

CHAPTER 5

THE EU TRANSPORT POLICY AND THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS

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1. Introduction

This chapter addresses two significant changes in the European Union's transport policy instituted in the last two decades. The first clearly relates to enlargement: the EU transport policy now covers a larger area of EU 28, as opposed to the area of EU 12 after the publication of the 1992 White Paper on transport. The other significant change is the broadening of the policy itself during this period to include country- and urban-level transport issues, in addition to the earlier focus on continental and EU-wide interconnection and synchronization. This broadening resulted from recognition that targets for EU competitiveness were unachievable without an encompassing approach to policies for transportation.

The first part of this chapter introduces the development of policies for EU transport during enlargement, the TEN-T network during the past two decades, and identifies the main issues and challenges of that period. The chapter presents details of the most recent EU policies for transport that aim to establish effective connection and synchronization in the enlarged area. An included comparison contrasts recent policies' deliverables for transportation networks with earlier expectations.

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2. Early plans for motorway interconnections between Europe and Turkey

The so-called Trans-European North-South Motorway network (TEM) was the result of a plan, initiated as early as the 1970s, to establish a corridor system “be-hind” the iron curtain.² The designation, TEM, reflects the plan’s initial intent to connect the Eastern-Central to the Southern European (ECSE) regions, using a corridor following the North-South direction. However, the plan soon extended towards Turkey, taking a West-East direction near the Yugoslav-Bulgarian borders. The earlier idea for the corridor arguably, might have had an agenda involving strategic and security plans for an interconnected highway parallel to the borders of the Soviet Union. However, the EU transport policy from the 1992 White Paper, after the demise of the Soviet Union, does not seem to coincide with the earlier TEM plans. Figure 1 illustrates the TEM network as planned in 1977.




Figure 1. Trans-European North-South Motorway (TEM) Network.
Source: (Hantak, 2007).

2 Marian Hantak, “TEM Project Development and Master Plan” (presented at a conference as the “Trans-European North-South Motorway (TEM) Project” for the United Nations Economic Commission For Europe, Chisinau, November 6-7, 2007), http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/main/eat/docs/5th_NW_Item1bi_e.pdf

3. From early EU ideas to the first common policy for transport in 1992

During the 1970s, the EU confined consideration to the EU-wide problems of transport, such as competitive neutrality, synchronization of rules, and common networks between the member states, but not focus on country-level, local-level or wider global problems. The need for a common policy guiding European transport became moot with the 1957 Treaty of Rome, but Future Development of a Common Transport Policy³ the first White Paper, did not appear until 1992, despite numerous regulations and guidelines for transport preceding the official document. The common attribute of the previous regulations was the concern for creating competition neutrality. The guidelines included, for example, important measures regulating scrapping of marine cargo capacity, and mandatory rest periods for over-the-road haulers. However, such measures did not represent a coherent approach to policies governing transport. To illustrate, the Single European Act of 1986, aimed to leave domestic trade undisturbed and competition undistorted, but the 1986 act ignored expectations for common European networks.

At the policy level, two target areas emphasized policy for common transport. The first related to legal aspects, a comprehensive measure to include earlier initiatives for regulating competition, particularly diminishing national regulatory and monopolistic conditions that reduce effective and efficient transport across borders. The second was to improve physical infrastructure to facilitate connections among the 12 (soon the 15) member states. Both of these policy areas, clearly expressed in the guiding principle of the 1992 Common Transport Policy,⁴ gained recognition as the “single network for a single market.” The EU, seeking to exploit existing potentials fully, first sought to link existing networks and institutions, largely ignored by member states in neighbouring countries. This opening to the neighbourhood led to the Trans-European Network (TEN) to provide EU-level trunk connections not only for transport (TEN-T) but also for energy (TEN-E) and telecommunications (TEN-C). In 1996, the EU established guidelines and key elements of the TEN-T network. Thereafter, the focus shifted from the network itself to the task of completing 14 priority projects associated with TEN.

3 Commission of the European Communities, “The Future Development of the Common Transport Policy [CTP]– A Global Approach to the Construction of a Community Framework for Sustainable Mobility,” *Communication from the Commission, White Paper*, document drawn up on the basis of COM(92) 494 final, 1992, http://aei.pitt.edu/1116/1/future_transport_policy_wp_COM_92_494.pdf.

