

HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE KÁDÁR ERA

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János Kádár came into power in 1956 and remained in office until 1988. He has left his stamp on all aspects of Hungarian life. This paper will show that Kádár, despite the circumstances of his coming into power, lack of domestic support, and being an international outcast, he emerged as an effective political leader and an internationally respected statesman.

Keywords: Soviet bloc, the Kremlin's foreign policy, the 1956 uprising, "Hungarian question", New Economic Mechanism, Warsaw Pact, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, UN

At the onset, outside of the Soviet bloc nations, Kádár faced complete international isolation. Even though he never deviated from the Kremlin's foreign policies, gradually, he was able to break out from the isolation. His attempt to be accepted by the international community suffered a serious setback on account of his initial harsh persecution of the participants of the 1956 uprising, especially after the execution of Imre Nagy and his collaborators. On the other hand, Kádár's friendship with Khrushchev and his unfailing loyalty to the Soviet Union allowed him more freedom to maneuver in his domestic policies. Eventually, political restrictions were relaxed, and domestic economic reforms were promulgated. As a consequence, the West responded more favorably to the Kádár regime's initiatives to establish itself in the international community. At the same time, the Hungarian economy needed modern Western industrial equipment and technology and an access to foreign markets to sustain itself.

Hungary did not follow Romania's more independent-minded foreign policies. In 1967, it severed its diplomatic relations with Israel, and in 1968, it participated in the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, Hungary received "most favored nation" status from the United States and became a member of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The once vilified János Kádár gradually achieved universal recognition and even respectability. By the late 1980s he had been received by most Western European heads of state and had hosted most of them in Hungary. As for the United States, President Carter re-

turned the “sacred” crown to Hungary, secretaries of state Cyrus Vance and George Schultz paid visits to Hungary, and so did Vice-President George Bush. Clearly, Kádár did not move Hungary out of Soviet orbit but he charted a course that brought Hungary closer to Western democracies.

Considering that he was installed into office only as a Hungarian mouthpiece for the Kremlin, one might easily conclude that János Kádár had no independent foreign policy. In retrospect, one cannot dismiss thirty-two years in Hungary’s history without a closer look at the country’s interaction with members of the Soviet bloc countries, the non-aligned nations, and with the Western democracies. Thus, this paper will explore these dimensions of Hungarian foreign policy. János Kádár’s rule over Hungary for more than a generation has left its stamp on all aspects of Hungarian life, and most certainly on the country’s foreign policies. While this study will focus on Kádár’s foreign policies, relevant domestic policies will also be taken into consideration.

In 1956 the Soviet Union crushed the anti-Communist and anti-Soviet uprising in Hungary. The decision for the military intervention was made in the Kremlin, but the Soviet leaders needed a Hungarian figurehead to give at least a semblance of legitimacy to their attack. For this reason they entrusted János Kádár, an inconspicuous, non-Stalinist, dedicated long-time Communist functionary, with the leadership of the Hungarian Communist Party and the government. It is the contention of this writer that János Kádár, despite the inauspicious beginning, lack of domestic support, and international isolation outside the Soviet bloc, emerged as an effective political leader in his own right. Hungary’s rapid recovery from the ruins of the 1956 uprising, and the country’s acceptance by the international community, was the direct result of Kádár’s ability to overcome the alienation of his compatriots without incurring the wrath of the Soviet Union.

In the early years the Kádár regime had no foreign policy; it was entirely at the mercy of the Kremlin. But the Russian leaders realized that in order to give the newly installed regime a chance to survive, the country’s economy had to be revived. That task could not have succeeded without the infusion of significant economic aid. Material aid and credit came from the Soviet Union and concurrently, the Kremlin instructed its client states to extend all possible help to Hungary (see *Table 1*).

In addition, Hungary was given long-term loans: 250 million rubles in convertible currency from the Soviet Union, 200 million from China (half of it in cash and the rest in merchandise), sixty million marks from the German Democratic Republic in raw materials, and goods and seven million rubles from Bulgaria.¹ Loans from the West were refused, but substantial gifts through the International Red Cross reached Hungary. Five thousand tons of merchandise and medicine, valued at 2,500,000 Swiss Francs were delivered by December 21, 1956.

In the final analysis, the Soviet Union assumed a large part of the financial burden for Hungary's economy. As the economy began to revive, Kádár had to give some explanation for the stationing of the Soviet troops in Hungary.

