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# REVIEW ARTICLES

GÁBOR TAKÁCS: *Etymological Dictionary of Egyptian I. A Phonological Introduction*. Leiden–Boston–Köln, Brill, 1999. 471 pp.

GÁBOR TAKÁCS: *Etymological Dictionary of Egyptian II. b-, p-, f-*. Leiden–Boston–Köln, Brill, 2001. 639 pp.

It is far from easy to give an idea about an etymological dictionary, and all the more so if it is so concise and rich in difficult problems as the work under review. The first volume which is a historical and phonological introduction, starts with an overview on the studies of lexical affinities among Egyptian, Semitic and other Afro-Asiatic languages. The author rightly observes that after the first tentative attempts it was Adolf Erman who laid the foundations of really reliable Egypto-Semitic comparative studies (*ZDMG* 46, 1892, pp. 93–129). The "old school" (A. Ember, F. Calice, J. Vergote, and others) was followed in the second half of the 20th century by a new trend represented e.g. by O. Rössler, W. Schenkel, H. Satzinger, F. Kammerzell, A. Loprieno (*neuere Komparatistik*). The author also provides a detailed account of the Russian linguistic school led for a long time by I. M. Djakonov, which has expended great efforts on the Afro-Asiatic correspondences of Egyptian (cf. e.g. Orel, V. É.– Stolbova, O. V.: *Hamito-Semitic Etymological Dictionary*. Leiden, 1995).

Until recently there was no complete agreement among linguists concerning the sub-groups of the languages to be classified as Afro-Asiatic, so the list given in the book will greatly facilitate the orientation of the reader in this respect. (The older name Semito-Hamitic is only rarely used in modern linguistics). The main classes of the Afro-Asiatic group are: Semitic, Egyptian, Berber or Libyo-Guanche, Cushitic, Omotic, Chadic. Within these classes the reader will find numerous sub-groups and the individual languages.

Takács analyses the position of Egyptian in the Afro-Asian group but at the same time calls attention to the fact that a number of Egyptian roots are related to African languages outside the Afro-Asiatic family (Proto-Bantu, Proto-Koman and others).

The highly controversial homeland question arises in a short chapter (pp. 46–48). The author is very cautious on this question, and instead of coming to risky conclusions, he poses questions. One of them shows best the tendency of his hypotheses. "Can we identify the bearers of the palaeolithic-neolithic Saharan culture with a wide conglomeration in which Proto-Egypto-Chadic and other ancient African (Nilo-Saharan, Bantu etc.?) populations could also have taken part?" As stressed by the author, the study of Egyptian ethnogenesis needs a close cooperation of linguists, archaeologists, historians, experts of art, etc.

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Two chapters about the consonant correspondences represent the central part of the first volume and illuminate the methodological principles used by the author in his comparisons. He first examines the regular consonantal correspondences between Egyptian and Afro-Asiatic languages specifying the problems by analysing each Egyptian consonant from 3 (aleph) to d̲ (dj) enumerating them according to the transliteration system used by Egyptologists. Actually, each entry represents a concise study, mostly giving a number of possible derivations from different languages. The key issue of the phoneme aleph (3), whether a glottal stop or liquid (*l* or *r*), is treated separately (pp. 273–275).

Correspondences regarded by the author as seemingly irregular ones receive again an extensive chapter. These irregularities can be partly solved by taking into account the rules of consonant incompatibility in Old Egyptian and Afro-Asiatic causing assimilation and dissimilation in the consonantal structure.

O. Rössler's and his followers' (especially Th. Schneider's) studies and etymologies receive a profound analysis with severe criticism in a separate chapter. Many etymologies of the *neuere Komparatistik* school are shown to be vulnerable and caution is recommended against the acceptance of the new hypotheses concerning Egypto-Semitic comparative phonology.

On the other hand, the "Law of A. G. Belova" (the first w- and j- in Egyptian triconsonantal words cannot be always treated as prefixes), receives a more favourable judgement. The author adduces a number of examples which seem to support this law.

The second volume constitutes the first part of the etymological dictionary proper (quoted abbreviated as EDE) including the words of Egyptian vocabulary from *b* to *f*. Coptic words are treated only sporadically. Borrowings from Semitic languages in the New Kingdom are not discussed unless they have relevance to the history of Egyptian phonology. Since traditional comparative studies concerning Egyptian are largely occupied with languages that have survived in written form, the author is fully aware of the difficulties of his bold undertaking caused first of all by the lack of sources to the older history of most of the Afro-Asiatic languages. As he writes "I cannot pretend to pursue the same goals as could be expected in the case of Indo-European etymologies." (vol. II, p. XV).

