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## THE INITIAL STATE OF MAN IN AUGUSTINE'S *DE GENESI CONTRA MANICHAEOS*<sup>1</sup>

**Summary:** An important passage of Augustine's *De genesi contra manichaeos* (Gen. man. 2.8.10), which seems to be the source of permanent misunderstandings, includes one thesis, two hypotheses, and three sub-hypotheses concerning the initial state of man or the soul. All possibilities derive from an exegetical puzzle raised by Gen. 2:7. The author of the paper analyses these possibilities mentioned by Augustine in order to ponder whether Augustine gave preference to one of them. Arguments are shown for the assumption that according to the early Augustine, in its initial state the soul did not use any kind of body.

**Key words:** St. Augustine, origin of the soul, first man, exegesis.

Augustine's early interpretation of Genesis 1:26, 2:7 and 3:21; that is, his concept of man and theory about the origin of the soul, raises difficulties. According to the famous and disputed theory of Robert J. O'Connell and his disciples, Augustine believed that the soul "is fallen and yet not fully fallen, that memory and illumination are identical, that souls are diversely fallen and differ in their way of return."<sup>2</sup> O'Connell grounds his conclusions upon detailed analyses of Augustine's early works, above all, *De genesi contra manichaeos*.<sup>3</sup> The other thesis he insistently formulated in his writings is closely linked to the fallen-soul theory, namely, that Augustine believed in the pre-existence of souls. In the first commentary "the pre-existence of the soul must have been so obviously an *implicit* to the moderately cultivated reader of his time that Augustine does not feel the slightest need to 'unequivocally assert' it."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of North American Patristics Society in 2000.

<sup>2</sup> I borrowed this concise summary of O'Connell's position from R. PENASKOVIC, "The Fall of the Soul in Saint Augustine: A *Qaestio Disputata*," *Augustinian Studies* 17 (1986), 135.

<sup>3</sup> R. J. O'CONNELL, *St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968, 156–183; idem "The *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* and the Origin of the Soul," *Revue des Etudes augustinienes* 39 (1993): 129–141.

<sup>4</sup> O'CONNELL 1993, 139; cf. idem 1968, 183.

These conclusions have been criticised by many specialists in Augustine's theology.<sup>5</sup> However, all of its opponents except Roland J. Teske pay no particular attention to *De genesi contra manichaeos*, the work which O'Connell regarded as the most relevant to the issue.<sup>6</sup> I shall focus on this commentary.

The key passage of the work, which seems to me to be the source of permanent misunderstandings, includes one thesis, two hypotheses, and three sub-hypotheses concerning the initial state of man or the soul. All possibilities derive from an exegetical puzzle raised by Gen. 2:7.

*Scripture says, 'And he breathed into him the breath of life, and man became a living soul.' If up to this point there was only the body, we should understand that the soul was at this point joined to the body. Perhaps the soul had already been made, but was still as if in the mouth of God, that is, in his truth and wisdom. But it did not depart from there as if separated by places, when it was breathed forth. For God is not contained by place, but is present everywhere. Or perhaps the soul was made when God breathed the breath of life into the mud he had formed so that the breathing forth signifies God's activity by which he made the soul in man by the spirit of his power. If the man who had been made was already body and soul, sensation was added to the soul<sup>7</sup> by that breath, when man was made a living soul – not that this breath was turned into the living soul, but it acted upon the living soul. We should not yet think of the man who was made into a living soul as spiritual, but as still animal. For he was made spiritual when he was established in paradise, that is, in the happy life, and received the commandment of perfection so that he might then be made perfect by the word of God. Thus, after he sinned by withdrawing from God's commandment and was dismissed from paradise, he remained in such a state that he was animal.<sup>8</sup>*

<sup>5</sup> See the reviews by Robert P. RUSSELL in *Thought* 44 (1969), Mary T. CLARK in *International Philosophical Quarterly* 11 (1971) and Ernest FORTIN in *Theological Studies* 30 (1969). More detailed criticisms are formulated by G. O'DALY, "Did Augustine ever Believe in the Soul's Pre-existence?" *Augustinian Studies* 5 (1974): 227–235; G. MADEC, "Une lecture de Confessions VII IX, 13–XXI, 27: Notes critiques à propos d'une thèse de R. J. O'CONNELL." *Revue des Etudes augustinienes* (1970): 79–137; R. J. TESKE, "St. Augustine's View of the Original Human Condition in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*." *Augustinian Studies* 22 (1991): 141–155; E. TESELLE, "Thesis on O'Connell: The Origin and 'proper Life' of the Soul in Augustine's Thought." *Augustinian Studies* 27 (1996): 7–19. Arguments for O'Connell's thesis are found in PENASKOVIC 1986 and J. T. BEANE "Augustine's Silence on the Fallenness of the Soul." *Augustiniana* 43 (1993): 77–84.

