to the concept of the transcendental (GA61 173; cf. GA58 229). He urges that the meaning of Descartes’ “I am” should be investigated more deeply, and warns, in accordance with his “formally indicative” method, against allowing traditional views of the “I” to infiltrate surreptitiously. If life is to be brought to self-showing, then it is the “am” rather than the “I” which must be stressed (GA61 173ff.; later SZ 46/71, 211/254). In the third part of the course, in developing significant hints given in 1919–20, Heidegger provides the first detailed analysis of what in 1923 will be called “hermeneutics of facticity” and in Being and Time “existential analytic”—a description put under the heading of “factual life.”

In conjunction with Heidegger’s postwar dissatisfaction with the basically theoretical character of contemporary philosophy, including Husserlian phenomenology, we find repeated attempts to redefine the original character of the description of factual life. As early as KNS 1919, in outlining the idea of philosophy as “Urwissenschaft,” primal science—whose circular character is accentuated several times—and more specifically, in the interpretation of phenomenology as pretheoretical “Urwissenschaft,” Heidegger presents his alternative in terms of “hermeneutical intuition,” to which he assigns the role of remaining close to Erleben, living experiencing. What is meaningful, or is of the character of linguistic expression, need not necessarily be theoretical—in fact, this springs from life, “lives in life itself” (GA56/57 117; see also GA61 88, 99). In Heidegger’s redefinition of the specific descriptive character of phenomenology, the coupling term “phenomenological hermeneutics” appears several times between 1919 and 1922, until hermeneutics attains a detailed reinterpretation and consolidated initial meaning in the coinage of the phrase “hermeneutics of facticity” in 1922–23.

As part of the rethinking of the methodological devices of phenomenology, we find sketches and outlines of a theory of understanding with its characteristic pre-structure (GA56/57 116ff.; GA61 41ff., 59; GA9 9, 32, 38ff.; GA63 79f.; for later, see GA20 416/300). A result of this reconsideration is the exposition of what Heidegger calls “formal indication,” which is taken to be the method proper to philosophy or phenomenology (GA9 9f., 29; GA58 248; GA61 20, 32ff., 60, 66f., 113, 116, 134, 141, 175; GA21 410; GA29/30 425ff.). Generally speaking, it is due to Heidegger’s search for proper methodological devices for an adequate conceptual expression of “factual life” that the hermeneutic problematic emerges in the postwar lecture courses. Theoretically (and ahistorically) neutral knowledge is opposed to, and gives way to, existentially (and historically) involved understanding (or preunderstanding) and interpreting, whereby knowledge becomes at best a subdivision of understanding. All these efforts are in the service of seizing “life.” The main character of the latter is care (Sorge) rather than knowledge (GA61 89ff.; PIA 240).

It is in his effort to gain a new access to life, as well as to reject the theoretical conceptuality and comportment proper to transcendental philosophy, that Heidegger formulates his hermeneutic concepts and formal indication, and so comes to the elaboration of a hermeneutics of facticity. “Facticity” is a term adopted to substitute for the vague and ambiguous concept of life employed by life-philosophy, as well as for that of “existence” employed by Jaspers and Kierkegaard. “Hermeneutics,” “hermeneutical,” “have the sense of rival concepts to “theory,” “theoretical,” understood in terms of “theoretically neutral.” The description of life, or “facticity,” obtains an overall hermeneutic character precisely in virtue of the insight that interpretation cannot be regarded as something added, as a kind of extension or annex, as it were, to some theoretically neutral (and allegedly “objective”) description of a state of affairs. Rather, preliminary “interpretedness” is inherent in all kinds of description, in all kinds of seeing, saying, and experiencing. (See GA61 86f.; PIA 241, 264; for later, see GA20 75/56, 190/140, 416/300; SZ 169/213, 383/435.) If there is no “pure” theory (or “theory” is a derivative mode of being or comportment of a particular being called human), there is also no pure description. What this insight implies for an adequate description of life or facticity is that theoretical concepts, as well as the language that theory speaks, should be abandoned in favor of a language growing out of everyday life and able to let things be seen in their interpretedness, that is, in exactly the way we encounter them and deal with them; a hammer, e.g., is primarily encountered as a tool for pounding nails into the wall, etc., rather than as a neutral thing out there having the property of weight (SZ 154ff./195ff.). We shall return to this point in the discussion of Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl.
This reevaluation of interpretation implies that hermeneutics cannot remain a subordinate discipline of the human sciences, but becomes, as Heidegger explicitly states, "the self-interpretation of facticity" (GA63 14). It is important to see that this "self-interpretation of facticity" is not a kind of anthropology, simply a matter of our having to do with ourselves, implying that other beings of the world are left untouched. Insofar as humans are precisely the beings who describe the world in its entirety, hermeneutics gets linked to ontology—a major reason why, in the title of the SS 1923 lecture course, "hermeneutics of facticity" and "ontology" occur together, clearly anticipating the correlation of fundamental ontology and existential analytic in Being and Time. The relation of hermeneutics to facticity, moreover is, not such, Heidegger adds, that facticity is the "object" of hermeneutics, it is just a question of grasping this object adequately. Hermeneutics is rather a way of being pertaining to facticity itself, so that if we define the latter as the "object" of hermeneutics, hermeneutics itself is affected intrinsically with regard to its "object."  

