

4. Personal recollection.
5. George Schöpflin, Rudolf Tökés and Iván Völgyes, 'Leadership Change and Crisis in Hungary', *Problems of Communism*, 37:5 (September–October 1988), pp. 23–46.
6. Rudolf Tökés, *From Post-Communism to Democracy: Politics, Parties and the 1990 Elections in Hungary* (Bonn: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1990).
7. Several of the contributions to the 1990 *Yearbook of Politics in Hungary* are relevant here, see notably Attila Ágh, 'A pártosodás éve: válságok és szervezetek', (The year of party formation: crises and organisations), Mihály Bihari, 'Egy pártkongresszus szociológiája', (The sociology of a party congress), István Kukorelli, 'Az Országgyűlés a többpártrendszer első évében', (The legislature in the first year of the multiparty system) all in Sándor Kurtán, Péter Sándor and László Vass (eds), *Magyarország politikai évkönyve 1990*, (Budapest: Aula-OMIKK, 1990).
8. On the roundtable negotiations, see András Bozóki, 'Út a rendszerváltáshoz: az Ellenzéki Kerekasztal' (The road to the transformation: the Opposition Round Table), *Mozgó Világ*, 16:8 (August 1990), pp. 23–38.
9. Table taken from András Körösenyi, 'Pártok és szavazók – Parlamenti választások 1990-ben' (Parties and voters – parliamentary elections in 1990), *Mozgó Világ*, 16:8 (August 1990), pp. 39–51.
10. The text of the agreement was in *Népszabadság*, 3 May 1990.
11. It was held on 29 July. Legislation on referenda required a 50 per cent turnout for validity.
12. The second issue of *Századvég* 1990 is devoted entirely to the question of populism. See in particular the article by Mária Heller, Dénes Némédi and Ágnes Rényi, 'Népesedési viták 1963–1986' (Debates on population growth 1963–1986), pp. 69–105.
13. See the writings of István Csurka, *passim*. Sándor Csoóri, in many respects the most prestigious spokesman of the populists, has also implied that Jews are outside the definition (his definition) of Hungarian culture, see his 'Nappali hold (II)', (Daylight moon), *Hitel*, 3:18 (5 Sept. 1990).
14. Csoóri, *ibid*.
15. There was an interesting parallel here with Poland, where, it was reported, the Senate had passed a law outlawing abortion, *The Independent*, 2 October 1990.
16. On some of the consequences of state-directed privatization, see Kálmán Mizsei (editor), *A privatizációs kihívás Közép-Kelet-Európában* (The challenge of privatisation in Central-East-Europe), (Budapest: MTA Világ-gazdasági Kutató Intézet, 1990).
17. Csurka, again, made repeated calls for government control over the electronic media.
18. On legitimation crises, see Andrew C. János, *Politics and Paradigms*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), pp. 142–146 and the literature reviewed there.

9 Revival of the past or new beginning? The nature of post-communist politics*

András Körösenyi

The collapse of Communism and the first free elections gave room for the emergence of multiparty systems in East-Central Europe. A wide range of political parties have been flourishing and new political regimes have been established. The post-communist transition did not follow a single pattern: three major types of regimes had emerged by 1990. Dominant non-authoritarian party systems, led by the 'national liberation movements', had emerged in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Croatia and Slovenia; dominant authoritarian party systems had been revived in Romania and Bulgaria; and competitive multiparty systems came into existence in Hungary and East Germany.

Political dominance of 'national liberation movements'

In Poland, Solidarity, being deeply rooted in the movements of 1980–81, has overwhelmingly dominated the political scene and remained an 'umbrella organization' of the opposition (then of the government). None of the political parties – Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Nationalists – could win any seats against the candidates of the Citizens' Committee, which was backed by Solidarity at the 1989 general election. The role of Solidarity, the 'umbrella organization' of the anti-communist opposition, is similar to the 'national liberation movements' of the decolonization period in the developing world. The Polish Solidarity, or the Civic Forum in Bohemia, absorbed all the political forces of the opposition, as did the Indian Congress Party, and they were also led by charismatic leaders (Walesa, Havel). These movements did not have any specific policy orientation or electoral programme beyond a general democratic and Western-looking attitude and reform programme. With their 'aggregative' character they won the elections with an overwhelming majority and became dominant ruling parties.

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The Czechoslovakian development of the party system produced an intermediate position between the Polish and the Hungarian patterns. The Czech Civic Forum and the Slovakian Public Against Violence dominated the political scene, but could not become the 'melting pot' of all the non-communist political forces. Therefore, the Czech, the Slovak and the Federal parliaments developed a multiparty character.

Revival of authoritarianism

In Romania and Bulgaria authoritarian regimes and dominant authoritarian party systems emerged.¹ In Romania, the nationalist and semi-communist National Salvation Front, successfully creating an image of the leading force of the December 1989 revolution, was able to preserve the power and the monolithic character of the regime. In Bulgaria, the reform-wing of the former Communist Party, by changing the name of the party to Socialist and promising free elections and other reforms, won the multiparty elections. It is characteristic of the new Romanian regime that the strongest opposition party in parliament is organized along ethnic principles by the Hungarian minority. The two revived historic parties, the National Liberal Party and the National Peasant Party, achieved a rather poor result. In Bulgaria, the coalition of the opposition parties did much better, but the former ruling party, renamed as Socialist, won an absolute majority of the parliamentary seats.

In Romania and Bulgaria the (ex-)communist ruling elites were able to win the multiparty elections and preserve their political power. In spite of the personal continuity, the character of the regimes are different from their predecessors. The Romanian National Salvation Front does not have a distinct ideological orientation, but has become a rather pragmatic political party. However, it preserved the nationalist character of the Ceaucescu regime, as the anti-Hungarian and anti-Gypsy pogroms showed (the National Salvation Front either inspired or did not condemn these violent actions). Beside its nationalism, the Front has a *populist* character. The mobilization of the working class (miners) against the democratic political opposition gives a Latin-American Peronist character to the new Romanian regime.² Though this kind of violence did not happen in Bulgaria, the overwhelming electoral victory of the ex-communist Socialist Party is due to its strong rural and working-class constituency.