<sup>6</sup> O'CONNELL, "Pre-Existence in the Early Augustine," *Revue des Etudes augustinienes* 26 (1980): 178; idem 1993, 139; PENASKOVIC 1986, 142.

<sup>7</sup> Or: 'sensation of the soul was added to him,' viz. to man. Morphologically, 'animae' might be taken as a genitive, 'sensus' as the possession of 'anima' and 'ipsi' as a dative referring to 'homo.' I agree with Teske's version.

<sup>8</sup> Translated by R. J. TESKE in *Saint Augustine on Genesis. The Father of the Church* 84. Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991, 104–105. *Gen. man.* 2.8.10, 129: *Quod autem scriptum est: 'et insufflavimus in eum spiritum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem,' si adhuc corpus solum erat, animam adiunctam corpori hoc loco intellegere debemus; sive quae iam facta erat, sed tamquam in ore dei erat, id est in eius veritate vel sapientia, unde tamen non recessit*

There are two expressions in this passage which may be unusual to the modern reader who is not familiar with the vocabulary of Scripture. *Homo animalis* and *homo spiritalis* represent Pauline terms, as in 1 Cor 2:13 ff.; Rom. 8:5; Gal 6:1. 'Animal man' lives according to the flesh and is ruled by bodily desires. Such a man is not capable of the Holy Spirit and is unable to understand and receive the gifts of the Spirit. Contrary to him, spiritual man can judge all things: this man is purified and has subjected himself to God's law.

This classification, of a moral character, serves as the basis for Augustine's moral interpretation:

*And so all of us who were born from him after sin first bear the animal man until we attain the spiritual Adam, that is our Lord Jesus Christ, who committed no sin.*<sup>9</sup>

This remark could mean that, being born from Adam, who sinned and lost the spiritual life, we are not capable at first of the Spirit, but then, having converted to Christ, we can attain a higher, spiritual state. Augustine, importantly, places this moral interpretation in its historical framework. He conceives of 1 Cor. 15:45, *but what is spiritual is not first, but what is animal, as has been written: the first Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a lifegiving spirit*, as a reference to the fact that the first Adam, that is, the first man, was made into animal man. For this reason, it would be an oversimplification to assert that Adam was merely a symbolic figure for Augustine at the time when he composed *De genesi contra manichaeos*. It is obvious from chapter 2.8.10 that he thinks of an historical Adam, a 'real' Adam, who first was made an animal man but whom God established in paradise as spiritual man.

This historical perspective reveals another substantial feature of Augustine's understanding of the Pauline classification. Animal and spiritual man are distinguished not only morally, but also anthropologically. For he makes it clear in the commentary that in paradise spiritual man lived in a heavenly, transparent and fine body, which was identical in its nature to the angelic body of the resurrection.<sup>10</sup> After

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*quasi locis separata, quando insufflata est – non enim deus loco continetur, sed ubique praesens est –, sive tunc anima facta est, quando in illud figmentum deus insufflavit spiritum vitae, ut illa insufflatio ipsam operationem dei significet, qua fecit animam in homine spiritu potentiae suae (cf. Sap. 11:20). Si autem homo ille, qui factus erat, iam corpus et anima erat, ipsi animae sensus est additus ista insufflatione, cum 'factus est homo in animam viventem,' non quia illa insufflatio conversa est in animam viventem, sed operata est animam viventem. Nondum tamen spiritalem hominem debemus intellegere qui factus est in animam viventem, sed adhuc animale. Tunc enim spiritalis effectus est, cum in paradiso, hoc est in beata vita, constitutus praeceptum etiam perfectionis accepit, ut verbo dei consummaretur. Itaque postquam peccavit recedens a praecepto dei et dimissus est de paradiso, in eo remansit ut animalis esset.*

<sup>9</sup> TESKE 1991, 105. *Gen. man.* 2.8.10, 129–130: *Et ideo animale hominem prius agimus omnes, qui de illo post peccatum nati sumus, donec assequamur spiritalem Adam, id est dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, qui peccatum non fecit* (1 Pet. 2:22).