II. 2. The Husserl-Critique of 1925

This rough sketch puts us in a position to leap forward to Heidegger's critique of Husserl's phenomenology in the lecture course of SS 1925. At the risk of oversimplifying Heidegger's complex treatment, I will condense the discussion into one basic issue. This is the delimitation of the specific field of research of phenomenology itself, in other words, the self-concretization of phenomenological philosophy out of its initial principle or maxim. The basic issue is whether and how phenomenology gets access to and comes to delimit its own field of research, whether the procedure thereby employed is phenomenologically coherent or not.

Heidegger begins by defending Husserl's phenomenology, its central concept of intentionality, over against the charges of dogmatism, viz., metaphysical speculation. Indeed, owing to its Scholastic origin and the fact that Husserl took it over from Brentano, Rickert claimed this concept was permeated with "traditional metaphysical dogmas" (GA2 35f./28f.). After a detailed examination of this charge, Heidegger comes to the conclusion that it is not intentionality as such that might legitimately be claimed to be dogmatic, but rather to which intentionality gets tacitly linked or bound, that of which it is claimed to be the specific structure. In fact, intentionality is held to be the specific structure of the psyche, reason, consciousness, etc. (rather than, say, of nature), all of which are ontological regions naively, traditionally, and so dogmatically assumed rather than phenomenologically discussed, delimited, and elaborated. Rather than an ultimate explanation of psychic reality, Heidegger observes signifi-

antly, intentionality is a way of overcoming such traditional ontological realities as psyche, consciousness, reason. The question is whether access to that of which intentionality is declared to be the structure is attained in a phenomenological way.

Insofar as the principle of phenomenology ("To the things themselves!") requires suspension of unwarranted constructions and subjectation of the unquestioned domination of philosophical theories to critical examination, Heidegger's objection strikes home; it turns out to be eminently phenomenological. From it Heidegger infers the inevitability of the being-question. The issue concerns the delimitation of the "thing itself" in a phenomenological way—the question of whether the linking of intentionality to pure consciousness, or to the transcendental ego, is carried out phenomenologically, and not simply by taking over the leading idea of modern philosophy. That phenomenology may be shown to be intrinsically incoherent or inconsistent, i.e., "unphenomenological," affected with metaphysical bias, is significant enough. However, it is not yet clear whether the posing of the being-question is really inevitable, i.e., whether and why phenomenology is to be radicalized ontologically. Can the being-question be dispensed with? The inevitability of this question follows for Heidegger from the fact that—although Husserl fails to pose it, claiming to suspend "assertions concerning being," although he leaves the being of intentionality in obscurity—he nevertheless answers it tacitly by linking it to an ontological region called transcendental consciousness. Moreover, he makes distinctions of being like the one between being as consciousness and being as transcendental being, which he himself, symptomatically, calls "the most radical of all the distinctions of being." Remarkably enough, while prohibiting the making of assertions about being, he tacitly commits himself to certain ontological positions without thematizing the access to those positions phenomenologically.

The immanent reexamination and renewal of phenomenology thus shows the necessity of an ontological transformation. To achieve this renewal, can we receive some help from phenomenology itself? How, in what kind of experience, do we gain access to intentional being? Can we experience this being more originally, more unjudged, as it were? (GA20 152/110f.) The experience of the distinction between empirical reality and pure consciousness is characterized by Husserl in terms of a change in attitude. Performing phenomenological reductions, the being of the outside world (including my empirical consciousness) is bracketed so as to gain access, through reflections, to pure "Erlebnisse," experiences, and their "essences." Let us look more closely at what is going on here. What exactly is it that gets bracketed; what precisely characterizes the region that now, at the moment it gets left behind, is put out of action? In the
natural attitude, the world is present as a spatio-temporal sequence of events including the psychic processes going on in the minds of empirically existing people, as opposed to the new realm, i.e., the pure region of consciousness, which we are about to enter, where man appears merely as a living being, a zoological object among others.

