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“If You Come to Hungary . . .”: Folklore, Digital Media, and European Migrant/Refugee Crisis

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It is a complicated question in the twenty-first century as to what should be considered folklore.¹ Certainly, there continues to be a multitude of offline forms of folklore, and it is not entirely clear yet what or how online forms should be studied or analyzed. However, it is also clear that in the contemporary period, folklorists cannot ignore the effects of digital technology on everyday culture. Even without yet reaching a conclusion about the nature of folklore in digital environments, folklorists should begin studying digital culture using the tools that we have developed over the long history of our discipline. In doing so, we can, as I aim to do in this chapter, test the limits of our current understandings of folklore, in order to develop a better understanding of how present-day folklore is created, varies, and spread.

In order to do so, this chapter will display and analyze the Hungarian political response to the European migrant crisis, which began in 2015 and has increased in size and severity since then. Within the context of this larger political response, this study brings to bear the tools of folkloristics to analyze internet meme variations related to an anti-migrant billboard campaign.

In my definition, the term “internet meme” refers to a method of mediation. As not only folklore products fall in this category, therefore, it may not be a proper term to denote all the folklore transmitted digitally. However, it can be a useful term to label some certain visual expressions as a subset of folklore. Main characteristics of them are the repetition and variation that occur in a folkloric way in computer-mediated contexts. The meme variations I investigated were recorded in digital spaces, primary,

social, or microblog sites such as Facebook or Tumblr, and also on some other internet news sites and blogs.

THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH

Web 2.0 is the collective name of a group of internet applications that promote simultaneous media production and consumption, and allows users to easily edit and share content with one another. This phenomenon was first identified by the American futurist Alvin Toffler (1980) who predicted the blurring of the roles of consumers and producers and coined the expression “prosumer” (producer + consumer).² In these types of interactions, the consumer plays an active role in the process of creating information. This is the characteristic that makes the internet suitable to be researched as a field site: it is a site of cultural production. Yet, today the internet is not so much a parallel world, as it has been thought of in the past, as part of our everyday life.³ In recent years, more and more scholars have been dealing systematically with developing the theoretical basis for internet ethnography, including studies from specifically anthropological or folkloristic perspectives.⁴ The majority of these researchers now agree that written culture in the digital technological age should be studied as parallel to oral tradition. In other words, because of features such as interactivity and synchronicity, works of (written) digital folklore are closer to oral tradition than to traditional written records.⁵

Traditional folklore genres are present on the internet, but at the same time the unique environments online have created new forms of folklore, as a result of new conditions such as the availability of easy visual effect creation and editing, as well as the ease of circulation through e-mail and social media. Compared to the traditional folklore genres, spread mainly through word of mouth, the dynamics of these phenomena have radically changed due to their unique media environments and their rapid transmission. The time dimension of tradition is necessarily redefined in the digital field. “Face-to-face” exchange of information has been replaced with “person-to-person” communication. As a result, the lifecycle of particular phenomena has been shortened, and the circle of producers and users/participants in the tradition has become wider.

Why should these digital products be considered folklore? The authors of folklore works spreading on the internet are unknown. These works are passed on from user to user; they use traditional elements and traditionalized structures or formula, but can also be varied quickly and easily. Therefore, this material, like offline folklore, is largely divorced from a specific creator, makes use of patterned form, is passed from person to person, and displays variation.⁶ A characteristic feature of internet folklore, then, is that it is able to rapidly respond to the issues of concern to the community that produces it.

As is natural in the case of the study of a new phenomenon, however, a methodology for collecting online folklore has not been fully elaborated yet. The methodological expectations worked out for traditional collection in offline settings cannot be fully applied in the changed conditions of collection. The question also arises whether the information collected in the virtual field can be considered reliable in the same way that offline material can. The meaning of authenticity during collecting digital folklore becomes doubtful, which has to be decided separately in each case.

Rejecting the interpretation of folklore as opposed to technology, Alan Dundes argued more than 30 years ago that modern technological change did not destroy folklore, but instead allowed it to be more easily created and spread.⁷ Linda Dégh, drawing on the research of Rudolf Schenda, went a step further in her call in the book *American Folklore and the Mass Media* for folklorists to begin their work from the assumption that mass media is an important element in maintaining folklore.⁸

Similarly, Trevor Blank's work suggests that, rather than distinguishing oral and digital folklore, we should acknowledge the continuity of folklore as it moves through different communicative media, as his studies of jokes demonstrate, from oral tellings to photocopied variants to e-mail forward and other forms of online humor. Given the pervasiveness of the internet in everyday life, the study internet folklore can no longer be separated from the offline study of folklore.⁹ Moreover, internet culture increasingly both responds to and affects offline actions and situations.¹⁰

THE EUROPEAN MIGRATION CRISIS

In recent years, the number of asylum seekers arriving in the European Union has increased dramatically. According to the official statistics of the European Union, in 2015 nearly 1.3 million refugees came into EU countries, mainly from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq.¹¹ According to the statistical data of the Hungarian Office of Immigration and Nationality, the number of registered asylum seekers has risen considerably in Hungary in recent years, in accordance with the international trends. In 2012, there were 2,157 asylum seekers, in 2013 18,900, in 2014 42,777, and by 2015 177,135. In 2015, 85 percent of those seeking asylum came from outside Europe.¹² As a member state of the European Union and a signatory of the Schengen Treaty, Hungary is required to abolish border control for those moving between member states, but tighten security for those coming from outside states. Of the increase since 2012, most has come from the migrants flooding out of Syria in the wake of the 2011 civil war in that country.¹³ Those fleeing the war reached 4 million in 2015 and almost 5 million by May 2016, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.¹⁴ Refugees coming from regions other than Syria, in the Middle East, Africa, the Balkans, and Central Asia, come for a

variety of reasons, including military conflicts, civil war, a rise in population, global warming, and unemployment. This dramatic rise in recent years was a shock to Hungarian society, since previously Hungary, unlike the wealthier Western and Northern European countries, had not been a significant destination for migrants. While the issue of migration became prominent in the political communication in Hungary in 2015, it should be noted that the main target countries of these migrants are still in Northern and Western Europe where the more developed economies offer more favorable employment conditions and where networks of migration have previously been established. By contrast, the majority of migrants coming to Hungary consider it a stopover rather than a final destination.

