CASHING IN ON LAND AND PRIVILEGE FOR THE WELFARE
OF THE SHAH: MONETISATION OF TİYÜL IN EARLY
SAFAVID IRAN AND EASTERN ANATOLIA*

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The assignment of land as tiyūl to early Safavid military and bureaucratic elites was conditional on their emoluments being subjected to direct taxation on annual basis. Between 914 and 918/1508 and 1512, the money-based disposal of tiyūl land assignments boosted Shah Ismā‘īl’s control over fiscal resources in Iran. In the province of Diyarbakır, however, the Safavid practice of tiyūl expedited dynastic transition, enabling the new regime to uproot the regional allies and partners of the Aqquyunlu. A glimpse at monetisation of tiyūl brings necessary torch into the dynamics of bureaucratic centralisation and its political implications in this early phase of territorial expansion and political absolutism in the Safavid history. The principal primary source this study explores is an unpublished fiscal statement, kept as document E. 1071 at the Topkapı Palace Museum Archives in Istanbul, that details the taxes paid to central treasury by early Safavid tiyūl-holders in Iran and eastern Anatolia over the course of four fiscal years (914–918/1508–1512).

Key words: Tiyūl, fiscal administration, direct taxation, Shah Ismā‘īl, Diyarbakır, Iran, Safavids, Qizilbāsh.

I. Introduction

Studies on early modern systems of land tenure have drawn our attention to the limits of central government’s control over the fiscal and administrative status quo across the rural and urban settlements temporarily assigned to bureaucratic and military elites. Fiscal evaluation and direct taxation were two principal procedures that were

*I would like to thank John E. Woods of the University of Chicago for sharing with me his copy and partial transcription of document E. 1071. I am also indebted to Vural Genç who kindly offered to send me the digitised copy of two evrak pieces of archive as well as a copy of his forthcoming article on the Ottoman plunder of the Hasht Bihisht Gardens in Tabriz in 920/1514.
applied to ensure the centralised management of land and cash revenues in early modern polities. In the Ottoman Empire, the tīmār districts were subject to occasional cadastral land surveys, making their bestowal and/or renewal dependent upon fluctuations in taxpayer population statistics (Beldiceanu 1980, pp. 46–48; Howard 1987, pp. 7–11; Tezcan 2010, p. 20; Bartusis 2013, pp. 580–581). Basically, the early Safavid practice of tiyūl – the most common type of short-term land assignment in early modern Iran – was similar to the Ottoman military tīmār in that both authorized the assignee to collect and invest the local annual tax yields on drafting and training a pre-determined number of cavalry forces.¹ Known as tābīn or recruits in Persian bureaucratic terminology, the army units thus raised and organised by tiyūl-holders were required to be called up and deployed at short notice in times of general mobilisation or jār u yasāq side by side with the regiments under the command of the shah. The 15th-century tiyūl-holders had to attend an almost identical set of responsibilities (Tihrānī 1962–1964, pp. 371, 571).

Unlike the Ottoman tīmār-holders, whose career mobility was contingent on the state’s approval of their fiscal management in provinces, tiyūl-holders in Safavid Iran had to pay a portion of their emoluments to the royal treasury to make their way up on the rungs of political ladder. During the 16th and 17th centuries, a similar situation shaped power relations between the king and the landed men-at-arms in France, whose revenues from land and privilege were subjected to direct taxation in the form of imposts such as taille, octroi, don gratuit, and crue levies (Beik 1985, pp. 245–251; Collins 1988, pp. 45–48; Goldstone 1991, pp. 212–213). Even in the Ottoman Empire, in remote provinces such as Egypt, Baghdad, and Yemen, where the administrative hold of the state was no concrete, tīmār-holders paid a pre-determined percentage of their annual revenues to central treasury (İnalçık et al. 1994, Vol. 1, p. 73).

Vladimir Minorsky, Il’ia P. Petrushevskii, Ann K. S. Lambton, and Bert Fragner pioneered the study of tiyūl under the Safavids. Minorsky (1927, p. 800; [Mīrzā Samī‘ā] 1943, pp. 28–29) and Lambton (1991, p. 110; 2000, p. 550) considered it respectively as “financial expedient” and “land assignment made to officials in lieu of salary”, implying that by parceling out administrative districts as tiyūl among the military and bureaucratic elites the central authorities sought a leeway to dodge their fiscal and administrative responsibilities to the institutionally less manageable provincial sector of the bureaucracy. This line of argument represents tiyūl as the Safavid equivalent of the Ottoman practice of temlîk, according to which the grantee enjoyed absolute and hereditary rights and privileges “within a virtually autonomous enclave within the territory of the state” (İnalçık 2006, p. 112). Never going beyond overgen-

¹ According to 16th- and 17th-century tiyūl-nāma appointment letters, besides commanding military forces in provinces, the Safavid tiyūl-holders acted as provincial dīvān begbīs, supervising the execution of criminal justice. Homicide was the only crime they had not been allowed to deal with as it was supposed to be taken to religious courts; see, for instance, documents IX (Dhu’l-Qa’dā 991/November–December 1583), XII (Sha’ban 996/June–July 1588), XV (Dhu’l-Hijja 999/September–October 1591), XVI (Jumada I 999/March–April 1591), and XXX (Dhu’l-Hijja 1036/September 1627) in Futuridze (1955, pp. 19, 33–34, 39, 41–42, 73–74); on the post of dīvān begbī, see Floor (2000, pp. 20–21).
eralising on ῃvyūl as practised under the later Safavids, it leaves us in the dark over how ῃvyūl and ῃvyūl-holders operated under the early Safavids. Instead of the first Safavid century, as the temporal scope to explore the practice of ῃvyūl within its framework, both Minorsky and Lambton tended to focus on the trends and events in the 17th century and afterwards, an era punctuated by the relatively long intervals of efficiency crisis at court and political instability in provinces. This shift in temporal scope is crucial as since the opening quarter of the 17th century, the Safavid central bureaucracy ceased to deal out ῃvyūl land assignments on a non-hereditary basis.²

Expanding on the conclusions drawn by Minorsky and Lambton, Fragner (1986, p. 516) argued that as practised under the Safavids, ῃvyūl was a continuation, albeit in a smaller scale and more simplified manner, of mediaeval iqṭā’ as well as the post-Ilkhanid practice of söyürghāl: all three entailed the devolution of land and power into the hands of the forces of decentralism.³ It is true that in times of political unrest and bureaucratic stagnation at the centre ῃvyūl could give strength to centrifugal tendencies in the periphery. Yet Petrushevskii (1949, pp. 188–189) put stress on the centralising potentialities of the practice in early Safavid Iran, highlighting the fact that the scheduled assignment of ῃvyūl helped the central government incentivise land and privilege in favour of more “servile” servitors of the throne.

The contractual nature of the practice of ῃvyūl under the early Safavids provided for the central government to perpetuate its presence on the horizon of administrative life in provinces. To keep this system of administrative control and fiscal centralisation working, the shah needed to make ῃvyūl-holders accountable for their exploitation of tax resources in provinces. If there was any effective mechanism of fiscal and administrative control that might have kept them in check it was direct taxation. Direct taxation on early Safavid ῃvyūl-holders provided for the Shah Ismā’īl’s fledgling government to experiment with a centralist platform of administrative evaluation and reward as a viable alternative to the intrinsically decentralist Turko-Mongol practices of corporate and confederative exploitation of land operative in Iran and Central Asia during the 15th and 16th centuries.⁴ Under Shah Ismā’īl (1501–1524), almost all ῃvyūl-holders were required to deposit a portion of their emolument with the royal treasury. Over the course of the 16th and 17th centuries, düshlik (the amounts a ῃvyūl-holder had to pay upon arrival at the court) in particular and rūsūm or pre-determined imposts in general were the two principal categories of the fees the grand vizier’s office or daftarkhāna-yi humāyūn collected from ῃvyūl-holders across the country on behalf of the shah.⁵

² In 1026/1617 Shah ῃAbbās ordered all in-office ῃvyūl-holders to take over the control of their land grants on a permanent and hereditary basis; see AFT III, f. 383r. Thus, no accident that in the last two thirds of the 17th century and beyond ῃvyūl was known to be a type of “perpetual” land grant; see Chardin (1811, Vol. 5, pp. 416–417); cf. Kaempfer (1712, Vol. 1, p. 97).

³ Similarly, the parliamentary bill that proposed the abolition of ῃvyūl in 1907 claimed that the administrative decentralism of the country under the Safavids and their successors rooted in the practice of ῃvyūl; see Lambton (1987, p. 74); cf. Sharīf (1352 Sh./1973, pp. 79–85).

⁴ For more on corporate and confederative exploitation of land, see Dickson (1963); Woods (1999, p. 20); Subtelny (2007, pp. 36–38).

The earliest recorded attempt to impose direct taxation on *tiyūl*-holders in Iran is datable to about a century prior to Shah Ismā‘īl’s rise to power. A late 15th-century Timurid chronicler described the procedure as *tasʿīr* or “price enforcement”, a judicial move normally carried out against misdeeds such as monopoly and price-fixing conspiracies. The episode on extracting *tasʿīr* fees from Timurid military chiefs contains the earliest known mention of the practice of *tiyūl* in Persian historiography, given sub anno 810/1407–1408. In that year, a Herat-based Timurid vizier is reported to have demanded the *tiyūl*-holders posted to eastern Iran and Central Asia to pay cash to get their land assignments renewed by the court. By so doing, it is pointed out, the central authorities sought to defray the debts the *tiyūl*-holders had incurred at the expense of the royal treasury in the wake of Tamerlane’s death. In the short run, this first bid to monetise *tiyūl* through direct taxation proved destabilising as it prompted the delinquent *tiyūl*-holders to plot a regicide and, when it failed, to muster their troops and take arms against the newly enthroned Timurid ruler Shāhrukh (807–850/1405–1447) (Samarqandī 1935–1939, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 63).

This article studies re-monetisation of *tiyūl* under Shah Ismā‘īl (907–930/1501–1524) over the course of four fiscal years (914–918/1508–1512) and the way in which it shaped administrative centralisation and dynastic transition in Iran and eastern Anatolia. This study argues that while in Iran the money-based disposal of *tiyūl* assignments smoothed the way for regularised income redistribution among the Qizilbāsh, in eastern Anatolia the monetisation of *tiyūl* was a catalyst for a radically absolutist agenda of dynastic transition that undid the Kurdish ruling families of Diyarbakır, leaving the Qizilbāsh with almost no allies in the region in the years leading up to the Ottoman invasion of Azerbaijan in 920/1514 and subsequent annexation of Diyarbakır in 922/1516. The principal primary source this present study explores is an unpublished income statement prepared around 919/1512–1513. This statement provides us with rare statistical information on the shah’s share of the income from direct taxation on the *tiyūl*-holders posted to several dozen urban and rural districts in Iran and eastern Anatolia between 913/1507–1508 and 919/1512–1513.

II. Evrak 1071: Provenance, Structure, and Chronology

A potentially unique copy of the transcript version (*savād*) of the unpublished income statement this present article draws on is housed at the Topkapı Palace Museum Archives in Istanbul catalogued as Evrak 1071 or E. 1071. The document is in Persian and consists of four folios, which are likely to have originally been bound together as part of a miscellaneous collection or *majmū‘a*. Composed in a cursive *taʿlīq* script, the text is split throughout into two columns, except for the folios 1r and 4v. Based

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7 For two brief references in modern scholarship to E. 1071, see Bacqué-Grammont (1993, p. 16); and Woods (1999, p. 12).

on its format and calligraphic style, E. 1071 has the appearance of a number of the late Aqquyunlu royal edicts and state documents. Ta’līq was one of the most popular scripts among the early Safavid bureaucrats. According to an early 17th-century biographical dictionary on calligraphers and painters (Ḥusaynī Qumī 1359 Sh./1980, pp. 46–47; Ḥusaynī Qumī 1959, pp. 87–88), some of the high-ranking bureaucrats at the court of Shah Ismā’īl mastered the script, including his vakīl/vizier or deputy in fiscal/ scribal affairs the Ni’mat-Allāhī mystique Zahir al-Dīn Mīr ‘Abd al-Bāqī Kūhba-nānī Kirmānī (d. 920/1514). The last date mentioned in E. 1071 coincided with the first year of Kirmānī’s appointment as vizier, making it likely to assume that either he or one of his bureaucratic underlings must have prepared the transcript version of this income statement based on the original copy of the document as filed and archived at grand vizier’s office.

E. 1071 has two parts, which altogether consist of seven sections. The first part details the shah’s share of the income (sahm al-mulk-i humāyūn) from the impost collected from the tīyūl-holders shifted to more than eighty urban and rural districts in nine provinces. The document then closes with a brief list of the amounts made by the military chiefs who had received pay vouchers (barāt) in 916/1510–1511. E. 1071 consolidates four sets of data. First come the dates, all given in accordance with the turkī fiscal/animal calendar. Then follow topographical details on the districts enfeoffed as tīyūl with the Qizilbāsh and non-Qizilbāsh military and bureaucratic elites in the provinces of Diyarbakir, Azerbaijan, Persian Iraq, Arabian Iraq, the Kalhur District, Fars, Luristan (Khurramabad) and Qara-Ulus, Kirman, and Khurasan. Almost all tīyūl-holders are identified by name, but some lack tribal nisba, making it difficult for the reader to ascertain their background based on narrative sources. The last set of data specifies the amount of the taxes collected from each tīyūl-holder over the course of a six-year period, of which two years are listed as empty (khālī). In addition to the payments recorded under each tīyūl district, E. 1071 includes the aggregate amounts of the taxes paid by tīyūl-holders per year and per province. An inverted exclamation mark stands next to each unit of topographical, prosopographical, and monetary data to set it apart from the next one.