The Serb Republic also belongs to the group of new post-communist authoritarian regimes, though there were no multiparty elections there. Serbia, under the rule of the populist nationalist S. Milosevics, became one of the first among those countries to begin to transform their communist one-party system into an authoritarian one-party regime. It was the success of the populist-nationalist appeal which made it possible for the Serbian ruling elite to avoid free elections for a long time.

This remarkable success of the (ex-)Communists, and the authoritarian character of these regimes (especially of the Romanian) can be explained by historical factors:

1. In these countries there were no dissident or opposition movements under communist rule. The Ceaucescu regime was overthrown by a spontaneous mass revolt, while the Bulgarian was reformed by the ruling elite itself. The opposition in Romania appeared only after the revolt, at the end of December 1989, and in Bulgaria in the second half of 1989. Neither of them was well established, well known or organized. Neither of them had for longer than half a year been active before the elections.
2. These countries do not have strong parliamentary traditions with free elections.
3. The political culture of the population, with the categories of G. Almond and S. Verba, is traditionally a 'subject' rather than 'participatory' one.³

Beside these similarities, the Romanian and Bulgarian political regimes have different prospects for the future. While the Romanian could easily slip into a pure one-party authoritarianism, where no legitimate political opposition exists, the politically more balanced Bulgaria has greater potential towards becoming a representative multiparty system.⁴ In Serbia the regime probably could keep its authoritarian character, even if it could not avoid holding multiparty elections.

Competitive multiparty systems

While in Poland or Romania the new political regime has a secular one-party character, in Hungary and in East Germany the emerging political scene became more pluralistic. In East Germany, though various political parties were able to take part in the first multiparty elections in March 1990, the political agenda, and therefore the new political scene, was dominated by the manner and speed of unification. The new East German politics were very much influenced by the West German political parties. In Hungary, the new party system developed much more from internal political sources. The lack of a revolution or a strong popular movement left room for a gradual and smooth political development, marked by the slow decay and split of the ruling Communist Party on the one hand, and by the groupings of the opposition along various political traditions and orientations on the other hand. A wide range of political parties developed and stabilized themselves on the political scene, and no room was left for any 'umbrella organization' of the opposition forces. Therefore, in Hungary, a moderate pluralism emerged with a representative party system; various political parties appeared with specific ideologies, policy orientations and constituencies. Both in Hungary and East Germany the elections were dominated by the contest of the emerging new parties, which produced clear-cut policy alternatives. These countries have the best prospects for the development of an alternative government and of a West European-type multiparty democracy in the post-communist East Central Europe.

Table 9.1 Types of post-communist party systems

Party system	COMPETITIVE MULTIPARTY moderate pluralism	DOMINANT single-umbrella organization	AUTHORITARIAN reshaped ruling party
<i>Character of the party system</i>	representative, with policy alternatives	aggregative, no policy alternatives	aggregative, no policy alternatives
<i>Ruling elite</i>	new	new	old
<i>Parliamentary tradition</i>	strong	strong	weak
<i>Political culture</i>	participant/subject	participant/subject	subject
<i>Countries</i>	Hungary East Germany Czechoslovakia*	Poland Croatia Slovenia*	Romania Bulgaria Serbia

* Slovenia and Czechoslovakia can be regarded as mixtures of competitive and dominant party systems.

The collapse of the one-party regimes and fast transition to the first post-communist parliamentary elections raises a series of questions for political scientists. What issues appear on the political agenda? What factors explain the new party formation? What are the roles of political traditions and of the new issues? What characterizes the voting behaviour of the newly enfranchised citizens? What political preferences or cleavages exist after a four-decade-long attempt at political neutralization and social homogenization? What kind of party systems emerge in these countries?

This paper is an attempt to discuss these questions and use mainstream methods and approaches to analyse the moderate pluralism which developed in politics and the party system in Hungary.

The nature of Hungarian politics

In Hungary, a two-year-long transition process took place before the March 1990 parliamentary elections. The first opposition movement appeared in the autumn of 1987, and by the time of the 1990 elections 12 political parties were able to set up a nationwide organization network. Six of them passed the 4 per cent threshold and became parliamentary parties, as is shown by Tables 6.1 and 6.4 on pages 77 and 79.

As to their origins, the six parliamentary parties fall into three categories. The first is constituted of those parties which developed out of the dissident movements of the 1970s and 1980s: the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD) and the

Federation of Young Democrats (FYD). The second category is that of the revived historic parties, which had their origin prior to the Second World War: the Smallholders' Party (SHP), the Social Democratic Party (HSDP), the Hungarian People's Party (HPP) and the Christian Democratic People's Party (CDPP). They had dominated the political scene with the Communist Party in the last two multiparty elections in 1945 and 1947. The third category contains the two heirs of the former ruling Communist Party, the hard-line Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) and the moderate, reform-oriented Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP).

The origin of the new Hungarian parties

The first striking feature of the electoral results was the dominance of the *new parties*: the proportion of the total votes for them (HDF, AFD, FYD) was over 50 per cent. (55.3 per cent.) In fact, the competition of the two major opposition parties, the HDF and the AFD, defined the political agenda in the pre-election period, and their split determined the emerging left-right dimension of Hungarian politics. It is a peculiarity of the new Hungarian political scene that the two main parties, the HDF and the AFD, grew from two small groups of intellectuals into dominant political parties.

The AFD was formed around a dissident group of 'urbanist' intellectuals which had existed since the mid-1970s. They formed the dissident 'human rights' opposition of the communist regime. Ideologically they came from the left (many of them are ex-Marxists), but developed towards a left-liberal middle-class radicalism by the mid-1980s. The recent involvement of leading economists gave a rather libertarian character to its economic programme.⁵ The HDF was formed in 1987 around the traditional 'national-populist' group of intellectuals, whose ideal was a 'third road' (neither communist nor capitalist), genuinely 'Hungarian' future. They were less hostile to the existing regime, and had contact with the reform wing of the ruling Communist Party.⁶ By the autumn of 1989, however, the HDF had developed towards a Christian-democratic character.

The division of the Hungarian *intelligentsia* into 'urbanist' and 'populist' groups has historical origin. This historical split can be explained first of all by political and ideological factors, but sociological factors play some role as well. These two tiny subcultures have deep-seated roots and some continuity since the 1930s.

