

# Chapter 10

## Carnap's *Weltanschauung* and the *Jugendbewegung*: The Story of an Omitted Chapter

Adam Tamas Tuboly

### 10.1 Introduction

Richard Creath (2007, 332) claimed earlier that “Quine did arrive in Vienna in 1932, but intellectually, at least, he never left. [...] Vienna remained the city of Quine’s dreams; it was the home of his concerns, the source of his arguments, and the lodestar of his aspirations.” If Vienna was the city of Quine’s dreams, then it was indeed the city of Rudolf Carnap.

According to the usual story, after Carnap arrived in Vienna in 1926 (first in 1925 to present the *Aufbau* as his *Habilitationsschrift*), he found himself in a stimulating and cooperative atmosphere. For Carnap, originally a physicist, who tried to explicate the connections between physics, mathematics, logic, and philosophy while searching for a general and unified scientific framework, Vienna offered the required help both to finish his ongoing projects and to conceptualize the further scientific-philosophical works.

Even the Vienna Circle welcomed Carnap as the long-awaited system-builder who could synthesize their various efforts and philosophical insights into a general framework which would connect all the dots. As Philipp Frank (1949, 33) put it: “[In the *Aufbau*] the integration of Mach and Poincaré was actually performed in a coherent system of conspicuous logical simplicity. Our Viennese group saw in Carnap’s work the synthesis that we had advocated for many years.” But even if we do not take at face value the retrospective – and as Thomas Uebel (2003) said – highly “programmatically” historiography of Frank, already in 1929 the authors of the Circle’s manifesto (Carnap, Neurath, and partly Hahn, Feigl and Waismann) claimed that (in the context of their method):

---

A.T. Tuboly (✉)  
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary  
e-mail: [Tuboly.Adam@btk.mta.hu](mailto:Tuboly.Adam@btk.mta.hu)

[i]f such an analysis were carried through for all concepts, they would thus be ordered into a reductive system, a ‘*constitutive system*’. Investigations towards such a constitutive system, the ‘*constitutive theory*’, thus form the framework within which logical analysis is applied by the *scientific world-conception*. (Carnap et al. 1929/1973, 309. Italics added.)

Thus before Neurath’s critique and Carnap’s physicalist turn, a part of the Circle maintained that Carnap’s general ideas about concept-building (in the *Aufbau*) provided the required framework to spell out their (scientific) conception of the world.

Vienna seemed to be, however, the city of Carnap’s dream from a broader cultural perspective too. The manifesto’s authors (among them Carnap) said that

[i]n the second half of the nineteenth century, liberalism was long the dominant political current. Its world of ideas stems from the enlightenment, from empiricism, utilitarianism and the free trade movement of England. In Vienna’s liberal movement, scholars of world renown occupied leading positions. Here an anti-metaphysical spirit was cultivated [...]. (Carnap et al. 1929/1973, 301.)

Besides the diverse scientific landscape, Vienna showed a colorful picture of political, social and cultural ideas. Even Carnap seems to confirm that Vienna was an ideal place for him after he visited the Circle for the very first time in 1925: “Besides[the philosophical atmosphere] Vienna is attractive too: a lot of cultures, a lot of international lives.”<sup>1</sup>

So far so good one could say, concerning, at least, the usual story. As a part of Carnap’s *Nachlass*, however, in his original and unpublished intellectual autobiography written in the late 1950s for the Schilpp volume, Carnap draws our attention to a quite different narrative of his “Wiener Projekt”<sup>2</sup>:

After the war [...] the same spirit was still alive [vivid] in the life of my newly founded family and in the relationships with friends. When I went to Vienna, however, the situation changed. I still preserved the same spirit in my personal attitude, but I missed it painfully in the social life with others. None of the members of the Vienna Circle had taken part in the Youth Movement, and I did not feel myself strong and productive enough to transform singlehandedly the group of friends into a living community, sharing the style of life which I wanted. Although I was able to play a leading role in the philosophical work of the group, I was unable to fulfill the task of a missionary or a prophet. Thus I often felt as perhaps a man might feel who has lived in a religious[ly] inspired community and then suddenly finds himself isolated in the Diaspora and not strong enough to convert the heathen. The same feeling I had in a still greater measure later in America, where the power of traditional social conventions is much stronger than it was in Vienna and where also the number of those who have at least sensed some dissatisfaction with the traditional forms of life is smaller than anywhere on the European continent. (Carnap 1957, [UCLA] Box 2, CM3, folder M-A5, pp. B35–B36.)

This passage is purported to show that even though Vienna could have been the city of Carnap’s dreams from a theoretical (philosophical and scientific) point of view,<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Carnap to Reichenbach, March 10, 1925. ASP RC 102-64-11. All translations are mine.

<sup>2</sup>The term is from Carnap’s letter to his father-in-law. It is dated just after Carnap went back to Wiesneck after his visit to Vienna, November 2, 1925. ASP RC 102-23-01.

<sup>3</sup>As many scholars argue, even from a philosophical point of view, Vienna could not cover the whole interest of Carnap due to the anti-Kantian tendencies of Austrian philosophy. In 1933

from a broader cultural (social and political) perspective the Viennese people just missed something important and fundamental: none of them have taken part in the so-called German Youth Movement (GYM), the *Jugendbewegung*.

The role and lasting effect of GYM on Carnap's thought and philosophy were emphasized recently, for example, by Gottfried Gabriel (2004), André Carus (2007a, b), Christian Damböck (2012) and Jacques Bouveresse (2012). The aim of this paper is to make some further comments on Carnap's relation to the GYM, particularly on the question of why was it omitted from his published intellectual autobiography?

I will proceed as follows. In Sect. 10.2 the *Jugendbewegung* is going to be discussed, particularly its effect on Carnap's *Weltanschauung*. Then in Sect. 10.3 I will present some reasons which led finally to the decision to cut from the autobiography those passages which concerned the *Jugendbewegung*.

