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Edited by

John D. Caputo
Villanova University

and

Lenore Langsdorf
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

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With this issue, Philosophy Today inaugurates an ongoing relationship with the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Beginning in 1997 with volume 41 we will publish a fifth, supplementary issue each year consisting of selected essays from the annual meeting of SPEP. To get this process under way, we are publishing papers from the Thirty-Second Annual Meeting of the Society, held in New Orleans in 1993, in this issue. Papers from the Thirty-Third and Thirty-Fourth Annual Meetings, held in Seattle and Chicago respectively in 1994 and 1995, will appear in our first issue of 1997, with the first annual supplementary issue, featuring papers from the 1996 Georgetown meeting scheduled to be distributed in the spring of 1997 as a supplement to our 1996 volume.
HEIDEGGER’S POSTWAR TURN
THE EMERGENCE OF THE HERMENEUTIC VIEWPOINT OF HIS PHILOSOPHY AND
THE IDEA OF “DESTRUKTION” ON THE WAY TO BEING AND TIME
István M. Fehér

For a long time it had been customary within Heidegger scholarship to speak about a “Heidegger I” and a “Heidegger II,” divided by the famous turn [Kehre]—a distinction which found ample justification in Heidegger’s writings and moreover was to some extent approved of even by Heidegger himself.1 With the on-going publication of Heidegger’s Complete Works, including the great manuscript from the thirties with the title Contributions to Philosophy, and the texts of some of the highly important early Freiburg lecture courses (GA 56/57, GA 58, GA 61, GA 63),2 as well as of related manuscripts, published outside of the Gesamtausgabe, such as the “Natorp essay” (PIA) and the lecture on the concept of time (BZ), we have been put in a better position to understand Heidegger’s philosophical path, leading up to Being and Time, and even after. As a result, in contradistinction to the tendency of the former Heidegger scholarship to speak about two Heideggarians, it has become more and more customary and even fashionable (though not at all unjustified) to speak about more periods or more turns on Heidegger’s path of thinking. Thereby the concept of the turn has been taken on ever more complex and differentiated meanings, undergoing, as it were, a certain proliferation.3

In the following essay, however, I do not wish to contribute to the discussion of problems of this sort—problems pertaining to what might be called the periodization of Heidegger’s life work. “Heidegger’s Postwar Turn” (the title of my essay) is taken to mean just one turn among several possible others—it designates the turn that took place in Heidegger’s thinking right after World War One. This turn is at the same time, as I hope to show, a decisive one; in a sense, it may be claimed to be the fundamental turn, preceding—as well as underlying, that is, making possible—all subsequent turns or reversals which Heidegger scholarship has hitherto come to detect, or is yet to detect, on Heidegger’s path of thinking. Heidegger’s turn following World War One is taken to mean the turn through which Heidegger, a talented student of Husserl, Rickert, Külp, or others, became Heidegger himself, i.e., the thinker we know and appreciate today, using a distinct language and conceptuality, one all his own.

Indeed, to speak about anticipations of Heidegger’s postwar hermeneutic perspective—such as, for example, the presence of several proto-hermeneutic elements in his student and academic writings4—or about various other anticipations of several of his later positions, significant as they may be, is not to speak about the adoption of an autonomous philosophical stance—and it is still less to speak about, say, Heidegger’s carrying out the hermeneutic transformation of Husserl’s phenomenology. Although the young Heidegger seems to have been fairly familiar with Neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy as well as with Husserl’s phenomenology, and to have adhered to their basic anti-psychologism without reservations, it is unclear how far he worked himself through these trends in their complexity by the end of the war. We know from a 1917 letter of Husserl’s to Natorp (October 8) that Heidegger’s first in-depth confrontation with phenomenology (“seeking to come to grips with [it] from within”) took place near the end of the war.5 Still, in spite of the numerous and indeed remarkable early writings between 1912 and the end of the war, the young Heidegger can in no way be said to have had a philosophical outlook of his own. Had he not published a work with the title Being and Time in 1927, the student and academic writings would presumably have no importance today. In other words, the importance they have is hardly on their
own: they are, to be sure, the work of a talented young student who knows his way fairly well in the leading trends of contemporary philosophy, seems to have a solid knowledge and well argued preferences, and is able to apply them in an autonomous way; but in no way do these writings display a tendency toward originality. True, there are some programmatic claims about the being-question at the end of the dissertation, and the closing chapter of the Habilitationsschrift urges a return to metaphysics and a confrontation with Hegel. These are nevertheless nothing more than sketches and hints and anticipations—anticipations that take on significance only in the light of what was to come. It is solely because Heidegger was to change his tone and position radically after the war and to publish Being and Time in 1927—in other words: it is because he was to follow up these anticipations—that we can so much as identify these hints and sketches as anticipations of the mature position in those early writings today. If we ignored what was to come we should scarcely be able to touch upon and identify those anticipations. In summary, the story we write or recount is retrospective.

In what follows, I shall attempt to characterize some aspects of this early turn. In a first step, I shall seek to delineate the outlines of Heidegger’s postwar thinking with regard to what I shall call its characteristic twofold direction. In a second step, I will then focus more closely on the specific character of this turn as a whole.

But before proceeding to develop the first point, a preliminary methodological consideration is in order. Since the designation of “turn” for this early phase of Heidegger’s thought may sound surprising, or, in any case, somewhat unusual, or at least not quite self-evident, it will be appropriate to provide some justification. For it may reasonably be argued that what is at issue is just the beginnings of Heidegger’s (the real Heidegger’s) thought, rather than a turn in it; it is improper to speak about a turn, it may be objected, because this presupposes a clear-cut distinction or passage between two well defined positions. By contrast, what we have to do with here is just one distinct position, i.e., the later one, while the starting position is vague, non-original, or in any case under-determined and unimportant.

In response to this objection I should contend that, at a closer look, what the term does indicate is just a change, maybe a fundamental one, in the thinking of a philosopher, a clear-cut passage from one position to another—a passage perhaps also accompanied by a certain “logic” of its own—whereby the question of whether both of the two positions (the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem) are philosophically significant remains wholly irrelevant. We may be entitled to speak about a turn even if the terminus a quo is not really interesting—i.e., interesting on its own—although, understandably enough, philosophical scholarship typically concentrates on those turns where both positions are found worth of attention and study on their own. Moreover, if, in accordance with Heidegger’s postwar efforts to go back to the very origins, to interpret phenomenology as the science of the origins of life (Ursprungs- wissenschaft des Lebens), we want to set out and proceed as originally and radically as possible, not taking thereby for granted Heidegger’s passage from the status of a talented disciple or follower of any of the philosophers of the day (be it Husserl or Rickert or Külpe or others) to that of an autonomous thinker, it is exactly his origins, the way Heidegger set out on his own and began gradually becoming Heidegger (the zero point, the origin), on which we must concentrate our attention.

I.

Heidegger was to find his own voice and start the move toward Being and Time after the war. The mainly Platonizing-wissenschaftstheoretisch perspective of the prewar student and academic writings gives way to a radical re-orientation. Whatever the underlying motivation may be that catalyzed this turn, his new password sounds: back to life in its originality! In a sense, this was also the general tendency of the age, so Heidegger may be seen to have just taken seriously and to have radicalized this urge coming from thinkers, such as Dilthey, Bergson, Simmel, Jaspers, Scheler, James. We see the young Heidegger striving for, and gradually working out, a new approach to philosophy with a specifically two-
fold ramification: to the subject matter of philosophy and to the history of philosophy. In other words, he is taking great pains to develop an autonomous relation to philosophy both in its systematic and historical aspects. This implies a comprehensive confrontation with what has been handed down as philosophy and (what is inseparable from it) with what philosophy has been concerned with, i.e., its subject matter, for which he constantly seeks the right name or designation. The two sides or aspects of this confrontation may be called the systematic and the historical, and both are accompanied by considerations concerning method. In a certain respect, this way of putting things is, of course, inappropriate, for one of the recurring points of the young Heidegger’s *Sturm und Drang* period is the claim that the systematic aspect of philosophy cannot be isolated from the historical, and vice versa, or that doing philosophy should not be separated from doing history of philosophy. Obviously, the fusion of the two already involves, or rests upon, a given philosophical (or systematic) standpoint whose reconstruction is going to occupy me later on, up to and inclusive of the question concerning its success. Still, at this early point we may say, somewhat extrinsically or didactically, that the texts of the early Freiburg lecture courses may be classified as belonging to three main categories, namely the critical-historical, the autonomous-systematic, and the methodological. Although there is no sharp division among these three types of texts—in a sense they are complementary to each other, and there are constant passages among them—it is nevertheless the interest of one or the other that prevails from time to time. There are texts predominantly engaged in critical confrontation, or critical assessment, of the philosophical positions of contemporary or past thinkers or schools; there are then those that are concerned to provide more or less detailed sketches or elaborations of what constitutes the subject matter of philosophy (typically called by Heidegger “life,” “factual life experience,” and the like)—elaborations whose function may also be seen to provide the fundamentals, or, if you like, the measure or criterion, of those criticisms. Finally, a third type of the texts, equally important as the other two, is made up of what may be called methodological observations of the most various kinds, not unfrequently even to highly negative effects, such as, e.g., the one that the question concerning “method” is an impossible one, and that the best method is the one oriented towards, or conforming wholly to, the object—connecting the principle with that for which the principle is a principle. Heidegger’s postwar turn may be comprehensively characterized as an overall attempt at appropriation and reappropriation, i.e., as an effort to come to terms with the significant tendencies of contemporary philosophy—inclusive of the philosophical tradition in general—and, more importantly, with what philosophy really is, inclusive of its subject matter, i.e., life. For it is somehow the prerogative or perhaps the fate of every great and original philosopher to rethink and redefine the concept of philosophy itself. Small wonder then that Heidegger, when he set out on his own, repeatedly reflected upon philosophy itself, re-examining its very concept and meaning. In terms of preliminary vantage points, the attempt at an overall re-examination and renewal may take place in one of two ways: either the philosopher adheres to, links his or her position to, some existing tendency of the day, or he a priori disengages it from any one of them. In the first case, he must gradually come to transform the position to which he initially adhered in a substantial, radical way in order to make his claim to originality justified. In the second case, the claim to originality is, as it were, granted from the very beginning; what remains difficult to justify, however, is the claim to superiority to the contemporaries. Indeed, superiority presupposes comparison, while comparison in its turn presupposes a common criterion—a criterion that holds for all parties to be compared—which is what the prior disengagement from the existing tendencies makes it extraordinarily difficult to provide. In Heidegger’s case, we have clearly to do with the first option. If he had opted for the second, we would have an attempt to reappropriate the subject matter of philosophy and thereby philosophy itself, but not the history and tradition of philosophy. Precisely in virtue of the prior disengage-
ment, it would become thoroughly implausible to justify the claim that what he is doing is basically identical with what his precursors have been doing. For, obviously, one must claim in some ways to be doing the same sort of thing others have been doing in order to reasonably claim to be doing it better than others have been doing it.

The philosophical position that Heidegger preliminarily adhered to when setting out on his own was phenomenology. It was Husserl’s phenomenology that provided him with the “method” and the “devices” for re-examining the very concept of philosophy—which means that the rethinking of philosophy became for him inseparable from coming to grips with phenomenology. In fact, for Heidegger phenomenology became identical with philosophy.\(^\text{16}\) It was phenomenology that provided him with the device and strategy of re-examining and reappropriating contemporary tendencies as well as the whole philosophical tradition, inclusive of phenomenology itself. While his remarks on phenomenology in the academic writings scarcely amount to more than a faithful recapitulation or exposition, the postwar observations display a tendency toward a comprehensive confrontation of its basic concepts and theoretical fundamentals. WS 1919–20, bearing the title *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* begins with the following characteristic statement: “For phenomenology, the fundamental problem of phenomenology—its most acute problem, a problem that can never be extinguished, its most original and decisive problem—is phenomenology itself.”\(^\text{17}\) Phenomenology should, for Heidegger, not just occasionally be concerned with itself. On the contrary: if it is to be radical enough it should bring to bear its criticism also upon itself—indeed, primarily against itself (see GA 58: 6, 145, 237).