The 'urbanist' intellectuals⁷ of the 1930s received inspiration from the nineteenth-century liberal tradition and from the development of democratic political institutions in Western Europe. The 'populists'⁸ were inspired by nationalism and by the anti-capitalist left as well. Both were 'democratic' and opposed the authoritarian conservative Horthy regime, but in very different ways. The political target of the 'urbanists' was the *political* emancipation of the lower classes, universal and secret franchise, right of assembly, trade unions rights, etc. Democracy has a *procedural*

meaning for them. In contrast, the 'populist' intellectuals, although they never rejected democratic ideas, concentrated on a programme of *social* emancipation of the under-classes (first of all the millions of landless peasants). Therefore land reform and other social reforms were in the centre of their political programme. Populist thinking had a rather anti-elite and anti-establishment character. They criticized the ruling elite, the gentry and the Christian middle class as well as the liberal urban bourgeoisie. They stood for the creation of a new social elite, recruited from the peasantry, which was regarded as the only embodiment of the genuine Hungarian character. For the 'populists' democracy had a *substantive* meaning, i.e. democracy meant a certain social arrangement rather than institutional setting and legal procedures. Therefore, unlike the 'urbanists', they were much more interested in the output (policies) than in the input side of politics.

The political and ideological differences were strengthened by social factors. While 'urbanist' liberalism was associated with the Budapest Jewish intelligentsia and middle class, the 'populist' approach was favoured by the reform-oriented 'Christian' middle class (professionals, civil servants, intellectuals).

The split was a consequence of the peculiar pattern of capitalization and embourgeoisement in late nineteenth-century Hungary. Lacking a 'Hungarian' urban middle class, the Jews dominated the emerging bourgeoisie. Therefore, liberalism and capitalism were associated very much with the Jewish social elements of society. While the failure to create a pure nation-state strengthened nationalism, the social tension produced by rapid economic modernization boosted modern anti-Semitism. These two tendencies fused very much by the inter-war period and had an influence on 'populism' as well.⁹

The populist tradition remained continuous in the post-war period and under communist rule among intellectuals, especially in Hungarian literature. In fact, the revolt of the 'populist' writers at the 1986 Congress of the Writers' Association against the cultural policy of the Kádár regime was one of the antecedents of the foundation of the HDF. On the 'urbanist' side of the Hungarian intellectual tradition, direct continuity was broken in the 1950s. The generation of the 1930s was dispersed: some of them emigrated, others became victims of the Holocaust. Survivors of the war who stayed in Hungary were either imprisoned or silenced under the Rakosi era of the 1950s. The following generation, especially those who were of Jewish origin, became Communist in the post-war period. They regarded Marxism as the only progressive idea and remedy against anti-Semitism and nationalism. Under strict communist control and censorship of cultural life, the internationalist 'urbanist' and the national 'populist' attitude was expressed in literature and in the esoteric debates of historians.¹⁰ The split between 'progressives' and 'nationalists' never disappeared in twentieth-century Hungarian political thinking. The revival of urbanist political thinking began with the appearance of the dissident Marxist philosophers at the end of the 1960s (the 'Lukács school'). By the end of the 1970s, the urban wing of the

intelligentsia, leaving Marxism behind them, switched towards the liberal and radical political tradition of the inter-war period. The traditional political split evolved again. By the 1980s, two tiny but influential groups had evolved in Hungarian intellectual life. Having their historical prejudices, they regarded each other with resentment and hostility.

The traditional and mutual prejudices of the urban and populist wings of the Hungarian intellectuals explain to a great extent the divergent character of the evolving political pluralism. The subcultural hostility between the two elite groups strengthened their ideological differences, and determined the *left-right* scale.

Does the left-right dimension exist?

The second striking feature of the electoral results was the victory of the right, and the failure of the left. But who is on the left and who is on the right in Hungarian politics? Do these categories matter at all on the new political scene?

To answer these questions, the following questions should be taken into consideration. What kind of issues appeared on the Hungarian political scene? Are they really separated into coherent 'groups' of issues along the left-right division? What are the main differences between the character of the left and right? Let me list a series of these characteristics of left and right in terms of some dichotomies¹¹ (Table 9.2) and attach those parties to each (in brackets) which have a specific alignment with those characteristics.

Table 9.2 Characteristics of Hungarian political parties

Left	Right
International (AFD, FYD, HSDP, HSP) (HWSP)	National (HDF, SHP)
Secular (FYD, AFD, HSDP, HSP)	Denominational (CDPP)
Urban (FYD, AFD, SDP)	Rural (SHP, HDF)
Industrial (HSDP)	Agrarian (SHP)
Unions (HSDP, HSP)	Business
Neutrality (FYD, AFD)	Defence (HDF)
Civil rights (AFD, FYD)	Social order
Liberal	Authoritarian
'Liberal' (FYD, AFD) (pro-abortion)	'Conservative' (CDPP) (anti-abortion)

The characteristics of the right can be attributed more to the HDF, the CDPP and the SHP, while those of the left rather better to the AFD, FYD, HSP (and to the failed HSDP and HSWP). In fact, the formation of the government confirms the relevance of the left-right political scale, since it is based on a centre-right HDF-SHP-CDPP coalition.

The *economic dimension*, however, does not overlap with this distinction. Though the HSP and the HSDP had some contact with the trade unions, which coincides with their 'leftist' character, the two main parties, the HDF and the AFD, have a 'deviant' character in this dimension. The AFD (and the FYD) has a deregulation-oriented, more libertarian economic programme, while the HDF was less radical and slightly *etatist* in its economic policy. (For example, while the AFD is committed to fast privatization, the HDF is more cautious on that question and aims at creating a domestic bourgeoisie; it worries about the unlimited influx of Western capital into the Hungarian economy.)

The different attitudes to the concept of private property and to privatization are also worth mentioning. Private property is a 'natural right' for the parties on the right, especially for the historical parties (SHP, CDPP). Therefore, they do not consider the former socialist collectivization of agriculture legitimate. The SHP inclined towards interpreting the way of privatization as giving back the confiscated or nationalized private property to its original owners, even though the confiscation happened more than 40 years earlier.¹² (The line of the HDF is less strong on this issue than that of its allies.) By contrast, for the parties on the centre-left (AFD, FYD), privatization is a question of economic efficiency, and they regard the status quo in property rights as legitimate.¹³ The socialist left (HSP, HSDP) also regard privatization as an economic necessity, but they have not entirely given up their alignment to some form of collective ownership.

