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***Antineutralidad: An unknown and unpublished book of  
Diego de Saavedra Fajardo***

Tibor Monostori  
Institute of History, Research Centre for the Humanities,  
Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Hungary)  
tibor.monostori@gmail.com

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**Resumen**

La *Antineutralidad* es un largo tratado jurídico-político anónimo, escrito en 1640, dedicado al conde-duque de Olivares, conservada en manuscrito en al menos dos archivos: Bruselas y Madrid. Se presentan varias razones para probar que se trata de una obra maestra y madura de Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, de significado cultural comparable a las *Empresas políticas*, la otra obra suya principal.

**Palabras clave**

Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Guerra de los treinta años, Razón de estado, Casa de Austria, Sacro Imperio Romano Germánico

**Title**

*Antineutralidad*: un libro desconocido e inédito de Diego de Saavedra Fajardo

**Abstract**

The *Antineutralidad* is an anonymous, legal-political treatise in manuscript from 1640, dedicated to the count-duke of Olivares, stored in at least two locations: Brussels and Madrid. A variety of reasons are provided, arguing that it is a mature masterpiece of Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, in cultural significance comparable to the *Empresas políticas*, his other principal writing.

**Keywords**

Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Thirty Years' War, Reason of State, House of Austria, Holy Roman Empire



The quest for unknown or lost writings of Diego de Saavedra Fajardo (1584-1648), Spanish diplomat and writer has been a continuous effort of scholars since modern philology and historiography were born, and since the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century almost no decade passed without the publication or analysis of newly discovered texts in substantial volumes<sup>1</sup>. Such discoveries are inevitable, given the complex itinerary of the Spanish diplomat over 30 years in dozens of early modern states and the range of libraries, archives and manuscript collections where the documents are stored<sup>2</sup>. Vast volumes of correspondence are being published, several texts have been recently uncovered and edited or reedited as scholarship gathers material, publishes papers and makes progress<sup>3</sup>.

These efforts have yet to produce any evidence of a text similar to the magnitude and significance of his most important work, the *Empresas políticas*. In the pages that follow, a variety of reasons are provided to substantiate two claims:

- A) The Spanish diplomat wrote in 1640 the anonymous *Antineutralidad*<sup>4</sup>, consisting of nearly 200 pages, that I first found in the Miscellaneous collection of the National Archives of Belgium in Brussels<sup>5</sup>, then

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<sup>1</sup> Since then, key contributors include González Palencia and the *Obras completas* (1946), Fraga (1998 [1955]), Aldea Vaquero and the *Correspondencia* (1986-2008), a compilation of texts, the *Rariora et Minora* edited by Villacañas (2008), Monostori (2011) and Boadas (2015).

<sup>2</sup> Besides the key archives of the former dynasty of Austria (Simancas, Vienna and Brussels), original documents are archived in Germany (eg Munich), Italy (eg Vatican) and France (eg Franche-Comté), among other countries and locations.

<sup>3</sup> New editions have shed new light and opened up new perspectives on the *corpus* of Saavedra Fajardo, like that of the *Empresas políticas* in López Poza (1999) or the Sánchez Jiménez - Sáez (2014) edition of his writings related to the Swiss cantons.

<sup>4</sup> *Antineutralidad. Tratado y discurso jurídico-político en que se prueba claramente que los electores, príncipes y estados del Imperio Romano Germánico no pueden ser neutrales, sino tener siempre el partido del Emperador contra cualesquiera príncipes dentro y fuera del Imperio. Compuesto por el bueno y fiel vasallo.*

<sup>5</sup> AEB, *Manuscripts divers* 1228, recently renumbered to 640 (196 unnumbered pages).

discovered in the Biblioteca Nacional de España<sup>6</sup>, the latter with a two-page anonymous letter of dedication to the Count-Duke of Olivares<sup>7</sup>, prime minister of Philip IV, King of Spain (1621-1665).

- B) The legal and political treatise is a mature masterpiece of the diplomat, in cultural significance comparable to the *Empresas políticas*.

In terms of the transcriptions of the original sources, all texts have been modernised: capitalisation and punctuation have been standardized, and spellings have been corrected. The numeration of the references to the *Antineutralidad* will follow that of the BNE text, since the Brussels text is unnumbered.

