BOOK REVIEWS

Wolfgang U. Dressler – Oskar E. Pfeiffer – Markus Pöchträger – John R. Rennison (eds): Morphological analysis in comparison. Current Issues in Linguistic Theory Vol. 201. John Benjamins, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 2000, 253 pp.

The volume contains selected papers from the *Seventh International Morphology Meeting* held in Vienna, Austria, from February 16 through 18, 1996. In spite of the fact that the volume appeared four years later, the papers have not lost their actuality and they provide an adequate overview of current problems in morphological theory. Morphology internal problems are discussed in six papers, five papers are devoted to the morphology–syntax interface, none of the papers tackles morphophonological problems.

Let us first have a look at the first set of papers.

Henry Davis' paper ('Salish evidence on the causative-inchoative alternation') brings data from a lesser-known language (Lillooet Salish) to bear on the problem of cross-linguistic variation in the causative-inchoative alternation. Many European languages derive inchoatives from causative roots via reflexivization (e.g. German *öffnen* 'open' (caus.)–*sich öffnen* (inch.), French *ouvrir* (caus.)–*s'ouvrir* (inch.), Russian *otverat'* (caus.)–*otverat'sja* (inch.)), Salish, however, derives all causatives from inchoative roots (as does, among others, also Slave, Turkish and Chichewa). It has been noted that the direction of derivation is often dependent on the nature of the predicate involved in the alternation. Internally caused events (e.g. *grow, freeze, rot*) tend to go in the causative (inchoative → causative) direction, while externally caused events (e.g. *break, open*) tend to go in the anti-causative (causative → inchoative) direction. This means that in the vast majority of languages the direction of derivation is neither purely causative nor purely anti-causative—it is split along semantic lines. The paper sketches three possible solutions to the problem. The first one allows lexical representations to vary from language to language, and from predicate to predicate within a language. The author rejects the variable representation approach on conceptual grounds: the variation must be accounted for in terms of rules rather then by individual representations. The second solution is to assume a universally causative representation, which, too, is rejected by the author, who carefully examines six arguments in favour of the causative representation and finds them all inconclusive or invalid. Similar things hold true for the third solution, which would posit a universally inchoative representation. The author argues convincingly that in spite of the fact that Salish has a strongly causative morphological system, it has both derived (anti-causative) and non-derived inchoatives. Thus the variation cannot be reduced to a simple cross-linguistic parameter. Moreover, it cannot be reduced to semantic differences between predicates either. But it can be claimed that for languages different derivational paths are available: simple inchoatives are associated

with a causative derivation, derived inchoatives are associated with both a causative and an anti-causative derivation.

Marianne Kilani-Schoch's and Wolfgang U. Dressler's paper ('Are fillers as precursors of morphemes relevant for morphological theory? A case study from the acquisition of French') is a case study on the emergence of (semi-)auxiliaries and subject clitics from so-called fillers, i.e. underspecified positional place holders. The data drawn from French show that fillers respresent a prosodic and phonological strategy in the early period of language acquisition. The child retains some rhythmic and phonological structure, e.g. 'unstressed vowel $+\frac{1}{2}$ stressed syllable'. The first unstressed vowel, the filler, is just an indication for something missing. A typical example of this structure is represented by the sequence 'filler + infinitive'. In the first phase this structure carries almost exlusively pragmatic meaning, in the second phase the structure 'filler + finite verb' emerges, which already carries descriptive meaning whereas the 'filler + Inf' retains its pragmatic meaning, in the third phase this structure extends its descriptive meaning, finally in the last phase the filler is dropped or replaced by the adult form. The development of fillers provides new evidence for a constructivist approach to language acquisition. The child ('Sophie') constructs parts of grammar from a previous phonological basis, and in doing so she does not simply imitate the adults but follows a creative acquisition path of her own. The relatively slow development of fillers affects not only their form but leads to more specific and more grammatical meaning distinctions. The authors argue that the acquisitional data reported on can easily be accommodated into the theory of Natural Morphology but they are incompatible with models which integrate inflectional morphology into syntax.

Mária Ladányi's paper ('Productivity as a sign of category change: The case of Hungarian verbal prefixes') deals with the grammaticalization of a certain type of verbal prefix in Hungarian. The main hypothesis put forward is that in the process of grammaticalization the prefix becomes more productive, and the increase in productivity goes hand in hand with the decrease of co-occurrence restrictions. The plausibility of this hypothesis is shown by the detailed analysis of the prefix *agyon* 'to death, to excess'. The two meanings can easily be kept apart. The author shows convincingly how the second meaning has developed from the first one and how—in the later development—the second meaning got further differentiated. It should be noted (Ladányi's discussion is restricted to Hungarian) that a similar development (of the parallel verbal prefix) can also be observed in other languages. Cf. for example, German *totschlagen* 'beat sb to death' → *sich totarbeiten* 'overwork oneself'. However, the Hungarian prefix is more productive and more polysemous. Ladányi claims that an element can be categorized as a verbal prefix only if lexical meaning has shifted to grammatical meaning. Namely, this would mean that only prefixal elements (most often called preverbs) which express an aktionsart or are used to perfectivize the verb can justifiably be termed verbal prefixes. This goes certainly too far because one would still like to consider preverbs with directional meaning (such as *ki* 'out', *be* 'in', *fel* 'up', *le* 'down') to be prefixes. Maybe, Ladányi's hypothesis holds for preverbs with non-directional meaning only.

Adrienne Lehrer's paper ('Are affixes signs? The semantic relationships of English derivational affixes') is an interesting contribution to the controversy concerning the sign-like behaviour of affixes. Some linguists have argued that affixes are not different from ordinary lexemes, they are just bound. Others take the opposite view: affixes are quite different from lexemes both syntactically and semantically. Lehrer takes a look at some English derivational affixes and shows that they enter into the same semantic relations, such as antonymy, synonymy, hyponymy and meronymy, as lexemes do. Consequently, these affixes cannot be different from lexemes, they must be signs. On the other hand, it should

be made clear that there are affixes with very little meaning, which do not enter into the semantic relations mentioned above. (For example, none of the verbal prefixes which carry aktionsart-meaning only could be used in Lehrer's argumentation.) We can, however, readily agree with the conclusion that there is a cline between the lexeme-like and the non-lexeme-like affixes rather than a clear-cut division.

