Natural law and non-aggression

Chartier, Gary (2010) Natural law and non-aggression. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 51 (2). pp. 79-96. ISSN 1216-2574

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Abstract

Natural law theory can render the so-called “non-aggression principle” (NAP), which prohibits the initiation of force against person or property, intelligible and can ground a robust, even if not exceptionless, version of the principle. Natural law and natural rights theories share common roots, but are often seen as divergent, if not antagonistic. But I believe it can plausibly be maintained that claims about natural rights find their home within the context of more comprehensive natural law theories. I seek to illustrate this claim by showing how a central claim about natural rights can be defended using the resources provided by the best contemporary version of natural law theory. I consider the significance of the NAP and its place in natural rights theory. I outline the contours of one contemporary natural law position, the new classical natural law (NCNL) theory. I go on to indicate what form I suspect a version of the NAP framed using the categories provided by the NCNL theory might take.

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