<sup>10</sup> *Gen. man.* 2.21.32, 155: *Neque enim in illis corporibus caelestibus sic latere posse cogitationes credendum est, quemadmodum in his corporibus latent; sed sicut nonnulli motus animorum apparent in vultu et maxime in oculis, sic in illa perspicuitate ac simplicitate caelestium corporum omnes omnino animi motus latere non arbitror. Itque illi merebuntur habitationem illam et commutationem in*

man transgressed and ‘*was dismissed from paradise he remained in such a state that he was animal.*’ Fallen man received a fragile, mortal, and perishable body called flesh.<sup>11</sup> Spiritual man lives in a spiritual body; animal man in an animal body.

The first animal man, thus, lived in an animal body; hence, he was similar to us. This is the point that Augustine takes for granted. At this point, however, two questions occur. First: How did this man become spiritual? What does it mean: to be established in paradise? Second: Why is this man still animal? What does it mean: to be made animal? For the present, I shall attempt to answer these latter questions.

It is worth repeating Augustine’s thesis according to which *we should not yet think of the man who was made into a living soul as spiritual, but rather still animal.*

For Teske and O’Connell this thesis means that the first man “was created as animal,” that is to say, the so-called animal condition must have been the “initial state” of man.<sup>12</sup> Augustine does not affirm, however, that the animal state necessarily was the initial state of man. His thesis is that after the breathing forth the first Adam was made, or was turned into (*factus est*) animal man. In fact the Latin ‘*factus est*’ can be derived either from ‘*facere*’ or ‘*fieri*.’

According to Augustine the first part of Gen. 2:7, *God formed man from the mud of the earth*, can be understood in two ways. Firstly, it can refer to the moulding of the body. Secondly, it can refer to the creation of man, who is a composite of body and soul.<sup>13</sup> The body of this man, moreover, is described as a spiritual body ruled and vivified by the soul, so that *it would not be subject to corruption if, in obedience to God’s commandment, the man had not willed to sin.*<sup>14</sup>

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*angelicam formam, qui etiam in hac vita ... hoc solum tegunt, quod hi qui audiunt ferre non possunt, sed nulla mentiuntur.*

<sup>11</sup> Gen. man. 2.7.8, 128: *Dicimus enim tabidum et fragile et morti destinatum corpus humanum post peccatum esse coepisse.* Cf. ibid. 1.13.19; 2.21.31.

<sup>12</sup> TESKE 1991, 105. n. 46 and 47: Augustine “claims that Adam was created as animal.”... “To say that man was created as ‘animal’ would imply that man was created in a state such as that he had after the Fall.” O’CONNELL 1993, 140 states “For Augustine makes it plain that man was subsequently elevated from his initial ‘animal’ to the ‘spiritual’ state of happiness.”

<sup>13</sup> Gen. man. 2.7.9, 129: *Sic enim nonnullos nostros intellegere accepi, qui dicunt, posteaquam dictum est: finxit deus hominem de limo terrae, propterea non additum: ‘ad imaginem et similitudinem suam’, quoniam nunc de corporis formatione dicitur; tunc autem homo interior significabatur, quando dictum est: ‘fecit deus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem dei.’ Sed etiam si nunc quoque hominem ex corpore et anima factum intellegamus, ut non alicuius novi operis inchoatio, sed superius breviter insinuat diligentior retractatio isto sermone explicetur, si ergo, ut dixi, hominem hoc loco ex corpore et anima factum intellegamus, non absurde ipsa commixtio limi nomen accepit. Sicut enim aqua terram colligit et conglutinat et content, quando eius commixtione limus efficitur, sic anima corporis materiam vivificando in unitatem concordem conformat et non permittit labi et resolvi.*