Let us stop at this point. We may legitimately ask whether one really experiences oneself in the manner described here in this alleged “natural attitude”? In other words, is this attitude indeed so natural? Is it not rather artificial or, in any case, theoretical? Do I really experience myself “naturally” as a living being, a zoological object, out there, present-at-hand as any other? Do I not rather experience myself as someone engaged in a particular activity, job, and the like?  

It suffices to have followed Heidegger’s criticalism up to this point to see how the previously accomplished transformation of phenomenology (a more original phenomenology as a “science of the origins of life” [GP 10-7-19, 11-7-19], as a hermeneutics of facticity) enables Heidegger to uncover the hidden dogmatic, i.e., “theoretical,” presuppositions of phenomenology, as well as to make Husserl’s transcendental elaboration of it superfluous and indeed empty. And because the primacy of the theoretical is not a modern development, but rather goes back to the Greeks, this calls for a destruction of the conceptuality of the history of ontology—not simply a turn away from (as Husserl urged) but a radical new turn toward the history of philosophy.

The implications of the above criticisms for a transformation of phenomenology in terms of its ontological-hermeneutic renewal are simple enough: an attempt should be made to experience intentional being more originally, i.e., in a more unprejudiced way, in its “natural” setting, thereby no longer taking the traditional definition of man as “animal rationale” for granted. This is exactly what Being and Time will do under the heading of an “existential analytic.”

A good example of Heidegger’s modified outlook: by adopting a hermeneutic way of seeing, traditional empiricism can be shown to be insufficiently “empirical,” indeed, laden with a multitude of dogmatic “theoretical” presuppositions. In turning to “factual life,” Heidegger might have been expected to embrace empiricism, but the “experience” Heidegger has in mind is something entirely different from the concept of experience employed in empirical philosophy. “Experience” is a key word for the young Heidegger, but as he elucidates it “experience is not understood here in a theoretical sense, as empiricist perceiving in contradistinction to something like rational thinking” (GA61 91). What we perceive in the first place is, hermeneutically seen, emphatically not “sense data.” “What we first hear,” writes Heidegger in Being and Time, “is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking wagon, the motorcycle. We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling.” And then he adds, significantly: “It requires a very artificial and complicated comportment [Einstellung] to ‘hear’ a ‘pure noise’” (SZ 164/207; cf. GA20 367/266). In other words, to claim that we first perceive a “pure noise” requires a change of comportment, the assumption of a theoretical attitude. In like manner, what we do see in the first place is not anything like colored surfaces, or, still less, “sense data,” but, e.g., the professor’s chair, a ready-to-hand object in our surrounding world. What is immediately given is not acts of consciousness. An immediate, unprejudiced experiencing knows of no acts of consciousness, sense data, pure sounds or noises, complexes of colors and surfaces, and the like.

The emergence of the hermeneutical dimension in Heidegger’s thought, as well as the hermeneutical reshaping of phenomenology, are, as we have seen, inspired to a considerable extent by Heidegger’s effort to develop an original, “unprejudiced” approach to life. It is therefore in order, finally, to focus a bit more on his confrontation with life-philosophy.  