THE BILLBOARD CAMPAIGN

Historically speaking, the enforcement of political interests has often generated folklore.¹⁵ Besides spontaneously created folklore, the systematic repurposing of folk materials for present political purposes has played an important role in the various political campaigns, for instance in the case of canvassing songs where up-to-date lyrics are attached to popular tunes. The development of digital technologies and their mass use has more recently made it possible for political folklore to be mediated through text messages (SMS, Short Message Services), multimedia messages (MMS, Multimedia Messaging Services), e-mails, internet forums, blogs, and social media.¹⁶ Besides the former textual genres, in recent years visual and even audio-visual genres have become increasingly common.

Since 2010 in Hungary, the conservative-civil democratic Fidesz party and its current Prime Minister Viktor Orbán have been governing the country in a coalition with the Christian Democratic People's Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt). National sovereignty is a central element of the politics of this government. Following the terrorist attack against the French satirical newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* in 2015 in Paris, immigration has become a high-profile issue in the discourse of the Hungarian government. The government's "National Consultation" (Nemzeti konzultáció) campaign, launched in the spring of 2015, sought to engage the public in a discussion of the appropriate level of strictness in the regulation of migrants and refugees. The main political theme of the campaign was the terrorist threat posed by these migrants.

For example, a 12-question survey distributed as part of the campaign contained a number of questions that directly connected migration with terrorism, thus stigmatizing all migrants. Moreover, some of the questions suggested that the migrants had come to Hungary to take Hungarian people's jobs. These strongly suggestive questions were widely criticized both in Hungary and abroad.¹⁷ Out of the nearly 8 million questionnaires distributed, around 1.3 million were returned complete.

This questionnaire was more a piece political propaganda than a genuine attempt to read or engage with the will of the people.¹⁸ Despite the relatively few questionnaires sent back, the consultation was considered a success by the government, who interpreted the results as a justification to tighten immigration and refugee controls. For example, the government instituted stricter punishments for human smugglers, created a stronger border patrol, and accelerated both processing and deportation procedures for asylum seekers. At the same time, to stop illegal border crossing, a temporary border fence was built in the south of Hungary along the Hungarian-Serbian and the Hungarian-Croatian borders.

The anti-migrant policy of the government seems to have contributed to an increasing xenophobia in Hungarian society in recent years, which reached a peak among the adult population in the spring of 2015, according to research conducted by the country's social scientific institutions.¹⁹ On top of that, the clearly anti-migrant policy of the government boosted the government's popularity in Hungary.

In one of its most spectacular attempts to use political propaganda, in early summer 2015, the government planned to launch an anti-migrant billboard campaign along roads and in public places. When these plans were reported on June 2, 2015, by an internet news site, several Hungarian parties protested.²⁰

One of these protesting political organizations, the Democratic Coalition, created a “meme” image to convey its opposition to this government policy. On June 7, the party posted to its Facebook page an image of a placard reading: “If you come to Hungary, you must know: the people in this country are not identical to its government, we don't hate anyone, we help those in need even if our situation is not easy either.” This post was liked by nearly 2,000 and was shared by 1,675.²¹ Responding to the news of the billboard campaign, the Együtt (Together) Party denounced the government messages and organized a movement to tear up or deface the xenophobic posters, an effort that resulted in humorous inscriptions being scrawled across the government posters. Similarly, an opposition news portal called 444.hu asked internet users to produce images for counter-placards, parodying the style of the official ones. An application was created for this, and users had only to click on a picture visually similar to the official one and add their own inscription. Hundreds of counter-placards were made and circulated on the various websites.²²

POLITICAL INTERNET MEMES AS FOLKLORE VARIANTS

On the one hand, the internet is part of our everyday vernacular life, and on the other hand, it is an effective means of exerting political influence and control.²³ Digital media such as campaign e-mails, videos,

and blogs posts constitute a vital field of political communication in the twenty-first century, and online political activity has increased in the digital age.²⁴ In addition to official communication, the folklore of political campaigns is also transmitted through the internet and cell phones.

Hungarian political folklore, which mainly flourishes during the elections, has been analyzed by many researchers in recent years. During the 2002 elections, folklore transmitted via SMS was a new phenomenon,²⁵ and during the next elections, pictures edited with Photoshop also became prominent.²⁶ The 2010 elections saw the active use of social media, which was a new phenomenon.²⁷ The 2014 Hungarian and European parliamentary elections generated a huge number of political memes, circulated on social sites and blogs.²⁸

The term “meme” was coined by evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins to mean a small, self-replicating cultural unit coded to imitate.²⁹ Research into memes, or “memetics,” has been on the rise since the late 1990s, especially in the context of the study of digital folklore.³⁰

In her work, “Memes in Digital Culture,” for example, Limor Shifman writes that internet memes can be considered folklore because they transmit norms and values.³¹ In most usages of the term in folklore study, “meme” also seems to refer primarily to a method of transmission, a way in which online material is transmitted from one user to another.³² According to Kalevi Kull’s interpretation, which compares memetics to semiotics, the concept of meme should be considered a simplified sign, where attention is focused on one aspect of the phenomenon: transmission.³³

However, I would argue that it is necessary for variation to occur for a “meme” to be considered folklore. Memes are not synonymous with folklore. They can be folk products, and also can be any widely circulated fashionable phenomenon. Monica Foote has persuasively argued that folklorists should apply the insights of memetics in folklore studies, on the basis that folklore is always constituted by memes, even if not all memes should be considered folklore.³⁴

Memes have been a part of the online political culture in Hungary for over a decade. First only in static form, later as animated files, and since the time of the 2009 parliamentary elections in video forms, such as parodies of campaign videos.³⁵ Memes with political content play a vital role during campaigns, responding to the personalities, rhetoric, and actions of politicians, expressing support or criticism through humor and irony, often by manipulating and circulating digital images. Memes make it possible for a bigger audience to participate in politics, although it seems likely that some political memes are the result of the institutional forces of the political parties, rather than the voices of everyday people.

THE “IF YOU COME TO HUNGARY . . .”-MEME TYPE

The basic approach of this chapter is to study political memes as folkloric variants. Based on my research, I have found that these textual or partly textual materials display clear continuities with traditional genres (e.g., canvas song, motto, joke) and are also transmitted in a manner that is clearly folkloric. For these reasons, I argue that these phenomena can be described and interpreted using the basic concepts of folkloristics, such as variant, variation, and tradition. A variant or the technical equipment that convey folklore can be short-lived or even the event which the texts and pictures respond to can be forgotten quickly. Nonetheless, certain elements, plots, pictures and figures of speech, and even patterns and techniques of tradition keep appearing from time to time, regardless of the medium or the content. It is important to highlight that the phenomena documented here constitute part of a tradition, these phenomena that cannot be interpreted on their own; they are elements in a chain of tradition that can appear in oral, textual, visual, or audiovisual forms.³⁶

In early June 2015, the billboards put up by the Hungarian government along the roads and public places displayed anti-migrant messages. Earlier, similar billboards were displayed in the streets in other European countries as well. It is possible that the Hungarian billboards were based on the message of a billboard placed by the Social-Democratic Party during the 2015 election campaign in Denmark: “If you come to Denmark, you should work.”³⁷ The billboards placed by the Hungarian government were in Hungarian language, which suggests perhaps that these messages were not really as much an admonition to new immigrants as a political message addressed to Hungarian citizens. The billboards triggered lively online responses in the first few weeks after they appeared. As part of these responses, many internet users modified the original billboards digitally transforming them into memes. The often satirical variations on the government images were spread on various community sites around the web.

