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Serial Dictatorship Mechanism for Project Scheduling with Non-Renewable Resources

Egri, Péter and Kis, Tamás (2017) Serial Dictatorship Mechanism for Project Scheduling with Non-Renewable Resources. Other. UNSPECIFIED. (Submitted)

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Abstract

This paper considers a resource-constrained project scheduling problem with self-interested agents. A novel resource allocation model is presented and studied in a mechanism design setting without money. The novelties and specialties of our contribution include that the nonrenewable resources are supplied at different dates, the jobs requiring the resources are related with precedence relations, and the utilities of the agents are based on the tardiness values of their jobs. We modify a classical scheduling algorithm for implementing the Serial Dictatorship Mechanism, which is then proven to be truthful and Pareto-optimal. Furthermore, the properties of the social welfare are studied.

Item Type: Monograph (Other)
Subjects: Q Science / természettudomány > QA Mathematics / matematika > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science / számítástechnika, számítógéptudomány
Depositing User: Dr. Tamás Kis
Date Deposited: 16 Sep 2017 10:30
Last Modified: 05 Mar 2018 15:49
URI: http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/62594

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