In general, the economic and ideological left-right scales cross-cut each other. The libertarian economic line of the left-liberal AFD is on the right of the economic scale, while the recent economic programme of the centre-right HDF is to the left of the AFD position. Regarding the general *left-liberal* character and the libertarian economic philosophy of the Free Democrats and the Young Democrats, they can be classified as liberal centre parties.

In addition, there is one more factor on the issue level which underlines the *centre-party nature* of the AFD and FYD. Post-materialist issues,¹⁴ like the green issue, the disarmament question, the anti-death penalty or the pro-abortion view, already appeared at the margin of Hungarian politics. The appearance of the 'new issue' politics connected more with the left-liberal parties (FYD, AFD) than with the right. The interweaving of the 'old' and 'new left' underlies the centre-party nature of the AFD and FYD.

The current social basis of the Free Democrats is also a factor of its centre-party character. It is dominated by urban intellectuals and professionals (by the 'new middle class') and it does not have any institutional link either to the blue collar trade unions or to the blue collar workers themselves.

This leads to a more general question: what is the social character of the new parties? The new political parties were initially organized by small groups of intellectuals or old politicians of the historical parties (who had not been active in politics since the last multiparty elections in

1945/1947). Could they acquire an appeal to specific social groups and forge institutional links to them?

The social character of the political parties

One of the main characteristics of Hungarian politics is the lack of organized interest groups behind the political parties. The electoral failure of the HSDP, which tried to establish links with eight trade union associations, showed the weakness and lack of credibility of the trade unions. But parties backed by other interest organizations (the Party of Entrepreneurs had the support of KIOSZ and KISOSZ, the interest organizations of artisans and small shopkeepers; the Agrarian Alliance was backed by the association of collective farms) also failed to pass the 4 per cent threshold and to gain effective representation in the unicameral Hungarian parliament.

The lack of either a Polish Solidarity-type working-class movement or Western-type trade unions partly explains the weakness of the left. On the whole, the party formation had a strong middle-class character in Hungary.

The social composition of the constituency of the different parties, however, was divergent. The electorate of the historical parties (SHP, CDPP, SDP) has the most specific character.

The *Smallholders' Party's* strongholds were in rural Hungary. The SHP became a sectional party, backed by the poorly educated old-aged groups of the rural areas, by those who agree with the project to restore the 1947 private farming. The constituency of the *Christian Democratic People's Party* was very similar to that of the SHP, i.e., elderly, poorly educated citizens with relatively low social status. There were, however, three major differences: the sexual, professional and regional composition. Diverging from the Smallholders, there were more female than male voters among the electorate of the Christian Democrats, and its constituency was not limited to rural areas but concentrated in the highly Catholic regions.

There were two other historic parties (HSDP, HSWP) which were not able to become parliamentary parties but had a very specific social backing. Both the *Social Democrats* and the *Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party* had a working-class electorate, but each of them was from the old-aged groups.

The *Free Democrats* and the *Hungarian Socialist Party*, had a support more evenly spread among each social group than the historic parties, without extreme regional differences. However, both of them had a strong elite character: high income groups, professional groups with high social status, and the Budapest and urban population were strongly over-represented in their electorate. To put it more specifically the HSP was strongly supported by the old 'ruling-class' (the elite of the former regime, like managers, high-ranking officials), while the AFD was backed by the new elite groups (professionals, intellectuals). Both had support from each age-group, but while in the HSP electorate the elderly were over-

represented, in the AFD electorate their proportion was small. The peculiarity of the AFD constituency was that in spite of its elite character it was slightly over-represented among the lower income groups. The *Federation of Young Democrats* also had support from all social strata, but it was highly over-represented among the younger age groups. In addition, the constituency of the FYD did not have an elite character: on the contrary, it was over-represented among the lower income groups.

The *Hungarian Democratic Forum* had a strong middle-class character. In spite of this, the HDF was the only Hungarian political party which had a backing that was evenly spread among all social (income, residential, educational and age) groups. The HDF was able to create a 'catch-all' character, which became the main source of its landslide electoral victory. In the single-member constituency contest, there was a two ballot system. Without an absolute majority victory a run-off was held (in 171 out of the 176 single-member constituencies) between the first three candidates. The HDF could increase its votes by 30 per cent,¹⁵ in spite of the serious decline of turn-out (from 65 per cent to 45 per cent). The HDF could gain most of the voters of the unsuccessful parties, i.e. the HDF was the second preference of the originally non-HDF voters.

Electoral behaviour and party competition

How can we characterize the voting behaviour of the Hungarians at the first post-communist election? Though it is difficult to draw serious conclusions after one general election, an assessment of the main models of electoral behaviour might yield some results. In the following I will survey the main models¹⁶ of voting behaviour in order to find out whether they are applicable to the recent Hungarian elections.

The *party identification model*, which assumes strong party alignments of the electorate, explains some votes, especially the votes of the SHP, the HSP, the HSDP and the HSWP. These four parties had long traditions, and have some electorates with strong party alignment. But most of them were able to regain only a fraction of their former electorates. The SHP was founded in 1930 (and it had a predecessor in the 1920s as well) and was on the political scene until 1948. The HSP and HSWP are the heirs of the more than five-decades-long Communist Party tradition. The CDPP does not have a strong party tradition: its direct predecessor, the Democratic People's Party, took part only in one election in 1947. Just like the CDPP, however, the Christian social parties of the inter-war period had good results in Western Hungary. The AFD, the FYD and HDF are new parties, without a long party tradition.

The *sociological model*, which assumes that people vote in accordance with the interests of their social location, explains only marginal votes. Since the links between the political parties and the social interest groups in society were rather weak and the electoral programmes of the parties were far from clear in terms of special group interests, the 'interest vote' did not characterize the 1990 Hungarian elections. There might have been

some 'interest votes' in some areas.