The original billboards were visually quite simple in composition. The Hungarian coat of arms appears above the inscription “National consultation on immigration and terrorism.” In the middle, in white letters against a blue background, one of the three messages is displayed:

“If you come to Hungary, you cannot take Hungarian people’s jobs!”
 “If you come to Hungary, you must respect our culture!”
 “If you come to Hungary, you have to keep our laws!”

This didactic visual composition centers attention on the textual message of the billboard. But it is also their simplicity that perhaps made these images so easy to parody as memes. In most cases, the online versions of the meme



“If you come to Hungary, you cannot take Hungarian people’s jobs! National consultation on immigration and terrorism.” (Official billboard)

type “If you come to Hungary . . .” only modified the inscriptions in the original image, leaving all other elements unchanged.

The recognition of the important role that news of current social, cultural, and political events play in generating folklore has led folklorist and journalist Russell Frank to define “newslore” as a separate area of folklore research.³⁸ According to Frank, newslore is a collective term for a variety of folklore genres that are transmitted orally, in writing, and through electronic channels. Newslore is both a sensitive social response to current news and a kind of, mainly humorous, criticism of the events described. To interpret it, therefore, it is necessary to describe the medium in which a particular message is transmitted, and the analysis of its context must also take into account the news that led to the newslore’s creation.

Using this approach, I should first point out that the “If you come to Hungary . . .” memes were responding to a variety of contemporary issues in Hungary, including the government or the personality of the prime minister, unemployment, corruption, and a number of controversial governmental decisions, such as the closure of shops on Sunday. In terms of transmission, the memes also appeared in online meme collections gathered by several journalists around June 2015. These collections appeared in online newspaper articles and represent another significant way that many Hungarian people became familiar with variants of “If you come to Hungary . . .” memes, and so undoubtedly played a role in subsequent transmission.³⁹ In the following sections, I would like to present some examples of the “folklorization” of the memes created in response to the 2015 anti-migrant billboard campaign in Hungary through an analysis of their content and form.⁴⁰

While I was collecting, I came across more than a hundred versions of this type, so my selection here was aimed to show the most common textual variants. I tried to follow particular billboard parodies from their birth (when they first appeared) so I can give a more detailed picture of the creation, variation, and propagation of today’s folklore. Certain counter-billboard variants appeared both in the digital online world and offline, affecting one another.

If You Are the Prime Minister of Hungary . . .

Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, has been playing an important role in the political life in Hungary for a quarter of a century. He is one of the founders of the Fidesz party, and a member of parliament since 1990. He served as president of the party between 1993 and 2000, and since 2003. From 1998 to 2002, and since 2010, he has served as prime minister. Because of his high-profile positions and his strong personality, Orbán has been the subject of a wide variety of political folklore.⁴¹ Unsurprisingly, then, some of the “If you come to Hungary . . .” meme variants were aimed at the personality of the prime minister. For example, one of the government’s most well-known initiatives is to develop sports facilities, especially soccer stadiums. Sport plays an important role in fostering community and boosting Hungarian national identity. On top of that, earlier in the twentieth century (from the 1930s to the 1960s) the Hungarian national soccer team was considered internationally successful.⁴² On the other hand, the results of the national team and symbolically the sports facilities are demonstrations of political power.⁴³ Within this context, the Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party (MKKP),⁴⁴ a joke political party, created the meme “If you are the Prime Minister of Hungary, you can build stadiums from public funds,”⁴⁵ it is widely known that Viktor Orbán’s favorite sport is soccer. Many consider building expensive stadiums to be a waste of taxpayer money. Similarly, the Facebook group Government Overthrowing Demonstration, with more than 15,000 followers, also criticized the soccer stadium building scheme on June 8.. Posted in this group was the following variant: “If you are the Prime Minister of Hungary, you should spend the money of the state on culture, education and health care and not on your soccer mania!”⁴⁶


Picking up on a similar line of criticism, another user, Sz. Zs., posted on his Facebook site: “If you govern Hungary, spend the money on hospitals instead of billboards.”⁴⁷ A user called “huschampo” posted a variant on the microblogging site Tumblr: “If you come to Hungary, a 5 occasion pass for Pancho Aréna is 3000 HUF (10 EURO).” Pancho Aréna is a 3,500-seat soccer stadium named after Ferenc Puskás, which was built in 2014 in Felcsút (Fejér County), Orbán’s hometown, where only 1,800 people actually

live.⁴⁸ User G. G. posted the same meme to Facebook with the comment “In Felcsút there are one too many stadiums” and a call to place the placard should in Orbán’s village.⁴⁹

In Felcsút, a lot of infrastructure has been developed in recent years, besides the soccer stadium. For instance, the construction of a train line, which cost billions to build, triggered nationwide outrage, as only a few hundred people in the area actually use public transport on a daily basis. Referencing this controversy, a user called G. Sz. G. posted a meme variant on Facebook: “If you come to Hungary and you cannot play soccer, you should know how to drive a mini train. That’s the boss’s other mania!”⁵⁰

A user called T. G. on Tumblr created an archive called “National Insult”⁵¹ at the beginning of the summer of 2015, on which billboard meme variants were collected. These included the meme: “A stadium for each village.”⁵² This variant evoked a medieval law by Stephen I (King Saint Stephen, the founder of Hungary) who ordered the building of one church for every 10 villages at the beginning of the eleventh century. In another instance, the Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party (MKKP) not only published memes but also cooperated with the blog “Vastagbőr (Thick skin)” to organize a counter-billboard campaign.⁵³ The campaign did not focus on protecting the rights of the refugees, but rather on the offensiveness of the government using public funds to dictate who should be included and excluded from the country. The MKKP and Vastagbőr intended to produce counter-billboards, converting the most popular meme parodies into offline physical forms. Their fundraising for this counter-billboard action was so successful that billboards with 23 different inscriptions were put up in 900 locations! Two unique billboards were also produced, one was displayed in Felcsút and the other in Vienna (Austria). The organization held a vote among its followers on the Facebook to decide which meme variant should be displayed on the billboard in Felcsút. The inscription “If you are the Prime Minister of Hungary, you should keep our laws!” won and was displayed in Orbán’s hometown⁵⁴ along with an English language version reading “Sorry about our prime minister.”⁵⁵

Following a similar line of humor, the Facebook community “One million people for the freedom of press” posted: “If you come to Hungary, could you bring a sane prime minister?” This variant later appeared as a physical billboard as well, in 13 locations around the Hungarian town (Szombathely), funded by the local office of a leftist opposition party, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP).⁵⁶ Another text variant of this meme found its way to “Mémgenerátor,” a website specializing in memes: “If you come to Hungary, bring a reasonable prime minister!”⁵⁷ This line of meme variation did not actually focus on the refugees problem itself but rather on internal political affairs, criticizing some of the most expensive investments of the government.