<sup>14</sup> Gen. man. 2.7.8, 127–128: *Quid autem mirum aut difficile deo, etiamsi de limo istius terrae hominem fecit, tale tamen corpus eius efficere, quod corruptioni non subiaceret, si homo praeceptum dei custodiens peccare nolisset? Si enim speciem caeli ipsius de nihilo vel de informi materia dicimus factam, quia omnipotentem artificem credimus, quid mirum si corpus, quod de limo qualicumque factum est, potuit ab omnipotenti artifice tale fieri, ut nulla molestia, nulla indigentia cruciaret hominem ante peccatum et nulla corruptione tabesceret?* These are characteristics of the spiritual body, as it is also clear from chapter 1.19.30, 97–98: *Erat enim prius casta coniunctio masculi et feminae, ... et spiritalis fetus intellegibilium et immortalium gaudiorum replens terram, id est vivificans corpus, et dominans eius, id est ita subiectum habens, ut nullam ex eo adversitatem, nullam molestiam pateretur.*

The commentary on the second part of Gen. 2:7, *God breathed into him the breath of life, and man became a living soul*, is the explanation of three sub-possibilities of these two possibilities.

1. First hypothesis: *If up to this point there was only the body,*
  - 1.1. Sub-hypothesis: *we should understand that the soul was at this point joined to the body.*  
This sub-hypothesis is divided into two:
    - 1.1.1. First: *Perhaps the soul had been already made, but was still as if in the mouth of God, that is, in his truth and wisdom.*
    - 1.1.2. Second: *Or perhaps the soul was made when God breathed the breath of life into the mud... .*
2. Second hypothesis: *If the man who had been made was already body and soul.*
  - 2.1. Third sub-hypothesis: *sensation was added to the soul by that breath, when man was made a living soul ... .*

Let us consider the third sub-hypothesis (2.1), usually neglected by interpreters. What seems the most remarkable in Augustine's Latin is the chronological and logical distinction between two events. He uses verbs in *praeteritum perfectum* and *praesens perfectum*. The man who consisted of body and soul had already been made (*factus erat*) and after that, he was made (*factus est*) living soul, because sensation was added (*additus est*) to the soul. In this version, the breathing forth is not considered a creative act of God, because man, the composite of the soul and body, already existed. This man, for some reason, received sensation and turned into animal man. In the beginning he was made, according to the second hypothesis, a soul and spiritual body which was not yet subject to corruption and death. Consequently, the third sub-hypothesis, according to which this man turned into animal man, implies the theory of the Fall – but not the fallen-soul-theory! It is man and not the soul who received sensation, that is, man and not the soul was dismissed from a spiritual state of happiness. In the spiritual state, man did not yet use his sense-organs, if he had any at all: sensation was no more than mere potentiality. When God activated sensation, man turned from his spiritual state into a mortal and animal condition and he “was made into living soul.” This is exactly what happened to the spiritual man in paradise. He consisted of virile reason (*virilis ratio*), an animal part (*animalis pars*), and a heavenly body. There, he did not need bodily eyes to see God.<sup>15</sup> After the Fall, however, *it is necessary that we be admonished about the truth through these eyes and these ears* because of our corruptible body.<sup>16</sup> Just as man received sensation after sin in paradise, so the first man had received sensation and was made into animal man before the life in paradise.

The second sub-hypothesis (1.1.2) predicates that God joined the soul to the body. In this case, ‘connection’ is taken as ‘creation.’ God had moulded the earthly body and created the soul that he immediately joined to the body. This could mean two things. First, the body had already existed when God created the soul, that is to

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *Gen. man.* 2.11.16–12.16.

<sup>16</sup> TESKE 1991, 125. *Gen. man.* 2.20.30, 152–153.

say, the body in a sense predates the soul. Second, if this sequence of events is due to only the natural temporality of the narrative, then Augustine simply means that the body and the soul may have been simultaneously created. Since this man was made into a living soul (*factus est in animam vivam*) as still animal man, the second sub-hypothesis includes that in his initial state, man was created as soul and mortal, corruptible body. In this version, Augustine thus considers the term "*factus est*" a derivative of the verb "*facere*," "to make."