The *issue voting* model assumes that the voters rationally analyse the programme of the parties on various issues of the political agenda and vote for the party which is the closest to their own viewpoints. Voters also evaluate the *policy* of the incumbents (and compare it with their previous promises). The defeat of the incumbent (ex-)communist HSP in the first round of the Hungarian elections demonstrated the general dissatisfaction with its previous record. In spite of the fact that the last government of the one-party rule was much more responsive to the people than its predecessors, the election became a verdict over the four-decades-long past of the one-party regime. The first ballot was much more a referendum on the transition towards a multiparty democracy than a vote on specific policy issues. The competition of the opposition parties, however, especially in the second round, might have made the issue voting model more relevant. The AFD, in particular, as a *programme* party, raised specific policy issues with a clear-cut view on them. But, in general, the electoral competition of the three major opposition parties was much more that of political parties with different political characters, styles and images, than competition of clear standpoints on specific policy issues. (The HDF, which appeared as a *people's party*, had a rather vague political programme.)

However, there were some issue cleavages among the political parties. The most important ones are: 1. the speed and methods of privatization; 2. control over the central mass media (state-owned TV channels and radio broadcasts); 3. the political responsibility of civil servants and economic managers for the previous policy; and 4. the question of landed property. In general, however, the issue dimension played a secondary role.

The party system: revival of the past or a new beginning?

The dominance of the new parties in Hungarian politics has been emphasized above, but their role was not overwhelming. The historic parties, i.e., the SHP, the CDPP and the HSDP, gained altogether 21.79 per cent of the (list) votes. In addition, the heirs of the communist ruling party, i.e., the HSP and the HSWP, which also had a long historical tradition, gained altogether 14.57 per cent. Though these votes meant support for the former incumbents, it also represented a loyalty to the inter- and post-war social democratic and communist tradition (the left-wing of the HSDP fused with the Communist Party in 1948). Though the new parties, the HDF, the AFD and the FYD, did not have any direct political predecessors, at the *ideological* and *issue* level they represented a strong continuity with the 1930s and 1940s. (The traditional ideological subcultural division of the Hungarian intelligentsia as the origin of the HDF and the AFD in this split has already been mentioned above.) The rural-urban, agrarian-industrial, denominational-secular and national-international dichotomies of the 1930-40s still dominate the division

between the political right and the left. (On the 1947 political scale, the Smallholders' Party, the (Catholic) Democratic People's Party and the Hungarian Independence Party were on the right, while the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party and the tiny Hungarian Radical and Civilian Democratic Party were on the left.)

These unexpected findings raise the question of historical continuity. S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan set up a model which emphasizes strong continuity of the party systems (see Note 22). According to their 'freezing thesis', the party cleavages, which had appeared by the time of universal suffrage, tended to be 'frozen' and determined the further development of the party structure. But if Lipset and Rokkan's 'freezing-thesis' on the continuity of party structure fits the development of the Hungarian political scene at all, what period should be regarded as a 'starting point'? Before 1945 there were no free elections with secret ballot and the freedom of political parties to enter the contest was also limited.¹⁷ The 1945 elections achieved a universal franchise and the secret ballot, but excluded all but one of the political parties on the right, therefore the Smallholders' Party took all the votes on the right. The 1947 elections gave more parties on the right the chance to enter the contest (viz. the Smallholders' Party fragmented into three major parties – the Catholic 'Democratic People's Party' ((C)DP), the 'Hungarian Independence Party' (HIP) and the SHP itself), but restricted the franchise and excluded about 10 per cent of the citizens, most of whom were voters of the right. In spite of these restrictions, the 1947 general elections gave an opportunity for the expression of a wide range of political preferences. Therefore the political scene and party structure of the 1947 elections can be regarded as a 'starting point' which could have determined the further development of the party structure if the multiparty system had not been abolished. Therefore, if the 'freezing thesis' of Lipset and Rokkan is relevant in our case – which is my hypothesis – the party structure produced by the 1990 elections should be a revival of the 1947 one.

The 1988–90 period showed signs of historical continuity on the *issue* and *ideological* levels, as has been described above. The 1990 general elections demonstrated to a certain extent even the *sub-cultural cleavages* of society survived, as the strong regional character of the historic parties shows. Namely, the votes for the historical parties were far above their national average in those regions which were their strongholds in 1947 at the time of the last multiparty elections (see Tables 9.3–9.6). This shows some continuity in electoral behaviour.

Hungary is divided into five politico-geographical regions. The first is the metropolitan area of Budapest, which is the most developed part of Hungary and represents one million voters by itself. The second is the heavy industrial North East (Nógrád, Heves and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén counties) with its high working-class population and communist tradition. In addition, this region has a high Catholic population. The third region is the rural south-eastern 'Tiszántúl' (Békés, Szolnok, Hajdu-Bihar and Szabolcs-Szatmár counties). This is the only region in Hungary which has a Protestant character. The fourth is rural Mid- and South Hungary (Pest,

Table 9.3 The regional character of Smallholders' constituency in 1947 and 1990. Difference from the national average (proportion of total votes, in %) by regions

	1947	1990
Metropolitan Budapest	-8.0	-5.0
Industrial north-east	-0.6	-3.1
Protestant-rural 'Tiszántúl'	+7.1	+5.9
Rural mid-south	+1.4	+2.7
Urbanized north-west	-2.4	-0.9

Source: calculated by the author.

Table 9.4 The regional character of the 1947 Democratic People's Party* and of the 1990 Christian Democratic People's Party. Difference from the national average (proportion of total votes, in %) by regions

	1947	1990
Metropolitan Budapest	-11.3	-0.7
Industrial north-east	+1.2	+5.0
Protestant-rural 'Tiszántúl'	-8.7	-3.9
Rural mid-south	+5.0	+0.2
Urbanized north-west	+17.4	0.7**

* Together with the result of the Christian Women's Camp.

** In one of the four counties (Fejér) the CDP did not have a party list, while in the other three counties of the north-west region the party got 9.7 per cent of the total votes, i.e. +3.2 per cent over its national average.

Source: calculated by the author.

Bács-Kiskun, Csongrád, Baranya, Somogy, Zala, Veszprém and Tolna counties).¹⁸ The fifth is the most developed and urbanized rural region, the North West (Vas, Győr-Sopron, Komárom and Fejér counties). Each region has its own particular political character.

The votes of the *Smallholders' Party* were concentrated in the southern and south-eastern regions where they surpassed their national average by 3–10 per cent. In these rural regions, the SHP had strong political

traditions and gained over its average in the 1947 parliamentary elections as well. On the other hand, Budapest turned out to be their weakest region in 1990, as it was in the post-war elections (see Table 9.3).