### **THE ANTINEUTRALIDAD: CONTENT AND STRUCTURE**

The purpose of the book was to convince the princes and states of the Holy Roman Empire that they must support and be faithful to the Emperor, Ferdinand III (1637-1657). According to the text, Ferdinand had the support of the biggest and strongest empire of the world, Spain. Key enemies were France, Sweden and their allies, and in a wider perspective, the Ottoman Empire. Being neutral towards other European powers was against the laws, and had many inconveniences and disadvantages. The Peace of Prague (1635)<sup>8</sup> should be considered as *status quo*. The argumentation is backed by at least 357 quotes, many of them inserted in the manuscript in latin and referenced in the margin, primarily from classical authors and legal texts, and to a smaller extent from the Bible and medieval or early modern history books.

Another, secondary purpose of the book was to synthesize, integrate and systematize the reason of State of the Spanish Monarchy in the context of divine providence and the history of the world, including the end times in Christian eschatology.

The book has four major parts:

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<sup>6</sup> BNE Mss 432. I. ff. 1r-73v. (142 pages in a very condensed format)

<sup>7</sup> BNE Mss 432. I. f. 2bisr-2bisv.

<sup>8</sup> The Peace of Prague, a central theme of the *Antineutralidad*, was signed by Emperor Ferdinand II (1619-1637) and the prince-elector John George I of Saxony (1611-1656), on behalf of the majority of Protestant princes and states of the Holy Roman Empire. It ended the major religious conflicts and the civil war in the Empire, forbade confederations with foreign states, intended to create one single imperial army and granted amnesty to those princes who deliberately fought against the Emperor.

1. An introduction with two subdivisions: an invocation (*A la Germania*<sup>9</sup>) and a more detailed “table of contents” in prose (*Motivo del autor y argumento de la Antineutralidad*)<sup>10</sup>. It describes the chaotic situation at the end of the Thirty Years’ War, the threat that France and Sweden represented for the public peace of the Empire and why neutrality with these enemies was disadvantageous and dangerous for the Empire.

2. The core part is the twenty-four propositions (in many cases broken down into subpoints) that back the main argumentation of the book. They argue against the practice of neutrality in the Empire from different angles<sup>11</sup>. The propositions can be grouped into subdivisions:

- *Biblical* (propositions 1-2): the divine law of the Old and the New Testament<sup>12</sup>.

- *Predominantly legal, combined with international politics of his time* (propositions 4-15 and 20): the governance of the Holy Roman Empire, international law (*ius gentium, derecho de gentes*), civil law, canonical law, the principal Golden Bull of the Empire (1356)<sup>13</sup>, the historical constitutions of the Empire from 1495 to 1576, the rulings of the Imperial Chamber Court of Speyer, the Peace of Prague, the general obedience that the electors, princes and states of the Empire must express towards the Emperor, as well as their fidelity, and the feudal oath of fidelity, the feudal law, the office and the power of the electors, princes and the states and the Peace of Augsburg (1555)<sup>14</sup>.

- *Arguments concerning political theory and reason of State, combined with international politics of his time* (3, 16-17 and 21-24): the 3 forms of political governments (aristocratic, democratic and monarchical) and their theory, the office and power of the electors, princes and states, the piety, reverence, fidelity and love they must have towards the Empire as a common homeland, their private security, public security and conservation of the Empire, the liberty of

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<sup>9</sup> AN 3r-4v.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. 5r-7v.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. 7v-49v.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. 7v-10r.

<sup>13</sup> *Bulla Aurea*, a set of constitutional rules introduced at the imperial diets in 1356, supervised by the Emperor Charles IV (1355-1378). It normalised the election process of the Holy Roman Emperors (more precisely, the King of the Romans), among many other minor decrees.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. 10v-26v. and 31r-31v.

the Empire, the honor, power, value, fame, reputation of the German *natio* and the dignity and greatness of the Empire<sup>15</sup>.

- *Historicism* (18-19): although most of the other points are infused with the regular historicism of the medieval and early modern era, in case of these two chapters there is a greater emphasis on reasons and sources: the proven track record of the faith and constancy of Germany towards the homeland is highlighted, as well as their ancient sincerity, integrity and fidelity<sup>16</sup>.

3. Counterarguments against the propositions and counterresponses to the counterarguments (*Argumentos contrarios con sus respuestas*)<sup>17</sup>, broken down into 12 points, that can be regrouped into specific categories: historical examples that seem to show the benefits of being neutral (but for the author, they do not), the denial of the monarchical nature of the Empire and the limitations of the Emperor by the constitutions, the liberty of the princes and states and the balance of power (and the affirmation of the author that yes, the Empire is monarchical), the rights of the weak against any oppressors within the Empire and the possibility of signing an alliance with an external power (and the author's counterarguments), the negative effects of the *monarchia universalis* (the medieval and early modern concept of a dominant global, leading power) of the Habsburg dynasty (and the author's justification that it is divine and beneficial), this last point being the most extensive, and finally, the benefits of neutrality and the abuses of the armies of the Emperor (both with their counterarguments)<sup>18</sup>.