Given the fact that, in conjunction with his attempt at an overall confrontation with the philosophical tendencies of the day by adhering to—and subsequently radicalizing the perspective of—one particular philosophical trend, i.e., phenomenology, Heidegger sought to radically re-examine and reappropriate the original subject matter of philosophy, we see his postwar thought developing in two basic directions. The one may be called, as has been mentioned (for lack of a better term), the “systematic,” the other the “historical.” Insights pertaining to the first provide essential criteria or points of view for re-examining and criticizing the second, and vice versa: a sense of dissatisfaction and uneasiness emerging from the critical appropriation of traditional doctrines and approaches urges him to search for a new access to the objects in question. Since the tendency to gain a new access to life was widespread at the time there is no easy way of settling the question of whether at the zero point of Heidegger’s postwar turn (from which grow all his subsequent efforts) the systematic effort may be claimed to have priority over the historical or vice versa. Be it as it may, the one direction of his setting out on his own is marked by repeated attempts to elaborate a new access to what should constitute the business or subject matter of philosophy, i.e., life—and that is the point of emergence of the hermeneutic perspective of his philosophy leading up to the elaboration of his early hermeneutics of facticity. The emergence and gradual unfolding of this positive or systematic aspect of the young Heidegger’s thought runs parallel with, and is supported as well as supplemented by, the simultaneous rise of a historical or negative (or critical) aspect, indicated comprehensively by the idea of destruction. These two aspects—which belong closely together in mutual conditionality—are indicated in the title of my essay and are meant to capture, schematically, the basic characteristics of Heidegger’s postwar turn.\(^\text{18}\) The very fact, however, that these two aspects are linked together in the title of my essay by an “and” indicates that, in spite of the claim of their merging together, their presentation is bound, for obvious purposes, to constantly oscillate by making the one prevail over the other and vice versa. This is a difficulty inherent in Heidegger’s undertaking\(^\text{19}\) no less than in its interpretive reconstruction—a reconstruction of the sort to be attempted here. In view of this reservation, I shall attempt to briefly outlines both aspects.

I.1

Let me start by taking up and expanding on a point already made, namely that the tendency to gain a new access to life was widespread at the

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time, urged by most different thinkers—life-philosophers, historicists, and Kulturkritiker of all sorts. These tendencies challenged the systematic or scientific character of philosophy, by opposing the “irrationality” of life to philosophy itself. Under these circumstances, a major dilemma presented itself to the philosophy of the day in terms of an either-or. Philosophers could either persist in their effort to pursue systematic or scientific philosophy, with its claim to the status of a universally valid science (as was the case with predominantly epistemology-oriented Neo-Kantianism), thereby however running the risk of making philosophy, in the face of urgent problems, ever more irrelevant for life. Or philosophers could choose to dramatically enunciate the “irrationality of life,” thereby vehemently attacking, and indeed rejecting, systematic or scientific philosophy together with its claim to universal validity. One of the sharpest formulations of the fact that scientific questions and problems of life belong to entirely different domains was provided by Wittgenstein somewhat later, but the fact of their incompatibility was clearly enunciated already by Husserl, who linked his passionate defence of “philosophy as a rigorous science” to a sharp criticism of historicism and the kind of philosophy striving to provide a Weltanschauung, both of which he viewed as giving up the idea of scientific philosophy. The alternative was unequivocally spelled out by Rickert in dedicating the second edition of his book Die Philosophie des Lebens (The Philosophy of Life), symptomatically, “to the life of philosophy.” This way of putting things contributed to stressing the alternative: either the philosophy of life or the life of philosophy—you cannot have them both at the same time.

If we want to schematically characterize Heidegger’s efforts after the war, we may say that Heidegger enthusiastically adhered to the view of contemporary philosophy that the object primarily to be approached and investigated was “life.” But for all his enthusiasm for the idea of getting back to life itself, Heidegger was reluctant to join in with the ardent critics of scientific philosophy. What he suggests is that, rather than a rejection of philosophy conceived of in terms of a universal science, as it has been understood traditionally, it is a thoroughgoing reform of it that is needed—something that will soon be called deconstruction. For those who suggest that philosophy as a universal science must be rejected because of its inability to embrace problems of life, do indeed, for all their criticism of traditional philosophy, uncritically accept the concept of philosophy as it has been handed down by the tradition. Their rejection is thus parasitic upon the adversary—upon what they want to reject. To claim that there is no way to get a “universal” knowledge of life—that life is unknowable, “irrational,” inaccessible to and impenetrable by general concepts—is to adhere surreptitiously and uncritically to what concepts and knowledge have traditionally been held to be, rather than to search for a way of transforming the knowing apparatus in order to make it conform to its subject matter. All those who complain about the irrationality of life, its impenetrability by rational means, tacitly borrow their measure or concept of rationality from their adversary rather than developing or elaborating a rationality or conceptuality of their own, conforming to its “object.” It is true that, as opposed to scientific philosophy which totally ignores or overlooks the ownmost “object” of philosophy, life, the other party does somehow perceive it, behold it, that is, it has some awareness or knowledge of it—but it does so with the devices provided by the adversary! This is one major reason why they end up by complaining about the inadequacy of the tools, the impenetrability of life. Irrationalism is for Heidegger just the “the counterplay of rationalism”: when it “talks about the things to which rationalism is blind, it does so only with a squint.” What it comes down to is, then, that, rather than taking over your tools from somebody else as ready-made you have to work out and refine them for yourself. The sense of philosophy can even be seen to consist in the “destruction of irrationality” thus conceived (PhA 5–20–1920).

What Heidegger offers in alternative to rational concepts and theoretical knowing, by way of such a “destruction,” is what he calls “herme-neutical concepts” (GA 9: 32), or—over against pure or theoretical intuition—“herme-neutical in-
tuition” (GA 56/57: 117), “Hermeneutics,” “hermeneutical,” have their meaning as rival concepts to “theory,” “theoretical,” understood in terms of “theoretically neutral.” Generally speaking, it is due to Heidegger’s search for proper methodological devices regarding an adequate conceptual expression of “factual life” that his hermeneutic outlook emerges in the postwar lecture courses. Theoretically (and ahistorically) neutral knowledge is opposed to, and gives way to, existentially (and historically) involved understanding (or pre-understanding) and interpreting—whereby knowledge becomes at best a subdivision of understanding. All these efforts are in the service of seizing upon “life.” The main character of the latter is claimed to be concern (Sorge) rather than knowledge.25

The description of life, or “facticity”—as Heidegger comes to call it soon—obtains an overall hermeneutic character precisely in virtue of the insight that interpretation cannot be regarded as something added, as a kind of extension or annex, as it were, to some theoretically neutral (and allegedly “objective”) description of a state of affairs; rather, preliminary “interpretedness” is inherent in all kinds of description, in all kinds of seeing, saying, and experiencing.26 If there is no “pure” theory (for “theory” is a derivative mode of being or comportment of one particular being called human), there is no pure description either. What this insight implies for an adequate description of life or facticity is that theoretical concepts, as well as the language theory speaks, should be abandoned in favor of a language and conceptuality growing out of everyday life and able to let things be seen in their interpretedness, that is, in exactly the way we encounter and have to do with them.27 A hammer, for example, is primarily encountered as a tool for pounding nails into the wall rather than as a neutral thing out there having the property of weight (SZ 154ff.). If the hammer proves to be too heavy, “interpretation is carried out primordially not in a theoretical statement but in an action [. . . ]—laying aside the unsuitable tool, or exchanging it, ‘without wasting a word’” (SZ 157). Hermeneutics cannot, therefore, remain an auxiliary discipline of the human sciences, as has been traditionally conceived within a pre-established realm of sciences up to and inclusive of Dilthey—who held hermeneutics to be “the methodology of the understanding of recorded expressions”—for, in view of the above considerations, the case is simply not such that interpretation takes place only concerning “life manifestations objectified in written form.”28 Understanding is thus for Heidegger no longer a way of knowing proper to the human studies, in contradistinction to explanation as the way of knowledge characteristic of the natural sciences, but is rather a way of being of the being called human. It precedes the epistemological kind of understanding, and, therefore, the very epistemological distinction between “understanding” and “explanation.”29 Humans are understanding, so to speak, all along. What they understand are not just written texts or records, or, still less, matters of fact out there in the world, but the way they find themselves in the world, involved in it. As an interpreting animal, the human being interprets being as well; and Heidegger formulates his being-question specifically as a question of the meaning of being. These are some of the major reasons why Heidegger links hermeneutics to ontology, as is displayed as early as his 1923 lecture course whose subtitle specifies the title of “ontology” as “hermeneutics of facticity.”30

One way of exemplifying Heidegger’s modified outlook is that, by adopting a hermeneutic way of seeing, traditional empiricism can be shown to be insufficiently “empirical”—indeed, laden with a multitude of dogmatic “theoretical,” or even “metaphysical,” presuppositions. It is intuitively clear that to turn back to “factual life” should, in some sense, amount to turning back to “experience”; so one might expect Heidegger to heartily embrace some kind of “empiricism.” And indeed, this would not be a wholly bad way of putting things, for something of this sort does turn out to be the case with the young Heidegger. However, the kind of “experience” Heidegger has in mind (turns back to, and constantly refers to) is something entirely different from the concept of experience applied in empirical or positivistic philosophy.31 “Experience” is indeed a key word for the young Heidegger, but, as he elucidates it in 1921–22, “experience is not understood here

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in a theoretical sense as empiricist perceiving in contradistinction to something like rational thinking” (GA 61: 91). "One construes a concept of pure experience," he complains one year earlier, "which belongs to an entirely different domain than the factual experience of the environment" (GA 58: 135). Contrary to the way traditional empiricism has come to conceive of it, what we perceive in the first place are, hermeneutically seen, emphatically not "sense data." "What we 'first' hear," writes Heidegger in Being and Time, "is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking wagon, the motor cycle. We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling." And he adds significantly: "It requires a very artificial and complicated comportment [Einstellung] to 'hear' a 'pure noise'" (SZ 164; compare GA 20: 367). In other words: to claim that we first perceive a "pure noise" requires a change in comportment, the assumption of a theoretical attitude. In like manner, what we do see in the first place is not something like colored surfaces, or, still less, "sense data," but, e.g., the professor's chair, a ready-to-hand object in our surrounding world. What is immediately given is not acts of consciousness. An immediate, unprejudiced experiencing knows of no acts of consciousness, sense data, pure sounds or noises, complexes of colors and surfaces, and the like.

Heidegger's dissatisfaction with contemporary descriptive strategies of life soon led him to the insight that the predominance of the theoretical comportment is not an occasional mistake committed by the philosophy of the day, but rather something that dates back to the Greeks. Accounting for it, as well as for the origins of the distinction of rationalism and irrationalism, or metaphysics and life-philosophy, is a kind of derivative self-displacement (or self-dislocation) of life from itself—a displacement that nevertheless tries to undo itself (or catch up with itself) again and again. These insights provide Heidegger with a basic perspective to be applied in his "historical" confrontations—they give him important clues for viewing the way of European philosophy up to the present. And, given the recognition that the theoretical comportment is based upon a self-displacement, or self-distantiation, of life from itself, all the more urgent becomes the need that finds its expression in the password: Back to the origins, back to life itself! The science that is destined to provide access to this origin is, as should be clear from what has been reconstructed, intrinsically interpretive, i.e., hermeneutical—an insight that explicitly crops up in a note of the 1919–20 lecture course saying: "the science of the origins is ultimately the hermeneutical science" (GA 58: 55 [Ursprungswissenschaft letztlich die hermeneutische ist]).

We have come across the term of origin several times thus far, so at this point it will be appropriate to focus on it in somewhat more detail. From the rich variety of meanings attached to Heidegger's use of the concept of "origin" in his early lecture courses, let me now select just two. In a sense, the origin is, so to speak, simultaneous; it indicates the fundamental motivational basis out of which life, i.e., the individual's life, springs, and that governs its coming to pass, its being enacted. In describing this kind of origin, Heidegger frequently adopts the term of "self-world" (Selbstwelt), the underlying suggestion being that the life of the individual somehow centers around a self, or its own self. Heidegger illustrates this point by reference to the biographies and autobiographies, and as the paradigm of the historical emergence of the self-world he points to Christianity. The origin or center of an individual's life is however more often than not hidden or concealed from itself, partly by a tendency of its own to do so, partly by public interpretedness, dominated mainly by inauthentic, reifying interpretive schemes handed down by the tradition. This tradition must therefore be deconstructed. In this second sense, the origin is historical. History appears in this perspective as a Verdeckungsgeschichte (GA 63: 75), a history of repeated concealments of the original factual life-experience—a history that must be unlocked.