The Ottomans must have seized E. 1071 during Selim I’s invasion of Azerbaijan and subsequent sack of the shah’s palace in Tabriz in the summer of 920/1514.}

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8 My comparison here is based on grey-scale duplicates of the documents XX, XXI, XXII, XXV, and XXVI in Ṭabāṭabā’ī (1352 Sh./1973, pp. 87–106, 112–116, and 118–123). These documents are issued by the Aqquyunlu Sultan Ya’qūb (1478–1491), prince Qāsim b. Jahāngīr, and prince Alvand, respectively on 20 Dhu’l-Qa’dā 891/17 November 1484, 4 Jumada I 892/28 April 1487, 7 Dhu’l-Qa’dā 893/13 October 1488, 5 Sha’bān 903/25 June 1498, and 14 Rajab 904/25 February 1499. One of them, i.e. the edict dated 25 June 1498, has originally been published elsewhere; see Minorsky (1939, pp. 927–960). See also the facsimile copy of another Aqquyunlu document signed by Uzun Ḥasan (1457–1478) on 1 Rabi’ 1 897/6 August 1472, reproduced as Planch VI/document E. 3132 in volume one of Öz (1938–1940).

9 On Kirmānī’s career under Shah Ismā’īl, see AFT I, ff. 199 v–200r.

10 For more on this incident, see Simões (1898, p. 244); Lütfi Paşa (1341 AH/1923, p. 237); Tekindağ (1968, p. 72); Hoca Sa’dettin Efendi (1979, Vol. 4, p. 218); Şükrü Bitlisî (1997, p. 184); Emecen (2011, p. 148).
The plunder was orderly and systematic, at the end of which the looters prepared a detailed report itemising the confiscated belongings of the shah. Dated 12 Rajab 920/2 September 1514, the report thus drafted includes, in two parts, a long list of the items removed from the royal palace and the office of the court minister (mihtar-khāna) at the Hasht Bihisht Gardens in Tabriz. The first part, which is at the Topkapı Palace Museum Archives in the form of a small-size notebook bearing shelf number Defter 10734 or D. 10734, makes a reference to “some worn-out fiscal ledgers” or daftarhā-yi kuhna, which at some point after their transfer to Istanbul were to be detached from their spines so that their contents could be classified and archived separately as documents or evrak. Perhaps E. 1071 was part of one of these displaced and much-handed fiscal ledgers, a guess that can be made considering the still visible perforation marks on the gutter area of the first two folios of the document.

Table 1. E. 1071 Chronology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annals</th>
<th>AH/AD Years</th>
<th>Turkī Years</th>
<th>Vernal Equinox (Nawrūz)</th>
<th>Regnal Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>913 (1507–1508)</td>
<td>Dragon (Löy)</td>
<td>9 Dhu’l-Qa’da (11 March)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>914 (1508–1509)</td>
<td>Snake (Yilān)</td>
<td>20 Dhu’l-Qa’da (12 March)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>915 (1509–1510)</td>
<td>Horse (Yant)</td>
<td>1 Dhu’l-Hijja (12 March)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>916 (1510–1511)</td>
<td>Sheep (Qūy)</td>
<td>12 Dhu’l-Hijja (12 March)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>917–918 (1511–1512)</td>
<td>Monkey (Pichīn)</td>
<td>22 Dhu’l-Hijja (11 March)</td>
<td>10–11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>919 (1512–1513)</td>
<td>Cock (Tavkhaqīy)</td>
<td>3 Muharram (11 March)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Beginning with Year of the Dragon (Löy Yil), the dates given in E. 1071 are fiscal (see Table 1). The Tārīkh-i jahān-ārā, a general history on pre-Islamic and Islamic dynasties of Iran by Ahmad Ghaffārī Qazvīnī (d. after 972/1565), is the only 16th-century narrative source that has based its account on the reign of Shah Ismā’īl on the turkī fiscal/animal calendar. Two other Safavid chroniclers, who wrote their histories in the first part of the next century, also rely on the fiscal/animal calendar when dealing with the reign of the first Safavid monarch. But an interval of more than a century between them and Shah Ismā’īl made their chronological calculations go awry. While one of them tagged 917/1511–1512 as Year of the Dragon (Husaynī Qumī 1383 Sh./2004, p. 94), according to the other, Year of the Dragon coincided with 915/1510 (AFT I, f. 192r). Au contraire, Year of the Dragon under Shah Ismā’īl, as Ghaffārī Qazvīnī (1343 Sh./1964, p. 270) put it, first occurred in the sixth regnal year, i.e. the hijrī/lunar year 913 (6 June 1507 to 1 May 1508). As the first day of this fiscal/animal year, the vernal equinox or Nawrūz was celebrated on the tail end of the hijrī/lunar year on 9 Dhu’l-Qa’da 913/11 March 1508, making the fiscal/animal year extend well into the next hijrī/lunar year. That under 916/1510–1511, the year that ended with Shah Ismā’īl’s conquest of Khurasan,11 E. 1071 lists the taxes collected

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from the *tiyūl*-holders posted to the province bears out the accuracy of Ghaffārī Qazvīnī’s use of fiscal/animal calendar. Furthermore, there is archival evidence to corroborate his designation of the *hijrī* lunar year 913/1507–1508 as Year of the Dragon. Dated Jumada I 910/October–November 1504, a certified affidavit signed by an anonymous Safavid bureaucrat, wherein he endorses the ownership of part of the land estates in the fortress town of Maku, some 155 miles to the northwest of Tabriz, by an Armenian priest and his descendants, confirms that 909/1503–1504 was Year of the Rat or *Sīchqān Yīl.* In the *turkī* fiscal/animal calendar, Year of the Rat precedes Year of the Dragon by four solar years.

Year of the Cock (*Tavkhaqöy Yīl*), during which the vernal equinox occurred on 3 Muharram 919/11 March 1512 (Ghaffārī Qazvīnī 1343 Sh./1964, p. 275), is the last fiscal/animal year mentioned in E. 1071. A chronological anomaly sub anno 917–918 (31 March 1511 to 11 March 1513) makes the *hijrī* lunar year 918/1512–1513 ten days shorter than a full *Nawrūz* cycle. Therefore, the amounts taxed and recorded during this particular fiscal year pertain to two *hijrī* lunar years.

### III. *Tiyūl* Tax Flows

Between the fiscal years 914 and 918/1508–1512 the Safavid *tiyūl*-holders generated an overall amount of 730 *tūmāns* and 4000 dinars for the shah. More than half (56%) of this amount had been contributed by the *tiyūl*-holders posted to the provinces of Diyarbakir, Azerbaijan, and Persian Iraq (*‘Irāq-i ‘ajam*). During these four fiscal years, direct taxation on *tiyūl*-holders in these three provinces was year-by-year. During the same period, their counterparts in Arabian Iraq (Baghdad), Fars, Kirman, the Kalhur District (Kirmanshah), Luristan (and Qara-Ulus), and Khurasan had only occasionally paid their taxes to the royal treasury in Tabriz. However, the monetary value of these occasional payments did often outweigh the cash extracted more regularly from *tiyūl*-holders in Diyarbakir, Azerbaijan, and Persian Iraq (see Chart 1).

In addition to *tiyūl*-holders, the military chiefs who had received pay vouchers also had to pay a portion of their annual emoluments to the shah. In the 16th century, these pay vouchers or *barāts* were normally issued early in autumn and authorised their bearers to procure for free or reduced prices the fodder (*‘ulūfa*) and foodstuffs they and their retainers needed during the coming winter (Dūghlāt 1996, Vol. 1, p. 218). In 916/1510–1511, Shah Ismā‘īl had made an overall amount of 75 *tūmāns* and 8000 dinars out of the *barāt* pay vouchers issued in the name of the military chiefs who had taken up residence in Khurasan subsequent to the invasion of Marv and Herat. When added to the amounts collected from *tiyūl*-holders between 914 and 918/1508 and 1512, this last lump sum made the shah’s share of the income from *tiyūl* land assignments and *barāt* pay vouchers add up to 800 *tūmāns* in a four-year period.

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How much of a tiyūl-holder’s emolument was taxed during the reign of Shah Ismā’īl? At present, there is no definite answer to this question. Late Safavid administrative manuals delineate the fiscal regulations (dastūr al-ʿamal) concerning the rate of the taxes to be collected from tiyūl-holders, but these regulations deal with the fiscal practice in early 18th-century Iran and as such has nothing to do with the lay of the land under Shah Ismā’īl. The earliest known set of fiscal regulations on the subject of direct taxation on tiyūl-holders in Safavid Iran dates from the opening decade of the 17th century. According to these regulations, each tiyūl-holder was required to pay 3% of his annual emolument to the royal treasury in addition to the following fees:

(a) Ten percent of the cash value of the gifts (pīshkash) presented to him by the local notables in each fiscal year;
(b) Five percent of the cash value of the benefactions (inʿām) made to him by the shah;
(c) One percent of the amounts disbursed as annual salary among his retainers;
(d) Five percent of the annual tax yields of the tiyūl district to which the tiyūl-holder had been posted, to be collected as ḥaqq al-qarār or appointment fees (Jung 3455, f. 168r).

There is strong circumstantial evidence to suggest that under Shah Ismā’īl the taxes collected from tiyūl-holders amounted to a small fraction of their annual emolument – perhaps between 3 and 10%. Each year, direct taxation on tiyūl-holders gener-

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13 For instance, one administrative manual lists fourteen types of imposts and taxes collected from late Safavid tiyūl-holders; see [Mīrzā Samīʿā] (1943, f. 42v); Naṣīrī (1371 Sh./1992, p. 10).
ated an amount in the range of 100 to 150 tūmāns for central treasury. Except for the fiscal year 916/1510–1511, during which the military campaign against the Uzbek confederate clans had brought about a sharp rise in the rate of the taxes levied on tiyūl-holders, the cash payments made by them did rarely exceed 15 tūmāns in one fiscal year. Late in the 1500s, a payment of 15 tūmāns was equal to the annual tax yield of three small-size rural settlements. According to a royal edict issued on 10 Rajab 915/24 October 1509, the annual tax yield of Kazaj, a minor rural district some 30 miles to the southwest of Khalkhal, had officially been assessed to be four tūmāns and 5000 dinars. In 916/1510–1511, the Safavid bureaucrats had evaluated the annual emolument of the tiyūl-holder posted to the town of Qa’in in Khurasan to be about 150 tūmāns, and we know that in the same year the Qizilbash military governor of Qa’in had paid 13 tūmāns and 4000 dinars or less than 9% of his emolument to central treasury (E. 12212). The sharp debasement of the coinage in the latter part of the 15th century notwithstanding, under Shah Ismā’īl the monetary unit tūmān (10,000 dinars) in Persian Iraq and Azerbaijan (dīnār-i ‘irāqī and dīnār-i Tabriz) was in its highest value versus gold in the 16th century (Rabino 1945, p. 13; Fragner 1986, pp. 559–561).

How much of the royal treasury’s revenues did come from direct taxation on tiyūl-holders? It is safe to assume that the amounts collected from tiyūl-holders constituted only a small fraction of the royal treasury’s annual cash flow. In 916/1510–1511, the cash accrued in central treasury at the end of two fiscal years is reported to have amounted to 20,000 tūmāns (Khvāndmīr 1954, Vol. 4, p. 491; Amīnī Haravī 2004, p. 313; cf. Simões 1898, p. 243), implying that direct taxation on tiyūl-holders over the course of four fiscal years had produced an amount on a par with less than 1% of the sum total of shah’s revenues in one fiscal year.

The shah had made the most out of direct taxation on tiyūl-holders in the fiscal Year of the Sheep (Qöy Yil) or 916/1510–1511. The amounts collected from them in this year totaled 330 tūmāns and 9000 dinars (see Chart 2). This rise stemmed from the Safavid invasion of Khurasan, where more than fifteen rural and urban settlements were to be assigned at once as tiyūl to the Qizilbash military chiefs after Shah Ismā’īl’s conquest of Marv and Herat in Sha’ban-Ramadan 916/November–December 1510. These newly appointed tiyūl-holders had been recruited to shoulder part of the costs of the military campaign in Khurasan. In the next fiscal year, i.e. 917–918/1511–1513 or Year of the Monkey (Pichīn Yil), the amounts collected from tiyūl-holders across the country dropped to 202 tūmāns and 4000 dinars. As we have seen above, fiscal extractions from tiyūl-holders in Year of the Monkey covered two hijrī/lunar years and as such they seem to have been collected at once late in 916/1510–1511. The combined payments made in the fiscal Year of the Monkey kept the shah’s share of the income from direct taxation on tiyūl-holders in the range of 100 tūmāns per hijrī/lunar year.