One could naturally raise the question whether such a micro-story about an omitted chapter is important at all. Since I claim that (at least partly) the GYM's effect could be detected both in the principle of tolerance and in Carnap's general metaphilosophy, it indeed seems to be relevant to deal with the omitted passage and its context. On the other hand, since the GYM was not present in Carnap's philosophy as a propositionally formulated piece of knowledge (he never refers to it as such), approaching the problem from the idea of worldviews gives us a proper framework. According to Wilhelm Dilthey (1968, 78), "the deepest root of *Weltanschauung* is in life itself" thus we shall reveal those socio-cultural moments which made possible and framed Carnap's views. GYM was just such a moment. Furthermore, as Karl Mannheim (1921–22/1959, 45) formulated it, the analyzes of worldviews and cultural objects "embraces not merely cultural products endowed with traditional prestige, such as Art or Religion, but also manifestations of everyday life which usually pass unnoticed [...]", like participation in a movement.

## 10.2 The *Jugendbewegung* and Its Effect on Carnap's *Weltanschauung*

In an interview (Haller and Rutte 1977, 27–28), Heinrich Neider, a former member of the Circle, remembered Carnap as follows:

[Carnap] was then [around World War I] an independent social democrat [...], Carnap was never a communist. But he was nevertheless a radical socialist, even if it was not something you would have guessed when you saw him. He was a man unable of any outburst of affect,

---

Carnap wrote a short intellectual autobiography to Marcel Boll, in which he said: "It is characteristic of the recent German philosophical situation that as a German of the Reich [Reichsdeutscher] I found my field of activity [Tätigkeitsfeld] not in Germany but in Vienna and Prague [...]." ASP RC 091-20-09. One could interpret this passage as Carnap tries to give voice to his dissatisfaction that he had to leave Germany (even though he has found himself in a fruitful and cooperative atmosphere among logical empiricist outside of Germany).

from whom I have never heard an impolite or despising word and to whom any kind of fanaticism was alien. I considered him which such a reaction of incredulity, when he said: 'I, who was an independent at that time', and I said: 'I would absolutely not believe that of you' and he answered to that by the following reflection: 'There are many things you would not believe about me, I have also been there at the *Hohe Meißner* festival'.<sup>4</sup>

The "Hohe Meißner" is a mountain in Hesse, Germany, where Germans planned to celebrate the Battle of Leipzig against Napoleon. 1913 was the centenary and they organized a huge national-military-patriotic festival. On the 11th and 12th of October, 1913 the members of the GYM planned a huge counter-festival, with 4000 participants from all over the country; different groups of the Movement were gathering at the top of the mountain. One enthusiastic member and actually organizer of the counter-festival was Carnap.<sup>5</sup>

The GYM, whose first group was called the *Wandervogel* [birds of passage], began at the end of the nineteenth century in Berlin<sup>6</sup>: it was a "large-scale rebellion of well-off adolescents against the perceived conformism of their parents and teachers to the rigid norms of the society into which students were being socialized" (Carus 2007a, 50). The main roots of the GYM could be found in German Romanticism but members of the GYM tried to revive some customs and habits also from medieval times: they arranged extensive and long ramblings in the countryside, where they eat what they find and could make from the elements of nature.<sup>7</sup> They tried to get closer to the peasantry and master their lifestyle with all its naiveté and purity.

The latter characteristics were of the utmost importance for the participants. Members of the GYM abstained from the "bourgeois" vices and drugs, such as coffee, tobacco, alcohol. As Quine (1971, xxiv) recalled later: "Carnap's habits were already austere: no science after dinner, on pain of a sleepless night. No alcohol ever. No coffee." So instead of the usual contemporary lifestyle or traditions from the city, these young people created their *own habits* and *culture*: they sang while the walked, slept under the open sky, danced and read poems.

---

<sup>4</sup>Translated by Jacques Bouveresse (2012, 56).

<sup>5</sup>Another participant was Hans Reichenbach with a delegation of the *Freistudenten* [Free Students] from Berlin. Earlier Reichenbach was also a member of the *Wandervogel* movement and later took an active part in the *Freie Studentenschaft*. See the memoir of Carl Landauer (1978). Reichenbach's experiences in the GYM had a similar effect on his thought as on Carnap's. Kamlah (2013) provides a detailed analysis of Reichenbach's volitional conception of ethics and decisions regarding both philosophy and science. I am indebted to Thomas Uebel for calling my attention to the case of Reichenbach.

<sup>6</sup>About the GYM see Laqueur (1962), Aufmuth (1979); Bias-Engels (1988) and Werner (2003).

<sup>7</sup>As Laquer (1962, 15–16) said "[...] the early *Wandervogel* put itself into deliberate opposition to a society whose interest in nature was by and large limited to yearly visits to mountain or seaside resorts, with all their modern comforts. There was more to it, too. It was, or at any rate became, a somewhat inchoate revolt against authority."

Carnap was a member of the GYM's local group in Jena, called Serakreis [Sera Circle]; it was organized by the famous publisher Eugen Diederichs.<sup>8</sup> Actually, Carnap was present at the Hohe Meißner as one of the representatives and for some time leader of the Serakreis. He remembered the gatherings of the circle, especially its Festival of the Midsummer night as follows:

Influenced by Skandinavian customs, there were songs, dances, and plays. Diederichs read the Hymn to the Sun by St. Francis of Assisi, after sundown the big fire was lighted, encircled by the large chain of singing boys and girls, and when the fire had burned down there came the jumping of the couples through the flames. Finally, when the large crows of guests had left, our own Circle remained at rest around the glowing embers, listening to a song or talking softly, until we fell asleep in the quiet night under the starry sky. (Carnap, 1957, [UCLA], Box 2, CM3, MA-5, p. B30.)