In her paper ('Athabaskan redux: Against the position class as a morphological category') Joyce McDonough argues against the position class as a morphological category. She points out that there is no internal integrity to position classes other than their use as a device in describing complex morphologies. Since a classic example of the extensive use of position classes is found in Athabaskan, it suffices to show that a different, more adequate analysis of Athabaskan morphology is possible. The bipartite model developed in earlier work by the author proposes to analyze the basic Athabaskan verb as a compound consisting of two morphosyntactic constituents, a verb constituent and an auxiliary or 'infl' constituent. The two analyses, the position class analysis and the bipartite analysis, represent opposing views of the structure of the verbal complex. The crucial difference between the two is the concatenation they assume: the bipartite analysis does not use a position class prosthesis, all concatenation is affix to base. In the template model morphemes are assigned to position classes and have the morphological status 'prefix' in the grammar. It is then shown that Stump's model can build words from both the template and the bipartite structure equally well. But in the bipartite structure the position class ordering is completely redundant. The formalism cannot distinguish between the two different structures, the position class structure with its prosthetic template and the bipartite structure in which the ordering is redundant. At the same time, the two analyses make conflicting claims about the morphemes in the word, the structure of the complex, and the kind of morphological entities there are in the world. The author concludes that the formalism based on position classes fails to provide insights into any principles that underlie position class typologies.

Vladimir A. Plungian ('Agentive nouns in Dogon: Neither derivation nor inflection?') discusses a morphological marker in Dogon (West Africa) which seems to be neither affix nor clitic and neither an inflectional nor a derivational marker. Agentive nouns in this language are formed by a marker which is fully productive and has two main uses. In one of its uses, termed 'habitual', the marker shows typical derivational properties (numerous lexical restrictions, frequent idiomaticity, it cannot occur after inflectional markers). Other uses, referred to as 'participle-like', are characterized by the opposite properties: the marker is not lexically restricted, it does not undergo idiomatization, and occupies a position after inflectional markers. This situation is far from being exceptional. In order to account for this type of language a less rigid model of derivational morphology is called for, which would allow derivational markers to occur before as well as after inflection.

The second set of papers has to do with the morphology–syntax interface.

Pablo Albizu and Louis Eguren ('An optimality theoretic account for "Ergative Displacement" in Basque') discuss the problem of 'ergative displacement' in Basque, i.e. the phenomenon whereby an ergative DP is cross-referenced by means of an absolutive prefix with the same specification for person, instead of the expected ergative suffix. The authors propose an optimality theoretic account for 'ergative displacement' (ED). They argue that ED is confined to the mapping between Morphology and Phonological Form, to the process of Vocabulary Insertion and that there exists a prefixal 'position of exponence' in Basque verbal morphology whose obligatory lexical realization motivates either the application of ED or the insertion of 'default prefixes'. Furthermore the authors maintain that the constraint-based approach is superior to the rule-based analysis. Finally, they claim

that their analysis supports both late lexical insertion and the existence of an autonomous post-syntactic component.

'Prefixation and the head-complement parameter' is the title of Lluïsa Gràcia and Miren Azkarate's paper. The authors distinguish two types of prefixes: in one case prefixes function as modifiers of the root, whereas in the other case, they function as heads at a certain level of representation with the root acting as their complement. It should be noted that this distinction is also known in other languages. However, the interpretation of prefixes as heads raises at least one problem: the head determines not only the semantic interpretation of the complex but also the word class membership of the complex. Now *preistoria* 'prehistory' is a noun and not a preposition. Moreover, most examples mentioned in the lists in (1) and (2) are lexicalized cases, they do not represent productive patterns. We also know that heads in morphology are quite different from heads in syntax, why should then Lieber's licensing conditions be valid both in syntax and in morphology? The plausibility of Lieber's conditions seems to derive from the fact that they can be used to make certain predictions about prefixes. More precisely, it can be predicted that VO languages will have two types of prefixes whereas OV languages will not have prefixes in a head position. In reality, however, there are also languages which show OV characteristics (alongside of VO features) and which do have both types of prefixes.

The paper by Lluïsa Gràcia and Olga Fullana ('Catalan verbal compounds: Internal order and argument interpretation') discusses the internal order and argument interpretation of Catalan verbal compounds. The authors point out that in Catalan—in contrast to other Romance languages—verbal compounds are not unusual. The question is, however, if verbal compounds can be formed productively, which does not seem to be the case. Even if it may be true that compounds in which the head is preceded by an inalienable possession noun can be analyzed in two different ways, the possibility of interpreting the noun as a direct object of the verbal root should not be excluded. In fact, from the two analyses this latter analysis is more straightforward and intuitively more appealing. But whatever the explanation of the idiosyncratic behaviour of compounds containing inalienable possession nouns as their first member is, a semantic explanation is called for: Why are inalienable possession nouns in this respect different?

In his paper ('Agreement morphology in Chukotkan') Andrew Spencer presents an analysis of verbal agreement in the ergative languages Chukchee and Koryak showing that certain aspects of the system pose problems for current versions of Distributed Morphology and, in fact, for any other theory which seeks to defend the morpheme as the prototypical inflectional piece. The first problem is that Chukotkan agreement exhibits a kind of 'split ergativity' under which some affixes in a word form operate on a nominative/accusative basis, while other affixes in the same word form operate on an ergative/absolutive basis. The second problem is that certain person/number forms in transitive paradigms are syncretic, taking over one or other of an antipassive paradigm. The author concludes that the data support a realizational approach to inflection.

Edwin Williams' paper ('Three models of the morphology-syntax interface') investigates alternative positions about the extent to which syntax can have access to morphological information. One possibility is to consider words atomic, which occupy syntactic positions and have syntactic properties. The internal structure of words and how this structure comes about is irrelevant. On the other end, there is not much difference between word structure and sentence structure, the derivation of the properties of words and the derivation of the properties of sentences are intermingled in various ways. The third model referred to in the title is not made very explicit in the paper, which is rather an extensive critical

discussion of minimalist theory from the point of view of morphology. It would seem that the author espouses the strict separation of the lexicon and syntax, and does not believe that affixes appear in syntactic structure. The general conclusion is that minimalist theory cannot account for a number of phenomena (the ordering of elements in thematically based compounding, typological differences between languages, the interaction of lexical scope and syntactic scope) hence word syntax should be kept distinct from sentence syntax, a conclusion with which we readily agree.

