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Motto:

*Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall.
Humpty Dumpty had a great fall.
All the King's horses and all the king's men
Couldn't put Humpty Dumpty in his place again.*

(Lewis Carroll: *Through the Looking Glass, Humpty Dumpty*)¹

'Humpty dumpty'

Globalization Issues Illustrated by Local Self-Government Development

Lewis Carroll's well-known character lives in a unique world of his own. He sits and speaks on top of a wall self-importantly. Alice is listening to him amazed, singing the little rhyme chosen for our motto. In a certain context, as if reflected by a distorting mirror, all Humpty Dumpty says has logic. When, however, that logic crumbles, the stout man falls off the wall, and his rationale can no longer be reconstructed. The post-communist countries undergoing political transition were provided Western European patterns for establishing their democratic systems and market economy. Donor countries did consider the implications of globalization and potential integration. Yet, it was the individual countries themselves who had to, or ought to have taken into consideration the implications of their own social context which is more or less resistant to the received models. The same also applies to many other subsystems regarding local government functions and structures. The present study enumerates the limitations of the received models in the diverse regions of the post communist block. We will see that the quality of the adaptation attitude can generate fundamental errors.

1. CONCEPTS AND METHODS

Countries attempting to catch up with the rest of the world are fairly familiar with the above dilemma. Basically, following a pattern is the main issue, which is both a must and a need at the same time. *Globalisation* is the term used for the prevalent course of development² in the unifying international context nowadays, serving as the basis of comparison. The notion certainly has several levels. Economic and commercial globalization has a broader meaning than the world trade evolved by the 19th century. Currently, it no longer denotes the expansion of nation states, rather that of multi-national companies, whose comprehensive interests submit even state institutions. No wonder, since their scale exceeds that of medium sized states. In a conference the profitability of telecommunication companies was illustrated in comparison with the GNP of Ghana, the latter only being rated on an equal scale with medium rate multi-national companies. Hungary would also be disqualified in a race involving larger multinational companies. It is not even the revenue any more, but the influence that matters. World trade interests truly submit national regulations, even norm systems. The rules of law, of behaviour and faith

² Trends separating the different types of capitalism are less able to penetrate common talk, which trends also demonstrate the various routes of political transition. (Szelényi, 2004).

do in fact conform, or are at least bound to conform to uniform competition requirements. Economic and commercial globalisation increasingly requires uniform societies.

What does that actually imply? In the thematic context of globalisation, being the subject of the present study, there is an increasing urge for expansion and uniformity regarding all significant community subsystems of modernisation. This statement is true even if certain boundaries are being drawn. Large economic world organizations of course primarily advocate the unification of economic institutional systems. The example of European integration, however, clearly shows that the new community concept does manage to break ground for itself in a far wider context. The term Single European Area is commonly used in the context of the media, of higher education or for that matter, in public administration. According to our starting point, expansion does not only apply to European integration, but also to the whole process and scope of globalisation.

Now we are going to examine the common pattern (or rather the pattern regarded to be common) of *local governmental development* embodied in the logic of modernization, which is, as we all know, not a mandatory course to take in Europe, or outside, although an advisable one. As in a restaurant one need not necessarily order the chef's special offer, though it is common knowledge among regulars, especially in cosy, provincial restaurants that one is better-off taking the good advice. In this respect, then, local government development does by far not only concern local governments, but rather a complex civilization-bound phenomenon, whereby the evolution of local administration is only one of many aspects.

Civilisations are historically evolved paradigms which can be defined by their choice of value systems and way of living³. Individual civilisations and globalisation may conflict, and they do conflict, as is clearly indicated by current events. This conflict concerns all objects of civilisation, thereby truly reflecting that conflict. The organisation of local societies is under the pressure both of the trend regarded common and of the demands of the given civilisation.

As it is generally true for the social level, so also the uniform development of local govern-

ment demands is due to economic globalisation. Does determination also imply a certain chronological order? In the present case, therefore, does the increasing dynamism of market economy inevitably precede and induce the radical reorganization of institutions? Well, in transitional societies of our times, quite the contrary is taking place. Our starting statement, the factual ground for which will later on be expounded, concerned *reverse chronological order*. Thus, establishing a new institutional system will only be successful, if it comes to be realized while crisis prevails. An economic context in the phase of consolidation has a larger stake in conserving existing structures and relations. The adaptation attempt of civil local government systems in post-communist countries truly reflects this phenomenon. Furthermore, it also reflects another element, inasmuch as the failure of adaptation does not yet result in dead end development, routes linked to other civilisations still remain open.

As a factual basis for the analysis of the issue, we have used descriptions including the transformation of local administration systems in post-communist countries. We could primarily build on the three thick volumes⁴ written along uniform principles implemented by the program office called the *Open Society Institute's "Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative" (LGI)*⁵. Besides, we have utilised other comparative publications of LGI, in a complementary way: the *National Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe (NISPAcee)* conference volumes and finally to a smaller extent also parts of the Council of Europe documents contain system descriptions. As a complementary method we have applied the method of statistical data analysis.

2. GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Globalization is mainly an economic and world trade phenomenon. It means more than world trade, since world trade took shape a long time ago. Globalization also implies the liberalized free movement of goods and capital, fur-

⁴ Horváth, 2000; Kandeva, 2001; Munteanu and Popa, 2001.

⁵ The research director and program manager in one person was Gábor Péteri.

¹ Carroll, 1993: 180

thermore the forming and functioning of the institutional system aiming to secure that free movement. (see: Kolodko, 2002:21.). It is the international and "supranational" factors and also the adjusted structural elements of individual states and societies that enable the uniform operation of the basic market economy. Beyond that, globalization is a context of relations and in various senses. It is a relationship between developed and developing countries and also countries undergoing political transition inasmuch as they export the economic and social conditions of Western countries. On the other hand they spread market relations to other areas of human life, like the natural environment and community life.

It is exactly the relations nature of the phenomenon which results in conflicts. International integration organizations regarded to be the disciples of globalization have long been criticized for their homogenizing schematizing philosophy, which is insensitive to national, historical and environmental characteristics and tries to enforce the same patterns in all parts of the world in an aggressive way, regardless the damaging, sometimes specifically destructive impacts of their 'magic spells'. (Stiglitz, 2003.) It would, nevertheless be mistaken to blame solely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for this policy. In fact it is an ideology (Rupert, 2000), which deeply penetrates the thinking and interests of the developed world, whose roots reach as far back as Marx, Gramsci, and which culminates in neo-liberalism in the modern age. The ideological and attached aspirations have led both to achievements and failure. As far as our study is concerned, it is less the philosophical context than this ideology's impact on economics which is worthy of our attention.