“Sorry about our prime minister.” (Hungarian Two Tailed Dog Party/Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt and Vastagbőr blog, counter-billboard)

You Cannot Take Away Hungarian People’s Jobs!

One of the basic freedoms of the European Union is the free flow of workforces across national borders. Since Hungary joined the European Union in 2004, the emigration of Hungarians has increased, mostly for the purpose of seeking jobs. Since the beginning of the economic depression in 2008, the emigration has increased further, with the most popular destinations being Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom, respectively. Around 300,000 Hungarian migrants live the United Kingdom currently, more than the population of Debrecen, the second biggest Hungarian city, a fact which has even given rise to an oral joke (Which is the second biggest Hungarian town? London.)

At the same time, about 100,000 foreign migrants have come to live and work in Hungary.⁵⁸ Analyses of effects of immigration on the Hungarian labor market usually come to the conclusion that the negative effects of immigration have historically only mattered in the short run, and even then only to a limited degree. In the long run, immigration has tended to have more positive effects (e.g., pay standards rise in the target country) as the skills of native-born and immigrant employees tend not to overlap.⁵⁹

The current unemployment rate in Hungary is around 6 percent, which is average in the region.⁶⁰ The present migrant crisis has not exacerbated unemployment, as most refugees have come to Hungary only as a waypoint to a final destination. In this context, the Hungarian government’s anti-migrant rhetoric is even stranger, since it was mainly based on the threat foreigners pose to the labor market, as in: “If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away the Hungarian people’s jobs!”

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Moreover, it is equally strange that other major recurring elements in the anti-migrant campaign are the public expenses caused by migration and terrorism. While both of these issues have been significant problems in other parts of Europe, they have not had a major impact in Hungary, at least presently.

Ironically linking the government's opposition to non-Hungarian migrants with the reality of Hungarian migrants to other countries, the Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party posted the following variant: "You can come to Hungary, we already work in London."⁶¹ This slogan appeared in other versions as well: "If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away the jobs of Hungarian people, they already work in London."⁶²

Another similar variant linked this theme directly to the Hungarian political and labor situation: "If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away the Hungarian people's jobs! They have already been taken away by Fidesz!"⁶³

Another text, also created by completing the original inscription, from the site called "Mémgyár" (Meme Factory) reads: "If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away the Hungarian people's jobs as they don't have any! National consultation on unemployment."⁶⁴ A user on Tumblr posted: "If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away the ... er ... so if there were



"If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away the Hungarian people's jobs! They have already been taken away by Fidesz!" (Facebook-meme, posted by the Hungarian Socialist Party)

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any jobs available, it wouldn't be yours!”⁶⁵ Other users came up with different versions when they completed the text with only one word, changing its message in a funny way: “If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away the Hungarian people's *community* work.”⁶⁶

Referring to the contradictory themes in the government campaign, which expressed concern about jobs and migrants on the one hand, and the stress unemployed migrants could put on the Hungarian social system on the other, a user called “diogens 1001” posted the following variant on Tumblr: “The immigrants take away our jobs and do not work.”⁶⁷ The same text with a different word order appeared on two other sites as well: “The immigrants don't work and take away our jobs!”⁶⁸ This slogan, using the word “refugees” instead of “immigrants,” and without a picture, was posted as a comment on the Facebook site of MKKP.⁶⁹

“If you come to Hungary, then take some jobs with you as there are none here! International Insultation.”⁷⁰ This meme was posted by a Tumblr user called T. G. on his/her site “counter billboard.” Again humorously referencing Hungarian migration, a user called “cookkapitany” posted: “Government Information. If you go to England, you cannot take away the jobs of the English!”⁷¹ Another counter-billboard of the Szombathely office of the opposition party MSZP had another counter anti-migrant billboard that referred to the government's propaganda “poll”: “If you live in Hungary, fill in a national consultation questionnaire before going to Austria to work . . . please!”⁷² A meme image showing a paper plane made from the questionnaire was also posted on the Facebook community “One hundred thousand against the internet tax.”⁷³

In spite of the government's point of view, these meme-makers see no reason to be afraid that migrants will take away their jobs. In these variants, while serious social problems such as unemployment and emigration from Hungary are humorously evoked, they are not linked to the present migrant crisis.

If You Come to Hungary, Bring Diagonal Pliers!

Claiming pressure from migrants on its southern edge, the Hungarian government erected a four-meter high razor wire fence along the Serbian-Hungarian and the Croatian-Hungarian borders in the summer of 2015. This event served as a new stimulus for those internet users who produced memes as a counter to the government billboard campaign. A variant called “If you come to Hungary, bring a pair of diagonal pliers” was posted on the Facebook site of “HírCsárda,” a fake news portal on June 17.⁷⁴ The variant “If you come to Hungary, bring a four-meter high ladder!” was posted by E. J. on Facebook shortly thereafter,⁷⁵ followed by “If you come to Hungary, you should step higher than four meters.” This meme was published

together with some others in a meme collection on Facebook in the online issue of *Népszabadság*, the largest circulating Hungarian daily paper. The following variants were among the selected pictures: “If you come to Hungary, learn to climb walls!” “If you come to Hungary, you won’t come to Hungary.” Some memes used the shocking visual effect the pictures of the wire fence had: on one of them the wire fence can be seen in the background with the inscription: “You are busted, can’t even come in!” Another meme expresses the same even more simply, as the picture showing a section of a barbed wire was placed before the headline and the blue background of the government billboard.⁷⁶

Corruption

A characteristic of critical political commentary from opposition parties in Hungary is talk about the corruption of the government, as well as politicians and political parties more generally. Some of the billboard variations posted by the Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party on Facebook refer to this: “Welcome to Kickbackwood!” and “We know that you steal.”⁷⁷

“If you come to Hungary, even your underwear will be stolen by the government!”⁷⁸

A widely circulated variant refers to Lőrinc Mészáros, the mayor of Felcsút, who used to be a gas fitter and has become one of the richest people in the country in the recent years. His sudden rise is often explained by his political ties. Thus, a meme posted on Tumblr commented: “If you come to Felcsút, you cannot take away the gas fitters’ jobs.”⁷⁹ A more general variant about political corruption, posted on Tumblr on the site of a user called “zebrazoly,” read: “While we are stealing, you can care about the billboards!”⁸⁰ Other variants included:

“If you are a politician, you should keep our laws!”