It was clear to everybody that the Kádár government could not have come to power and stayed in power without the help of the Soviet army.

Table 1
Economic aid to Hungary from communist countries

Country	Amount of Currency	Means
USSR	38.0 million rubles	cash
China	30.0 million rubles	conv. currency
Czechoslovakia	90.0 million kronen	credit
Poland	100.0 million zlotys	credit
Romania	13.0 million leis	credit
Bulgaria	5.5 million rubles	credit
Yugoslavia	150.0 million dinars	credit
GDR	22.0 million marks	credit
Albania	0.2 million rubles	conv. currency

Source: Népszabadság, January 22, 1957.

The justification for the continued presence of the Red Army in Hungary was to provide security for the socialist countries and to counter the American buildup in Europe as well as the threats posed by NATO and the rearmament of West Germany. To legitimize the presence of the Soviet troops in Hungary, on May 27, 1957, the Kádár government signed an agreement with the Soviet Union that spelled out the "legal status of those Soviet troops, which have been temporarily stationed on the territory of the People's Democracy of Hungary".² Despite the elaborate agreement, neither the number of troops nor the proposed length of their stay was specified by the document.

The Soviet intervention and the circumstances of Kádár's coming to power isolated Hungary from the Western world. But fellow socialist leaders, in addition to extending economic assistance, paid personal visits to show their solidarity with Kádár and to provide recognition to his regime. On a more practical level, the Communist dignitaries came to Hungary to size up Hungary's new leader. In late 1956 high level Czechoslovak, German, and Romanian delegations came to Hungary. In early 1957 Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Romanian and Soviet government and party leaders met in Budapest to evaluate the situation in Hungary. Soon after that meeting Kádár traveled to Moscow to meet with the Soviet and Chinese leaders. Consequently, Chou En-lai visited Hungary. From there on, numerous

mutual visits took place between Kádár and Khrushchev. Impressed by Kádár's earnestness, modesty, sincerity and devotion to the Communist cause, Khrushchev took a special liking to his young Hungarian protégé.³

Beyond establishing some limited trade relations with non-Communist countries, the Kádár regime was unable to free itself from Western diplomatic isolation. News from the United Nations was discouraging. Since December 12, 1956 a special committee made up of representatives from five nations, Austria, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia, and Uruguay, had been investigating the situation in Hungary. Concurrently, the Credentials Committee refused to seat the Kádár government's representative. In September 1957, despite objections from the Kádár regime, the General Assembly heard and accepted a highly critical report from the Committee of Five, which condemned the Hungarian situation. Recognition by the UN was much sought after by Kádár because without it Hungary remained an international outcast. In the meantime, contacts with representatives of the Soviet bloc nations continued. In June 1957 Zhivkov of Bulgaria paid a visit. In August Ho Chi Minh arrived. In September Cedenbal of Mongolia stayed in Hungary for four days. On September 27 Kádár led a delegation to China.⁴

By 1958, living conditions had improved, and apparently the population had come to accept the inevitable. There remained one thorny, unsettled question, the fate of Imre Nagy. Except for the usual condemnation of Nagy's revisionist activities, hardly anything was said about his legal status or even about his whereabouts. Unexpectedly, on June 18, 1958, on the third page of the *Népszabadság*, appeared an announcement by the Ministry of Justice: "verdict was reached in the criminal trial of Imre Nagy and his associates." The international reaction was swift. Leaders of the Western world and the non-aligned nations expressed shock at the executions. Demonstrations and rioting took place in front of Soviet and Hungarian embassies. In the United Nations many delegates condemned the execution of Imre Nagy and his associates, and the Special Committee on the Hungarian Problems pointed out: "The Hungarian government in bringing Imre Nagy to trial was acting contrary to the solemn assurances that János Kádár had previously given on behalf of his government, including those confirmed by letter to the Yugoslav government."⁵ The Yugoslav government confirmed this charge.

The international furor at the news of the execution had been anticipated. All Hungarian legations received special warnings and were advised to brace themselves for the storm of protests. As for the domestic reaction, Kádár was taking a great chance. The execution of Imre Nagy was not in Kádár's best interest. The news in Hungary did not generate any outright protest. After the extended period of revolutionary fervor and defiance of the Soviets and the Communists, hopes for national independence faded as the nation's political life sunk into apathy. Individuals privately mourned Imre Nagy and cursed his killers, but could do

nothing publicly. The news of Nagy's execution stirred up bitter memories, reinforced distrust of the Communists, and gave way to political cynicism.⁶

Imre Nagy's execution seriously damaged the Kádár government's attempts to improve its relations with non-Communist nations. But in order to revitalize the country's economy, trade with non-Communist countries had to be resumed; but before the resumption of foreign trade diplomatic relations had to be normalized, so that removal of sanctions, trade barriers, and tariffs agreements could be negotiated. Despite the pressing economic considerations, the Kádár regime was not willing to make political concessions to the West, fearing that they would be interpreted as weakness.