Governmental issues of globalization related to certain themes of public administration have been brought to the forefront of attention (Nye, 2000), on the one hand, in the context of clearly defined overall conflicts, such as in world trade, security policy, the warming of the atmosphere, etc., on the other, almost all administration areas are facing globalization problems, and the set of instruments required for managing them are in the process of development as for instance in the military, telecommunication, cultural and environment management sectors. Conflicts may arise between the individual areas as well, even in an acrimonious manner. An example of

this is the developing of comprehensive system requirements for environmental sustainability which ever increasingly counters world trade globalization.

Globalization is an issue in the context of the public administration reform as well. According to a survey involving 123 countries, the following main topical fields were determined as common goals in reforms (Kamarck, 2000):

- decentralization
- privatization
- decreasing the further expansion of the public sector
- public sector reform
- information technology
- the reform of financial and budgetary management.

And from here it is only one step further to integrate into the scope of globalisation a large part of the movements targeted at thoroughly transforming the so called New Public Management⁶, administration organizational and governmental activities. This philosophy should clearly be distinguished from the more widely spread one, recognizing common features solely in Western development (Batley and Stoker, 1991; Stewart and Stoker, 1995; Montin, 2000; John, 2001 and others). Even though the common features and circumstances meant to be spread are of remarkable similarity, the domains of interpretation are significantly diverse.

The extrapolation of the process of new management, governance, of becoming more European, and of other related tendencies to the world may appear a little exaggerated. Anyhow, there should be awareness of the fact that the shaping and conduct of trade policy is an integral part or even condition of trade transformation. This is substantially supported by the IMF's loan policy, which obviously not accidentally favoured governmental reforms, especially in the form of transferring political support, which cannot be measured by financial means. Why so? An explanation is provided by a basic statement concerning governance as defined in the literature on globalisation, interpreting good governance as an element of sound economic development induced by economic competition (Kamarck, 2000: 233), which in turn has been induced by global economic

⁶ New Public Management (NPM)

competition. However, no parallel should necessarily be drawn between the two phenomena: between economic transition and the shaping of the whole of governmental policy. The counter-example of modern China illustrates that the economic effects of globalization within a huge market, and also regarding their outside influences are enormous – whereas a government reform applying the western pattern was not to be implemented simply due to the lack of political reform. No chronological order or determination can be presumed either. The pattern based development of a given country is not necessarily initiated by economic, but by political changes. And when economic changes have become prevalent, political transition will not take the same course, or may even be blocked. The socially interpreted territorial context of global economy can be of various types, and let us face it, not necessarily political democracy.

Our statement to be tested within this context is as follows: *Civic state organizational reforms, and within that civic self-government itself form an integral part of western social development and are closely tied to it. The question can be raised whether the results and values taking shape there can be turned into a basic demand for other regions, or even more so for other civilizations.*

What could be the conclusion drawn from the above statement? Not taking the decisive significance of this relationship into consideration, the larger half of the world is forced to accept a false rhetoric: they ought to display pattern following values in the hope of certain advantages, whose adaptability to their own civilisations is doubtful, if not outright contrary to them. Applying such force is never expedient. It creates misconceptions at both ends. Not to mention that experience shows that pressure might end in real violence.

Local government reforms especially in countries undergoing political transition form a part of governmental globalisation. We are trying to trace back in what developmental phase changes reach the critical mass, in other words when substantial changes occur, how those are connected to getting over the transformational economic crisis, whether there is any connection at all? Eventually, drawing the final conclusions from all the afore mentioned: Is a kind of pattern pursuance process taking place in countries undergoing political transition? Or more exactly, what is generally meant by 'following

or pursuing a pattern' or the reproduction of a western type model? To be able to establish this, we will first have to summarize what the western type local government development pattern actually implies.

3. THE WESTERN TYPE LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT MODEL

Many kinds of territorial self-governments have evolved throughout history. Ancient Greek city states already operated in this form for free men. In the Middle Ages feudal society had ever so many kinds of self-government, such as village communities of serfs, councils elected by guildsmen and merchants in free royal cities, or the county assemblies of the landed gentry. The later civic self-government was however distinct from these inasmuch as it was established along the lines of legally formalized equality on the territorial level, the ranking role of inherited privileges having disappeared. It was no longer the noble or civic origin that innately determined a person's local affiliation. Wealth, the amount of the tax paid did have an impact on the extent of political rights. Furthermore, franchise was rather segregational to start with, excluding women, and large numbers of the homeless, etc. Still, this kind of distinction was a great progress in comparison with the birth-related distinction of earlier times. Even more so, since in earlier phases of urban development, the process of obtaining and extending legal equality was a relatively constant process in developed countries from the beginning of the 19th century to the first third of the 20th century.

Local self-governments in the modern sense were first in operation in civic society. Their basis was provided by legal equality in the legal sense, which Marxists termed formal legal equality, acknowledging the historical significance of the process. This structure was the prerequisite for market economy. For capitalist production the abandonment of naturally evolved communities and the feudal society was inevitable. Equality in the legal sense could be the sole basis for self-government entrenched with public legal guarantees. The organisational structure of municipal and territorial communities was thereby fundamentally modernized. Civic self-government therefore cannot be isolated from market economy in its evolution and operation. Taking the top-to-bottom

office structure as the starting point of our study and not the independence of decision-making will bring us to the same conclusion. According to Max Weber, bureaucracy is an element of market economy and not its contrary. (Gajduschek, 2003:704-705). In his *Protestant Ethics* he already explains in his preface that the fundament of western capitalism lies in rationality. In other words, the modern characteristics of office functioning are just as much the conditions of capitalist production as the institutions of political power (Gajduschek, 2003:709). No doubt the same applies equally to the local-territorial context and to the national level. We may even risk the following statement: When nation states creating unified markets were in the process of formation, a corresponding structure was that of the local self-government with its similarly formalized, specifically political nature.