Though the 1990 results of the *Christian Democratic People's Party* (CDPP) were much poorer than in 1947, their regional distribution follows the same pattern (see Table 9.4). In most of the Catholic counties (Győr-Sopron, Heves, Nógrád, Tolna, Vas and Zala counties) the CDPP got 10–15 per cent of the votes at the 1990 general elections, which is twice as high as its national average. They had the poorest result in the south-eastern Protestant 'Tiszántúl' region. In most of the 'Tiszántúl' constituencies the CDPP could not even put up candidates.¹⁹

Table 9.5 The regional character of the 1947 Hungarian Communist Party and the 1990 HS(W)P. * Difference from the national average (proportion of total votes, in %) by regions

	1947	1990
Metropolitan Budapest	+ 5.2	+ 2.5
Industrial north-east	+ 7.1	+ 3.9
Protestant-rural 'Tiszántúl'	- 0.9	+ 1.9**
Rural mid-south	- 3.7	- 2.5
Urbanized north-west	- 1.9	- 2.9

* HP(W)SP = HSP + HSWP votes.

** The reason for the good HS(W)P result is that the 'Tiszántúl' region was the stronghold of the radical agrarian National Peasant Party (NPP) at the 1947 elections. The NPP was the rural ally of the Communists and in 'Tiszántúl' it gained almost twice the number of votes as in general (+ 8.2 per cent over its national average). The NPP could not reorganize itself by the time of the 1990 elections, so the HSP and the HSWP got all the votes of the radical-left tradition.

Source: calculated by the author.

The (ex-)communist HSP and HSWP altogether gained between 9 and 14 per cent of the votes in Western Hungary while in Budapest and eastern Hungary they gained 16–20 per cent (see Table 9.5). This divergence can also be explained by historical traditions. In Budapest and in the north-eastern heavy industry region the industrial character and the strong social democratic and communist tradition explains their high votes. In the Protestant south-eastern 'Tiszántúl' region there is no direct correlation between the 1947 result of the Hungarian Communist Party (HCP) and the 1990 result of the HS(W)P. While the HCP got slightly

Table 9.6 The regional character of the 1947 Social Democratic Party and the 1990 Alliance of Free Democrats. Difference from the national average (proportion of total votes, in %) by regions

	SDP - 1947	AFD - 1990
Metropolitan Budapest	+ 9.8	+ 5.7
Industrial north-east	- 0.4	- 4.2
Protestant-rural 'Tiszántúl'	- 5.5	- 4.2
Rural mid-south	- 2.2	- 2.1
Urbanized north-west	+ 1.1	+ 4.8

Source: calculated by the author.

under its average in 1947, the HS(W)P exceeded it by 1.9 per cent. The explanation might lie in the historical role of agrarian radicalism in this region, which was expressed by high National Peasant Party (NPP) votes at the 1945 and 1947 elections. The NPP became the rural ally of the Communists (HCP) and got almost twice the number of votes (16.5 per cent) in the 'Tiszántúl' region as in general (their national average was 8.3 per cent).

Although the new parties, the two major parties, the HDF, the AFD and the minor FYD do not have direct political predecessors, the question of whether they follow any historical voting pattern should nonetheless be answered. The *Hungarian Democratic Forum*, as a 'catch-all' party on the right, had a relatively evenly spread constituency and does not have a strong regional character; neither does it follow any historical pattern. The same is true of the *Federation of Young Democrats*, which had the most evenly spread constituency in regional terms, though it slightly correlated with the Free Democratic votes. Diverging from the HDF and the FYD, the *Alliance of Free Democrats* has a remarkable regional character. The metropolitan Budapest region and the rather developed and urbanized North-West Hungary turned out to be the strongholds of the AFD, and it got weaker results in all the other rural regions. In addition, there is a positive correlation between the regional distribution of the 1990 AFD and the 1947 Social Democrat votes (see Table 9.6).

This correlation prevails not only in the five bigger regions, but in 17 out of 20 counties as well.²⁰ One of the three exceptions is the southern rural Békés county, a traditional stronghold of agrarian radicalism, where the HSDP has a long historical tradition. Another exception is the north-east industrial Borsod county, where the trade union-based HSDP was strong (but much weaker than the Communists) in the post-war period. The example of Borsod underlines the basic difference between the 1947

and the 1990 AFD constituencies. While the former received a high working-class vote, the AFD got much less. Besides its trade union bases, the post-war SDP was not a pure blue-collar party. It was the main moderate parliamentary political party on the left,²¹ so it also collected the votes of the urban middle class, who were alienated from the national, clerical and/or agrarian-rural character of the right. The AFD (and the FYD) had the same democratic (but more liberal) appeal in 1990 and occupied the same position on the political scale.

The emerging Hungarian party structure is different from that of 1947 in three important aspects. First, while in 1945/47 the Social Democrats and Communists, backed by trade unions, dominated the left, the 1988–90 period was marked by fragmentation and the lack of a working-class base. Second, while in the post-war years the Hungarian political scene developed towards a bipolarization, in 1988–90 the emergence of a strong left-liberal centre (AFD, FYD) produced a tripolar structure. Thirdly, the emergence of a strong 'catch-all' party (the HDF) in 1990 is a new phenomenon. Therefore, strictly speaking, the 'freezing thesis' of Lipset and Rokkan lost its validity in the Hungarian case. In a wider sense, however, it is more relevant. The revival of the historical parties and of their constituencies, and the positive correlation between the 1947 HSDP and the 1990 AFD constituency, lead to the conclusion that there is a remarkable continuity between the pre- and post-communist Hungarian politics. It exists not only on issue and ideological levels but in the dimension of social cleavage as well. As the examples of the AFD and the HSDP show, it is a wider phenomenon than the revival of the historical parties. Though with the emergence of the new parties the party structure has changed significantly, traditions are still alive in the dimension of political culture and attitudes as well.

Regarding Lipset and Rokkan's thesis, we might put up another hypothesis and consider the period of 1989–90 as the 'starting period' of the model. The following elections will show whether the emerging party system will follow Lipset and Rokkan's 'freezing thesis'²², the party system of the 1990 election period becoming stabilized, or whether it will change significantly. My assumption is that the party formation and constituency of the right (HDF, SHP, CDPP), which was able to revive its traditional constituency and party alignment and produce a modern 'catch-all' party as well, has a strong potential to preserve its current political character and party structure.