The most productive tiyūl-holders had been posted to Persian Iraq, where between 914–918/1508–1512 fourteen urban and rural settlements were administered as

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15 See document II in Martin (1965, pp. 180–181). Around the same time, a well-bred horse is reported to come in 30 tūmāns in Persian Iraq, indicating that the shah’s share of the income from direct taxation on tiyūl-holders during a four-year period allowed him to procure only twelve to fifteen such horses for the royal cavalry regiments; see Amīnī Haravī (1383 Sh./2004, p. 362).
Chart 2. The shah’s share of the income from tiyūl land assignments per year, 1508–1512

Table 2. Taxes collected from tiyūl-holders in Persian Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tiyūl districts</th>
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**MONETISATION OF TIYŪL IN EARLY SAFAVID IRAN AND EASTERN ANATOLIA**

97

*Acta Orient. Hung. 68, 2015*

Tiyūl (see Table 2). Overall they had made a total of 167 tūmāns and 2000 dinars for the shah during these four fiscal years. Under normal conditions, central treasury had levied the biggest amount of taxes (38 tūmāns and 2000 dinars) on the tiyūl-holder-sposted to Persian Iraq in the fiscal Year of the Snake (Yīlān Yīl) or 914/1508–1509. As was the case with the rest of the country, Year of the Sheep or 916/1510–1511 saw a rise of more than 30 tūmāns in the amount of the taxes collected from tiyūl-holders in Persian Iraq, which obviously was due to the outbreak of wars with the Uzbeks and the central government’s starving for cash in the wake of the conquest of Khurasan. The taxes collected from tiyūl-holders in Persian Iraq amounted respectively to 23 tūmāns and 36 tūmāns and 3000 dinars in 915/1509–1510 and 917–918/1511–1513.

Martin B. Dickson (1958, p. 38) considered Shah Ismā‘īl’s invasion of Khurasan in 916/1510–1511 as no more than a war of prestige that ended with the conquest of “an area that was essentially extraneous to a power based on Iraq and Azerbaijan”. But the remarkably large amount of the cash funneled through the monetisation of tiyūl land assignments in the province, which in the same year totaled 153 tūmāns and 4000 dinars, calls into question the explanatory relevance of this observation. In the fiscal statement that details the shah’s share of the income from tiyūl land assignments between 913 and 919/1507 and 1513, Khurasan shows up only once under the fiscal Year of the Sheep or the hījrī/lunar year at the end of which the Safavids defeated the Uzbek Shībānī Khan (d. 916/1510) in Marv. That during one single fiscal year tiyūl-holders in Khurasan had made more than one fifth (21%) of the shah’s share of the income from the taxes placed on all tiyūl-holders in Iran and eastern Anatolia in a four-year period shows the conquest economy in full gear (see Table 3). To this substantial amount must be added the imposts levied on barāt-holders in Khurasan in the same fiscal year, which had provided the shah with a sum total of 75 tūmāns, making his monetary profits from Khurasan rise to more than 414 tūmāns in one fiscal year.

Most of the tiyūl districts in Khurasan at the time of the Qizilbāsh conquest of the province were dominantly Sunni-populated. Perhaps the conquerors had subjected these Sunni Muslims to excessive taxation, hence the unusually higher rates of their cash contributions to central treasury. Be that as it may, tiyūl-holders in Khurasan had made more money for the shah simply because of the fact that the brevity of their tenure in the province made it practically impossible for many of them to spend the bulk of local tax yields on recruiting and training tābīn forces, a situation that made it possible for central authorities to require them to pay more cash. Under the remaining two fiscal years included in the statement in question there is no mention of Khurasan, implying that by the end of 917/1511–1512 the Safavid tiyūl-holders had left the province. On 15 Rajab 917/918 October 1511, Shah Ismā‘īl appointed the Timurid prince Bābur (d. 937/1530) as the governor of Khurasan. Bābur’s period in Khurasan lasted only eight months until Rabi‘ I 918/May–June 1512, when the Uzbeks invaded Samarqand, forcing him to flee to the south, first to Kunduz and then to Kabul (Dūghlāt 1996, Vol. 1, pp. 208, 217). As such, the amounts collected from tiyūl-holders in Khurasan covered the period between Ramadan 916 and Rajab 917/December 1510 and October 1511.

The Azerbaijan-based tiyūl-holders had altogether contributed 116 tūmāns and 1000 dinars to the royal treasury over the course of four fiscal years. Their cash pay-
Table 3. Taxes collected from *tiyūl*-holders in Khurasan

<table>
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<th>1509–1510</th>
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Nements ran to 16% of Shah Ismā‘īl’s share of the income from the taxes imposed on *tiyūl*-holders between 914 and 918/1508 and 1512 (see Table 4). Per person, the amounts collected from this group of *tiyūl*-holders normally ranged from 5 to 10 *tūmāns* in each fiscal year, indicating the new regime’s moderate taxation in the districts ringed around Tabriz, a political move that was aimed to uproot the seeds of dissent among the Qizilbāsh. What is more, the imposition of such lower amounts of tax seems to have been due to the fact that *tiyūl*-holders in Azerbaijan used to invest more money on raising and organising local *tābīn* forces, which constituted the most accessible troop units at the time of military emergencies. At this early stage in the Safavid history, all *tiyūl*-holders in Azerbaijan were required to devote whatever resources at their disposal to “territorial expansionism” or *mamlakat-gīrī* (*AFT I*, f. 137r), suggesting that they were seldom allowed to commute their military service into monetary payment. As the most accessible military force, the Azerbaijan-based *tābīn* regiments constituted the backbone of the Safavid army and as such they were certainly paid more than their counterparts in other provinces. Given the new regime’s firm hold on bureaucratic life in Azerbaijan, the collection of the taxes levied on local *tiyūl*-holders was remarkably systematic and on-schedule. It was under these circumstances that the cash payments extracted from *tiyūl*-holders in seven remote nomadic and rural settlements to the north of the Aras River in Qarabagh, Qapanat, and Chukhur-i

16 About 130 miles to the southeast of Mashhad.
17 Modern Pashtun Zarghun, some 15 miles to the east of Heart.
Table 4. Taxes collected from *tiyūl*-holders in Azerbaijan

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Sa’ïd came to be 45% (50 *tāmān*s and 7000 dinars) of the shah’s share of the income from direct taxation on *tiyūl*-holders. Five of these seven *tiyūl* districts were dominantly Armenian-populated, which allowed the Qizilbâsh to impose higher taxes under religious pretexts in order to pay more cash to central treasury in Tabriz. Diyarbakir, where more than twenty-five rural and urban districts had been assigned to *tiyūl*-holders, made more than 125 *tāmān*s of the shah’s profits from direct taxation on *tiyūl* land assignments between 914 and 918/1508 and 1512 (see Table 5). As was the case with *tiyūl* land assignments in the Armenian-populated salient of Azerbaijan, the biggest amounts collected from the Diyarbakir-based *tiyūl*-holders came from those who had been put in charge of the Christian-populated rural and urban settlements. For instance, the most productive *tiyūl*-holders in eastern Anatolia...
Table 5. Taxes collected from *tiyūl*-holders in Diyarbakir

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between 914 and 918/1508 and 1512 were in charge of Harput (modern Elazığ), a major city to the west of Amid (or Kara-Hamid; present-day Diyarbakir) with a considerable Christian (Armenian, Nestorian, and Greek) population. Over the course of four fiscal years (914–918/1508–1512), the Safavid *tiyūl*-holders in Harput made more than 20% (27 *tūmāns*) of the taxes collected by the royal treasury from *tiyūl*-holders in Diyarbakir.

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18 Early in the 16th century, the Christian population of Harput was about 25,000, while the Muslim residents of the district amounted to about 14,500; see Ünal (1989, p. 73).

*Acta Orient. Hung. 68, 2015*
The amounts deposited with the royal treasury by tiyūl-holders in Fars, Kirman, the Kalhur District, Khurramabad (Luristan), and Arabian Iraq (Baghdad) added up to 211 tumāns and 6000 dinars or about one third (29%) of the shah’s share of the income from tiyūl land assignments over the course of 914–918/1508–1512.

IV. Distributional Significance of Tiyūl Prebends

On the eve of Shah Ismā’īl’s rise to power in the summer of 907/1501, the Aqquyunlu Sultanate consisted of two independent administrative zones. According to the peace agreement of Sa’in-Qal’a, which had been signed in 906/1500 between the Aqquyunlu claimants to the throne, prince Alvand (d. 911/1504) and prince Murad (d. 920/1514), the eastern zone, including the provinces of Persian Iraq, Arabian Iraq, Fars, and Kirman, belonged to Murad and his descendants, while the western zone, which consisted of the provinces of Diyarbakir, Van, and Azerbaijan, was supposed to be ruled by Alvand and his successors (*AFT I*, f. 55r). The advent of the Qizilbāsh and their territorial conquests between 907 and 914/1501 and 1508 (Sarwar 1939, pp. 32–54; Savory 1965, pp. 71–94) ended this administrative divide and coalesced all these provinces into a single administrative unit controlled by Shah Ismā’īl and the Safavid tiyūl-holders.

Under Shah Ismā’īl, almost all major urban centres in Iran and eastern Anatolia were administered as tiyūl. Twenty-eight out of more than eighty districts enfeoffed as tiyūl between 914 and 918/1508 and 1512 are localised to the province of Diyarbakır. Azerbaijan and Persian Iraq had twenty-five and sixteen tiyūl land assignments respectively. In Khurasan, more than fifteen rural and urban settlements were run as tiyūl in 916/1510–1511. The concentration of more than half of early Safavid tiyūl districts in the frontier provinces of Diyarbakir and Khurasan highlights the importance of the practice as a mechanism of territorial expansion and administrative control under Shah Ismā’īl. During this period, tiyūl land assignments in such geographically central provinces as Fars, Persian Iraq, and Kirman were no more than a cluster of borderland military outposts that for the most part abutted the territories of local dynasties in Luristan (and Qara-Ulus), Kurdistan (the Kalhur and ‘Ali-Shakar Districts), Laristan, Hormuz, Khuzistan (or Huvayzah; also Arabistan), and the Caspian provinces of Rasht, Lahijan, Rustamdar, and Mazandaran.19

IV.a. Eastern Anatolia

Persian narrative sources are reticent on administrative status of the province of Diyarbakir under Shah Ismā’īl; instead, they have tended to play up the military feats of the Qizilbāsh against the Aqquyunlu, Kurdish, and Zu’l-Qadr nucleuses of resis-

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19 For more on these local dynasties, see Nuvīdī Shīrāzī (1369 Sh./1989, pp. 131–145).

tance in Mardin, Cizre, and Harput.\textsuperscript{20} Even modern scholarship on early Safavid Diyarbakır is garbled. In a recent article on Shah Ṭahmāsb’s (930–984/1524–1576) Kurdish policy, Akihiko Yamaguchi (2012, p. 108) misinterprets Sharaf Khan Bidlīsī’s detailed narrative on the Safavid regime’s crackdown on Kurdish city-states of eastern Anatolia to hammer out a revisionist account on what he dubs the “appeasing” and “conciliatory tone” of Shah Ismā’īl’s relations with the Kurdish powerbrokers and ruling families of the region. As we shall see in this present article, the enfeoffment of the Kurdish city-states of the province of Diyarbakır as \textit{tiyūl} under Shah Ismā’īl had been carried out with the objective of sweeping away the last vestiges of the Aqquyunlu system of local alliances and proxy control.

Around the time of the Qizilbāsh conquest of Amid, the capital city of the province of Diyarbakır, it was a fortress town of about 13,000 (about 2400 households) inhabitants clustered by a dozen rural and nomadic settlements (İlhan 1977, p. 22).\textsuperscript{21} Economic recession and demographic decline marked this period of interregnum (\textit{SN}, f. 80v). The fact that under Shah Ismā’īl Amid had only once been assigned as \textit{tiyūl}, in the fiscal Year of the Monkey or 917–918/1511–1513, is a testimony of the new regime’s efforts to refrain from overtaxing fiscal resources in the region. Under Shah Ismā’īl, the \textit{tiyūl} districts operating in the administrative orbit of Amid were as follows: Kulb (modern Kulp), Kemah, Ruha (modern Urfa), Arabgir, Ergani, Atak (also Hatakh; modern Lice) (Tigris 2008, p. 14), Palu, Hizan (some 30 miles to the southeast of Bitlis), Hazo (or Hizo; present-day Kütübbaş, few miles to the south of Batman) (Bidlīsī 1860–1862, Vol. 1, p. 191), Çermik, Çapakçur (also Çevlîk; modern Bingöl), Çüngüş, Haçük (or Haçık; modern Elbėğendi, some 15 miles to the northwest of Viranşehir) (Barkan 1953–1954, pp. 306–307; cf. Tezcan 2000; Posch 2013, pp. 78–81).

Early in the 16th century, except for Harput, Amid, Ergani, and Ruha, the rest of the above-mentioned \textit{tiyūl} districts made up the “Cemaat-ı Kurdân” or Kurdish communities of Diyarbakır (Barkan 1953–1954, pp. 306–307; Tenreiro 1923, p. 57; Barkan 1957, p. 27).

The most detailed accounts on the Safavid conquest of eastern Anatolia under Shah Ismā’īl can be found in Ghaffārī Qazvīnī (1343 Sh./1964, pp. 270–271); and Ḥusaynī Qumī (1383 Sh./2004, pp. 89–93).

In the spring of 914/1508, when the Qizilbāsh took over Amid, Muhammad Khan Ustājlū (d. 920/1514), a scion of a family of local landed notables, was made governor of the city and the province of Diyarbakır; see Ghaffārī Qazvīnī (1343 Sh./1964, p. 270); Rūmlū (1383 Sh./2004, p. 904). In 948/1541, local population in Amid amounted to more than 3400 households (Tenreiro 1923, p. 57; Barkan 1957, p. 27).