The aim of the movements was “to find a way of life which was genuine, sincere, and honest, in contrast to the fakes and frauds of traditional bourgeois life; a life, guided by the own conscience and the own standards of responsibility and not by the obsolete norms of tradition.”<sup>9</sup> Though Carnap complained a lot about his memory<sup>10</sup> and the autobiography is indeed inaccurate and sloppy at some points, his recollection about the GYM agrees with the original documentation of the movement: “Free German Youth desires, of its own determination and under its own responsibility, to shape its life with inner authenticity [Wahrhaftigkeit]. It stands united for this inner freedom under all circumstances” (Messer 1924, 19–20).

It would be hard to overestimate the influence of the GYM on Carnap's thought. In the unedited and unpublished intellectual autobiography, he even devoted a section to these ideas, entitled as “Weltanschauung: Religion, enlightenment, youth movement” (B18). What he learned and acquired there is not a set of theoretical statements and doctrines, but a way and attitude towards life [Lebensgefühl], a form of life [Lebensform] and a certain worldview [Weltanschauung]. One could say with Dilthey (1968, 86) that worldviews are not the “products of thought.” A worldview is, after all, such an a-logical, non-conceptual and non-structured totality of feelings and experiences which underline *all* the products of the human mind [Geist]. From such a viewpoint, “theoretical philosophy is neither the creator nor the principal vehicle of the *Weltanschauung* of an epoch; in reality, it is merely only one of the channels through which a global factor – to be conceived as transcending the various cultural fields, its emanations – manifests itself” (Mannheim 1921–22/1959, 38). Philosophical contents, considered as cultural products and philosophical styles, are just expressions and documentations of worldviews.

Since worldviews are pre-propositional, they are evidently having a non-theoretical character; but they are not irrational if we mean by the concept something *meaningless*. Worldviews are rather a-theoretical (and/or a-rational) complexes of feelings and experiences, hence rational justification is not required in their case:

<sup>8</sup> Diederichs was an important figure later too: as a publisher he published the books of Franz Roh, Wilhelm Flitner and Walter Fränzel, who were close collaborators of Carnap in the early 1920s.

<sup>9</sup> Carnap, 1957, [UCLA], Box 2, CM3, MA-5, p. B31–B32.

<sup>10</sup> See for example his letter to Brian McGuinness, November 27, 1969. ASP RC 027-33-14.

worldviews do not violate the rules and norms of rationality since they serve as the hidden, but the continuous base of rationality and theoretical argumentation.<sup>11</sup>

Though Carnap is evidently not referring to what has been said earlier, one could still interpret his words as claiming that the suitable cultural medium and social experiences could influence philosophy itself in a fruitful manner, which is, as Mannheim (1921–22/1959, 38) said, “merely one of [the] manifestations [of world-views] and not the only one”:

For those whose work is on a purely theoretical nature, there is the danger of a too narrow concentration on the intellectual side of life, so that the properly human side may be neglected. I think it was very fortunate for my personal development during these decisive years that I could participate both in Freiburg and in Jena in the common life of such fine and inspired groups of the Youth Movement. (Carnap, 1957, [UCLA], Box 2, CM3, MA-5, p. B32.)

Though Carnap participated in the GYM only between 1910 and 1914, he actively maintained his relation to his fellows during and after the First World War.<sup>12</sup> He continuously corresponded with the members, read their pamphlets and articles which were published in their journals. His friendships made in the movement turned out to be lasting for decades and in some cases, they were life-long relations. Carnap got to know the German sociologist Hans Freyer in the GYM, and Freyer’s ideas about the *Geisteswissenschaften* became very influential on the *Aufbau* and Freyer played an important role in transmitting the philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey in the formative years of Carnap.<sup>13</sup> After the First World War, Carnap organized a workshop in Buchenbach about the “system of sciences”: the participants were his closest friends from the Serakreis, namely Freyer, the pedagogic Wilhelm Flitner, and the art historian and photographer Franz Roh. The discussion group of Carnap, Freyer, Roh and Flitner in the summer of 1920 had a well-documented effect on the *Aufbau* and on the early thoughts of Carnap.<sup>14</sup>

All these friends shared the same experiences in the GYM and the movement’s impact remained quite detectable and fundamentally important for Carnap:

---

<sup>11</sup> According to Tamás Demeter (2012, 49), worldviews could be approached as a form of Kantian conditions of possibility, especially like the forms of intuition. Neither of them have a conceptual character, they do not mean knowledge, they do not possess a propositional structure but they still make possible knowledge in a broader sense: “[w]e could say in the Kantian idiom, *Weltanschauung* is empirically real but transcendently ideal: works of cultural production are impossible independently of a worldview, but a worldview cannot be known independently of the works of cultural production.”

<sup>12</sup> Actually Carnap received two letters from Martha Hörmann, a former member of the Serakreis, in 1964. She told Carnap about the 1963 meeting at the Hohe Meißner, and how it revived her feelings and memories from the formative years in Jena. See ASP AC 027-29-26 and ASP RC 027-29-27.

<sup>13</sup> About Dilthey’s indirect influence on Carnap’s thought see Gabriel (2004); Damböck (2012); Tuboly (forthcoming).

<sup>14</sup> Freyer and Flitner were also members of the GYM and while Carnap’s friendship with Freyer broke in the early 1930s when Freyer moved to the political right, Flitner, Roh and Carnap were life-long friends. About the Buchenbach-conference see Dahms (2016), about Flitner’s recollection see Flitner (1986).

[...] the spirit that lived in this movement, which was like a religion without dogmas, remained a precious inheritance for everyone who had the good luck to take an active part in it. What remained was more than a mere reminiscence of an enjoyable time; it was rather an indestructible living strength which forever would influence one's reactions to all practical problems of life. (Carnap, 1957, [UCLA], Box 2, CM3, MA-5, p. B34–B35.)