The phenomenon of repeated concealments is motivated, paradoxically, by a tendency inherent in life itself—life is, after all (to use an argument Heidegger put forward several times in the 1919–20 lecture course now published in GA 58), self-sufficient, selbstgenügsam, there is nothing
outside of it, so its own concealment must take its point of departure, must proceed, from out of itself.37 Indeed, life has a tendency to deliver itself over to the world which it is taking care of, and to let itself be governed by the interpretive schemes derived from this state, with the result of taking itself, ultimately, as one worldly object among others.38 Running parallel with—or, rather, inherent in—"life’s evasion of itself"39 is its tendency to secure itself over against the fundamental unrest or disquiet characteristic of life (an unrest that can be obviously caught sight of only if life is viewed in its very origin, i.e., without bias or prejudice), and it is in the course of this effort that science and something like theoretical comportment have come into being. In a second step, then, science or theoretical comportment take command over the interpretation of life, consolidate themselves by setting the rules, prescribing the methods and criteria for its interpretation, whereby the original phenomenon of life becomes next to invisible.41 This invisibility is, it must be stressed, not merely a matter of an epistemological failure—lying, as it were, in some "imperfection of our cognitive powers"42—but, strictly speaking, it does very much concern its object, whereby life itself becomes peripheral, detached from its origin, lived at a distance from itself.43 Theoretical comportment is one specific crystallization of life (in the conceptuality of Being and Time, one way of being of the being called Dasein, "not the only manner of being which this being can have, nor is it the one which lies closest"),44 just a derivation from it, characterized by the fact that, after it has found, so to speak, refuge or shelter against life itself, it has a tendency to view it in a characteristic and safe detachment, in a harmless and comfortable disengagement or neutrality.45 Essential to this comportment is the failure to mitgehen (go along, accompany) with life itself—which is precisely what the young Heidegger urges a re-interpreted phenomenology should do (GA 58: 23; cf. ibid., 158, 162, 185, 254f., 262; see further GA 56/57: 110, 117). The task that Heidegger assigns to a phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity is therefore to deconstruct backwards the "dominating interpretedness in its hidden motives" (PIA 249). The present is thus seen by Heidegger as being thoroughly permeated and dominated by traditional conceptual schemes, dragged along through the centuries without any effort at an original re-appropriation—conceptual schemes and habits whose roots in lived experience, from which they once emerged, have long withered away. Indeed, stripped out of context in which access was found to them, those conceptual devices have long lost their interpretive power and become rootless. "Inauthentic conceptuality" (unechte Begrifflichkeit [GA 58: 20]) is Heidegger’s comprehensive term for the characterization of contemporary philosophy no less than of contemporary life—for philosophy pertains, as we have seen, intrinsically to its "object."46 We are misled and spoiled by it to such an extent, he adds immediately after, that we do not even see any possibility of getting out of the ruins (GA 58: 20). The ruins must be destructed, and so it is important to realize that the term of destruction refers, when emerging in the young Heidegger’s thinking around 1920, not only to philosophical texts, but to objectivations of life too; its aim is a restoration, a renewal of life.47

It is in this sense, then, that a destruction of this ossified conceptuality involves a return to the origins in both senses, simultaneous and historical, and that the twofold ramification of Heidegger’s setting out on his own in historical and systematic directions springs from one single intuition.48 For the attempt at a renewal by simply ignoring the tradition, setting it aside is, as Heidegger has repeatedly and convincingly shown with regard to Husserl and others, constantly to fall back into it.49 A reappropriation of philosophy is, in this sense, a reappropriation both of its the subject matter and its tradition. There is no reappropriating the one without reappropriating the other. To find a new access to the subject is, in this sense, to find a new access to the tradition, and conversely. A confrontation with the tradition is only meaningful if accompanied by a confrontation with the subject matter. In Heidegger’s postwar turn, a new, hermeneutic approach to, and a corresponding conceptual elaboration of, the subject matter of philosophy,
life or facticity, becomes thus merged with the historical-critical aspect of destruction.

This state of affairs, the immediate reciprocal interrelatedness of the positive and negative aspects, emerges also explicitly in Heidegger’s “methodological” reflections. “Hermeneutics is destruction,” he notes in an appendix to the 1923 lecture course on the hermeneutics of facticity (GA 63: 105). The emergence of the hermeneutic perspective and of the idea of destruction in their mutual conditionality is linked to, and is rooted in, a specific comportment, or “fundamental experience” [Grundерfahrung], or even “launch” [Einsatz], and is conditional upon the “truth of an original self-interpretation of philosophy” (GA 63: 109f.; see also GA 61: 20, 24, 38, 42, 160), namely the hermeneutical. “It is only by means of destruction that hermeneutics carries out its task” (PIA 249).\(^50\)

I.2

To round off this part of my essay, let me briefly reconstruct, first, some of Heidegger’s arguments against inauthentic ways of adhering to the tradition, and then, second, focus a bit more on the self-interpretation of philosophy that accompanies Heidegger’s hermeneutical transformation of it. One way of dealing with the first problem is to ask the question of what it exactly implies to adhere to, or to become a follower of, a given philosophical trend. In assessing Heidegger’s argument, we shall see that the attempt at an overall appropriation of the tradition turns out to be incompatible with joining in with any one particular philosophical tendency. Heidegger develops this point in 1919–20, claiming that what in the course of such adherences typically takes place is that certain basic propositions and theses are taken over without previously examining or justifying the legitimacy of this take-over; more importantly, without having insight into the character of evidence pertaining to those theses, or attempting to account for the necessity of the respective evidence and its methodical range. Prior adherence to a philosophical standpoint implies that, paradoxically enough, exactly the standpoint being taken over is not sufficiently understood and appropriated—it becomes just embraced in an obscure manner. By restricting questioning preliminarily, the position taken over is being veiled and dimmed down\(^51\)—the motives being typically extrinsic or extra-philosophical (confessional, political, concerning Weltanschauung, etc.). What is achieved by inauthentic traditionalism is that the tradition becomes ossified, scarcely understandable any longer, and its supreme or leading concepts remain typically unclear (GA 58: 8f.). What this kind of adhering to a traditional standpoint, whatever this may be, achieves is (to adopt a characteristic passage of Being and Time) that what “it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible . . . that it rather becomes concealed” (SZ 21; see GA 19: 413).\(^52\)

What the Greeks did, Heidegger urges in 1921–22, should not so much be taken over as indeed authentically understood (GA 61: 121).\(^53\)

There are, basically two ways of adhering to the tradition, Heidegger says in 1925. Either what is adhered to is not interrogated, questioned; or one attempts to appropriate what one is about to take up precisely by stepping back in front of the questions asked by the tradition—which is what may be called echter Anschluß, “authentic adherence” (GA 20: 187f.).\(^54\) Another characteristic way of relating oneself to the tradition is the one we have already touched upon, namely arrogantly ignoring or rejecting it; this results in an unconscious falling back upon it, for Dasein “is its past, whether explicitly or not” (SZ 20). Now we should realize that it is exactly this step back that is being carried out in Heidegger’s adhering to Husserl’s phenomenology after the war, in his re-examining its fundamentals, and ultimately radicalizing it in such a way as to turn it against its own transcendental concretization.\(^55\) This authentic kind of adhering to the tradition is what Heidegger calls repetition or retrieval, to be developed later on in detail in Being and Time.\(^56\) Phenomenology, reshaped and re-elaborated in such a way, turns out to be the revival of Plato’s and Aristotle’s questioning: “the repetition-retrieval of the beginnings of our scientific philosophy” (GA 20: 184).

Heidegger’s gradual developing his own philosophical stance after the war is accompanied by frequent reflections on what exactly he is
doing. He not only comes to adopt an original philosophical position, but is to some extent also aware of doing so, and seeks to come to terms with it—or even justify it. It is in the course of such methodological considerations—emerging in the intervals, as it were, of his work on and struggle with the Sachen selbst—that he comes to redefine the concept of philosophy itself. Obviously, he does so in the light of how he is transforming it. There is an embarrassing variety of considerations of this sort in his early lecture courses—some brief, others long, some just propedeutic, others nearly “systematic.” Due to space limits, I must, at the risk of oversimplifying this point, which would surely merit more detailed discussion, confine discussion to just a few passages. Thereby I overlook totally the propedeutic discussions, and rush forward to reflections providing a concept of philosophy corresponding to Heidegger’s hermeneutical re-conceiving of it.

Heidegger’s new concept of philosophy is in itself hermeneutical, i.e., situation-centered, equally detached from rationalism and irrationalism, absolutism and relativism or historicism. This concept centers around questionableness, essential to it is passionate dedication to the matter itself—which is Heidegger’s way of taking over, appropriating, and immediately radicalizing Husserl’s insistence on rigor (GA 58: 137, 231). “Pushed into absolute questionableness, to have questionableness by seeing it—that is what it means to seize philosophy” (GA 61: 37; see ibid., 35), he claims in 1921–22. Philosophy is essentially philosophy (as well as critique) of one given age; it is an understanding appropriation—retrieval of its own subject matter, life, no less than of its past; (for both itself and its subject matter, life, are intimately historical, they are their own past), accompanying life as closely to its center or origin as possible. It is a re-enacting accompaniment of life, helping it to interpretively illuminate—that is, appropriate and re-appropriate— itself.

Let me now focus on one specific aspect that emerged already in the above reconstruction. We know already that life has a tendency to detach itself from its origin, to get uprooted, alienated from itself, to deliver itself over to public interpretedness. Under these circumstances philosophy represents, as Heidegger repeatedly remarks, a kind of counter-tendency against (or destruction of) life’s self-alienation, self-reification, striving as it is for restoring life to its fundamental unrest—unrest prior to its own securing itself in theoretical comportment. Thus conceived, philosophy has no secure and eternal existence—as a counter-tendency it is extremely precarious with regard to its being. Its “object,” “objectual domain” must be sought for again and again, over against the concealing tendencies inherent in life itself. It is never possessed once for all. The moment philosophy comes to life (provided it ever does) is then a moment of dispersion, of decomposition, disintegration (see, e.g., GA 63: 19)—a state of affairs that shows some parallels with Hegel’s conception of the beginning of philosophy. The disintegration of reality was of course compensated for Hegel by the reconciliation taking place in spirit, while Heidegger from the very start dismissed all kinds of metaphysical comfort. In accordance with Heidegger’s hermeneutic viewpoint, it would be too much to say that the birth of philosophy is due, objectively, to a state of disintegration. All we are entitled to say is, strictly speaking, that, at the moment of its birth, setting into motion, philosophy gains awareness of itself as emerging from a state of dispersion—and it does so as an awareness of that dispersion. Thereby it makes things more difficult, inasmuch as it works against life’s tendency to protect itself against itself by taking things easy. If it does not emerge, however, there is of course no dispersion, and still less an awareness of it. Such seems to be the case, then, such is the philosophical comportment or condition, or predicament, as it can be reconstructed as becoming aware of itself no less than of its “object” at the moment of its coming into being in Heidegger’s postwar turn when he set out on his own.

I said earlier that in Heidegger’s postwar turn a new, hermeneutic approach to, and corresponding conceptual elaboration of, the subject matter of philosophy, life or facticity, becomes merged with the historical-critical aspect of destruction, and I called this state of affairs the

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immediate reciprocal interrelatedness of the positive and negative aspects, whose explicit awareness I have also attempted to show in some of Heidegger’s “methodological” reflections. In a further step, I have been attempting to come closer to the original belonging together of both aspects by coming to center discussion around the self-interpretation of philosophy that accompanies Heidegger’s hermeneutic transformation of it. There remains, however, a more radical way of focusing on the common origin of both aspects—one that occasionally also permits asking the question concerning the extent to which Heidegger’s project of destruction and re-appropriation may hope to be successful. This latter question can also be formulated as follows: What are the chances for the success of the destruction? Or, in other words: how far, to what extent can Heidegger’s hermeneutic project of destruction and re-appropriation be carried out? It seems to me appropriate to finish my reconstruction of the young Heidegger’s turn by finally addressing this point.