For more on administrative divisions of the province of Diyarbakır in the first quarter of the 16th century, see D. 9772 (Topkapı Palace Museum Archives, Istanbul), ff. 4r–5r, reproduced in Göyünç (1969a, pp. 26–28); Tezcan 2000; Posch 2013, pp. 78–81).
for about a decade until the spring of 922/1516 (Hoca Sa‘dettin 1979, Vol. 4, pp. 262–263; Ünal 1989, pp. 23–27; Amīnī Haravī 1383 Sh./2004, pp. 280–281; SN, f. 114r). That immediately after Shah ’Ismā‘īl’s capture of Harput a group of böy nökar or the Aqquyunlu special forces23 had been allowed to take care of the city’s fiscal administration as tiyǔl-holders bespeaks the political clout the Aqquyunlu still wielded in the region. After 861/1465, the Aqquyunlu had moved their harem to Harput so that Uzun Hasan’s fourth wife the Komnene princess Theodora of Trabzon could take up residence in the city together with her Greek retainers (Angiolello 1980, p. 369; Barbaro 1980, p. 550; Woods 1999, p. 95; Shukurov 2001, pp. 319–321). In the closing years of the 15th century, the Aqquyunlu prince Rustam, a grandson of Theodora of Trabzon, made Harput his capital, and minted the new regime’s coins in the city (Ardıçoğlu 1964, p. 73; Woods 1999, pp. 155–158).

Put on map (see Map 1), tiyǔl districts in eastern Anatolia formed an arrow-shaped line-up of fortress towns and military outposts stretched westward from Van to Amid to Harput. Bayburt, Erzincan, Kemah, Çemişgezek, and Arapgir sit on the northern side of this arrow, while the tiyǔl-holders stationed in Ruha, Telguran, and Mardin supervised the administrative affairs of the districts concentrated along the southern side. Between 914 and 916/1508 and 1510, the Safavid tiyǔl districts in Diyarbakır clustered around the region to the south of Amid. But beginning in 917/1511–1512 more tiyǔl-holders were posted to the northern and northwestern confines of the province. This shift in posting pattern reflected the changing military priorities of the Safavid regime. While the appointment of tiyǔl-holders in Diyarbakır between 914 and 916/1508 and 1510 was aimed to expedite dynastic transition in the Kurdish city-states of eastern Anatolia, after 917/1511–1512, the outbreak of succession wars in the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent enthronement of Selim I in Safar 918/April–May 1512 (Uluçay 1954b, pp. 127–131; Uluçay 1955, pp. 191–198) forced the Safavids to ease up pressure on Kurdish fortress towns of southern and central Diyarbakır and shift more tiyǔl-holders to the north, northwest, and west of Amid and Harput.

Almost all tiyǔl-holders posted to northern and western Diyarbakır in 917/1511–1512 were high-ranking military commanders, including one Tekkelū, one Varsāq/Rūmlū, two Ustājlū, and two Zu’l-Qadr emirs. But less than three years into their appointment as tiyǔl-holder, when the Ottoman armies invaded eastern Anatolia, none of them was able to resist their progress. Why? Part of their failure arose from the fact that, aside from Harput, Çemişgezek, and Erzincan, the rest of the tiyǔl districts in western Diyarbakır, including Çermik, Çüngüş,24 and Ebu Tahir (modern Sivir-

23 Under the Aqquyunlu, the royal guards were called böy nökar (Ṭihrānī 1962–1964, pp. 81, 175, 200, 272, 279, 385, 422, 555; cf. Doerfler 1963–1967, Vol. 2, pp. 358–359; cf. Fleischer 2011, p. 550); but in the latter part of the 16th century, the word böy nökar got a pejorative meaning and was applied to bandits and urban riffraff (Nuğdī Shīrāzī 1369 Sh./1990, p. 99).
24 According to the administrative and fiscal regulations prepared for Çüngüş under Uzun Hasan and updated immediately after the Ottoman annexation (Barkan 1943, pp. 152–153), the district consisted of only one fortress (ḥiṣār) around which clustered six rural settlements inhabited by the Armenian and Nestorian Christians.
Map 1. Tiyūl districts in Azerbaijan and Eastern Anatolia
were of little or no strategic significance. Far off the route that led from Harput to Amid via Ergani, these three tiyūl land assignments formed an isolated archipelago of upland military outposts. Direct taxation on tiyūl-holders in charge of all three districts between 914 and 918/1508 and 1512 had generated less than 5 tūmāns. Cash payments collected from Çermik and Ebu Tahir had been received only once, implying the new regime’s lack of effective control over both military outposts.

Arabgir, Çemişgezek, Kemah, Erzincan, and Bayburt were of greater importance both strategically and administratively. During 916–918/1510–1512, when it was still a tiyūl district, Arabgir spearheaded the Safavid defense line in western Diyarbakır, bordering the Mamluk and Ottoman garrisons in Malatya and Sivas. There is evidence to suggest that a combination of fiscal mismanagement and political wrong moves undercut the Qizilbāsh influence across the northern and northwestern confines of Diyarbakır. The Safavid tiyūl-holders in Arabgir seems to have been subject to excessive taxation, generating 7 tūmāns and 7000 dinars for the shah in a single fiscal year, i.e. 916/1510–1511, an amount that equaled approximately 15% of the taxes levied on the rest of the tiyūl-holders in Diyarbakır in the same fiscal year. The preamble to the Ottoman fiscal regulations for Arabgir in 924/1517–1518 makes it clear that the local population had been overtaxed under the Safavids (Barkan 1943, p. 171). In a similar manner, a local Armenian historian points to the “atrocities and destruction caused by the Safavids that led to the depopulation” of Kemah following the advent of Shah Ismā‘īl (Zulalian 1971, p. 62). Be that as it may, Arabgir was home to an influential nucleus of military supporters of the Safavid regime in western Diyarbakır (Anonymous 1361 Sh./1982, p. 25; Posch 2013, p. 189). Perhaps the two less-known tiyūl-holders whose names appear in the list of the shah’s share of the income from tiyūl as military governors of Arabgir in 916/1510–1511 represented the local stalwarts of the Safavid cause in the region. One of them, a certain Kurd-‘Ali Beg a.k.a. Kurd Beg, survived the Ottoman invasion of eastern Anatolia and shortly thereafter moved to Azerbaijan.

Early in the 16th century, Kemah had retained the military and strategic importance it enjoyed during Tamerlane’s invasion of Anatolia in 804/1401. Late in the 15th century the fortress town was a major administrative hub in northwestern Diyarbakır and a branch of the Aqquyunlu central treasury is reported to have operated from Kemah (Barkan 1943, pp. 184–185; Celâl-Zade Mustafa 1990, p. 390; Khunjī-Iṣfahānī 1992, p. 153). In the fiscal Year of Monkey or 916/1510–1511, Kemah was

25 Early in the 16th century, Ebu Tahir was a rural backwater to the north of Çermik; for more on its administrative status at that time, see Barkan (1943, pp. 169–170).
28 Located on the foothills of the Munzur mountain track in Dersim, early 15th-century Kemah was the seat of the Mutahharten’s anti-Ottoman emirate and one of the key bones of contention between Iranian and Central Asian army of Tamerlane and Bayezid I (791–805/1389–1403); see Yazdı (1387 Sh./2008, pp. 1123, 1125–1126); cf. Miroğlu (1990, p. 6).
administered as tiyūl, where the Safavid tiyūl-holder, who governed the fortress from Erzincan, paid a total of 15 tūmāns to central treasury or 20% of the taxes extracted from the Diyarbakır-based tiyūl-holders in the same fiscal year. In the autumn of 920/1514, the tiyūl-holder in charge of Kemah and Erzincan mounted a series of desperate guerrilla attacks against the Ottoman armies on their way back from Tabriz. But communication lines with Tabriz and Amid had already been cut off and it took only few months for the Ottomans to capture Kemah and Erzincan, which occurred in Rabi’ II 922/May 1516, paving the way for Selim I to set the stage for a major military campaign against the Zu’l-Qadr emirate to the south (Feridun Bey 1265–1274 AH/1848–1858, Vol. 1, pp. 407–411; SN, ff. 95v, 102v–104r; Miroğlu 1989, p. 97; Celâl-Zade Mustafa 1990, pp. 391–392; Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali 2009, f. 238r).

Assigned as tiyūl to a Chapnī military chief in 916/1510–1511, Bayburt was the closest Safavid military base to Trabzon, which between 892/1487 and 916/1510 had been appanaged to the Ottoman prince Selim (Emecen 2011, p. 33; Uluçay 1954a, p. 74). To the east of Trabzon, Ovacık was the westernmost military outpost of the Aqquynulu to the north of Bayburt (E. 3160, reproduced as document XXIX in Fekete 1977, p. 230). Tercan, Kovans, and Kelkit were three major rural settlements in the vicinity of Bayburt, of them Tercan is reported to have been a centre of pro-Safavid activities in the region in the early years of the 16th century. On the eve of the Ottoman invasion of eastern Anatolia and Azerbaijan, a Safavid military chief had been stationed in Tercan, leading local supporters of Shah Ismā‘īl against the intruders (SN, f. 77v; Celâl-Zade Mustafa 1990, p. 372). The appointment of a Chapnī emir as tiyūl-holder in Bayburt was not accidental; it took place at a time when a collateral branch of the Chapnī tribe led the Ottoman military base in Trabzon under the command of prince Selim. The likely prospect of the Qizilbāsh conquest of Trabzon in the wake of Selim I’s departure to Istanbul must have driven Shah Ismā‘īl to capitalise on inter-tribal divides between the Chapnīs of both cities. About half a century prior to this, Shaykh Junayd (d. 860/1456) and his disciples had laid a very successful siege to Trabzon and captured the city briefly before the outbreak of a plague epidemic forced them to leave the region for Georgia and Dagestan on a campaign of looting against non-Muslim denizens of both provinces (Shukurov 1993). But so far as Shah Ismā‘īl’s in-the-making campaign against the Ottoman garrison in Trabzon is concerned, all these proved to be a political miscalculation. In less than three years after its incorporation into tiyūl system, Bayburt was witness to the revolt of a Döğer military chief named Rustam Beg, during which the city was purged of high-ranking pro-Safavid elements and Rustam Beg entered an alliance with the Ottomans (Gökbilgin 1951, p. 40; cf. Celâl-Zade 1990, p. 384; Gelibolulu Mustafa ‘Ali 2009, f. 236v). There is evidence to suggest that the Qizilbāsh failure in Bayburt had also to do with their fiscal mismanagement: the findings of an Ottoman cadastral survey in 946–947/1540 indicates that the Safavid annexation of Bayburt in 913/1508 and the military

conflicts that ensued following the advent of Sultan Suleiman (926–974/1520–1566) had resulted in depopulation of more than 120 rural settlement in the region (Miroğlu 1975, pp. 25, 30, 32).

The way in which the Safavids dealt with the Kurdish city-state of Çemişgezek and its ruler Hājjī Rustam Beg Malkishī (d. 920/1514) throws light on the policy of using tiyūl as a mechanism of dynastic changeover in eastern Anatolia. At the time of the Qizilbāsh conquest of Diyarbakir, the township of Çemişgezek had a taxpayer population of up to 350 households, of which about two thirds were non-Muslim (Ünal 1999a, p. 60). Hājjī Rustam was one of those few Kurdish rulers in Diyarbakir who, in 913/1508, threw their support behind Shah Ismā’īl. Prior to his collaboration with the Safavids, the Ottomans had tried to win Hājjī Rustam’s allegiance, urging him to stop Turkmen nomads of central Anatolia to make their way into Diyarbakir and Azerbaijan (Çerini 1265–1274 AH/1848–1858, Vol. 1, pp. 353–354). Hājjī Rustam failed to comply with Bayezid II’s (886–916/1481–1512) order and soon allied himself with the Qizilbāsh. At the beginning, Shah Ismā’īl allowed Hājjī Rustam remain in his hereditary post as governor of Çemişgezek, but in 917/1511–1512, and not in 913/1507–1508 as Bidlīsī (1860–1862, Vol. 1, pp. 164–167) claims in his account on Hājjī Rustam’s career, the Qizilbāsh sent him and his relatives to exile in Azerbaijan and made a Tekkelu tiyūl-holder governor of Çemişgezek. In the summer of 920/1514, Selim I captured Hājjī Rustam and his clan in Marand, where they lived under house arrest, and put them to sword on account of their betrayal to the Ottoman cause under Bayezid II (Tekindağ 1968, p. 75; Hoca Sa’ddettin 1979, Vol. 4, pp. 219–220; Gelenbolulu Mustafa ‘Ali 2009, f. 236r). The Safavid tiyūl-holder in charge of local administration in Çemişgezek is reported to have dealt with local population heavy-handedly (Bidlīsī 1860–1862, Vol. 1, p. 165), pushing them further toward collaborating with the Ottomans shortly after Selim I’s rise to power.