Ferenc Kiefer

Stephen C. Levinson: Presumptive meanings. The theory of generalized conversational implicature. The MIT Press, Cambridge MA & London, 2000, 480 pp.

1. A general overview of the book

The book under review is a grandiose, inspiring volume on utterance type meaning in the field of pragmatics. It is an "old–new" book which provides an excellent summary of the relevant previous results in pragmatics including the author's own, as well as presenting the recent developments and achievements in contemporary pragmatics, semantics, syntax, theory of language and cognitive science connected to the issues treated by the author in his basically neo-Gricean theory of generalized conversational implicature. Integrating relevant knowledge from different fields, Levinson aims to defend the notion of generalized conversational implicatures as preferred/default interpretations. Relying on his earlier work to a great extent, he fulfils his goal, first, by showing that some general theoretical sense can be made of the notion of a preferred interpretation; second, by defending the assumption on existence of default interpretations against intensive offensives from various reductionist pragmatics theories (e.g. relevance theory); and third, by showing that the proposed theory of preferred interpretations covers a broad range of important interpretive phenomena (e.g. scalar quantifiers and several kinds of anaphors). In spite of the fact that such a theory can only be "a piece in the jigsaw puzzle of the theory of meaning" (p. xiv), it helps linguists to understand how language works, highlighting the interaction between various levels of linguistic structure and utterance-type structure, mainly semantic vs. pragmatic, syntactic vs. pragmatic; and syntactic, semantic vs. pragmatic levels. Presenting detailed analyses of various linguistic phenomena, Levinson convincingly argues that, to some extent, pragmatics can be considered a component in an overall theory of grammar. The author's theory on pragmatic principles, namely Q-, M- and I-heuristics, plays an important role not only in the intra- and extralinguistic synchronic descriptions of communicative language use, but also in the explanations of several diachronic changes in languages (see especially the relevant subsections in chapters 3 and 4), as well as making clear predictions about language structure at different levels of generalization, and even about possible languages. "These predictions arise because the Q-, M- and I-heuristics operate across the board, generating presumptive inferences that insert themselves willy-nilly into the interpretations of utterances. They thus play a decisive role in structuring lexical fields and syntactic constructions, especially by redundancy constraints: what is implicated need not be coded" (p. 369).

1.1. The structure of the book

Presumptive meanings has the following structure. It begins with four short sections including 'Conventions' (pp. xi–xii), with the typographical notations and the list of symbols and

abbreviations; a 'Preface' (pp. xiii–xv), which lets the audience know what motivations led the author to write the book and what general goals he has; a 'Note to Students' (pp. xvii–xix) with important information on how to use the book effectively in accordance with personal needs and interests, and, finally, Acknowledgements (pp. xxi–xxiii), from which the reader can think that—through building the results of discussions and consultations with a wide range of linguists and students in the book—the approaches of the whole pragmatically oriented linguistic community are present in the book either in the author's theory or in views he criticizes.

After the first four technical and preparatory sections, the author begins to evaluate his theory of generalized conversational implicature in the 'Introduction' (pp. 1–10) and continues it in the four main chapters (pp. 11–365). The fifth chapter, entitled 'Epilogue' (pp. 367–77), summarizes the results and points out some directions for further research. And finally, 'Notes' (pp. 379–423), 'References' (pp. 425–49), a 'Name Index' (pp. 451-5) and a 'Subject Index' (pp. 457–80) conclude the book.

1.2. A brief synopsis of the individual chapters

The 'Introduction' (pp. 1–10) already contains important starting theses. The author declares in it that the book is about utterance-type meaning and not about particular, contextually dependent utterance-token meaning investigated in several recent pragmatic works. Utterance-type meanings at a more abstract level are understood as preferred/default interpretations, they are inferences relatively invariant over changes in context and background assumptions. This relative invariance gives these inferences their linguistic importance as it is emphasized by the author (p. 5). The meaning of an utterance-type involves not only the content of the utterance-type but also inferences of a metalinguistic kind. Levinson proposes three heuristics to amplify the utterance-type content. By means of the "analysis" of the way an utterance-type is constructed, these three heuristics refer to the properties of the described situation: whether it is expected, stereotypical or not; whether it is unusual, unexpected or not, and whether it has special properties or has not; and whether it belongs to a contrastive world or not.

In addition to the first general characterization of the heuristics guiding general conversational implicatures, Levinson also situates his theory, radically different from that with which Gricean pragmatics began, among the current approaches to meaning by enumerating his main theses. In his theory he (1) makes a clear distinction between semantics and pragmatics; (2) differentiates semantics from "conceptual structure" or "the language of thought"; (3) specifies the aspects of semantic content by the apparatus of a recursive truth definition; (4) holds that there is no algorithm that could lead from a given syntactic string in a language to its unique logical form or semantic structure; (5) states that semantic representations are partially specified, and (6) claims that pragmatic processes play a crucial role in mapping syntactic structures onto semantic representations, as well as semantic representations onto utterance meanings (pp. 7–8). Furthermore, the semantics-pragmatics distinction is made by Levinson not on the basis of the difference between sentence-meaning and utterance-meaning (speaker's meaning), as it is in standard Gricean theory. Levinson argues that instead of thinking of the distinction in terms of levels of representation, one should consider both semantics and pragmatics component processes that offer their own distinctive contributions to a single level of representation. Because of the distinct character these processes have, the distinction between semantics and pragmatics must be retained.

The above statements together result in a new architecture of meaning theory, as it is demonstrated by Levinson in his approach to generalized conversational implicatures, and in the syntax they explain the distribution and typology of anaphoric expressions.

Following the rather explosive theoretical grounding, Levinson introduces the idea of presumptive meanings in the first chapter entitled 'On the Notion of Generalized Conversational Implicature' (pp. 11–72). Presumptive meanings vs. generalized conversational implicatures (abbreviated as GCIs from now on) are defined as default inferences, ones that capture people's intuitions about preferred or normal, expected interpretations (p. 11). They belong to the level of utterance-type meaning interposed between the level of speaker's meaning/utterance-token meaning and the level of expression-meaning/sentence meaning. Levinson develops a lot of arguments to demonstrate the importance of the level of utterance-type meaning in general and GCIs in particular. First, he refers to Grice's program, reminding the reader that it originally presupposed such a level clearly distinguishing the generalized and particularized conversational implicatures which can be illustrated by the following example (p. 16):

(1) A: "What time is it?"
     B: "Some of the guests are already leaving."
     PCI: 'It must be late.'
     GCI: 'Not all of the guests are already leaving.'