II. 3. The Lebensphilosophisch-Existentialist Motif

One crucial point of criticism that runs through the early courses is that the alternative of scientific, rational, or theoretical philosophy versus irrationalism, life-philosophy, or historicism is not a genuine one. These major trends (in short: metaphysical versus anti-metaphysical traditions) are indeed complementary to one other. Epistemologically oriented philosophy fails to seize upon life because its outlook and conceptuality are rooted in theoretical comportment, and in a derivative mode of it. But the opponents, life-philosophy, historicism, and any kind of irrationalism, remain dependent on it precisely to the extent to which they claim life, history, or existence to be inaccessible to concepts, a claim that does not make sense unless one tacitly assumes that the concepts developed by theoretical, epistemological philosophy (as well as the comportment from which they spring) are unchallengeable, to which we cannot even conceive alternatives. In the course of various devastating criticisms, Heidegger more often than not takes great pains to note that there is a positive and original impulse inherent in life-philosophy, that he indeed appreciates this impulse very much, while what he rejects is rather its insufficient (because parasitic) realization (GA61 82, 117; GA9 13f.; GA63 69, 108; GP 10–7–19; PhA 6–20–20; PhR 38). We should note that when Heidegger, for all his criticism, emphasizes the positive tendencies of life-philosophy, the philosopher he most frequently has in mind is Dilthey (see GA63 42; further GA9 13f.; PhA 6–20–20; GA61 7). And we can hardly conceive of
Heidegger's historicist opposition to Husserl's transcendental ego and the stress upon "das Historische," the historical, without Dilthey's influence. Heidegger seems to suggest that the basic effort of life-philosophy is correct. He seems even to share the view of contemporary philosophy that the object primarily to be approached and investigated is "life." But rather than developing conceptual means adequate to its own object, to "life," life-philosophy relies upon the tools of the adversary for its own concepts, tends to borrow them from there. That is also the reason why, having realized that their tools are not equal to the task, life-philosophers tend to come inevitably to the conclusion that life, history, and existence are irrational. The point Heidegger makes could be put as follows: irrationalist philosophy is really too rational. In claiming its objects to be irrational, it uncritically borrows the measure or concept of rationality from the adversary rather than developing or elaborating a rationality or conceptuality of its own, one conforming to its "object."

Heidegger's objections to Jaspers move in the same vein. He maintains that the way "existence" is characterized by Jaspers is reifying, containing as it does Bergsonian overtones. It is in the course of these observations that he first presents his decisive alternative, namely, "hermeneutical concepts" (GA 9 32).

In summary we can say that, in several important respects, it was the appropriation and radicalization of the lebensphilosophisch-existentialist problematic that led Heidegger to transform Husserl's phenomenology hermeneutically. But we may perhaps express this even more radically by saying that the hermeneutic transformation of phenomenology is in several important respects the consistent radicalization of the lebensphilosophisch-existentialist problematic, and not just one implication of it—something that may arbitrarily follow or may not. Heidegger's primary effort seems to have been directed toward gaining a new and genuine access to "life"—one without unwarranted constructions, uncontrolled prejudices, and presuppositions—an attempt in which the means were to be provided by phenomenology. That is how and why phenomenology was to undergo a transformation or, since it was shown to be laden with "un-phenomenological" prejudices, even "purification."

Finally, I may refer to a further interesting connection of phenomenology, hermeneutics, Dilthey, and historicism in Heidegger's thought. Heidegger emphasized several times that what Dilthey was striving to get access to was, although he himself was not fully aware of it, historical reality, historical life, rather than historical knowledge. We may assess what this implies by coupling two passages from the young Heidegger. In W. Bröcker's transcript of Heidegger's Kassel lectures there is the sentence, "Hermeneutics is a discipline which will attain fundamental impor-

tance in the present and the future." For the understanding of this sentence, which at first may sound arduous as well as enigmatic, a passage from the recently published lecture on the concept of time (1924), which sounds no less provocative, may give us a clue—a passage that formulates what Heidegger calls "the first principle of all hermeneutics":

The possibility of access to history is grounded in the possibility according to which, from time to time, a present age is capable of being futural. This is the first principle of all hermeneutics. . . . Philosophy will never come to find out what history is so long as it analyzes history as an object for methodical observation. The enigma of history lies in the question, what does it mean to be historical.
Abbreviations

In references to Heidegger's texts, a slash separates the pagination of the original German work and that of the published English translation, though individual authors have often either modified the published translation or given their own translation. The following abbreviations are also used: Kriegssnotsemester (KNS), Summer Semester (SS), Winter Semester (WS).

HEIDEGGER'S GESAMTAUSGABE (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975ff.)

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**OTHER TEXTS BY HEIDEGGER**

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Chapter 4

1. These are the transcripts of WS 1919–20, “Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie” (published meanwhile as GA58); SS 1920, “Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks (Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung)” (published meanwhile as GA59); WS 1920–21, “Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion”; and the transcript of 10 lectures that Heidegger gave in Kassel in April 1925 under the title, “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Forschungsarbeit und der Kampf um eine historische Weltanschauung” (published meanwhile in Dilthey-Jahrbuch 8 [1992–93], ed. Frithjof Rodi). These transcripts will be abbreviated hereafter as GP, PhA, PhR, K.