What Carnap learned is a certain *attitude*: we should not accept blindly any doctrine, knowledge and the heritage of our ancestors and other authorities just as it stand. We have the right and ability to revise everything, to reshape and rebuild (Aufbau) our material, cultural and social environment and to question every convention and arrange our cultural world as we wish. We have a total freedom [völlige Freiheit]<sup>15</sup> in these questions. Carnap formulated these ideas in his published autobiography under the label of “scientific humanism”:

[...] man has no supernatural protectors or enemies and that therefore whatever can be done to improve life is the task of man himself. [...] we had the conviction that mankind is able to change the conditions of life in such a way that many of the sufferings of today may be avoided and that the external and the internal situation of life for the individual, the community, and finally for humanity will be essentially improved. (Carnap 1963, 83)

In his unpublished autobiography, actually, he told a story about a conversation with a peasant in a remote village of the Black Forest after the First World War which documents the above-mentioned trends:

We looked at an airplane at great distance, high in the sky, and he said: ‘They say that sometimes people fly in such machines. But that is not possible.’ I told him that I had flown a few times in an airplane. He looked at me somewhat suspiciously, shook his head, and said: ‘Now look here: I am much older than you; I know very well what can be done and what cannot. Now you believe me, this thing is just not possible.’ (Carnap 1957, [UCLA], Box 2, CM3, MA-4, pp. N17–N18.)

This example shows quite well that attitude against which Carnap and his youth friends stood up.

I would like to end this section with the mentioning of the examples where one can evidently find the effect of the GYM on Carnap's thought. First there is the notorious *principle of tolerance* (Carnap 1934/1937, §17), which says, after all, that one is totally free to choose between logical systems and (philosophical/scientific) languages as he wishes (though the principle was extendable for methods also). Engineer your schemes and conceptions as you wish, decide which one fits your space of (practical and theoretical) reasons the best and leave behind the authoritative *a priori*/armchair-style philosophical reasoning.

The second point (which is actually connected to the first) is that our freedom is extended also to the practical realm through the dialectical conception of explication (Carus 2007a): since the possible consequences of the various possible acts affect our practices and these consequences are codified in different language forms, our actions and practical decisions are not fixed but relative in a sense to a particular language form. This conception was formulated compactly by Richard Jeffrey

---

<sup>15</sup> Carnap used these words when he introduced his principle of tolerance in the discussions of the Circle in 1933. See ASP RC 110-07-22.

(1994, 847) who was a close collaborator of Carnap on the theories of probability and inductive logic in the last few decades of his life:

Philosophically, Carnap was a social democrat; his ideals were those of the enlightenment. His persistent, central idea was: »It's high time we took charge of our own mental lives«, time to engineer our own conceptual scheme (language, theories) as best we can to serve our own purposes; [...] time to accept the fact that there's nobody out there but us, to choose our purposes and concepts to serve those purposes, if indeed we are to choose those things and not simply suffer them. [...] For Carnap, deliberate choice of the syntax and semantics of our language was more than a possibility it was a duty we owe ourselves as a corollary of freedom.

If the GYM had such a detectable and important influence on Carnap's intellectual development as claimed here, then one could rightly ask that why did he cut it from his intellectual autobiography? I will try to indicate some possible reasons in the next section.

### 10.3 The “Intimate” Parts of the Biography

In the recent literature on Carnap, it is frequently emphasized that his original intellectual autobiography written for the Schilpp volume in the second half of the 1950s was much longer and detailed than the published one in 1963.<sup>16</sup> Carnap cut his autobiography but there were certain shortenings also in his replies and systematic presentations of his philosophical ideas. So far Carnap-scholars did not focus on the reasons for this move besides that it was due to the unexpected length of the volume which, at some point, was considered to be published in two volumes just because of that.

Carnap's unpublished correspondence, however, is promising in this context and I will concentrate on three points. These points (or reasons) have in a general (and neutral) sense suitable documentary-value: they express aptly Carnap's worldview, the idea that the fallible and contingent factors of “everyday life” could bear on theoretical issues, and the trends of the social and political epoch of his time.

In a broader sense, we could connect these points and Mannheim's (1921–22/1959, 44) inquiries about the “strata of meaning” of the cultural and social products. Mannheim claims that we can differentiate three levels: (a) the objective meaning, (b) the intentional-expressive meaning, and the (c) documentary or evidential meaning. In the first case, to understand a given act, we shall abstract from the participant subjects, from their intentions and psychological states, and it is

---

<sup>16</sup>It seems, in fact, that the Schilpp volume, *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*, did not appear in 1963. Carnap wrote to Robert Mathers on 20 November, 1963 that “I hear that the Schilpp volume is to appear by Dec. 31; but there have been so many delays that this date cannot be counted on” (ASP RC 088-62-09). Still on 5 April, 1964, Carnap told to Albert Blumberg that “Unfortunately I am not able to send you a copy of my autobiography. In the mistaken trust that the Schilpp-volume was going to appear in 1963 I seem to have given away all my copies” (ASP RC 088-06-04).



enough to know the “objective social configuration” (ibid. p. 45). Only in a given social configuration will a bit of metal function as alms. In the second case, the subject will be relevant and the meaning of the act “cannot be divorced from the subject and his actual stream of experience, but acquires its fully individualized content only with reference to this ‘intimate’ universe” (ibid. p. 46). What matters is what the subject intends to *express* with the given act. Finally, in the third case, besides the social configurations, and the intended expressive elements, the important thing is “what is documented about [the subject], albeit unintentionally, by that act of his” (ibid. p. 47).

Given that Carnap's act, namely the cutting of the passages about the GYM, could be considered as a cultural and social product of the human mind [Geist], we could use Mannheim's approach. Actually Carnap's unpublished correspondence, mainly with Feigl and Hempel, is very promising and it indeed indicates some partial answers. I will concentrate on three separate points.