The scope of this review does not permit me to go into details, therefore I will deal in the following only with three entries. The first is a divine name Bes (*bs*) (pp. 303–305). Divine names are notorious for the difficulties of their deciphering, and the long entry gives a vivid picture of the controversies concerning its original meaning. In an in-depth discussion he deals with all the possibilities such as (1) "premature infant", (2) "secret image", (3) "panther skin", (4) "bad", (5) "to help", (6) "the demon Pazūzu in Mesopotamia". Without settling the dispute unequivocally, he gives preference to (1). Although (4)–(6) are the author's own suggestions based on his profound knowledge of Afro-Asiatic, he gives with exemplary moderation his vote to D. Meeks' etymology. In the reviewer's view the religious background suggests that in Egypt the name was connected – at least in the Late Period – with the meaning "secret image". Recently Takács published an article about the same subject in Mélanges offerts à Edith Varga (*Bulletin du Musée Hongrois des Beaux Arts. Supplément* 2001, pp. 455–458).

Numerals play an important part in comparative linguistics. The present volume includes one of them, *fd*(*w*) "four" (pp. 599–607). The wide range of parallels in a lot of Afro-Asiatic languages (Egyptian, Cushitic-Omotic, Chadic) does not permit any doubt as to their common origin, a fact that stands as one of the proofs for the common basis of this wide group of languages. The etymology of the word remains, however, obscure. The author does not accept the proposed solutions and at the same time refrains from giving his own opinion.

More positive results are reached in the entry *f3j* "to raise, lift up", where the main difficulty lies in the two weak consonants. Takács presents three of his own proposals. In the first he links the word among other African parallels with the Bedawye *fera'*. His next suggestion is to operate with the hypothetic Egyptian form

**flj* which has cognates in Cushitic and Chadic. The third is based on a possible relation with Afro-Asiatic *f-ˀ-y or *f-y-ˀ "to carry, load".

Bnw (*bnw* phoenix) raises again difficult questions. Takács presents the proposal "héron, garde-boeuf", and other names of birds in African languages (e-bélbél, etc.) which may be related to the root *bl-w. While he rejects the earlier etymologies based on the Heliopolitan solar theology and the root *bn*, at the end of the second paragraph with small type he refers to the traces of an Afro-Asiatic root **b-l* which seem to mean "return" thus establishing a link with the myth of the solar bird.

The two volumes conclude with bibliographies, overwhelmingly rich in both of them. Egyptologist readers will miss, however, some articles of the *Lexikon der Ägyptologie*.

This brief account cannot cover even the most important aspects of the dictionary. It lies in the very nature of achievements of this kind to provoke dissent over many of its conclusions. The author himself has formulated the entries as suggestions open to challenge. Although there will be in all likelihood numerous objections, the opinions opposing those of the author will not detract from the merits of the pioneering work done by the young Hungarian scholar.

Brill is to be thanked for making these volumes available, and it is hoped that Gábor Takács be provided with all the aid necessary to continue the edition of the volumes that will follow.

*László Kákosy*

*Kalātattvakośa – A Lexicon of Fundamental Concepts of the Indian Arts*. General editor: KAPILA VATSYAYAN. Vol. IV: Manifestation of Nature – *Sṛṣṭi Vistāra*. Editors: Advaitavadini Kaul & Sukumar Chattopadhyay. New Delhi, Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts – Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1999. xxxvii + 429 pp.

As the series has reached the fourth volume there is not much need to emphasise the importance of such an enterprise. Even if the great dictionaries were not so grossly outdated, such an encyclopaedic overview of the fundamental abstract categories of the Sanskrit-based Indian culture would be most welcome given the complexities of a tradition three thousand years old.

In the seven chapters of the present volume we find essays on 14 basic terms of natural philosophy, among which *indriya* (sense) seems slightly odd in the company of such metaphysical and cosmological concepts as *dravya, guṇa, sṛṣṭi* (substance, attribute, creation).