“If you are a politician, you should respect our culture!”

“If you are a politician, you cannot take away Hungarian people’s jobs.”⁸¹

These meme variants of the xenophobic billboard campaign were so popular in the summer of 2015 in Hungary that journalists began using them as illustrations or creating new ones for newspaper articles. Furthermore, in some cases, oral jokes became interwoven with meme variants, such as: “If you come to Hungary, don’t steal! The government doesn’t tolerate any competition!”⁸² This joke was transmitted not only orally but also via the text message (SMS), proving that a folklore text can thrive in a new digital medium.⁸³ It is not clear whether the picture based on the joke from folklore was created by the journalist or the meme was only used for his/her article.

In this case, it can clearly be seen how blurry the dividing line is between official, controlled products and spontaneous folkloric creations. As we have seen, certain websites provide the internet users with thousands of folklore texts and pictures. These online folklore collections are considerable. In one sense, they represent archives (not repertoires), compiled by outsiders as the collections of striking or interesting material from different folklore genres (e.g., riddles and mainly jokes). Yet these materials also find their way back to the users, who select from these archives material to recirculate or repurpose in new creations. Hundreds of thousands of folklore texts are available in these online archives, which are recirculated and repurposed online, between oral and written channels and between professional and vernacular agents.⁸⁴

Sunday Closed

At the end of 2014, the Hungarian parliament passed a law, proposed by a smaller Christian party that is part of the governing coalition, mandating the Sunday closure of shops. The majority of the population protested the law, which has since been revoked by referendum. But at the time of the anti-migrant billboard campaign, the law prescribing Sunday closure was still in effect, giving rise to meme variants. The next meme was posted on Tumblr: “If you come to Hungary, don’t forget to do your shopping on Saturday.”⁸⁵ A slightly modified version of the same meme was sent to the meme making grant of the news portal called 444.hu:

“If you come to Hungary, don’t forget to do your shopping on Saturday! National consultation on immigration and shopping!”⁸⁶ and also here: “If you come to Hungary, don’t come on Sunday!”⁸⁷

Although the majority of the “If you come to Hungary” memes can be interpreted as a spontaneous reaction to a well-constructed political campaign, not all variants have political messages. These memes are usually characterized by metacommentary or by references to popular culture or to absurd or obscene material. For example, a user “szarvas” posted a “meta-meme”⁸⁸ referring to the billboard parodies on Tumblr: “If you come to Hungary, you will have to make such memes!”⁸⁹

Other memes employed humor for its own sake, rather than as a political or social commentary, such as “If you come to Hungary, you will be in Hungary!,” “If you come to Hungary, eat Túrórudit!,” or “If you come to Hungary, you should try chicken stew with dumplings, because it is good!”⁹⁰ Finally, some memes made ironic reference to the ethnic stereotype of welcoming Hungarians: “If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away the hearty welcome of the Hungarians!”⁹¹

SUMMARY

Alan Dundes questioned the interpretation of folklore as a phenomenon that is the opposite of technology. More than three decades ago he argued that technological advancement does not eliminate but rather induces the creation and the spreading of folklore.⁹² In this chapter, I have analyzed how digital folklore can serve as a vernacular response to a significant social problem: the European migrant crisis. Besides the vernacular, spontaneous folklore variants, however, one also has to analyze the institutional creations, particularly related to a political campaign like the National Consultation on immigrants. Institutional responses built on well-known folklore schemes and certain folklore texts, which in turn had an effect on vernacular agents, as I have shown.

The anti-migrant billboard campaign of the Hungarian government, ironically, turned out to be an internal political affair rather than one aimed at migrants. The simplification of the migrant issue, which is complicated in terms of economy, society, and culture, in the government's communication served the purpose of shaping the public discussion of the issue. In this chapter, however, I interpreted the semi-official and folkloristic "If you come to Hungary . . ." type meme and counter-billboard variants as a thematic group of digital folklore. Billboards were made of memes, and the parodies displayed on billboards resulted in new digital versions. The popularity of the "If you come to Hungary . . ." meme also led several organizations (parties, joke parties, internet news portals) to organize counter-billboard actions. Dividing lines were crossed during the counter-campaign not just in terms of online/offline and political and not political dimensions but also in terms of transmission: the billboard parodies coming from community sites, micro-blogs, amateur meme collections, and professional newspaper articles reporting on the government were transmitted in all directions. This blurriness of production between institutional and vernacular agents and between various online and offline media seems to be a special characteristic of folklore in digital age.

In digital spaces, visual and textual folklore can be transmitted in seconds, much faster than the speed of offline, often oral, transmission. Because online contents can be accessed faster and by more users, they are incorporated faster into the knowledge of the community. But the sets of processes presented here occurred in stages. The creation and the transmission of folklorized billboard parodies were most intensive in the 10–14 days after the government's campaign was announced. At the same time, the meme-type images functioned much longer than two weeks. A year after the beginning of the campaign, on June 4, 2016, on the Facebook site "One million people for the freedom of press" posted a new version, responding to a new topic of political news: black market cars bought from Russia. The meme read "If you come to Hungary, buy

an underground refurbished [car] at a fucking exorbitant price from the Russians!”⁹³ This variant shows that the meme type has not been forgotten in the past year and it can still be activated at any time in the public consciousness. It also proves that, however fleeting certain text variants can be, the scheme on which the folklorization of the billboard versions relies is more stable and durable than any particular variant

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I wish to acknowledge Katalin Vargha (HAS) for her help in thinking about the phenomena and characteristics of digital folklore.

NOTES

1. The bibliography written by Mikhail Alekseevsky is often referred to in international forums, which lists nearly 500 English and Russian works in the topics of internet and folklore and internet anthropology: <http://mdalekseevsky.narod.ru/biblio-internet.html>. Further detailed bibliographies can be found in the following works: J. Blank Trevor, ed., *Folklore and the Internet: Vernacular Expression in a Digital World* (Logan: Utah State University Press, 2009) and Trevor J. Blank, ed., *Folk Culture in the Digital Age: The Emergent Dynamics of Human Interaction* (Logan: Utah State University Press, 2012).