3. In SZ this kind of criticism is still present (namely in the thematization of the problem of truth [SZ 216/259]), but is not given as much prominence as in the earlier lecture courses.

4. Heidegger’s objection to mathematical logic is that it obscures the meaning of propositions (see GA1 42).

5. See also the discussion of “Sinn” (GA1 170 ff.). Connected with this is Heidegger’s treatment of the problem of “method.” His main suggestion is that method and object are not to be separated (see GA1 200ff.; GA56/57 126, 181; GA58
135f.; GA61 23, 31, 59, 153, 160f.; GA9 9). It is for this reason that he welcomes phenomenology (as a "method" conforming wholly to the object), and that is why he says that there is no such thing as the phenomenology, i.e., understood as a "technique" or "method" (see GA24 467/328). For aspects of the Habilitationsschrift that anticipate important later themes, such as "facticity" (exemplified by Heidegger's interest in Scotus' concept of haecceitas), see Theodore Kisiel's detailed reconstruction in his paper "Das Kriegsnote Sommer 1919: Heidegger Durchbruch zur hermeneutischen Phänomenologie," Philosophisches Jahrbuch 99 (1992): 105–122. See also his "The Genesis of Being and Time," Man and World 25 (1992): 21–37, esp. 22, 27.


7. Let me nevertheless indicate the main points in brief. Neo-Kantianism is said to have formed its outlook not so much out of the "things themselves"—on the truly scientific grounds Heidegger thinks it should have been based on—but more by way of an emergency or embarrassment (KPM 246f. [cf. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 5, p. 357]; further GA20 17f., GA61 4; GA30 411f.). Husserl is claimed to have fallen victim to Neo-Kantianism (KPM 247); the self-definition of phenomenology is said to be carried out not so much out of the "things themselves" as in blindly joining with the tradition. Existence-philosophy cannot seize upon existence itself, for its conceptual apparatus is quite inadequate. Finally, historicism strives for an "objective" knowledge of history (an impossible aim), rather than for an authentic historical "being" of human life, and the first not so much promotes but instead suppresses the second.

8. See GP 10-14-19 on the "Ursprungsgebiet" of philosophy: "Das Schicksal der Philosophie! Tendenz in der Geschichte der Philosophie: immer neu anfangen, um es zu erreichen". "The fate of philosophy! Tendency in the history of philosophy to begin ever anew in order to reach the domain of origin."

9. This was the general tendency of the age; see GP 10-10-19; PhA 5-6-20; GA9 14f.


12. Characteristic of Heidegger's understanding of the fusion of philosophy and phenomenology is the following passage from SS 1920: "Phenomenology as a fundamental science is problematic as long as we have not explicated the concept of philosophy in phenomenological radicality" (PhA 5-20-20). See also GA61 18: "As an object . . . philosophy has its own way of being-had in a genuine manner". See further PIA 247; GA20 108/79.

13. On several occasions, Heidegger will later return to Husserl's "principle of all principles." In retrospect, he will say in the sixties that he wanted to rethink exactly this principle and the specific "matter" of phenomenology (SD 69ff./62ff.). With the publication of Heidegger's early lecture courses, we now have a wide textual basis to reenact what we have so far known only from Heidegger's retrospective accounts, namely, that something remained unthought in the phenomenological call "to the things themselves" (see SD 84/77; see also the reference to SD in note 27 below).

14. See GA56/57 16f., 24, 32, 39. On p. 95 Heidegger observes that this circular character is an essential characteristic of all philosophy and an index of potentially genuine philosophical problems. For the purposes of this chapter, it may be of use to note that the circular character of philosophy was clearly stated by Dilthey in his Das Wesen der Philosophie (Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 5, pp. 343ff.; see esp. the following sentence: "One seems to have to know already what philosophy is when one sets out forming this concept out of facts."), §3 of GA56/57 (esp. p. 21) offers a Diltheyean approach to the problem, when the definition of philosophy is explored through the history of philosophy—an exploration that (just as with Dilthey) proves to be a dead end. For analogous considerations in the young Heidegger, see the last paragraph of Section I of this chapter.

15. GA56/57 131; GA61 187i.; GA63 14ff. The term "phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity" occurs four times in PIA 247–49. "Ontology" is not lagging behind either; for the expressions "ontological phenomenology," "phenomenological ontological," see GA61 60; for "ontology of facticity," see PIA 246.