Similarly, local powerbrokers in Hizan and Hazo were pro-Safavid at the outset of Shah Ismā’īl’s conquest of Diyarbakir. Early in the 16th century, Hazo was a major rural settlement to the south of Sason (or Sasan) inhabited by 500 to 600 households of Nestorian Christians (Tenreiro 1923, p. 54). They paid their taxes and tributes to the Kurdish governor of Sasaon, ‘Alī Beg Sāsānī, who traced his descent to the Sasanid kings of Iran and was reportedly a stalwart of the Qizilbāsh cause in eastern Anatolia. ‘Alī Beg Sāsānī had given away his daughter in marriage to Sharaf Beg b. Shah Muhammad Rūjaḵ, the governor of Bitlis, who, in 913/1508, was jailed by the Safavid governor of Amid Muḥammad Khan Ustājlu. But as a result of ‘Alī Beg’s rapprochement with the Qizilbāsh Shah Ismā’īl recognised Sharaf Beg as an ally (Bidlīsī 1860–1862, Vol. 1, p. 411) and kept him for about two years (913–916/1507–1510) in his post as governor of the strategic city of Bitlis, which in the first part of the 16th century was known as “the gate of Azerbaijan”.30 Like Hājjī Rus-

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30 See documents A.DVN.950.171 and A.DVN.937.117 (both dated late autumn 940/1533) in Bacqué-Grammont (1991, pp. 151, 162). Shortly after 913/1507–1508, Sharaf Beg was put in jail in Tabrīz and later on accompanied Shah Ismā’īl as a prisoner in the course of the Qizilbāsh invasion of Khurasan, during which he somehow managed to flee to eastern Anatolia (Bidlīsī 1860–1862, Vol. 1, p. 411).

tam of Çemişgezek, on the eve of the Ottoman offensive in 920/1514 ‘Alī Beg was summoned to Tabriz, where he spent his last years as a “confidant” of Shah Ismā‘īl. But after his death in Tabriz, ‘Alī Beg’s son Khīżr Beg sided with the Ottomans and was consequently restored as the governor of Sason and Hazer under Selim I (Bidlīsī 1860–1862, Vol. 1, p. 193). In Hīzān, where Dāvūd Beg b. Amīr Malik (fl. 920s/1524–1535), a native of Hīnūs, acted as local ruler under Shah Ismā‘īl, the Safavids first allowed the local authorities to take care of fiscal and administrative affairs of the town, but in less than two years, Dāvūd Beg and his allies in Hīzān were arrested and shortly before Selim I’s invasion of Azerbaijan a Safavid military chief was made governor of Hīzān (Bidlīsī 1860–1862, Vol. 1, p. 412).

Likewise, in Palū and Atak, the Safavid practice of tīyūl paved the way for the elimination of local powerbrokers and ruling families. Early in the 16th century, Atak, a fortress town standing astride the route leading from Amid to Bitlis, was the seat of local rulers affiliated with a collateral branch of the Mārdīn-based Zārī (or Aẓraẓi; also Zīrākī) clan, who since 881/1477 had vowed allegiance to the Aqquyunlu (Khunjī 1992, p. 126). At that time, Atak was the administrative centre of two rural districts named Bilān and Serde and sixty villages. Like the rest of eastern Anatolia, Armenian and Nestorian Christians constituted the majority of local population, and the findings of an early 16th-century cadastral survey by the Ottomans indicates that in the first part of the century out of a total of 12,500 souls more than 10,000 were non-Muslim (Bizbirlik 1999, pp. 111–113). The Safavids conquered Atak in 913/1507–1508 and forced out the Zārī clan. Shortly thereafter, a group of Qājār Turkmen moved in and took charge of the Safavid garrison in Atak. The taxes collected from the new regime’s tīyūl-holders in Atak were spent on the Qizilbāsh forces stationed in Azerbaijan and Persian Iraq. A similar pattern of political transition shaped the Qizilbāsh capture of Palū, a fortress town controlled by the Bulduqānī and Pāzūkī clans of the Mārdīsī (or Mārdīnī) tribal confederation of Kurdistan and Diyarbakir (Aydın 2011, pp. 308–314; cf. Woods 1999, pp. 186–187, 194; Posch 2013, pp. 85–87). In 917/1511–1512, the Safavids appointed a tīyūl-holder as governor of Palū amid the outbreak of a succession crisis at the local court following the death of Ḥusayn Beg Bulduqānī during a raid against the pro-Aqquyunlu forces in Ergani. It was only after the Ottoman conquest of eastern Anatolia in 922/1516 that the Bulduqānī and Pāzūkī rulers of Palū, led by Jamshīd Beg b. Ḥusayn Beg, were restored (Bidlīsī 1860–1862, Vol. 1, pp. 184–185; Ünal 1999c, pp. 213–214).

Under Shah Ismā‘īl, Hīspankeyf, a small fortress town on the southern bank of the Tigris River in Diyarbakir, went through a similar process of degradation from an independent city-state to a tīyūl district. The Ayyubid rulers of Kurdistan ruled from Hīspankeyf. Early in the 890s/late 1480s, the local ruler Malik Khalīl b. Sulaymān Ayyūbī (d. after 920/1514) extended his rule to Siirt, a fortress town to the south of Bitlis (Barbaro 1989, pp. 529–530). Shortly thereafter, he captured the Safavid Shaykh Ḩāydar’s female descendants on their way from Diyarbakir to the Hijaz, fleeing the Aqquyunlu persecution in Azerbaijan and eastern Anatolia. Malik Khalīl then married his eldest daughter, but during the years leading up to Shah Ismā‘īl’s seizure of political power he is reported to have sided with anti-Safavid forces in the
After the summer 907/1501, however, Malik Khalīl visited Tabriz to vow loyalty to his newly enthroned brother-in-law Shah Ismā’īl, but upon arrival in the city he was jailed and during a decade of hiatus that ensued, both Hisnkeyf and Siirt were assigned as tiyūl to the Qizilbāsh (Bidlīsī 1860–1862, Vol. 1, pp. 155–156; Seçkin 2006, pp. 88–89; Gelibolulu Mustafa ‘Ali 2009, f. 240v). In 916/1510–1511, Muhammad Khan Ustājlū appointed his brother Qarā Khan as tiyūl-holder in Hisnkeyf, while a year before this, Siirt had been assigned as tiyūl to a Qājār military chief.

The integration of Kulb and Çermik into the tiyūl system of land tenure after 913/1507–1508 brought about the downfall of local ruling families. Early Safavid Kulb had seen the decline of a dynasty of Kurdish rulers who ruled from Batman and traced their descent to the Umayyad caliphs. During the civil wars that broke out in both cities early in the 910s/1505–1515, the Safavid governor of Amid, who had married a female member of the Batman-based branch of the ruling family, intervened and eventually managed to bring both urban centres under the Safavid rule (Bidlīsī 1860–1862, Vol. 1, pp. 264–265). In 914/1508–1509, Çermik became tiyūl and a Qizilbāsh military chief replaced the Kurdish ruling family at the helm of local administration (Bidlīsī 1860–1862, Vol. 1, p. 190).

IV.b. Iran

Administratively, the early Safavid tiyūl districts in the province of Azerbaijan clustered around Ganja and Chukhur-i Sa’d to the north and Tabriz to the south (see Map 1). To the northwest, Eleşkirt, a military outpost and nomadic settlement (ovâ), which in 916/1511–1512 was administered as tiyūl land assignment, separated Azerbaijan from Diyarbakir (Matraççi 1976, p. 82; Kürzioğlu 1993, p. 107; Posch 2013, p. 47). To the southwest, Bitlis was under the jurisdiction of the Safavid provincial administration in Azerbaijan. Besides Eleşkirt and the neighbouring fortresses of Maku and Bayezid (or Mağazird), the districts of Kulb, Van, Vustan (modern Gevaş), Ahlat, and Adelcevaz 32 were administered from Bitlis (Kılıç 1999, pp. 17–18) and as such all were part of the province of Azerbaijan. There is evidence to suggest that out of these last five tiyūl districts the Qizilbāsh had plundered Van and Vustan in 910/1504. According to the account given in a contemporary Armenian chronicle, under the Qizilbāsh, whom it described as “a bunch of bloodsuckers called redheaded Sufis”, both districts, which were predominantly inhabited by Armenian Christians, were on the verge of total ruin and depopulation (Zulalian 1971, p. 62). 33

32 In 920/1514, Ahlat and Adelcevaz had been depopulated to the effect that Shah Ismā’īl declared both cities free tax zones; see E. 5831, in Fekete (1977, pp. 315–316).
33 For much of the two decades to come Van and Vustan remained in the same conditions. Late in the 920s/early 1530s, the region was the scene of border clashes between the Qizilbāsh and emir of Bitlis, Sharaf Beg Rūzakī; see Ovanes of Erciyes (1971, pp. 126).
In Qarabagh, the early Safavid tiyūl districts were Ganja, Varanda (modern Füzuli District in Nagorno-Karabakh), Dizaq (modern Jabrayil District in Nagorno-Karabakh), Mughanat, and Bargushat in Qapan. During 914 and 916/1508–1509 and 1510–1511, Varanda and Dizaq had been assigned as tiyūl to Pīrī Beg Qājār, the governor of Qarabagh. Pīrī Beg had been recruited to raise an army from among the nomads of Qarabagh (*AFT I*, ff. 112r, 115r). Another tiyūl district in Qapan was the village of Arut, which in 915/1509–1510 had been assigned to a prominent Qizilbash military chief. For much of the 16th century, the nomads of Qarabagh, coalesced into the twenty-four (İgirmidört) and thirty-two (Otuz-İkı) tribal confederations, were among the key allies of the Safavids in the northern salient of Azerbaijan. The findings of a late 16th-century cadastral land survey conducted by the Ottomans show that the district of Dizaq had jurisdiction over several dozen rural settlements, mostly presided over by local Armenian potentates (*699 Tapu Tahrir Defteri*, pp. 98–99; *Kırzıoğlu 1993*, p. 373; *AFT III*, f. 206r). Early Safavid Varanda, some 35 miles to the northeast of Dizaq, was the administrative centre of more than 120 rural settlements (*699 Tapu Tahrir Defteri*, pp. 98–99; *Kırzıoğlu 1993*, p. 373). As was the case with non-Muslim (Armenian and Nestorian) communities of eastern Anatolia, excessive taxation on Armenian denizens of Qarabagh accounted for the relatively high amounts of cash payments collected from local tiyūl-holders.

To the south of the Aras River, tiyūl-holders in charge of Usku, Dihkhvaraqan (modern Azar-Shahr), and Maragha paid less than 5 tūmāns to central treasury over the course of five fiscal years. This amounted to less than 2% of the shah’s share of the income from tiyūl districts in Azerbaijan. The lower rates of the cash payments made by the tiyūl-holders stationed in the vicinity of Tabriz can be taken to imply that the central authorities were careful not to drive a wedge between the shah and the Azerbaijan-based military elites by bringing them under fiscal pressure. To the east of Tabriz, Ungud, Sarab, Garmrud (present-day Miyana), Khalkhal, and Tarumayn were administered as tiyūl. All these tiyūl districts had played a crucial role in Shah Ismā’īl’s ascent to the throne in 907/1501.

Little is known about the administrative status of most of the tiyūl districts in Azerbaijan during the reign of Shah Ismā’īl. The sole exception is Khuy, the site of

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36 In 1005–1006/1597, the Ottoman and Tatar armies are reported to have massacred Armenians of Dizaq and Varanda; see Aṛak’el of Tabriz (2010, pp. 41, 486).
37 Ungud is located some 65 miles to the north of Mushgin (modern Mushkin-Shahr); see *IVG*, Vol. 1, pp. 58–60.
38 Tarumayn (now Upper and Lower Tarum) stands astride the route leading from Abhar to Zanjan; see *IVG*, Vol. 16, pp. 14–17. In 921/1515, a population of five hundred inhabitants lived in Tarumayn and it was governed from Khalkhal; see Simões (1898, p. 236); cf. Smith (1970, p. 40); Aubin (1986, p. 43).
Map 2. Tiyūl districts in Iran

a Safavid royal palace (dawlatkhāna) early in the 16th century (Angiolello 1980, p. 399; [Romano] 1980, p. 442; Riyāḥī 1372 Sh./1993, pp. 88–90). According to an early Safavid chronicle, the city had been assigned as tiyūl to an Ustājlū military chief in 913/1507–1508 (Ghaffārī Qazvīnī 1343 Sh./1964, p. 270), but there is evidence to suggest that in the same year Khuy had been assigned as tiyūl to the shah’s nephew Durmush Khan Shāmlū (d. 931/1525). The administrative status of Sarab also needs some clarifications. Between 914 and 918/1508 and 1512 Sarab had been assigned as tiyūl to a certain Khush-Andām Beg, who was likely to have been a boon companion of the shah. He was the only tiyūl-holder in the country that had made cash payments to central treasury during four consecutive fiscal years. As tiyūl-holder in Sarab, Khush-Andām Beg was in charge of the Turkmen nomads of the region between Sarab and Ahar, which in the later Safavid narrative sources were known as the Khalajs of Sarab (AFT III, f. 427r).

In Persian Iraq, tiyūl land assignments were mainly concentrated along the border with the Caspian emirates of Gilan-i Biyah Pas (Rasht), Gilan-i Biyah Pas (Lahijan), Rustamdar (Nur and Kujur), and Mazandaran (see Map 2). In 914 and 916/1508–1509 and 1510–1511, two Safavid tiyūl-holders affiliated with the Varsāq uymāq of the Rūmlū clan held the districts of Shamiran, Shahryar, Ray, and Damavand to the south of the war-torn province of Rustamdar. Their appointment coincided with the outbreak of succession wars between the claimants to the throne in Nur and Kujur (Ghaffārī Qazvīnī 1343 Sh./1964, p. 187; Nuvīdī Shīrāzī 1369 Sh./1990, p. 138; AFT I, f. 70r), which makes it likely to assume that these tiyūl-holders had been recruited to make preparations for the conquest of Rustamdar in near future. Contemporary narra-
tive sources highlight the demographic decline in major urban centres in Persian Iraq at the close of the 15th century. Iosafat Barbaro (1980, p. 547; Aubin 1986, p. 39), who had visited the area in the closing quarter of the century, clarified that the major cities in Persian Iraq had been “ruined for the most part”. For instance, as an early Safavid tiyūl district, Isfahan had suffered the massacre of its Sunni population in the hands of the Qizilbāsh (Tenreiro 1923, pp. 20–21).