Second, Levinson enumerates a number of phenomena such as illocutionary force, presuppositions, and felicity conditions that justify the setting up of the level of utterance-type meaning in a theory of communication. Third, the author presents an argument "from human design" to be effective in communication. To find out the information conveyed but not coded in communication, the communicative partners need some heuristics. They are the following: *Q-heuristic*: "What isn't said, isn't." (p. 31), *I-heuristic*: "What is simply described is stereotypically exemplified." (p. 32), and *M-heuristic*: "What's said in an abnormal way, isn't normal, or Marked message indicates marked situation." (p. 33). The first heuristic can be related to Grice's first Maxim of **Q**uantity: "Make your contribution as informative as required" (p. 35). The second heuristic can be related to Grice's second Maxim of Quantity: "Do not make your contribution **more** informative than is required" (p. 37). This is the Informativeness Principle given by Atlas–Levinson (1981). And the third heuristic can be related to Grice's Maxim of **Manner**: "Be perspicuous" (p. 38). Levinson also discusses how these three heuristics are ordered if inconsistent GCIs arise: Q > M > I. Levinson's fourth argument for a need for the level of utterance-type meaning comes from the formal models of nonmonotonic human reasoning. Levinson convinces the reader that it is possible to formulate a relatively precise theory of default interpretation, "thus there is nothing to inhibit the development of clearly articulated theories of utterance-type meaning" (p. 72). Citing "Gazdar's bucket", Levinson captures what is commonly called the projection problem, giving the order of incremented information as follows (p. 50): first entailments; then Q GCIs, clausal and scalar; then M GCIs, and finally I GCIs. The author's fifth argument is a negative one. Levinson attacks some current reductionist accounts of implicature that do not suppose the level of utterance-type meaning e.g., Sperber–Wilson's (1986; 1995) Relevance theory and explanations based on Lewis's (1979) notion of accommodation. These theories of nonce inferences simply cannot handle the phenomena focal to a theory of GCIs, in Levinson's opinion. And the final, sixth argument is the repetition of Horn's (1972; 1989) observations on how GCIs can account for lexicalization patterns.

In the second chapter entitled 'The Phenomena' (pp. 73–164), Levinson explores the three main genera of GCIs and their consequences in detail. He analyzes a lot of examples, but of course the data examined in the chapter are not exhaustive. The examples, however, are sufficient to demonstrate that preferred interpretations have systematicity both within and across languages. Before starting to investigate how the proposed heuristics operate, Levinson addresses the question "Why three and just three principles?" (p. 74). In the relevant literature one can find various estimates from one (Sperber – Wilson 1986) to ten or more (Leech 1983) principles. As explanatory principles, it is a requirement from the theory of science to suppose only as many principles as absolutely necessary. Levinson's three principles are inevitably necessary to describe the utterance-type meaning, but because of the fact that they are incommensurable, their number cannot be reduced. Levinson presents his data (some of them are famous applications) in terms of Q-, I- and M-heuristics and also tries to clarify these principles. The author devotes a distinct section to each principle, outlines the history of the principles, answers critical comments against them, gives many examples illustrating the power of the principles, and, finally, refers to residual problems. In the section on the Q-principle, he studies scalar implicatures by means of the analyses of entailment scales derived from the operation of quantificational and modal operators, some nonlogical predicates, number words, function words, as well as examining casual implicatures. In the section exploring I-inferences, Levinson gathers a range of well-known phenomena such as conditional perfection, conjunction buttressing, bridging, inference to stereotype, negative strengthening, preferred local coreference, mirror maxim and noun-noun compounds. In the section devoted to the third heuristic, Levinson deals not only with M-implicatures (lexical doublets and rival word formations, lexicalized forms vs. periphrasis, litotes, grammaticalized vs. lexical expressions, zero vs. nonempty morphology, repetition and reduplication) but also with Horn's division of pragmatic labour. The second chapter concludes with a detailed treatment of the interaction of the principles and the projection problem.

The following chapter, 'Generalized Conversational Implicature and the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface' (pp. 165–260), mirrors Levinson's theoretical interest and orientation. The main questions of the chapter are as follows: (1) How does the theory of GCIs influence the architecture of an overall theory of meaning? (2) What aspects of the meaning of a linguistic expression is semantically specified and what aspects are pragmatically enriched? To describe these different aspects of meaning one needs different principles, different components in the overall theory of meaning. (3) How do these components interact? What is the relation between semantics and pragmatics?

Levinson discusses and criticizes the "traditional" views on the semantics–pragmatics distinction. According to the traditional approaches, semantics is an input to pragmatics, i.e. the central idea is that what is said is the input to what is implicated. However, Levinson demonstrates that identifying the referents, fixing the deictic parameters, disambiguating the linguistic string, unpacking ellipses and narrowing generalities (considered preconditions to determining what is said), involves exactly those inferential mechanisms that characterize Gricean pragmatics. Levinson studies the possible solutions of several kinds of "presemantic pragmatics" and "postpragmatic semantics" to these problems and concludes that pragmatic principles could play a role in truth conditions. Let us take only one short example from ellipsis unpacking.

(2)   A: "Who came?"
       B: "John."

B's answer can be enriched to the proposition *John came* by means of the I-principle and the Gricean maxim of Relevance. The missing predicate can be supplied from the preceding discourse, and after supplying it, the answer acquires a truth-conditional content. One should notice that "pragmatics is involved in the recovery of the elided linguistic material, which must then be semantically interpreted..." (p. 184).

In summary, the main conclusion of the chapter is that GCIs play a role in the assignment of truth-conditional content. As Levinson remarks, "This may seem not only a distinctly odd idea but definitionally impossible, because implicatures are often partially defined in opposition to truth-conditional content" (p. 166). But, if we accept the conclusion coming from the detailed analyses, then we have to drastically revise the traditional understanding of the semantics/pragmatics interface and the information transmission between the components in a general theory of meaning. Levinson emphasizes that we should focus on processes or operations rather than on the representations, and he demonstrates that semantic and pragmatic processes can interleave in the construction of the semantic representations. Where pragmatic processes end up embedded in semantic representations, Levinson establishes intrusion. Even the systematicity of GCIs' intrusion requires the rethinking of the traditional semantics/pragmatics interface.