Carnap finished the first drafts of his intellectual autobiography in December 1956, and he sent it directly to Feigl and Hempel. He was “very dissatisfied with it” and as he said in the letter “you two are those from whom I can get the best help for the later working on.”<sup>17</sup> As usual, Carnap was wondering about the “historical correctness” of his memory and asked his friends to think about “factual events but also about influences by books or persons on [his] conceptions or about anything else [...]” (ASP CH 11-02-10).

Hempel replied on January 14, 1957, and claimed that “it is an utterly fascinating piece, which will show [Carnap] to [his] readers from a side they never thought existed” (ASP CH 11-02-09). Hempel also suggested particular places where Carnap could shorten his autobiography. Interestingly in the light of his later remarks regarding the cutting, Hempel suggested omitting (among others) the parts about the *Jugendbewegung*.

Carnap was still bothering with the shortenings in April 1957, when his wife, Ina wrote to Hempel (who was called by his personal acquaintances as “Peter”):

I wish, Peter, you would let me have a line taking issue with the following; if cuts are to be made (Feigl, Bohnert say: “no cuts, if possible”; I don't agree), where would your cutting emphasis lie? Mia says: on the content of publications as given by Carnap, since people can read them anyway. (Ina to Hempel, ASP RC 102-13-59.)<sup>18</sup>

Though at first Ina said that she “like[d] just this [suggestion] very well”, after all, she had a different move in mind and did not agree with the advice that Carnap should cut the survey of his publications.<sup>19</sup> Instead, she claimed that “I should like

<sup>17</sup>Carnap to Hempel and Feigl, ASP CH 11-02-10. The letter is dated in Carnap's *Nachlass* as November 18, 1956 (ASP RC 091-20-18), but it was received by Hempel on December 5.

<sup>18</sup>The letter could be found also in Hempel's *Nachlass*, see ASP CH 11-02-07. “Mia” is Hans Reichenbach's wife, Maria Reichenbach.

<sup>19</sup>It would have been indeed optional for Carnap though given that Ayer's collection of *Logical Positivism* was just on his way (it was published in 1959) and he provided some fresh remarks about his recently translated papers. The University of California Press editor Robert Y. Zachary asked Quine's opinion about a possible translation of Carnap's *Aufbau* in 1961 (see Creath 1990,

to see cuts made in the more intimate material (childhood, youth movement, own children, auxiliary languages), and make it more an ‘intellectual’ auto.’<sup>20</sup> What does this passage tell us?

It seems that by an intellectual autobiography Ina indeed meant an *intellectual* autobiography where the emphasis lies on the evolution of Carnap’s theses, claims and results. An intellectual autobiography should not deal with the personal background and historical contexts beyond what is necessary for such a literary genre. The “intimate” parts and the personal experiences just do not add anything to the content of the philosophical claims. Presumably, it was Ina who formulated exactly this idea in a letter to Feigl:

This morning I mailed you the first half of the autobiography. Don’t be shocked about the length. Much of it is very easy reading. The part which impresses me more is always where it is not so easy reading, but then that may be my peculiarity. Before my eyes is the little book which Freud wrote as his autobiography, and which I think extremely good as an intellectual autobiography: a minimum of personal facts and a maximum about the develop[ment] and spread of the ideas, actually a history of psychoanalysis. To me this seems the ideal way of writing such a thing: people at large somehow do not seem worth the personal details, but should be fed facts primarily. Says I. (Ina/Carnap to Feigl, December 5, 1956. ASP RC 102-07-34.)

This could be justified even in the theoretical framework of Carnap and that’s could be one reason why did Carnap indeed cut off the mentioned “intimate” passages. Carnap always distinguished theoretical/philosophical claims and one’s attitude toward life (*Lebensgefühl*) and worldview (*Weltanschauung*). The latter underlies the former as non-theoretical complexes of cultural and social experiences along with the inherited bag of values. That was just the main point of his critic in 1932 (in the “Überwindung” article) when he claimed that though metaphysics could exhibit some positive role – namely to express one’s *Lebensgefühl* – it is *not* a theoretical one.

Since the relevant passages – which contained the memories about the *Jugendbewegung* – were entitled by Carnap as “Weltanschauung: Religion, enlightenment, youth movement” he indeed seemed to identify these reflections as the background basis for his philosophy and not as *parts* of his theoretical considerations. As such, Carnap held that though the remarks about one’s *Lebensgefühl* and *Weltanschauung* could be useful to understand the (often irrational or better, a-theoretical) reasons behind one’s philosophy, they are useless in the evaluation of proposed arguments. In a frequently quoted passage from Carnap’s intellectual autobiography – where he recalled the role and effect of Herman Nohl – he claimed that

---

453–454). Given that, Carnap could have known that another important book of his will be available to the English speaking world. Later on the 10th of June, 1969 Carnap wrote to Ferenc Altrichter (who was editing the selected Hungarian translations of Carnap) that “I think it will not be necessary for me to write new comments on these papers indicating my present views and how they differ from the formulations in these old papers. I made such comments at an earlier time.” Listing these places Carnap did not mention his Schilpp volume. See ASP RC 027-22-01.

<sup>20</sup>Ina to Hempel, April 15, 1957. ASP RC 102-13-59.

[m]y friends and I were particularly attracted by Nohl because he took a personal interest in the lives and thoughts of his students, in contrast to most of the professors in Germany at that time, and because in his seminars and in private talks he tried to give us a deeper understanding of philosophers on the basis of their attitude toward life ("*Lebensgefühl*") and their cultural background. (Carnap 1963, 4. Cf. Carnap 1957, [UCLA], Box 2, CM3, M-A3, p. B3.)