The distribution of tiyūl districts in Khurasan, from Damghan to Mazar (or Mazar-i Sharif), was aimed to create a multi-layered line-up of military outposts against any offensive from Samarqand. Marv spearheaded the northern frontier with the Uzbek confederate clans. Nisa, Bavard (or Abivard), and Sarakhs, where two Qājār and Afshār tiyūl-holders had been put in charge of the Safavid forces, were supposed to back up the tiyūl-holder stationed in Marv, while tiyūl-holders in Bastam, Damghan, and Jajarm had to attend the task of defending the Safavid territorial conquests in Khurasan against any Uzbek onslaught from Astarabad. But during the period in question, Balkh was the most important tiyūl district in Khurasan. In 916/1510–1511, Ahmad Beg Afshār, who held Sarakhs as tiyūl, along with the tiyūl-holders in the western flank of Khurasan had moved their tābīn regiments to Balkh to counter the Uzbek forces to the north of Samarqand (E. 8349, rephoruduced as document XXV in Fekete 1977, p. 260).

The two other major tiyūl land assignments in early Safavid Iran were Shiraz and Baghdad, both contributing an overall amount of about 160 tumāns between 914 and 918/1508 and 1512. Fars had been given as tiyūl to the military and tribal chiefs who had joined the Qizilbāsh from the Zu’l-Qadr Emirate in central and southwestern Anatolia.

V. Monetisation of Tiyūl and the Qizilbāsh Opposition

The backdrop against which the monetisation of tiyūl under Shah Ismā‘īl took place was a campaign of fiscal and administrative centralisation initiated in 913/1507–1508 by Najm al-Dīn Mas‘ūd Rashīf (d. 915/1509), a goldsmith (zargar) and political fugitive from Gilan-i Biyah Pas at the Safavid court, who was made the shah’s vakīl or deputy in fiscal affairs late in 913/1508 at the royal winter camp in Hamadan (Khvāndmīr 1333 Sh./1954, Vol. 4, pp. 490–491; Lāhījī 1974, pp. 198, 312, 315; Aubin 1988, pp. 112–113; Rūmlū 1384 Sh./2005, p. 1010). Contemporary narrative sources clarify that upon his promotion to vakīl Najm Zargar resolved on restricting the fiscal powers of the Qizilbāsh military chiefs. Underlying his centralising policies were “planned budgeting and systematic book-keeping” or ḥisāb u kitāb. In particular, he is reported to have been keen on “redressing the disorders that had crippled fiscal administration in several provinces” (Khvāndmīr 1333 Sh./1954, Vol. 4, p. 491; cf. Ghaftāfī Qazvīnī 1343 Sh./1964, p. 271; Sayfī Qazvīnī 1386 Sh./2007, p. 280). Najm Zargar’s reforms came in the footsteps of three ill-fated campaigns of fiscal and administrative centralisation initiated in Iran at the close of the 15th century under the supervision of the Aqquyunlu vizier ‘Īsā Sāvajī (d. 896/1491), his Timurid counterpart in Herat.
Majd al-Dīn Muḥammad Khvāfī (d. 899/1494), and the Aqquyunlu prince Gövde Ahmad (d. 902/1497).39

Shah Ismā’īl’s rise to power in the summer of 907/1501 was soon followed by the new regime’s double-standard approach to fiscal centralisation. In provinces like Azerbaijan, where the administrative authority of the Qizilbāsh was firm and expansive, it took less than two years for the Safavid bureaucrats to take first steps towards fiscal and administrative centralisation. In Ramadan 909/March 1504 and Shawwal 911/March 1506, a number of Safavid land surveyors were posted to the dominantly Armenian-populated districts of Urdubad, Nakhchivan, and Maku to the north and northwest of Tabriz to inspect the ownership status of agricultural lands and urban properties in the region (documents XI and XIII in Papazian 1956–1968, Vol. 1, pp. 460–463). Another task these bureaucrats were expected to attend to was direct taxation on landed notables in the region. Where it was politically disadvantageous for the new regime to effectuate bureaucratic centralisation, the Safavids opted for fiscal laissez faire and administrative decentralism. In Persian Iraq, for instance, the new regime’s policy of putting the locally prominent landed notables in charge of fiscal administration of the province is argued to have bought the shah their much-needed support and collaboration (Aubin 1959, pp. 50–51). In Khurasan, a hotbed of political and religious opposition to the Qizilbāsh, Shah Ismā’īl had no qualms about incentivising land and money to win the backing of local notables irrespective of their confessional leanings. Soon after the conquest of Marv and Herat, he ordered “liberalisation” of all Timurid khāliṣa or state-owned agricultural lands and urban properties (‘iqār u amlāk) so that they could be redistributed as financial expedient among the new regime’s allies in the province (Amīnī Haravī 1383 Sh./2004, p. 358).

The contemporary anecdotal accounts on Shah Ismā’īl represent the opening decade of his reign as an era of administrative disorder at court and fiscal excesses in provinces, all attributed to the shah’s calculated disinterest in amassing personal wealth, a trait that undid any institutional move toward systematic budgeting and fiscal discipline during the years that ensued immediately following the Qizilbāsh capture of Azerbaijan in 907–908/1501–1503. While a contemporary chronicler underlines the increasing personalisation of career mobility among the new regime’s bureaucratic and military recruits, which made all appointments and promotions dependent on the shah’s whims and wishes (Sayfī Qazvīnī 1386 Sh./2007, p. 289), another late 16th-century historian points to the shah’s lack of interest in micromanaging the fiscal affairs of the state (Qazvīnī 1999, pp. 45–47). Still another observer was baffled by the monetary costs of Shah Ismā’īl’s cronyism, clarifying that “no amount of cash in this world” could stand the shah’s lavishing money on his intimates and bureaucratic favourites (Simões 1898, p. 243; cf. Jodogne 1980, p. 227). To win the shah’s approval and support amid the increasing opposition to his centralising policies among the Qizilbāsh military and tribal chiefs, Najm Zargar had to provide him with as much cash as he could, hence his efforts to cash in on all the basic services of the

central government, including *tiyūl*. Fiscal belt-tightening in provinces required all *tiyūl*-holders to pay a fraction of their emoluments to central treasury on annual basis. During his period as *vakīl*, Najm Zargar had managed to extract some 200 *tūmāns* from the *tiyūl*-holders posted to Diyarbakir, Azerbaijan, Persian Iraq, and Fars. Shortly before his death, he is reported to have managed to accumulate a cash reserve of 20,000 *tūmāns* in central treasury (Khvāndmīr 1333 Sh./1954, Vol. 4, p. 491; Aubin 1984, p. 12; Amīnī Haravī 1383 Sh./2004, p. 313).

In the short run, these centralising policies brought profit for the shah, but Najm Zargar’s avaricious money mongering polarised political forces at court and in provinces. In particular, *tiyūl*-holders resented with direct taxation. Few months after surviving a coup, which took place in the spring of 915/1509 and ended with the shah’s intervention on his behalf, Najm Zargar revoked the *tiyūl* rights and privileges of his foes Abdāl Beg Zu’l-Qadr and Ḥusayn Beg Shāmlū (d. 920/1514), whose membership in the administrative and military cabinet (*dīvān-i a’lā*) he had already declared void and null (Ghaffārī Qazvīnī 1343 Sh./1964, p. 272; Aubin 1988, p. 114; Amīnī Haravī 1383 Sh./2004, p. 313). Najm Zargar died early in the autumn of the same year in Arvanaq (modern Khamina), a rural settlement near Tabriz, under the circumstances that make it plausible to consider his demise a political murder. A dirge by Muḥammad Ahlī Shīrāzī (d. 940/1535), an admirer of Najm Zargar, concludes with remarks on the deceased vizier’s enemies, blaming his unanticipated death on their “poisonous” thoughts (see ode XLVI/vv. 9642–9664 in Ahlī Shīrāzī 1344 Sh./1965, pp. 471–474).

The next *vakīl* Yār-Aḥmad Khūzānī (d. 918/1512) was so unrelenting in his pursuit of fiscal centralisation that it earned him the epithet Second Najm or *Najm-i thānī*. Like his predecessor, Khūzānī acted as *amīr al-umārā* or chief minister at the administrative and military cabinet (Aubin 1988, p. 117). At the time of his promotion to *vakīl*, Khūzānī had also been made vizier, which maximised the scope of his authority as head of the fiscal and scribal services of the Safavid bureaucracy (*AFT* I, ff. 91r, 167r–v, 169v; *AhT*, ff. 592r–v). In time, Khūzānī’s rise to power sealed the fate of five top members of the *ahl-i ikhtiṣāṣ* (lit. bearers of prerogative)40 clique: the shah’s guardian (*lala*) and chief of staff (*amīr-i dīvān*) Ḥusayn Beg Shāmlū (Ghaffārī Qazvīnī 1343 Sh./1964, pp. 266, 269, 277; Lāhījī 1353 Sh./1974, pp. 186, 262), his adjutant and commander-in-chief of cavalry regiments (*qūrchī bāshī*) Abdāl Beg Dada Zu’l-Qadr (Khvāndmīr 1333 Sh./1954, Vol. 4, pp. 474–475; Ghaffārī Qazvīnī 1343 Sh./1964, p. 272), the chief army inspector (*tuvāchī bāshī*) and the shah’s brother-in-law Zayn al-‘Ābidīn Beg Shāmlū (d. 912/1506) a.k.a. ‘Abdī Beg (Khvāndmīr 1333 Sh./1954, Vol. 4, pp. 477–481; Ghaffārī Qazvīnī 1343 Sh./1964, p. 272; *AFT* I, f. 122r), the shah’s deputy in spiritual affairs (*khalīfa*) Malik Muẓaffar Tālish (d. 920/1514) a.k.a. Khādim Beg Khalīfā (Ghaffārī Qazvīnī 1343 Sh./1964, p. 272; Aubin 1984, pp. 5, 26), and Bayrām Beg Qaramānlū (d. 920/1514), who had married

40 Under Shah Ismā’īl the *ahl-i ikhtiṣāṣ* clique was composed of seventeen high-ranking Qizilbash military chiefs; for more on these military chiefs and Khūzānī’s opposition to them, see Aubin (1984, pp. 2–3, 11–12).
a sister of Shah Ismā’īl and acted as chief royal equerry (amīr ākhūr bāshī) (Khvāndmīr 1333 Sh./1954, Vol. 4, pp. 392, 497–498; Ḥusaynī Qumī 1383 Sh./2004, p. 57; AFT I, ff. 102v, 112v). Needless to say, almost all of these Qizilbāsh emires were tiyūl-holders.

Upon his promotion to vakīl/vizier, Khūzānī brought under his control all “fiscal and administrative affairs of the country” and in less than four years accrued enough money to mobilise an army of 5000 cavalrmen on the occasion of his invasion of Khurasan in 918/1512 (Khvāndmīr 1333 Sh./1954, Vol. 4, p. 527; AFT I, f. 203r; cf. Aubin 1988, pp. 28–36). This stands in clear contrast to what we know about the numerical strength of the tābīn forces recruited by the Qizilbāsh tiyūl-holders on the eve of the Battle of Chaldiran in 920/1514, which according to an Ottoman military reconnaissance dispatch did not exceed 3000 qūrchī or cavalrymen (E. 11996, reproduced in Bacqué-Grammont 1987, pp. 179–181). The new army, whose ranks had swelled to 12,000 recruits towards to the end of Khūzānī’s career, represented one of the first steps taken by the Safavid central authorities towards creating a “professional” army, foretokening the introduction and sophistication of the ghulām system of military elite mobility under Ṭahmāsb I (924–984/1524–1576) and ‘Abbās I (995–1038/1587–1629).

So far as tiyūl-holders are concerned, Khūzānī’s centralising policies played on their further marginalisation. Less than a year into his appointment as vakīl/vizier, the amount extracted from tiyūl-holders had a 300% rise. The fragmentary evidence given in the Safavid narrative sources on Khūzānī’s management of tiyūl affairs between 915/1509 and 918/1512 indicates that he was bent on demilitarising tiyūl land assignments in central Iran, hence the relatively small number of the districts enfeoffed as tiyūl with the Qizilbāsh in Persian Iraq between 914/1508 and 918/1512. Early on in his career, Khūzānī is reported to have appointed a paternal cousin of his, a non-Qizilbāsh landed notable in Isfahan, as tiyūl-holder in Abarkuh (AFT I, f. 202r), the second most important city in the province of Yazd in the latter part of the 15th century (Ḥāfiẓ Abrū 1378 Sh./1999, Vol. 2, p. 111), which once had been given as tiyūl to such a prominent Qizilbāsh military chief as ‘Abdī Beg Shāmlū. At the same time, Khūzānī was keen on spending the cash reserves accumulated under his predecessor on non-Qizilbāsh cavalry regiments, a move that was aimed to make the shah less dependent on tiyūl-holders and their tābīn forces.

The Qizilbāsh resented Khūzānī’s reforms and a number of tiyūl-holders in provinces complained about their insolvency and subsequent inability to take part in the shah’s military campaigns. A petition dated from about 916/1510–1511 and signed by the keeper of the royal seal Amīr Beg Mawṣillū points to his career instability as a tiyūl-holder during Khūzānī’s period as vakīl/vizier, criticising those at the helm of central bureaucracy for overtaxing the emoluments of provincial tiyūl-holders of his ilk. In particular, Amīr Beg criticised central authorities for their excesses in taxing his meager earnings from a tiyūl district in Khurasan in 916/1510–1511, which had recently been plundered by the Uzbekns. He urged the shah to either lower the tax rate or allow him to lay off part of his personal retainers so that he could mount a well-organised army of tābūns at the time of general mobilisation or jār u yasāq (E. 12212;
Aubin 1988, p. 31). Similarly, another petition prepared on behalf of the Safavid military governor of Shahrubergan to the east of Balkh points to the disorderly nature of the disposal of tīyūl land assignments in Khurasan as well as to the heavy costs of keeping on duty nōkar forces along the eastern flank of the province (E. 5835, document XXXIV in Fekete 1977, pp. 255–258). The same problems prompted the Safavid tīyūl-holders in Balkh and its neighbouring rural settlements to petition to the shah in 916/1510–1511, asking him to reconsider the practice of direct taxation (E. 8316; cf. Fekete 1977, pp. 263–265). During this period, the outbreak of famine and depopulation of many urban and rural settlements in Khurasan prevented provincial tīyūl-holders in eastern Iran to pay the pre-determined imposts (E. 5835, document XXXVIII in Fekete 1977, pp. 269–270).