The strong opposition of the United States to the Kádár regime resulted in a prolonged adverse relationship between the two countries. Consequently, that hindered Hungary's case at the UN and its dealing with the other Western democracies. In addition to the repeated American denunciation at the UN of the illegitimate seizure of power by the Soviet-sponsored Kádár, in Budapest the American legation had given asylum to Hungary's besieged Catholic Primate, Cardinal Mindszenty. To make matters worse, the newly appointed American ambassador, Edward T. Wailes, who had arrived in Budapest on November 2, 1956, refused to present his credentials to János Kádár.⁷

On February 21, 1957 after the General Assembly of the United Nations accepted the American motion that "the Credentials Committee make no decision regarding the credentials submitted on behalf of the representative of Hungary," the Kádár government responded by requesting the removal of Wailes, who had still did not presented his credentials. The American diplomat departed on February 27, and for the ensuing eleven years, the United States legation in Hungary was headed by only a *charge d'affaires*.⁸ From that point on Hungary's policies towards the U.S., more than ever, reflected the ups and downs of Soviet-American relations. In the spring of 1957 Assistant Military Attaché Captain Thomas R. Gleason was accused of "open espionage" and was expelled from Hungary. In response, Washington expelled Gleason's Hungarian counterpart. On the first anniversary of the October uprising President Eisenhower gave an extremely critical speech on the Kádár regime. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry considered a strongly worded protest, and some hard liners urged to sever diplomatic relations with the U.S. Kádár vetoed that notion. Even the protest was not sent. After Kádár's consultation with Khrushchev, he was told not to criticize Eisenhower because such criticism may hurt the ongoing Soviet-American negotiations. Hungary only criticized Henry Cabot Lodge's remarks at the UN.⁹

To counter U.S. criticism the Kádár regime began an investigation of American espionage in Hungary. In fall 1958 two American military attaches were charged with spying and recruiting Hungarian citizens. In a stern note to the U.S.,

the Hungarian Foreign Ministry objected to the subversive activities of the Americans, and it complained about the continuous anti-Hungarian broadcasts of the *Voice of America* and *Radio Free Europe*. Furthermore, the note accused the U.S. of discrimination against Hungary, including the refusal to grant visas to athletes and scientists and disallowing Hungary's participation in the 1959 World's Fair. In response the U.S. stipulated that Hungary must live up to its international obligations under the UN Charter.¹⁰

At the UN Endre Sik, Hungary's foreign minister, attempted to be more conciliatory. He claimed that with the sentencing of Imre Nagy and his associates, court proceedings against "counterrevolutionaries" had been completed. The United States was not impressed. To show evidence of its legitimacy, on November 16, 1958, the Kádár government held parliamentary elections. The outcome was not different from previous Communist-controlled elections. Party-sponsored candidates received 99.4 percent of the votes cast.¹¹ In the meantime, the Kádár-Khrushchev friendship was becoming more and more cordial. Both in Russia and Hungary, meeting followed meeting between the two men. As the international situation worsened, and the four-power conference was canceled on account of the U-2 American spy plane incident, Kádár indignantly echoed the Soviet condemnations of the "American provocation."

In summer 1960 Kádár hosted the entire Khrushchev family at a Hungarian Trade Exhibit in Moscow. After an elaborate dinner Khrushchev held court. He gave an assessment of the American presidential candidates. He ridiculed Nixon and by calling him "the Soviet expert" referred to the so-called "kitchen debate." Khrushchev had no praise for Kennedy either: "they are like a pair of boots – which is better, the left or the right – is hard to tell."¹² In November of that year Khrushchev decided to attend the opening of the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations in New York. The official reason for that trip was "to move toward complete disarmament and to end the cold war." At the same time, he mobilized all the satellite leaders to make an appearance in New York. Kádár was invited to accompany him on the Soviet ship, *Baltika*. That was Kádár's first trip to the United States.¹³