Let us proceed from the stage of formation. A market economy context is an inevitable condition for the western type local self-government model and not only at its formation but also in the course of its operation. The following elements are vital:

(a) functioning in the context of the constitutional state,

(b) state territoriality,

(c) guaranteed resources,

(d) a certain extent of economic and political stability.

a) It is the constitutional state which can for the first time secure a definite measure of independence based on the territorial principle. In pre-capitalist models the question of separateness was not a real issue, since the whole of the state was constructed of these units, so to say in an unaggregated manner. The *power branch* of the constitutional state, however, is no longer organized along affiliation to birth or origin related circles and communities, but along the basic functions of a large organization controlling society. Territorial self-governments embody a way of exercising executive power, which in due course will act independently, i.e. its legal safeguards are secured even against state administration. The authority for exercising sovereignty rests in the people, who exercise this power generally through direct elections on the territorial level, including municipalities. Therefore, the context of constitutionality is a prerequisite both for the manner of authorization and for exercising the right.

b) The territorial organization of the nation state, its *territoriality*, is also the production of modern times. The distinguishing feature is that now the focal points are the units of the state, and not reversely, as previously used to be, the hierarchical chain gradually built up from economic (production) communities. And since self-sufficient communities organizing their own production and way of living cease to exist, the free individual can become Leviathan's partner. That is exactly the essence of civic self-government, i.e. that its territorial units are the communities of individuals, and their territoriality implies being parts of the whole. In tribal societies, individuals could only identify themselves as members of the tribe, having no other choice. Were they expelled they became pariahs. And the people then was nothing but an alliance of "essential" tribes. The summary of the land possessed by the tribes made up the territory of the state. Even when there massive central power ruled, the organizational principle implying that territoriality was purely a spatial equivalent of the social hierarchy, and remained unaltered throughout historical ages up to the end of the feudal age. It was the emergence of the nation state which was the first break-through in the sense that territoriality got to be regarded as an independent concept in itself.

d) In connection to the afore-mentioned we can also state another condition of self-government. A certain measure of economic and political *stability* is also necessary for genuine functioning. In a certain sense this is a condition for the above mentioned criteria, too, since constitutionality and guaranteed resources hardly exist in a state of civil war. It is, however, also true, at least theoretically, that the possibility of constitutionality and guaranteed resources cannot be ruled out even in that case by all certainty. In general, however, a certain level of stability is required for a genuine and efficient operation of local and territorial governments, for the genuine exercising of functions, decision making and enforcement.

Consequently, where the basic criteria (points a-d) are not realized in practice, no "European" self-government can be in operation. Let us take a few examples, first of all those of Islamic countries. Mostly, although not in all cases, there is no constitutional state. What is almost always missing, at least by western standard, is territoriality. Resulting from the philosophy of the Islam, the essence of their policy is to consider the isolating nature of territoriality as relative. This is even true

in the context of states. Kuwait's invasion in 1990 by Iraq could only be vaguely understood by a European mind. Considering Islam as a territorial unity, the violation of state sovereignty may have appeared an event of lesser gravity in the aggressor's mind. Or let us consider the states of Central Asia. They are often termed states "based on tribal societies" in western literature. Although this interpretation is questionable, especially, as far as post-Soviet states are concerned in the region, they cannot be considered as constitutional states, and market economy has neither become prevalent. This, among other factors and consequences, does influence the development of the local-territorial institutional structure, at least to the extent that the implementation of reforms following the political transition is progressing in a delayed rather reluctant manner. Additionally, as for the Western-Balkans (former Yugoslavia and Albania), it is mainly the absence of political stability, and the escalation of national and ethnic conflicts to civil wars, which have caused the lack of reforms, as well as other reform deficit, too, in the region.

In other words: the diversity of community norms cannot be ignored when considering reform attempts of self-government. What is more, the response of public power is also bound to be different, for which the actual reactions occurring in practice are telltale signs. Retaliation against a suicide bomber (the demolition of the family's home) cannot be interpreted under European law, since the death of the perpetrator is a reason for excluding culpability. It would also be absurd to require a crowd celebrating a family event with shooting to produce licences for carrying arms, while it is also unacceptable to regard them, by the standards of another civilisation, a fighting squad and eliminate them by a helicopter attack. Furthermore, community rights are exercised obviously broadly differently, which is well illustrated by the radically different concept of women's role in society (Ingelhart and Norris, 2003). Such distinction of genders, aside from many others, makes even the launching of the establishment of civil self-government forms plainly impossible⁷. Obviously, in this context, the

⁷ Not that the civil age have always been based on the fundaments of gender equality. The franchise of women only became universal in the 20th century and even the concept of virility only disappeared gradually. However, in European civilisation, the distinction did not rest on essential religious, world-view concepts.

role of local communities, compared to that of families or religions is much less emphasized. In summary, therefore, the context of civilization cannot be ignored. Hence, the Western-European development pattern, regarding the local-territorial context, cannot be generic.

4. FOLLOWING A PATTERN

Although the western pattern is not a general one, all seem to be delighted to jump on this band wagon. Their choice is of course perfectly justifiable, and it is not purely slavish imitation. Support and acceptance can be gained when taking appropriate advice. Leading world trade organizations of globalisation communicate the criteria. It is worth pointing out some of them: the North-Atlantic Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU). We do not mention here the targeted programs, which might actually have the greatest direct impact in developing and transitional countries.

Recommendations concern public administration too, also including the system of local territorial administration. From among the main organizations affecting this circle the following deserve our attention: the World Bank, several programs of the IMF for developing and transitional regions, the Council of Europe, the EU policies (Horváth, 2000a), the development strategy and support policy of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)⁸. Often there are programs running also outside "the sphere of operation", like the West-Balkans support programs of the Union. The direct and indirect impact of projects inciting to progress cannot be underestimated. The one we would here like to highlight is one adopted by the Council of Europe, the European Charter of Local Self Government, setting the minimum standard for self-government development. The document is a treaty by form, issued on October 15th 1985 in Strasbourg. In its content it lays down the basic requirements of self-government according to the

⁸ We deliberately do not list here the various international local government interest groups, whose influence can also be considerable.

European model. The signing countries undertake to incorporate the criteria into their own laws. Since then 42 countries have adopted the document⁹. Among them are the former socialist Central-Eastern-European countries in full number, including those in the Balkans; some of the Commonwealth of Independent States: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Armenia and the Ukraine, the Balkan states, the successor states of Yugoslavia. It is common knowledge at the same time that the contents of the document serve as the norm for other Central-Asian countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States in professional and policy disputes.