It was as a result of these fiscal and disorganisation pressures that late in the autumn 918/1512, the Khurasan-based Qizilbāsh tīyūl-holders deserted the armies led by Khūzānī during a major campaign against the Uzbeks, leaving him alone with his death in the hands of the Uzbeks at the fortress of Ghijduvān few miles to the north of Marv (Khvāndmīr 1333 Sh./1954, Vol. 4, pp. 523–524; Szuppe 1992, p. 82).

VI. Concluding Comments

Between 914 and 918/1508 and 1512 more than eighty rural and urban districts across the Safavid dominions in Iran and eastern Anatolia were administered as tīyūl land assignment under the supervision of the Qizilbāsh military and tribal chiefs. These tīyūl-holders paid a portion of their emoluments to central treasury. The total amount of the taxes collected from them during these four fiscal years did not go beyond one tenth of central treasury’s cash flow in one fiscal year. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that more than its monetary value, the disposal of tīyūl land assignments acted as a mechanism of administrative control. In the provinces of Azerbaijan, Persian Iraq, Fars, Arabian Iraq, and Kirman, the tīyūl system of land tenure provided for the new regime to boost its control over fiscal administration. The most productive tīyūl-holders in early Safavid Iran had been stationed in Persian Iraq, contributing 23% of the taxes levied on and collected from tīyūl-holders across the country. Overall, the amounts extracted from the tīyūl-holders posted to Khurasan and Azerbaijan added up to 37% of the shah’s share of the income from direct taxation on tīyūl-holders’ annual emoluments. Less than a quarter of the shah’s income from the taxes collected from tīyūl-holders came from Fars, Kerman, Arabian Iraq, Luristan, and the Kalhur District.

In Diyarbakir, where over the course of four fiscal years tīyūl-holders had deposited as tax more than 125 tūmāns of their emoluments with central treasury, tīyūl expedited the process of dynastic transition in the Kurdish city-states of eastern Anatolia. The appointment of tīyūl-holders in Hazo, Hizan, Palu, Kulb, Çemşîcezek, Çermik, Atak, Hısnkeyf, and Siirt between 914 and 918/1508 and 1512 brought about the downfall of local powerbrokers and ruling families. Most of these marginalised local elites were former allies of the Aqquyunlu and in the latter part of the 15th cen-
tury had supported them against the Ottomans. As a result, their elimination in the years leading up to Selim I’s invasion of Tabriz in the summer of 914/1520 left Shah Ismā‘īl with no reliable regional allies. In 916/1522, many of these locally prominent emirs and bureaucrats backed the Ottomans in their struggle against the Safavid forces in eastern Anatolia in the Battle of Eski Koç Hisar, which resulted in the separation of the province of Diyarbakır from Safavid Iran.

Only a small fraction (between 3 and 10%) of a tīyūl-holder’s annual emolument was subject to direct taxation, but in 916/1510–1511 there had been a 300% spike in the overall amounts collected from tīyūl-holders across the country. This resulted in the disgruntlement of a number of tīyūl-holders. In particular, those tīyūl-holders who had been posted to Khurasan were vocal in expressing their dissatisfaction with the way in which tīyūl affairs of the country were handled under the supervision of the shah’s vakīl/vizier Yār-Aḥmad Khūzānī. The controversy over the mismanagement of tīyūl epitomised the internal power crisis that engulfed the Safavid state on the eve of the Battle of Chaldiran, ushering in a decade that witnessed major territorial loses in the eastern and western flanks of the country.

Appendix

He

THE RECEIPT OF THE SHAH’S SHARE OF THE INCOME FROM TĪYŪL [DISTRICTS] IN ITS TRANSCRIPT [VERSION], 730 TŪMĀNS AND 6000 DINARS [sic]41

YEAR OF THE DRAGON

Empty

YEAR OF THE SNAKE

100 tūmāns and 4000 dinars

Diyarbakır

9 tūmāns and 1000 dinars
Harput as tīyūl of bōy nūkar 5 tūmāns
Savur as tīyūl of Ḥusayn Beg Shāmlū 2 tūmāns and 5000 dinars
Çenguş and its fortress as tīyūl of Khāfīl Beg 6000 dinars
Çermik as tīyūl of Quṭfī Khalīfa Shāmlū 1 tūmān

41 The correct amount is 730 tūmāns and 4000 dinars.
Azerbaijan

32 tumāns and 1000 dinars
Ganja as tiyūl of Dāna Beg 7 tumāns and 2000 dinars
Khuy as the fodder tiyūl of Durmush Beg 1 tumān and 2000 dinars
Varanda and Dizaq, etc., as tiyūl of Pīr Beg Qājār 5 tumāns
Turkmens of Qarabagh, etc., as tiyūl of the same community 5 tumāns
Bargushat etc., as tiyūl of Uğurlu Mīrzā 8 tumāns
Garmrud as tiyūl of Shahvirdī Beg 1 tumān and 2000 dinars
Maragha as tiyūl of ‘Alī Beg Halvāchī-Uğlī 2 tumāns
Sarab as tiyūl of Khush-Andām Beg 2 tumāns
Arut as the fodder tiyūl of Lala Beg 5000 dinars

Persian Iraq

38 tumāns and 2000 dinars
Hamadan as tiyūl of Yigān Beg Tekkelū et al., 6 tumāns
Ray as tiyūl of Dīv Beg 7 tumāns
Qazvin as tiyūl of Dada Beg 5 tumāns
Shahryar as tiyūl of Pīr Aḥmad Beg Varsāq 4 tumāns and 2000 dinars
Qum as tiyūl of Lala Beg 5 tumāns
Isfahan as tiyūl of Durmush Beg tvāchī 7 tumāns
Natanz as tiyūl of Nārīn Beg 4 tumāns

Arabian Iraq

As tiyūl of Khulafā Beg Qaramānī 30 tumāns

YEAR OF THE HORSE

80 tumāns and 9000 dinars [sic]42

Diyarbakır

25 tumāns and 2000 dinars [sic]43
Çemîşgezek as tiyūl of Rustam Beg 8 tumāns
Harput as tiyūl of Aygūd-Uğlī 9 tumāns
Ebu Tahir and its fortress as tiyūl of Murād Beg Zu’l-Qadr 1 tumān and 5000 dinars
Ataq as the fodder tiyūl of Lala Beg 1 tumān
Çüngüş and its fortress as tiyūl of Ḥasan Beg Zu’l-Qadrlū 9000 dinars

42 The correct amount is 78 tumāns and 7000 dinars.
43 The correct amount is 23 tumāns.
MONETISATION OF TĪYŪL IN EARLY SAFAVID IRAN AND EASTERN ANATOLIA

Ruha as tīyūl of Turmush Beg 1 tūmān and 8000 dinars
Siirt as tīyūl of Nārīn Beg 8000 dinars

Azerbaijan

23 tūmāns and 7000 dinars
Chukhur-i Sa’d as tīyūl of Shah ‘Alī Beg 7 tūmāns
Mughanat as tīyūl of Bayrām Beg 8 tūmāns
Dīkhkvarāqan as tīyūl of Sārū Shaykh 1 tūmān and 2000 dinars
Salmas as tīyūl of Hasan Beg Tekkelu 1 tūmāns and 2000 dinars
Urmia as tīyūl of the same person 4 tūmāns
Ungud as tīyūl of Shah Manṣūr Beg 1 tūmān and 3000 dinars
Sarab as tīyūl of Khush-Andām Beg 1 tūmān

Arabian Iraq

23 tūmāns
Qazvin as tīyūl of Zaynāl Beg 7 tūmāns
Isfahān as the shared tīyūl of Lala Beg 7 tūmāns
Qum as the fodder tīyūl of Lala Beg 5 tūmāns
Sava as tīyūl of Manṣūr Beg qaychāchī

Fars

As tīyūl of the Zu’l-Qadrūlī emirs 9 tūmāns

YEAR OF THE SHEEP

331 tūmāns and 2000 dinars [sic]44

Diyarbakır

28 tūmāns and 4000 dinars [sic]45
The well-guarded Ruha as tīyūl of Turmush Beg et al., 2 tūmāns
Talguran as tīyūl of Aḥmad Beg Iğdir 1 tūmān
Hazo, etc., as ulkā of ‘Alī Beg Sāsānī 1 tūmān and 5000 dinars
Harput as tīyūl of Sārū Shaykh 13 tūmāns
Hisnkeyf as tīyūl of Qarā Beg 4 tūmāns and 2000 dinars

44 The correct amount is 339 tūmāns and 9000 dinars.
45 The correct amount is 33 tūmāns and 4000 dinars.

Arabgir as tiyūl of Kurd ‘Alī Beg and Qazzāq Beg 7 ūmāns and 7000 dinars
Bayburt, etc., as tiyūl of Maqsūd Beg Chapnī 4 ūmāns

Azerbaijan

25 ūmāns
Usku as tiyūl of the same community 1 ūmān
Turkmens as tiyūl of the community’s military chief 8000 dinars
Miyanduab and Ushni, etc., 1 ūmān and 5000 dinars
Khalkhal as tiyūl of Jalāl al-Dīn Ṭālish 2 ūmāns
Tarumayn as tiyūl of the same person 2 ūmāns
Urmia as tiyūl of Yigān Beg and Charkas Ḥasan 13 ūmāns
Dizaq and Varanda, etc., as tiyūl of Pīrī Beg Qājār 4 ūmāns and 2000 dinars
Turkmens of Sarab as tiyūl of Khush-Andām Beg 5000 dinars

Persian Iraq

69 ūmāns and 7000 dinars
Qum as the fodder tiyūl of Durmush Beg 24 ūmāns
Ray and Simnan as tiyūl of Dīv Beg 9 ūmāns and 5000 dinars
Shahrīyar and Damarand, etc., as tiyūl of Maḥmūd Beg Varsaq 5 ūmāns
Sultaniyya as tiyūl of Aḥmad Beg Zu’l-Qadr 7 ūmāns
Hamadan as tiyūl of Yigān Beg and ‘Alī Khan Beg 16 ūmāns
Darjazin as tiyūl of ‘Alī Beg ishīk āqāsī 1 ūmān and 2000 dinars
The Sa’idi Arabs as the fodder tiyūl of Lala Beg 7 ūmāns

Fars and Kirman

58 ūmāns and 4000 dinars
Fars as tiyūl of Zu’l-Qadr and Rūmlū emirs 45 ūmāns
Kirman as tiyūl of Aḥmad Beg 13 ūmāns and 4000 dinars

Khurasan

153 ūmāns and 4000 dinars
Herat as tiyūl of Lala Beg 6 ūmāns
Balkh as tiyūl of Bayrām Beg 7 ūmāns
Sarakhs as tiyūl Aḥmad Beg Afsähr 14 ūmāns
Sabzivar, Damghan, and Bastam as tiyūl of Dīv Beg 23 ūmāns
Mazār and Shaflan, etc., as tiyūl of Ḥasan Beg Ḥajīlar 28 ūmāns
Bakhriz as ukā of Dāna Beg 13 ūmāns
Khvaf as tiyūl of Maṃşūr Beg Afsähr 7 ūmāns

Haratrud etc., as *ulkā* of Shah ‘Alī Beg 11 *tūmāns* and 4000 dinars
Nisa and Bavard as *tiyūl* of Nārīn Beg 3 *tūmāns*
Marv as *tiyūl* of Lala Beg 14 *tūmāns*
Mashhad as *tiyūl* of Zayn al-‘Ābidīn Beg 13 *tūmāns*
Turshuz etc., as *tiyūl* of Durmush Beg 14 *tūmāns*

**YEAR OF THE MONKEY**

200 *tūmāns* and 4000 dinars

**Diyarbakır**

51 *tūmāns* and 5000 dinars
Çemigrouph as *tiyūl* of Ḥasan Beg Tekkelū 14 *tūmāns*
Āmid and Mardin, etc., as *tiyūl* of Chiyān Beg *tuvāchī* 7 *tūmāns*
Erzincan and Kemah as *tiyūl* of Maḥmud BegVarsāq 15 *tūmāns*
Harput as *tiyūl* of Sārū Shaykh registered under Year of the Sheep
Hīzan as *tiyūl* of Dāvūd Beg 5 *tūmāns*
Arabgir as *tiyūl* of Asilmas Beg 2 *tūmāns*
Van and Vustan as *tiyūl* of Ḥasan Beg Tekkelū 6 *tūmāns* and 2000 dinars, which is not included in this year
Fortress of Makuya and Bayezid, registered under Azerbaijan
Ergrān as *tiyūl* of Ḥasan Beg, Muḥammadī Beg’s brother, 5 *tūmāns*
Haçuk and Çapakçur as *tiyūl* of Ḥasan Beg Ayğūd 2 *tūmāns* and 5000 dinars
Palu as *tiyūl* of ‘Arab Beg 1 *tūmān*