This first chapter is the second longest in the book,[1] and probably rightly so as the problems of perception are perhaps even more focal in the history of Indian philosophy than in Europe. Unfortunately we also find the second largest number of mistakes or problematic interpretations in the same chapter. To list some:

*Indriya*, meaning 'organ', is neuter, not an adjective (mfn.), and does not mean sense-perceptions (not even as *jñānendriya*). The *tanmātra*s are not "subtle senses" but subtle elements or sensible qualities like colour, smell etc. (p. 1).

The Pāṇini-quotation on p. 3, *indriyam indra-liṅgam, indra-dṛṣṭam, indra-sṛṣṭam, indra-juṣṭam, indra-dattam iti vā*, is translated (by R. S. Bhattacharya) as "The word *indriya* is irregularly derived (*nipatyate*) from *Indra* (meaning *ātman*, self) – in the sense of 'a sign of Indra', 'perceived by Indra', 'created by Indra', 'endowed with Indra', 'given by Indra' and the like." Tacitly skipping over all the inaccuracies that are irrelevant here, *ātman* is not mentioned either in the sentence interpreted or anywhere around it, so probably Pāṇini referred to the king of the gods.[2] Still from now on it is taken for granted that *indriya* is derived from a word meaning 'self' (pp. 3–4).

In the long list of quotations that follow under the heading "Evolution and Development", it is far from clear what the author is attempting. Is he locating important occurrences

[1] "Indriya", by Kapila Vatsyayan, pp. 1–68.

[2] Aṣṭādhyāyī, 5.2.93. The interpretation *Indra = ātman* is, of course, traditional, taken from the *Vṛtti ad loc.*

of the word *indriya*? Or is he tracing elements of the concept (senses / active human capacities) that is normally referred to in classical times with this term? Sometimes neither seems to be the case: why does he quote the Yajurveda list[3] of the parts of the body, where besides the eye and the ear we also find the navel, the head, the palm etc.?

In the section "The Philosophic Schools: Darśana" Sāṁkhya is to some extent misrepresented, with philologically rather problematic methods. First verse 34 of the Ṣāṁkhya-kārikā is quoted; then, with the introduction "[t]he commentary Yuktidīpikā explains this further" two quotations from the commentary on verse 28 (!) follow. Also the first Yuktidīpikā sentence is not the Sāṁkhya position, but the opinion of the Nyāya-sūtra.[4] The "question of time in which [the *indriya*s] function" (p. 29) is not raised by the Sāṁkhya-tattva-kaumudī (10th century) but by the Sāṁkhya-kārikā (5th century). There are some further inaccuracies here but so much is enough to illustrate.

The description of the other classical schools is rather cursory. For example, on the Nyāya theory of visual rays we get only this half-sentence: "there is the interesting argument of the 'ray' and the eye" (p. 33). Of the Vaiśeṣika theory of perception we learn basically nothing; extra-sensory (yogic) perception is not even mentioned. Also the section on Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta (pp. 33–35) does not seem to contain anything on perception; the theory of perceptual error is entirely missing.

The method of presentation is completely different in the section on the "Schools of Medicine: Āyurveda" (pp. 36–44). Almost the whole text here consists of quotations only, without any explanation added. On pp. 39–42 a portion of the Caraka-saṁhitā (Sūtra-sthāna VIII.3–17) is reproduced, with P. V. Sharma's translation – and not a single word commenting on it.

Under the heading "Buddhist Philosophy and Psychology" (pp. 44–55) all the information is taken exclusively from the Abhidharmakośa with Bhāṣya, chapter II, verse 1–17, without even mentioning its author or the school he belonged to. And we look for such characteristic old Buddhist concepts as *ṣaḍ-āyatana* (the six areas of cognition) in vain.

After the sections on "Jaina Philosophy" and "Tantra-Āgama" the chapter closes with the utterly uninformative "Manifestation in the Arts". This shows probably that the too rigid application of a uniform editorial concept is not always the best way to produce a practical reference book: when we have nothing to say under a standard heading it may be better to drop that section.

In general no satisfactory analysis is given of many important facets of the topic, like the active faculties (*karmendriya*s); the relation of the sense faculties and the biological organs; the relation of the senses, sensations, sensible qualities, object and medium of perception.