II

To focus on the common origin of the twofold ramification of Heidegger’s postwar thinking, thereby also attempting to assess its chances or prospects of success, means however asking an even more radical question—one hinted at in my introductory remarks but not dealt with explicitly thus far. Indeed, even if the previous reconstruction has not been wholly successful (hopefully, it was not), still, it has been lacking in radicality, and, above all, it did not meet a radical demand anticipated at the beginning. This concerns the question of how Heidegger became a philosopher (and this question can no more be answered by the procedure followed thus far, for this has always already presupposed something like Heidegger’s philosophy, viz., his hermeneutic turn). For Heidegger’s becoming an autonomous philosopher must obviously be the common origin, preceding the twofold ramification or development of his subsequent thought. More precisely (and with a more hermeneutical self-consciousness), this question may be formulated like this: what kind of pre-understanding of philosophy accompanied Heidegger’s becoming an autonomous philosopher—the philosopher who came to develop exactly the kind of philosophy he did? Indeed, if we want to explain not only this or that turn whereby Heidegger passed from one philosophical position to another (and possibly also the “logic” accompanying this transition), but the fundamental turn by which he became a philosopher at all (earlier he was a non-philosopher, or just a follower of some of the contemporary schools), we can scarcely avoid posing some question of this sort. For the case is simply not such that Heidegger, in a first step, became a philosopher (opted for philosophy), and then, in a second step, i.e., at one subsequent point of his philosophical path, the outlines of something such as the hermeneutics of facticity as well as the idea of destruction emerged in his thought. Rather, the contrary is true: he became a philosopher exactly by the emergence of the outlines of one given philosophy in his thought and (what is pretty much the same) by his embracing it, his consenting to it, his delivering himself over to it—as well as to the attitude or comportment this particular philosophical perspective involved. To let the outlines of this kind of philosophy emerge in his thought and to hand himself over to this emergence means to adopt a philosophical attitude, i.e., it involves a fundamental change in attitude. How, in what terms, did Heidegger account to himself for becoming a philosopher? Thus formulated, the question seems to be directed towards psychological details or subtleties—still, my intention is wholly “hermeneutical,” in wanting to find out something important about Heidegger’s postwar turn, or maybe even about philosophy itself. Philosophers are eternal beginners, possessing “eternal youth,” so runs one of Heidegger’s typically hermeneutical theses, and we interpreters of Heidegger’s thought should in like manner set out on our interpretive task as beginners, as if we did not know anything about philosophy. In other words, in accordance with the hermeneutical principle of openness, not only must we not mind being taught something fundamentally original about what philosophy (or the philosophical attitude) is from the philosopher we happen to study, but we must expect to be communicated matters of this sort, or must
even make the philosopher we study say such things.\textsuperscript{67} For the issue of what philosophy exactly is, is not something to be found out simply from handbooks, independent of how the great philosophers went about doing their own business. What philosophy is, is to be identified—provided we adopt hermeneutic criteria and reject free-floating speculations or purely edifying instructions—only by studying the self-understanding of significant philosophers. If it is a privilege of significant thinkers not to take the concept of philosophy for granted, it is fitting for their interpreters not to do so either. It is fitting for them to become as much of a beginner as their philosophers are—provided they want to correspond to the philosophers they study by proceeding as originally as they did.

Indeed, it is characteristic of a good deal of philosophers who have come to be known as significant philosophers that for them philosophy, far from being self-evident, constituted rather a problem. Take the example of Hegel again. As the so-called early theological writings show, he claimed to be not only fairly disinterested in purely philosophical or metaphysical matters all along, but explicitly displayed a considerable distaste and even contempt for them.\textsuperscript{68} That the absolute was unknowable was part of Kant's philosophy; by contrast, Hegel became a philosopher precisely by embracing the tenet of the knowability of the absolute (over against, for example, his own earlier view that the access to the absolute, or absolute life, was provided by religion rather than by philosophy).\textsuperscript{69} Hegel became a philosopher, embraced philosophy by coming to view philosophy as capable of realizing what he previously thought only religion was able to achieve. It was a given pre-understanding of philosophy that made Hegel first be disinterested in philosophy, and that, subsequently, made him embrace it. Hegel became a philosopher by rejecting the Reflexionsphilosophie of the time—that kind of thinking that was, for Kant or Fichte, still a kind of philosophy.

Philosophy is not meaningful for this kind of significant thinkers from the very beginning, and, accordingly, it can lose its meaning for him again. In this sense, we find the topos of the end of philosophy in a good many significant thinkers, such as Hegel, Marx, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, whereby philosophy, together with its end, are pre-understood in most different ways. Just as, for some of them, philosophy had a beginning, so they claimed to diagnose, or were looking forward to, its end.\textsuperscript{70}

If, after these preliminary observations, we turn back to Heidegger we see, first of all, that his understanding, not only of philosophy but, parallel with it, of whether he himself was a philosopher at all, far from being secure, showed considerable oscillations from the beginning to the end. In a letter written to Karl Löwith in 1921, we can read that it is a serious mistake to compare him to creative philosophers; he then goes on to claim not to be a philosopher at all, and not even to entertain the idea of doing anything that can be compared to it. He is rather, he says, a Christian theologian.\textsuperscript{71} The remark that he has no philosophy turns up in 1925 again (GA 20: 417), and in the authorized protocol of his seminar on “Time and Being,” given in 1962, the claim that “there would be something such as Heidegger’s philosophy” is again rejected (SD 51).\textsuperscript{72} The letter to Löwith gives us to understand that the alternative to philosophy is theology—and this much is clear also from his letter written to Father Krebs two years before, in 1919, explaining him that he had detached from Catholicism, and opted for philosophy.\textsuperscript{73}

The letter to Krebs is especially capable of disclosing what may be called Heidegger’s existential option for philosophy. The counterpoint of this option is clearly theology, and at this point our question must be directed towards Heidegger’s understanding of both when taking his decision. In opting for philosophy, what kind of pre-understanding did Heidegger have of what he had opted for, as well as of what he had opted against, and how did this two-fold pre-understanding affect what he was to provide as philosophy later on? For, clearly, the kind of pre-understanding of what he had opted for, i.e., philosophy, the kind of pre-understanding that accompanied this option, did immediately condition the kind of philosophy he was to elaborate (together with the comportment essential to it); it
is not something simply left behind, once the decision is completed. In concentrating on this most radical of all of his turnings (because it underlies all subsequent ones, which are clearly turns within an identical dimension or horizon, i.e., philosophy—a dimension opened up by this first turn), we should address the question of Heidegger’s understanding of the relation of philosophy and theology. Even if as of today we are not provided with extensive documents dating back to this period, still, some occasional but very effective observations that have recently become accessible, supplemented by some of Heidegger’s later reflections on the relation of philosophy and theology (those that may be taken to be a kind of retrospective account for, or justification of, his option), may provide us with important clues.

Let me begin by quoting a passage from an important footnote of the 1922 Aristotle Introduction, saying that “life’s retreat towards its own self/true rush back to itself/making life violently bring itself back to itself,” which is what philosophy achieves, is, in religious terms, “a show of hands against God.” Since the characterization of philosophy that Heidegger provides here is absolutely central to what he is doing in terms of a hermeneutics of facticity, it is an important new piece of information that this kind of philosophical activity understands itself in terms of a counter-tendency to religiosity, or more precisely, to a given kind of religiosity. As a kind of revolt against one typical sort of comportment, it still conceives of itself in terms of that comportment (“a show of hands against God”), in terms of a conceptuality dependant on what it intends to detach itself from. It is in this context that Heidegger designates philosophy as “atheistic,” and although he does not fail to add that this designation is not content-dependent, but (as he elsewhere puts it), merely “principal,” i.e., methodological (see GA 61: 196ff.; compare GA 20: 109ff.; GA 24: 28; BZ 6), the term “atheistic” remains nevertheless effective.

Philosophy is, for Heidegger, the free questioning comportment of Dasein entirely delivered over to itself (GA 9: 65), so the kind of religiosity, or of religious comportment, Heidegger may have had in mind when parting from it is the tradition-dependent, authority oriented sort. Philosophers are those humans who, according to the original designation, strive for knowledge, wisdom, i.e., they do not possess it, for if they did they would no more have to strive for it. The kind of religiosity Heidegger urges philosophy should be free from in that footnote of the Aristotle Introduction is a seducing, tempting sort of worrying, which merely talks about, or imitates religiosity. The characteristic expression of “forcibly inauthentic religiosity” turns up in Heidegger’s 1928 lecture course (gewaltsame unechte Religiosität [GA 26: 211]), and all through his path of thinking Heidegger frequently criticized what he came to perceive as inauthentic forms of religiosity.78

The atheism Heidegger proclaims is only methodological, i.e., it refers to, and urges the adoption of, a certain attitude or comportment, that of not taking over anything blindly from the tradition, from the authorities, but rather appropriating and reappropriating, in and by factual life-experience, what has been handed down. But this is something that has already been dealt with in some detail above.

These, then, seem to be the terms in which Heidegger took his option for philosophy, and, at the same time, for a given kind of philosophy. Central to it is the insistence on autonomous appropriation and re-appropriation, and the ensuing aversion for all kinds of dogmatic take-overs no less than for dogmatic rejections. This is Heidegger’s first and most fundamental turn, while all the others—such as the passage from the fundamental ontological way of elaborating the Being question to the seinsgeschichtlich perspective, or any other that Heidegger scholarship may yet single out in terms of its changing points of view—are carried out within the domain or dimension opened up by it. The self-understanding of philosophy and of its comportment that Heidegger provided and came to adopt in his postwar turn, and that he persisted in up to the end of his life, may legitimately be seen to be a particular crystallization or radicalization of the idea of philosophy. To decide “objectively” for or against one of the two comportments, or to argue

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for one of them—the one Heidegger opted for over against the other, as he pre-understood them—seems to be out of place, for any kind of argument arrives (to adopt a Heideggerian phrase) always already too late. What we can do, however, is to assess the consequences of the respective options. What the inauthentic type of adherence implies has been outlined previously—it achieves that the tradition becomes ossified, scarcely understandable any longer, and that its supreme or leading concepts remain typically unclear. By contrast, we have not yet estimated the consequences of the Heideggerian way of doing philosophy, and that is the point at which we have to deal with the question concerning the extent to which the Heideggerian project of destruction and reappropriation, as a counter tendency to inauthentic traditionalism, can hope to be successful or effective. Are there limits inherent in this endeavor? How far can the tradition be re-examined, i.e., reappropriated or deconstructed—or, can it at all in its entirety? Is a total reappropriation possible, and if it is what does it imply? If Dasein is, according to some of Heidegger’s later tenets, appropriated unto its absence, if Being withdraws itself, is then not the very idea of a total reappropriation illusive? But these insights clearly do not so much account for (or clarify), as rather draw the consequences from, the infeasibility of the project aiming at total destructive recovery, reappropriation, their explanatory power is therefore poor.

An overall attempt at the reappropriation of the tradition\(^80\) must, from the very beginning, face a serious difficulty, namely, the impossibility of adopting any previously established criteria or measure in going about checking the tradition. For, obviously, to adopt any standpoint or criteria, to employ any devices, would be to have suspended putting those very criteria or devices into question, to have uncritically embraced them. It would be, in other words, to give up the project of a total re-appropriation. The attempt at an overall re-appropriation must therefore remain without criteria—which may also be expressed by characterizing the Heideggerian (and also Gadamerian) sort of hermeneutics as “descriptionist” over against the “normativist” sort of traditional hermeneutics. Or, if there is a criterion, it is, as we have seen, what Heidegger calls *Grund erfahrenung*, which, for the reason of being linked to the “truth of an original self-interpretation of philosophy” (GA 63: 109f.), remains no less precarious, together with the “truth” and “character of evidence” of that philosophy (GA 63: 16). In lack of other authorities, the philosopher must ultimately make his own factual life experience the authority for the revisitation of the tradition—of its reappropriation and destruction. This may perhaps imply no special embarrassment or distress for an Enlightenment philosopher, supplied with a typical self-certainty, whereas it must surely be the source of considerable torment for a Heideggerian Dasein, only too conscious of its throwness, finitude, and groundless grounding. In the revisitation of the texts of the tradition, a moment must come when the philosopher is left completely alone to decide whether a given concept or doctrine has emerged in the course of the history out of an original access to the phenomena, or is due to pure imitation, take-over, or systematization—whether, in other words, he can make it resound in his factual experience. Is he left with anything more than a vague disposition to assent to or refuse it (even though the assent may then be followed by interpretive transformation and radicalization)? This state of affairs, this exaggerated sense of responsibility, may well be the source of a number of oscillations in Heidegger’s position. It can provide reasons for why, for example, the Greeks or the Pre-Socratics are sometimes declared to be exempt from the charge of the oblivion of being, sometimes are seen to be involved in it. And we may even ask whether the Being question itself, which is apparently absent in the earliest lecture courses, where the term of ontology appears in a critical sense (see, e.g., GA 58: 239f.), owes its emergence to a tentative adherence to a given tradition—an adherence which of course Heidegger was to fill in with “content” abundantly later on.\(^81\)

In response to the tormenting issue of whether the centering of philosophy around the phenomenological-hermeneutic nucleus of factual life experience can provide a sufficient criterion for
an overall destructive re-appropriation of the tradition, it may be said that it is not impossible to give an affirmative answer on the condition that the philosopher’s efforts appear against the background of helping a new age be born. We have seen that the young Heidegger’s endeavor does have an aspect of this sort (see, e.g., GA 56/57: 4ff.; GA 58: 22; GA 61: 75), and the theme of the other beginning (der andere Anfang) is going to emerge emphatically and powerfully in the second half of the thirties. This other beginning may aptly be seen to retrospectively justify the philosopher’s destructive undertaking. Running parallel with this is Heidegger’s criticism of historicism from the perspective of what may be called a historicism of the second degree, namely, a self-reflective or self-conscious historicism that centers around the recognition that the dominating historicism (whose central thesis is, roughly, that everything is historical) is itself historically conditioned. The overcoming of this kind of historicism is nothing less than the overcoming of this age, in the service of which, and for the sake of which, Heidegger apparently understands his philosophy, or rather, more precisely, his becoming a philosopher. Thereby we have, as it were, already a vague sense of his ceasing to be a philosopher, the concept of the end of philosophy.