In the first sub-hypothesis (1.1), Augustine chronologically differentiates between the creation of the soul and its connection to the body. His Latin is as consequent as in the case of the third sub-hypothesis. The soul *had been already made* (*iam facta erat*) and after that, God joined it to the body *when the soul was breathed forth* (*quando insufflata est*). Augustine's main thesis reveals that as the result of the connection, the body and the soul were made into animal man. One can say about the soul that it happened to find itself in a mortal, corruptible body. At the same time, it is not evident from the passage whether the soul was sent by God or had fallen *sua sponte* into the body;<sup>17</sup> in other words, this sub-hypothesis may allow the fallen soul theory, although Augustine does not make it obvious whether the soul was fallen or sent into the body. It is clear that according to this version, the soul did not use any kind of body at all before God joined it to the animal body. This is an essential difference between the first and the third sub-hypotheses. Unlike the third sub-hypothesis, the first does not imply that the soul was originally joined to a spiritual or celestial body which later turned into an animal or earthly body. The vehicle of the soul is the incorporeal matter of which Augustine speaks in chapter 1.11.17: *The firmament of heaven separated the corporeal matter of visible things from the incorporeal matter of invisible things*.<sup>18</sup>

Consequently, as far as the initial state of man or soul is concerned, Augustine offers three possibilities in *De genesi contra manichaeos*.

1. In the beginning the soul alone existed. It was joined to a mortal body and man thereby came into existence. (This is the first sub-hypothesis.)
2. In the beginning man was created as a composite of soul and immortal, incorruptible body. (This is the second hypothesis.)
3. In the beginning man was created as a composite of soul and mortal, corruptible body. (This is the second sub-hypothesis).

Can we regard these possibilities as being equal in weight? Considering Augustine's emphatic statement in the contemporary *De moribus* (2.7.9) that the initial state of creatures is identical to their final state, that is: *all things return to that from which they fell away*, one must exclude the third possibility as *suppositum non concessum*. It would be nonsensical and non-Biblical (against, for example, 1 Cor. 15:53) to believe that after the resurrection man will live in a mortal and perishable body. In *De genesi contra manichaeos* Augustine unequivocally asserts that the resurrected body is not subjected to corruptibility and death.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *Lib. arb.* 3.200.

<sup>18</sup> TESKE 1991, 64.

<sup>19</sup> *Gen. man.* 2.21.32.

The question is then whether Augustine chose between the two other possibilities. Did he hold the view that the soul as a member of the spiritual creatures did not initially use a body at all? Or, did he believe that man had been created as soul and immortal, spiritual body? In other words: What is man? The rational soul alone, or a composite of soul and body? This is the dilemma which frequently emerges in the early writings. In *De moribus* 1.4.6–5.7 Augustine asks: What is it that we call man? The composite of soul and body, the body alone, or the soul alone?<sup>20</sup> He excludes, naturally, the possibility that man might be identical to the body, and, finally, defines man as a rational soul which uses a mortal and earthly body.<sup>21</sup> This is a definition for the fallen Adam and his descendants. Following this pattern, we might say that man in paradise was rational soul which used an immortal and heavenly body; however, in this way every difference between angels and humans would disappear, for according to the early Augustine, man in paradise lived an angelic life. It is a more urgent question as to whether Augustine's interpretation in *De genesi contra Manichaeos* implies that in the beginning, before the life in paradise, rational souls did not use any kind of body.

The commentary does not provide firm ground for an unequivocal answer. A sharp distinction between the incorporeal matter of the invisible things, like the soul, and the corporeal matter of the visible things, like the body, is made in chapter 1.11.17, but the distinction is ontological in its nature and does not cogently imply the theory of the initial incorporeality of the soul (incorporeality in the sense of not using a body), especially because the two kinds of matter had been simultaneously created. Possibly, the spiritual creature, however incorporeal it was, had been inseparably joined to the corporeal matter through the firmament, 'the most beautiful body.' This would mean that the spiritual creature originally did make use of an ethereal body, since for Augustine the firmament consists of some kind of fine ethereal body.<sup>22</sup>

Nevertheless, R. J. O'Connell has pointed out an important characteristic of Augustine's terminology in the commentary, which may suggest that Augustine gave preference to the hypothesis of the total incorporeality of the soul. Concerning Gen. 2:5–6, Augustine observes that

*the addition, 'before they were upon the earth,' (cf. Gen. 2:5) means: before the soul sinned. For soiled by earthly desires, it is correctly said to have come to be upon the earth or to be upon the earth. [...] After sin man began to labor on the earth and to have need of those clouds. But before sin God had made the green of the field and food, and we said that this expression signified the invisible creature. God watered it by an interior spring, speaking in its intellect, so that it did not receive words from the outside, as rain from the aforementioned clouds. Rather it was satisfied from its own spring, that is, by the truth flowing from its interior.*<sup>23</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *Moribus* 1.4.6 5.7.