The Charter provides for regulatory principles, operational terms, financial resources and safeguards for legal practice concerning local self-government.

a) From the scope of *safeguarding principles* it emphasizes that the basic powers and responsibilities of local authorities shall be prescribed by the constitution or by statute. Councils or assemblies shall be composed of members directly elected by the citizens. These representative bodies shall exercise the basic competences.

b) Within the scope of *operational conditions* changes in local authority boundaries shall not be made without prior consultation of the local communities concerned. Local authorities shall be able to determine their own internal administrative structures and recruit their own staff. They shall allow for appropriate financial compensation for expenses incurred. Any administrative supervision of decisions and rulings within the administrative structure may only be exercised according to such procedures and in such cases as are provided for by the legal remedies act.

c) With regards to the *financial resources* of local authority operation, local authorities shall be entitled to adequate financial resources of their own commensurate with their responsibilities, part at least of which shall derive from local taxes and charges. Financially weaker local authorities are entitled to complementary support based on financial equalisation procedures. As far as possible, grants to local authorities shall be in a lump sum, shall not be earmarked for the financing of specific projects, thereby not removing the basic freedom of lo-

⁹ Chart of signatures and ratifications, 2007

cal elected authorities to exercise policy discretion.

d) *Legal protection of local self-government rights* shall be secured on the one hand by local self-government interest groups possessing the necessary licences. On the other hand local self-governments shall have the right of recourse to a judicial remedy as realized in the division of power between the power branches.

The extent to which the Charter has been adopted by countries varies. Not all member states signed the treaty immediately. Furthermore, signing has not always been followed by a successful ratification, which may indicate the presence of political resistance, a will to decentralise as opposed to government decision. A successful ratification, however, seems to be always followed by becoming effective, only being a matter of time. There is also a third level of variance: a difference in the extent of submitting oneself to various individual articles of the Charter, for which the declaration does leave room, to a certain degree. When browsing the ratification list, certain facts are striking: Ireland signed the treaty only within 12, whereas Switzerland only within 19 years of issuance. From among those immediately signing it, Belgium needed another 19 and France another 22 years for ratifying the agreement. However, Albania, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Macedonia and the Ukraine "kept the right rhythm" in signing, ratifying and putting it into practice. Moreover, they did not even opt out of any of its provisions. The "local government major powers", the United Kingdom, Sweden, Holland, Italy, Germany, Denmark and Austria, however, did exercise the right of opting out. Hence, the newcomers appear to be more bent on following the western model than the model-setters themselves.

Within the *European Union* acceding countries declaredly and naturally sign up to following a pattern. This requirement concerning the state structure is mainly specified by the principles regarding the European Administrative Space. Even more important may be, however, regulations provided for by statute, stipulating the essence and practice of competences which constitute an integral part of the *acquis communautaire*. Most important may be the regulations on arranging public services, for which local self-government role is decisive.

Nevertheless, the *acquis communautaire*, European community law, builds on the principle

of subsidiarity, so unification only occurs when the issue cannot be settled on a lower level. Therefore, member state characteristics will always retain their significance, also in creating the organizational structure of local self-governments. The fact that no universal patterns exist has been thereby acknowledged. All seems to be in order as far as the crux of the matter is concerned. The source of the problem here too, like with the Charter, lies more in the pattern followers. Due to the regulators, they seem to be less able to think in terms of alternatives, than the model countries. This is best illustrated by the recent creation of regional administration systems. Newcomers and future members are both aiming to construct institutional structures that would ensure maximum benefits when utilizing Structural Funds.

The lure is attractive indeed, and they do submit regional mechanism to that aim. Complying with a pattern creates the model itself, even if only for an imaginary object, since the imaginary goal is heterogeneous in reality. Regulations themselves can no doubt be blamed, but the process can still take a rather unusual course.

After all, the pattern itself is not even so uniform as neophyte followers make it appear in their own true or imagined interest. Under such circumstances, how successful can such transformational routes may be? Even though this question may be of interest regarding the EU, we will postpone dealing with this rather delicate matter in the absence of historical experience. The global approach studied so far can be better matched by an overview and assessment of routes the large groups of countries undergoing political transition have taken. Let us now study certain overall contents and the framework of the western local self-government development pattern as followed by all the transitional countries.

5. TRANSFORMATIONAL ROUTES

The first group of countries we are going to examine is those, having acceded to the European Union May 1st 2004. Let us call them *Eastern-Central-European countries*¹⁰, also including in our geographic historical concept the Baltic states. The next group is that of *former socialist states of the Balkan*. Apart from the former Yugoslavia and Albania, nowadays so often considered a West-Balkan seat of war, Bulgaria and

Romania also belong here. (Slovenia, however has been classified as a member of the previous group.) Finally, the third block is constituted of members of the *Commonwealth of Independent States*, i.e. successor states of the former Soviet Union, with the exception of the Baltic states. Hereby, we will have to distinguish the Russian Federation from other Eastern-European member states, and also from the other Central-Asian successor states.

5.1. Countries acceding to the European Union

In the acceding countries certain similarity of the routes of the political transition undertaken is their massive commitment to the western development model. A proof of this commitment is their EU membership. In the development process of the 90s various intergovernmental and international programs underpinning public administration (Phare, US AID, British Know How Fund, WB programs, Soros Foundations OSI, the GIPA and SAPARD support programs of the EU) tried to emphasize the conditions and potentials of pattern pursuance. In order to be able to roughly interpret the overall outcome, we will have to examine the time gap in which local self-government changes took place in relation to the political transition. The year of declaring independence is also of considerable importance, for six of the eight countries were fully newly constructed. Municipal elections can be interpreted this time closely linked to the constitutional structure taking shape. Another basis of comparison for studying local self-government reorganisation can be the lowest point of economic recession, since transitional countries underwent a substantial transformation of the economic structures, and also severe production crises owing to social changes. These crises surpassed, even in their slightest form, the shock of the Great Economic Depression in 1929, as far as the drop in GDP is concerned. The transformational decline, also had external causes at the same time (Kolodko, 2002:57.)¹¹

¹⁰ A little bit extended, but basically following Jenő Szűcs' interpretation. (Szűcs, 1983)

¹¹ Significant one of these were the collapse of the Soviet Union, and later the monetary crisis in Russia (1998-99); the changes in the prices of raw materials all throughout this time, and the various regional wars.