16. We should realize, writes Heidegger in the Jaspers-review, that "life-philosophy . . . is tending towards the phenomenon of existence." "The pioneering element of Jaspers' work lies . . . in having directed attention to the problem of existence" (GA9 14f.). Heidegger's position on Kierkegaard will manifest a series of reservations in Being and Time; for some decisively positive hints in the earlier period, see GA4 91; GA4 91, 30. Characteristic of Heidegger's understanding of facticity, i.e., of opposing it to the "objectivity" pertaining to "theory," are the following assertions: "secure objectivity is indeed an insecure flight from facticity" (GA61 90); "to meditate upon universal validity is to misunderstand the fundamental meaning of facticity" (ibid. 87; see also 99 where facticity is said to be the "main matter in philosophy"). On the origin of the term "facticity," see Theodore Kisiel, "Das Entstehen des Begriffsfeldes 'Faktizität' im Frühwerk Heideggere," Dilthey-Jahrbuch 4 (1966/87): 91–120.

Recall also the relation of facticity to the earlier Scotian theme of haecceitas (note 5 above). Dilthey's turn to "life" can also be understood as a turn to facticity and individuality. For an interesting occurrence of the term haecceitas used very much in the later Heideggerian sense of facticity and Da-sein, see Wilhelm Dilthey, Grundlegung der Wissenschaften vom Menschen, der Gesellschaft und der Ges-
chichte, Volume 19, Gesammelte Schriften, edited by H. Johach and F. Rodi (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1982), p. 348: "The structure of life expresses itself in an individual facticity [Tatsächlichkeit], a haecceitas, which can be presented by the intellect as not necessary."


18. GA63 15. Heidegger’s analogy is the relationship between plants and botany, as a particular conception of botany effected the being of plants. One way of understanding what Heidegger has in mind is that, if hermeneutics possesses facticity as an “object,” it has tacitly changed its relation to it (see in Being and Time the characterization of existence as a kind of “business procedure” [SZ 294/340]). If one interprets one’s facticity as an “object,” one has already adopted a particular attitude to one’s facticity, and thereby modified it intrinsically. Analogously, see SZ 828 regarding the being-question (“here what is asked about has an essential pertinence to the inquiry itself”), as well as the new concept of philosophy (SZ 38/62).


20. See GA20 147/107. See also the retrospective accounts (SD 84/77) referred to in note 13 above, as well as GA56/57 111. These show that the leading methodological insight of this critique was basically present already in 1919.

21. GA20 159/115, 178/128. The term “unphantomenologisch” crops up already in a 1923 remark stating that it is unphenomenological to hold up mathematics as the ideal of scientificity (GA63 72).


25. The eminently phenomenological character of Heidegger’s 1925 criticism of Husserl is emphasized by Walter Biemel in his paper “Heidegger’s Stellung zur Phänomenologie in der Marburger Zeit,” Phänomenologische Forschungen 6/7 (1978): 178ff. Heidegger now undermines the very distinction of psychic act and ideal content, of which he was once a fervent supporter; he shows that anti-psychologism abandons the empirical realm to the psychologistic-naturalistic perspective. He shows in particular that, in the “natural” attitude, Husserl tends to “experience” reality, as his own words show, in a naturalistic way. Anti-psychologism is thus shown to be pervaded by naturalism.Rickert takes psychology as a kind of mechanics. The criticism of psychologism is significant and meaningful only as a critique of psychology, and not by opposing it to a realm of pure logic. (See GA20 160/115ff., 172/124; GA21 89ff.) Cf. the quotations of GA21 29f. in Section I above.


27. Phenomenology, which was ahistorical in Husserl (see GA63 75; K 22), and turned away from the history of philosophy, permitted Heidegger a new access to the tradition, one that may be called hermeneutical in that it rejected both mere thoughtless adoration of the past and the similarly self-evident and self-conceived contempt for it in the Enlightenment. The term that expresses this dynamic attitude is: “Wiederholung” (see SZ 385/437 and the title of §1: KPF 232; GA20 184ff./136ff.; the hitherto earliest occurrence of the term in its specifically Heideggerian sense known to me is GA61 80; for a detailed discussion, see John D. Caputo, “Hermeneutics As the Recovery of Man.” Man and World 15 [1982]: 343–67). In the foreword of Heidegger’s 1923 course on the hermeneutics of facticity we find significant passages sounding much like an autobiographical intimation: “Companions in my searching were Luther and Aristotle. . . . Kierkegaard gave impulsion, and Husserl gave me my eyes” (GA63 5; my emphasis). This passage points in the same direction as the memories of the old Heidegger, namely, that while phenomenology meant for Husserl rejecting the authority of tradition and history, it became for him an important device to reappropriate it (see SD 86/78; see also US 95). Another fact hitherto known only from personal records—namely, that Heidegger was reluctant to accept Husserl’s transcendental ego, because he regarded the historical ego as more original (see Gerda Walther’s letter to Alexandre Pâgner on June 20, 1919, quoted by T. Sheehan, “Heidegger’s ‘Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion’,” 1920–21,” The Personalist 60 [1979]: 312–24)—can now be ascertained in the published text of the 1919 courses (see GA56/57 85, 88ff., 206).
On the theme of "destruction" in the early period, see GA9 3f., 6, 34; GA61 67, 96, 141; GA63 48, 75f., 89, 105, 107; PIA 245, 249f., 252; GA24 31f.