4. A special section with advice to Germany (*Advertimiento*)<sup>19</sup>, an extended and detailed summary of the previous chapters, an overview of how the Ottoman Empire conquered Europe and a future vision about liberating all the continent from the yoke of the Ottomans (making them equal to Sweden and France). The work ends with a long quote from Ovid (*The Art of Love*).

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid. 10r., 25r-28v. and 32r-49v.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. 29r-31r.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. 49v-60v.

<sup>18</sup> This point was needed, since neutrality as a political concept can be beneficial under certain circumstances (outside of Germany) according to Empresa 95 of the *Empresas políticas* and according to Saavedra's own diplomatic experience.

<sup>19</sup> *Advertimiento a los electores, príncipes y estados del Imperio para que procuren conformarse a la Paz de Praga, uniéndose todos y siguiendo el partido del Emperador para poder después llevar las armas comunes, si quisieren, contra el Turco, y otros infieles, y recuperar el Imperio del Oriente*. Ibid. 60v-73v.

### CONTEXT: THE DIPLOMAT'S OTHER WRITINGS FROM 1640

One of the proofs that this work was written by Saavedra Fajardo is that he wrote three shorter (until 2009 unknown as well, and still unpublished<sup>20</sup>) discourses from the same year (August and September), with similar topics and arguments, found in the same archive.

Saavedra Fajardo spent 15 years in the Holy Roman Empire, wandering from the Netherlands to Italy, from the Franche-Comté to Vienna, becoming one of the best formed professional of the Spanish Monarchy in all matters related to Germany and to the Emperor during this period<sup>21</sup>.

No doubt – if such a category had existed, the Spanish nobleman would have been granted citizenship in the Central European Habsburg Monarchy. He visited Vienna multiple times, where the Spanish Embassy developed into a financial and logistical centre of the world empire. During many years, he received his salary from there<sup>22</sup>. While Saavedra Fajardo ceaselessly sent his letters to Madrid and Brussels<sup>23</sup>, he also attended several imperial diets and was actively involved in strategic missions, such as the journey of the Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand of Austria, governor of the Spanish Netherlands (1634–1641), the brother of Philip IV, from Italy to Brussels in 1634, or supervising some of the military and logistical supplies to the Franche-Comté.

In Regensburg, Saavedra Fajardo represented the Spanish interests and voted at the diet.<sup>24</sup> The recurring topics of his diplomatic correspondence from Regensburg before the start of and during the diet (from August 1640 until March 1641<sup>25</sup>), such as the Peace of Prague, the approach of the diet to the participation of France and Sweden and neutrality, and the development of the negotiations for a universal peace treaty, are constant topics of the *Antineutralidad*.

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<sup>20</sup> Monostori (2011).

<sup>21</sup> For a general introduction on his diplomatic missions, political philosophy, the concept of the reason of State, and influences, see Fraga (1998), Rosa de Gea (2010), and the introduction of López Poza (1999) to her edition of the *Empresas políticas*.

<sup>22</sup> Descargo y data del dinero de su Majestad que yo, Baltasar Walderode he gastado en cosas de su real servicio por órdenes del excelentísimo señor conde de Oñate, embajador extraordinario de su dicha Majestad en Alemania, desde el 20 del mes de agosto 1634 hasta fin del año de 1635. ÖstA, HHStA, Staatenabteilung, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, Spanien, Varia, Karton 7a, ff. 20r–49r. Género octavo: Diferentes ayudas de costa que se ha dado en esta embajada... (ff. 42r–45v). From 10 years later, in 1644 another source confirmed the same: Fraga (1998: 336–337).

<sup>23</sup> In the AEB these are collected into 16 volumes: *Secrétairerie d'État et de Guerre*, 342–345, 385–396.

<sup>24</sup> Fraga (1998: 285–302).

<sup>25</sup> AEB SEG 342–343, passim.

The Spanish diplomat met Emperor Ferdinand III, his family and the members of his councils several times, to discuss political matters. As part of his relentless struggles to convert them and the German princes into closer friends, and followers and supporters of the Spanish cause in the Empire, he wrote pamphlets, letters and discourses.