Table 1

The basic circumstances of creating local self-government systems in countries of the former Eastern block, acceding to the EU in 2004

Country	Time of political transition	Time of obtaining independence	Local government system's		Time of the lowest level of economic recession year: (GDP*, 1989 = 100%)
			formal change	first** genuine change	
1. Czech Rep.	1989-90	Jan. 1. st. 1993	the same	Sept. 1990	1992 (86,9);1993 (86,9)
2. Estonia	1990	Aug. 1991	Nov. 1989	June 1993	1994 (63,7)
3. Poland	1989-90	-	the same	March 1990	1991 (82,2)
4. Latvia	1990	May 1991	Febr. 1990	1991-92	1995 (54,1)
5. Lithuania	1990	Febr. 1991	Febr. 1990	1993-94	1994 (54,3)
6. Hungary	1989-90	-	the same	August 1990	1993 (81,9)
7. Slovakia	1989-90	Jan. 1. st 1993	the same	Sept. 1990	1993 (75,1)
8. Slovenia	1990	June 1991	1991	1993	1992 (79,1)

Source: Based on Horváth, 2000 (HMT); GDP-figures: ECE, 2003:112; Ágh, 1998; Dexia, 2003

*Hear and in the following tables: real GDP/NMP (gross domestic product/national revenue), at an unaltered price, in percentage.

**Generally, comprehensive genuine changes occur in several phases; the only exception in this respect was Hungary. The second phase concerned basically the regional level and mergers and also the functional settlement. Other comprehensive reforms came into effect in the Czech Republic, 2000, Estonia, 1995, Poland, 2004, Latvia, 2003-04, Lithuania, 2001, Slovakia, 2002.

In the table we used separate boxes for the "formal" and "genuine" changes of national local self-government systems. The former applies to the adoption of new laws for municipalities and to the declaration of the new system replacing the Soviet type councils. Compared to this "genuine" change is the legislation that results in deep-going changes in the institutional system. In Eastern-Central-European countries these two points of time were mostly the same, or were at least very close to each other. This means that the political transition processes were more or less uniform. The social and governmental processes of the transition reached the local context at more or less the same time. The

integral relationship is well illustrated by how it was related to the economic crisis. The lowest level of the recession was always preceded by the political transition, inclusive the real starting point of the establishing process of self-governments. Hence, the political transition is supposedly linked to economic reforms, not separable from them, its effects being beyond questioning.

Naturally, all countries are different. For instance, in certain cases one leap was enough for genuine change (Poland, Hungary, the then existing Czechoslovakia), in others several ones were needed. The Hungarian act of 1990 illustrates the one-phase radical change, while in

other cases bargaining took longer. By now, even the memory of the "big leap" in Hungary has worn out considerably. It is no longer so highly valued, knowing that the corrections required have not been implemented. The numbers and dates may even provide cause for justifiable further argument. As a basis for establishing an assessment we provide a description of the forming of the systems (Horváth, 2000), which we have tried to check upon from various sources.

Consequently, we conclude that in this group of countries the political transition was fairly compact. Their own economic development could not serve as the basis for change, since the transformation of the institutional system was in the process of changing. The question of how to overcome the crisis was still a matter of daily importance. Finding a connection between following the western pattern, as for the adoption of institutions of market economies and democracies, and the maturing phase of this adaptation, regarding the economy and the political institutional system seems to be justified. Political changes, local self-government changes inclusive, did become implemented despite the confusing turns in the maturing process of the new system, which is a good sign, even though it does not guarantee immunity against faltering. Now let us compare this fast-test of pattern pursuance with the test outcomes of the other two country groups.

Before the reader sat back to relax at this point, depending on his temper, or even contrarily, startled back seeing that surprisingly all is in order in this region, we can reassure them that the author would never dare to risk such a statement, not even in the state of severe illness. It is simply a matter of simplification, *determining a basis for comparison, which will only help mark the place of the systems in relation to one another* –

and not their assessment. More precise statements concerning pattern observance in this region will be made in view of the comparative assessment later on.

5.2. The former socialist countries in the Balkans

The destruction of the Mostar Bridge in 1993 was symbolic. What had been a symbol of connection before now turned into one of division. Destroying the bridge marked the irreversible division of the city into Croatian and Bosnian parts. Local society was going to be divided just as much as the state itself. The Bosnian Croatian state as well as the state formation of Bosnian Serbs striving for independence were aspiring for ethnic homogeneity in the multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina. Reconciliation failed both in the city and country-wide. At the site of shooting at the bridge a huge cross has been erected in the Croatian part of the city¹², which is a clear indication of the fact that it is not only nationalities but civilisations that clash there. As Huntington, 2002, points out, the Balkans is traditionally at the crossroads of Christian, Muslim and Orthodox traditions. In Bosnia the three clashed shatteringly. The political transition was crossed strangely by independence movements, spilling over into wars. Political and military conflicts flared up in various parts of the region in several waves. According to Table 2 this was a great obstacle to local government development.

¹² András G. Gergely: Mostar regains its old bridge. Reconciliation still has not occurred 10 years after the destruction. *Népszabadság*, August, 6th 2003 p. 7. The rebuilt bridge was inaugurated on July 25th 2004.

Table 2

The basic circumstances of creating local self-government systems in the former Eastern block countries in the Balkans

Country	Time of political transition	Recently obtained independence	Military / armed political crisis	Local self-government system's		The lowest level point of the economic recession: year (GDP, 1989 = 100%)
				formal changes	genuine changes	
Albania	1991	-	-	1992	2000	1992 (60,1)
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1990-91	1991 and 1995 (Dayton)	1992-95	-	1999 után	1993-1994* (%:?)
Bulgaria	1990	-	-	1991	1998	1997 (68,2)
Croatia	1990-91	1991	1991-95	the same	1992-93	1993 (59,5)
Macedonia	1991	1991	2001	the same	1995 (then: 2002)	1995 (70,8)
Romania	1990	-	1989-1990	1991	1996 (then: 2001)	1992 (75,0)
Serbia	1990	1992	1991-	1999	2002	1993 (40,6)
Montenegro	1990	2006		[1999]		[1993]
Kosovo	1990	[1992]	1998-1999	[2001]	2003 (UNMIK)	no data

Source: Based on Kandeve, 2001 (HMT); GDP-data: ECE, 2003:112; Furthermore: Ágh, 1998.; Sevic, 2003.

*Transition report, 2003:56

As with state development, also the local government process tumbled. The formal change of the system is sharply distinct from the creation of sufficiently applicable institutions. The context of war naturally did not favour the democratic transition of local power structures. At the same time, genuine legislation was postponed so long that meanwhile even the recovery from the economic crisis could commence. Even though the turning points of economic development do follow a consolidation phase, still they precede the deep-going institutional change. We can therefore conclude that development can really start on a certain course, even on that of market economy, it can be launched and even be stabilized – even in the absence of new type institutional reforms.