In the unpublished version, however, this passage continues with the following rarely cited remark:

[...] since my interest was more systematically than historically oriented, I was frustrated when he [Nohl] pushed aside questions about the correctness of the views of a philosopher whose work we studied. Following his teacher Dilthey, he regarded as the main aim of philosophical study not the solution of problems, but the understanding of the ways of thinking of the various philosophers. (Carnap 1957, [UCLA], Box 2, CM3, M-A3, pp. B3-B4.)

This also seems to suggest that for Carnap, writing a mainly *intellectual* autobiography means that one should omit the elements of his *Weltanschauung*.

From this angle, we could explore the *objective meaning* of Carnap's act – though what is relevant is not the objective social configuration but the objective philosophical configuration. Carnap's act – namely to remove certain typewritten pages from a document – in a given theoretical medium become bearer of a philosophical meaning: it will be the manifestation of the idea to distinguish factual/cognitive and non-factual/non-cognitive elements. If one knows the relevant and particular philosophical stance in question and all of its commitments, then the given act of cutting the parts about worldviews (which are non-theoretical, hence non-intellectual) from an *intellectual* autobiography will be meaningful. From this point of view, it does not matter that we are talking about Carnap, Hempel, Reichenbach or any other philosopher who puts more weight on the theoretical side: what matters is that a certain act (or product) will acquire its meaning in a given objective philosophical configuration.

We could also point out that Carnap was just simply not interested in writing the autobiography and cutting the least intellectual and theoretical parts which were not known in the U.S. (as the *Jugendbewegung*) just seemed to be the most simplest move to get over the project.<sup>21</sup>

Carnap started to work on his autobiography in 1954; in fact, it turned out to be just a duty to him which he wanted to "avoid."<sup>22</sup> After all, he wrote in 1960 that "Schilpp has just sent the mss. for the Carnap-volume to the printer – perhaps it will then appear in 1961. I spent an inordinate amount of time on the writing of the 'Intellectual Autobiography', I don't do this sort of thing too well. The technical discussions are much more my sort of writing [...]"<sup>23</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Since every other autobiography of the Schilpp volumes starts with the author's childhood it would have been unreasonable to delete the relatively long passages about his childhood and his mother.

<sup>22</sup> Carnap to Feigl, June 14, 1954. ASP RC 102-08-43.

<sup>23</sup> Carnap to Vere Chapell, August 4, 1960. ASP RC 027-03-17.

When he was working on the intellectual autobiography, Carnap was indeed in a project with a lot of technicalities: it was the theory of probability which was his “latest and in his eyes most valuable baby” on which he was working for 30 years.<sup>24</sup> Due to the regular and increasingly grievous pains in his back, Carnap was concerned from time to time about the prospects of his life.<sup>25</sup> Since there was still a lot to do with probability, the writing and shortening of the autobiography were just a liability. In 1956, during the composition of the manuscripts, Carnap fulminated as follows: “For heaven’s sake, a logician should not be asked to write a history or an autobiography, unless he is a genius like Russell!”<sup>26</sup> Later, in 1958, he was still quite desperate: “I am engaged in the somewhat tedious work of working over my ms. for the Schilpp volume; I shall be much relieved once this manuscript is off my hands and I can return to inductive logic.”<sup>27</sup>

Even though Carnap had to work also on the replies, the autobiography was a “bigger chore than the former.”<sup>28</sup> Anyways, if Carnap would have the required time, his memory would function just good as he wished, and he would have enough space for his autobiography, writing that sort of thing would have been still a huge challenge to him. In 1965, he asked Hempel to help him formulate a preface to his *Philosophical Foundations of Physics* (second edition as *Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*). He said: “You know, I am rather clumsy in formulating such things, where the non-cognitive meaning components are more important than the cognitive ones.”<sup>29</sup> The relevant parts of the autobiography, however, were just filled with such non-cognitive passages which could not be formulated in a technical way because they formed the *basis* for all the theoretical projects of Carnap.

Again judging things from this perspective, cutting all the “intimate” parts was just the quickest move to get over the autobiography and move back to the technical projects. Carnap’s correspondence documents quite well that while Schilpp insisted aggressively that he should write first the autobiography, he always tried to delay the

---

<sup>24</sup> Carnap/Ina to Hempel, August 31, 1957. ASP RC 102-13-55. According to the unpublished parts of his autobiography Carnap started to work on the questions of probability between 1941 and 1944. See Carnap 1957, [UCLA] Box 2, CM3, folder M-A5, p. P20.

<sup>25</sup> See for example Carnap’s letter to Bochenski (October 30, 1963) where he was wondering about “how much time one has left [...]” ASP RC 027-23-40.

<sup>26</sup> Carnap to Hempel and Feigl, November 28, 1956. ASP CH 11-02-10.

<sup>27</sup> Carnap to Richard Martin, May 1, 1958, ASP RC 081-12-13. Carnap wrote to Feigl already on the 4th of February, 1955 that “the Schilpp volume is taken far more of my time than I can spare from my work on probability [...]” ASP RC 102-08-26. The same motive occurs in many other letters see e.g. ASP RC 102-08-01; ASP RC 102-07-39; but Carnap complained about it also to Hugues Leblanc, ASP RC 081-10-03.

<sup>28</sup> Carnap to Howard Stein, August 11, 1954. ASP RC 090-13-26.