4 Ibid.

4. Extending TEN-T: the system of Pan-European corridors

The EU transport policy, adopted in 1992, reflected the realities of Europe in the late 1980s at the time of the policy's formulation. Incorporating these ideas into the Union's documents during the 1990s, the map of Europe changed. In 1989, the Berlin Wall collapsed and the Iron Curtain disappeared, forcing policy-makers to accept the notion of a larger Europe. Correspondingly, the process of approving the TEN-T concepts also changed. A process of negotiations, the Pan-European transport conference, began in Prague in 1991, in Crete 1994, and in Helsinki 1997. In these discussions, delegates of respective transport ministries negotiated and approved plans for the so-called "Helsinki corridors" or "Pan-European corridors," which became the Eastern European extension of the original TEN-T.

The implications of the TEN-T appear in Figure 2, which shows the scheme for the network of the 1990s with interlocking internal corridors covering the EU 15:




Figure 2. The scheme of the TEN-T network

The extension for Eastern Europe of the TEN-T would give a network represented in Figure 3.

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


Figure 3. The extended TEN-T network

However, the scheme did not become reality, undoubtedly due to the euphoria of the 1990s' improving East–West relations having influenced the parties' consideration of the task and clouded longer-term thinking. The priority became only extending the main East–West corridors, as illustrated in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Schematic extension of the East-West corridors

In actuality, the East–West schematic is inaccurate, partly because **Eastern** Europe encompasses a greater area north to south than the **Western part**, and partly because Western European nations demand links to the north-east from Italy and to the south-east from Germany too. These demands led to connections resembling those depicted in Figure 5, which may represent a network, but still display a different pattern from the originally designed TEN-T network for *improving internal connections* among the EU's 15 countries.


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Figure 5. Extension of the East-West corridors of the TEN-T network

In the Pan-European network no North–South corridors existed except Corridor 9 (Finland to Greece). Instead corridors linking the East from the EU 15 veered north or south (Figure 6). The North-South connections established as a result are clearly more accidental than planned. Indeed, what emerged hardly reflects the original intention of a grid network intended to balance spatial inequalities.⁵

In summary, the extended network’s structure linked the new territories to the earlier grid rather than extending the multilateral grid to the enlargement encompassing Eastern countries. In addition to the ten Helsinki corridors, four Pan-European transport areas (PETRAs) delineated water transport corridors.

5. Extension of the Pan-European corridors as the TINA Network 1999

After the initial euphoria following the collapse of the Iron Curtain, the development of the Pan-European network to link East-West elements of TEN-T led to the realization that the Pan-European corridors were insufficient to meet the need for inter-regional and trans-national transport connections for Eastern Europe. For instance, no Pan-European corridor crosses the East-West border of Slovakia and Hungary to the east of Bratislava – a distance of more than 600 kilometers. Due to such problems, the so-called Transport

5 Even later some EU documents have not progressed beyond the unilateral effort described here. See “White Paper on Services of General Interest COM (2004) 374 final,” Commission for the European Communities, Brussels, May 12, 2004, 3.3, “. . . the Commission’s policy in the area of Trans-European Networks is improving access to transport, energy and communications networks in the more remote area and will assist in linking the new Members States with the infrastructure of the Fifteen...” (italics added by the author).

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Figure 6. The Pan-European (PEC; or Helsinki) Corridors.

Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/00/Pan-European_corridors.svg/826px-Pan-European_corridors.svg.png

Infrastructure Needs Assessment⁶ process launched in 1995, while the Pan-European conferences continued. In the TINA framework, the transport experts of the EU-15 advised high-level transport administrators of the candidate countries on methods for assessing these candidates' transport infrastructural needs. The final report of TINA

⁶ TINA (Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment), "Final Report," Phare EC DG IA – EC DG VII (Vienna: TINA Secretariat, 1999).

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(1999) extended beyond simply an advisory document, but rather one advocating additional corridors, defined as either primary or secondary priorities.

The primary corridors proposed, unanimously agreed, or at least voted for “without visible opposition,” reflected the successful advocacy of the advisors. These corridors were to be identical to the Helsinki corridors that had evolved. TINA (1999) never clearly defined “secondary” priority but estimated that those would be less likely to attract EU Cohesion Funds.