The West and the EU played contradictory roles in consolidation attempts. They were hesitantly wavering between the logical models of

Europeanisation in Kosovo, Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia. Their role can be described along the following variations (Noutcheva, 2003):

a) According to the *common state model* the European Union is supposed to openly and clearly support more integrated formations, thereby upholding the rest of the status quo. Therefore, secession attempts should not be encouraged (Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonian Albanians, etc.), since it would lead to the further unforeseeable escalation of the conflicts, not to mention that creating stability in the Balkans would be hopeless. An unintended effect of this policy, however, is that it would weaken the internal support for the international community, since this solution would not be favoured by minorities fighting for their rights.

b) *Neutrality in conflicts* is also a tacit support of more unified forms and an expression of the reluctance to recognize smaller entities. This

policy will only delay the solution of festering conflicts, and will actually empower separatist forces, so would only result in a contrary result.

c) *The hesitant support of disintegration*, i.e. the recognition of new entities, is the expression of reproach by denying these countries the option of acceding to the EU. An advantage of this policy is the emphasis of the right of self-government. A disadvantage is the danger of high expenses and the risk of the further escalation of the problem.

All the here enumerated solutions weigh outcomes with respect to the Union's interests. It is difficult to harmonize them with otherwise preferred principles. Similar dilemmas have to be faced both on the state and the local government levels. On the state level it is a dilemma of unified vs. neutral forms, whereas on the local governments level it is a dilemma of unified regional local government vs. the ethnically based organization of local governments. The multiethnic solutions encouraged by the West cannot handle civilisation-based differences. It is interesting, however, that Tito's socialism was able to achieve that at his time. Let us take as one example of the afore-mentioned the requirements issued by a special envoy of the UN Secretary General at the end of 2003 concerning Kosovo, which were set as the conditions for negotiations on Kosovo's status¹³. They clearly advocate European legal and state organisational standards. Regarding the transitional institutions of national local self-government communities, detailed criteria are laid down on fair elections, the rule of law, respecting liberties, the transparency of finances.

Kosovo standards approved by the UN Security Council (December 10th 2003):

a) Sub-headings of the document:

- I. Functioning democratic institutions
 - Elections
 - The media and civil society
- II. Rule of law
 - Equality before the law
 - Economic and financial crimes
- III. The freedom of organization
 - The right of free assembly (also ethnic)
 - Free use of language

IV. Ensuring the rights of minorities and their right of resettlement

Minority rights

The support of resettlers and guaranteeing their individual and collective rights

V. Economy (conditions for a competitive market economy)

VI. Property rights

The protection of private property

Preserving the cultural heritage

VII. Dialogue on a national and regional level

VIII. Kosovo Civil Protection Body

b) A few details from the criteria:

- The public service shall be professional, impartial and accountable, representing all communities of Kosovo, including a defined proportion of women.

- Women shall be represented in the local government institutions of their national communities, at least proportionately with their number; their interests shall be represented in the policies and rules of the institutions.

- The Council of Europe's recommendations for decentralization shall be examined and will be considered as goals to achieve in establishing the functional structures of local governments.

- Each national community shall be fairly represented in the judicial, prosecution service and police personnel.

- Each national community can freely exercise their social, religious and cultural traditions, including the attendance at ceremonies and visits at shrines.

- Public officials belonging to ethnic minorities shall be able to perform their work in areas populated by other ethnic majorities.

- Ministerial and local official documents shall have to be translated into all official languages in due course of time.

- The members of all national communities shall have to be granted the opportunity to be involved in the economic, political and cultural life of Kosovo.

The details quoted in the above box illustrate that the compliance with European standards is sharply in contrast with the characteristics of the concrete context of local civilisation. The Council of Europe model, for instance will certainly not be appropriate for a non-multi-ethnic but autonomy-based objective. The extended role of women in conducting public affairs or the civilisation neutrality of public officials is

¹³ December 10th 2003 Pristina. Source: CEPS Europa South-East Monitor. Issue 50, November / December 2003. Centre for European Policy Studies, website: www.ceps.be

hard to interpret in view of the Muslim community-based thinking. However, it is an important issue to decide whether it is expedient and possible to seek a solution solely by favouring common formal legal equality when national conflicts go hand in hand with distinct civilisation-based separation. As we saw when outlining European strategic alternatives, they were cut along the very same pattern. And the kind of tailor here commissioned does not consider any other cuts.

Overcoming difficulties is not simply a matter of following dictated behaviour patterns, as was clearly indicated by further acts of violence occurring during the crisis following the issuing of the document, early 2004. In addition, the adoption and formal application of the criteria by no means 'cure' the roots of the conflicts. The way this country group conformed to the pattern was much clumsier than in the Eastern-Central-European region. The western model was less directly adaptable here. The conditions for functioning could only be created by overcoming far greater difficulties. The Western-European treatment offered under the name "democratic solution", is not the perfect solution and is neither applicable in all instances. Not even if those having an immediate interest in receiving the funds are inclined to create this image. The Mostar Bridge can be rebuilt from Western funding, but reconstructed relationships are unfortunately not easily imported.

5.3. Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States

The Commonwealth of Independent States has in effect been in existence since 1992. In the previous one or two years the former member republics of the Soviet Union declared their independence one by one. At the same time the

process of reorganisation was commenced both on state and local levels. Modernization played an especially unique role thereby. During the first phase, the changes implemented in institutions were purely of a technical nature, though essential for the functioning of the power mechanism. Such were these measures:

- The "executive commission" type bodies functioning as the presidium of elected bodies and entitled to making general decisions between two sessions were abolished.

- The function of the lord mayor and similar functions and positions were created.

- Free municipal elections were held, basically within the framework of the corrected but sustained institutional system.

The new system and the new or newly authorized representatives, officials started their activity fundamentally in the old framework. Of course, even that required legislation and the amendment of the constitution. That is what we mean by important, however, in an institutional sense only formal-legal changes of the system. The deep-going systemic transition, the new structure underpinned by organisational, functional and operational conditions could only evolve as the outcome of a long process. This phase stretched out much longer than in the Eastern-Central-European group of countries; and the delay was not exclusively due to mainly local war conflicts, like in case of Western-Balkan states. Although armed conflicts did strike major parts of these countries for some period, still that was not the sole and most decisive reason for the slow pace. The crisis itself was grave, as is clearly illustrated by the data on the recession. In Table 3 one can find the data for the armed crises following the declarations of independence, the low points of the economic recession and in relation to them the time of the formal and "genuine" changes in local government transition, with data on the legislative process, like milestones of a route.