Among the 1640 discourses, the first is titled “If the Emperor should help the [Spanish] Netherlands on this occasion” against the Dutch<sup>26</sup> and his answer is evidently yes. It has a dialectic nature, like that of the *Antineutralidad*. There is a first part where the counterarguments are listed, and a second where the affirmative reasons are itemized, point by point. The author argued that the fear of the alliance between Vienna and Madrid is baseless, since that axis is the guarantee of the preservation of the Empire, as shown in the text by the mentions of military interventions of the Spanish Monarchy when the Empire was threatened by external powers – a recurring theme of the *Antineutralidad*.

The second discourse derived its name from the secretary of the Brussels state office on the original document as “The discourse of don Diego de Saavedra about the conveniences to cancel the imperial diet”<sup>27</sup>. This is a very diverse discourse, covering the need for a union of the princes of the Empire against France and Sweden, a reflection on whether to wage a defensive or an offensive war against them, with an analysis of the current strategies of the European powers on the battlefield, the dangers of neutrality, and about how to achieve a universal peace, how to deal with the Swiss cantons and how to strengthen the diplomatic net of the dynasty in Northern Europe.

The third discourse has an informal title as well: “It is not Spain that creates enemies in the Empire”, a discourse requested by one of the council members of the Emperor<sup>28</sup>. As per the reasoning, the two branches of the *Casa de Austria* must move in the same direction and must have common objectives, since such unity was the only guarantee of a European peace, stability and well-being for the Holy Roman Empire, because:

- Divine providence established the power of the dynasty and wants them to stay together

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<sup>26</sup> *Si el Emperador debe socorrer los Países Bajos en la ocasión presente*. Saavedra Fajardo to the Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand. Regensburg, 26 August 1640. AEB SEG, 342, ff. 244r–245v (ciphered), 250r–252v (deciphered).

<sup>27</sup> *Discurso de don Diego Saavedra y Fajardo sobre las conveniencias que hay para que se deshaga esta dieta, dado a su Majestad cesárea*. AEB SEG 342, ff. 254r–259v.

<sup>28</sup> “...un ministro cesáreo me propuso que convendría hacer un papel desengañando a los de esta dieta, de que no es España quien causa enemigos al Imperio, he hecho ese y lo he dado al Emperador para que si le pareciese bien se imprima en alemán”. Saavedra Fajardo to Philip IV. Regensburg, 12 September 1640. AEB SEG 343, ff. 11r–11v. The discourse: *Ibid.*, ff. 13r–16r.

- The history of the dynasty shows clearly that in the 16<sup>th</sup> century Spain supplied enormous financial, military and political support to the Empire and to Vienna in their fight against the Protestants, France and the Ottoman Empire
- In the present days, Spain still provides troops and money to the common cause
- Spain does so even if these assistances menace their own political integrity and peaceful development
- The reason of State of the Holy Roman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy is to have stronger ties with Spain
- The two branches of the dynasty have the strongest link possible: they share the same blood
- The Spanish monarch was the leader of the Burgundian Circle in the Empire (which included the Free County of Burgundy, the Low Countries and other territories in present day France), and as a consequence, a German prince. The Emperor was a German prince as well and both were obliged to help each other in any case of need.

Some of these themes, like that of the Burgundian Circle, the Ottomans and divine providence seem to be disconnected at first glance, but in the argumentation of Saavedra Fajardo they melt together and constitute a complete arsenal of diplomatic, political and rhetorical weapons and thoughts, and are totally interconnected.

An illustrative example of this is the fight against the Ottoman Empire (and against all offensive powers outside of the Holy Roman Empire) and its legal background, which is a repeated subject in Saavedra Fajardo's writings of 1640, the *Antineutralidad* included. Spain played an instrumental part in the wars against the Ottoman Empire, and it was not just a rhetoric *topos*. The kings of Spain had twofold responsibility towards the Emperor: as a family member, and (since 1548) as the head of the Burgundian Circle<sup>29</sup>. In that role, Spain was obliged to pay fixed sums of money to the Emperor to finance his wars against the Turkish, as was the case for the other circles (*Reichstürkenhilfe*). However, Philip II, King of Spain (1556-1598) suspended the payments in 1566, and subsequently issued the aid only partially, causing a long period of resentment between the two branches of the dynasty, closely related to the different ways that they looked at the situation in the Netherlands. Still, the money towards Vienna kept flowing through many channels.

The Spanish interest in the eastern battlefields waned after the victorious battle of Lepanto (1571), then increased anew during the Long Turkish War (1593–1606), but never equalled that of the reign of Emperor

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<sup>29</sup> Rauscher (1999).