The fourth chapter, 'Grammar and Implicature: Sentential Anaphora Reexamined' (pp. 261–364), deals with one of the most prominent aspects of grammar, the (mainly syntax)/pragmatics interface. As we have seen, the previous chapter examined how GCIs can influence semantic interpretations, and this chapter investigates how GCIs intrude into grammar. Pragmatic intrusion of this kind is illustrated by the detailed analyses of discourse and sentential anaphors. Levinson starts the chapter by discussing the relation between grammar and pragmatics, then he turns to the problem of coreference. Levinson claims that anaphora is a complex phenomenon, and it is fundamentally pragmatic for at least three reasons (cf. p. 272): (1) the essential patterns of anaphors are cross-, and intrasentential; (2) any semantically general expression can operate as anaphora; and (3) anaphors involve pragmatic resolution between alternatives which themselves may also be constrained by syntax. GCIs restrict and delimit the search for possible antecedents. The use of a semantically general expression (e.g., a pronoun) I-implicates local coreference, the use of a semantically specific expression (e.g., a definite noun), and M-implicates the complementary interpretation, i.e. disjointness in reference from the local NPs. However, it is also worth noting that the Q-principle might also be involved in generating disjoint interpretations (p. 277).

After treating the relation between implicatures and coreferential relations, the author confronts generative binding theory and the alternative pragmatically driven explanations for anaphors. According to generative syntax, there are three binding principles/conditions used in anaphora descriptions: (A) an anaphor is bound in its governing category, (B) nonreflexive pronouns must be free in their governing category, and (C) a lexical NP must be free in all its occurrences. Taking into consideration various configurational and non-configurational languages, Levinson partially reduces binding conditions in two ways. In what is called the A-first account, he eliminates binding conditions B and C, because "their effects seem to be predicted by independently motivated pragmatic principles" (p. 289). Unmarked pronouns pick up the disjoint reference by Q-contrast to reflexives, while pronouns and full lexical NPs generally contrast in reference because of the I-inference to coreference from minimal expression associated with pronouns, with M-contrast to disjointness arising when a pronoun might have been used but a full NP was used instead (p. 326). The A-first pragmatic analysis is not restricted to any specific kind of grammatical theory, it can interdigitate with any current syntactic framework. The second, more radical possibility to reduce binding

principles is to eliminate conditions A and C. In this so-called B-first account, only the second binding principle is accepted as a grammatical rule, and the other two conditions are reduced to pragmatic inferences. This account uses the same pragmatic principles as the A-first account, but it is more suitable for certain languages that do not directly code reflexivity, such as Old English, Biblical Hebrew, Austronesian languages, and a number of Australian languages. Levinson also formulates a synthesis of the two accounts, taking a diachronic perspective into consideration. The author's final thoughts in this chapter concern the connection between pragmatics and parameters in language learning and language change, as well as the relation between pragmatics and the generative program.

The fifth and final chapter, the 'Epilogue' (pp. 367–77), does not only provide a summary of the results, emphasizing again the importance of the third level of utterance-type meanings situated between the coded meanings of linguistic expressions and speaker's meanings, but also highlights the predictive power of the theory of generalized conversational implicature, and demonstrates the connection between presumptive inferences and general human reasoning, as well as determining the role of GCIs in linguistic theory.

2. Some further comments

Presumptive meanings is an intellectually enjoyable tour in the world of meaning and in the world of theories of meaning. The book summarizes, critically evaluates and rethinks what was formulated and achieved in the study of language and meaning in the past few decades. It is a real encyclopedia for pragmaticians in a sense that a great amount of knowledge from the pragmatics literature is involved in it.

The author's main research question in the book, originally coming from Gricean pragmatics, is as follows: What role do generalized conversational implicatures play in communicative language use? Levinson argues that GCIs (i.e. preferred or default interpretations) heavily interact with both syntactic and semantic descriptions, thus pragmatics influences both structure formulation and meaning construction. Evidence in support of these facts yields another crucial consequence: pragmatics can be considered a component in the theory of language. This view on pragmatics radically differs from the approach according to which pragmatics provides a functional perspective on language (cf., for instance, Verschueren 1995), and it is consistent with the modular approach (cf., for instance, Kasher 1991) belonging to the generative paradigm. According to this modular pragmatics, pragmatic competence is a faculty of using knowledge of language to achieve various human purposes. As we have seen, Levinson emphasizes that one should consider both semantic and pragmatic component processes that offer their own contributions to a single level of representation. The pragmatic faculty has a similar status in modular and neuropragmatics, it has an integrative function between various components and processes of the mind (cf. Pléh 2000), and it is not a separate module in the Fodorean sense. Utterance-types can be defined as the "units" of pragmatic competence that disregard particular contextual information and consider only the linguistic properties and the categories of communicative interaction (Németh T. 1995; 1996). Utterance-types are situated at a more abstract level than utterance-tokens. GCIs contribute to the utterance-type meanings, they differ in nature from nonce-inferences because they do not need any particular context.

Kempson (1996) demonstrates that the paradigms of generative linguistics and relevance theory are compatible in spite of the fact that relevance theory deals mainly with nonce-inferences. If we can integrate the theory of presumptive meanings with the generative

program in the above-mentioned way and can accept Kempson's argumentation for compatibility between generative and relevance theoretical frameworks, then we might think about whether Levinson's theory of preferred interpretations and relevance theory are really inconsistent or not. The hypothesis of the existence of the level of utterance-type meaning can be in harmony with the cognitive principle of relevance (Sperber–Wilson 1995). If the interpretation processes start their work at the level of utterance-types, it is the most economic way of meaning construction. Supposedly, this stage precedes the mechanisms of context choice that are responsible for achieving communicative relevance. These latter statements may probably be surprising for Levinson, since he considers relevance theory together with other reductionist approaches a rivalling account and he argues against its conception sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly and very vehemently through the whole book.