<sup>21</sup> *Moribus* 1.27.52: *Homo igitur, ut homini apparet, anima rationalis est mortali atque terreno utens corpore.*

<sup>22</sup> *Gen. litt. imp.* 3, 464; 8, 479; 12, 486.

<sup>23</sup> TESKE 1991, 97–99. *Gen. man.* 2.3.5–4.5, 123–124: *Deinde quod addidit: 'antequam esset super terram,' intellegitur: antequam anima peccaret. Terrenis enim cupiditatibus sordidata tamquam su-*

Importantly, when Augustine uses the term ‘man’ (*homo*) he thinks of man living in a fallen state.<sup>24</sup> It is the ‘soul’ that initially enjoys and contemplates God while being ‘watered’ by Truth, the inner fountain. This is the spiritual mode of existence which in the hypothesis of initial incorporeality is also described as the state of the soul which exists ‘*in the mouth of God, that is in his Truth and Wisdom.*’ The claim that after the sin of the soul ‘man’ appeared upon the earth is also analogous to the hypothesis that after the soul had been joined to an earthly body, animal man came into existence. The following terminology indicates that ‘man’ is a term applied to a being consisting of soul and body, whereas the ‘soul’ stands for the incorporeal, in every sense incorporeal, and ‘interior man’ made in the image of God. This terminological argument seems to be the only indication of the fact that Augustine preferred the theory of initial incorporeality.

Finally, what are the implications of this theory? If in its initial state the spiritual creature, like the soul, and the body were not linked at all, then the soul and its substrate, incorporeal matter, existed before the body and corporeal matter.<sup>25</sup> This composite could have been pre-existent in two ways. On the one hand, since all of time is made along with the corporeal creature subsisting in corporeal matter,<sup>26</sup> pre-existence cannot mean a temporal priority, but merely the relationship between timelessness and temporality. On the other hand, since the visible world of the corporeal creatures represents the world of spatiality where the soul arrived from the non-spatial, non-extended divine Wisdom, pre-existence can also mean the relation of non-spatiality and spatiality.

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*per terram nata vel super terram esse recte dicitur. [...] Post peccatum autem homo laborare coepit in terra et necessarias habere illas nubes; ante peccatum vero cum ‘viride agri et pabulum’ fecisset deus, quo nomine invisibilem creaturam significari diximus, irrigabat eam fonte interiore loquens in intellectu eius, ut non extrinsecus verba exciperet tamquam de supradictis nubibus pluviam, sed fonte suo, hoc est de intimis suis manante veritate satiaretur.*

<sup>24</sup> O’CONNELL 1968, 158: “Noteworthy here is the fact that the original sin is regularly imputed not to ‘man’ but to ‘soul.’ Augustine seems bent on distinguishing the ideal state ‘before the soul sinned’ (*antequam anima peccaret*) and post-lapsary state where the term ‘man’ (*homo*) appears for first time to become an entirely appropriate designation. Only after the Fall, he observes, was there ‘man laboring upon the earth’ (*homo laborans in terra*, 2.5).” Cf. TESKE 1991, 97–98.

<sup>25</sup> This ‘pre-existence’ does not involve pre-existence of the individual souls which Augustine would explore in *Lib. arb.* 3.200 and 214 as a possibility. In *Gen. man.* 2.8.10 he is concerned with the origin of the first man. Even if for Augustine the first man was a ‘fallen soul,’ it does not mean that he believed our individual souls to be pre-existent and fallen souls as well. The theory of pre-existence can be combined with others, like traducianism and creationism. Cf. J. M. RIST, *Augustine*. Cambridge: University Press, 1996, 317–320.

<sup>26</sup> *Gen. man.* 2.3.4, 121: *Fecit enim deus omne tempus simul cum omnibus temporalibus creaturis; quae visibiles caeli et terrae nomine significantur.*