The chapter on "Dravya",[5] substance, is generally well written, although the information on Buddhism is too brief (the dogma of *anātman*, insubstantiality is not even referred to). The comparison of the meaning and usage of *dravya, vastu* and *artha* is interesting but too short (pp. 73–74), and also a comparison with *viśaya, dhātu, āśraya* and *guṇin* ('object', 'constituent', 'substrate' and 'bearer of qualities') would have been most welcome.

The third and shortest chapter is on "Dhātu".[6] It is a good introduction to the several, quite distinct uses of the term, and the relevant

[3] XVIII. 2, p. 7. This is one of several cases in the book where in spite of the explicit promise of the editors (p. xv) no English rendering is given.

[4] See pp. 28–29. The Yuktidīpikā quotations can be found on p. 203 of the critical edition (by A. Wezler and S. Motegi, Stuttgart 1998), lines 23 and 25–26. The whole paragraph starts with "*naiyāyikās tv evam āhuḥ*" (the followers of the Nyāya say so), and between the two sentences quoted we read "*etat tu sāṁkhyācāryāṇāṁ neṣṭam*" (but the teachers of Sāṁkhya do not accept this).

[5] 2nd chapter, by Satkari Mukhopadhyaya and Ratna Basu, pp. 69–112.

[6] By Saroja Bhate and Sanghamitra Basu, pp. 113–142.

information is well grouped under the headings of "Grammar" ('verbal root', pp. 121–123), "Āyurveda" ('bodily humour or constituent', pp. 123–126) and "Buddhism" ('psycho-physical constituent', pp. 126–133). Unfortunately the section on "Music" (by P. L. Sharma, pp. 135–137) is not readily comprehensible.

The longest chapter is on "Guṇa–Doṣa";[7] it contains a lot of information and is mostly reliable. However for people to whom it would be most useful, it might be very difficult to follow, for a number of reasons. Many of the technical terms and short definitions quoted are left untranslated, or unexplained. (For example, in the section on Vaiśeṣika, p. 175: "*Guṇa*s get destroyed in two ways: (i) by effect and (ii) by their causes".) Sometimes it is not clear whether a statement is an undisputed fact, the opinion of the authors or the view of the work analysed. (About Sāṁkhya, on p. 172: "*sattva* is clearly known and as such its existence (*sattva*) is naturally proved".) The order of the quotations is not chronological, and the importance (or unimportance) of a work in a tradition is not underlined. Modern scholarship is not taken notice of.

In the presentation of some schools (e.g. the two *mīmāṁsā*s) the material presented is not very important and not organised systematically. In the section on "Buddhism" we are given information only on the oldest phase of the religion: besides one line of the Buddhacarita we find only quotations from the Pāli canon. The sections on the arts and music (pp. 188–193) are quite unnecessary: a sentence would have sufficed, like 'here *guṇa* has only the usual meaning, i.e. virtue'. The separate section on "Classification" (pp. 202–205) being simply an extract of the Praśastapādabhāṣya should have formed part of the discussion of the Vaiśeṣika system (pp. 173–175), and a considerable overlap could have been avoided.

The "Appendix: DOṢA"[8] contains in general nothing in any way useful or interesting, except the correctly written section on medicine.[9] Probably to group *guṇa* and *doṣa* together was not an entirely felicitous editorial decision. Their non-technical meanings ('virtue' and 'fault') are indeed closely related, but in the vocabularies of the *darśana*s and the arts they seem to be completely unrelated.

The fifth chapter addresses the interrelated concepts of "Adhibhūta–Adhidaiva–Adhyātma".[10] It is, however, not quite precise to say that "it is first mentioned in the Sāṁkhya-Kārikā as *duḥkhatraya*" (p. 230), for (a) the 'triad of suffering' has probably another meaning there and (b) this triad occurs in the medical *Suśruta-saṁhitā* which may quite possibly be earlier than those Sāṁkhya commentaries that mention it.[11] This is one of many inaccuracies and misrepresentations occurring in the chapter, side by side with quite a lot of interesting and relevant information. But the real problem is that the relations analysed in the chapter are mostly dyadic: "the inner and the outer, the micro and the macro, the tangible and the intangible" (from the "Conclusion", p. 273), and no clear reason is given for the triadic approach attempted in the chapter.[12]

The shortest chapter is rightly so, as its subject-matter is clearly nonexistent. "Sthūla–Sūkṣma–Para"[13] ('coarse', 'subtle' and 'beyond') is not a triad in any sense, as the author himself suggests in the "Conclusion" (p. 315): "[these] terms … may seem distinct concepts at the phe-

[7] 4th chapter, by R. S. Bhattacharya and Sukumar Chattopadhyay, pp. 143–227.