Let me conclude finally by trying to spell out some possible consequences of the second part of my reconstruction. If the interpretive perspective I have been delineating has some plausibility, then some of the motivational background of Heidegger’s becoming a philosopher attains some evidence; and it does so in a strangely dialectical connection with the emergence of some of the motivational background for his ceasing to be a philosopher. A second consequence may be that Heidegger’s postwar turn need not only be declared to be his fundamental turn, but it can also be seen to contain in itself, or foreshadow, the vestiges of the turn more properly called as such, to be accounted for in terms of a passage from the failure to carry out a total reappropriation/destruction to a concept of the self-withdrawal of being.

ENDNOTES


2. Heidegger’s works will be cited with abbreviations. The Gesamtausgabe volumes will be cited as GA followed by volume and (after colon) page numbers. For full bibliographical data see below. In addition to the published texts, I shall occasionally also draw upon student transcripts of some of Heidegger’s lecture courses. These are the transcripts of WS 1919–20 “Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie,” of SS 1920 “Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks (Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung),” of WS 1920–21 “Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion,” and the transcript of 10 lectures that Heidegger gave in Kassel, in April 1925, under the title “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Forschungsarbeit und der Kampf um eine historische Weltanschauung.” These transcripts will be abbreviated hereafter as GP, PhA, PhR, K. Other abbreviations: WS = Wintersemester; SS = Sommersemester; KNS = Kriegsnotehsemester.

3. See H.-G. Gadamer, “Wilhelm Dilthey nach 150 Jahren (Zwischen Romantik und Positivismus. Ein Diskussionsbeitrag),” in Dilthey und die Philosophie der Gegenwart, ed. E. W. Orth (Freiburg/München: Alber, 1985), p. 159: “The turn... seems to me to have actually taken place in the year 1920.” On the basis of the publication of vol. 56/57 of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe, containing the lecture courses that Heidegger gave in 1919, and notably in virtue of the coming up in them of the phrase es er-eignet sich (which anticipates the all-important Ereignis in the late Heidegger), Theodore Kisiel confirms Gadamer’s assumption as a kind of Kehre before the Kehre; see his “Das Kriegsnotehsemester 1919: Heideggers Durchbruch zur hermeneutischen Phänomenologie,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 99 (1992): 105. (The date he reports Gadamer as saying, i.e., 1919, must be an implicit correction or a misprint). In the yet unpublished English version, Kisiel writes that this phrase “adds further credence to Gadamer’s thesis that the groundwork for all of Heidegger’s later thought after the ‘turn’ was already being laid in 1919.”— In the foreword to his book Heidegger und die hermeneutische Philosophie (Freiburg/München: Alber, 1983), p.

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59, Otto Pöggeler writes that he suggested a *Dreiteilung* of Heidegger’s life work (namely, that it should be divided into three parts) in his paper “Zur Historicität in Heidegger’s Later Work” as early as the mid sixties (the paper was first published in English in the *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* 4 (1973): 53–73; see now Pöggeler’s above cited book, pp. 139–170, esp. pp. 159ff.). In another respect, with regard to conceptual clarifications, a clear distinction should be made between the “turn” that Heidegger explicitly planned to bring about with the elaboration of *Being and Time*, namely, in Part One, Division Three, and that has to do with what is referred to as *Kehre* as early as 1928 (see GA 26: 201), but was later reported, in the *Letter on Humanism*, as having been failed (see GA 9: 328, further GA 49: 39ff.), from the “turn” which was in fact carried out by passing from the fundamental ontological way of elaborating the *Being* question to the *seinsgeschichtlich* approach. F.-W. von Herrmann has stressed this difference in many essays, most recently in his “Wirkungen der Martin-Heidegger-Gesamtausgabe,” in *Information Philosophie* 21 (July 1993): 51. In an earlier paper he distinguished a further division within the turn in the second sense with reference to the “turn in the e-vent” (*Kehre im Ereignis* [see, e.g. GA 65: 57, 407ff.]), which, according to Heidegger’s self-interpretation, is the —so to speak—fundamentum in re of the turn that he carried out; see F.-W. v. Herrmann, “Das Ende der Metaphysik und der andere Anfang des Denkens. Zu Heideggers ‘Kehre,’” *Freiburger Universitätsschriften* 28 (Juni 1989): 47ff.; it should not be overlooked, however, that the turn in the third sense is a philosophical theme occurring within the perspective of the second Heidegger, i.e., of the *seinsgeschichtlich* approach to *Being*, only after he had carried out the turn in the second sense. I attempted to treat the difference (and at the same time strict connection) of the two turns, i.e., the turn as intended, and the turn as carried out, in more detail in my book *Martin Heidegger. Egy XX. századi gondolkodás életútja* (Budapest: Gönül, 1992), pp. 197–205, 266–80, the thesis being that it was exactly Heidegger’s insight into the impossibility of carrying out the turn as he had envisaged it in fundamental-ontological terms in *Being and Time* that constituted the basis of the *factual* turn consisting in passing from the fundamental ontological perspective to the no more systematic, i.e., *seinsgeschichtlich*, perspective. Already in his classic monograph, Otto Pöggeler stressed that the turn was never carried out exactly the way it was planned to be, and gave a detailed analysis of its coming to pass (see his *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, 2nd ed., [Pfullingen: Neske, 1983], pp. 181ff.). For a clear and well-argued early analysis of the turn and of the problem of the “two Heideggers,” see Richardson, *Heidegger*, pp. 238ff., 243ff., 623ff. For the design of the turn, as Heidegger intended to carry it out, see Max Müller’s report in his *Existenzphilosophie. Von der Metaphysik zur Metahistorik*, 4th ed. (Freiburg/München: Alber, 1986), p. 86 (on the interpretation of this report, see Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, pp. 158ff.; F.-W. von Herrmann, *Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins. Eine Erläuterung von ‘Sein und Zeit’:* Bd. 1. “Einleitung: Die Exposition der Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein” [Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1987]), pp. 399ff; see further SZ 39, 440). On the interpretations of the turn, see now Alberto Rosales, “Heidegger’s *Kehre* im Lichte ihrer Interpretationen,” in D. Papenfuss, O. Pöggeler eds., *Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers*, vol. 1: *Philosophie und Politik* (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1991), pp. 118–40. A good early summary of the theme of the “turn” with reference to its double meaning, i.e., as the turn in Heidegger’s thinking, and the turn as a philosophical topic of Heidegger’s, was provided by Winfrid Franzen; see his *Martin Heidegger* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1976), pp. 74ff. For a thorough interpretation, see Jean Grondin, *Le tournant dans la pensée de Martin Heidegger* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987). For the concept of the *Kehre*, von Herrmann noted in his editor’s postscript to GA 9, Heidegger originally used the Kantian term of *Umkippung* (GA 9: 487). In the lecture course of 1925/26, we indeed find a passage in which Heidegger remarks that philosophy must always be prepared to carry out an *Umkippung* (GA 26: 269). And it may be not quite uninteresting to note that the word *Umkippung* crops up in the closing part of Oskar Becker’s notes of Heidegger’s 1919/20 lecture course, whose text has recently been published (see GA 58: 263; Becker has here Heidegger speak about the *Umkippungen des Verstehens und Anschauens*).


5. The letter is quoted by Thomas Sheehan in his “Heidegger’s Early Years: Fragments for a Philosophical Biography,” in


7. Handbooks of the history of philosophy are of course entirely justified to overlook this. For them, a philosopher is "born" when he or she first comes up with something interesting, and, incidentally, also when he or she changes his or her subsequent position conspicuously—that is, his or her previously adopted, but sufficiently significant position. A hermeneutical treatment of Heidegger's herme- neutic turn however, for good reasons, ought not to disregard this circumstance, i.e., the formation of the first significant position. The difference lies clearly in the moti- vation of the scholarly or philosophical interest; and the importance attached to motivation seems to be a fundamental ingredient of the young Heidegger's hermeneutic approach both to philosophy (and what is equivalent with this: the subject matter of philosophy) and the history of philosophy; see, e.g., GA 56/57: 40, 125ff.; GA 58: 2f., 7f., 10f., 41, 82ff., 86, 91f., 94, 98, 142, 171, 174, 185f., 237, 253ff., 263; GA 61: 39; GA 63: 43; PhA 7–8–20, 7–15–20, 7–22–20, 7–26–20; PhR 3f., 12f., 22, 24; PI 240, 253.

8. An example may be Fichte, whose turn from the position of the Wissenschaftslehre to the later "realistic" system has been widely discussed by interpreters in the past 150 years, while the fact that Fichte started out as a "dogmatic" philosopher—one who was yet to encounter Kant in order to become a "criticist," and to elaborate his own version of Kantianism in terms of a Science of Knowledge—does not seem to have been given due weight, namely as a philosophical problem sui generis; it is typically men- tioned by interpreters as a kind of biographical curiosity that is not worth, and perhaps is not even capable of, being accounted for in "rational" terms. (I have attempted to do this, i.e., to treat the zero point of Fichte’s development, in more detail in chapter one of a work in progress with the tentative title The Labyrinths of the Philosophy of Identity: German Idealism from Fichte to Hegel.) That there lies a philosophical problem in Fichte’s early adherence to Kant is shown by the fact that Fichte himself attempted to treat it at length in Book One of his Die Bestimmung des Menschen, by giving his reasons for adopting a dogmatic position, first, and then for passing from this to an idealistic one, second. See Fichtes Werke, vol. 2, ed. I. H. Fichte (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970), pp. 169–98. In a sense, the question is, as will be shown later in the text, that of passing from a non-philosophical state to a philosophical one (dogmatism is for Fichte essentially a non-philosophy [gar keine Philosophie; see Fichtes Werke, vol 1, p. 438]; and Heidegger speaks analogously about the "Unphilosophie des kritischen Realismus" [GA 58: 7], of which he had once considered himself as a follower [see, e.g., GA 1: 9f., 15, 403f, 407]; see on this point, Claudio Baglietto, "La formazione del pensiero di M. Heidegger nei suoi scritti giovanili," Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa 26 (1957): 211). See also the parallel with Hegel below.


11. Highly indicative is already the Zweiteilung von Being and Time, namely its projected design of a "systematic" Part One (whose third division was never published) and a "historical" Part Two (also never published in the form in which it was projected); see SZ 39f. It is also indicative that the published Part One already contains remarkable portions of the historical, "destructive," part, such as parts of the criticisms of Descartes, Kant and Hegel (ibid., §§19–21, §43a, §82; the confrontation with Hegel was not included in the design of Part Two).

12. E.g. GA 56/57: 29–62, 99–109 129-203 (critical analyses of contemporary conceptions of psychology, of Natorp, and of Neo-Kantian value-philosophy); GA 63: 33–47 (confrontation with the general tendency or spirit of contemporary philosophy); 52–57 (criticism of historicism); 67–77 (historical exposition and critique of phenomenology, see also GA 58: 11–24), GA 20: 13–182 (confrontation with Husserl's phenomenology), etc.

13. See, e.g., GA 56/57: 63–98 (the idea of, and sketches pertaining to, a pre-theoretical primal science); GA 58 (contains mainly sketches and elaborations of a phenomenology conceived of in terms of a science of the origins of life), GA 61: 85–155 (phenomenological description of the fundamental categories of life), GA 63: 67–83, 85–104 (preliminary exposition and outlines of a hermeneutics of facticity), GA 20: 183–442 (an alternative draft of Being and Time), BZ 12–28, PhA 238–46, etc.