Levinson's book stimulates discussions on several general theoretical topics such as e.g., the semantics/pragmatics interface, the grammar/pragmatics interface, the status of pragmatics in the theory of language, the relation between pragmatics and the theory of mind, as well as the role of formalisms in semantics and pragmatics. *Presumptive meanings* is a provoking volume for any reader. There are a number of arguable special particular problems, solutions, analyses in the various chapters that force the reader to think about them intensively. However, separate studies would be necessary to treat these questions and this also supports the great importance of the book.

Levinson's book is a user-friendly volume written in a brilliant, sometimes ironic, sometimes chaffing style. It avoids the unnecessary use of formalisms, it is redundant in an expectable way, i.e. it contains the necessary repetitions in every chapter. Each chapter has the same structure: first, a brief presentation of problems, second, detailed data analyses, discussion of proposals of rivalling theories and argumentation for the author's solution, and third, a summary of results and conclusions pointing out the remaining unsolved problems. These all guide the readers to find their way through this 480-page book. Levinson gives fairly extensive lists of notes in each chapter, but unfortunately these notes are endnotes and are situated at the end of the book. It is sometimes difficult, sometimes boring to interrupt reading in order to find the notes. It would have been better if the author had integrated the information in notes in the main text, or at least had used footnotes.

In summary, *Presumptive meanings* is well worth reading not only because it is an important contribution in the development of pragmatics, but also because it simply presents the reader with an excellent intellectual experience.

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István Kenesei (ed.): Crossing boundaries. Amsterdam studies in the theory and history of linguistic science. John Benjamins, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1999, 301 pp.[1]

This volume contains the selected and reviewed conference proceedings of the First Conference on Linguistic Theory in Eastern European Languages (CLITE 1), held at the University of Szeged in 1998. The primary goal of the conference was to bring together the various streams of ongoing syntactic research in Eastern European countries in order to facilitate interaction after the long period in which political factors made it difficult for linguists to convene and be part of the larger international scene. The proceedings serve a similar goal: to make ideas available to a larger public and sustain linguistic research in Eastern Europe by means of testifying the recent upsurge in this field of investigation.

The book can be conceived of as a reader in contemporary Eastern European syntactic theorizing, as it contains discussions about many languages (Slavic, Romanian, Hungarian among others) by various, mostly Eastern European, experts on syntax. The scientific achievements of this book contribute to our understanding of cliticization, verb and verb projection raising, the structure of possessives and nominalizations, event and argument structures of verbs and nominals and many other topics. All articles report about recent research embedded in Government and Binding and Minimalist Theory, analyzing phenomena that are interesting peculiarities of the individual languages, and whose theoretical implications refine our knowledge of universal grammar.

Space restrictions unfortunately prevent me from entering into a detailed critique of every article in the book, so in what follows I confine myself to summing up the basic novelty within each article, with a more articulated account of the articles about Hungarian.

The first two articles in the book contribute to our understanding of the nature of clitics, a recurrent topic in Slavic syntax. In 'Cliticization and clitichood', Olga Tomič reviews the behaviour of some South-Slavic clitics in order to show that clitics do not always wear their

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behaviour on their sleeve: the direction of cliticization is not always lexically marked on
them. For example, Macedonian clitics (unlike Bulgarian or Serbo-Croatian ones) become
proclitic or enclitic depending on the categorial properties of the verbal head in their clause.
If the head of the VP is a [+V, +N] category (as in the case of past and passive participles),
the clitic is enclitic, as a result of the participle raising to a clause-initial head and the clitics
cliticizing it on the right:

(1) [$_{\text{Tense/AgrsP}}$ rečeno   [$_{\text{AgrioP}}$ mu   [$_{\text{AuxP}}$ e   [$_{\text{VP}}$ t [da bide   točen]]]]]
         told-past-part   him-datCl   is-Cl   to be-3sg-subj punctual
     'He was told to be punctual.'

If the head of the VP is a [+V, −N] category on the other hand (these are tensed verbs or
l-participles), the clitics are proclitic due to the fact that in the above representation the
verbal head stays in situ in VP, and the clitics cliticize to it from the left. This shows that
clitics are rather flexible: they can be Janus-faced with respect to which direction they attach
in phonology. This in itself (together with a reclassification of clitic types) is an important
addition to clitic-syntax, although not so much when it comes to being explanatory as far
as verb movement is concerned: it remains unclear how categorial differences ([+V, +N]
vs. [+V, −N]) can underlie the observed phenomena at hand, and therefore, whether this
categorial difference is really the relevant factor determining verb movement and the direction
of cliticization.

'Eventive TO and the placement of clitics in Serbo-Croatian' by Ljiljana Progovac
also deals with clitics. The author settles a huge debate in the literature concerning the
phonological/syntactic placement of second position clitics. Second position clitics occur
after the first constituent of the clause, the nature of which is debated: it is a phonological
constituent according to some researchers, and a syntactic constituent according to others.
Consider the following example.

(2) <u>U koju</u>   **(li) je** <u>sobu</u> Goran ušao?
     in which Q   aux room Goran entered
     'Which room did Goran enter?'

The phonological approach does not treat *u koju* as a constituent and claims that the place-
ment of the auxiliary clitic *je* (and that of the interrogative *li*) is due to a phonological rule
that places the clitic after the first phonological word (*koju*). The syntactic approach treats
u koju as one syntactic constituent, which fronts to Spec,CP via remnant movements. New
evidence for the latter view comes from a non-clitic event-demonstrative *to* element, which
shows up clause internally in the same position as clitics in the above:

(3) <u>U koju</u>   **(li) je** *to* <u>sobu</u> Goran ušao?
     in which Q   aux that room Goran entered
     'Which room did Goran enter?'

Since *to* is not a clitic, no phonological placement can affect it. Its surface position, within
u koju sobu, is due to a syntactic mechanism in which *u koju* fronts independently of *sobu*
by remnant topicalization. Provided *to* is really a non-clitic element (as other works of
the author prove), and remnant topicalization can be worked out, the facts constitute clear
evidence for the syntactic approach.

'The structure of Old Russian periphrastic verbal construction' by David Willis discusses participle fronting in perfect and conditional periphrastic verbal constructions in Old Russian, the former of which is exemplified in (4):

(4) Kupil"   esm'   sol'   německuju.
     buy-past-part am-1sg salt-acc German-acc
     'I have bought German salt.'