Charles V (1519–1556)<sup>30</sup>. Sending troops was replaced by sending money in cash and precious metal by the end of the sixteenth century (2.5 million escudos during the Long War)<sup>31</sup>, and when this situation changed at the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, soldiers could be stationed in the Holy Roman Empire and (with substantial amounts of cash) used against the Protestant princes and France, due to the long-standing peace with the Ottoman rulers.

Although France was Catholic, it was not difficult for Saavedra and the Spanish diplomacy to find reasons against its political agenda. Besides the fact that Paris allied with the Ottoman Empire and many Protestant princes, Saavedra in his discourses liked to make use in 1640 of the Fourth Imperial Diet of Speyer of 1544, when France was declared enemy of the Empire, because of its alliance with Constantinople<sup>32</sup>. This is one example of many about how in the *Antineutralidad* the Murcian diplomat connected the dots and placed all external enemies of the Empire into the same category.

Saavedra's legal reasoning, which is much more fully elaborated in the *Antineutralidad*, provides an insight into a less-known facet of the Spanish Monarchy's political and diplomatic efforts and shows that there were strong and sound (although sometimes very anachronistic) legal reasons for Spain to stand its ground in Europe and maintain the *status quo*. It was not the lack of legal foundations that prevented the Emperor (even with the help of Spain) from reinforcing his authority in the Empire at the end of the Thirty Years' War, but the lack of military and financial power against the anti-Habsburg alliance.

#### **MAIN THEME – NEUTRALITY AND THE *PAX AUSTRIACA***

The previous chapter provided a hint of the geopolitical strategy that was behind the foreign policy making of Madrid. The backbone of that strategy was the *Pax Austriaca*, the peace guaranteed by the Madrid-Vienna axis, as the primary foundation of the weakening Spanish hegemony in the world. From that angle, the neutrality of the princes and states towards the United Provinces in the 1620s, and later the neutrality towards Sweden and France in the 1630s was a major risk that Spain ran when it came to its dominance and to the vital cooperation of the two branches of the dynasty.

1640 was probably the last year in history when the *Pax Austriaca* still seemed to be sustainable for Spanish diplomacy, before continuous revolts and military defeats and the new balance of power swept the strategy from the table. Within a couple of years it turned out that the maintenance of a possible

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<sup>30</sup> Korpás (2008).

<sup>31</sup> Niederkorn (1993).

<sup>32</sup> AEB SEG 342, f. 250v. and 343, f. 15r.

European peace would not have been guaranteed even if it had been established by Habsburg control. The peace negotiations in Westphalia (1643–1648) and their outcome proved the contrary.

But in 1640 the final target still seemed to be attainable. The principal point of *status quo* as desired by the dynasty and by Saavedra Fajardo in the *Antineutralidad* (the Peace of Prague) was signed five years earlier. The sign-off followed the last great victory of the combined Habsburg cooperation against their enemies, the battle of Nördlingen in August 1634 (referenced multiple times in the work), won jointly by the future Emperor Ferdinand III and the Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand,<sup>33</sup> the subsequent reopening of the Spanish Road between Italy and the Low Countries and the signature of the formal and secret alliance between Madrid and Vienna in October 1634. Almost simultaneously, France declared war on Spain in May 1635.

These efforts were not about creating a stronger Spanish presence in Germany, since it was already there and settled, in the framework of the weakening *Pax Austriaca* and the *monarchia universalis* – it was about making it accepted and respected. The reasoning was in harmony and compatible with the real Spanish foreign policy, aimed at convincing the imperial states and princes of Germany to support Spain and the dynasty in general in their fight against France, Sweden and the Dutch, so that the peaceful hegemony of the Casa de Austria in Europe could be restored and maintained.

Going one step further, central to the foreign policy of Madrid were the defense of Catholicism, the defense of the heritage of Charles V and the defense of the monopoly of commerce with the New World. To achieve those targets, the primary objective was the defeat of the Dutch United Provinces (once part of the hereditary lands of the Spanish kings), and their reincorporation into the Monarchy, but at minimum to negotiate a beneficial peace with them. Consequently, the Count-Duke of Olivares strived for the creation of an alliance between the Emperor, the Spanish king and the Catholic princes of the Empire. Conservation, remedies and reputation: these were the key terms for him and for many of his generation. Spanish goals included selecting the right reason of State to use and keeping the *status quo* of the authority of the Habsburg dynasty, constantly advising on how to restore the weakening health and wealth of the Spanish economic and military power, and strengthening the still existing prestige and respect towards the Spanish Monarchy<sup>34</sup>.