Table 3
Basic circumstances of the creation of local government system in the former Soviet successor states (CIS)

Country	Recently acquired independence	Armed military political crisis	Local government system's		The lowest level of the economic recession: year (GDP, 1989 = 100%)
			formal changes	genuine changes	
Aserbajdschan	Oct 1991	-	-	1999	1995 (37,0)
Beloruss	1990	1995-96	1991	-	1995 (63,9)
Georgia	1990-91	1992-; 2003-	Jan. 1991	Oct. 1997, 2005	1994 (23,4)
Kazachstan	1991	-	Febr. 1991	Jan. 2001	1995 (60,8)
Kirgizistan	1990	March 2005	1994	1999-2001	1995 (53,1)
Moldavia	1991	1992-93	-	Dec. 1998	1999 (33,2)
Russia	[March 1992]*	-	1991	-	1999 (55,7)
Armenia	Sept. 1991	1991- May 1994	-	July 1996-1998	1993 (44,3)
Tadzjikistan	Sept. 1991	1992-94	Febr. 1991	-	1996 (29,8)
Turkmenistan	1991	-	1993	-	1997 (60,7)
Ukraine	end of 1990	Nov. 2004	1990 and 1992	May 1997; Dec. 2004	1999 (39,3)
Usbeghistan	Sept. 1991	2005	1993	1999	1995 (80,5)

Source: Based on Munteanu and Popa, 2001 (HMT); GDP-data: ECE, 2003:112.; Csaba, 2005: 67-69.; http://lgi.osi.hu/country_datasheet.php (unloaded 2007.07.10).

* The new federation treaty of the Russian Federation

The deep-going reorganization of the local government system took place well after the beginning of the economic growth. The proportions show that the crisis was virtually beyond comprehension from a European point of view. The turn of the trend was clearly connected to the emergence of market economy. At the same time, this refers to the unusual circumstance that institutional changes did not have to be or could no longer be postponed until commencing market economy processes. The new competition environment was also operational in the absence of a certain part of the political-institutional safeguards. Naturally, not exactly the same way, as if its own development could have taken place in due course.

This 'own type development' has also some special qualities. Patterns also exist with regards to changes in the various political institutions, just like when creating the conditions for the economic competition. Let us take the Rus-

sian Federation as an example. The Local Government Act of 1991¹⁴ was created on the federation level, in all respects in accordance with the Local Government Charter of the Council of Europe. There was no fault in the adoption, in the degree of elaboration from a legal aspect, except one point¹⁵, which authorizes the constitutions and acts of the republics of the federation for further regulations. Do not forget, however, that the state adopting the document is the Russian Federation ratifying it in 1999, and not its member countries. The authorization for further regulations removes the obstacles from watering up local government rights. Various government levels can freely limit local authority licences, can impose new obligations on them without the financial resources being secured

¹⁴ Zakon rossijskoi sovetskoi federativnoi sotsialititscheskoi respublik, July 6th 1991

¹⁵ Article 3

(Danielan, 2002:95). Such a constitutional state can also be the source of further abuses.

Proceeding with our examination, we find social and historical reasons, inherently contrary to the civic local government model, which is well illustrated by the management of the offices in local government in the current framework. Three models can be separated in the Commonwealth of Independent States: the executive commission, the gubernator's and the people's representative models. *The executive commission model* (especially in the states lying in Europe) retains the presidential managing body, preserving the organization of the Soviet council. *The gubernator's model* represents one-person leadership over the executive body, as accepted in the local administration of other states, hinting at the centralization in tsarist times. *The people's representative model* is typical for Central-Asian countries in various degrees. The classic Soviet principle of the unity of power is manifested here, uniquely similarly to the unified internal order of village communities, whose alignment to the territorial network of the strong and extensive presidential power structure is uniformly ensured. New local government systems, when established, do respect traditional forms to a certain extent what even the Soviet system never wanted to erase. Such a representational council is the *Usbeg makhalla*, the *Kazach maslahat*, the *Kirgiz kenesh*, the *Turkmehn gengesh*. Regarding their origins they are the same kind of tribal forms that were preserved by the village community *obsčina*, just like the system of *kolchoses* taking its place in the 20s of the last century – without any transitional period. Consequently, in vain do we look for the indispensable private ownership traditions serving as the basis for the western local government pattern, even though western support funds favour such circumstances for the conditions of funding, and this is what experts trained abroad will bring home as a model. The willingness of Internal Asian transitional countries to follow the European (!) Local Government Charter shows their clear public administration commitment.

A further deep-rooted limitation of pattern observance can be recognized in the context of civilisation. This is what *Kovryga and Moonley, 2004* hint at in connection with decentralization attempts in the Ukraine. Already the references

to the above historical traditions show the significance of traditions besides those of the Soviet Union. Huntington's classification in the 90s assigns the countries of the region to the Orthodox religion and the majority of those in the Internal-Asian¹⁶ region to the Islam. The concept of the individual in neither groups resembles that of the Western type, so after so much reasoning there is no need for further explaining that their ideas and goals concerning regional local self-governments are bound to be different, too. This is true, even if, with regards to the Islam, it would be totally wrong to assume uniformity. Within one given civilisation, tensions may culminate in a certain developmental stage, just as much as with various civilisations in question. *Modestov* quotes Fukuyama in this respect: the Islam is nowadays in such a geopolitical state, as Christianity was in the 17th century, at the time of the thirty-year-war. It is not only a clash with other civilisations, but also severe internal tensions and differences that characterize it. The most heated one of them is perhaps the shiita-sunita conflict at the moment. Hence, this is a good example for managing the significance of the diverse Internal-Asian traditions within their own context. For our topic other traditions of the Islam are also important, since family relations, clans¹⁷, the head of the family living in the countryside and elders play such significant roles in holding communities together which can be associated with certain forms of self-government, but certainly not those of the European tradition. Assessments, value systems are fundamentally diverse in this respect. Let us take only a few examples: the custom of mutual gift giving, "corruption"¹⁸ and the use of violence are all considered and judged differently by the various civilisations. What is corruption in one tradition may be no more than the system of returning gifts in another; the rule of clans can be considered as a framework for large family organisations, etc. Of course, terrorism, as a unique product of globalisation fatalistically blends the "denial cultures" of various civilisations. Therefore, civilisation-based differences cannot be peacefully reconciled, only be tolerated *at the most*.

¹⁶ According to *Modestov, 2003*: 122-125 47% of Kazakhstan's population, while 75% of the Kirgiz, 75% of the Tadžik, 89% of the Turkmens and 88% of the Usbeg belongs to the Islam.