<sup>29</sup> Carnap to Hempel, November 24, 1965, ASP RC 102-13-05. When Carnap wrote the preface to *Logische Syntax der Sprache*, Neurath helped him with some ‘nice’ formulations. See Neurath’s letter to Carnap, June, 10. 1934. ASP RC 029-10-65.

task: "I have, of course, not only unconscious but also quite conscious resistance against the writing of the autobiography [...]."<sup>30</sup>

One could plausibly claim that omitting the "intimate" parts of the autobiography (and even some first-orderly philosophical parts) set back Carnap's historical rehabilitation for many years. Hempel was very much aware of the problem when he wrote to Ina (after she suggested cutting the personal passages):

Would we not be shocked if there were an autobiography of Kant which had been cut down just to save on publication costs? I sympathize with the feeling and think and you should try how much Schilpp will allow; but I think that some cutting is possible where repetitions or extremely leisurely reflections occur [...]. As for Ina vs. Maria Rbch concerning where the cuts should be made if further reductions are inevitable: On the whole I would agree with Maria Rbch. I think that most of the people who are really interested in the volume will have read a good deal of Carnap's work or will be willing to look into it; and at any rate, those publications are there and available for posterity; but the material about the human side is not available elsewhere and will surely arouse a great deal of interest. (Hempel to Carnap/Ina, May 18, 1957, ASP RC 102-13-57.)

Things were settled, however, and a few years later the intellectual autobiography appeared just as we know it today. Considering things like this, it will matter that we are talking about Carnap: it was Carnap himself, who expressed with his act a certain meaning, namely the intention of avoiding to write an autobiography. It is more than just the fact that a certain theoretical/philosophical commitment surfaces in practice: a certain 'higher strata' of meaning is also *expressed* here intentionally. It is the way how we authentically grasp the conveyed meaning: "just as it was meant by the subject, just as it appeared to him when his consciousness was focused upon it" (Mannheim 1921–22/1959, 46).

The final reason – which I will just mention because it was treated in quite a detailed manner by George Reisch (2005, 2007) – is connected to the political atmosphere of the United States just before and after the Second World War. When Carnap immigrated finally to the U.S. in 1935, he found himself in a wholly different cultural and political context that he experienced earlier in Germany and later in Austria (or in Czechoslovakia). In 1935 (just before he left Europe) Carnap was about to hold a lecture tour in the U.S., especially at the New York University. Nagel was preparing the invitation and he wrote to Sidney Hook to arrange it; later Nagel quoted to Carnap some parts of Hook's letter with his own commentaries:

»Tell Carnap that Universities throughout the U.S are becoming politically more reactionary daily and to exclude from his prospectus anything which some dumb conservative – who 'feel' these things – might regard as cultural Bolshevism. I wish I could get him to NYU for a year, but it doesn't seem possible now and we couldn't pay him enough [...].« In the light of these remarks, perhaps it would be wiser if you replaced the lecture on the relation between contemporary philosophy and culture by something less full of dynamite. (Nagel to Carnap, January 5, 1935. ASP RC 029-05-16.)<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup>Carnap to Feigl, November, 14. 1955. ASP RC 102-08-06. On Schilpp's forceful letters see the correspondence of Carnap and Feigl, ASP RC 102-08-07 and ASP RC 102-08-09.

<sup>31</sup>In turn Ina replied that "[t]hrough the chance of a longer stay there is very little, Carnap is glad that H. knows about him and is also grateful for the advice not to show apparently that he is a

The situation just got worse after the Second World War under the McCarthy-area and so Carnap had to rethink and stow his European socialist and political sensitivity away. As Reisch (2005) showed in his sociology of science book with great clarity, there was only one way to uphold Carnap's admitted professionalism and significance: he had to fall back to the "icy slopes of logic" (Carnap et al. 1929/1973, 317).

If even the mentioning of the relation between culture and philosophy by an allegedly East-European socialist in the mid-1930s was just so dangerous and triggered the concept of "cultural Bolshevism", some parts of his intellectual autobiography could cause a certain philosophical and cultural trauma in the philosophy departments.<sup>32</sup> The earlier phases of the a-political *Jugendbewegung* and the later political phases was uniquely German and considering the fact some members of the movement ended up in either communist or Nazi groups could not help the carefully constructed politically-neutral picture of Carnap. From *this* perspective, cutting the "intimate" parts of the autobiography was perhaps the right move to shorten the manuscripts.

Though Carnap did not even mention or referred to the political atmosphere of the United States, or that he had in mind such reasons to cut the "intimate parts", at this point we are facing the third "strata of meaning", i.e. the documentary-meaning in the Mannheimian sense. Even if Carnap's act points to theoretical commitments, and even if he evidently expressed his disinterest in the autobiography, cutting the politically (possibly) sensitive parts 'unintentionally' *documents* certain trends and the socio-political environment of the 1950s and 1960s.

As Peter Galison (1996, 35) wrote, "[...] people move across oceans with relative ease, complexes of ideas do not." If Carnap would and could publish his intellectual autobiography as he first imagined and wrote it (i.e. if he could 'move' his own *Jugendbeweger* past officially), then perhaps he could have helped the understanding of his ideas and that socio-cultural environment which gave rise to his informal and even technical philosophy.

**Acknowledgement** I would like to thank Christian Damböck and Thomas Uebel that they read the manuscript and provided helpful comments. I am indebted to the Carnap Archives at Los Angeles (Rudolf Carnap papers (Collection 1029). UCLA Library Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library) and at Pittsburgh (Rudolf Carnap Papers, 1905–1970, ASP.1974.01, Special Collections Department, University of Pittsburgh), and to the Hempel Archive also at Pittsburgh (Carl Gustav Hempel Papers, 1903–1997, ASP.1999.01, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, Special Collections Department, University of Pittsburgh.) for the permission to quote the archive materials. All rights reserved. I cite the Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel Archives from Pittsburgh as follows: ASP RC XX-YY-ZZ and ASP CH XX-YY-ZZ, where XX is the box number, YY the folder number, and ZZ the item number; the UCLA archive as Carnap 1957, [UCLA] fol-

---

'Cultur Bolshevist'. But it seems not necessary to replace the lecture-title on the relation between contemporary philosophy and culture by an other, because Carnap may speak about anything under this vague title." Carnap/Ina to Nagel, January 23, 1935. ASP RC 029-05-15. Hook had a quite complex relation to the logical empiricists, see Reisch (2005).