<sup>33</sup> On 6 September 1634, the allied forces of Bavaria, the Emperor and Spain won the battle of Nördlingen against the Swedish and Protestant imperial forces. On the Catholic side, the Spanish army was the biggest in terms of the number of soldiers.

<sup>34</sup> The literature on Spanish hegemony in Europe, the vast network of the Spanish System, the history of the Spanish Road, the Spanish influence through allowances and orders given to

As will be shown in the last chapter, Saavedra Fajardo, like others (politicians and men of letters) who defended the Spanish or imperial cause<sup>35</sup>, went one step further.

#### NATURE AND VARIETY OF THE SOURCES

The clearest evidence of the authorship of the *Antineutralidad* is the selection and usage of its sources and their nature, number and variety.

The text utilizes at least 357 quotations, most frequently referenced in the margin: 33 from the Bible (9%), 132 from legal texts or texts supporting a legal argumentation (37%), 145 from classical authors (41%) and 47 from other sources, mostly books of history (13%).

With regards to the Bible and the classical authors, the selection is similar to that of the *Empresas políticas*. The most cited books of the Bible are Matthew, Joshua, Daniel, Proverbs and Deuteronomy, which are favoured parts of the Scriptures in the *Empresas políticas* as well. The *Antineutralidad* cites the same story of the moabites and the blood-like water of 2 Kings 3:22-23, as Empresa 46<sup>36</sup>.

“*Crece con la concordia las cosas pequeñas, y sin ella caen las mayores*” – so begins Empresa 89<sup>37</sup>.

“*Que con la concordia crecen las cosas pequeñas, y con la discordia las más grandes se destruyen, ... Esta sentencia propongo a tus ojos por símbolo, O Germania, éste es el argumento de los advertimientos que te ofrezco...*” – says the author in the Introduction<sup>38</sup>.

“*Grandes daños causó a los tebanos el haberse querido mantener neutrales cuando Jerjes acometió a Grecia.*” – elaborates an idea from Empresa 95<sup>39</sup>.

“*En las historias griegas sirven de ejemplo los tebanos que cayeron en peligro por haber andado neutrales, cuando el rey Jerjes vino a Grecia.*” – is the version found in *Antineutralidad*<sup>40</sup>.

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German princes and nobles, family ties and military cooperation and the concept of the *monarchia universalis* is extensive. Essential sources include: Elliott (1983), Bosbach (1988), Parker (1988), Ernst (1991), Aldea Vaquero (2000), Schmidt (2001) and Edelmayer (2002).

<sup>35</sup> Eg Tommaso Campanella in *The Monarchy in Spain* (1600).

<sup>36</sup> AN 58r, and Empresa 46, p. 553.

<sup>37</sup> Empresa 89, p. 942.

<sup>38</sup> AN 4r.

<sup>39</sup> Empresa 95, p. 987.

<sup>40</sup> AN 36v.

Both texts quote the same verses of the *Aeneid* of Virgil, 6:851-853<sup>41</sup>, and in several cases we find *verbatim* quotations from Tacitus' *Historiae*: “*Nemo enim unquam Imperium flagitio quaesitum bonis artibus exercuit*”<sup>42</sup>, “*Rara temporum felicitate* ([in AN: *faelicitas*], *ubi sentire quae velis et quae sentias dicere licet*”<sup>43</sup>, “*Legiones operum et laboris ignaras, populationibus laetantes, veterem ad morem reduxit*”<sup>44</sup>, “*Neque quies gentium sine armis; neque arma sine stipendiis; neque stipendia sine tributis haberi queunt*”<sup>45</sup>, and from his *Germania*: “*Quia inter innocentes* [in AN: *inter potentes*] *et validos falso quiescas. Ubi manu agitur, modestia ac* [In AN: *et*] *probitas nomina superioris sunt.*”<sup>46</sup>

In terms of the legal texts, of the classical jurists he uses most Scaevola (6 times) and Ulpian (12 times) – they are also mentioned in the *Empresas*<sup>47</sup>. Saavedra quotes peace treaties (21 times the Peace of Prague), the constitutions of the Empire (17 times), and the Golden Bull (8 times), besides many other feudal compilations and the works of medieval and early modern jurists, the analysis of which will require a separate investigation.