This type of verb movement had been claimed to be head movement to C^0 in a related language, Bulgarian (Rivero 1991). Old Russian, however, resists such an analysis, as in this language topic, focus and *wh*-items, which are claimed to be in Spec,IP by King (1995), can precede the initial participle. This gives the author reason to believe that the participle obligatorily left-adjoins I^0 (in a movement which is common to all predicates), the non-clitic auxiliary remaining in I^0. In case there is an overt complementizer present (e.g., *li*), VPP–*li*–auxiliary order results if V further raises to C^0, or *li* and VPP invert in phonology. Since the facts are interesting, one would like to see this analysis recast in a more articulated theory of clause structure: the functional categories referred to are only CP and IP, but it is not clear whether these are all the categories Old Russian had, or whether the author intentionally resorts to the pre-Pollockian model of clause structure this way.

Verb movement is also dealt with in another article: 'Stylistic verb movement in yes-no questions in Bulgarian and Breton' by María Luisa Rivero. It claims that there are types of verb movement, so-called "stylistic" ones, whose triggering factor is not minimalist: they do not happen for feature-checking reasons, but in order to satisfy interface requirements of certain elements. For example, in Bulgarian yes/no questions with the question particle *li*, the requirement that *li* has an overt constituent in its checking domain forces the verb to adjoin *li* on the left (in case there is no other element satisfying *li*). This movement creates a structure similar to a checking configuration, by way of head adjunction. A different type of stylistic verb movement results in a head-complement configuration, which is reminiscent of merge (the verb moves to take an XP in its internal domain, to satisfy the requirement of the latter). Presumably due to space restrictions, the article reads as a rather compressed summary of the overall idea and contains few pieces of supportive evidence for the described state of affairs. For the latter, the references section points to other, more lengthy works by the author.

Verb and verb projection raising is further discussed in two articles on Hungarian, in connection to the word order phenomena involving aspectual/modal/temporal verbal complexes. 'Strategies of complex predicate formation and the Hungarian verbal complex' by Katalin É. Kiss and 'Hungarian complex verbs and XP-movement' by Hilda Koopman and Anna Szabolcsi both present a comprehensive theory of verbal complexes (and complex predicate formation), providing fundamentally different analyses of the same facts, which are constituted by the following patterns:

(5) (a) János szét   fogja akarni   kezdeni szedni a   rádiót.
          János apart(VM) will want-inf begin-inf take-inf the radio-acc
          'János will want to begin to take apart the radio.' VM-climbing: VM-V1-V2-V3-V4

     (b) JÁNOS fogja akarni kezdeni szétszedni a rádiót.
          'It is János who will want to begin to take apart the radio.'
                                               straight order:V1-V2-V3-VM-V4

(c)   JÁNOS fogja szétszedni kezdeni akarni a rádiót. inverted order: V1-VM-V4-V3-V2

As we see in (5), the position of the verbs and the verbal modifier (VM) with respect to each
other is to some extent flexible in Hungarian. The verbal modifier can precede its host verb
(5b), it can undergo long movement across many verbs (5a) or it can move together with its
host and first embedding verb, the latter two in the reverse order (5c).

    To analyze these facts, É.Kiss' analysis contains the following ingredients. The aspec-
tual/modal/temporal verbs (V1,V2, V3 in this case) are "light" verbs, marked in the lexicon.
They have two requirements: they have to form a complex with a theta-assigning predicate
(the most embedded one) in the syntax, and they have to escape from phrasal stress (that
of the leftmost major constituent in a phrase) in phonology. The latter requirement explains
why these verbs always have to be preceded by either VMs (5a), other verbs, or focal con-
stituents (5b), or they have to be focalized themselves (not illustrated here). VMs are argued
to be heads, which can undergo head movement across several apparent clausal boundaries
due to the fact that these form a **local** domain, as a result of complex predicate formation (in
other words **restructuring**, i.e., each light verb deletes the phrasal boundary of its infinitival
complement). The inverted order (5c) results from successive cyclic incorporation of one
verbal head into another, in the usual right-to-left order.

    Koopman and Szabolcsi approach (5) with a different underlying idea. They work in
a framework in which all movements are overt phrasal movements: VM and (VM+)verb
movements alike (they take VMs to be XPs). These movements target newly introduced
landing sites: WPs, which stand for the verbal complex right above InfP; and LPs, where
arguments and adjuncts raise from out of the VP. The former host the moving VM and
(VM+)verb complexes, the latter are necessary to allow for the emptying of the VP, as a
result of which remnant VP-movement will raise a single verbal element. The key movements
in the derivation of the inverted and straight orders are forced by the lexical requirements
of the auxiliaries (i.e., light verbs in É. Kiss' term): the VM must raise to Spec,WP of the
selecting verb (if there is no VM, the VP itself moves to Spec,WP to activate this with
phonetic material) and auxiliaries need a WP in their own Spec,WP. Since these derivations
apply obligatorily, they result in an inverted order (5c) in all cases. The original straight
order (5b) emerges if the above movements are masked by further movements. Thus, inverted
order ensues when the VM moves to Spec,WP, and WP itself raises higher to Spec,WP(aux).
Straight order ensues when the most embedded WP (which contains VM+V) moves to
Spec,CP first, and from there pied-pipes the whole CP to Spec,WP(aux), after which CP
raises further to a CP-licensing position and the WP(aux) (only containing the auxiliary
now) raises even higher than this CP.

    É. Kiss very clearly points out that the phenomenon has a phonological base, and in
this it converges with some of the findings of María Luisa Rivero in the previous article
concerning non-feature-triggered verb movements. The predicates that show the pattern in
(5) (among others, *fog* 'will', *lehet* 'may', *akar* 'want', *szokott* 'tend', *talál* 'happen', *szabad*
'be permitted', *kezd* 'begin', *kíván* 'wish', *próbál* 'try') do not form a coherent group on
the basis of either semantic or categorial-syntactic criteria, apart from the fact that they
take infinitival complements. If it is their phonology that groups them together (the stress-
avoiding property), it is a yet unknown interface requirement that motivates the movements
described above. At this point, however, not much is known about the syntactic repercussions
of PF-requirements, and thus deciding between the two opposing analyses (head versus XP-
movement) is pretty much impossible. Some basic facts do not easily lend themselves to
an analysis at this point (see the discussion about the head/XP nature of verbal modifiers,

where the list of arguments could be continued pro and contra); and the two approaches seem to be complete opposites: what falls out from one has to be stipulated in the other. It may turn out that these facts could easily be accommodated in a syntactic framework that we do not have at our disposal yet.