2. Toffler here refers generally to the future change of the system of production and consumption of industrial age by electronic technology.

3. Sam Hinton and Larissa Hjorth, *Understanding Social Media* (London: Sage, 2013), 7.

4. Daniel Miller and Don Slater, *The Internet: An Ethnographic Approach* (Oxford: Berg); Christine Hine, *Virtual Ethnography* (London: Sage, 2001); Christine Hine, ed., *Virtual Methods: Issues in Social Research on the Internet* (New York: Berg, 2005); Christine Hine, *Ethnography for the Internet: Embedded, Embodied and Everyday* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015); Daniel Miller, *Tales from Facebook* (Cambridge: Polity, 2011); Natalie M. Underberg and Elayne Zorn, *Digital Ethnography: Anthropology, Narrative and New Media* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014); Ilona Folklor Nagy, “in statu nascendi.” Magyar választások 2002-ben. In *Mindenek gyűjtemény I. Tanulmányok Küllős Imola 60. születésnapjára*, ed. Csörsz Rumen István (Artes Populares 21.) (Budapest: ELTE BTK Folklore Tanszék, 2005), 465–71; Mariann Domokos, “Towards Methodological Issues in Electronic Folklore,” *Slovenský Národopis* 62, no. 2 (2014): 283–95; Katalin Vargha, “Digital Folkloristics,” *Ethnographia* (2016) (forthcoming). Unpublished paper.

5. John Miles Foley, *Oral Tradition and the Internet: Pathways of the Mind* (Urbana, Chicago, Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 2012).

6. This last feature may be the most important. Folklorist Linda Dégh’s analysis of folklore and the mass media seems to hold true for digital folklore as well. Dégh argues that the existence of variation is the most important criterion in defining folklore (Linda Dégh, *American Folklore and the Mass Media* [Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994], 33).

7. Alan Dundes, “Who Are the Folk?” in *Interpreting Folklore*, ed. Alan Dundes (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 1–19, 17.

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8. Dégh, *American Folklore and the Mass Media*.
9. Trevor J. Blank, "Examining the Transmission of Urban Legends: Making the Case for Folklore Fieldwork on the Internet," *Folklore Forum* 37, no. 1 (2007): 15–26, 22.
10. Christie Davies, "Jokes that Follow Mass-Mediated Disasters in a Global Electronic Age," in *Of Corpse: Death and Humor in Folklore and Popular Culture*, ed. Peter Narváez (Logan: Utah State University Press, 2003), 15–34; Trevor J. Blank, *The Last Laugh: Folk Humor, Celebrity Culture, and Mass-Mediated Disasters in the Digital Age* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 2013).
11. Eurostat, the statistical office of the EU. Asylum statistics: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics (May 20, 2016).
12. The statistical report of the Office of Immigration and Nationality 2014–2015. http://www.bmbah.hu/jomla/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=177&Itemid=1232&lang=hu (May 22, 2016).
13. Gyöngyi Csuka and Ádám Török, ed., *Az Európába irányuló és 2015-től felgyorsult migráció tényezői, irányai és kilátásai. A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Migrációs Munkacsoportjának elemzése* (2015). http://mta.hu/data/cikkek/106/1060/cikk-106072/_europabairanyulo.pdf.
14. UNHCR. The UN Refugee Agency. Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php> (May 26, 2016).
15. Mariann Domokos and Katalin Vargha, "Elektronikus választási folklór 2014," *Replika* 90–91, no. 1–2 (2015): 141–69.
16. Géza Balázs, "Választási sms-ek folklorisztikai-szövegtani vizsgálata," *Magyar Nyelvőr* 128 (2004): 36–53; Mariann Domokos, "Folklore and Mobile Communication," *Fabula* 48, no. 1/2 (2007): 50–59.
17. Rita Pálfi, Orbán házibulihoz hasonlította a bevándorlás kérdését. Euronews. <http://hu.euronews.com/2015/05/08/orban-hazibulihoz-hasonlitotta-a-bevandorlas-kerdeset/> (May 8, 2015). Another reflection of the xenophobic nature of government rhetoric is the obscure concept of "subsistence migration," coined as part of the campaign as an analogue to "subsistence crime." The government applies this term to asylum seekers, other immigrants, and for those crossing the border illegally. Gábor Bernáth and Bedarálva Vera Messing, "A menekültekkel kapcsolatos kormányzati kampány és a tőle független megszólalás terepei," *Médiakutató* 16, no. 4 (2015): 7–17.
18. National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism. <http://nemzetikonzultacio.kormany.hu/> (July 1, 2016). Some characteristic questions of the questionnaire and the answers to them were: Do you support a stricter immigration policy? almost 90 percent of respondents supported it. Can immigration be connected to terrorism? According to 61 percent it can, 29 percent holds it possible. Do immigrants pose a threat to the jobs of Hungarians? 72 of the respondents say yes, almost 19 percent say rather yes. Should not we spend our money on families rather than on immigrants? almost 94 percent of the respondents agree, 2 percent do not agree. The evaluation of the poll: Szabolcs Dull, A konzultáló magyarok tényleg jobban szeretik a családokat, mint a bevándorlókat. *Index*. http://index.hu/belfold/2015/07/27/kovacs_zoltan_ismertette_a_bevandorlasi_nemzeti_konzultacio_eredmenyet/ (July 27, 2015).
19. According to the phone survey conducted by Századvég, an economic research institute after Charlie Hebdo shooting in Paris on January 2015, 70 percent of the population would support tightened immigration laws, and 61 percent of the respondents thought that the European Union could not defend Europe from the terrorist attack similar to those in Paris. (<http://szadveg.hu/hu/kutatasok/az-alapitvany-kutatasai/piackutatas>

-kozvelemeny-kutatas/a-tobbseg-szigoritana-a-bevandozlas-szabalyait). According to a survey conducted by Tárki, a social science research institute, in April 2015, 46 percent of the adult population chose the anti-migrant claim saying that no asylum seeker should be allowed to enter the country. 9 percent of respondents can be considered friendly toward foreigners, saying that all asylum seekers should be accepted, and 45 percent of them would consider whether to provide asylum or deny it. (http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2015/kitekint/20150505_idegen.html).

20. Tamás Fábrián, Földes András, and József Spirik, “Teljes fordulatszámra kapcsolt a kormány menekültellenes kampánya,” *Index*, June 2, 2015, http://index.hu/belfold/2015/06/02/teljes_fordulatszamra_kapcsolt_a_kormany_menekultellenes_kampanya/?token=62c245bb3685cde32f3a4a2902d13288.