<sup>32</sup>In his personal correspondence Carnap complained a lot about the atmosphere and attitude both of his department at Chicago and about other philosophy departments in the U.S.

lowed by box, folder, and page numbers. Normal underlining in the quotations is made with pencil in the archive materials. The research was supported by the Hungarian National Grant of Excellence.

## Bibliography

- Aufmuth, Ulrich. 1979. *Die deutsche Wandervogelbewegung unter soziologischem Aspekt*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.
- Bias-Engels, Sigrid. 1988. *Zwischen Wandervogel und Wissenschaft: Zur Geschichte von Jugendbewegung und Studentenschaft 1896–1920*. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik.
- Bouveresse, Jacques. 2012. Rudolf Carnap and the Legacy of *Aufklärung*. In *Carnap's Ideal of Explication and Naturalism*, ed. Pierre Wagner, 47–62. Palgrave: Macmillan.
- Carnap, Rudolf. 1934/1937. *Logical Syntax of Language*. Trans. A. Smeathon. London: Kegan Paul Trench.
- . 1963. Intellectual Autobiography. In *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*, ed. Paul A. Schilpp, 3–84. Chicago/LaSalle: Open Court.
- Carnap, Rudolf, Hans Hahn, and Otto Neurath. 1929/1973. Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle. In *Empiricism and Sociology*, ed. Marie Neurath and Robert S. Cohen, 299–318. Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Carus, André. 2007a. *Carnap in Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2007b. Carnap's Intellectual Development. In *The Cambridge Companion to Carnap*, ed. Michael Friedman and Richard Creath, 19–42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Creath, Richard, ed. 1990. *Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine-Carnap Correspondence and Related Work*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . 2007. Vienna, the City of Quine's Dreams. In *The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism*, ed. Alan Richardson and Thomas Uebel, 332–345. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Dahms, Hans-Joachim. 2016. Carnap's Early Conception of a 'System of all Concepts': The Importance of Wilhelm Ostwald. In *Influences on the Aufbau*, ed. Christian Damböck. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Damböck, Christian. 2012. Rudolf Carnap and Wilhelm Dilthey: 'German' Empiricism in the *Aufbau*. In *Rudolf Carnap and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism*, ed. Richard Creath, 67–88. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Demeter, Tamas. 2012. *Weltanschauung* as a Priori: Sociology of Knowledge from a 'Romantic' Stance. *Studies in East European Thought* 64: 39–52.
- Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1968. *Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 8, 4th ed. Stuttgart/Göttingen: B.G. Tuebner/Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Flitner, Wilhelm 1986. *Erinnerungen 1889–1945*, Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 11. Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich: Ferdinand Schöningh.
- Frank, Philipp. 1949. Introduction – Historical Background. In *Modern Science and its Philosophy*, 1–52. New York: George Braziller.
- Gabriel, Gottfried. 2004. Introduction: Carnap Brought Home. In *Carnap Brought Home – The View from Jena*, ed. Steve Awodey and Carsten Klein, 3–23. Chicago/LaSalle: Open Court Publishing.
- Galison, Peter. 1996. Constructing Modernism: The Cultural Location of *Aufbau*. In *Origins of Logical Empiricism*, ed. Ronald Giere and Alan Richardson, 17–44. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

- Haller, Rudolf, and Heiner Rutte. 1977. Gespräch mit Heinrich Neider: Persönliche Erinnerungen an den Wiener Kreis. *Conceptus* 1: 21–42.
- Jeffrey, Richard. 1994. Carnap's Voluntarism. In *Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science IX*, ed. Brian Skyrms, Dag Prawitz and Dag Westerståhl, 847–866. Elsevier: Amsterdam.
- Kamlah, Andreas. 2013. Everybody Has the Right to Do What He Wants: Hans Reichenbach's Voluntarism and Its Historical Roots. In *The Berlin Group and the Philosophy of Logical Empiricism*, ed. Nikolay Milkov and Volker Peckhaus, 151–175. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Landauer, Carl. 1978. Memories of Hans Reichenbach. University Student: Carl Landauer. In *Hans Reichenbach: Selected Writings: 1909–1953*, ed. Maria Reichenbach and Robert S. Cohen, vol. 1, 25–31. Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Laquer, Walter Z. 1962. *Young Germany. A History of the German Youth Movement*. New York: Basic Book Publishing Co., Inc.
- Mannheim, Karl. 1921–22/1959. On the Interpretation of *Weltanschauung*. In *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. Paul Kecskemeti, 33–83. London: Routledge/Kegan Paul.
- Messer, August. 1924. *Die freideutsche Jugendbewegung: Ihr Verlauf von 1913 bis 1922*. Langensalza: Beyer.
- Quine, Willard van Orman. 1971. Homage to Rudolf Carnap. In *PSA 1970. In Memory of Rudolf Carnap*, ed. Roger C. Buck and Robert S. Cohen, xxii–xxxv. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing.
- Reisch, George. 2005. How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science. In *To the Icy Slopes of Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2007. From 'the Life of the Present' to the 'Icy Slopes of Logic': Logical Empiricism, the Unity of Science Movement, and the Cold War. In *The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism*, ed. Alan Richardson and Thomas Uebel, 58–87. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Tuboly, Adam Tamas. forthcoming. From the Jugendbewegung to the Vienna Circle: Carnap's Cooperation with Hans Freyer. Forthcoming manuscript.
- Uebel, Thomas. 2003. Philipp Frank's History of the Vienna Circle: A Programmatic Retrospective. In *Logical Empiricism in North America*, ed. Gary Hardcastle and Alan Richardson, 149–169. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Werner, Meike G. 2003. Moderne in der Provinz. In *Kulturelle Experimente im Fin de Siècle Jena*. Göttingen: Wallstein.