28. GA20 173f./125f. This definition was challenged already in 1923 (see GA63 25f.). The criteria of philosophical criticism are also redeﬁned. The only reasonable phenomenological criterion of critique is posed on motivational grounds; free-ﬂoating, purely "conceptual" questions are to be avoided (GA56/57 125f.; see GA63 71), as are the free-ﬂoating "problems" proper to Neo-Kantian "Problemgeschichte" (GA63 5; later GA26 197/155; GA45 7f.). See Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (Tübingen: Mohr, 1975), pp. 358f.

29. See already in 1919: GA56/57 85, 71f. On July 8, 1920, F. J. Brecht noted the following: "Sense data as such are neither seen nor heard." Concerning "Erfahrung," "Grundverhältnis," in a hermeneutical-phenomenological sense, see GA9 6, 29, 32; GA61 21, 24, 38, 42, 91, 176; GA63 110; PIA 249, 253f., 264. The origin of Gadamer's later concept of hermeneutical experience lies clearly in these Heideggerian insights (see Wahrheit und Methode, pp. 329f.).

30. Heidegger, as we now know, developed a "phenomenology of life" in his postwar lecture courses; H. Tanabe reported this in Japan in 1924 under the title: "A New Turn in Phenomenology: Heidegger's Phenomenology of Life" (see O. Pöggeler, "Neue Wege mit Heidegger?" Philosophische Rundschau 29 [1982]: 57; see also his "Zeit und Sein bei Heidegger," Phänomenologische Forschungen 14 [1983]: 155 and, more generally, his "Heidegger's Neubestimmung des Phänomenbegriffs," Phänomenologische Forschungen 9 [1980]: 132f.).

31. See GA9 31, 32f., 36, 38; GA56/57 85, 88f., 117, 206; GA61 1, 76, 111, 159, 163; GA63, 83, 107; PIA passim. Heidegger frequently spoke of Dilthey's appreciation of Husserl (see GA56/57 165; GA20 30/24; K 7). This may have prompted him to assume the task of unifying the impulses of both thinkers.

32. See the references in note 9 above. That philosophy has life as its subject matter appears clearly from SZ 46/72. Heidegger says here that the expression "philosophy of life" amounts to nothing more than "botany of plants" (a pleonasm), and that in a genuine "philosophy of life" "there lies an unexpressed tendency towards an understanding of Dasein," i.e., existential analytic. An anticipation of this is GA9 14f., as quoted in note 16.

33. See Heidegger's use of "Begriffsaufruf" (GA9 10).

34. See, e.g., GA63 45: "Was heißt irrational? Das bestimmt sich doch nur an einer Idee von Rationalität. Woraus erwächst deren Bestimmung?" "What does irrational mean? This is still deﬁned in terms of an idea of rationality. Where does this deﬁnition come from?" This view of Heidegger's was to be held through four decades up to the sixties (see SD 79). For a fuller discussion of Heidegger's treatment of rationalism and irrationalism, see my paper "Heidegger und Lukács. Eine Hunderterjahresbilanz," I. M. Fehér (ed.), Wege und Irrwege des neueren Umganges mit Heideggers Werk (Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 1991), pp. 43–70.