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claims that, in philosophy, the “strictness” of a method lies in the degree of devotion, or dedication, to the subject matter (here: life situations). That in philosophy “method” is not equivalent to “technics” was already a thesis held by Husserl. See, e.g., Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, Husserliana vol. VI, ed. W. Biemel (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976), p. 445. Another group of such “methodological” considerations is provided by reflections centering around what Heidegger calls “formal indication,” which he takes to be the method proper of philosophy or phenomenology (see, e.g., GA 9: 9f., 29; GA 58: 248; GA 61: 20, 32ff., 60, 66f., 113, 114, 134, 141, 175; GA 63: 85; PhR 45; GA 21: 410; GA 29/30: 425). It should be added that there are significant texts not to be comprised by this sort of categorization, such as, e.g., PIA 255-69, or the whole of GA 19 (which is obviously neither a “criticism” of Plato or, still less, some early outlines of the existential analytic). But I think that it is pertinent to a good deal of the texts of the early Freiburg lecture courses.


16. See, e.g., GA 58: 139, 233 (“Phänomenologie ... mit Philosophie zusammenfällt”; “Phänomenologie ist gleichbedeutend mit Philosophie”). From his postwar period to his last years Heidegger repeatedly maintained that phenomenology was not just a philosophical “trend,” one “standpoint” among many possible others, but was, in the radicalized sense he has come to give it, equivalent to the innermost possibility of philosophy itself (see, e.g., GA 56/57: 110; GA 58: 171; GA 61: 187; GA 63: 72; PIA 247; GA 19: 9; GA 20: 184; GA 21: 32, 279f.; SZ 38; GA 24: 3; GA 29/30: 534; US 95; SD 90). Phenomenology was a possibility for Heidegger—not just something to be taken over in its actuality from someone, not even from Husserl. On the contrary: “Higher than actuality stands possibility. We can understand phenomenology only by seizing upon it as a possibility” (SZ 38; see also GA 20: 109).

17. GA 58: 1. Franz Joseph Brecht’s lecture note sounds analogously like this: “For phenomenology, the most original and decisive problem of phenomenology is phenomenology itself” (GP 10–10–19; see also GA 9: 36).

18. Questions pertaining to priority, as indicated above, seem to be out of place. In one sense, the systematic supports or precedes the historical, for it provides viewpoints, analytical (hermeneutic) devices for critically approaching the texts of the tradition. But there are at least two senses in which, conversely, the historical supports the systematic: first, the dissatisfaction with traditional approaches is the constant source or motivation for setting out on new, original, “systematic,” explorations (rather than passively accepting preceding doctrines); second, the critical remarks resulting from the confrontation of classical and contemporary texts contribute to strengthening the claims provided by the systematic inquiries. In a certain respect it may be argued—as I did above in the text—that the systematic aspect is the primary one, namely insofar as to claim that there is a certain relation between philosophy and the history of philosophy is to adopt a certain philosophical attitude (pertaining to the systematic aspect).

Several times in his early lecture courses Heidegger makes the point that the historically contingent articulation of the philosophical disciplines with respect to each other (e.g., logics, ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, philosophy of history, etc.), should not be taken over blindly, but that it should constitute an eminently philosophical issue (see GA 58: 18, 21, 28; PhA 7–26–20; PhR 24; GA 24: 3; for an anticipation, see GA 1: 208ff.). In this sense, it may be said that the relation between philosophy and the history of philosophy is a philosophical problem, pertaining to systematic philosophy.

19. This is a difficulty with which Heidegger was coping all time. His repeated insistence upon fusing the systematic aspect and the historical, upon the fusion of the two, indicates fairly well this difficulty—which is, incidentally, also ours. See, e.g., GA 56/57: 125 (“die ganze Scheidung von historisch und systematisch ... eine unechte ist”); GA 61: 110 (“eine Trennung von ’Geschichte’ und ’Systematik’”); GA 9: 36 (“das Problem des Zusammenhanges von Geschichte der Philosophie und philosophischer Systematik ... unechtes Problem ist”), etc. (all three emphases mine). For more references, see notes 10 and 11 above.

20. “We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all.” Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, 6.52.

21. Husserl’s critique of both is clearly motivated by his firm rejection of any kind of skepticism or relativism to which these tendencies seem to him to lead inevitably—see E. Husserl, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” in P. McCormick and F. A. Elliston, eds., Husserl: Shorter Works (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 185ff.—as well as by the defense of “objective validity,” “absolute validity,” “supratemporal universality,” “eternal validities” (see, e.g., ibid., pp. 186ff., 191, 195).
22. See, e.g., GA 9: 14f.; GA 58: 79, 81, 162; GA 61: 82, 117; GA 63: 69, 108. That philosophy has life as its subject matter appears clearly from SZ 46. Heidegger says here that the expression "philosophy of life" amounts to nothing more than "botany of plants" (a pleonasm), and that in a genuine "philosophy of life" "there lies an unexpressed tendency towards an understanding of Dasein," i.e., an existential analytic.


25. See GA 61: 89ff.; PIA 240.

26. See GA 61: 86f.; PIA 241, 264; for later, see GA 20: 75, 190, 416; SZ 169, 383.

27. Although in this essay I am not primarily concerned with finding anticipations of Heidegger's postwar turn in his earlier writings (proto-hermeneutic elements that I referred to in note 4), let me nevertheless indicate that in his habilitation work Heidegger already makes an important "discovery," destined to remain crucial for his postwar attempts to develop a new language and conceptuality. Much like an incidental remark, he notes at one point of his analysis of Duns Scotus: "Es muß eine eigentümliche Tatsache genannt werden, daß wir bei der Bearbeitung der unsinnlich logischen, desgleichen auch für die psychische Wirklichkeit Ausdrücke gebrauchen, die ihrem eigentlichen Gehalt nach zumeist der sinnlichen Naturwirklichkeit entnommen sind." And then he adds: "Für jene Bereiche fehlt uns oft die 'Sprache'" (GA 1: 315; the last italics are mine). This point augurs quite clearly his subsequent predicaments, i.e., the tribulations, the Sprachnot, that will accompany his attempts to elaborate an adequate hermeneutic conceptuality after the war, pointing as it does to the observation in Being and Time, according to which for a hermeneutic ontology "fehlen nicht nur meist die Worte, sondern vor allem die 'Grammatik.'" and, more specifically—paralleling the above remark in the habilitation work—to the characteristic question: "Ist es Zufall, daß die Bedeutungen zunächst und zumeist 'weltliche' sind . . . ja, so oft vorwiegend 'räumliche'?" (SZ 39, 166; both italics are mine).


30. For Heidegger's considerations on hermeneutics in his radicalized sense, and on its relation to hermeneutics in the traditional sense, see GA 63: 9ff., esp. 14f.; SZ 37f., 142ff. 148ff.; GA 20: 356ff., 415.; BZ 26. For later, see US 95f.
31. Already Husserl showed that positivism’s urge that all knowledge claims be justified by “experience” is dogmatic, self-contradictory, and indeed not at all presuppositionless. In particular, Husserl showed that this urge was a “speculative a-prioristic construction” (see Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Husserliana II/1, ed. K. Schuhmann [The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976], §19, p. 42). Sounding much like a challenge, he then provocatively stated: “Sagt ‘Positivismus’ soviel wie absolut vorurteilsfreie Gründung aller Wissenschaften auf das ‘Positive’, d.i. originär zu Erfasende, dann sind wir eben die echten Positivisten” (ibid., § 20, p. 45; see further his remark about “true positivism” in “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” p. 195, as central to his own program of philosophy; on this point, see also Ferdinand Fellmann, Gelebte Philosophie in Deutschland. Denkformen der Lebensweltphänomenologie und der kritischen Theorie [Freiburg/Munich: Alber, 1983], p. 65). Heidegger may have had passages of this sort in mind (passages to which he seems to have fully subscribed) when he claimed in a note of Being and Time (p. 50) that it was Husserl who “not only enabled us to understand once more the meaning of any genuine philosophical empiricism; he has also given us the necessary tools.” It is not difficult to see that Heidegger wholeheartedly adopted Husserl’s “empiricism,” and that what he essentially did was to hemeneutically radicalize it. The “tools” necessary for this kind of genuine empiricism were hermeneutically refined by Heidegger. Therefore, just like Husserl, Heidegger might equally (or perhaps even more than Husserl) have had reasons to claim that he was the genuine “positivist.” See the following examples quoted in the text. For the young Heidegger’s arguments against empiricism which remind us of the above-cited Husserlian considerations, see his dissertation (GA 1: 165).


33. Compare the following passage from Dewey’s Experience and Nature: “The man who has experience, as distinct from a philosopher theorizing about it, would probably say that he experienced the chair most fully not when looking at it but when meaning to sit down in it, and that he can mean to sit down in it precisely because his experience is not limited to color under specific conditions of light, and angular shape.” John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago/London: Open Court, 1926), p. 5. For some further significant parallels it will be worth while quoting some more passages by Dewey. With regard to Heidegger’s position on rationalism and irrationalism (see notes 23 and 24 above), and his understanding of phenomenology as a correct “method,” compare the following statement by Dewey: “To say that the right method is one of pointing and showing, not of meeting intellectual requirements or logical derivation from rational ideas, does not, although it is non-rational, imply a preference for irrationality.” Dewey insists further on “accepting what is found in good faith and without discount,” and calls it a “doctrine of humility” (ibid., 11f., my italics). It is interesting to note that in 1919-20 Heidegger calls the attitude of genuine phenomenological method humilitatis animi (GA 58: 23). For Dewey’s reservations on „hankering after ultimate ‘sense-data’“ and the exaggeration of “mathematical logistic,” see ibid., 13. Dewey’s warning that “not all philosophies have assumed that reflective experience, with logic as its norm, is the standard for experiential, religious, esthetic, industrial, social objects” (p. 16) reminds us of Heidegger’s Lask-like claims of this sort (see note 34).

34. See, e.g., GA 61: 83, 92, 121; PIA 249f.; PhA 7–20–1920; GA 20: 179. This is probably, in part, a Laskan influence. See his Gesammelte Schriften, ed. E. Herrigel (Tübingen: Mohr, 1923), vol. 2, pp. 203ff., vol. 3, pp. 235; and further Heidegger GA 56/57: 59 (Heidegger claims here that the predominance of the theoretical is shown by the very fact that it is customary to speak about ethical, artistic, religious “truths”), 87f. (in speaking about the unjustified predominance of the theoretical within the essentially untheoretical spheres, Heidegger explicitly names Lask).

35. See, e.g., GA 58: 45f., 57ff. (esp. p. 59, where Heidegger expresses his conviction “daß das faktische Leben und seine Welt irgendwie im Selbstleben zentrieren kann . . . daß das faktische Leben in einer merkwürdigen
Zugespitztheit auf die Selbstwelt gelegt, erfahren und dementsprechend auch historisch verstanden werden kann)." (Christianity is shown as a paradigm for the rise of the Selbstwelt), 63 ("Das Leben als faktisches zentriert in gewisser Weise jeweilig in einer Selbstwelt"), 85f. ("ob nicht die Selbstwelten als solche möglicher Gegenstandsgebiet einer Wissenschaft sein können; "Ist die Selbstwelt wissenschaftlich erfahrbar und zwar nicht als diese oder jene, sondern hinsichtlich ihrer allgemeinen Bestimmungen": allusions to, and anticipatory deliberations of, the object area which the subsequent existential analytic will elaborate). 89 ("Die erkenntnismaßige Bemachtigung der Selbstwelt ist lange Zeit beherrscht von metaphysischen und vor allem religiösen Motiven" [themes to turn up several times later; see SZ 48ff.; GA 63: 21ff.]), 93ff., 178 ("Wie ist im Ausgang von den nichtwissenschaftlichen Erfahrungen innerhalb der Selbstwelt ... eine objektive Wissenschaft von der Selbstwelt möglich?"); 206 ("Nicht nur bei den bedeutenden Persönlichkeiten hat die Selbstwelt diese besondere funktionale Tendenz, sondern jedes seelische Leben lebt in irgendeiner Art zentriert in einem Selbst"); 207ff., 221, 227, 232, etc. Later the term Selbstwelt is gradually pushed into the background (see, e.g. GA 61: 94ff.; GA 63: 102; PIA 240), and will merge into the term "facticity" (see PIA 246), and subsequently, into Jemeinigkeit and In-der Welt-sein in Being and Time. For a criticism of this term, see GA 20: 333. For a self-criticism concerning the term Selbstwelt, see GA 20: 333.