The stability of the status quo that has emerged is, however, less likely to be maintained from the left of the centre. The reason is that on the one hand, the traditional political loyalty of the working-class disappeared; the socialist left became fragmented and dispersed. On the other hand, two new left-liberal *programme* parties (ADF, FYD) emerged, and, becoming the main rivals of the winning right coalition, occupied the political position of the moderate left. In spite of this, since the AFD did not have a clear and stable electoral basis and because of the logic of political competition, the AFD might be compelled to seek a social democratic political character. Since most of the parties on the left of the

centre (except the FYD) endeavour to recreate and occupy the political position and especially the constituency of a classical social democratic party, restructuring on the left of the political scene is very likely.

Hungarian democracy: social cleavages and party system

With the 1989 constitutional amendments and 1990 free multiparty elections, Hungary fulfils the two major criteria for democratic political systems.²³ The constitution and the political practice have tended towards a parliamentary form of democratic government.²⁴ The political traditions and the electoral law have produced a multiparty parliament. Since the political scene and the electorate were rather fragmented, no party gained the majority of the seats and a coalition government was formed. But what prospects does Hungary have for a stable democracy? What kind of democracy has emerged in terms of social-political cleavages and party system? The political scene of the pre-election period was rather polarized. Finally, six parties gained 97 per cent of the parliamentary seats (376 out of 386 seats), which is still a rather fragmented political scene.

In general, two major factors are taken into account as far as the nature and stability of democratic regimes are concerned: first, the nature of the social cleavages (homogeneous or plural society), and secondly, the character of the party system.

Homogeneous or plural society?

Hungary society was clearly a plural one in the inter-war and the immediate post-war period. The more than four-decades-long communist rule, however, destroyed the institutions of the subcultures and carried out the greatest social homogenization programme in human history. It was very successful, as far as the institutional level is concerned. The institutions of the different social, residential, religious and professional groups were banned and abolished. People were either atomized or forced into organizations strictly directed and controlled by the Communist Party. Though a great industrialization programme of the 1950–60s²⁵ radically changed the fabric of society (the occupational structure, etc.), producing 'rootless' generations, the homogenization programme was less successful on the level of attitudes, values and social habits. Non-institutionalized, informal (religious, residential, national, occupational, racial, etc.) group loyalties as well as the memories of pre-communist political alignments and loyalties survived, as the fast revival of political traditions in the years 1987–90 and the electoral successes of the historical parties testify. Since then, there have been no administrative obstacles to the institutionalization of the segmented social groups; therefore the plural character of Hungarian society might strengthen in the future.

Contemporary Hungarian society can be described as slightly *segmented* rather than plural; a segmented society with various 'objective' social (religious, cultural, ideological and 'class') cleavages, which are not institutionalized but exist in inherited attitudes, instincts and memories of the people. This social segmentation, however, has an effect on the electoral behaviour of the people, as the voting patterns of the 1990 elections showed.²⁶

The party system: moderate or extreme pluralism?

In general, homogeneous societies tend to produce a two-party system (or a moderate pluralism) and a stable form of democratic government. Plural societies, however, have to face more difficulties in creating a stable democracy. Much depends on the way social cleavages are transformed into political cleavages by the party system.

G. Sartori distinguished between bipolar and multipolar party competition. A bipolar party competition, either in a two-party or in a multiparty system, tends toward a moderate pluralism with *centripetal* party competition. A multipolar competition in a multiparty system, however, leads toward a *polarized* (extreme) pluralism with a *centrifugal* party competition.²⁷ The short history of the Hungarian multiparty competition of the 1988–90 pre-election period was a multipolar one, where the HS(W)P, the HDF and the AFD formed the three main poles. After the marginalization of the HS(W)P, however, the competition tended to follow a bipolar pattern, where the political contest was dominated by the Hungarian Democratic Forum–Free Democrats competition.

The prospects for bipolar or multipolar party competition are still unclear. In spite of the bipolarity of contemporary Hungarian politics, the left-liberal centre-party character of the Free Democrats and Young Democrats leaves room for the tripolar development of Hungarian politics. If the Socialist Party (HSP) regains its political credibility and moves successfully towards the unoccupied position of a classical social democratic party, the AFD and FYD might be closed into a centre party position.

Other scholars emphasize that the polarity of the political scene depends very much on the depth of the social and political cleavages of a plural society, i.e. on the breadth and intensity of the polarity. If there is no consensus among the main political actors on basic constitutional or procedural questions, the form of government and of democracy itself might be fragile.

A. Lijphart emphasizes the role of political elites in stabilizing the democratic form of government in a plural society, where the social cleavages are deep and directly transformed into political cleavages. Hostile elite behaviour may deepen the political fragmentation and produce a *centrifugal* party competition and therefore a fragile democracy, as in the classical examples of the Weimar Republic and the Fourth French Republic. A consensus-oriented, coalescent elite behaviour,

however, might moderate and counterbalance the hostile political cleavages of a plural society, and produce a 'consociational democracy' as the Dutch, Belgian and Swiss examples demonstrated. In consociational democracies, the forms of coalition government prevail.²⁸

Where can we place Hungary in Lijphart's typology? Its *society* is between a 'plural' and a 'homogeneous' type. Its *elite behaviour* is much more 'adversarial' than the nature of the social cleavages (while at a social level the homogenization programme eclipsed the traditional cleavages, the emerging new parties – the HDF and the AFD – were rooted in the traditional subcultural hostility of rival elite groups of the 'intelligentsia').

If some cautious conclusion could be drawn it might be the following: on the rather fragmented and multiparty Hungarian political scene there are tendencies towards 'centrifugal party competition', but this is much more the consequence of adversarial elite behaviour than the cleavages of the segmented and slightly plural society. Hungary is an example of a 'reversed' adversarial policy.