21. <https://www.facebook.com/dk365/photos/a.512783782145374.1073741913.169599166463839/830458617044554/?type=1&theater>.

22. <http://444.hu/2015/06/03/keszits-oriasplakatot-az-idegengyulolo-nemzeti-konzultacionak/>.

23. Norbert Merkóvity, “Barack Obama elnöki kampányának sajátosságai,” *Médiakutató* 10, no. 1 (2009): 97–106; András Burján, “Internetes politikai kampány 1–2,” *Médiakutató* 11, no. 3–4 (2010): 93–103, 37–50.

24. Paul G. Nixon, Rajash Rawal, and Dan Mercea, eds., *Politics and the Internet in Comparative Context: Views from Cloud* (New York: Routledge, 2013); Ralf Lindner, Georg Aichholzer, and Leonhard Hennen, eds., *Electronic Democracy in Europe. Prospects and Challenges of E-Publics, E-Participation and E-Voting* (New York, London: Springer, 2016).

25. Balázs, “Választási sms-ek folklórisztikai-szövegtani vizsgálata,” 36–53; Endre Dányi, “A faliújság visszazól. Politikai kommunikáció és kampány az interneten,” *Médiakutató* 7, no. 3 (2002): 23–36; Nagy, “in statu nascendi, 465–71.

26. Tamás Bodoky, “Többet retusálunk, mint négy éve. Választási kampányplakátok az interneten,” *Médiakutató* 6, no. 2 (2006): 7–31.

27. Burján, “Internetes politikai kampány 1–2,” 93–103, 37–50.

28. Domokos and Vargha, “Elektronikus választási folklór 2014,” 141–69.

29. Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).

30. Susan Blackmore, *The Meme Machine* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Lynne S. McNeill, “The End of the Internet: A Folk Response to Provision to the Provision of Infinitive Choice,” in *Folklore and the Internet: Vernacular Expression in a Digital World*, ed. Trevor J. Blank (Logan: Utah State University Press, 2009), 80–97; Merill Kaplan, “Curation and Tradition on Web 2.0,” in *Tradition in the Twenty-First Century: Locating the Role of the Past in the Present*, ed. Trevor J. Blank and Robert Glenn Howard (Logan: Utah State University Press, 2013), 123–48.

31. Limor Shifman, *Memes in Digital Culture* (London, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014), 15.

32. Lynne S. McNeill, “The End of the Internet: A Folk Response to Provision to the Provision of Infinitive Choice,” in *Folklore and the Internet: Vernacular Expression in a Digital World*, ed. Trevor J. Blank (Logan: Utah State University Press, 2009), 80–97; Kaplan, “Curation and Tradition on Web 2.0,” 123–48.

33. Kalevi Kull, “Copy Versus Translate, Meme versus Sign: Development of Biological Textuality,” *European Journal for Semiotic Studies* 12, no. 1 (2000): 101–20.

34. Monica Foote, “Userpicks. Cyber Folk Art in the Early 21st Century,” *Folklore Forum* 37, no. 1 (2007): 27–38, 31.

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35. András Mózer, Kampányhirdetés-paródiák üzenete. Internet access: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20090524_mozer_kampany; Rita Glózer, "Internetes paródiavideók és ifjúsági médiahasználat," *Replika* 90–91, no. 1–2 (2015): 117–39.

36. cf. Trevor J. Blank and Robert Glenn Howard, eds., *Tradition in the Twenty-First Century: Locating the Role of the Past in the Present* (Logan: Utah State University Press, 2013).

37. Asylum rules hit Danish pre-election talks. *The Local*. <http://www.thelocal.dk/20150407/asylum-rules-hit-danish-pre-election-talks> (April 7, 2015).

38. Russell Frank, *Newslore: Contemporary Folklore on the Internet* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2011).

39. Rita Pálfi, "Mindenkit gyűlölünk viccet csináltak a magyar kormány kampányából," *Euronews*, June 3, 2015, <http://hu.euronews.com/2015/06/03/mindenkit-gyulolunk-viccet-csináltak-a-magyar-kormany-kampanyabol/>; http://kettosmerce.blog.hu/2015/06/02/_gyulolunk_mindenkit_porognek_a_memek_orban_konzultacios_plakatjaitol#gallery-1433261975_6 "anarki," "Íme az idegengyűlölő plakátpályázat nyertesei," *444.hu*, June 4, 2015, <http://444.hu/2015/06/04/ime-az-idegengyulolo-plakatpalyazat-nyertesei/>.

40. I would like to state that the collection of the material and the analysis are unbiased, those meme variants have been published here which seemed to be popular and variable according to the preliminary surveys.

41. István Povedák, "One From Us, One For Us: Viktor Orbán in Vernacular Culture In: Heroes and Celebrities in Central and Eastern Europe," *Szeged: MTA-SZTE Vallási Kultúrakutató Csoport–SZTE Néprajzi és Kulturális Antropológiai Tanszék* (2014): 153–71; Domokos and Vargha, "Elektronikus választási folklór 2014," 155–64, 141–69.

42. In 1954, he won silver in the World Championship, in 1964 a bronze in the European Championship. Ferenc Puskás was the captain of the Golden Team, whose life work is an officially acknowledged Hungarianism. The team had a legendary 6:3 victory over England in 1953.

43. Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young, eds., *National Identity and Global Sports Events: Culture, Politics, and Spectacle in the Olympics and the Football World Cup* (New York: State University of New York Press).

44. The Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party (Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt, MKKP) is a Hungarian joke political party which aims to draw attention to the flaws of the major parties by ridiculing the current political elite, often making use of the tools of street art.

45. <https://www.facebook.com/14792493292/photos/a.10153440552338293.1073741849.14792493292/10153440552713293/?type=1&theater>. It was liked by 12,000 and shared by 206.

46. <https://www.facebook.com/KormanybuktatoDemonstracio>. This post was liked by 109 and shared by 31.

47. <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=905449839502026&set=p.905449839502026&type=3&theater>. This version was liked by 142.

48. <http://hushcampo.tumblr.com/post/121021384459>. Pancho is the nickname of Francisco, the Spanish version of Ferenc.

49. This meme was liked by 1,190. <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10206663343456364&set=p.10206663343456364&type=3&theater>.

50. <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1616674688619397&set=p.1616674688619397&type=3&theater>.

51. This name ("National Insult") refers to the government public consultation process ("National Consultation").

52. <http://ellenplakat.tumblr.com/>.