[8] See pp. 206–227, by Sukumar Chattopadhyay.

[9] "Doṣa in Āyurveda" (pp. 218–226) by L. M. Singh.

[10] See pp. 229–274, by S. K. Lal and P. L. Sharma.

[11] I have elaborated both points in a paper read at the Xth World Sanskrit Conference in Bangalore, 1997: *The triple suffering. A note on the Sāṁkhya-kārikā*. Also in: *A klasszikus szánkhja filozófiája*, Budapest 1997, pp. 27–43.

[12] Sometimes rather feebly – in the section on "Manifestation in the Arts" (pp. 267–273) only one or another of these concepts appear singly in most quotations.

[13] 6th chapter, pp. 275–316, by H. N. Chakravarty.

nomenal plane". They do not even occur together except in some tantras (pp. 302, 306, 308).

The last chapter on "Sṛṣṭi–Sthiti–Saṁhāra"[14] ('creation', 'existing' and 'withdrawal') is a generally correct summary of the relevant facts, although here again the historical relations are not given their due weight. The sections on "Buddhism" and "Jainism" (pp. 354–355) are parodistically short and uninformative, while there is really not much to say on these concepts in the arts.

To summarise what has been more than once suggested above – the editorial concept seems to have frequently prevailed over the facts collected. And especially the sections on "Manifestation in the Arts" contain mostly not *manifestations* of the same concepts but *occurrences* of the same word with quite independent meaning. This worthy project and the wealth of collected material would deserve a little more flexibility in the way the results are published.

*Ferenc Ruzsa*

PIOTR BALCEROWICZ: *Jaina Epistemology in Historical and Comparative Perspective*. Critical Edition and English Translation of Logical-Epistemological Treatises: *Nyāyâvatāra, Nyāyâvatāra-vivṛti* and *Nyāyâvatāra-ṭippana* with introduction and notes. Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien, herausgegeben von der Abteilung für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens und Tibets des Asien-Afrika-Institutes an der Universität Hamburg, 53, 1–2. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2001.

This scholarly work in two volumes is based on three Sanskrit works:

1. *Nyāyâvatāra* by Siddhasena Divākara (?), a fundamental text of Jaina logic from the 7th century CE, 32 *kārikā*s in *śloka (anuṣṭubh)* metre.
2. *Nyāyâvatāra-vivṛti* by Siddharṣi(-gaṇi) or Siddhavyākhyānika, probably the first commentary on the above, around 900 CE. On average it contains one page of commentary (ca 30 lines) per verse, but sometimes much more: 11 pages for *kārikā* 1 and 27 pages for *kārikā* 29.
3. *Nyāyâvatāra-ṭippana* by Devabhadra(-sūri), a gloss on the *vivṛti*, ca 1150 CE.

Balcerowicz gives a critical edition and English translation of the first two texts, the third being sometimes cited in the apparatus only – as '[i]n many cases, Devabhadra's glosses hardly add anything new to the text of the *Vivṛti*', so it was considered 'unproductive to edit the whole text' (p. xxxix).

In volume 1 we have an Introduction (pp. iv–xli), the translation (pp. 1–137), and the 884 footnotes, all keyed to the translation (pp. 139–318). The second volume contains the Sanskrit text (pp. 323–490), where approximately half of the page is taken up by the critical apparatus. (It is a little unfortunate that the key to the apparatus is found in vol. 1, pp. xl–xli.) The volume ends with indices of selected vocabulary (pp. 491–509), of quotations (pp. 511–512) and of *nyāya*s (p. 513); and a Bibliography (pp. 515–536).

The Introduction mainly focuses on one question: the age of the root-text, the *kārikā*s. Having first surveyed previous positions on the issue, Balcerowicz tries to establish that Siddhasena was indebted to Dharmakīrti, especially to his *Nyāya-bindu* (pp. xii–xxx). His method is meticulous: he selects 21 fragments of the *Nyāyâvatāra* and shows that they match in content, method and wording a passage in Dharmakīrti. As he himself says, '[s]ome of the … points are not entirely convincing, when taken singly'. The cumulative effect, however, seems overwhelming.