36. See PIA 241f.; SZ 21.

37. Only the grammatical subject of the self-concealment must change from "life" to "being" in order for us to have the later Heidegger's characteristic position on the self-retreat of Being. But perhaps we do not even have to wait for that long, for in the 1923 lecture course we can read an interesting passage allowing for exactly this to be the case: "Sollte es sich nun herausstellen, daß es zum Seinscharakter des Seins, das Gegenstand der Philosophie ist, gehört: zu sein in der Weise des Sich-verdeckens und Sich-verschleierns—und zwar nicht akzessorisch, sondern seinem Seinscharakter nach" (GA 63: 76; italics in original). Of course, Heidegger here does not yet proceed to draw exactly the conclusion he will some time later; on the contrary, in the face of this matter-of-fact, he hopes to uncover being (just as in SZ 35) by means of the concept of phenomenon interpreted in a radically phenomenological sense. Accordingly, Heidegger completes the sentence in 1923 as follows: "dann wird es eigentlich ernst mit der Kategorie Phänomen"—while he could have gone on with this sentence some decades later approximately like this: "wobei geleistet wird, daß das Denken das Sein gerade in seinem Sich-entziehen und Sich-verdecken zum Vorschein bringt."


39. PIA 243 (I have adopted Michael Baur's translation, p. 365).

40. See, e.g., GA 58: 62ff.; 205: GA 61: 93, 120; PhA 7–20–1920; PhR 41.

41. See, e.g., PIA 263 (with regard to Aristotle); PhA 7–20–1920 ("Verrwissenschaftlichung des ganzen Menschheitslebens"); GA 20: 220. This perspective is still present in SZ; see 58ff., 62.

42. These are words taken from Being and Time (SZ 236, see ibid., 243), with regard to Dasein's wholeness as well as death, the case being pretty much the same, namely, in the sense, that what we intend to grasp, but are not able to, is always already there, even though it is "provisionally and occasionally inaccessible to one's own experience" (ibid., 243).

43. See, e.g., GA 58: 20; GA 61; 123; PIA 243; GA 20: 210.

44. SZ 11. See GA 20: 416.

45. "Secure objectivity is indeed an insecure flight from facticity" (GA 61: 90); "to meditate about universal validity is to misunderstand the fundamental meaning of facticity" (ibid. 87; see also p. 99 where facticity is said to be the "main matter in philosophy"). See further, on the connection of the emergence of science out of the tendency of life to gain stability, GA 61: 122. The same holds for theoretically oriented philosophies (GA 63: 63ff.). The whole theme is extensively treated, regarding Descartes and Husserl, in the recently published GA 17; see in particular 197, 213ff., 284, 289.

46. The relation of hermeneutics to facticity is not such, Heidegger explains in 1923 (see GA 63: 15), that facticity is the "object" of hermeneutics, and it is just a matter of grasping this object adequately. Hermeneutics (or interpretation) is rather a way of being, pertaining to facticity itself, so that, if we define the latter as the "object" of hermeneutics, hermeneutics itself is affected intrinsically with regard to its "object." Heidegger brings forward an analogy concerning the relationship between plants and botany, as if a particular conception of botany effected the being of plants; one way of understanding what Heidegger has in mind is that, if hermeneutics possesses facticity as an "object," it has tacitly changed its relation to it (see in this regard the characterization of existence as a kind of "busi-

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ness procedure” in *Being and Time* (SZ 294)). If one interprets one’s facticity as an “object” one has already adopted a particular attitude with regard to one’s facticity itself, and thereby modified it intrinsically. Analogously, see SZ 8 regarding the being-question: “Here what is asked about has an essential pertinence to the inquiry itself,” as well as the new concept of philosophy (SZ 38).


48. Particularly characteristic in this sense is a passage of WS 1921/22. Concerned as it is with the problem of delimiting the real “object” of philosophy (Gegenstandsbestimmung der Philosophie), called, tentatively, *Existenz, Faktizität, Seinsinn des faktischen Lebens*, etc. (all belonging to the simultaneous aspects), it comes eventually to the realization that, as a genuine beginning of philosophy, one would have to come to terms with one’s own past in the first place (historical aspect), i.e., to understand “wie in dem überhaupt angefangen und vorgegriffen wurde, was als griechische Philosophie wurde und als solche in verschiedenen Umbildungen und Verdeckungen im heutigen geistigen Dasein ausdrücklich oder versteckt nachwirkt.” This is necessary because “es ist Grundaufgabe, einen genuinen Zugang zu[r] Gegenständlichkeit zu gewinnen” (GA 61: 170f.). This “object,” i.e., life, has already been claimed to be “historical” in 1919 (GA 56/57: 117; see also ibid., p. 125, where Heidegger speaks of the “absolute unity” of “phenomenology and historical method” in [the service of] the “purity of understanding life in and for itself”).

49. See, e.g., GA 20: 147, 178, 180ff.; GA 29/30: 64; GA 32: 196. Heidegger typically considers it an arrogance to reject the tradition, and does not dedicate this argument further attention (see, e.g., GA 56/57: 17f.).

50. “Die Hermeneutik bewerkstelligt ihre Aufgabe nur auf dem Wege der Destruktion.” Conversely, “‘destruction’ is hermeneutic violence,” for “hermeneutics means interpretation . . . but interpretation—because it is the work of falling Dasein—must always be a forceful setting-free (Frei-legung) of the matter to be understood which counters Daseins’s own tendency to fall and take the easy way out.” John D. Caputo, *Radical Hermeneutics. Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 63.

51. Compare what is going on when an assertion becomes a “predication” (SZ 155).

52. In a sense, Heidegger seems to fully subscribe to Kant’s claim that it is impossible to learn philosophy by studying past philosophers (unless historically), but that, at best, it is possible to learn to philosophize. See GA 61: 43, and Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 837 = B 865, and Kant, *Logik. Ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen*, in Kant, *Werkausgabe*, ed. W. Weischedel (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), vol. 6, pp. 448ff. Heidegger would of course add that it is possible to learn philosophy from the texts of past dead philosophers—or better, undertake a critical confrontation with them, enter into a fruitful dialogue with them—precisely to the extent to which we have a pre-understanding of the Sache, i.e., what those texts are about. But if we suspend or extinguish the pre-understanding there remains really nothing more than what also Kant called merely historical (or subjective) knowledge.

53. “Das, was [die Griechen] machten, nicht übernehmen, sondern eigentümlich verstehen!”, see further ibid., 170.

54. An example of inauthentic traditionalism is for Heidegger the contemporary call for a “resurrection of metaphysics” (*Auferstehung der Metaphysik*, the title of a book by Peter Wust published in 1920); see GA 1: 415; GA 63: 20; GA 56/57: 9; PhA 6–17–1920; GA 19: 256; SZ 2, 21f. It is plausible that Heidegger derived his Being-question partly from the impulse given by this endeavor of the age—endeavor which he was of course to recognize as superficial and inauthentic, as is shown, e.g., by the very first lines of §1 of SZ. See also GA 19: 256, where he calls the endeavor of this *Auferstehung a Schwachsinn*. In this regard see also, among others, his frequent, explicit or implicit, critical remarks and quips on Nicolai Hartmann’s attempts to renew “metaphysics,” in GA 61: 5, SZ 59, 208; GA 9: 133f.; GA 26: 190; GA 65: 94, 205. Heidegger’s attempt to pose the Being-question anew may be seen (according to his own self-interpertation) as an authentic response to this call of the age. On the two ways of adhering to the tradition, discussed above, see also GA 19: 411ff.; GA 45: 32ff., 39.

55. See GA 56/57: 87, 101, 109, 111; GA 58: 146, 229ff., 254, 262; GA 61: 173; GA 63: 71. See also the observation in his Kassel lectures: “Es gehört aber zum Sinn der Phänomenologischen Forschung, sich immer wieder auf sich selbst zu besinnen” (WDF 176).

56. See SZ 385, but the term occurs already in the title of the first paragraph. For an early occurrence, see GA 61: 80 (“‘repetition’: everything turns on its meaning”), see also

57. Situation-centeredness is of course also history-centeredness. Claiming that “the science of the origins is ultimately the hermeneutical science” (GA 58: 55 [‘Ursprungwissenschaft letztlich die hermeneutische ist’]), Heidegger also makes the point that Ursprungwissenschaft is historische Wissenschaft. For Heidegger’s concept of das Historische in his early lecture courses, see GA 9: 31, 32f., 36, 38; GA 56/57: 85, 88f., 117, 206; GA 58: 252, 256 (at the last two places the term is Geschichte); GA 61: 1, 76, 111, 159, 163; GA 63: 83, 107; PIA 144; PhR, passim. See also “the first principle of hermeneutics” in BZ 26, directed clearly against historicism. Generally, it may be said that Heidegger works out his all important concept of das Historische in his early lecture courses in sheer opposition to historicism, the main critical suggestion being that historicism strives for an “objective” knowledge of history (an impossible aim), rather than for an authentic historical “being” of man—and that the first not so much promotes the second but instead suppresses it. The term das Historische will be replaced in Being and Time by das Geschichtliche, viz. Geschichtlichkeit. For later, see the distinction between geschichtliche und historische Wahrheit in GA 39: 144ff., viz., that between historische Betrachtung and geschichtliche Besinnung in GA 45: 34ff., 49ff., 88ff. Further see also GA 45: 11ff., 40, 201; GA 65: 32f., 151f.

58. See GA 63: 18; PIA 238; PhA 5–6–1920, PhR 31; K 28f. See now WDF 175.

59. One of his main efforts is directed, Heidegger says explicitly in 1919, to revive and reanimate the great thinkers of the tradition: Plato, Kant, Hegel (GA 58: 2).

60. See GA 61: 132, 153, 160, 178; GA 63: 15; PhA 7–26–1920; PhR 5, 10; PIA 243, 245.

61. See GA 58: 27 (it is questionable “ob überhaupt ein Ursprungsgebiet des Lebens zugänglich wird. . . . Das Gegenstandsbereich der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie muß also immer wieder neu gesucht, die Zugänge immer neu geöffnet werden. Das liegt nicht in einem zufällig, historisch vielleicht unvollkommenen Zustand der Philosophie, sondern in ihr selbst”), 29, 203. See also GA 63: 56; GA 26: 13f. (first philosophy is not a firm possession, but a science that has to be searched for; it is attained only insofar as it is looked for anew again and again: “Gesucht werden zu müssen, gehört zum Wesen dieser Wissenschaft”). For later, see, e.g., GA 45: 5; GA 65: 17, 80.


63. This point is given much prominence in John D. Caputo’s Radical Hermeneutics (see pp. 1ff., and passim), who even centers his concept of “radical hermeneutics” around this aspect: “it is the claim of radical hermeneutics,” he writes, “that we get the best results by yielding to the difficulty ... not by trying to cover it over” (ibid., p. 7). On this point, see now also Heidegger’s explicit elucidation in PIA 238. See also GA 58: 221, and for later, e.g., GA 3: 291; EM 9; GA 65: 45.

64. The procedure followed thus far in unfolding the reciprocal conditionality of the positive and the negative aspects of Heidegger’s postwar thinking was to select different philosophical themes within the horizon opened up by Heidegger’s hermeneutic turn, to show how these are related to each other, and to close gradually in on the origin in concentric circles, as it were; thereby we have been moving towards the center from within this horizon. Our attention was directed towards the structure or structuring of the horizon shaped by the turn. By contrast, what we want to understand now concerns the coming-to-pass or the emergence of the horizon itself, rather than the original belonging-together in it (or in its center) of specific features.


66. Beginners of this sort have, therefore, a peculiar tendency to question about beginnings, e.g., the beginnings of all things, reluctant as they are to accept what is being handed down as self-evident (selbstverständlich). That philosophy must concentrate on what appears as self-evident (selbstverständlich) in natural thinking—or that philosophy must even be able to see a kind of mystery in this alleged self-evidence—was already central to Husserl’s thinking; see, e.g., Die Idee der Phänomenologie, Husserliana, vol. II, ed. W. Biemel (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), p. 19 (“Die Erkenntnis, im natürlichen Denken die allerselbstverständlichste Sache, steht mit einem Mal als Mysterium da”); Die Krise, pp. 183f. (“Von vornherein lebt der Phänomenologe in der Paradoxie, das Selbstverständliche als fraglich, als rätselhaft ansehen zu müssen und hinfert kein anderes wissenschaftliches Thema haben

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zu können als dieses"), etc. Beginners of this sort do occasionally also tend to perceive the beginning as the greatest—perhaps the greatest of all things to come (see, e.g., SUR 12; EM 12, 145; GA 5: 64, 327; GA 34: 15; GA 45: 110, 114; GA 65: 57; GA 51: 15). I use the term “beginning” here in the sense of Anfang, not of Beginn (for this distinction, see GA 39: 1f.; GA 54: 9f.).