On September 19, 1960 the *Baltika* docked at Pier 73 at 25th Street in New York City. Only a few protocol officials and representatives of the press were present to greet the visitors. The media focus was on Khrushchev. To the chagrin of Kádár, the Hungarian delegation was restricted to Manhattan. Kádár could not even join the Soviet delegation at their Glen Cove estate on Long Island. Kádár had some opportunity to do some sightseeing and shopping. He was quoted as saying "the dollar has the least value in America," obviously he was referring to the exchange rates. During his stay, the shrewd and enterprising businessman Cyrus Eaton held a lavish reception in honor of Kádár. Consequently, whenever Eaton traveled to Hungary on business, Kádár personally welcomed him.¹⁴

On October 3, 1960 Kádár had his chance to address the United Nations. When he was called to the rostrum many delegates walked out in protest. Kádár's speech was well researched. At first he expressed his complete solidarity with the Soviet Union, then defended the two countries' trade relations. He argued that those relations could not be called colonial considering that the Soviet Union was supplying Hungary with raw materials, and it was buying finished goods in return. Such relations were contrary to the definition of colonialism. In regard to the "Hungarian question" at the UN, Kádár accused the United States of keeping it alive as a baseless attack on the Soviet Union and Hungary. Kádár pointed to the ineffectiveness of the UN peacekeeping forces in the Congo; thus, they could not have been relied on to restore order in Hungary in 1956. As for the West accusing the Soviet Union of defeating a "national uprising" in Hungary, he claimed that it had crushed a "counterrevolutionary putsch." To support his argument, Kádár reasoned that national movements could not be defeated in two-three days. As an example, he pointed to the long-lasting Algerian liberation movements. Kádár did say that those who in 1956 had attacked the "legitimate system" in Hungary had been punished, but he emphasized that criminal proceedings against the conspirators had already been completed.¹⁵ Kádár was hoping for some positive results from his American trip, but there were no immediate favorable responses either from the UN or from the U.S.

In 1961, Kádár attended the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. That congress was a high mark of Khrushchev's power, but it was marred by the "Albanian question." Albania had been too slow to de-Stalinize. At the congress Chou En-lai was not ready to condemn the Albanians. On the other hand, Kádár rushed to second Khrushchev's denunciation of the Albanians and launched an attack on those who would not renounce the cult of personality. The Twenty-second Congress provided Kádár with the opportunity to move against the remnants of Stalinism in Hungary.¹⁶

In November 1962 Kádár triumphantly presided at the Eighth Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. Foreign policy issues received only routine mention: adherence to Soviet policies was stressed, and Hungary's ongoing difficulties with the UN and the U.S. were brought up. Kádár pointed out that life in Hungary was getting "easier and it was better," and even travel restrictions to the West had been relaxed.¹⁷ In 1962 Kádár instructed János Radványi, the new Hungarian *charge d'affairs* in Washington, to begin reconciliation negotiations with the United States. Kádár was very concerned about showing any sign of weakness in his dealings with the West. He stubbornly resisted any Western pressure. But before reducing the pressure on Hungary, the United States wanted to see additional improvements in Hungary, specifically the Americans wanted amnesty for political prisoners.

At the Eighth Congress Kádár reported that ninety-five percent of the political

prisoners had already been released. The United States responded accordingly. On December 20, 1962, it submitted a resolution for the removal of the six-year-old "Hungarian question" from the agenda of the UN.¹⁸ In July 1963 U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations, paid a brief visit to Hungary. That visit signaled the concluding chapter of the "Hungarian question." U Thant gave a favorable report on Hungary to the Eighteenth Session of the United Nations, which in turn seated the representatives of the Kádár regime, thus accepting the country as a legitimate member of the international community.¹⁹ Consequently, relations between Hungary and the United States were also improving, but a real diplomatic breakthrough could not occur until the Mindszenty issue was resolved.

In 1963, while Kádár was vacationing in the Soviet Union, the Sino-Soviet conflict erupted. The Chinese criticized Khrushchev's policies of peaceful coexistence, rapid de-Stalinization, and also the handling of the Cuban missile crisis. Kádár seized the opportunity to be one of the first satellite leaders to express his "100 percent solidarity with Khrushchev's policies, and condemn the Chinese comrades for breaking the unity of the Socialist peace camp".²⁰ As a possible reward for his loyalty, Khrushchev convinced Tito to invite Kádár in Belgrade. Since the 1958 execution of Imre Nagy, Tito had kept his distance from the Kádár regime. As a result, the visit to Yugoslavia constituted a breakthrough for Kádár.