In the rest of the Introduction Balcerowitz mentions some less debated points: the lower age limit (Haribhadra quotes the *Nyāyâvatāra*); and the authorship and age of the *Vivṛti* and the *Ṭippana.*

[14] 7th chapter, pp. 317–379, by Saroja Bhate. The section on "The Philosophic Schools: Darśana" (pp. 334–355) is by R. S. Bhattacharya; on "Tantra-Āgama" (pp. 356–369) by H. N. Chakravarty; and on "Manifestation in the Arts" (pp. 369–376) by Advaitavadini Kaul.

The description of the sources utilised for the edition is brief in the extreme (pp. xl–xli). Three manuscripts of the Pāṭaṇa-collection (Nos 2448, 2449 and 6808) were used as well as two editions (by Bhagavandas Harakhchand, 1917 and by P. L. Vaidya, 1928, repr. 1971). There is no information on whether other mss are known or not (probably there are, as Balcerowicz calls his sources a 'selection of manuscripts', p. xl); whether other editions exist; what mss were the basis of the previous editions. So it is far from clear what the motivation was for a new edition and whether it is comprehensive enough or not. We do not learn anything about the format of the mss, their script, age, or mutual relation. These are serious shortcomings that should be corrected by the author in a separate communication.

We are also not explicitly told if other translations exist; from the references it appears that only the *kārikā*s have been translated before, by S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1909, 1915, repr. 1981).

The edition is in Roman characters, with parts of compounds separated by a dash (–) wherever possible; the amalgamation of vowels is shown by a caret (^). Punctuation (,;:?.) is added abundantly. All this appears to me very laudable; as Sanskrit was written everywhere in the local script, there can be no *a priori* objection to a European script. Also it is easier to read than *devanāgarī*[1] and can easily accommodate extra signs, diacritics etc. The clear marking of compounds and syntactical units is extremely useful for the reader while it does not diminish the philological value of the publication. It is furthermore not alien to Indian tradition, as in this case ms A uses word-separators, sandhi- and elision-markers (pp. xl–xli).

The apparatus shows even minor variations (the occurrence of *daṇḍa*s etc.), some of which seem superfluous. In this electronic age such information that may concern only one or two future researchers should be made available electronically only, not burdening the page unnecessarily. The technique used to mark variant readings is not the best: footnote reference numbers are added at the end of the location, and in the footnote the variants and the mss supporting them are given; the accepted text and its supporting sources are not mentioned. This can lead to confusion (see the example given here in fn. 4), while the reference numbers really do harm the readability of the text (e.g. on p. 469, l. 5, we read: …*-bhāvântara*[1369] *-kāraṇatvād*[1370, 1371] *grāhyāder*[1372]).

The quality of the text printed seems to be good, although some misprints remain (I have noticed mostly missing length-markers: *a* for *ā* etc.).

The translation has been carried out with great care; it attempts to reflect every single word of the original, and by adding [in brackets] the necessary explanatory extensions we get (in most cases) a not ungrammatical English sentence. There are, however, some debatable points that I would like to mention here; first about terminology.

At the first occurrence of the term *pramāṇa* Balcerowicz adds a rather lengthy footnote explaining why he will consistently translate it as 'cognitive criterion',[2] '[s]ince in conversations with some of [his] colleagues [his] proposal has been met with various objections and lack of understanding'. I have to admit that he also failed to convince me.

A criterion is a factor by which we decide an issue, by which we judge a case. So 'cognitive criterion' should mean something like 'the decisive factor with respect to cognition', i.e. by which we decide whether something is a cog-

[1] This may appear quite subjective, but my experience seems to show that it is in fact so. European people with excellent knowledge of Sanskrit read *devanāgarī* much more slowly than other scripts also not native to them, e.g. Greek. An educated person can read e.g. English at least twice faster than he can speak it, while it seems that it is impossible for a *paṇḍita* although his mother tongue may be Hindī (also written in *devanāgarī*). Of course for some Indians not having had much experience in reading Sanskrit in transcription the use of Roman characters might be quite an obstacle.

[2] Footnote 4, pp. 140–145.

nition or not. Now *pramāṇa* is clearly not this: it can decide whether a cognition is *valid* or not. And, of course, it also gives rise to (valid) cognitions. In the first meaning it could be called a criterion, but only a validity criterion (or, if you like, a 'cognitive validity criterion'). For the second meaning element we clearly need something like 'source'; and to me it seems that 'source of knowledge' works perfectly in both jobs, as 'knowledge' implies validity, and perhaps we can say that we decide an issue 'by a source of knowledge' (*pramāṇena*).