¹⁷ See: about the influences of clans in Uzbekistan: *Pashkum, 203*: 11-13

¹⁸ See: about the connection between corruption and tradition in Kirgizistan: *Abazov, 2004*

If we have earlier made the statement that the transformational development of market economy had started before the new political institutional system model was formulated, then we are justified to presume that the further development will proceed without the maturing of the institutional structure, but that the two processes will surely no longer strengthen each other with sufficient interference. Furthermore, if the stability of market economy is already guaranteed (e.g. the protection of privatisation and of the monopolistic interest), the influential interest groups will cease to advocate a further, broader and deeper democratisation of the political institutional system. This circumstance will slow down or even halt the local government development process, and may divert its course from economic unfolding. And if all that is true for the whole of the state structure, i.e. safeguarding means are not provided for, then in the long run one must count with an eastern type transformation of the competition context. In other words: one must count with the prospect that there will not be an organic link to Western-European institutions, which are obviously the outcome of a specific civilisation. It follows that pressing on with such a model, or outwardly pursuing it cannot lead to substantial results.

6. THE SUMMARY OF THE THREE TRANSITIONAL MODELS

The local self-government development in Eastern-Central European countries which have acceded to the Union is relatively pattern pursuant. In the beginning, the formal minimum of changes was immediately complemented by a standardizing institutional reform. Market economy transition took place simultaneously and took off considerably after the institutional reform. The local formations of the democratic institutional structure could only become consolidated on this fundament. As to the *countries in the Balkans*, the formal minimum of changes could not be followed by a genuine reorganization of institutions, since wars interfered repeatedly, for shorter or longer periods. The military crisis led to an economic low point, in certain cases to collapse. Recovery commenced sooner in the economic sector. The point of inflection of growth a little or much precedes the effectual institutional establishment despite the war inflicted delay. This chronologi-

cal order more or less applies to non-Western-Balkans countries as well. The scenarios in individual countries, however, significantly differ. As a whole, we can describe this model as *reluctantly pattern-pursuant*. Finally, the *other successor states of the former Soviet Union* clearly do not follow the *Western pattern*, despite their rhetoric and appearances. A turning point in the economic development followed the formal changes only by a long delay, but always significantly preceding the deep-going institutional changes, whose massive influence is questionable even so. The consolidation of market economy preceding the forming of democratic institutions may have a delaying effect on the development of structures, too. Namely, actors of the private sector may lose their interest in furthering the political transition.

The difference between the three groups is not only of quality but also of extent. Regarding the severity of the economic crises, the low points of recession vary between the following limits in relation to the last value preceding GDP transition:

- in acceding Eastern-Central-European countries: 87-54%
- in the transitional countries of the Balkans: 75-41%
- in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States: 81-23%

The degrees of recession in the various country groups vary, though severe without exception, and even further degrees of gravity beyond expectations are also detectable. As we could see, recession and economic lagging behind are interrelated. Beyond that, however, a further connection can be established regarding the quality of civilisations in the Huntingtonian sense. The diverse Balkans region shows resistance of a lesser and combined kind, the Eastern-European and Internal-Asian regions show a more obvious and homogeneous resistance to Western traditions.

An important aspect of pursuing the local self-government model is what the political institutional development context and the degree of stability of market economy is, basically based on private property. The capacity for adopting the model is also influenced by the context of civilisation. Local self-government values are confronted with the traditions of state and community organizations, their locally applied methods, common life-styles and well established social relationships.

7. CONCLUSIONS

The comparative analysis of the transitional process illustrates that *the territorially organised local government system of the civil state is only totally in accordance with Western civilisation*. In the framework of the economic, commercial and interrelated institutional globalisation this model and the basic elements of the system are being exported, similarly to other forms of social organisation. *The more different the context of civilisation is, the more doubtful the success of the adaptation attempt.*

We must note, however that adopting the whole local government system is not globalisation interest, purely the interest of a norm-setting minimum of globalisation. As an illustration: in the Soviet type council system, for instance, multi-national companies may not enter the public services market, as there is not even one, and one cannot even evolve. This and solely this limitation has had to be overcome. However, two further aspects follow: on the one hand maintaining the globalisation interest with respect to territorial local government is only feasible to a certain degree. On the other hand, considering the advantages and funds arising from adopting the model, the will to adopt it is mainly there in the transitional countries, even though their civilisation context would suggest otherwise. Often a sort of "alibi pattern adoption" results from the unique and limited scope of interest. In other words, the adoption is realized to the minimum extent required in exchange for the gained benefits, but the transference does not become systemic. Often it cannot even do so, since global impacts clash with traditional structures in a destructive way.

The struggle of civilisations is expressed also in the process of adopting system-alien institutions. The implantation requires painful operations, and – as illustrated by one example – a rejection might not be avoidable. All the important life functions of organized society need to be considered when "operating". It is exactly that circumspection which seems to be avoidable by outward solutions, so that later on the repressed tensions may come even more sharply to the surface. The recommendations suggesting methods applicable for anyone and anywhere are therefore suspect and risky. Regions situated more distantly from the western system could perhaps make more of creative recommendations respecting the civilisation context as well. Another

issue is that globalisation itself is linked to Western civilisation, so it is not accidental that such expectations may not be met beyond a certain limit.

Not only the person providing a recipe is, however, to take responsibility for the damage caused, but also the recipient. "Alibi pattern observance" can be a problem, even where all seemed to be in the most perfect order, e.g. in Eastern-Central European accession countries. Even though pattern observance along institutionalisation seemed ever so successful, it cannot be concluded. The new structures need to be maintained, and it is necessary to provide for further development. If such minute details are neglected, the not fully developed structures will "rot". The risk is great. Players learn the new-wave rhetoric, which covers rather than reveals the practice of non-transparent, corrupt and undemocratic acts.

This is no longer the problem of institutional globalisation, at least, not until it crosses a certain boundary. Adopting a model may only be possible when considering the unique features of the organisation of society, including sustainability, i.e. the reproduction of achievements and their protection by constant maintenance. It is high time we also faced the same need when planning our institutional structures (and not only our local governments).

Humpty Dumpty can only exist truly on top of the wall!

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*The current study is a revision of several earlier versions. The study was first published in regional university publications in Hungarian [an Internet journal: www.jogimuhely.hu 3. issue, 2005: *Debreceni Jogi Műhely Évkönyve* (2006) p. 31-60] I would like to express my thanks to György Hajnal and György Gajduscheck for the detailed comments they attached to the first version of the present study.

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
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Published by the Hungarian Official Journal Publisher

No. 2
December 2007

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ISSN 1789-1035
07.4189

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