Notes

1. G.A. Almond, 'Introduction: A Functionalist Approach to Comparative Politics', in G.A. Almond and J.S. Coleman, *The Politics of Developing Areas*, 1960, pp. 40–44.
2. Jonathan Eyel, 'Pledge of Peace Turns to Rule by the Sword', *The Guardian*, 15 June 1990, p. 10.
3. G. Almond and S. Verba, *Civic Culture*, 1960.
4. The more moderate and liberal character of the Bulgarian regime and the more violent and repressive character of the Romanian regime are due to their different origins. While in Bulgaria the (peaceful) internal power struggle within the ruling Communist Party and the victory of the 'progressives' led to the political reforms and to free elections, in Romania a popular revolt and a violent struggle led to the transition.
5. In Hungary it was the 'human right' or 'democratic opposition', formed by leftist dissident intellectuals in 1977, which came into existence as a *radical* anti-system opposition. They published the leading 'samizdat' journals, like the *Beszélő* and the *Hirmondó* during the 1980s. The human rights principle united the different Marxist, Maoist, liberal socialist and plebeian radical groups into a loose, political alliance. Leaving the extreme leftist approach behind, it became a group of intellectuals with left-liberal views (in an American sense) and radical democratic views (in a French sense) by the mid-1980s. They considered the liberalism and middle-class radicalism of Hungarian political thinkers like Jászi, Csécsy and Bibó as their intellectual forefathers. Their political model was, however, the Polish Solidarity movement. Besides the rights of the citizens, the democratic procedures of the political institution became the centre of their political thinking. Their political critique of the regime also emphasized the lack of individual political rights: the illegal procedures carried out by the police, by the judiciary and by the state administration. Their political ideal has been, since the mid-1980s, a Western-type parliamentary democracy with a strong welfare state. The sociological composition of the 'democratic opposition' was marked by

- Budapest urban intellectuals, philosophers, historians, sociologists and economists, with a significant proportion being of Jewish origin.
6. The *moderate opposition* came into existence with the foundation of the *Hungarian Democratic Forum* (HDF) in September 1987. The HDF had its own ideology of the populism. The HDF was founded by populist writers and intellectuals. The HDF tried to keep an intermediate position between the regime and the opposition and enjoyed the support of the reform wing of the ruling Communist Party. The intermediate self-positioning of the HDF between the regime and the radical opposition was due to different factors. The crucial one was the traditional split of the Hungarian intelligentsia between the *populist* and the *urban* wing; therefore the reviving populist movement established its own organization and did not join the 'democratic opposition', which was the political expression of the radical urban intellectuals.
 7. For example, F. Fejtő, P. Ignóty, B. Zsolt, I. Hatvany and A. József. The 'urbanists' rallied around journals like the *Századunk*, *Szép Szó*.
 8. For example, Gy. Illyés, L. Németh, P. Veres and T. Kovács. The 'populists' wrote in journals like the *Válasz* and *Tanú*.
 9. 'Urbanist' liberalism was accused by the populist view of being the intellectual expression of the Budapest Jewish middle class and bourgeoisie. For many 'populists', liberal parliamentarism and Manchesterian liberalism meant first, a danger for the traditional Hungarian values, and second, the reservation of the power monopoly of alien social groups. The populists were for some 'third road' between East and West, between capitalism and socialism. Their ideal was the formation of co-operatives based on private farming in agriculture, private ownership and a free market in small-scale industry and nationalization of the banking system and big business.
 10. One of the watersheds was, for example, the interpretation of the 1848 Independence War against the Habsburg-rule and of the 'Pact' of 1867.
 11. R.J. Dalton, 'The West German Party System Between Two Ages', in R.J. Dalton, S.C. Flanagan and P.A. Beck, *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?*, 1984, pp. 104-33.
 12. The view of the SHP is very clear in the case of landed property, where they would like to reinstate the 1947 situation. There were some endeavours within the CDPP to take back the historical role of the churches, involving the plan partly to give back former church property.
 13. The Free Democrats considered the former nationalization of industry and the collectivization of the private farms as an historically given fact, which could not be reshaped to the 1947 situation in a fair way. They were more technocratic on the question of privatization and refused the orthodox version of property right.
 14. R. Inglehart, 'The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society', in R.J. Dalton, S.C. Flanagan and P.A. Beck, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-69.
 15. In those 125 single-member constituencies, where both the HDF and the AFD took part in the run-off, the votes for the HDF candidates increased by 29.13 per cent while the votes for the AFD candidates grew by only 4.98 per cent.
 16. M. Harrop, 'Voting and Electorate', in H.M. Drucker *et al.*, *Developments in British Politics*, 1986, pp. 34-59.
 17. By the inter-war period universal suffrage was introduced, but the secret ballot (except in the 1939 general elections) was limited to the cities. However, the HSDP was excluded from the contest in the countryside and the Communist Party was banned during the whole period.

18. Mid- and South-'Dunántúl' (Danubia) and the 'Alföld' without the 'Tiszántúl' region.
19. Szabolcs-Szatmár county was the only exception from the four south-eastern 'Tiszántúl' regions where the CDPP had candidates (and votes). It is religiously more mixed, with a higher Roman and Greek Catholic population, and the CDPP here has political traditions as well.
20. The three exceptions Borsod, Békés and Vas counties. The correlation is less striking in the case of the 1945 results of the HSDP. Comparing the 1945 HSDP and the 1990 AFD votes, there are positive correlations in only 13 out of the 20 counties.
21. Beside the HSDP two tiny urban liberal parties existed - the Hungarian Radical Party and the Civilian Democratic Party.
22. S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', in S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds), *Party Systems and Voters Alignments*, pp. 1-64.
23. There are several others, like the durability of the regime, which is especially important in the case of new democratic regimes. G. O'Donnell and P. Schmitter consider the first change of power within a permanent regime (i.e. whether the freely elected democratic government would pass on the power if it is defeated at the following elections). (P.C. Schmitter, G. O'Donnell and L. Whitehead, *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, 1986.)
24. The political concept of a semi-presidential regime had already been defeated during the political fight of the winter of 1989-90. The President of the Republic, who has very limited constitutional power, had been elected indirectly, i.e. by the parliament, in summer 1990.
25. Which was carried out parallel with the collectivization of agriculture and the enforcement of the peasantry towards industrial jobs.
26. The votes for the CDPP in Catholic areas, the votes for the SHP in rural Hungary and the votes for the HSP and HSWP in heavy industrial districts demonstrated it.
27. G. Sartori, 'European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism', in J. LaPaLambora and M. Wiener (eds), *Political Parties and Political Development*, 1969.
28. A. Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, 1977.