With regards to the other texts, the author likes to quote books of medieval and early modern historians, like the *Rerum Ungaricarum Decades* of Antonio de Bonfini (Hungary), the *Chronicon Saxoniae* of David Chytraeus (Saxony) and the *Suecia, sive de Suecorum Regis Dominiis et opibus* of Henricus Soterus and Andreas Bureus (Sweden), among many others.

In addition to the textual references, as might be expected, all five texts from 1640 (the *Empresas políticas*, the three unpublished discourses and the *Antineutralidad*) reveal a lot of similarities with each other (and with the diplomatic correspondence of Saavedra in general), like typical phrases and sayings of Saavedra (*rienda suelta, flujo y reflujo, nervios, cuerpo de la república, máxima*), and themes, like friendship, discord, fidelity, reason of State, and his constant concern about the reality that the princes and states of the Empire provide the enemies with weapons, money, horses, accommodation, and food.

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<sup>41</sup> AN 32r, and Empresa 6, p. 239.

<sup>42</sup> AN 34v, and Empresa 59, p. 696.

<sup>43</sup> AN 40v, and Empresa 14, p. 302.

<sup>44</sup> AN 59v, and Empresa 82, p. 898.

<sup>45</sup> AN 66v, and Empresa 67, p. 766.

<sup>46</sup> AN 34v, and Empresa 98, p. 1014.

<sup>47</sup> Empresa 55, p. 651.

### MAGNITUDE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE *ANTINEUTRALIDAD*

Before evaluating the book's cultural significance, two questions need to be answered. First, why did it remain unknown for centuries? Second, should it be really called a book, rather than a longer treatise or discourse?

As to the first question, a root cause analysis shows clearly the principal reasons:

1. The incorrect dating of the *Antineutralidad* in the Biblioteca Nacional de España. It may seem to be of minor importance, but the fact that due to a human error the *Inventario* of the BNE gives 1630 as the date of the manuscript, rather than 1640, might have derailed the attention of scholars<sup>48</sup>.
2. The archives of Brussels, a principal source of Saavedra's letters and other writings, have not been thoroughly researched since Aldea Vaquero finished the publication of his diplomatic correspondence between 1631 and 1634, except for the recent examinations of Monostori<sup>49</sup>.
3. The anonymity of the manuscript. It was a regular practice of Saavedra who was asked several times by both the counsellors of the Emperor and the Spanish government<sup>50</sup> to write pamphlets and papers. Many of his writings were issued and sent for printing in various languages without authorship, place and date identifiers, in order to hide the fact it had been written by a representative of the Spanish Monarchy. What seems to be still uncommon is that no name appears on his letter of dedication to the Count-Duke of Olivares either.
4. The lack of reference in his diplomatic correspondence. Although in 1644 Saavedra listed retrospectively quite a few of his writings<sup>51</sup>, a direct reference in his diplomatic correspondence to the *Antineutralidad* has not yet been found. The State Archives in Belgium should be expected to house such information: Ferdinand, the Cardinal-Infante acknowledged receipt of all his writings of 1640 (the *Empresas* plus the three unpublished discourses)<sup>52</sup>, except for the one in question, and those archives also reveal that another important text of Saavedra, the *Carta de un holandés escrita a un ministro de los estados confederados* was not written in 1642 as

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<sup>48</sup> *Inventario general de Manuscritos de la Biblioteca Nacional*. I. (1 a 500), 432. It says: "En el año MDCXXX" [1630], in reality, MDCXXXX, that is, in 1640.

<sup>49</sup> Aldea Vaquero (1986-2008), Monostori (2011).

<sup>50</sup> Saavedra Fajardo to Philip IV. Münster, 6 May 1644. Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España (1884), p. 45.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> AEB SEG 342-344, passim.

recently assumed by scholarship<sup>53</sup>, but in April or in May 1641 in Regensburg<sup>54</sup>, a couple of months later than the possible date of compilation of the *Antineutralidad*. More thorough research needs to be conducted for that purpose in the archives, mostly in the General Archive of Simancas in Spain, and Brussels to find more evidence and more signs of the motivation behind the work.

5. Considerations of literary and art history, and those of political thinking have predominantly triggered and steered the studies and publications about Saavedra Fajardo in the last decades. When his diplomatic endeavours were explored, they were done habitually from the perspective of the Spanish Monarchy. Since the Murcian author was a global figure, representing a global power, in a time when the modern order of global and international law was formed, an even more comprehensive and interdisciplinary research framework is required to fully capture and understand his thoughts, motives and methods. The *Antineutralidad*, more than any of his writings, calls for that level of methodological granularity and completeness. From this perspective it becomes clearer why the anonymous, legal and political treatise of Saavedra Fajardo on Germany remained hidden.