Of course, translation is also a matter of taste, but 'cognitive criterion' has quite inappropriate overtones from 'criterion of truth' (*Wahrheitskriterium*): as that clearly presupposes that we have verbally articulated cognition – a proposition – first, and then we apply this criterion to decide whether it is true or not. So it definitely excludes from its meaning the *process* of the original appearance of the given cognitive state, while *pramāṇa*, especially in its most generally accepted form, perception, refers exactly to that.

The English used to reproduce the Sanskrit is not always easy to follow, sometimes practically incomprehensible. At times we may have doubts whether the author was really clear about what he intended to say, perhaps on account of the difficulty of the text. To illustrate:[3]

In a passage refuting a Buddhist opponent, according to whom perception is valid because the form of the cognition is similar to the form of the object, Siddharṣigaṇi says:

*anādi-kālâlīna-vāsanā-prabodha-sampādita-sattāka-nirvikalpaka-vivikta-darśanôttara-kāla-bhāvi-vikalpa-vyavasthāpita-sādṛśya-vaśād artha-grahaṇa-niyame saty eka-nīla-svalakṣaṇe kṣaṇe sakala-kāla-[kalā-*[4]*]kalāpa-vyāpi-kāka-kuvalayādi-gata-nīlatāyā vyavasthitir aviśeṣeṇânuṣajyeta, tathā ca pratiniyato grāhya-grāhaka-bhāvo na ghaṭām-aṭāṭyeta*.[5] I think this means:

'[In your position,] the cognition is specific to its object on account of a similarity that is established by a conceptual cognition. [This conceptual cognition] arises later than the sensation; it is different from the pre-conceptual cognition. It is produced by the awakening of mental dispositions (*vāsanā*s) dormant since beginningless times. If this would be so, it would follow that one moment of one blue[6] [atomic] individual would establish indiscriminately the blueness of crows, lilies etc. in the totality of all time-instants. And thus no specific object–cogniser relation could ever get justification.'

The basic idea in the passage seems to be: the pre-conceptual, immediate perception reflects only the atomic blueness of the object. This is expanded using unconscious mental resources into the conceptual cognition (e.g. a lake), and this is the cognition that can be called *similar* to the object. But we could have equally well expanded that blueness into the form of a bird or a flower – so if our perception of the blue lake is valid, the very same perception would be a valid perception of all blue birds, flowers, etc.!

The same text in Balcerowicz's rendering:

'If the grasping of an object was confined only to, [say], a single dark-blue individual thing in a [single] moment, then – by the force of the similarity determined by conceptualisation arising in the point of time posterior to the [purely] non-conceptual distinct perception, whose existence (*sc.* of conceptualisation) is produced by the awakening of past impres-

[3] The Sanskrit is on p. 325, ll. 9–13; the English on p. 3.

[4] In contrast to the edition, I prefer the reading of ms A, for Siddharṣigaṇi here definitely strives for some poetic effect. It may be here remarked that a positive critical apparatus would have been preferable. For e.g. here we have in the text '… *sakala-kāla-kalāpa*[68]*-...*' and fn. 68 says merely 'A: º*-kālakalākalāpa-*º', which is far from clear.

[5] The function of the dash (–) in this expression is not clear to me.

[6] The Sanskrit *nīla* can mean any colour from blue through indigo to black, so that both a crow and the *kuvalaya* water-lily have this colour.

sions, that have been dormant from beginningless times – determinate cognition of dark-blueness subsisting in crows, water-lilies, etc., that pervade the totality of time[7] would necessarily follow indiscriminately in any case, and, therefore, the relationship between something-which-grasps and something-to-be-grasped, which is fixed in every case, could in no way be possible.'

The profuse use of brackets in the translation makes reading it rather tiring, while the gain is negligible. E.g.