53. <http://mkkp.hu/wordpress/>.

54. Ágnes Benke, “Ha Magyarország miniszterelnöke vagy, be kell tratanod a törvényeinket!” *24.hu*, July 1, 2015, <http://24.hu/belfold/2015/07/01/megjelentek-a-kutyapart-első-ellenplakatai/>; Zsolt Kerner, “Óriásplakátokra gyűjt a Kétfarkú Kutyapárt és a Vastagbőr,” *24.hu*, June 8, 2016, <http://24.hu/belfold/2015/06/08/oriasplakatokra-gyujt-a-ketfarku-kutyapart-es-a-vastagbor/>; <http://vastagbor.atlatszo.hu/2015/07/17/kikerultek-az-ellenkampany-uj-oriasplakatai/>.

55. MKKP, Anti-immigration campaign. July 8, 2015, <http://mkkp.hu/wordpress/>.

56. Tamás Botos, “A szombathelyi MSZP tette ki . . .” *444.hu*, June 13, 2015, <http://444.hu/2015/06/13/a-szombathelyi-mszp-tette-ki-a-ha-magyarorszagra-jossz-nem-tudnal-hozni-egy-epeszu-miniszterelnokot-plakatokat/>.

57. <https://memegenerator.net/instance/63026512>.

58. Judit Lakatos, “Külföldön dolgozó magyarok, Magyarországon dolgozó külföldiek,” *Statistikai Szemle* 93, no. 2 (2015): 93–112, 109.

59. Csuka and Török, *Az Európába irányuló és 2015-től felgyorsult migráció tényezői, irányai és kilátásai. A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Migrációs Munkacsoportjának elemzése*, 46.

60. According to the report of Hungarian Central Statistical Office, in the first quarter of 2016. <https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/gyor/mun/mun1603.html>.

61. <https://www.facebook.com/14792493292/photos/pb.14792493292.-2207520000.1434038909./10153411440163293/?type=1&theater>. This variant was liked by 13,000 and shared by 4,083.

62. This variant was posted in a blog on June 1. http://vizallasjelentes.blogspot.hu/2015_06_01_archive.html. According to this blog, its source was the news portal called *444.hu*.

63. This meme was posted on the Facebook site of the former government party representing leftist values, the Hungarian Socialist Party, it was liked by 4,900. <https://www.facebook.com/750318541714178/photos/a.754564507956248.1073741828.750318541714178/856323651113666/?type=1&theater>.

64. <http://memgyar.net/2422> (Mémgyár=Meme Factory).

65. http://41.media.tumblr.com/75c8018a6871cf5dda2511fb1969564a/tumblr_npdpa5oz031ux26y6o1_1280.png.

66. Community work is the name of an employment program, which was created to help the unemployed by combining work and practical training. <http://444.hu/2015/06/04/ime-az-idegengyulolo-plakatsorozat-nyertesei/>.

67. <http://diogenes1001.tumblr.com/post/121173278176/r%C3%A9szletesebben-is-kifejtett%C3%A9k-a-hazugs%C3%A1got-hogy-a>.

68. <http://ellenkampany.com/portfolio/plakatok/és>; <http://ellenplakat.tumblr.com/archive>.

69. “The refugees don’t work and take away our jobs!” Posted on 26 April (before the launching of the campaign). It was liked by 3,100 and shared by 331. https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?id=14792493292&story_fbid=10153302033753293.

70. <http://ellenplakat.tumblr.com/post/121421558437#notes>.

71. <http://cookkapitany.tumblr.com/post/120683963142>.

72. http://hvg.hu/itthon/20150612_Fotok_Szombathelyen_mar_kikerultek_az_els.

73. <https://www.facebook.com/Ne.legyen.Internetado/photos/a.1509323472643335.1073741828.1509298262645856/1599571063618575/?type=3&theater>.

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74. <https://www.facebook.com/hircsarda/photos/a.338065209892.149963.253036679892/10153509120139893/?type=3&theater>. The site is observed by nearly 55,000 people, the meme was liked by 1,500 and shared by 381.

75. <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1022506287784252&set=p.1022506287784252&type=3&theater>.

76. http://nol.hu/galeria/Ha_Magyarorszagra_jossz_tanulj_meg_falat_maszni.

77. <https://www.facebook.com/14792493292/photos/a.10153440552338293.1073741849.14792493292/10153440553298293/?type=1&permPage=1>.

78. http://vizallasjelentes.blogspot.hu/2015_06_01_archive.html.

79. <http://ellenplakat.tumblr.com/archive>.

80. <http://zebrazoly.tumblr.com/post/121092649526/tegnap-l%C3%A1ttam-valahol-de-m%C3%A1r-nem-tal%C3%A1ttam-meg>.

81. <http://imgur.com/a/8WJWm>.

82. Benjámín Novák, "A magyar kormány idegengyűlölő kampányt indított," *Budapest Beacon*, July 6, 2015, <http://hu.budapestbeacon.com/kiemelt-cikkek/a-magyar-kormany-idegengyulolo-plakatkampanyt-inditott/>.

83. <http://www.smsgyujtemeny.hu/evkonyv.hu/sms/item/ne-lopj-a-korma>. Dányi, "A faliújság visszazól. Politikai kommunikáció és kampány az interneten," 23–36; Domokos, "Folklore and Mobile Communication," 50–59.

84. Domokos, "Towards Methodological Issues in Electronic Folklore," 283–95.

85. <http://ellenplakat.tumblr.com/>.

86. <http://444.hu/2015/06/04/ime-az-idegengyulolo-plakatpalyazat-nyertesei/> (<http://img.444.hu/erno.jpg>). This also was displayed on a site of Tumblr collecting counter placards, dated to June 4: <http://ellenplakat.tumblr.com/post/121421558437#notes>.

87. <http://img.444.hu/andras.jpg>.

88. Metameme in my point of view is a characteristically self-referential meme. Here especially: a meme about meme producing.

89. <http://szarvas.tumblr.com/post/120682320223>.

90. "Túrórudi" is a nugget-shaped cottage cheese dessert covered in cocoa, a characteristically Hungarian product. <http://www.keptelenseg.hu/keptelenseg/csak-plakatok-101871>. <http://ellenplakat.tumblr.com/post/121421484032>.

91. <http://hushcampo.tumblr.com/post/120944007029>.

92. Dundes, "Who Are the Folk?" 1–19, 17.

93. It was liked by 654 and shared by 66. <https://www.facebook.com/sajtoszabadsagert/photos/a.175487312488054.30541.169854769717975/1082944241742352/?type=3&theater>.