The available syntactic framework (that of Government and Binding) is certainly sufficient, however, to give a complete account of anti-agreement facts in possessive constructions in Hungarian, as Marcel den Dikken shows in 'On the structural representation of possession and agreement: the case of (anti-)agreement in Hungarian possessed nominal phrases'. In Hungarian possessive constructions the possessum is always adorned by a marker that shows agreement with the possessor. Anti-agreement is found in the case of 3pl possessors, where number agreement is lacking. If the possessor is a pronoun, it lacks plural morphology (6a), if the possessor is a full DP, the agreement marker on the possessum is singular (6b):

(6) (a) az **ő/*ők** kalap-***ja/juk**
          the (s)he   hat-*3sg/3pl
          'their hat'

     (b) a **nők**   kalap-**ja/*juk**
          the women hat-3sg/*3pl
          'the women's hat'

To give a comprehensive account of these and also normal agreement facts in possessive nominals, the author first shows (after due criticism of Szabolcsi 1994) that possessive constructions are best analyzed in terms of a predication structure in which a dative PP containing the possessor is predicated about the possessum (the subject), in a small clause: [$_{DP}$ D [$_{SC}$ possessum [$_{PP}$ P$_{dat}$ possessor]]]. The dative marker can be overt or covert, the latter corresponding to nominative case on the possessor in Hungarian. From this basic structure, the possessor inverts with the possessum via predicate inversion, and occupies the specifier of a functional projection between DP and the SC. The structure of possessives is therefore the following:

(7) [$_{DP}$ D [$_{AgrP}$ Agr [$_{FP}$ P$_{dat}$ possessor$_i$ [$_{SC}$ possessum [$_{PP}$ t$_i$]]]]]

Anti-agreement easily falls out of this structure in a fashion similar to Rouveret's (1991) account of agreement mismatches in the clausal domain in Welsh, where the finite verb agrees with pronominal but not with full DP subjects. In the case of (7), anti-agreement is a result of the possessor DP not raising into AgrP, forcing the appearance of default singular agreement. Pronominals on the other hand show agreement because they reach AgrP: their Num head raises to Agr^0 for independent licensing reasons. This process is actually visible in Hungarian: the number morpheme of the pronominal gets spelled out on Agr, and appears as plural agreement in (6a).

Further, this analysis is made compatible with a great deal of speaker variation, attested in a survey by the author. While nominative possessors uniformly give rise to the pattern in (6) for all speakers, dative marked possessors induce some variation in agreement properties:

(8) a nőknek   a kalap-ja/%juk
     the women-DAT the hat-3sg/3pl
     'the women's hat'

Speaker variation is elegantly handled by assuming that the plural agreeing (8) contains a resumptive pronoun strategy, i.e., the dative noun phrase is generated outside the DP, and is represented inside by a *pro*, which triggers anti-agreement as in (6a) above. The resumptive pronoun strategy finds support in the existence of similar constructions with an overt resumptive singular pronominal ő in the place of the nominative possessor.

Anti-agreement facts fall into place naturally in this account, which is furthermore compatible with the author's conception of possessive constructions in general and the properties of Hungarian concatenative number morphology and agreement facts in particular. The presented account makes Hungarian parallel to languages that express possessors with PPs without any further ado, successfully amending Szabolcsi's (1994) analysis of possessive constructions by explaining the nominative-dative alternation of possessors without resorting to the unlikely movement from one case position to another and without assuming D^0 to be the dative case assigner.

The role of D is also dealt with in 'On the syntax of the genitive in nominals: the case of Polish' by Ewa Willim, who discusses crosslinguistic patterns in the distribution of genitive arguments of nouns. Her basic claim is that there are two genitive case licensing positions in a nominal: genitive case can be licensed either by the noun (as an *of*-phrase in English), or on the functional D projection, among other features of the noun, as a free rider. This can be evidenced by the fact that languages where two genitive arguments are disallowed (Polish, Czech, Russian, Latin) lack a syntactically active DP-layer. If one of the genitives is licensed on D^0, this particular generalization gets an immediate explanation.

'Aspect and nominalizations: the case of Romanian' by Alexandra Cornilescu takes up Grimshaw's (1990) theory about the difference between event and result nominalizations and modifies it on two points with the help of Romanian data of infinitival and supine nominalizations. First, the subject in event nominals is an argument, and not an adjunct modifier, like in Grimshaw's theory. Second, aspect plays a role in determining the argument structure of derived nominals: if the nominal has a [+telic] interpretation, the object argument has to be projected; if the nominal has a [−telic] interpretation, it suffices to project the agent argument and the object can be missing. The final analysis of these facts is embedded in a minimalist feature checking account of telicity, where it is suggested that telicity is verified in the Gen(itive case)P projection by checking.

'Subjunctive complements, null subjects and case checking in Bulgarian' by Iliyana Krapova proves that Bulgarian subjunctive complements accommodate two types of subjects, depending on the tense specification of the clause. The subject appears as a *pro* (in free variation with an overt DP/pronoun) in case the embedded tense is non-anaphoric on the matrix tense, i.e., can have a possible future interpretation (as is the case with complements to volitional and epistemic predicates). The subject appears as *PRO* if the embedded tense is anaphoric, i.e. the denoted event is always simultaneous with the matrix event. The anaphoric/non-anaphoric tense specifications go together with nominative/null case assigning ability, licensing pro/PRO respectively.

In the last article, 'Non-active morphology in Albanian and event (de)composition', Dalina Kallulli tackles issues connected to the existence of two verbal paradigms in Albanian: the active and non-active paradigms. Adding non-active morphology to an active verb derives a new predicate by changing the lexical meaning of the active predicate as a result of modifying the aspectual template associated with it. This operation either shifts the event type of the predicate into a lower event-type by suppressing the initial subevent in its event structure, or suppressing the name that is associated with the initial subevent.

To conclude, this book presents its readers with an interesting collection of recent articles full of innovative ideas and curious facts. The research presented in these pages is organically linked to the research going on in the rest of the world, both in terms of content and quality.

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