6. Time to decide: **White Paper** for transport policy in 2001

Nine years after the first White Paper on Transport, the EU Transport Policy White Paper of 2001 appeared and reviewed the mixed results achieved. By that time, initiatives had largely achieved the goals for competitive markets: consumer prices fell, quality of services improved, technology spread with more ease, and the closed transport markets opened (except for rail); however, the more general dysfunctional features remained unalleviated. Similar to EU development as a whole, the center of the network for transportation continued its congestion, while uneven development characterized the periphery, and more remote areas were neglected almost entirely. As the 2001 White Paper admitted, European transport suffered from “[a]poplexy in the centre and paralysis at the extremities.” Congestion on main roads and railways, in cities and in the air, mounting health and environmental damage, and shocking accident figures were especially alarming.

The 2001 White Paper included environmental proposals built on the recommendations offered in the 1992 Transport White Paper. It aimed to ensure that the quantity of traffic would not rise in conjunction with economic development (“decoupling”). The proposals expressed the intent of curbing the increase in road traffic by three means: (1) employing pricing and regulation schemes for the road sector; (2) improving efficiency of modes of transport other than via roads to offer feasible alternatives; and in the meantime; (3) investing in infra-structure. These infrastructural developments were automatic associations with the TEN-T network, in a slightly revised form.

As such, the 2001 White Paper made a significant step forward in formulating principles by recognizing that concentration on inter-country links was insufficient for progress to improve EU transport. Objectives for policies required synchronization in depth and outlook, and proposals revised the approach of the

1990s and firmly asserted need for changes in environmental and social matters. The implementation of the White Paper foresaw 60 tasks grouped according to four headings: (1) changes in proportions among transport modes; (2) elimination of bottlenecks; (3) development of a user-centered transport policies; and, (4) consideration of globalization of transport.

7. Re-examination of the TEN-T principles (2004) and further extensions

The 2001 White Paper seemed to indicate that new investments would conform to the tenets of the TEN-T network, but the implementation of the 14 agreed projects encountered significant delay, clearly indicating that these projects were of varying priority among each of the member states. The uneven support resulted in the inability of these projects to attract EU contributions, with a ceiling of ten percent for a project's budget (leaving the remaining 90 percent as the member state's responsibility), leading a loss of incentives for completion.

In 2003, a committee chaired by the Union's earlier transport commissioner pre-sented recommendations for revising TEN-T.⁷ The report stated that improving the execution of the projects called for changes in the TEN-T guidelines and the appointment of coordinators for each project, along with greater EU financial contribution. The Van Miert Report also proposed new projects in addition to the uncompleted ones. The re-examination of the TEN-T guidelines clearly had no concern for defining the network, revising its structure, or envisaging an expanded area (along with the problems such expansion entailed). The report dealt mainly with the TEN-T guidelines for priority projects, and significantly, with the means for more effective implementation. The report passed through the Union's bureaucratic forums relatively quickly and the Commission endorsed its findings on April 29, 2004, just two days before the accession of the ten new member states into the Union. Thirty projects received priority instead of 14 and raised the EU financial contribution from 10 to 20 percent.⁸

This treatment of the corridors' extensions as appendices of the earlier accepted TEN-T elements did not mark a departure from the 1997 Helsinki conference, during the original corridors were delineated. A new document on the transport infrastructure of the Balkans appeared in 2002 (TIRS—Transport Infrastructure Study in Balkans) and covered seven countries: Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina,

7 Karel Van Miert, "High Level Group on the Trans-European Transport Network – Report," 2003, http://ec.europa.eu/ten/transport/revision/hlg/2003_report_kvm_en.pdf.

8 Decision 884/2004/EC and Corrigendum to the Decision 884/2004/EC.

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Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro, Macedonia, and Romania. This document indicated that the basic network in Bulgaria and Romania would be identical to the corridors decided earlier in the TINA process. As for the other five countries, the European Investment Bank (EIB) conducted a survey (Western Balkans Transport Infrastructure Inventory), which identified and categorized (according to financial feasibility) 223 potential projects.⁹

The next process, beginning in 2005, accounted for the new neighbourly relations of the EU 27 when designating further “transnational axes” labelled “North,” “Central,” “South-East,” and “South West,” with the “maritime highways” as the fifth axis (Figure 7).¹⁰ As Figure 7 shows, the latter two, namely the South-West Axis and the maritime highways, are the most promising connections between the Union’s area and Turkey.




Figure 7. Five transnational axes to assist trade and regional integration. Source: Guidelines 2007. Guidelines for transport in Europe and neighbouring regions.