On April 17, 1964 Kádár once again traveled to Moscow to celebrate Khrushchev's seventieth birthday.

By 1964 it became evident that Hungarian economic developments depended on technological modernization. Signing scientific and technical agreements with the Soviet Union and with fellow Socialist states was not sufficient. Purchasing more advanced Western industrial equipment had to be considered. On the other hand Hungary was short on hard currency, and its domestic products were not competitive in Western markets. Initially, Austria and Yugoslavia were possible venues for reaching the capitalist markets. In summer 1964 an Austrian trade delegation came to Hungary, and it was soon followed by a delegation led by Tito. Tito was a sufficiently pragmatic politician to sacrifice principles for possible trade advantages.

In October 1964, while the world was distracted by the Eighteenth Summer Olympic Games in Tokyo, the Soviet leadership announced the replacement of the previously much-honored Khrushchev with Leonid Brezhnev. Kádár received the news in Poland and was slow to respond. But he valued his Communist Party discipline above personal relations. Despite his close friendship with Khrushchev, he accepted the Kremlin's decision without any outright objection. He did not waver in his loyalty to the Soviet Union.

Already in the mid-1960s Kádár was intent to introduce major economic reforms in order to assure the country's continuous economic development. The proposed reforms significantly diverged from Soviet practices. The so-called New

Economic Mechanism was to allow the formation of a controlled market based economy. At that point the Soviet Union was Hungary's number one trading partner; 35.6 percent of Hungary's foreign trade was with the Soviet Union; and an additional 29.4 percent with Comecon countries. At the same time Hungarian exports already reached 120 countries, and imports came from sixty-eight others; in fact, regular trade existed with 100 countries.²¹

In 1967, while the Hungarian leadership was feverishly working on the introduction of the economic reforms, fighting broke out in the Middle East. Kádár was summoned to Moscow to decide on a common response to the "Israeli aggression." In line with the Kremlin, Kádár and fellow Communist leaders, with the exception of Romania, condemned Israel and severed diplomatic relations with it.²² The conflict in the Middle East did not interfere with the planned introduction of the Hungarian reforms.

On January 1, 1968 the New Economic Mechanism was officially inaugurated. The Kremlin was not enthusiastic about the non-Marxist experimentation, but Brezhnev did not oppose it.

The fact that the NEM received a fair start, to a great extent can be attributed to the political developments in Czechoslovakia. The country's press began to criticize the entrenched Communist leadership and the system. Prague was moving toward its own version of *glasnost*. Alexander Dubček moved up to head the Czechoslovak Communist party, and during his leadership Czechoslovakia rapidly gravitated toward significant political reforms. At the height of the crisis, Dubček came to Hungary to renew the two countries' Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. Dubček's meeting with Kádár was most cordial, although in light of the recent events, Kádár warned Dubček about the imperialists who would do anything

... to lure one or another Socialist country with their enchanting siren song away from the Socialist camp... They entice people with Western loans and talk about the superiority of Western freedom and democracy, but they remain silent about their sick society.²³

To prove his point Kádár listed the ongoing Vietnam war, the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, and Robert Kennedy. In conclusion, Kádár stressed that Hungary would remain true to the just signed Treaty of Friendship.

Less than a month after Dubček's visit Kádár was again summoned to Moscow to take a stand against the "imperialist-inspired" counterrevolutionary developments in Czechoslovakia. Kádár asserted that there was "no anti-Soviet Communism and neither was there Socialism without Communists."²⁴ The Kremlin's main concern was that Czechoslovakia might secede from the Soviet-controlled bloc. The concern in Hungary was that the Czechoslovaks' radical political reforms could endanger Hungary's economic reforms. On July 14 the Warsaw Pact lead-

ers met and sent a warning letter to their Czechoslovak comrades in which they expressed their concern about the possible collapse of the socialist system in that country. Romania did not attend the meeting and did not sign the letter. The Czechoslovak leaders did not heed the warning and pushed for additional reforms.

On August 20, 1968 the following bland announcement was made by the Kremlin: "Joint fraternal forces had taken action in defense of law and order in Czechoslovakia." News of the invasion was toned down and instead of direct reporting the Hungarian media quoted articles from *Pravda*.²⁵ Despite the recently concluded Treaty of Friendship, Kádár joined the Soviet-led invasion of its neighbor. Once again proving his loyalty to the Kremlin, Kádár was protecting his own maneuverability at home.