67. See Heidegger's remarks about the intimate interconnection of teaching and learning (WD 50: "Lernen heißt: lernen lassen... Der Lehrer muß es vermögen, belehrbar zu sein als die Lehrlinge"), viz., of knowing, learning and questioning (EM 17: to know means being able to learn, to be able to learn means being able to ask questions; see also GA 51: 13). See on this point, Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 4th ed., p. 253: "Offenheit für die Meinung des anderen... wird gefordert... Wer einen Text verstehen will, ist... bereit, sich von ihm etwas sagen zu lassen."


70. In Heidegger this may be seen, e.g., in the preparation of the other beginning (der andere Anfang).


72. See also the oscillations as to whether or not phenomenology (as a pre-science in his sense), or hermeneutics, pertain to philosophy at all. In GA 63: 20 he claims that hermeneutics itself is not philosophy, and in his lecture on the concept of time he claims that his considerations are not philosophical, but belong rather to a kind of pre-science (BZ 6). Conversely, phenomenology is claimed to be more than a mere pre-science in, e.g., GA 20: 108, PIA 247; GA 24: 3. Phenomenology, together with hermeneutics (i.e., hermeneutics of facticity, soon to be called existen
tial analytic), are then claimed not only to belong to philosophy in Being and Time, but, as "universal phenome
nological ontology," even to exhaust the concept of philosophy in its entirety (SZ 38; see also GA 60: 22). On his not having a philosophy, see now also GA 59: 191; GA 17: 1, 276.

73. See Bernhard Casper, "Martin Heidegger und die Theol

74. See GA 61: 53: "Philosophieren ist... ein Verhalten."

75. "Zurückweisen zu" should clearly be translated by a more violent term than the rather neutral or passive "retreat towards," adopted by the English translator (see PIA 246, viz., the English trans., note 2, p. 393). For the same term, see also GA 63: 18 ("Philosophie ist die im faktischen Leben selbst seidende Weise des Erkennens, in der fakti
tisches Dasein sich rücksichtslos zu sich selbst zurückreißt").

76. On the relationship of Nietzsche, religiosity, atheism, Christianity, and Gottlosigkeit, see SUR 13; GA 43: 191; GA 44: 69f.; GA 5: 213ff.—I dedicate more attention to the analysis and interpretation of these problems in my essay "Heidegger's Understanding of the Atheism of Phi
losophy. Philosophy, Theology, and Religion in his Early Lecture Courses up to Being and Time," American Catho

77. "Rein auf sich gestellt"; compare GA 61: 197: "Philoso
phie muß in ihrer radikalen, sich auf sich selbst stellenden Fraglichkeit prinzipiell a-theistisch sein." (The first em
phasis is mine). See also GA 63: 18 (Philosophie ist die... Weise des Erkennens, in der faktisches Dasein sich... auf sich selbst stellt" [italics mine]).

78. Over against inauthentic forms of religiosity, Heidegger made repeated efforts to recuperate a genuine kind of religiosity in terms of his philosophy. See, e.g., the thesis that the questioners (die Fragenden) are the genuine be
lievers in GA 65: 12 (see also ibid., 369), and the famous saying: "questioning is the piety of thinking" ("Die Frage nach der Technik," in VA 40). This is also the implicit suggestion of his conceiving of a-theism in seinsgeschicht
lieh terms in GA 54: 166, claiming that a-theism, correctly understood, is nothing else but the oblivion of being: to

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call this oblivion to mind would then be a kind of counter
movement to this *seinsgeschichtlich* kind of a-theism.

79. Perfectly in line with this basic attitude is the way Heidegger comes to define phenomenology. This means "to grasp its objects in such a way that everything about them which is up for discussion must be treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating it directly." Phenomenological method has for Heidegger primarily a "sense of prohibition—the avoidance of characterizing anything without such demonstration" (SZ 35).

80. See Heidegger's use, in 1921–1922, of the coupling *ursprüngliche Neuaneignung* (GA 61: 115). See further his urge to go back to the Greeks, ibid., p. 170.

81. Gadamer and some early disciples were apparently unhappy to see the radicality of the early hermeneutics being neutralized through its coupling with a "scholastic" tradition. For one of the first, characteristically vague, occurrences of this theme, see GA 61: 58ff.

82. It is also significant that the topos of "preparation" is constantly present on Heidegger's path of thinking (obviously, with a variety of connotations). What it comes down to, we can read in the early lecture course of WS 1919/20, is the "Vorbereitung der Situation philosophischen Verständens, eine Weckung der Disposition, um das philosophische Erfassen frei werden zu lassen" (GA 58: 136; see also GA 61: 72). A characteristic passage from the second half of the thirties goes like this: "Philosophie [ist] jetzt zuerst Vorbereitung der Philosophie" (GA 65: 421), and in the Spiegel Interview, given in 1966, he still speaks about the *Vorbereitung der Bereitschaft*, probably because, as he says in an article published in 1969, "die Revolution der Denkart, die dem Menschen bevorstellt, ist noch nicht vorbereitet": the thinking of Being lives (according to another article, published in 1959) only in reservations (GR in *Antwort* 101; DE 152, 84). — For *Übergang* in the early lecture course, see, e.g., GA 61: 46. In the period of the *Beiträge*, *Übergang* is one of the main themes (see, e.g. GA 65: 4f., 76, 114, 144, 171, 177, 186, 227ff., 309 ("Vorbereitung des Übergangs in eine andere Geschichte des Menschen"), 423, 430, 458; see also GA 45: 125, 133, 184, 190, 215; GA 47: 295, etc.), and, as to the sixties, Heidegger closes the Spiegel Interview by speaking about the "schmalen und wenig weit reichenden Stegen eines Überganges" (GR in *Antwort* 111).

83. Whereby in the thinking of "Heidegger II," that of the *seinsgeschichtlich* project of the "other beginning," the theme of "destruction" (as well as that of repetition-appropriation) will turn up again, or, better, will be itself "repeated," or "retrieved." The other beginning, Heidegger says characteristically in the *Beiträge*, does not reject the first one, nor does it "sublate" it, but rather turns back to it (GA 65: 187). See also GA 65: 185 ("Der Einsprung in den anderen Anfang ist der Rückgang in den ersten und umgekehrt"), 504, and, in particular, 468: "der Versuch zur ursprünglicheren Seinsfrage zugleich sein muß eine wesentlichere Aneignung der Geschichte der Metaphysik. Aber dieses Beides zu einigen bezw. von Grund aus schon in Einem zu haben: das Anfangen im ganz Anderen und die alles bisherige historische Beschaften wesentlich übertreffende Treue zur Geschichte des ersten Anfangs... das ist für die Gewohnheit der Historie und der Systematik so befremdlich, daß sie sich gar nicht einfallen lassen, Solches könnte gefordert sein. (Was anderes aber will die phänomenologische Destruktion?)". (The first and last italics are mine.) See also GA 9: 417: "Dieser Weg zur Antwort auf unsere Frage ist kein Bruch mit der Geschichte keine Verleugnung der Geschichte, sondern eine Aneignung und Verwandlung des Überliefer ten. Solche Aneignung der Geschichte ist mit dem Titel 'Destruktion' gemeint... Destruktion bedeutet nicht Zerstören, sondern Abbau, Abtragen und Aufdie-Seite-stellen—nämlich die nur historischen Aussagen über die Geschichte der Philosophie. Destruktion heißt: unser Orhöffnen, freimachen für das, was sich uns in der Überlieferung als Sein des Seienden zuspricht." (What is Philosophy? trans. W. Kluback, J. T. Wilde [Albany: NCUP, 1956], pp. 70ff.: "This path to the answer to our question is not a break with history, no repudiation of history, but is an appropriation and transformation of what has been handed down to us. Such an appropriation of history is meant by the term "destruction."... Destruction does not mean destroying but dismantling, liquidating, putting to one side the merely historical assertions about the history of philosophy. Destruction means—to open our ears, to make ourselves free for what speaks to us in tradition as the Being of being" [translation slightly modified].) For the term "ursprünglichere Wiederholung," see GA 65: 475.—For the way Heidegger views the relation of his project of "destruction" in his first period to the conceptuality and comportment of the *seinsgeschichtlich* one, see also GA 65: 221.

85. This was of course not to come about, even if the later attempts at an overcoming of metaphysics, and of philosophy as such, in the name of a “thinking” claimed to be more original, try somehow to catch up with this failure.—The above interpretation may be confined by Heidegger’s famous retrospective account about his theological origins, without which he claims he would never have come onto the path of thinking, i.e., philosophy (US 96). He adds there that “Herkunft bleibt stets Zukunft,” and this, in the present context, allows the interpretation that not only his becoming a philosopher was conditioned by theological motives, but that those very motives might some day let him cease being a philosopher (or free him from having to be a philosopher) and let him become a theologian again—namely, after the new age has been born. However, it can be reasonably doubted whether there is a way back from philosophy to theology. See Th. C. W. Oudemans, “Heidegger’s ‘logische Untersuchungen,’” Heidegger Studies 6 (1990): 96.

ABBREVIATIONS OF HEIDEGER’S WORKS CITED


GR “Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten.” Spiegel-Gespräch mit Martin Heidegger; originally published in Der Spiegel 30 (May 31, 1976), quoted above from G. Neske, E.


For the abbreviations of the student transcripts referred to, see note 2 above.

ELTE University, H-1364 Budapest, Hungary

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SPATIALITY, TEMPORALITY, AND THE PROBLEM OF FOUNDATION IN BEING AND TIME

Yoko Arisaka

One of the crucial moves in Heidegger’s project of “fundamental ontology” occurs at the onset of Division Two of Being and Time, where he affirms that the content of the first half of the book—Being-in-the-world—is itself founded on temporality. Heideggerian scholars generally agree that Heidegger later abandoned this foundational approach. However, a clear account of the reasons for this change of focus is still a matter of dispute. Was it an external consideration, or was it a tension within the theory itself?

This essay argues that an aspect of the problem that later led Heidegger to abandon the earlier project can be found already within the theoretical framework of Being and Time. I will highlight this tension by closely evaluating the connection between the first and the second divisions of Being and Time, focusing on a particular foundational relation—that of space and time—which Heidegger discusses explicitly in Section 70. The space-time relation is chosen as an example, since Heidegger’s notion of spatiality is one of the central structural components of Being-in-the-world. The space-time relation, moreover, is one that continued to concern Heidegger for the next forty years: In his 1962 lecture “Time and Being,” he admits that “the attempt in Being and Time, section 70, to derive human spatiality from temporality is untenable” (OTB 23). Why did he change his mind? A careful analysis of Being and Time will show that to found space in time, Heidegger would have to abandon his whole phenomenological framework.

The problem can be stated in terms of Heidegger’s distinction between what he calls the “equiprimordial” (gleichursprunglich) relation and the “foundational” relation. These are two alternative ways in which we can think about the relation between space and time. While Heidegger argues that the space-time relation is foundational, I argue that it must be considered equipri-


tordial. Let me begin by explaining what I take the distinction to be in Heidegger.

A.) Equiprimordiality: If X and Y are equiprimordial, then they are equally basic (primordial) and mutually interdependent. They pick out different aspects within a unified, integrally connected whole, and one cannot exist without the other. This is a non-hierarchical relation. Neither term is more basic than the other. For Heidegger, since we are mutually interdependent with the others and things with which we interact, Dasein and “world” are equiprimordial constituents of Being-in-the-world.

B.) Foundation: If X supervenes on Y, then X is founded on Y. For example, dreams presuppose perception which supplies its content, so dreams are said to be founded on perception, or perception is said to be founding for dreams. The relation is hierarchical in the sense that the content of dreams depends on perception, but not vice versa. This relation is also expressed in terms of conditions; if Y founds X, then Y is the condition for X. In order for X and Y to stand in such a relation of dependence, the two terms must share some features, yet one of the terms must have additional features that constitute the hierarchy. Heidegger is most concerned with relations of ontological dependence: the possibility of the mode of existence of X depends on the mode of existence of Y, in which Y contains some ontological features above and beyond X. For example, since representations supervene on Being-in-the-world, Vorhandenheit is a founded mode of existence in this ontological sense. His foundational project, at least as he conceived it at the outset of Being and Time, was to provide the ultimate basis for ontology.

Heidegger’s Theory of Space

Heidegger distinguishes three different types of space: world-space, regions (Gegend), and Dasein’s spatiality. What Heidegger calls