*adhunâkṣarârthas: tatra **pramāṇam** iti pūrvavat* is rendered as:

'Now the meaning [according] to the 'letter' [is elucidated]. In this [verse, the phrase] **'the cognitive criterion'** [is to be explained in the same] way as before.'[8]

I feel that the grammatical, syntactical, stylistic and tradition-based (pragmatic) differences of the two languages should in general remain unmarked in translations; except, of course, when the aim is to illustrate one or another of those very differences, e.g. in a grammar book. In a philosophical text the proper use of the brackets should be restricted to interpretations not actually found in the original. E.g., in a given context '… *iti cet* …' could be nicely translated as 'In answer to the [Buddhist] position that … , we say …'.

The amount of material added in footnotes is appalling: 180 pages to 137 pages of the translation. If one tries to keep track of them while reading the main text it is hardly possible to follow the reasoning itself. Actually many of them merely explain well-known facts, and I feel that these could have been omitted. The reader of such a treatise should be supposed to be familiar with the main trends of Indian thought, and even if not, (s)he is capable of looking up information in standard reference works. To cite an example: when Siddharṣigaṇi mentions the basic *vijñānavādin* position (there are no external objects, only ideas), Balcerowicz adds footnotes, no. 90 and 91, to explain it in one and a half pages, with quotations from Vasubandhu's *Viṁśatikā, Triṁśikā* etc.

It would also be easier to handle the book if the footnotes pertaining to the Sanskrit text only had been printed separately, in the volume containing the edition; and with references to the edition, not to the translation.

Of course many of the notes are apt and excellent; they help us to understand the text, add important references, quote the opinions cursorily referred to in the text, etc. Some of the longer notes could stand as short papers in their own right, e.g. fn. 158 on *ūrdhvatā-* and *tiraścīna-sāmānya* (pp. 180–183) or fn. 166 on *arthāpatti* (pp. 185–190).

The use of modern logical and set-theoretical apparatus is most welcome in the analysis of classical Indian logic, but should be used with care and consideration. Mathematical notation is an obstacle for many (most?) readers, so it is better to avoid it whenever possible. And, of course, consistency and a clear description (in tabular form) would be an absolute must, but we do not find them here. And some blunders in this area bring dizziness instead of light not only to the uninitiated.[9]

[7] 'I.e., immediate determinate cognition of dark-blueness of all things in all past, present and future moments.' – Balcerowicz's footnote.

[8] The Sanskrit is on p. 334, l. 1; the English on p. 10.

[9] E.g. in fn. 391 on the concept of *pakṣa*, pp. 229–231 we read: 'In a valid inference, the locus was supposed to meet the condition $p =_{df} R(h,p) \supset R(s,p)$ ['If the locus is pervaded by the property of the logical reason, then the locus is pervaded by the property to be proved'].' (p. 230) Here locus, *pakṣa* is *p*; the relation invariable concomitance, *vyāpti* is *R*; the logical reason, *hetu* is *h*; and the property to-be-proved, *sādhya* is *s*. Now disregarding minor inaccuracies, the 'condition' above could not be expressed by the '=' sign, the *df* (by definition) is inappropriate, and the whole thing is misleading, as here we find no condition of a valid *pakṣa* but a peculiar application of a basic law of *vyāpti* (the law of transitivity): if $R(s,h)$ then for any property $x$ if $R(h,x)$ then $R(s,x)$). Fully formalised: $R(s,h) \Rightarrow \forall x\,[R(h,x) \supset R(s,x)]$. Now a *hetu* is valid only if $R(s,h)$ and $R(h,p)$.

In the footnotes some Sanskrit texts are quoted without a translation, and that seems to me bad practice. Even people with some experience in reading Indian philosophy may find it quite challenging to read a detached paragraph from a text previously not studied by them; and some of the really interested readers (e.g. those studying Buddhism from Tibetan, Chinese etc. sources) may be entirely ignorant of Sanskrit. On the other hand the author quoting the text surely knows what it is about, so it would only be a small effort to add an English rendering.

In spite of the minor criticisms above and the remarks on some approaches followed in the book, the work of Balcerowicz is clearly a useful mine of information and will be the standard reference tool for the two texts edited therein.

*Ferenc Ruzsa*

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With the first restriction, we get $\Rightarrow \forall x\ [R(h,x) \supset R(s,x)]$, and with concretisation of the variable $x$ with value $p$ the result is Balcerowicz's original 'condition': $\Rightarrow R(h,p) \supset R(s,p)$. (And with the second restriction of a valid *hetu*, $R(h,p)$ we get the result proved: $\Rightarrow R(s,p)$.)