9 TIRS (Transport Infrastructure Regional Study), “Final Report,” 2002, <http://www.cemt.org/topics/tirs/TIRSFinal.pdf>.

10 European Commission, “Guidelines for transport in Europe and neighbouring regions: Extension of the major trans-European transport axes to the neighbouring countries and regions,” 2007; *Memo*, Directorate General for Energy and Transport, http://www.cluster-maritime.fr/pdf/2007_guidelines_tent_en.pdf.

These developments suggest distinctive processes, particular for the Balkans. First, determination of the networks for the Balkans appears to be more a result of decisions occurring outside the region, in an interregional framework, as opposed to planning based on intra-regional considerations. Second, since the categorization is according to financial feasibility, those projects already in progress and which gain strength from modifications had improved chances for EU support while feasibility for new structures substantially diminished.

8. Re-examination of the **White Paper (2006): road haulage strikes back?**

The 2006 midterm review represented a significant departure from the 2001 White Paper, whose report sought imposing effective limits on shares of road haulage in European transport.¹¹ As noted, the 2001 White Paper examined previous mistakes and underlined the need for significant change. The re-examination in 2006 emphasized the continuity of basic principles in transport policies, thereby reversing the environmental friendliness of the 2001 White Paper. Indeed, the 2001 White Paper asserted that the share of road transport among all other modes continued to rise despite efforts at curbing this. Instead the re-examination in 2006 identified an achievement: “The internal market has contributed to creating competitive international road haulage and increasingly also rail operations. Moreover, the last five years have seen the effects of globalisation leading to the creation of large logistics companies with worldwide operations.”¹² Moreover, the 2001 White Paper advocated curbing the increase in traffic volume by separating economic growth from traffic growth. The re-examination also **talked about separation**, but in a different sense: “Mobility must be disconnected from its negative side effects,” implying acceptance of traffic growth rather than limiting it.¹³

The White Paper adopted a policy of curbing road transport **by** intervention. To the contrary, the mid-term review’s concern was “to optimise each mode’s

11 Commission of the European Communities, “Keep Europe moving – Sustainable mobility for our continent. Mid-term review of the European Commission’s 2001 Transport White paper,” *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, White Paper*, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0314:FIN:EN:PDF>.

12 *Ibid.* p. 5.

13 *Ibid.* p. 4.

own potential,” indicating a lack of interest for intervening with respect to curbing road transport.¹⁴ The new document also defined optimizing goals (“each transport mode must be optimised,” and “the efficient use of different modes on their own ... will result in an optimal and sustainable utilisation of resources”).¹⁵ However, no anchor in sectorally integrated policy-level assignments existed for optimizing these goals. Rather than openly rescinding the earlier interventionist objectives (shifting the balance between modes), the new report negated them by omission. Still, the midterm review declared that “sustainable mobility policy therefore needs to build on a broader range of policy tools achieving shifts to more environmentally friendly modes where appropriate, especially on long distance, in urban areas and on congested corridors.”¹⁶ The 2006 paper asserted, however, “[t]he efforts to achieve the goals of meeting growing mobility needs and strict environmental standards are beginning to show signs of friction,”¹⁷ and sought to imply quite strongly restoration of strict environmental protections. In short, although the 2006 re-examination of transport policies diverged significantly from the progressive direction of the 2001 White Paper, the 2006 review attempted to imply continuity by avoiding overt divergence.

9. The 2011 White Paper on EU transport policy

The main document of this new transport policy is a 30-page White Paper, delineating its main points in 68 paragraphs, and accompanied by an appendix of 40 initiatives.¹⁸ The overriding objectives of the 2011 White Paper are reduction of emissions and the construction of a uniform European network. The focus arises from two important EU documents: The EU 2020 Strategy, from which the White Paper draws its *sustainability goals*,¹⁹ and the Maastricht Treaty (1992), (which was quoted explicitly only in the impact assessment.²⁰) The Maastricht Treaty ^{20a} is the source for the objectives concerning the *single Europe*, the completion of the internal market, and the free movement of goods.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid p. 21.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid. p. 29.

18 European Commission, “Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system,” *White Paper*, COM(2011) 144 final, 2011, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0144:FIN:EN:PDF>.

19 European Commission, “Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth,” *Communication from the Commission*, EU 2020 Strategy COM (2010) 2020 final, 2010.

20 European Commission, “Impact Assessment,” *Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment SEC* (2011) 358 final, 2011, paragraphs 90-93, http://ec.europa.eu/transport/strategies/doc/2011_white_paper/white_paper_2011_ia_full_en.pdf.