Once again Kádár's loyalty paid off, Hungary received favorable economic considerations from the Soviet Union. From 1971–1975 the USSR remained Hungary's chief supplier of fossil fuels and raw materials. With the availability of an ample supply of cheap Soviet oil, Hungary was rapidly converting to the use of oil. As a result of the NEM, the country's foreign trade with the socialist countries was gradually decreasing. In the early 1970s the trade balance with the West showed a slight surplus. In 1973 Hungary heartily approved the Arab oil embargo as a weapon against the imperialists. Trouble started when Hungary realized that 10–12 percent of its oil requirements had to be purchased abroad. The Soviet Union was unwilling to increase its oil deliveries because it was more profitable to sell to Western European countries.

In 1975 Kádár traveled to Helsinki to attend the Third Session of the Conference for European Security and Cooperation. In addition to Brezhnev and U.S. President Ford, the conference was attended by practically all European heads of state. The Helsinki Agreement, which legitimized post-World War II borders and guaranteed the observance of "human rights," was signed by 33 countries.²⁶

Hit hard by the ever-increasing oil prices, the Hungarian trade balance suffered serious setbacks. Hungary criticized the European Economic Community and the United States for their protectionist trade barriers, but at the same time, Hungarians applied for substantial Western loans. The Kádár regime's explanation was that the country had an excellent credit rating and a sound economy, and loans were obtained on "sound fiscal principles." Despite the macro-economic difficulties, Hungarians were living better than most of their socialist neighbors and were free to travel to the West.

On December 6, 1976 Kádár himself traveled to Vienna. The purpose of the trip was to lower trade barriers. Answering reporters' questions, Kádár responded that he was willing to travel anywhere in the interest of his country. In 1977 he traveled to the Federal Republic of Germany, and then to Italy, where he even had an audience with Pope Paul IV. Relations with the United States rapidly improved

after the 1971 departure of Cardinal Mindszenty from the American Embassy. In January 1978 the Carter administration decided to return the historic crown of St. Stephen and other coronation regalia to Hungary. The gesture symbolized an approval of Kádár's internal policies, and was to some extent the "coronation" of János Kádár.²⁷

The United States also granted Hungary "most favored nation" status. Despite the improved foreign relations the domestic economic conditions had worsened. By 1980 Hungary owed \$7 billion to Western banks. Nevertheless, the World Bank reacted positively to Hungary's additional loan requests. In fact, in May 1982 Hungary was admitted in the International Monetary Fund and in July, into the World Bank. Membership to the international financial organizations helped Hungary to consolidate and refinance its pressing short-term loans.²⁸

In 1983 Vice-President George Bush visited Hungary and speaking for the Reagan administration he said: "We in the United States are heartened by Hungary's efforts to expand contacts, to foster tolerance, and meet commitments that bind our countries under the Helsinki Final Act." At the formal dinner Bush hailed the U.S.–Hungarian relations "as a model for the rest of the world."²⁹

Two years later U.S. Secretary of State George P. Schultz stopped in Hungary and was impressed by János Kádár. He noted: "He [Kádár] was a person whose views on how change comes about were worth listening to." Then Schultz added: "Clearly he is a member of the Warsaw pact and makes that very clear, and no doubt what he is telling me is what the Soviets would like him to tell. But he is a person with a lot of experience and depth as an individual and has been on the scene for a long time."³⁰

The accolades continued. In July 1986 the Human Rights Committee in Geneva praised the Hungarian government's detailed report on "Civil and Political Rights: 1980–1985." Similarly, Amnesty International found only minor human rights violations.³¹ Kádár, despite apparently insurmountable odds at the onset of his coming to power, emerged as an effective leader, who succeeded in charting a political and economic course that improved the living standards of the Hungarian people and received not only the Kremlin's but also the Western democracies' approval. Kádár did not move Hungary out of Soviet orbit – he never intended to do so – but he succeeded in maneuvering his country into an orbit that to some extent overlapped the orbit of Western democracies.

Notes

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9. Radványi, *Hungary and the Superpowers*, 30–33.
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11. *Népszabadság*, November 19, 1958.
12. *Népszabadság*, August 31, 1960.
13. *Népszabadság*, September 10, 1960.
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25. *Népszabadság*, August 22, 1968.
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27. *Ibid.*, 250–253.
28. *Ibid.*, 255.
29. *The New York Times*, September 20, 1983.
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31. *The New York Times*, July 17, 1986.