**Azerbaijan**

44 *tūmāns* and 2000 dinars
Mughanat as *tiyūl* of Aḡzivār Beg 13 *tūmāns*
Sarab as *tiyūl* of Khush-Andām Beg 1 *tūmān* and 5000 dinars
Bargushat as *tiyūl* of Uḡurlū Mīrzā 9 *tūmāns*
Garmrud as *tiyūl* of Shāhvirdī Beg 1 *tūmān*
Ganj as *ulka* of Tarkhān Beg 5 *tūmāns*
Maragha as *tiyūl* of ‘Alī Beg et al., 4 *tūmāns*
Fortress of Bayezid and Makuya as *tiyūl* of Asilmas Beg 1 *tūmān* and 8000 dinars
Ahlat and Adelcevaz as *tiyūl* of Aḥmad Beg Zū’l-Qadr 2 *tūmāns* and 7000 dinars
Eleşkirt as *tiyūl* of Khalīl Beg *yasāvul* 1 *tūmān*
Kulb as *tiyūl* of ‘Alī Beg *ishīk āqāsī* 5 *tūmāns* and 2000 dinars

**Persian Iraq**

36 *tūmāns* and 3000 dinars
Isfahan as *tiyūl* of Muḥammad Beg emir of the *dīvān* 15 *tūmāns*
Shamiran, Shahryar, and Damavand as tiyūl of Maḥmūd Beg Varsāq 7 tūmāns and 8000 dinars
Sultaniyya as tiyūl of Burun Beg tōshmāl 4 tūmāns
Tarumayn as tiyūl of Jalāl al-Dīn Beg 2 tūmāns and 5000 dinars
Khurramabad as tiyūl of Katkhūdā Rustam’s Lala in Qara-Ulus 7 tūmāns

Arabian Iraq

45 tūmāns and 2000 dinars

Shiraz

19 tūmāns and 2000 dinars
As tiyūl of Khalīf Beg Zu’l-Qadr 15 tūmāns
As tiyūl of Ḥasan-‘Alī Beg Fīl-Qich 4000 tūmāns and 2000 dinars

Kalhur, etc.

As tiyūl of Bakhshī Beg Kalhur of Qara-Ulus 6 tūmāns

YEAR OF THE COCK

Empty

AND THE REST FROM THE PAY VOUCHERS ISSUED IN THE NAME OF MILITARY CHIEFS IN YEAR OF THE HORSE, 75 TŪMĀNS AND 8000 DINARS

Jam 7 tūmāns
Sarakhs 8 tūmāns
Badghis 15 tūmāns and 4000 dinars
Mashhad and Nishabur as ulkā of Zaynāl Beg’s brother 18 tūmāns
Qa’in as ulkā of Amīr Beg and his relatives 13 tūmāns and 4000 dinars
Farah the amount deposited during ‘Alī Beg’s tenure 13 tūmāns
Isfarayin and Jajarm 8 tūmāns
Sabzivar as tiyūl of Dīv Beg 5 tūmāns

MONETISATION OF *TIYÜL* IN EARLY SAFAVID IRAN AND EASTERN ANATOLIA

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E. 1071 (Topkapı Palace Museum Archives, Istanbul), f. 1r.
E. 1071 (Topkapı Palace Museum Archives, Istanbul), f. 2r.
E. 1071 (Topkapı Palace Museum Archives, Istanbul), f. 3r.
E. 1071 (Topkapı Palace Museum Archives, Istanbul), f. 3v.
E. 1071 (Topkapı Palace Museum Archives, Istanbul), f. 4r.
هو

وصول سهم الملك همايون از بایت تیول فی السواده
هفتصد و سی تومان و نش هزار دینار ۴۶
لوي نیل
خالی
نیلان نیل
صد و نه تومان و چهار هزار دینار
دیاربکر
نه تومان و یک هزار دینار
خربرت عن تیول بیو نوکر پنج تومان
سوار عن الكابی حسین بیگ شامول دو تومان و نش هزار دینار
چنگش و حصار ان عن تیول خلیل بیگ شش هزار دینار
چرمهک عن تیول قلی خلیفه شامول یک تومان

اذربایجان
سی و دو تومان و یک هزار دینار
گنهه عن تیول دانا بیگ هفت تومان و دو هزار دینار
خوی عب تیول علفه دورمش بیگ یک تومان و دو هزار دینار
ورنده و دراق و غیره عن تیول پری بیگ قاجار پنج تومان
ترکمه قرابغ و غیره عن تیول جمعه پنج تومان
بیستش و غیره عن تیول اوغلو میرزا هشت تومان
گزمود عن تیول شاهویرده بیگ یک تومان و دو هزار دینار
مراعع عن تیول علفه الله بیگ پنج هزار دینار
سراب عن تیول حسید ادام بیگ دو تومان
اروط عن تیول علفه الله بیگ پنج هزار دینار

عراق عجم
سی و هشت تومان و دو هزار دینار
همدان عن تیول یکان بیگ تخلو و غیره شش تومان
ری عن تیول دیو بیگ هفت تومان

۴۶ Sic.; it must be read 730 tūmāns and 4000 dinars.

قزوین عین تیول ده ده بیگ پنج تومان
شهریار عن تیول بیپن احمد بیگ ورساق چهار تومان و دو هزار دینار
قم عن تیول لله بیگ پنج تومان
اصفهان عن تیول درمش بیگ توایج هفت تومان
نطنز عن تیول تارین بیگ چهار تومان

عراق عرب
عن تیول خلفا بیگ قرمانی سی تومان

یونون نیل
هشتاد تومان و نه هزار دینار

دیاربکر
بیست و پنچ تومان و دو هزار دینار
چمشگزک عن تیول رستم بیگ هشت تومان
خریارت عن تیول ایغود اغلی نه تومان
ابواه و قلعه اش عن تیول مراد بیگ نواقدر بک تومان و پنچ هزار دینار
اطاق عن تیول علفه لله بیگ یک تومان
چنانکه و حصاران عن تیول حسن بیگ نواقدینه نه هزار دینار
رهه عن تیول طورش بیگ یک تومان و هشت هزار دینار
سعود عن تیول نارین بیگ هشت هزار دینار

آذربایجان
بیست و سه تومان و نه هزار دینار
چخورسند عن تیول شاه علی بیگ هشت تومان
مغانان عن تیول براهم بیگ هشت تومان
دهخوارستان عن تیول سارو شیخ پک تومان و دو هزار دینار
سلماس عن تیول حسن بیگ تکلی پک تومان و دو هزار دینار
ارومیه عن تیول ایضاً چهار تومان
انگود عن تیول ذا متصور بیگ پک تومان و سه هزار دینار
سراب عن تیول خوش اندام بیگ پک تومان

عراق عجم
بیست و سه تومان

47 Sic.; it must be read 78 tūmāns and 7000 dinars.
48 Sic.; it must be read 23 tūmāns.
MONETISATION OF *TIYÜL* IN EARLY SAFAVID IRAN AND EASTERN ANATOLIA


49 *Sic*.; it must be read 339 *tūmāns* and 9000 dinars.

50 *Sic*.; it must be read 33 *tūmāns* and 4000 dinars.

قرؤين عن تیول زینل بیک هفت تومان
اصفهان عن تیول حصن‌الله بیک هفت تومان
فم عن تیول عطفه لله بیک پنج تومان
سازون عن تیول منصور بیک فیشاچی چهار تومان

فآرس
 عن تیول امراه ذوالقدرلو و غيره ته تومان

قوی نبل

سیصد و سی و پنجم تومان و دو هزار دینار

دیاربکر

بیست و هشت تومان و چهار هزار دینار

رهاه محررسه عن تیول طورمش بیگ و بقیه دو تومان

تلگون عن تیول احمد بیگ ایگر یک تومان

حزه و غيره عن الکات علی بیگ ساسانی یک تومان و پنج هزار دینار

خربرت عن تیول سارو شیخ سیزده تومان

حسن‌کیف عن تیول قرا بیگ چهار تومان و دو هزار دینار

عربیگیر عن تیول سعدی بیگ و قراق بیگ هفت تومان و هفت هزار دینار

بابرده و غيره عن تیول مقصود بیگ چنی چهار تومان

آذربایجان

بیست و پنجم تومان

اسکو عن تیول جماعت یک تومان

تراکمه عن تیول امیر جماعت هشت هزار دینار

میان دو آب و اوزنی و غیره یک تومان و پنج هزار دینار

خملان عن تیول جلال الدين طاشت دو تومان

طارمین عن تیول ایضا دو تومان

ارومیه عن تیول بکان بیگ و چرکس سیرزه تومان

درراق و ورندی و غیره تیول پیری بیگ قاجار چهار تومان و دو هزار دینار

تراکمه سراب عن تیول خوشی اندام بیگ پنج هزار دینار

عراق عجم

شصت و نه تومان و هفت هزار دینار

قم عن تیول عطفه درمش بیگ بیست و چهار تومان
ری و سمنان عن تبیل دید بیگ‌ه تومن و پنچ هزار دینار
 شهریار و دماوند و غیره عن تبیل محمود بیگ و رقاص بنچ تومن
 سلطانیه عن تبیل احمد بیگ نزارقو هفت تومن
 همدان عن تبیل لکان بیگ و علی‌خان بیگ شلزنده تومن
 در هزینه عن تبیل علی بیگ ایشک افاسی بیگ تومن و دو هزار دینار
 اعراب سعیدی عن تبیل علیه لله بیگ هفت تومن

فارس و کرمان
پنجه و هشت تومن و چهار هزار دینار
فارس عن تبیل امرای ذوالفقار و رضوان چنبل و پنچ تومن
کرمان عن تبیل احمد بیگ سیزده تومن و چهار هزار دینار

خراسان
صد و پنجه و سه تومن و چهار هزار دینار
هرات عن تبیل لله بیگ شش تومن
بلغ عن تبیل بیرام بیگ هفت تومن
سرخس عن تبیل احمد بیگ افشار چهارده تومن
سیروان و دامغان و بسطان عن تبیل دیو بیگ بیست و سه تومن
مزار و شافلان و غیره عن تبیل حسن بیگ حاجی‌نور بیست و هشت تومن
باشیر عن الکان دانا بیگ سیزده تومن
خواف عن تبیل منصور بیگ افشار هفت تومن
هرآرود و غیره عن الکان شاه علی بیگ پارس تومن و چهار هزار دینار
نیا و باورد عن تبیل ناریا بیگ سه تومن
مرو عن تبیل لله بیگ چهارده تومن
مشهد عن تبیل زین العابدين بیگ سیزده تومن
ترشیز و غیره عن تبیل درم شیخ بیگ چهارده تومن

پیچین دل
دویست و دو تومن و چهار هزار دینار

بیاپکر
پنجه و بیک تومن و پنچ هزار دینار
چم‌گرک عن تبیل حسن بیگ تکلو چهارده تومن
امد و ماردن و غیره عن تبیل چایان بیگ تواجی هفت تومن
ارزنجان و کم‌خان عن تبیل محمود بیگ و رقاص پانزده تومن
خرپرت عن تبیل سارو شیخ در قوی بیک نوشته شده
خیران عن تبیل داوود بیگ پنچ تومن
عسکری عن تبیل اسلم بیگ دو تومن

و ان و وسطان عن تیول حسن بیگک تکلیف شش تومان و دو هزار دینار داخل در این سال نیست
قلعه ماکویه و بندرین دل اذربایجان نوشته شده
ارغیان عن تیول حسن بیگ برادر هدیه بیگ پنج تومان
خاجورو و چیباچور عن تیول حسن بیگ ایوغود دو تومان و پنج هزار دینار
پنا عن تیول عرب بیگک یک تومان

آذربایجان
چهل و چهار تومان و دو هزار دینار
مغناطیس به تیول افزایش بیگ سیزده تومان
سراب عن تیول خوش اندام بیگ یک تومان و پنج هزار دینار
برگشات عن تیول افرزو میرزا نه تومان
گرمرود عن تیول شاهوری بری بیگ یک تومان
گنجه عن شکایت ترخان بیگ پنج تومان
مراغه عن تیول عیسی بیگ و غیره چهار تومان
قلعه بازیزی و ماکویه عن تیول اسمبلس بیگک یک تومان و هشت هزار دینار
خلاق و عادنوارعن تیول احمد بیگ ذوالقدر دو تومان و هفت هزار دینار
الاشرفیعن تیول خلیل بالول بیگک تومان
کلب عن تیول علی بیگک ایشک آقاصی پنج تومان و دو هزار دینار

عراق عجم
سی و شش تومان و سه هزار دینار
اصفهان عن تیول حیدر بیگک میر دیوان پانزده تومان
شمران و شهریار و دماوند عن تیول محمدر بیگ ورساق هفت تومان و هشت هزار دینار
سلطانیه عن تیول بورون بیگک تشنم چهار تومان
طامینعن تیول جلال الدین بیگک دو تومان و پنج هزار دینار
خرم اباد عن تیول لله کخدا رستم قرا الوس هفت تومان

عراق عرب
چهل و پنج تومان و دو هزار دینار

شیراز
نوزده تومان و دو هزار دینار
عن تیول خلیل بیگک دو اقلد پانزده تومان
عن تیول حسنعلی بیگک فیض چهار تومان و دو هزار دینار

کلهر و غیره
عن تیول بخشی بیگک کلهر قرا الوس شش تومان

Abbreviations


References

Primary Sources


MONETISATION OF TİYŪL IN EARLY SAFAVID IRAN AND EASTERN ANATOLIA


E. 12212, Topkapı Palace Museum Archives, Istanbul.


Secondary Sources