20a Maastricht (1992): Treaty on European Union. Official Journal C 191, 29 July 1992 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html#0001000001>

The *overall policy objective* of the document is acceptance of a sustainable transport system as a key aspect for attaining the goals of the EU 2020 strategy, namely smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth. These goals assert a radical departure from present practice, claiming that among the economically, socially, and environmentally undesirable effects to avoid are congestion, high levels of oil-dependency, accidents, emissions of greenhouse gases and other pollutants, noise, and fragmentation of territory. Three specific goals for transport policies to achieve the overall objective are: (i) to reduce transport-related carbon-dioxide emissions by 60 percent by 2050; (ii) to reduce oil dependency substantially; and (iii) to halt increasing levels of congestion.

The fact that the 2011 White Paper developed from or implicitly referenced the Maastricht Treaty raises the issue of whether or not the transport policy of Europe can have a basis in the major contours of the plan dating from 1992. Furthermore, a remaining issue is whether or not the EU's current transport policy should continue to aim for a uniform and homogenous EU, **when** characterized by regions with clearly widely varying levels of development.

Imagining a uniform Europe with regions linked strongly requires accepting the precondition **that these links help eliminate even big differences between the economic developments of these regions**. However, in reality, strong links among regions that exhibit large differences in economic development may perpetuate or even exacerbate inequality. Similarly, the adoption of the common currency among member states with widely different economic and fiscal development leads to a widening of the gaps between these two groups of countries.

The requirement needed to overcome this dilemma is, rather than promoting an abstract, exogenously conceived and thus impractical transport system, an intermediate step of dynamic relations among groups of countries that have similar levels of economic and social development, leading to the establishment transport links within such “macro-regions.” Unfortunately, the present EU concept of “macro-region” leads to diametrically opposite results. To illustrate, the designation of the EU Danube Region, a non-homogenous region extending from Baden-Württemberg to Ukraine, undermines the potential utility of the “macro-region” concept for the EU. Therefore, adjustment of future transport policy should reflect realities.

The three specific transport policy objectives of the 2011 White Paper, as noted, are reducing carbon dioxide emissions, oil dependency, and congestion. The White Paper designates three categories of developments to achieve these goals:

(i) intervention in vehicle and fuel technology; (ii) innovations for multi-modal

chains and modal changes; and, (iii) information systems, traffic management, and market-compatible economic methods to facilitate more efficient use of infrastructures. The document elaborates ten developmental goals in these three categories' frameworks.

	Urban, suburban	Macro-regional (medium, 300–800 km)	EU-wide and continental	Global and intercontinental
Vehicle and fuel technology	(1) Phase out conventionally fuelled automobiles in cities			(2) Reduce maritime emissions by 40%, low-carbon fuel airplanes achieve 40% share in fleet
Multi-modal chains and modal shift		(3) 30% of > 300km road freight to another mode by 2030; 50% by 2050 (4b) Transport goods medium distances by rail by 2050	(4a) More high speed rail by 2030 (5) TEN-T core network by 2030; more capacity by 2050	(6) Rail provision for airports and seaports by 2050
Information systems, traffic management		(8) Multimodal systems for information and managing payments		(7) Transport managerial systems for air, land, water by 2020 + Galileo
Safety,	(9) 0 fatalities by 2050			
Market-based incentives	(10) User/polluter payments; harmful subsidies = 0			
Source: COM(2011) 144 final. Ten goals in Section 2.5.				

Table 1. Ten provisions for attaining the White Paper's transport policies' goals.

Table 1 distributes the ten development goals of the transport policy among the three categories and adds a fourth row, "Safety and Market-based incentives." Categorization of transport segments by trip length, listed in columns (local/urban/suburban; medium/macro-regional; continental; and, global/intercontinental), demonstrates the extent of these segments' individual responsibility for emissions. This categorization relates the developmental goals of the EU more to local or regional sized transport segments, and the global transport segment, rather than the EU-wide continental segment. Thus, to attain the EU's

transport goals, such as smart, sustainable, multi-modal, and inclusive transport, the EU must formulate solutions at levels beyond the EU-level. The only goals that the EU can address at the continental level pertain to TEN-T construction including the high-speed rail network.

The 2011 White Paper appears to establish an environmental offensive to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 60 percent by 2050, decrease in the use of traditional fuels in urban areas and alleviate urban congestion. The other priority objective, the achievement of a Single European Transport Area, remains questionable and is not compatible with the White Paper's sustainability goals. This, again, reflects that the issue of uniformity has not been meaningfully considered or adapted to the changes occurring since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.