36. GA63 42; PhA 6-15-20; GA20 19/17. See also the end of note 7.

37. BZ 26 (emphasis in original). These considerations should be seen against the background of the thesis that philosophy is always that of a particular present (GA63 18; PhA 5-6-20; see K 28f.), that the hermeneutical situation as a repetition-retrieval of the past is always present-centered (PIA 237; GA58 256; GA61 3; GA63 35f.). In the Kassel lectures, historicity has a priority even over the being-question. The being-question, viz., doing philosophy, appears as just one way of being historical. This anticipates a major tension, inherent in S&Z, between system and history, ontology and historicity (see O. Pöggeler, "Heidegger's Neubestimmung des Phänomenbegriffs," p. 150, and Heidegger und die hermeneutische Philosophie [Freiburg/München: Alber, 1983], pp. 164, 227ff., 286). The "first principle of all hermeneutics" is clearly directed against historicism, which confines itself to "analyzing" history as a "Betrachtungsgegenstand der Methode," and thus stands in the way of being genuinely historical (the subject of this description being a fantastic ahistorical nowhere man or transcendental ego). As a result, any kind of history-making becomes impossible. By contrast, "Nur wer sich selbst zu verstehen versucht, vermögt die gewesene Geschichte zu verstehen, die in ihr liegende 'Kraft des Möglichen' zu wiederholen" (Pöggeler, Heidegger und die hermeneutische Philosophie, p. 273). See also the last sentence of note 7 and the citations of GA61 in note 16 above.
Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Professor of Philosophy at The Catholic University of America, is the author of Das logische Vorurteil (1993). He has published widely on a variety of philosophical themes, but with particular focus on the thought of Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger.

István M. Feher is Professor of Philosophy at Budapest University. He is the author of books on Sartre and Heidegger, as well as articles on Lukács, Popper, Croce, phenomenology, hermeneutics, and German Idealism. He is the editor of Wege und Irrwege des neueren Umgangs mit Heideggers Werk (1991).

Hans-Georg Gadamer is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Heidelberg in Germany. Among many writings on Heidegger, which are gathered in his Gesammelte Werke (1985ff.), is Heideggers Wege. Studien zum Spätwerk.

Jean Grondin is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Montréal. His book publications are Hermeneutische Wahrheit? Zum Wahrheitsbegriff Hans-Georg Gadamers (1982); Le tournant dans la pensée de Martin Heidegger (1987); Kant et le problème de la philosophie: l'a priori (1989); Emmanuel Kant. Avant/Après (1991); Einführung in die philosophische Hermeneutik (1991).

Theodore Kisiel is Professor of Philosophy at Northern Illinois University. He is the author of The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (1993) and (with J. Kockelmans) Phenomenology and the Natural Sciences (1970). In addition, he is the author of numerous articles in English and in German on philosophy of science and hermeneutic philosophy.

George Kovacs is Professor of Philosophy at Florida International University. He is the author of The Question of God in Heidegger’s Phenomenology (1990), as well as numerous articles on continental philosophy.

David Farrell Krell is Professor of Philosophy at DePaul University. He is the author of Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy (1992); Of Memory, Reminiscence, and Writing: On the Verge (1990); Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger’s Thinking of Being (2nd ed., 1991); Postponements: Woman, Sensuality, and Death in Nietzsche (1986). He is editor and translator of a wide range of books and articles by Heidegger, including Basic Writings, Nietzsche, and Early Greek Thinking, all now in their second, revised editions.

Daniel Magurshak teaches at Carthage College. He is co-translator of Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking by Otto Poggeler.

Will McNeill is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at DePaul University. He has published a number of articles on Heidegger’s work, and is the translator of Heidegger’s 1924 lecture The Concept of Time (1992), as well as co-translator of Heidegger’s 1929–30 lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World—Finitude—Solitude (1994).


John Protev teaches philosophy at Villanova University. He is the author of several articles on Heidegger, Derrida, and Levinas, as well as the forthcoming Time and Exteriority: Aristotle, Heidegger, and Derrida.

François Renaud is a doctoral candidate at the University of Tübingen. His work is centered on Gadamer, Heidegger, and Greek thought.


Frank Schalow has served as Associate Professor at Loyola University, New Orleans, and has been Visiting Professor at Tulane University. He is the author of The Renewal of the Heidegger-Kant Dialogue (1992) and Imagination and Existence (1986), as well as co-author of Traces of Understanding (1990).

P. Christopher Smith received his Ph.D. in 1966 after five years of study with H.-G. Gadamer in Heidelberg. He has translated three of Gadamer’s books for Yale University Press, and has published numerous articles on Heidegger and on Gadamer. His book Hermeneutics and Human Finitude: Toward a Theory of Ethical Understanding appeared in 1991.

Jacques Taminiaux is Professor of Philosophy at Boston College and