As for the second question, I call it a book for various reasons: the well-planned and detailed structure of the work, its length, the direct dedication to the Count-Duke of Olivares (and therefore the importance of the work for the author himself), the likely intention of printing it, and its state of readiness for printing. Lastly, with the term “book”, my intention is to split the prosaic works of Saavedra Fajardo into two categories: books (the *Empresas políticas* and the *Antineutralidad*, among others) and the minor works (*Minora*).

With regards to the scale of the book and its status in his *corpus*, it needs to be stated that the purpose of this article has been primarily to prove the authorship and give general guidance about its content and sources as well as about the locations where the *Antineutralidad* can be found. Several areas deserve long, separate publications, from its legal argumentation to the usage of his sources. A scrupulously annotated critical edition is a must and I have taken the first methodological steps towards making it happen.

This said, some preliminary observations can be offered. A first and second reading show that the *Antineutralidad* is not only a mature masterpiece of Saavedra Fajardo, but it can be equalled only by the *Empresas políticas* in his

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<sup>53</sup> Sáez (2014).

<sup>54</sup> Saavedra Fajardo to the Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand. Regensburg, 6 May 1641. AEB SEG 345, 26r-28v. (ciphered and deciphered).

*corpus*. The classical and modern sources and their incorporation in the text and the development of the political maxims and reasoning are very similar. The lack of emblems (and their explanatory and descriptive power) and the smaller volume of the treatise are offset and compensated by the rich legal argumentation and the dialectic nature of the assertions and counterarguments, sometimes almost in the form of a dialogue. The book is a sort of showcase and practical application of the *Empresas políticas* and goes beyond the traditional understanding of Saavedra Fajardo as a rare combination of a diplomat, a man of arts and a political theorist. With the book (and the three other discourses from 1640 and an even closer look at his diplomatic endeavours) he gets even more multifaceted and rounded: the picture that emerges is that of a good debater, a well-trained historian, a jurist and legal advisor to Spanish policy making and a strategist.

At the very end of the Spanish dominance in Europe, Saavedra Fajardo made a huge intellectual effort to convince his audience of the reason and the necessity of sustaining and upholding the military and political power of the House of Austria in the Empire. As a result of his outstanding erudition, comparable to the top writers of the Spanish Golden Age literature, and of his first-hand, in-the-field experiences with imperial matters, he managed to develop a genuine, valid and robust reasoning and a theoretical structure in order to defend and justify the Spanish and Catholic cause during the Thirty Years' War.

On top of that, the *Antineutralidad* has an end-to-end view on all of human and divine history and it has an eschatological feature: once Germany and the Empire joined forces and expelled Sweden and France from the Empire, the time should immediately come to reconquer all of Europe lost to the Ottoman Empire, retake the former Eastern Roman Empire and Jerusalem, before human history ends with the second coming of Jesus Christ<sup>55</sup>.

The Holy Roman Empire played a central role in this end-to-end vision: it was a direct successor of the Roman Empire as per the medieval and early modern concept and practice of the *translatio imperii*, traditionally originated in the second chapter of the book of Daniel in the Old Testament, verses 39 and 40 – the very verses quoted on the last pages of the *Antineutralidad*<sup>56</sup>. The Roman Empire (the ancient and the Holy) would be the last one before the end of the world.

As a consequence, in the world of 1640 the “antineutrality” of the German *natio* towards France and Sweden (and their allies) was the necessary

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<sup>55</sup> AN 67r.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

and sufficient condition of the survival of the global hegemony of the Spanish Monarchy and of the dynasty, the *Casa de Austria*, and of the fulfilment of the divine prophecies of the Scriptures.

While the *Empresas políticas* as a book is the formal masterpiece, the *Antineutralidad* is the informal, practical *obra maestra* of the Spanish writer. It is not a coincidence that he dedicated the first book to a royal family member, and the second book (like his own political career and his diplomatic efforts) to the Spanish Monarchy, and to the actual ruler of the state, the Count-Duke of Olivares<sup>57</sup>.



### Abbreviations

BNE = Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid

AEB SEG = Archives de l'État en Belgique, Secrétairerie de l'État et de Guerre,  
Brussels

AN = Antineutralidad

ÖstA, HHStA = Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna

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<sup>57</sup> "Porque su argumento es la fidelidad que los vasallos deben a su supremo príncipe, y patria." Saavedra Fajardo's letter of dedication to the Count-Duke of Olivares. S.d. BNE, Mss. 432. 2bisr.



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