10. 2009 – 2013: revision of the TEN-T network

While the 2011 White Paper adopts evolving challenges for issues of environment, security, energy, technology, and cooperation, and adopts a new focus on urban and regional developments, the construction of the TEN-T network remains a major target for European investment. The most recent revision of the TEN-T network begun in 2009, is continuing, and appears to be interminable for the foreseeable future. The 2011 TEN-T documents reflect the 2009 debate that distinguished between core- and comprehensive-level network investments and indicated a preference for emphasizing the core-level.²¹ Still, another two years transpired before reaching a more substantial agreement.²² However, the 2011 document does not indicate an end of this process: “[t]his agreement, reached in trilogue negotiations between the European Parliament, Council and European Commission, must be formally approved by the European Parliament Plenary and Council.”²³ The agreement further states, “[t]he new EU infrastructure policy aims at creating a real network and no longer focuses on isolated projects,” reaffirming the expectations from the previous two decades of the policy formulation. Moreover, the 2011 document stated that “[t]he guide-lines contain precise maps of the network which has been identified on the basis of an objective methodology.” In any event, however, the selection of, and the agreement for single corridors delayed the process.

21 See 2009 debate paper, the 2011 TEN-T paper, and European Commission, “Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Union guidelines for the development of the Trans-European Transport Network,” TEN-T proposal COM(2011) 650 final, 2011/0294 (COD), 2011, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0650:FIN:EN:PDF>.

22 European Commission, “The Commission welcomes “historic” agreement on new trans-European transport network,” *Press release*, modified May 30, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-478_en.htm.

23 Ibid.

11. Summary

The chapter surveys the past two decades of the European Union's transport policies. The main objective of these policies was to support cooperation among the member states, and by that means, to promote wider social and economic objectives of the Union. During this two-decade period, the number of member-states more than doubled, inequality of levels of development among the states and regions in the EU increased. Under these circumstances, during the twenty years, achieving convergence in the developmental levels of regions has become more difficult. Contrarily, promoting **uniform** EU-wide transport policies will only exacerbate this inequality among regions. In the meantime, EU transport policies have significantly evolved, in part to account for local transport circumstances. Whether or not the initial idea of the TEN-T will also change to accommodate current realities remains unknown.

*Tamás Fleischer***Appendix A.****The transport policy goals of the EU's policies of the last two decades, categorized by levels**

Table 2 summarizes the main components of the EU's transport policy as it evolved over the past two decades. The table shows the main proposals for corridors and the extent to which these proposals address different challenges at local, regional, EU-wide, and global levels.

Documents / years	Local urban & sub-urban	Country-wide or macro-regional (cc.100–800 km)	EU-wide / continental	Global & intercontinental
before 1992			Specific sub-sector targets; competition balancing	
1992 CTP		Synchronization of states' regulations	"Single network to a single market" + TEN-T	Maintain parity USA & Japan/E-Asia
1996 TEN-T			TEN-Guidelines + emphasis on 14 priority projects	
1991–94–97 PEC				Pan-European (Helsinki) Corridors
1995–99 TINA				TINA Dense secondary network for accessing countries
2001 WP "Time to Decide"	Users at the heart of transport policy	Breaking the link between economic growth and transport growth Reduction in mobility Decreasing road transport + TEN-T		Managing the globalisation of transport
2002 TIRS & 2003 REBIS				Transport Infrastructure Regional Study in the Balkans
2004 (29 Apr.) TEN-T Guidelines			30 priority projects	

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2006 WP review “Keep Europe Moving”		“Optimise each mode’s own potential” “Mobility must be disconnected from its negative side-effects”		
2007 Guidelines for Europe and neighbouring regions:				Extension of trans-European transport axes to neighbouring countries and regions.
2011 WP ...to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system	WP development goals No (1), (9) and (10).	WP development goals No (3), (4b), (8), (9) and (10).	60% GHG emiss. reduc. by 2050; reducing oil dependency; barriers to increasing congestion + “single European transport area” WP goals (4a) and (5).	WP development goals No (2), (6), (7), (9) and (10).
2010-12. EU TEN-T Guidelines	Identification of main modes in urban areas		Dual layer approach: core & comprehensive network... + core network corridors	Adequate connections to neighbouring and third-world countries

Table 2.

TURKEY AND THE EU

Energy, Transport and Competition Policies

Ahmet O. Evin
Emre Hatipoglu
Peter Balazs



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